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		By: Hegel (Simple)		</title>
		<link>https://grundlinien.de/en/10/#comment-3450</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hegel (Simple)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:35:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://grundlinien.de/?p=2060#comment-3450</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[§ 10: Free in potential, not yet free in reality

At the beginning, the content of the will is simply there. The will did not produce it itself. It finds it already there.

What follows from this? The will is free, yes. But at first it is free only in itself. That means: in its potential. We who look at it see its freedom. The will itself does not yet have its freedom before its eyes. It is free and at the same time unfree.

A comparison: A child is already a human being. It has reason, but only as a potential, as a possibility. It still has to work its way toward being a rational, free human being. It must go out of itself, learn and educate itself. In this way, it becomes for itself what it already is in itself.

The same holds for the will. It is free for itself only when it has itself as its object. That is, when it wants freedom itself.

Here we also see what “finite” means. Something is one thing in its potential, but it still shows itself as something else. Potential and appearance fall apart.

We should remember two things. If you know a thing only in its potential, you do not yet know it in its truth. And the mere potential also exists already, in a shape of its own. After all, the child really exists, as a child.

The danger: The understanding likes to stop at the potential. Then it calls freedom a capacity. It thinks: I am free because I could if I wanted to. In this way, freedom remains a mere possibility. In its view, what I really want is just an application to some material. That does not belong to freedom itself, it says. So the understanding holds an empty shell of freedom in its hand, not its truth.

Summary: At first the will is free in its potential, but not yet in reality. It only becomes really free when it wants freedom itself.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>§ 10: Free in potential, not yet free in reality</p>
<p>At the beginning, the content of the will is simply there. The will did not produce it itself. It finds it already there.</p>
<p>What follows from this? The will is free, yes. But at first it is free only in itself. That means: in its potential. We who look at it see its freedom. The will itself does not yet have its freedom before its eyes. It is free and at the same time unfree.</p>
<p>A comparison: A child is already a human being. It has reason, but only as a potential, as a possibility. It still has to work its way toward being a rational, free human being. It must go out of itself, learn and educate itself. In this way, it becomes for itself what it already is in itself.</p>
<p>The same holds for the will. It is free for itself only when it has itself as its object. That is, when it wants freedom itself.</p>
<p>Here we also see what “finite” means. Something is one thing in its potential, but it still shows itself as something else. Potential and appearance fall apart.</p>
<p>We should remember two things. If you know a thing only in its potential, you do not yet know it in its truth. And the mere potential also exists already, in a shape of its own. After all, the child really exists, as a child.</p>
<p>The danger: The understanding likes to stop at the potential. Then it calls freedom a capacity. It thinks: I am free because I could if I wanted to. In this way, freedom remains a mere possibility. In its view, what I really want is just an application to some material. That does not belong to freedom itself, it says. So the understanding holds an empty shell of freedom in its hand, not its truth.</p>
<p>Summary: At first the will is free in its potential, but not yet in reality. It only becomes really free when it wants freedom itself.</p>
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		<title>
		By: Eduard Gans (Additions)		</title>
		<link>https://grundlinien.de/en/10/#comment-1932</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eduard Gans (Additions)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 May 1833 12:50:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://grundlinien.de/?p=2060#comment-1932</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;The will that is will merely according to its concept is free in itself, but at the same time also unfree, for it would be truly free only as a truly determinate content; then it is free for itself, has freedom as its object, is freedom. What is only as yet according to its concept, what merely is in itself, is only immediate, only natural. This is also familiar to us from ordinary conception. The child is &lt;em&gt;in itself&lt;/em&gt; a human being, has reason only &lt;em&gt;in itself&lt;/em&gt; [so far], is as yet only the possibility of reason and freedom, and is free only in this way according to the concept. What is thus only as yet in itself is not yet in its actuality. The human being who is &lt;em&gt;in itself&lt;/em&gt; rational must work himself through, by the production of himself, by going out beyond himself, but equally by forming himself inward, so that he also becomes it &lt;em&gt;for himself&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The will that is will merely according to its concept is free in itself, but at the same time also unfree, for it would be truly free only as a truly determinate content; then it is free for itself, has freedom as its object, is freedom. What is only as yet according to its concept, what merely is in itself, is only immediate, only natural. This is also familiar to us from ordinary conception. The child is <em>in itself</em> a human being, has reason only <em>in itself</em> [so far], is as yet only the possibility of reason and freedom, and is free only in this way according to the concept. What is thus only as yet in itself is not yet in its actuality. The human being who is <em>in itself</em> rational must work himself through, by the production of himself, by going out beyond himself, but equally by forming himself inward, so that he also becomes it <em>for himself</em>.</p>
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		<title>
		By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)		</title>
		<link>https://grundlinien.de/en/10/#comment-3187</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 18 Sep 1830 23:06:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://grundlinien.de/?p=2060#comment-3187</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 469:&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;§ 469.&lt;/strong&gt; Spirit as will knows itself as resolving upon itself within itself and as fulfilling itself out of itself. This fulfilled &lt;em&gt;being-for-self&lt;/em&gt; or &lt;em&gt;individuality&lt;/em&gt; constitutes the side of existence or &lt;em&gt;reality&lt;/em&gt; of the &lt;em&gt;Idea&lt;/em&gt; of spirit; as will spirit enters into actuality, as knowing it stands on the ground of the universality of the concept. - As giving itself its content, the will is &lt;em&gt;with itself, free&lt;/em&gt; in general; this is its determinate concept. - Its finitude consists in the &lt;em&gt;formalism&lt;/em&gt; of this, that its being fulfilled through itself is the &lt;em&gt;abstract&lt;/em&gt; determinacy, its &lt;em&gt;own&lt;/em&gt; determinacy in general, which is not identified with developed &lt;em&gt;reason&lt;/em&gt;. The determination of the will which is &lt;em&gt;in itself&lt;/em&gt; is to bring freedom into existence in the formal will, and the purpose of the latter is accordingly to fulfil itself with its concept, i.e. to make freedom its determinacy, its content and purpose as well as its determinate being. This concept, freedom, is essentially only as thinking; the way of the will to make itself &lt;em&gt;objective&lt;/em&gt; spirit is to raise itself to a thinking will - to give itself the content which it can have only as a will that thinks itself. &lt;em&gt;True&lt;/em&gt; freedom is, as ethical life, this: that the will has as its purposes not a subjective, i.e. selfish, content, but a universal one; such a content, however, is only in thinking and through thinking; it is nothing less than absurd to want to exclude thinking from ethical life, religiosity, uprightness, and so forth.&lt;/p&gt;]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 469:</em></p>
<p><strong>§ 469.</strong> Spirit as will knows itself as resolving upon itself within itself and as fulfilling itself out of itself. This fulfilled <em>being-for-self</em> or <em>individuality</em> constitutes the side of existence or <em>reality</em> of the <em>Idea</em> of spirit; as will spirit enters into actuality, as knowing it stands on the ground of the universality of the concept. &#8211; As giving itself its content, the will is <em>with itself, free</em> in general; this is its determinate concept. &#8211; Its finitude consists in the <em>formalism</em> of this, that its being fulfilled through itself is the <em>abstract</em> determinacy, its <em>own</em> determinacy in general, which is not identified with developed <em>reason</em>. The determination of the will which is <em>in itself</em> is to bring freedom into existence in the formal will, and the purpose of the latter is accordingly to fulfil itself with its concept, i.e. to make freedom its determinacy, its content and purpose as well as its determinate being. This concept, freedom, is essentially only as thinking; the way of the will to make itself <em>objective</em> spirit is to raise itself to a thinking will &#8211; to give itself the content which it can have only as a will that thinks itself. <em>True</em> freedom is, as ethical life, this: that the will has as its purposes not a subjective, i.e. selfish, content, but a universal one; such a content, however, is only in thinking and through thinking; it is nothing less than absurd to want to exclude thinking from ethical life, religiosity, uprightness, and so forth.</p>
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		<title>
		By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)		</title>
		<link>https://grundlinien.de/en/10/#comment-3186</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 May 1827 23:06:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://grundlinien.de/?p=2060#comment-3186</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 469:&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;§ 469.&lt;/strong&gt; Spirit as will knows itself as determining itself, and thus as fulfilling itself out of itself. This fulfilled being-for-self or individuality constitutes the side of existence or reality of the Idea of spirit, whose concept is reason. - The finitude of the will consists in its &lt;em&gt;formalism&lt;/em&gt;, according to which it is, as self-determining, with itself and hence free, but this being fulfilled through itself is at first only the abstract determinacy, its own determinacy in general, and has not yet identified itself with developed reason. The determination of the will which is in itself is to bring freedom into existence in the formal will, and hence the purpose of the latter is to fulfil itself with this its concept, i.e. to make freedom its determinacy, its content and purpose as well as its determinate being. This concept, freedom, is essentially only as thinking; the way of the will to make itself objective spirit is to raise itself to a thinking will - to give itself the content which it can have only as something that thinks itself. True freedom, ethical life, is this: that the will has as its purposes not a subjective, i.e. selfish, content, but a universal one; such a content, however, is only in thinking and through thinking; it is nothing less than absurd to want to exclude thinking from ethical life, religiosity, uprightness and so forth.&lt;/p&gt;]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 469:</em></p>
<p><strong>§ 469.</strong> Spirit as will knows itself as determining itself, and thus as fulfilling itself out of itself. This fulfilled being-for-self or individuality constitutes the side of existence or reality of the Idea of spirit, whose concept is reason. &#8211; The finitude of the will consists in its <em>formalism</em>, according to which it is, as self-determining, with itself and hence free, but this being fulfilled through itself is at first only the abstract determinacy, its own determinacy in general, and has not yet identified itself with developed reason. The determination of the will which is in itself is to bring freedom into existence in the formal will, and hence the purpose of the latter is to fulfil itself with this its concept, i.e. to make freedom its determinacy, its content and purpose as well as its determinate being. This concept, freedom, is essentially only as thinking; the way of the will to make itself objective spirit is to raise itself to a thinking will &#8211; to give itself the content which it can have only as something that thinks itself. True freedom, ethical life, is this: that the will has as its purposes not a subjective, i.e. selfish, content, but a universal one; such a content, however, is only in thinking and through thinking; it is nothing less than absurd to want to exclude thinking from ethical life, religiosity, uprightness and so forth.</p>
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		<title>
		By: Hegel (Notes)		</title>
		<link>https://grundlinien.de/en/10/#comment-1931</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hegel (Notes)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 05 Nov 1822 08:06:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://grundlinien.de/?p=2060#comment-1931</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;[zu § 10] &lt;em&gt;Immediate&lt;/em&gt; will – will &lt;em&gt;in itself&lt;/em&gt; – is immediate only in its concept. This [is] a highly important speculative remark – the true only through the movement – of its being-other – and its having-returned-into-itself – and this &lt;em&gt;immediate&lt;/em&gt; will is itself the &lt;em&gt;being-other&lt;/em&gt; of the will.&lt;br /&gt;
[It] is the subjectivity of the concept – (this reflection makes it into the immediate) is &lt;em&gt;first will&lt;/em&gt;, hence &lt;em&gt;immediate&lt;/em&gt; – not yet advanced further. But it lies precisely within the concept itself that the will should be – the reflecting, the going-beyond-itself, and the sublating of this its being-other. – has [it] as object, i.e. as content and purpose –&lt;br /&gt;
As before: the unlimited is the abstract, precisely it itself is limited, the one of the limit[ation] – for to limit[ing] belong two, –&lt;br /&gt;
Immediate&lt;br /&gt;
α) as opposed simply to the &lt;em&gt;mediated&lt;/em&gt; in general, i.e. to the relative – the relational – contract – property –&lt;br /&gt;
β) [as opposed] to the ideal – the mediating posited as sublated –&lt;br /&gt;
§ 10. What is &lt;em&gt;true&lt;/em&gt; will; free will, that has &lt;em&gt;itself&lt;/em&gt; as its object – its freedom – wills only it – it as its existence – e.g. precisely in &lt;em&gt;right&lt;/em&gt; –&lt;/p&gt;]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[zu § 10] <em>Immediate</em> will – will <em>in itself</em> – is immediate only in its concept. This [is] a highly important speculative remark – the true only through the movement – of its being-other – and its having-returned-into-itself – and this <em>immediate</em> will is itself the <em>being-other</em> of the will.<br />
[It] is the subjectivity of the concept – (this reflection makes it into the immediate) is <em>first will</em>, hence <em>immediate</em> – not yet advanced further. But it lies precisely within the concept itself that the will should be – the reflecting, the going-beyond-itself, and the sublating of this its being-other. – has [it] as object, i.e. as content and purpose –<br />
As before: the unlimited is the abstract, precisely it itself is limited, the one of the limit[ation] – for to limit[ing] belong two, –<br />
Immediate<br />
α) as opposed simply to the <em>mediated</em> in general, i.e. to the relative – the relational – contract – property –<br />
β) [as opposed] to the ideal – the mediating posited as sublated –<br />
§ 10. What is <em>true</em> will; free will, that has <em>itself</em> as its object – its freedom – wills only it – it as its existence – e.g. precisely in <em>right</em> –</p>
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		<title>
		By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)		</title>
		<link>https://grundlinien.de/en/10/#comment-3185</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Apr 1817 23:06:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://grundlinien.de/?p=2060#comment-3185</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 388:&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;§ 388.&lt;/strong&gt; Spirit as intelligence is at first, however, abstractly for itself; as free will it is &lt;em&gt;fulfilled&lt;/em&gt;, because it is as concept, as self-determining. This fulfilled &lt;em&gt;being-for-self&lt;/em&gt; or individuality constitutes the side of existence or reality of the Idea of spirit, whose concept is reason.&lt;/p&gt;]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 388:</em></p>
<p><strong>§ 388.</strong> Spirit as intelligence is at first, however, abstractly for itself; as free will it is <em>fulfilled</em>, because it is as concept, as self-determining. This fulfilled <em>being-for-self</em> or individuality constitutes the side of existence or reality of the Idea of spirit, whose concept is reason.</p>
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