Comments on: 100

By: Hegel (Simple)

Hegel (Simple) — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:51:47 +0000

§ 100: Punishment is the wrongdoer’s right

Punishment is just. We have seen that. But it is even more. It is the wrongdoer’s own right.

How can that be?

The wrongdoer is a rational human being. What he does has a universal side. A thief says through his deed: “You may take what is not yours.” So he sets up a law. And he himself has recognized this law. So we may apply it to him.

There is honor in this:

Whoever grounds punishment in this way honors the wrongdoer. He takes him seriously as a human being who knows what he is doing. It is different if you see him only as a dangerous animal that you must make harmless. Or only as someone you want to deter or reform.

And the death penalty?

Beccaria, an Italian legal scholar, denied the state the right to capital punishment. His reason: In the social contract, no one agreed to let others kill him. But the state is not a contract at all; we know that already. Nor does it exist only to protect the life and property of individuals. It is the higher thing. It can even demand that individuals sacrifice their lives.

And as for consent: The wrongdoer has already given it. Through his deed.

Still, Beccaria’s efforts had a good effect. People began to ask which crimes deserve death and which do not. Since then, the death penalty has become rarer, as befits this harshest of punishments.

Summary: Through his deed, the wrongdoer sets up a law that strikes himself. That is why punishment is his own right. In this way, it honors him as a rational human being.

By: Eduard Gans (Additions)

Eduard Gans (Additions) — Wed, 29 May 1833 13:24:24 +0000

What Beccaria demands, namely that the human being must give his consent to punishment, is quite correct, but the criminal already gives it through his deed. It is equally the nature of the crime as [it is] the criminal's own will that the violation proceeding from him be annulled. Nevertheless, this effort of Beccaria's to have the death penalty abolished has produced beneficial effects. Even though neither Joseph II nor the French have ever been able to carry through its complete abolition, [people] have nevertheless begun to discern what crimes deserve death and what do not. The death penalty has thereby become rarer, as this highest extremity of punishment also deserves.

By: Hegel (Notes)

Hegel (Notes) — Fri, 13 Dec 1822 08:10:32 +0000

[zu] § 100. Here too the subjective will is present; and this is to be taken into account.
Punishment, domain of freedom – With his own will
Not only the concept of the matter, but posited by himself;
– his subjective will.
His deed is
α) violation of the will
β) he is a rational universal – has established the law.

[zu § 100 Anm.] Beccaria: I have deposited a part of my natural freedom – for the preservation of my freedom and the freedom of all – over which the others, the state, are to dispose, but not life –
subjective freedom – without regard to content – today a principle as such – theology too – not truth – whether
His consent is indeed present – namely in his deed.
Consent – as this subject –
To express consent as conviction – morally still different from deed as that of a thinking being – consented to as regards the matter – posited –
honor, that is, as the will that he had, still has – treated according to its actuality – regard for improvement is a change of the will –
[below this, in pencil:] This deed – crime α) is null in itself, β) crime has posited as null