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		By: Hegel (Simple)		</title>
		<link>https://grundlinien.de/en/104/#comment-3544</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hegel (Simple)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:51:53 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[§ 104: From right to morality

We stand at a great threshold. The first part of the book ends here. The second begins.

What has happened along the way?

In crime, the will split in two. On one side stands right, which holds for all. On the other side stands the individual, who opposes it. Punishment has overcome this opposition. Right has proved itself. Now it is actual.

But in this process, the will itself has changed too.

A look back:

In property, my will lived in an external thing. In contract, my will joined with the will of another. In wrong, it became clear: The individual will can depart from right. It is a matter of chance.

And now?

Now the will turns inward. Its object is no longer only things. Its object is itself. It asks: What do I really want? And why? We call this inner side subjectivity.

With this, morality begins. What counts now is not only what someone does. What he wanted in doing it counts too.

Summary: Through crime and punishment, right has become actual. At the same time, the will has turned inward. This is the transition from right to morality.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>§ 104: From right to morality</p>
<p>We stand at a great threshold. The first part of the book ends here. The second begins.</p>
<p>What has happened along the way?</p>
<p>In crime, the will split in two. On one side stands right, which holds for all. On the other side stands the individual, who opposes it. Punishment has overcome this opposition. Right has proved itself. Now it is actual.</p>
<p>But in this process, the will itself has changed too.</p>
<p>A look back:</p>
<p>In property, my will lived in an external thing. In contract, my will joined with the will of another. In wrong, it became clear: The individual will can depart from right. It is a matter of chance.</p>
<p>And now?</p>
<p>Now the will turns inward. Its object is no longer only things. Its object is itself. It asks: What do I really want? And why? We call this inner side subjectivity.</p>
<p>With this, morality begins. What counts now is not only what someone does. What he wanted in doing it counts too.</p>
<p>Summary: Through crime and punishment, right has become actual. At the same time, the will has turned inward. This is the transition from right to morality.</p>
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		<title>
		By: Eduard Gans (Additions)		</title>
		<link>https://grundlinien.de/en/104/#comment-2068</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eduard Gans (Additions)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 May 1833 13:25:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://grundlinien.de/?p=900102#comment-2068</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;To truth it belongs that the concept should be, and that this existence should correspond to it. In right, the will has its existence in something external; but what is further required is that the will should have this same existence within itself, in something internal: it must be, for itself, subjectivity, and must have itself over against itself. This relation to itself is the &lt;em&gt;affirmative&lt;/em&gt;, but this it can attain only through the sublation of its immediacy. The immediacy that is sublated in crime thus leads, through punishment—that is, through the nullity of this nullity—to affirmation – to &lt;em&gt;morality.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>To truth it belongs that the concept should be, and that this existence should correspond to it. In right, the will has its existence in something external; but what is further required is that the will should have this same existence within itself, in something internal: it must be, for itself, subjectivity, and must have itself over against itself. This relation to itself is the <em>affirmative</em>, but this it can attain only through the sublation of its immediacy. The immediacy that is sublated in crime thus leads, through punishment—that is, through the nullity of this nullity—to affirmation – to <em>morality.</em></p>
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		<title>
		By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)		</title>
		<link>https://grundlinien.de/en/104/#comment-2378</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 18 Sep 1830 23:06:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://grundlinien.de/?p=900102#comment-2378</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 502:&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;§ 502.&lt;/strong&gt; A distinction has developed between right and subjective will. The reality of right, which the personal will at first gives itself in an immediate manner, shows itself mediated by the subjective will, the moment that gives existence to right-in-itself, or that also separates itself from it and sets itself in opposition to it. Conversely, the subjective will, in this its abstraction of being the power over right, is for itself a nullity; it has truth and reality essentially only in that it is, within itself, as the existence of the rational will, - &lt;em&gt;morality.&lt;/em&gt; The expression &lt;em&gt;natural right,&lt;/em&gt; which has been customary for the philosophical doctrine of right, contains the ambiguity whether right is meant as something present in an &lt;em&gt;immediate natural manner,&lt;/em&gt; or whether it is meant in the sense that it determines itself through the nature of the thing, i.e. the &lt;em&gt;concept.&lt;/em&gt; That sense is the one formerly usually meant; so that at the same time a &lt;em&gt;state of nature&lt;/em&gt; has been fabricated in which natural right is supposed to hold, whereas the state of society and of the state, on the contrary, requires and brings with it rather a restriction of freedom and a sacrifice of natural rights. In fact, however, right and all its determinations are grounded solely on &lt;em&gt;free personality,&lt;/em&gt; a &lt;em&gt;self-determination,&lt;/em&gt; which is rather the opposite of &lt;em&gt;determination by nature.&lt;/em&gt; The right of nature is therefore the existence of strength and the assertion of force, and a state of nature is a state of violence and of wrong, of which nothing truer can be said than &lt;em&gt;that one must go forth out of it.&lt;/em&gt; Society, on the contrary, is rather the state in which alone right has its actuality; what is to be restricted and sacrificed is precisely the arbitrary will and violence of the state of nature.&lt;/p&gt;]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 502:</em></p>
<p><strong>§ 502.</strong> A distinction has developed between right and subjective will. The reality of right, which the personal will at first gives itself in an immediate manner, shows itself mediated by the subjective will, the moment that gives existence to right-in-itself, or that also separates itself from it and sets itself in opposition to it. Conversely, the subjective will, in this its abstraction of being the power over right, is for itself a nullity; it has truth and reality essentially only in that it is, within itself, as the existence of the rational will, &#8211; <em>morality.</em> The expression <em>natural right,</em> which has been customary for the philosophical doctrine of right, contains the ambiguity whether right is meant as something present in an <em>immediate natural manner,</em> or whether it is meant in the sense that it determines itself through the nature of the thing, i.e. the <em>concept.</em> That sense is the one formerly usually meant; so that at the same time a <em>state of nature</em> has been fabricated in which natural right is supposed to hold, whereas the state of society and of the state, on the contrary, requires and brings with it rather a restriction of freedom and a sacrifice of natural rights. In fact, however, right and all its determinations are grounded solely on <em>free personality,</em> a <em>self-determination,</em> which is rather the opposite of <em>determination by nature.</em> The right of nature is therefore the existence of strength and the assertion of force, and a state of nature is a state of violence and of wrong, of which nothing truer can be said than <em>that one must go forth out of it.</em> Society, on the contrary, is rather the state in which alone right has its actuality; what is to be restricted and sacrificed is precisely the arbitrary will and violence of the state of nature.</p>
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		<title>
		By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)		</title>
		<link>https://grundlinien.de/en/104/#comment-2376</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 May 1827 23:06:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://grundlinien.de/?p=900102#comment-2376</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 502:&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;§ 502.&lt;/strong&gt; The reality of right, which the personal will at first gives itself in an immediate manner, shows itself mediated by the subjective will, the moment that gives existence to right. Conversely, the subjective will, as power over right, is in this its abstraction for itself a nullity, and has truth and reality essentially only in identity with the universal will; – morality.

The expression natural right, which has been customary for the philosophical doctrine of right, contains the ambiguity whether right is meant as something present in an immediate natural manner, or whether it is meant in the sense that it determines itself through the nature of the thing, i.e. the concept. That sense is the one formerly usually meant; so that at the same time a state of nature has been fabricated in which natural right is supposed to hold, whereas the state of society and of the state, on the contrary, requires and brings with it rather a restriction of freedom and a sacrifice of natural rights. In fact, however, right and all its determinations are grounded solely on free personality, a self-determination which is rather the opposite of determination by nature. The right of nature is therefore the existence of strength and the assertion of force, and a state of nature is a state of violence and of wrong, of which nothing truer can be said than that one must go forth out of it. Society, on the contrary, is rather the state in which alone right has its actuality; what is to be restricted and sacrificed is precisely the arbitrary will and violence of the state of nature.&lt;/p&gt;]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 502:</em></p>
<p><strong>§ 502.</strong> The reality of right, which the personal will at first gives itself in an immediate manner, shows itself mediated by the subjective will, the moment that gives existence to right. Conversely, the subjective will, as power over right, is in this its abstraction for itself a nullity, and has truth and reality essentially only in identity with the universal will; – morality.</p>
<p>The expression natural right, which has been customary for the philosophical doctrine of right, contains the ambiguity whether right is meant as something present in an immediate natural manner, or whether it is meant in the sense that it determines itself through the nature of the thing, i.e. the concept. That sense is the one formerly usually meant; so that at the same time a state of nature has been fabricated in which natural right is supposed to hold, whereas the state of society and of the state, on the contrary, requires and brings with it rather a restriction of freedom and a sacrifice of natural rights. In fact, however, right and all its determinations are grounded solely on free personality, a self-determination which is rather the opposite of determination by nature. The right of nature is therefore the existence of strength and the assertion of force, and a state of nature is a state of violence and of wrong, of which nothing truer can be said than that one must go forth out of it. Society, on the contrary, is rather the state in which alone right has its actuality; what is to be restricted and sacrificed is precisely the arbitrary will and violence of the state of nature.</p>
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		<title>
		By: Hegel (Notes)		</title>
		<link>https://grundlinien.de/en/104/#comment-2069</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hegel (Notes)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Dec 1822 08:06:32 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;[zu § 104] α) Will, freedom, – to objectify itself – in an external immediate existence –&lt;br /&gt;
β) Difference, will and wills – Abstr[action], first right, will in itself – and &lt;em&gt;particular&lt;/em&gt; will in the same subject, &lt;em&gt;particular&lt;/em&gt; interest –&lt;br /&gt;
Meaning of existence, &lt;em&gt;as relation&lt;/em&gt; to a will, determined –&lt;br /&gt;
γ) Two independent wills in contract – of equal&lt;br /&gt;
determination –&lt;br /&gt;
αα) different in general,&lt;br /&gt;
ββ) opposed; not merely two different wills in general, but &lt;em&gt;particular&lt;/em&gt; against universal.&lt;br /&gt;
δ) of unequal, opposed determination. Wrong against right –&lt;br /&gt;
ε) abstract particularity, – pure subjectivity.&lt;br /&gt;
α) Will &lt;em&gt;in itself&lt;/em&gt;, immediate concept of the will;&lt;br /&gt;
β) &lt;em&gt;existence&lt;/em&gt; is particular subjective will, i.e. being-for-itself, infinite subjective will.&lt;br /&gt;
Will that is free &lt;em&gt;for itself&lt;/em&gt; – appearance of existence – &lt;em&gt;for itself&lt;/em&gt;, first difference, then infinite reflection into itself – the positing of these configurations, moments, in that the conceptual determinations are as will being-for-itself. –&lt;br /&gt;
Realization of right – is the &lt;em&gt;infinite&lt;/em&gt; movement of the will out of its opposition to itself – i.e. &lt;em&gt;subjectivity&lt;/em&gt; – the infinite &lt;em&gt;particularity&lt;/em&gt; – being-within-itself – against – distinguished from – objectivity.&lt;br /&gt;
Particularity, existence – of the will that is in itself – is the subjective will itself.&lt;br /&gt;
Right holds against the particular, abstractly &lt;em&gt;for-itself&lt;/em&gt; will.&lt;br /&gt;
But its holding is itself being-for-itself.&lt;br /&gt;
negative. &lt;em&gt;Formal&lt;/em&gt;: sublation of subjectivity.&lt;br /&gt;
a) through sublation of the &lt;em&gt;thing&lt;/em&gt;, b) of my &lt;em&gt;particular&lt;/em&gt; will in this thing – c) through sublation of the opposing will.&lt;br /&gt;
Progress of the concept – a) immediacy, b) sublation&lt;br /&gt;
of immediacy, c) return into itself, no longer immediate.&lt;br /&gt;
Will &lt;em&gt;is&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
a) right; existence of freedom in an external individual thing; – elevation of the individual into universality&lt;br /&gt;
b) to free itself from this immediacy – mediation. Relation to another will, the will&#039;s becoming-inward. Thing as the will of another – right for me and for another. Contract is a relation of will to will, but of another – relation of the will to itself, its reality as within itself. Free in this thing, free within myself.&lt;br /&gt;
c) &lt;em&gt;right&lt;/em&gt; as &lt;em&gt;right, for itself&lt;/em&gt; – is as valid; – as necessary existence; what can stand opposed to right is only wrong – right is &lt;em&gt;valid&lt;/em&gt;, is &lt;em&gt;confirmed&lt;/em&gt; – this the confirmation of right – as a determination of it, but not merely a determination – but as actuality – for itself again &lt;em&gt;will within itself&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
right&lt;em&gt; for itself – infinitely returned into itself as &lt;/em&gt;such&lt;em&gt;, &lt;/em&gt;infinity within itself&lt;em&gt;.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Returned not merely as conceptual determination, but as existence, as &lt;em&gt;subjectivity&lt;/em&gt;, will within &lt;em&gt;itself&lt;/em&gt; – will as for itself&lt;br /&gt;
α) in contract – its interest –&lt;br /&gt;
β) anger, against wrong – singular being-for-itself of feeling. But in itself, in justice, will no longer as a singular [will] for itself – &lt;em&gt;right for itself&lt;/em&gt; – at first &lt;em&gt;abstr[action]&lt;/em&gt;, being-for-itself, &lt;em&gt;moral&lt;/em&gt; will, will within itself, reason.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[zu § 104 Anm.] First&lt;br /&gt;
α) immediately &lt;em&gt;singular&lt;/em&gt; [will] (desire)&lt;br /&gt;
β) particular – i.e. common&lt;br /&gt;
γ) will in itself.&lt;br /&gt;
Right as right &lt;em&gt;holds&lt;/em&gt; – relation of right to itself – only through mediation – negation of the contingent, single will. –&lt;br /&gt;
Right in itself – in relation to subjective will (not pedagogically, discipline, education of states) but to the &lt;em&gt;rightful&lt;/em&gt; will, will in the sphere of &lt;em&gt;right&lt;/em&gt; – (hence revenge, punishment not against children, the uneducated – only coercion as such, force turning itself against externality).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;em&gt;Will for itself&lt;/em&gt; – within it; – &lt;em&gt;formal&lt;/em&gt; universality – with itself, &lt;em&gt;as&lt;/em&gt; with itself –&lt;br /&gt;
Three forms of the progression of the determination: a) of the subject (person), b) of the thing, c) of the conceptual determination of [right].&lt;br /&gt;
a) of the &lt;em&gt;person&lt;/em&gt; (of the will) in its object, itself&lt;br /&gt;
objective&lt;br /&gt;
α) existence as singular [will] – wills itself as this one – existence of the will&lt;br /&gt;
β) &lt;em&gt;singular&lt;/em&gt; existence as &lt;em&gt;at the same time&lt;/em&gt; the will of another. Existence of &lt;em&gt;common&lt;/em&gt; will in value&lt;br /&gt;
γ) &lt;em&gt;right&lt;/em&gt;, existence of the universal will &lt;em&gt;in itself&lt;/em&gt;, which, [as will] &lt;em&gt;in itself&lt;/em&gt;, i.e. [as] true will, is &lt;em&gt;Idea&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
Will is as such for itself – but how – a) as desire, singular β) …&lt;br /&gt;
b) of the &lt;em&gt;thing&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
α) &lt;em&gt;this&lt;/em&gt; individual thing&lt;br /&gt;
β) &lt;em&gt;common&lt;/em&gt; thing – value, – and property of everyone, and as separated, between owners. Existence of freedom; &lt;em&gt;the individual thing&lt;/em&gt; vanishes. What does the will that is in itself will? right, i.e. the existence of freedom as such&lt;br /&gt;
γ) &lt;em&gt;the thing&lt;/em&gt; itself, &lt;em&gt;substance&lt;/em&gt;, right; –&lt;br /&gt;
c) of the conceptual determination of right&lt;br /&gt;
α) right in general, immediately, for us, only in itself&lt;br /&gt;
β) right &lt;em&gt;posited&lt;/em&gt;, particular positedness as &lt;em&gt;common&lt;/em&gt; will – binding, &lt;em&gt;as&lt;/em&gt; in itself, yet contingent,&lt;br /&gt;
γ) right – posited.&lt;br /&gt;
Interest, &lt;em&gt;objectivity&lt;/em&gt; of right – positedness –&lt;br /&gt;
α) &lt;em&gt;immediately&lt;/em&gt; for us, β) &lt;em&gt;posited&lt;/em&gt;, – merely &lt;em&gt;particular&lt;/em&gt; – &lt;em&gt;here&lt;/em&gt; as subjective arbitrariness, γ) posited, – as it is in itself – &lt;em&gt;as&lt;/em&gt; right, – right &lt;em&gt;for itself&lt;/em&gt; –&lt;br /&gt;
This determination for us or in itself – right &lt;em&gt;for itself&lt;/em&gt; – is right as right – [the] &lt;em&gt;subjective&lt;/em&gt; [side] of right.&lt;br /&gt;
Subject is will – as such within itself – thus right as &lt;em&gt;within the will&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
That right as right is essentially within the will – thus within &lt;em&gt;its purpose&lt;/em&gt; – its insight, intention –&lt;br /&gt;
Subjective will &lt;em&gt;as the existence&lt;/em&gt; of the will.&lt;/p&gt;]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[zu § 104] α) Will, freedom, – to objectify itself – in an external immediate existence –<br />
β) Difference, will and wills – Abstr[action], first right, will in itself – and <em>particular</em> will in the same subject, <em>particular</em> interest –<br />
Meaning of existence, <em>as relation</em> to a will, determined –<br />
γ) Two independent wills in contract – of equal<br />
determination –<br />
αα) different in general,<br />
ββ) opposed; not merely two different wills in general, but <em>particular</em> against universal.<br />
δ) of unequal, opposed determination. Wrong against right –<br />
ε) abstract particularity, – pure subjectivity.<br />
α) Will <em>in itself</em>, immediate concept of the will;<br />
β) <em>existence</em> is particular subjective will, i.e. being-for-itself, infinite subjective will.<br />
Will that is free <em>for itself</em> – appearance of existence – <em>for itself</em>, first difference, then infinite reflection into itself – the positing of these configurations, moments, in that the conceptual determinations are as will being-for-itself. –<br />
Realization of right – is the <em>infinite</em> movement of the will out of its opposition to itself – i.e. <em>subjectivity</em> – the infinite <em>particularity</em> – being-within-itself – against – distinguished from – objectivity.<br />
Particularity, existence – of the will that is in itself – is the subjective will itself.<br />
Right holds against the particular, abstractly <em>for-itself</em> will.<br />
But its holding is itself being-for-itself.<br />
negative. <em>Formal</em>: sublation of subjectivity.<br />
a) through sublation of the <em>thing</em>, b) of my <em>particular</em> will in this thing – c) through sublation of the opposing will.<br />
Progress of the concept – a) immediacy, b) sublation<br />
of immediacy, c) return into itself, no longer immediate.<br />
Will <em>is</em><br />
a) right; existence of freedom in an external individual thing; – elevation of the individual into universality<br />
b) to free itself from this immediacy – mediation. Relation to another will, the will&#8217;s becoming-inward. Thing as the will of another – right for me and for another. Contract is a relation of will to will, but of another – relation of the will to itself, its reality as within itself. Free in this thing, free within myself.<br />
c) <em>right</em> as <em>right, for itself</em> – is as valid; – as necessary existence; what can stand opposed to right is only wrong – right is <em>valid</em>, is <em>confirmed</em> – this the confirmation of right – as a determination of it, but not merely a determination – but as actuality – for itself again <em>will within itself</em><br />
right<em> for itself – infinitely returned into itself as </em>such<em>, </em>infinity within itself<em>.</em><br />
Returned not merely as conceptual determination, but as existence, as <em>subjectivity</em>, will within <em>itself</em> – will as for itself<br />
α) in contract – its interest –<br />
β) anger, against wrong – singular being-for-itself of feeling. But in itself, in justice, will no longer as a singular [will] for itself – <em>right for itself</em> – at first <em>abstr[action]</em>, being-for-itself, <em>moral</em> will, will within itself, reason.</p>
<p>[zu § 104 Anm.] First<br />
α) immediately <em>singular</em> [will] (desire)<br />
β) particular – i.e. common<br />
γ) will in itself.<br />
Right as right <em>holds</em> – relation of right to itself – only through mediation – negation of the contingent, single will. –<br />
Right in itself – in relation to subjective will (not pedagogically, discipline, education of states) but to the <em>rightful</em> will, will in the sphere of <em>right</em> – (hence revenge, punishment not against children, the uneducated – only coercion as such, force turning itself against externality).<br />
<em>Will for itself</em> – within it; – <em>formal</em> universality – with itself, <em>as</em> with itself –<br />
Three forms of the progression of the determination: a) of the subject (person), b) of the thing, c) of the conceptual determination of [right].<br />
a) of the <em>person</em> (of the will) in its object, itself<br />
objective<br />
α) existence as singular [will] – wills itself as this one – existence of the will<br />
β) <em>singular</em> existence as <em>at the same time</em> the will of another. Existence of <em>common</em> will in value<br />
γ) <em>right</em>, existence of the universal will <em>in itself</em>, which, [as will] <em>in itself</em>, i.e. [as] true will, is <em>Idea</em>.<br />
Will is as such for itself – but how – a) as desire, singular β) …<br />
b) of the <em>thing</em><br />
α) <em>this</em> individual thing<br />
β) <em>common</em> thing – value, – and property of everyone, and as separated, between owners. Existence of freedom; <em>the individual thing</em> vanishes. What does the will that is in itself will? right, i.e. the existence of freedom as such<br />
γ) <em>the thing</em> itself, <em>substance</em>, right; –<br />
c) of the conceptual determination of right<br />
α) right in general, immediately, for us, only in itself<br />
β) right <em>posited</em>, particular positedness as <em>common</em> will – binding, <em>as</em> in itself, yet contingent,<br />
γ) right – posited.<br />
Interest, <em>objectivity</em> of right – positedness –<br />
α) <em>immediately</em> for us, β) <em>posited</em>, – merely <em>particular</em> – <em>here</em> as subjective arbitrariness, γ) posited, – as it is in itself – <em>as</em> right, – right <em>for itself</em> –<br />
This determination for us or in itself – right <em>for itself</em> – is right as right – [the] <em>subjective</em> [side] of right.<br />
Subject is will – as such within itself – thus right as <em>within the will</em><br />
That right as right is essentially within the will – thus within <em>its purpose</em> – its insight, intention –<br />
Subjective will <em>as the existence</em> of the will.</p>
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		By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)		</title>
		<link>https://grundlinien.de/en/104/#comment-2374</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Apr 1817 23:06:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://grundlinien.de/?p=900102#comment-2374</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 415:&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;§ 415.&lt;/strong&gt; The reality of right, which the personal will gives itself in an immediate manner, has on the whole developed as a contingency; it shows itself mediated by subjective arbitrariness, and the latter as an essential moment, which is thus on the one hand the power over right, but on the other hand, in its abstraction, [is] for itself a nullity, and has truth and reality essentially only in identity with the universal will; &lt;em&gt;morality.&lt;/em&gt;

The expression &lt;em&gt;natural right&lt;/em&gt;, which has hitherto been customary for the philosophical doctrine of right, contains the ambiguity whether right is meant as something implanted, as it were, by immediate nature, or whether it is meant in the sense that it determines itself through the nature of the thing, i.e. the concept. That sense, however, is the one formerly usually meant; so that at the same time a &lt;em&gt;state of nature&lt;/em&gt; has been fabricated in which natural right is supposed to hold, whereas the state of society and of the state requires, rather, a restriction of freedom and a sacrifice of natural rights. In fact, however, right and all its determinations are grounded solely on free personality, a self-determination which is rather the opposite of determination by nature. A state of nature is therefore a state of violence and of wrong, of which nothing truer can be said than that one must go forth out of it. Society, by contrast, is the state in which alone right has its actuality; what is to be restricted and sacrificed is precisely the arbitrary will and violence of the state of nature. – The &lt;em&gt;formalism of right&lt;/em&gt; consists in the fact that it is the abstract, and thereby immediate, determination of free personality; the subsumption of particular existence under it is therefore something contingent, and which objects are my property is a matter of arbitrary will and chance. – The transition of right into morality is therefore effected by the necessity of subjectivity, but at the same time by the sublation of its contingency, whereby it becomes determined as universal in and for itself.&lt;/p&gt;]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 415:</em></p>
<p><strong>§ 415.</strong> The reality of right, which the personal will gives itself in an immediate manner, has on the whole developed as a contingency; it shows itself mediated by subjective arbitrariness, and the latter as an essential moment, which is thus on the one hand the power over right, but on the other hand, in its abstraction, [is] for itself a nullity, and has truth and reality essentially only in identity with the universal will; <em>morality.</em></p>
<p>The expression <em>natural right</em>, which has hitherto been customary for the philosophical doctrine of right, contains the ambiguity whether right is meant as something implanted, as it were, by immediate nature, or whether it is meant in the sense that it determines itself through the nature of the thing, i.e. the concept. That sense, however, is the one formerly usually meant; so that at the same time a <em>state of nature</em> has been fabricated in which natural right is supposed to hold, whereas the state of society and of the state requires, rather, a restriction of freedom and a sacrifice of natural rights. In fact, however, right and all its determinations are grounded solely on free personality, a self-determination which is rather the opposite of determination by nature. A state of nature is therefore a state of violence and of wrong, of which nothing truer can be said than that one must go forth out of it. Society, by contrast, is the state in which alone right has its actuality; what is to be restricted and sacrificed is precisely the arbitrary will and violence of the state of nature. – The <em>formalism of right</em> consists in the fact that it is the abstract, and thereby immediate, determination of free personality; the subsumption of particular existence under it is therefore something contingent, and which objects are my property is a matter of arbitrary will and chance. – The transition of right into morality is therefore effected by the necessity of subjectivity, but at the same time by the sublation of its contingency, whereby it becomes determined as universal in and for itself.</p>
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