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	Comments on: 108	</title>
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		By: Hegel (Simple)		</title>
		<link>https://grundlinien.de/en/108/#comment-3548</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hegel (Simple)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:51:58 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[§ 108: The standpoint of the ought

With morality, something new begins. The will is now with itself. But it is not yet one with what is right in itself. It stands over against it.

What does that mean?

The moral will keeps saying: I ought to. I ought to be just. I ought to help. For it, what is right is a demand, not yet a fact. A gap yawns between what it is and what it ought to be.

You can picture this as a kind of restlessness. The moral will never arrives. It always works on itself. Only at a later stage, in ethical life, does it come to rest.

Moral does not mean good here:

When we speak of morality here, this does not yet mean “good” as opposed to “evil”. It means a standpoint. On it, a person asks about his inner life, his reasons and intentions. On this standpoint, he can act well. But he can also act in an evil way. Both require that he has an inner life.

Summary: The moral will still stands over against what is right. That is why it is the standpoint of the ought. Only here do good and evil become possible.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>§ 108: The standpoint of the ought</p>
<p>With morality, something new begins. The will is now with itself. But it is not yet one with what is right in itself. It stands over against it.</p>
<p>What does that mean?</p>
<p>The moral will keeps saying: I ought to. I ought to be just. I ought to help. For it, what is right is a demand, not yet a fact. A gap yawns between what it is and what it ought to be.</p>
<p>You can picture this as a kind of restlessness. The moral will never arrives. It always works on itself. Only at a later stage, in ethical life, does it come to rest.</p>
<p>Moral does not mean good here:</p>
<p>When we speak of morality here, this does not yet mean “good” as opposed to “evil”. It means a standpoint. On it, a person asks about his inner life, his reasons and intentions. On this standpoint, he can act well. But he can also act in an evil way. Both require that he has an inner life.</p>
<p>Summary: The moral will still stands over against what is right. That is why it is the standpoint of the ought. Only here do good and evil become possible.</p>
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		<title>
		By: Eduard Gans (Additions)		</title>
		<link>https://grundlinien.de/en/108/#comment-2074</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eduard Gans (Additions)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 May 1833 13:26:41 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;Self-determining is to be thought of, in morality, as the pure unrest and activity which can as yet arrive at no &lt;em&gt;what is&lt;/em&gt;. It is only in ethical life that the will is identical with the concept of the will and has only this as its content. In morality the will still stands in relation to what is in itself; it is thus the standpoint of difference, and the process of this standpoint is the identification of the subjective will with its concept. The &lt;em&gt;ought&lt;/em&gt;, which therefore still belongs to morality, is first attained in ethical life; and this other, to which the subjective will stands in a relation, is a twofold: on the one hand the substantial element of the concept, and on the other the externally existing. Even if the &lt;em&gt;good&lt;/em&gt; were also posited in the subjective will, it would not yet thereby be carried out.&lt;/p&gt;]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Self-determining is to be thought of, in morality, as the pure unrest and activity which can as yet arrive at no <em>what is</em>. It is only in ethical life that the will is identical with the concept of the will and has only this as its content. In morality the will still stands in relation to what is in itself; it is thus the standpoint of difference, and the process of this standpoint is the identification of the subjective will with its concept. The <em>ought</em>, which therefore still belongs to morality, is first attained in ethical life; and this other, to which the subjective will stands in a relation, is a twofold: on the one hand the substantial element of the concept, and on the other the externally existing. Even if the <em>good</em> were also posited in the subjective will, it would not yet thereby be carried out.</p>
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