Comments on: 114

By: Hegel (Simple)

Hegel (Simple) — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:52:07 +0000

§ 114: The path through morality

The moral will has three rights. They give the second part its order.

First: purpose. What I have done should be mine only as far as I set out to do it.

Second: intention and welfare. Why did I do it? What meaning did it have for me? And what good does it bring me and others?

Third: the good. Here it is no longer only about my intention. It is about what is good in itself, for all. Conscience also belongs here, and its reverse side, evil.

How does this hang together?

You can see it as three breaks. First, plan and result gape apart. Then my intention and the universal meaning of the deed gape apart. In the end, my intention itself should become the good. The good is the intention that has become wholly universal.

Summary: Morality has three stages: purpose, intention with welfare, and the good with conscience. On this path, one’s own intention becomes the good.

By: Eduard Gans (Additions)

Eduard Gans (Additions) — Wed, 29 May 1833 13:27:56 +0000

For any action to be moral, it must, first of all, accord with my purpose, for the right of the moral will is that only what inwardly existed as purpose be recognized in its existence. The purpose concerns only the formal aspect, namely that the external will also be, in me, something inward. In the second moment, by contrast, what is asked after is the intention of the action, that is, the relative worth of the action in relation to me; the third moment, finally, is not merely the relative but the universal worth of the action, the good. The first division of the action is that between what was purposed and what exists and has been brought forth; the second division is between what exists externally as universal will and the inward particular determination that I give it; the third, finally, is that the intention should also be the universal content. The good is intention raised to the concept of the will.

By: Hegel (Notes)

Hegel (Notes) — Fri, 20 Dec 1822 08:10:32 +0000

The whole moves within oppositions: α) what is, and β) what it is for me and in me.
a) Purpose – what is immediate, and how this existence is for me.
b) Intention, itself reflected –
α) the value of the thing – the universal – reflection, a predicate distinct from the individual[:] useful, purpose –
β) Abstract reflection into myself, formal undetermined subjectivity, reflection into myself interest – as against existence – the thing –
γ) Content – my particularity – distinct – as against right – interest fulfilled – is the formal unity –
c) Absolute reflection of the content and of singularity – of what is mine, into myself – of particularity –
α) Determination of the good as duty – for me –
β) of its content
γ) Formalism α) evil, β) conscience, γ) transition
b) Opposition of the inner and the outer (intention – and what the deed is)
The outward – wider context – universal – other than the individual
Intention is something universal,
α) distinct as such from the individual as such, the action
β) interest, that I – formal universality –
γ) content, determinate particularity, welfare, opposition to the universal – right.
c) The difference of the actions from the purpose – their reflection into themselves –
The relation of the action to a universal – relative universality is what is reflected into itself in the action; hence particularity – and its subordination; what is intention is in itself purposed; the content of the intention and of the purpose, i.e., what is peculiar to it, can differ – be subordinated – the one more universal than the other – posited only as essential. Determinate content, but here only drives, inclinations –
Value of the action for me –
α) Intention – can be different [from] the absolute universality – as form – and from the immediate action –
β) This particularity as particular content –
[γ)] Purpose [:]
a) Knowledge of the immediate circumstances – immediate judgment.
b) Knowledge of the reflected thing, not merely of its immediacy, α) of its own qualitative content, β) of subjective, peculiar content – γ) opposition of α) and β), judgment of reflection.
c) Knowledge of the concept (judgment of the concept) α) of the immediate good: it is so, determined by law, β) subjective determination of duty, out of myself; reflection upon the good, γ) opposition of α) and β), namely as of the universal, objective or immediate, and the particular good: αα) conscience in general, collision; ββ) the particularity of the will as opposed to the objective good; γγ) the abstract good, and the subject as what determines – likewise evil αα) the particular as against the objective as abstract good …