Comments on: 124

By: Hegel (Simple)

Hegel (Simple) — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:53:45 +0000

§ 124: Great deeds and one’s own satisfaction

Someone who achieves something great also gets something out of it himself. He finds satisfaction. Perhaps he gains honor and fame.

Is the deed then worth less?

Some people think so. They say: You may do a good deed only for the sake of the cause. As soon as your own joy comes into it, it spoils the deed. That is an empty assertion. The cause and your own satisfaction do not exclude each other.

The reverse is worse. Others say: The great man only wanted fame. The work was only a means to fame for him. In this way people make every great deed small. They see only the vanity and overlook the work.

A well-known saying goes: There are no heroes for the valet. But that is not because there are no heroes. It is because the valet is only a valet.

Who is a person?

A person is the series of his actions. If the actions are worthless, then his will is worthless too. If the actions have substance, then so does his inner will. Fine intentions alone are dry leaves that were never green.

The modern age:

The right of the individual to find satisfaction in what he does separates the old world from the new. Christianity brought this right into the world. Love, the romantic and conscience grew out of it. Some people want to do their duty only against their own inclination. They misunderstand this. Schiller mocked the advice “to do with repugnance what duty commands”.

Summary: Your own satisfaction and a great cause do not exclude each other. A person is the series of his actions. The right to your own satisfaction is the principle of the modern age.

By: Eduard Gans (Additions)

Eduard Gans (Additions) — Wed, 29 May 1833 13:30:40 +0000

„In magnis voluisse sat est“ has the correct meaning that one ought to will something great; but one must also be able to carry out what is great: otherwise it is an empty willing. The laurels of mere willing are dry leaves that have never turned green.

By: Hegel (Notes)

Hegel (Notes) — Fri, 10 Jan 1823 08:08:32 +0000

Opposition – α) not necessary – β) briefly noted: not essential, not absolute, – on the contrary. αα) not excellent intentions and bad actions, ββ) not bad intentions and excellent actions, γγ) not excellent intentions and no actions at all – occupying oneself inwardly with intentions – not the actuality of the individual – the intention does not remain inward, but is given along with the action itself; – it is the moral quality of the action, i.e., its universal purpose, its relation to a purpose that, in the spiritual realm, is universal as regards content; α) killing, whether [there were] external circumstances – β) intended, whether [there were] consequences, i.e., the universal quality of the action according to its externality – the connection of the particular case with other circumstances – γ) subjective intention, revenge or justice; – purpose in the world of freedom, the nature of nature as spiritual αα) taken from what is inward – ββ) existence, posited in relation to the will of others, i.e., actuality as such in the world of freedom. The intention is attained, i.e., not only as mine, but also as a universal matter on spiritual ground. – Here a higher, different ground of existence – [this] constitutes the nature of the action as an actual [one]. My action is effective on this ground, and likewise subject to judgment. – I have not kept my intention to myself, but have also posited it objectively –
A distinction made by the understanding, as to which, among the many determinations in an action, is the intention – [as if] this determinacy were the purpose – mediocrity raises itself up, – [saying] I have no such passion. It is as if it were merely a matter of subjectivity, not of the thing itself.
Acting [is what] makes the subjective, of the intention, objective, precisely so that it should not be subjective –
Opining, being able, possibility. – Action is actuality. Here particularity counts, circumstances, all the advantages and disadvantages of birth, of talent, of character – the extent of deeds, of effects – must be regarded without envy. I have not been this one, am not this one. I, for my part, under my [own] circumstances, must actually be what I can be – What man ought, that he can, Fichte – such empty general words. What each ought is different in each case – Moral appraisal of human beings – judgment of oneself and of others, of oneself in comparison with others, and of others in comparison with oneself.
Substantial nature, that is the thing itself – the objective, the rational, the necessary.
Worthless productions. Value here is the character of the action – according to its inner purpose, the spiritual actuality, whose principle [it is].
Intention – at first the interest of the particular will – the spiritual content of the action posited through the will – (revenge) justice, self-interest, universal purpose, etc. – thus the matter on the one hand; on this the nature of the action depends; this in and for itself – soul, body – the spirit of the action – is the will of the subject (imputation) – children do not know whether [something is] right or wrong –
Arbitrary choice can make the action into a means – whether the substantial [element] of the action was this – makes no difference for me – more on this later – The spiritual [element] of the action must have absolute value –