Comments on: 127

By: Hegel (Simple)

Hegel (Simple) — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:53:50 +0000

§ 127: The right of necessity

But there is one case in which welfare comes before right. That is when life itself is in extreme danger.

An example:

A person is close to starving. He steals a loaf of bread. In doing so, he violates the baker’s property. But it would be wrong to treat this like an ordinary theft.

Why?

On one side stands a whole life. If it perishes, the person has no rights at all. On the other side stands only a small piece of property. The baker remains an owner and a person. No one denies his right. The theft violates it at only one point.

So the hungry man has a right of necessity. Not merely as a kindness, but as a real right.

How far does it reach?

Only as far as the need of the moment. The future is open. There is no right of necessity for the future. Only someone in extreme danger right now may act like this.

The saying “There shall be justice, even if the world perishes” is an empty phrase here.

A consequence in law:

Even someone in debt must not lose everything. The law leaves him his tools, his clothes, and what he needs to live and work. This too comes from the right of necessity.

Summary: In extreme danger to life, a person has a real right of necessity against the property of others. It holds only for the need of the moment. A debtor, too, keeps what he needs to live.

By: Eduard Gans (Additions)

Eduard Gans (Additions) — Wed, 29 May 1833 13:32:49 +0000

Life, as the totality of ends, has a right against abstract right. If, for example, it can be preserved by stealing a loaf of bread, then a person's property is indeed thereby infringed, but it would be wrong to regard this act as ordinary theft. Were the person whose life is endangered not permitted to act so as to preserve himself, he would be determined as devoid of rights, and since his life would thereby be denied him, his entire freedom would be negated. Securing life certainly involves a great many particulars, and if we look to the future, we must go into these details. But it is necessary only to live now – the future is not absolute and remains at the mercy of contingency. Hence only the necessity of the immediate present can justify an unlawful act, because in its omission there would in turn lie the commission of a wrong, indeed of the highest wrong, namely the total negation of the existence of freedom; – the beneficium competentiae has its place here, in that, within relations of kinship or other relations of proximity, there is a right to demand that one not be entirely sacrificed to right.

By: Hegel (Notes)

Hegel (Notes) — Mon, 13 Jan 1823 08:08:32 +0000

Life also has a genuine right against formal right, i.e., likewise an absolute moment. It is particularity according to its content in its totality – not, like my well-being, merely a universality of reflection. – Well-being, not something actual on its own account.
Life [is the] infinite mode of reality, is the real side of personality itself, determined in and for itself, not a matter of opinion.
– Well-being [is] an abstract word – well-being does not lie in any one thing – but life [lies] in one circumstance, one moment. –
Fiat justitia, pereat mundus – an empty phrase.
Necessity is a sacred word, when genuine – the whole of a condition – the necessity of a whole – life, family. –
For others, necessity [carries] a higher warrant.
The right of necessity – as existence – namely universal, not limited, – but rather abstract existence as such; existence, through its universal scope, sets itself over against right – formally infinite, but limited in its existence. These are the two universal moments of right itself in collision – the revolt of the necessity of life –