<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	
	>
<channel>
	<title>
	Comments on: 13	</title>
	<atom:link href="https://grundlinien.de/en/13/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://grundlinien.de/en/13/</link>
	<description></description>
	<lastBuildDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:35:13 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=7.1.3</generator>
	<item>
		<title>
		By: Hegel (Simple)		</title>
		<link>https://grundlinien.de/en/13/#comment-3453</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hegel (Simple)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:35:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://grundlinien.de/?p=2072#comment-3453</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[§ 13: If you want something, you must commit

When I make up my mind, I become someone definite. Then I am this one person with this will, different from all others.

But this will is still formal. That means: I have decided, yes. But what I decided still comes from my drives. It is not yet the work of my freedom. The decision is mine, but I find the material already there.

Now a surprising thought. Many people think: In willing, a human being is infinite. After all, I can want all sorts of things. In thinking, by contrast, he is limited, they say. This is exactly the wrong way around.

Why? In thinking, everything stays general. I can think about any tree, about any person, about everything. In willing, this does not work. Willing means: I want this, here and now. Whoever wants something must commit. So finitude begins with willing. Whoever passes from thinking to willing decides to be limited.

How does the will get beyond this? By rising again to thinking. By choosing purposes that are universal and rational in themselves. Then the will no longer belongs just to me. It becomes an objective, infinite will.

Why do some people find it so hard to commit? A person without character never comes to a decision. Others hesitate out of delicate feeling. They know: Whoever decides gives up other things. But they want to keep everything. Such a soul thinks it is beautiful. In truth, it is dead. And for some, it is simply too much effort. Laziness prefers to keep on brooding, for there everything is still possible. But possibility is not yet reality.

Goethe said it: Whoever wants great things must be able to limit himself. Only through a decision does a person step into reality, however hard it may be for him. And whoever is sure of himself does not lose himself when he commits.

Summary: Willing means committing yourself. That is why the will is not more infinite than thinking, but more finite. It only becomes free when it gives itself rational purposes.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>§ 13: If you want something, you must commit</p>
<p>When I make up my mind, I become someone definite. Then I am this one person with this will, different from all others.</p>
<p>But this will is still formal. That means: I have decided, yes. But what I decided still comes from my drives. It is not yet the work of my freedom. The decision is mine, but I find the material already there.</p>
<p>Now a surprising thought. Many people think: In willing, a human being is infinite. After all, I can want all sorts of things. In thinking, by contrast, he is limited, they say. This is exactly the wrong way around.</p>
<p>Why? In thinking, everything stays general. I can think about any tree, about any person, about everything. In willing, this does not work. Willing means: I want this, here and now. Whoever wants something must commit. So finitude begins with willing. Whoever passes from thinking to willing decides to be limited.</p>
<p>How does the will get beyond this? By rising again to thinking. By choosing purposes that are universal and rational in themselves. Then the will no longer belongs just to me. It becomes an objective, infinite will.</p>
<p>Why do some people find it so hard to commit? A person without character never comes to a decision. Others hesitate out of delicate feeling. They know: Whoever decides gives up other things. But they want to keep everything. Such a soul thinks it is beautiful. In truth, it is dead. And for some, it is simply too much effort. Laziness prefers to keep on brooding, for there everything is still possible. But possibility is not yet reality.</p>
<p>Goethe said it: Whoever wants great things must be able to limit himself. Only through a decision does a person step into reality, however hard it may be for him. And whoever is sure of himself does not lose himself when he commits.</p>
<p>Summary: Willing means committing yourself. That is why the will is not more infinite than thinking, but more finite. It only becomes free when it gives itself rational purposes.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: Eduard Gans (Additions)		</title>
		<link>https://grundlinien.de/en/13/#comment-1936</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eduard Gans (Additions)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 May 1833 12:51:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://grundlinien.de/?p=2072#comment-1936</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;A will that decides nothing is no actual will; the person without character never arrives at deciding. The reason for hesitation can also lie in a tenderness of temperament, which knows that in determining itself it engages with finitude, sets itself a limit, and gives up infinity: yet it does not wish to renounce the totality that it intends. Such a temperament is a dead one, even if it wishes to be a beautiful one. Whoever wills something great, says Goethe, must be able to limit himself. Only through deciding does the human being enter into actuality, however hard this may be for him, for inertia does not wish to emerge from its brooding within itself, in which it retains for itself a general possibility. But possibility is not yet actuality. The will that is sure of itself does not, on that account, lose itself in what is determinate.&lt;/p&gt;]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A will that decides nothing is no actual will; the person without character never arrives at deciding. The reason for hesitation can also lie in a tenderness of temperament, which knows that in determining itself it engages with finitude, sets itself a limit, and gives up infinity: yet it does not wish to renounce the totality that it intends. Such a temperament is a dead one, even if it wishes to be a beautiful one. Whoever wills something great, says Goethe, must be able to limit himself. Only through deciding does the human being enter into actuality, however hard this may be for him, for inertia does not wish to emerge from its brooding within itself, in which it retains for itself a general possibility. But possibility is not yet actuality. The will that is sure of itself does not, on that account, lose itself in what is determinate.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
