Comments on: 134

By: Hegel (Simple)

Hegel (Simple) — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:53:59 +0000

§ 134: What is my duty?

I ought to do my duty. Fine. But what exactly should I do?

That is an old question. People already asked Jesus: What must I do to gain eternal life? The universal good alone does not tell me. I need a definite content.

What do we know so far?

Not much. I ought to do right. And I ought to care for welfare: for my own welfare and for the welfare of others. We have no more than that yet.

Summary: Duty alone does not say what to do. So far we only know this: do right and care for welfare. The question of the exact content remains open.

By: Eduard Gans (Additions)

Eduard Gans (Additions) — Wed, 29 May 1833 13:34:31 +0000

This is the very same question that was put to Jesus, when people wanted to know from him what was to be done in order to attain eternal life; for the universal of the good, the abstract, cannot as abstract be accomplished – it must first receive, in addition, the determination of particularity.

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) — Sat, 18 Sep 1830 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 509:

§ 509. β) For the subject, which in the existence of its freedom is essentially a particular, its interest and welfare are, for the sake of this existence of its freedom, to be an essential purpose and therefore a duty. At the same time, however, within the purpose of the good, which is not the particular but only the universal of the will, the particular interest is to be no moment. On account of this independence of both determinations, it is likewise contingent whether they harmonize. But they are to harmonize, because the subject, as singular and universal, is altogether in itself one identity. γ) The subject, however, is not only, in its existence, a particular in general, but it is also a form of its existence to be abstract certainty of itself, abstract reflection of freedom into itself. Thus it is distinguished from the reason of the will, and capable of making the universal itself into a particular, and thereby into a semblance. The good is thus posited as something contingent for the subject, which can accordingly resolve upon something opposed to the good, can be evil.

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) — Thu, 24 May 1827 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 509:

§ 509. β) For the subject, which in the existence of its freedom is essentially a particular, its interest and welfare are to be an essential purpose and therefore a duty. At the same time, however, within the purpose of the good, which is not the particular but only the universal of the will, the particular interest is to be no moment. On account of this independence of the two determinations, it is likewise contingent whether they harmonize. But they are to harmonize, because the subject, as singular and universal, is in itself one identity. γ) The subject, however, is not only, in its existence, a particular in general, but it is also a form of its existence to be abstract certainty of itself, abstract reflection of freedom into itself. Thus it is capable of turning the universal, for itself, into a semblance, into a particular. The good is in this way posited as something contingent for the subject, which can accordingly resolve upon something opposed to the good, can be evil.

By: Hegel (Notes)

Hegel (Notes) — Wed, 15 Jan 1823 08:10:32 +0000

α) Formal relation – of knowledge – the good here as immediate object –
β) Content – particularity – reflection – the good not merely given – posited by the subjective will – no external things, like natural things, – posited by the will, subject, duties of the essential will, – this my will – become eternally posited things, and the question is not who the positor is – only form (indifferent as to who) – but rather the principle: the determination within the essential will. Here particularity within the abstract universality of the good, or of duty for duty's sake – only the predicate of the good – is that whereby it is good, – the universal, the beautiful in Plato – the particular compared with the universal – not yet the particularity that in itself is universal.
γ) Determinations of the good of the essential will itself – i.e. the question of particularity – impossible on the presupposition of abstract essentiality.
These two determinations already mentioned above, but in their dialectic – right, through which welfare [is undone, is] a wrong – welfare – heteronomy – against pure duty – a particular matter – eudaimonia
Right – formal – moral duty concerns disposition – reflection into itself – presupposes a further standpoint than immediate personality –

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) — Wed, 30 Apr 1817 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 423:

§ 423. But they are to be in agreement, since each is absolute both as duty and as good, because it has the universal will as its essence. Likewise, since the action is the activity of the subject and has singularity as its principle, the individual is to know them themselves in their diversity, as well as the manifold sides of the objectivity — of the case, which is a concrete and inherently manifold one — presupposed by the subject as an individual; likewise the manifold duties that relate to these manifold sides. There is, further, to be the true dialectic, which knows their subordination to one another, and is to decide upon a single one of them, or a combination of them, to the exclusion of the others, or of their absolute validity.