By: Eduard Gans (Additions)

Eduard Gans (Additions) — Wed, 29 May 1833 13:39:50 +0000

Just as nature has its laws, just as the animal, the trees, the sun accomplish their law, so custom is what belongs to the spirit of freedom. What right and morality are not yet, custom is, namely spirit. For in right, particularity is not yet that of the concept, but only that of the natural will. Likewise, at the standpoint of morality, self-consciousness is not yet spiritual consciousness. What is at issue there is only the worth of the subject in itself, that is, the subject who determines himself for the good as against evil still has the form of arbitrary choice. Here, by contrast, at the ethical standpoint, the will is the will of spirit and has a substantial content corresponding to it. Pedagogy is the art of making human beings ethical: it regards the human being as natural and shows the way to give him a second birth, to transform his first nature into a second, spiritual one, so that this spiritual element becomes habit in him. In habit the opposition of the natural and the subjective will disappears, the struggle of the subject is broken, and to that extent habit belongs to ethical life, just as it also belongs to philosophical thinking, since the latter requires that spirit be trained against arbitrary notions, and that these be broken and overcome, so that rational thought may have a free path. A human being also dies of habit, that is, when he has become wholly accustomed to life, has grown dull in spirit and body, and the opposition between subjective consciousness and spiritual activity has disappeared; for a human being is active only insofar as he has not attained something and wants to produce and assert himself in relation to it. When this has been accomplished, activity and vitality disappear, and the lack of interest that then sets in is spiritual or physical death.

By: Hegel (Notes)

Hegel (Notes) — Fri, 24 Jan 1823 08:06:32 +0000

Unity α) as substance, β) as custom in individual consciousness or consciousness in general, γ) world – as being, existence, consciousness of this unity
α) as spirit, God – person
β) Presence – is, as [?] abstract in another consciousness – a purpose of subjective consciousness with universality. But the subject is essentially this one, a person – on this side, empirical universality.
γ) World αα) custom – of many individuals – α) relation of subject to subject (not as in abstract right) – the thing only need, and so contract too contingent – β) moral worth – morality – right of subjective self-consciousness, the inwardness of the action – ground, subjective relation to others, but worth, a turning into itself – Here consciousness of unity – identity – consciousness not in me (moral reflection), but as being, that is, outside me – my unity outside me – unity of individuals.
Ethical life, custom, is § 147 as spirit – α) absolute content, β) freedom, testimony of spirit.
Conscience, reflection, morality, is not spirit; so too is dull innocence not spirit. – α) There the subject determining itself within itself – according to the good, abstract reflection on duty – understanding – not as living good – identity, subjectivity appears as arbitrary choice. – β) Here without consciousness of a universal purpose – or (the Chinese) the ethical made into the juridical – an external law.
Custom – ἡϑος – the ancients knew nothing of conscience – Riemer: ἡϑος Ionic ἔϑος – habit, usage – (chiefly dwelling, in Herodotus) the tradition of man – Sitte [custom] – perhaps from Sitz [seat]? – habit, character, mien – in style and declamation ἠϑιϰός, the characteristic – manner of being and living –
ββ) External actuality. – If the laws are bad, so too are the customs

Comments on: 151

By: Eduard Gans (Additions)

By: Hegel (Notes)