Comments on: 2

By: Hegel (Simple)

Hegel (Simple) — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:34:54 +0000

§ 2: How we study right (the method)

The science of right is a part of philosophy. So we must develop the Idea of right (its rational core) out of the concept. We do not invent right. We watch how it develops out of itself.

Where do we start? We do not start from zero. The concept of right comes from another part of philosophy: from the doctrine of spirit. There we showed how thinking turns into the will. And we showed how this will is free. We bring this free will with us. We take it as our starting point here.

What we do NOT do (the wrong method): Many sciences start with definitions. They simply say: “Right is this and that.” In actual law (in the laws of a country), this is dangerous.

An example: In Roman law, nobody could define the human being. For there were slaves. And no slave fits under a definition of the human being.

Now you might think: Then the definition is just no good. It is the other way around. The definition only makes visible that this law contradicts itself. It is not dangerous because it is false. It is dangerous because it shows the wrong.

It is also a mistake to derive right from where words come from.

And it is a mistake to take right from feeling. If you only listen to your heart or your enthusiasm, right becomes arbitrary. Everyone feels something different. That is not science. That is chance.

And it does not stop at thinking. Whoever takes right from feeling also acts that way. So this convenient way is not harmless.

What we do (the philosophical method): We look for necessity. We ask: Why must right be this way? Once we understand the concept, we look around in the real world and in language. Often our everyday picture already fits the concept. But the concept is the boss. It is the standard. The everyday picture must follow the concept, not the other way around.

Summary: We do not look for opinions or feelings. We look for the inner logic of the thing itself.

By: Eduard Gans (Additions)

Eduard Gans (Additions) — Wed, 29 May 1833 12:07:04 +0000

Philosophy forms a circle: it has a first, an immediate element, since it must after all begin somewhere, something not proven, which is no result. But that with which philosophy begins is immediately relative, since it must appear as a result at another endpoint. It is a sequence that does not hang in the air, not something that begins immediately, but rather something that rounds itself into a circle.

By: Hegel (Notes)

Hegel (Notes) — Mon, 04 Nov 1822 08:02:28 +0000

[zu § 2] α) The manner in which we must proceed here – in determining the
concept of right.
α) The ordinary way of deriving determinations from a representation of positive legal determinations.
β) The concept of right in and for itself – necessity; now whatever other determinations may otherwise lie in the representation, let it be what it will – a son – a thing, something saleable by the father, does not flow from the concept of right, – thus the definition does not correspond to this representation; so much the worse for the representation, the positive legal determination, – not for the definition.
β) to develop from the concept – consistently –, according to the concept of the matter.
Definition. In practical law such formal, general matters are not what counts, but rather the detail – the more detail a subject commands, the more learned he is. But the matter itself is another thing; it is all the worse the more it consists of sheer detail and nothing general.
Thank God, in our states one may place the definition of the human being – as one capable of rights – at the head of the law-book, – without running the risk of encountering determinations concerning the rights and duties of the human being that would contradict the concept of the human being.
One can, however, also place definitions that are correct in respect of the concept at the front, if consistency is thereby renounced – that is, [the requirement] that the following determinations should not contradict this concept.
If inconsistent definitions [are given] for nothing and again nothing – that too is merely a piece of erudition.
In ancient Roman law this is not so – the slave, the son, are not subsumed under it.
Hein[eccius, Elementa Juris Civilis, 1728] § 75. Homo cuicunque mens10) , ratione praedita in corpore humano contigit. Persona est homo, cum quodam statu consideratus. § 76. Status est qualitas, cuius ratione homines diverso iure utuntur. § 77. Servus itaque est homo, est etiam persona, quatenus cum statu naturali consideratur, sed ratione status civilis est ἀπϱόσωπος.
§ 89. Ingenuus est, qui statim, ut natus est, liber est – and yet he could be sold by his father – earlier, even killed.
§ 130. filii familias erant quidem ingenui, sed non patres familias (not even if married –) et hinc personae quidem censebantur, sed ratione aliorum civium et ingenuorum, non ratione patris, cuius respectu res mancipi aeque ac servi habebantur. 11)
10) but then ratio is an empty word, and its concept cannot be given.
11) “§ 17. A human being is whoever has been endowed with a mind gifted with reason in a human body. A person is a human being considered under a certain status. § 76. Status is a quality by virtue of which human beings enjoy different rights. § 77. A slave is accordingly a human being, and he is also a person insofar as he is considered in the state of nature, but with regard to civil status he is ‘without a face’.
§ 89. A freeborn person is one who is free from the moment of his birth …
§ 130. Those in a condition of dependency (the children) were indeed freeborn, but not those not in a condition of dependency (the fathers of families) – and hence the former were indeed regarded as persons, but only in relation to other citizens and freeborn persons, not in relation to the father, with respect to whom they were treated as things (property).”