Comments on: 260

By: Hegel (Simple)

Hegel (Simple) — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:58:32 +0000

§ 260: Concrete Freedom

The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. What does that mean?

Two things belong together.

First: The individual and his particular interests develop fully. In the family and in society they have their right.

Second: Individuals pass over of their own accord into the universal. They recognize it, knowingly and willingly, as their own essence. And they work for it as their ultimate end.

Neither without the other:

The universal does not hold good without the particular interest and knowledge of individuals. And individuals do not live only as private persons. At the same time they will the universal.

The strength of the modern state:

The ancient states already knew the universal. But they did not yet set the individual free. The modern state lets the freedom of the individual go to the very extreme. And at the same time it brings this freedom back into unity. That is where its immense strength and depth lie.

Summary: Concrete freedom means: The individual develops fully and at the same time wills the universal. The modern state has the power to join both.

By: Eduard Gans (Additions)

Eduard Gans (Additions) — Wed, 29 May 1833 14:10:00 +0000

The idea of the state in modern times has the peculiarity that the state is the actualization of freedom not according to subjective caprice, but according to the concept of the will, that is, according to its universality and divinity. The imperfect states are those in which the idea of the state is still enveloped and where its particular determinations have not attained free independence. In the states of classical antiquity, universality was indeed already present, but particularity had not yet been unbound and set free and led back to universality, that is, to the universal end of the whole. The essence of the modern state is that the universal be bound up with the full freedom of particularity and with the well-being of individuals, so that the interest of family and civil society must gather itself into the state, but that the universality of the end can advance only along with the particular's own knowledge and will, which must retain its right. The universal must therefore be actively at work, while subjectivity, on the other side, must be developed wholly and vitally. Only through the fact that both moments subsist in their full strength can the state be regarded as articulated and truly organized.

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) — Sat, 18 Sep 1830 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 537:

§ 537. The essence of the state is the universal in and for itself, the rational element of the will, but, as knowing and activating itself, simply subjectivity, and, as actuality, one individual. Its work in general consists, in relation to the extreme of singularity as the multitude of individuals, in the twofold: on the one hand, to preserve them as persons, and thus to make right into necessary actuality, and then to further their welfare, which each at first attends to for himself but which absolutely has a universal side, to protect the family and to guide civil society — on the other hand, however, to lead both of these, together with the entire disposition and activity of the individual, as one who strives to be a center for himself, back into the life of the universal substance, and in this sense, as a free power, to curtail those spheres subordinate to it and to preserve them in substantial immanence.

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) — Thu, 24 May 1827 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 537:

§ 537. The essence of the state is the universal in and for itself, of willing, the rational element of the will, but, as knowing and activating itself, is simply subjectivity, and, as actuality, one individual. Its work in general consists, in relation to the extreme of singularity as the multitude of individuals, in the twofold: on the one hand, to preserve them as persons, and thus to make right into necessary actuality, and then to further their welfare — which each at first attends to for himself, but which absolutely has a universal side — to protect the family and to guide civil society; on the other hand, however, to lead both of these, together with the entire disposition and activity of the individual, who strives to be a center for himself, back into the life of the universal substance, and in this sense, as a free power, to curtail those spheres subordinate to it.

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) — Wed, 30 Apr 1817 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 436:

§ 436. The universal work of substance, in relation to the extreme of singularity, consists in a twofold labor: on the one hand, to preserve them as persons, and thus to make right into necessary actuality and the vengeance for the infinite violation of it into punishment, and then to further their welfare — which each at first looks after for himself, but which absolutely has a universal side; and, on the other hand, to lead both of these, together with the entire disposition and activity of the individual, who strives to be a center for himself, back into the life of the universal substance, and in this sense, as a free power, also to curtail those first spheres.