Comments on: 270

By: Hegel (Simple)

Hegel (Simple) — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:59:34 +0000

§ 270: State and Religion

The state takes care of the universal and, within it, of particular interests. It divides itself into fixed powers. And it knows what it wills. It acts according to conscious purposes, known principles and laws.

Is religion the foundation of the state?

People often say this today. Religion has absolute truth as its content. So it is the foundation of ethical life. But it is only the foundation. The state is the divine will as present spirit, which unfolds itself into a world.

A danger:

Religion lives in feeling and faith. If we try to steer the state only in this form, it starts to totter. Then people say: “Be pious, and for the rest you may do as you please.” If this attitude turns against reality, fanaticism arises. It rejects property, marriage and work as chains. Religion can also lead to the harshest bondage under superstition.

What does the state owe the churches?

Protection and support. It may require everyone to belong to a church, whichever one. A strong state can be generous. It can even tolerate communities that refuse it certain duties, such as military service. To deny the Jews civil rights would be wrong. They are human beings above all.

Where the state decides:

If a church owns property or acts in the outside world, it stands under the laws of the state. The state knows; the church believes. The freedom of science came from the state. A church, by contrast, burned Giordano Bruno and forced Galileo to recant.

The division of the church:

In the despotisms of the Orient, state and church are one. But there is no real state there. Only the division of the church let the state become what it should be. For the state, for the church and for thought, it was the happiest thing.

Summary: Religion is the foundation, but the state is present spirit. It protects the churches, but in worldly matters its law holds. The separation of state and church is good fortune for both.

By: Cross-reference

Cross-reference — Mon, 21 Sep 2026 14:49:03 +0000

Cross-reference: From the reading group’s excursuses (in German), the following belong here: Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: The Relation of Religion to the State Encyclopaedia § 552 with Remark The Positivity of the Christian Religion (1795/96): How a Moral or Religious Society Becomes a State and The Necessity of the Rise of Sects

By: Karl Marx

Karl Marx — Sat, 01 Apr 1843 23:22:17 +0000

(The Remark to this paragraph, on the relation of state and church, later.)

The application of these logical categories deserves quite special attention.

»That the end of the state is the universal interest as such, and within this, as its substance, the preservation of particular interests, is, 1., its abstract actuality or substantiality.«

That the universal interest as such, and as the subsistence of the particular interests, is the end of the state, is — its actuality, its subsistence, abstractly defined. The state is not actual without this end. This is the essential object of its willing, but at the same time only a quite universal determination of this object. This end, as being, is the element of subsistence for the state.

»But it« (abstract actuality, substantiality) »is, 2., its necessity, insofar as it divides itself into the conceptual distinctions of its efficacy, which, through that substantiality, are likewise actual, fixed determinations, powers.«

It (abstract actuality, substantiality) is its (the state’s) necessity, insofar as its actuality divides itself into distinguished efficacies, whose distinction is rationally determined, and which are, in this, fixed determinations. The abstract actuality of the state, its substantiality, is necessity, insofar as the pure end of the state and the pure subsistence of the whole is realized only in the subsistence of the distinguished powers of the state.

Of course: the first determination of its actuality was abstract; the state cannot be regarded as simple actuality, it must be regarded as efficacy, as a distinguished efficacy.

»Its abstract actuality or substantiality […] is its necessity, insofar as it divides itself into the conceptual distinctions of its efficacy, which, through that substantiality, are likewise actual, fixed determinations, powers.«

The relation of substantiality is a relation of necessity; i.e. substance appears divided into self-subsistent, but essentially determinate, actualities or efficacies. These abstractions I shall be able to apply to any actuality. Insofar as I first consider the state under the schema of the »abstract«, I shall afterward have to consider it under the schema of »concrete actuality«, of »necessity«, of fulfilled distinction.

3. »But this very substantiality is the spirit, knowing and willing itself, having passed through the form of education. The state therefore knows what it wills, and knows it in its universality, as something thought; it therefore acts and functions according to known ends, recognized principles, and according to laws which are not only in themselves but also for consciousness; and likewise, insofar as its actions relate to existing circumstances and relations, according to determinate knowledge of them.«

Let us now translate this whole paragraph into plain German — that is:

1. Spirit, knowing and willing itself, is the substance of the state; (educated, self-conscious spirit is the subject and the foundation, is the self-subsistence of the state).

2. The universal interest, and within it the preservation of the particular interests, is the universal end and content of this spirit, the subsisting substance of the state, the state-nature of the spirit knowing and willing itself.

3. The realization of this abstract content is attained by the spirit knowing and willing itself, the self-conscious, educated spirit, only as a distinguished efficacy, as the existence of various powers, as an articulated power.

On Hegel’s presentation, it must be remarked:

a) Made into subjects are: abstract actuality, necessity (or substantial distinction), substantiality — hence the abstract-logical categories. To be sure, »abstract actuality« and »necessity« are designated as »its«, the state’s, actuality and necessity; but 1. »it«, »abstract actuality« or »substantiality«, is its necessity. 2. It is that which »divides itself into the conceptual distinctions of its efficacy«. The »conceptual distinctions« are, »through that substantiality, likewise actual, fixed« determinations, powers. 3. »Substantiality« is no longer taken merely as an abstract determination of the state, as »its« substantiality; it is itself made into the subject, for in the end it says: »but this very substantiality is the spirit, knowing and willing itself, having passed through the form of education«.

b) Nor, in the end, is it said: »educated etc. spirit is substantiality«, but rather the reverse: »substantiality is educated etc. spirit«. Spirit thus becomes the predicate of its own predicate.

c) Substantiality, having been determined, 1., as the universal end of the state, then, 2., as the distinguished powers, is, 3., determined as educated, self-knowing and self-willing, actual spirit. The true starting point — spirit knowing and willing itself, without which »the end of the state« and »the powers of the state« would be baseless imaginings, essence-less, even impossible existences — appears only as the last predicate of substantiality, which had already earlier been determined as universal end and as the various powers of the state. Had one proceeded from actual spirit, then the »universal end« would have been its content, the various powers its manner of realizing itself, its real or material existence, whose determinacy would have had to be developed precisely out of the nature of its end. But because one proceeds from the »idea« or »substance« as the subject, the actual essence, the actual subject appears only as the last predicate of the abstract predicate.

»The end of the state« and »the powers of the state« are mystified, in that they are presented as »modes of existence« of »substance«, and appear separated from their actual existence, from »spirit knowing and willing itself, educated spirit«.

d) The concrete content, the actual determination, appears as formal; the wholly abstract determination of form appears as the concrete content. The essence of the determinations of the state is not that they are determinations of the state, but that in their most abstract shape they can be regarded as logical-metaphysical determinations. Not the philosophy of right, but logic, is the true interest. Not that thought embodies itself in political determinations, but that the existing political determinations are volatilized into abstract thoughts, is the philosophical labor. Not the logic of the matter, but the matter of logic, is the philosophical moment. Logic does not serve to prove the state; rather, the state serves to prove logic.

1. The universal interest, and within it the preservation of the particular interests, as the end of the state;
2. the various powers as the realization of this end of the state;
3. the educated, self-conscious, willing and acting spirit as the subject of the end and of its realization.

These concrete determinations are taken up only externally, as hors d’oeuvres |a side matter|; their philosophical sense is that the state has, in them, the logical sense:

1. of abstract actuality or substantiality;
2. that the relation of substantiality passes over into the relation of necessity, of substantial actuality;
3. that substantial actuality is, in truth, concept, subjectivity.

Omitting the concrete determinations — which could just as well be exchanged, for another sphere, e.g. physics, for other concrete determinations, and are hence inessential — we have before us a chapter of logic.

Substance must »divide itself into conceptual distinctions which, through that substantiality, are likewise actual, fixed determinations«. This proposition — its essence belongs to logic and is complete prior to the philosophy of right. That these conceptual distinctions are here distinctions of »its« (the state’s) »efficacy«, and the »fixed determinations« are »powers of the state« — this parenthesis belongs to the philosophy of right, to political empirics. Thus the whole philosophy of right is only a parenthesis to logic. The parenthesis is, as goes without saying, only a hors d’oeuvre to the actual development. Cf., for example, p. 347 [§ 270, Addition]:

»Necessity consists in this: that the whole be divided into the conceptual distinctions, and that this division yield a fixed and enduring determinacy, which is not dead-fixed, but ever regenerates itself in dissolution.« Cf. also the Logic.

By: Eduard Gans (Additions)

Eduard Gans (Additions) — Wed, 29 May 1833 14:14:08 +0000

The state is actual, and its actuality consists in this: that the interest of the whole realizes itself in the particular ends. Actuality is always the unity of universality and particularity, the unfolding of universality into particularity, which appears as something self-subsistent, although it is only borne and sustained by the whole. Insofar as this unity is not present, something is not actual, even though it may be granted existence. A bad state is one that merely exists; a sick body also exists, but it has no true reality. A hand that has been cut off still looks like a hand and exists, yet without being actual; true actuality is necessity: what is actual is in itself necessary. Necessity consists in the whole being divided into the differences of the concept, and in this dividedness yielding a fixed and enduring determinacy, one that is not rigidly fixed but continually engenders itself anew in its own dissolution. Consciousness, thought, essentially belongs to the completed state; the state therefore knows what it wills, and knows it as something thought. And since knowledge has its seat in the state, science too has its seat here, and not in the church. Nevertheless, in more recent times much has been said about the state having to arise out of religion. The state is spirit developed, and it displays its moments in the light of consciousness; because what lies in the idea steps forth into objectivity, the state appears as something finite, and thus shows itself as a domain of worldliness, while religion presents itself as a domain of infinity. The state thus seems to be the subordinate one, and because the finite cannot subsist on its own, it is said to need the church as its basis. As something finite it is said to have no title of its own, and only through religion does it become holy and belong to the infinite. But this way of viewing the matter is only highly one-sided. The state is indeed essentially worldly and finite, has particular ends and particular powers, but that the state is worldly is only one side of the matter, and it is only to an unspiritual perception that the state is merely finite. For the state has an animating soul, and this animating principle is subjectivity, which is at once the creating of differences and, on the other hand, the maintaining of them in unity. In the religious realm too there are differences and finitudes. God, it is said, is triune: there are thus three determinations, whose unity is spirit itself. If, therefore, the divine nature is grasped concretely, this too occurs only through differences. In the divine realm, then, finitudes occur just as in the worldly realm, and the view that worldly spirit, that is, the state, is merely finite is a one-sided view, for actuality is nothing irrational. A bad state, to be sure, is merely worldly and finite, but the rational state is infinite within itself. The second point is that it is said the state must take its justification from religion. The idea, as it is in religion, is spirit within the inwardness of the heart, but it is this same idea that gives itself worldliness in the state and procures for itself, in knowing and willing, an existence and an actuality. Now if one says that the state must be grounded in religion, this can mean that it ought to rest upon rationality and proceed out of it. But this proposition can also be misunderstood to mean that human beings whose spirit is bound by an unfree religion are thereby best fitted for obedience. The Christian religion, however, is the religion of freedom. This can, admittedly, take a further turn, so that the free religion is perverted into an unfree one, in that it becomes afflicted with superstition. If, then, what is meant is that individuals must have religion so that their bound spirit may all the more be suppressed within the state, this is the bad sense of the proposition; if what is meant is that human beings ought to have respect for the state, for this whole of which they are the branches, then this is indeed best accomplished through philosophical insight into its essence; but in the absence of this, a religious disposition too can lead to the same result. In this way the state can have need of religion and of faith. Essentially, however, the state remains distinguished from religion in this: that what it demands has the form of a legal duty, and that it is a matter of indifference in what disposition of mind [it] is performed. The field of religion, by contrast, is inwardness, and just as the state, were it to make its demands in a religious manner, would endanger the right of inwardness, so too a church that acts like a state and imposes punishments degenerates into a tyrannical religion. A third difference, connected with this, is that the content of religion is and remains something enveloped, so that the heart, feeling, and representation are the ground on which it has its place. On this ground everything has the form of subjectivity, whereas the state actualizes itself and gives its determinations a fixed existence. If religiosity now wished to assert itself within the state in the way it is accustomed to being on its own ground, it would overturn the organization of the state, for in the state the differences have a breadth of being-outside-one-another; in religion, by contrast, everything is always related to totality. Were this totality now to seize upon all the relations of the state, it would be fanaticism; it would want to have the whole in every particular, and could achieve this only through the destruction of the particular, for fanaticism consists precisely in refusing to let the particular differences stand. If one expresses this by saying, "to the pious no law is given," this is nothing other than the utterance of that very fanaticism. For piety, where it takes the place of the state, cannot endure what is determinate and shatters it. Connected with this, likewise, is the fact that piety lets conscience, inwardness, decide, and is not determined by reasons. This inwardness does not develop into reasons and gives no account of itself. If, then, piety is to count as the actuality of the state, all laws are thrown to the winds, and subjective feeling becomes the legislator. This feeling can be mere caprice, and whether it is so can be recognized only from its actions; but insofar as these become actions, commands, they take on the form of laws, which is precisely what contradicts that subjective feeling. God, who is the object of this feeling, might also be made the determining factor, but God is the universal idea, and within this feeling he is the indeterminate, one that has not matured to the point of determining what is present, developed, in the state. Precisely that everything in the state is fixed and secured is the bulwark against caprice and mere positive opinion. Religion as such must therefore not be what governs.