Comments on: 33

By: Eduard Gans (Additions)

Eduard Gans (Additions) — Wed, 29 May 1833 13:04:12 +0000

When we speak of right here, we do not mean merely civil law, which is what is usually understood by it, but morality, ethical life, and world history, which likewise belong here, because the concept brings together thoughts in accordance with their truth. The free will must first, in order not to remain abstract, give itself an existence, and the first sensuous material of this existence is things, that is, external objects. This first mode of freedom is the one we are to know as property, the sphere of formal and abstract right, to which no less belong property in its mediated form as contract, and right in its violation as crime and punishment. The freedom we have here is what we call the person, that is, the subject that is free, and indeed free for itself, and that gives itself an existence in things. This mere immediacy of existence, however, is not adequate to freedom, and the negation of this determination is the sphere of morality. I am no longer merely free in this immediate thing, but I am also free in the sublated immediacy, that is, I am free within myself, in what is subjective. It is in this sphere that everything depends on my insight and intention and on my purpose, since externality is posited as indifferent. The good, which here is the universal purpose, is not, however, to remain merely within my inwardness, but is to realize itself. For the subjective will demands that its inwardness, that is, its purpose, attain external existence, so that the good is to be accomplished in outward existence. Morality, like the earlier moment of formal right, are both abstractions whose truth is only ethical life. Ethical life is thus the unity of the will in its concept and the will of the individual, that is, of the subject. Its first existence is in turn something natural, in the form of love and feeling: the family; here the individual has sublated its brittle personality and finds itself, with its consciousness, within a whole. But at the following stage one sees the loss of true ethical life and of substantial unity: the family falls apart, and its members relate to one another as independent persons, bound together only by the tie of mutual need. This stage, that of civil society, has often been taken for the state. But the state is only the third moment, the ethical life and spirit in which the immense union of the independence of individuality and universal substantiality takes place. The right of the state is therefore higher than the other stages: it is freedom in its most concrete configuration, which falls only under the highest, absolute truth of world spirit.

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) — Sat, 18 Sep 1830 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 487:

§ 487. The free will is: A. itself at first immediate and hence as individual, - the person; the existence which gives this its freedom is property. Right as such is formal, abstract right; B. reflected into itself, so that it has its existence within itself and is thereby at the same time determined as particular, the right of the subjective will, - morality; C. the substantial will as the actuality conforming to its concept in the subject and totality of necessity, - ethical life, in family, civil society and state. Since I have expounded this part of philosophy in my Elements [of the Philosophy] of Right (Berlin 1821), I can be briefer here than concerning the other parts.

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) — Thu, 24 May 1827 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 487:

§ 487. The free will is: A. At first immediate, and hence as individual, – the person; the existence which gives this its freedom is property. Right as such, formal, abstract right. B. Reflected into itself, so that it has its existence within itself, and is thereby at the same time determined as particular, the right of the subjective will, – morality. C. In the unity of its subjective and its objective existence, – the substantial will as the actuality conforming to its concept in the subject, and totality of necessity, – ethical life. Since I have expounded this part of philosophy in my Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Berlin 1821), I can be briefer here than concerning the other parts.

By: Hegel (Notes)

Hegel (Notes) — Thu, 14 Nov 1822 08:08:32 +0000

A. Freedom in general turns first to immediate external existence – within it. α) Determinacy – immediate freedom – β) Existence – thing
B. within itself – to be in itself, for itself –
In my inwardness will – thoughts – a universal – freedom as subject of the will with the determination of subjectivity; thereby it is existence – determination of the moments of right
Right is not concerned with particular inwardness – insight, conviction, intention, conscience – at all –
Will – I, subjective reflection into myself, freedom as universal, immediate concept –
α) Existence of freedom in general. I and freedom immediately identical – immediate apprehension – undifferentiated – I will because I will – I am particular I and universal – not yet differentiated as free. I have right – simply because I am free.
β) Personal freedom, i.e. concept, universal, and I
– differentiated
Separation into universality and singularity.
Essentiality of both sides
Universality and singularity (subjective particularity) have differentiated determinations as
α) knowing – insight – conviction, relation to the good,
β) particular needs become the object
αα) objectification of the good – duty for me. Right of the good over me – makes it a duty for me
ββ) subjective right, that I know it, be convinced of it, consent to it – right of subjectivity – of knowing, of my willing, of my needs, welfare
β) particular welfare
αα) universal welfare – subsumed under αα), good here only abstract.
Is – truth – i.e. unity of the two determinations – which are posited as determinate, as differentiated.
Particular persons and yet in One
Ethical life –
α) Abstraction, thoughts α) Good. –
β) my particularity, my will β) with this universal the particularity identical – good will – contingent connection
γ) Immediacy – like right γ) A substantial relation – actual – as relation, bond subsisting for itself.
Giving up – the particular subjectivity of the individual. No longer my arbitrary choice in feeling, but an objective bond – that for me this unity is present as being, as valid, independently of my subjectivity, not merely a thought within me, in my certainty – in my conscience.
[C.] Good, universal, essentially determinate within itself – determinacy taken up into the universal – determinate good
Appearance as substantial unity of several [?] – self as having given itself up – as in identity – spirit – otherwise no other content
The development determines the concept further – and therefore also at once changes the first shape – Hugo is surprised that world history [is subsumed] under the state)
Right of spirit – only here spirit – namely no longer merely I, reason, unity of subject and reality, of concept and I – and not merely in itself, universal – but knowing self-consciousness.
a) Only in the family a concrete beginning – ethically actual spirit – Penates
b) Relation of many families to one another; cannot exist for itself – system of needs, that is, an external, spiritless connection, mediated relation – relativity – identity [as] ground – self-interest – the bond – needs. One often understands by the state – need as contingent necessity. Also relation, connection – of need, of particularity
c) The spirit of a people – its world – solar system. Relation to the spirit of the world
Right of spirit
α) Laws
Right of substance
β) Right of individuals; their highest right [is] the substantial existence of their freedom –
) cf. Gustav Hugo's review of the Philosophy of Right in the Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen (issue 61, 16 April 1821, p. 601 ff.) and Hegel's reply

[handschriftlich] (inline) i.e. other subjects

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) — Wed, 30 Apr 1817 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 401:

§ 401. Spirit, in this way the Idea of reason that is in and for itself, which is for itself as such, is the concept of absolute spirit. The side of the existence of subjective reason is the individual will as knowledge of this its concept, which constitutes its content and purpose, and whose merely formal activity it is. – This identity is: 1) as simple immediate concept, right; 2) as reflection or judgment, morality; 3) as reality conforming to its concept, or the totality of the syllogism, ethical life.