By: Hegel (Simple)

Hegel (Simple) — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:36:56 +0000

§ 38: Right only forbids

We are still at the first, thinnest stage. Right at this stage knows only the person and its things. What does this mean for how we act?

A permission, not a command:

When we really act, much more is at stake than this right. Friendship matters, duty matters, the welfare of others matters. Next to all this, bare right is only a possibility. It says: You may. It does not say: You must. I may claim a right, and I may also give it up. I cannot give up only one thing: that I can have rights at all.

What is necessary, then?

Here only something negative is necessary. No one may violate the person and what belongs to it. This right demands no more.

That is why there are only prohibitions at this stage. There are also commands that sound positive, such as: Pay your debts. But at their core they too contain a prohibition. It says: Do not keep what belongs to someone else.

Summary: The first right permits, but it does not command. Only one thing is necessary: not to violate the person. That is why every command of right is at its core a prohibition.

By: Hegel (Notes)

Hegel (Notes) — Mon, 18 Nov 1822 08:06:32 +0000

Not unity of will; only for itself, negative.
Permission, because determinacy is, for me, only an external matter, not identical with right itself; for the other, I am [already] there in the matter; thus [it is] no mere possibility for him –
α) Concrete [action] still something quite different – here at once its possibility – reflection upon higher relations – it can be this way or that – I can give up this right or that one, but not [my] capacity for rights, that is, this very possibility itself. In the particular right also the universal.
Positive action is the bringing forth of an objectivity and of a content.
β) Command of right – in relation to an other – passing over of what is mine to him
Performing [a service] – seems positive – a doing – arising from contract – contract, to be sure, [is] an entanglement with others – an identity with them – not merely letting them be –
This is generally how it goes – only the very first [stage] fully corresponds to the concept
I am within mediation, act essentially in relation to an other, that is, I posit something – on the ground of commonality.
I act for him – an ought that comes to his benefit from me, that becomes his through me.
α) I can enter into the contract or not
β) Performance is putting the other in possession, into his property.
β) Concerns [the] relation, regard for others – which strictly does not yet belong here; – but this relation to others belongs in general (like contract and wrong later on) to the reality that is further determined – in § 37 in my interest – regard for others is being active in theirs, for their interest, safeguarding it and the like.

Comments on: 38

By: Hegel (Simple)

By: Hegel (Notes)