Comments on: 65

By: Hegel (Simple)

Hegel (Simple) — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:37:48 +0000

§ 65: Giving something away

A thing is only mine because I place my will into it. So I can also take this will out again.

There are two ways to do this. I can simply give up the thing. An old chair stands by the street. A note on it says: “Free to take.” Or I leave the thing to a particular person. I sell it or give it as a gift.

There is a limit:

I can only give away what is external by its nature. The next section shows what this means.

Why is giving away part of property?

You can see it like this: Whoever gives something away shows most clearly that it belonged to him. Only the owner can freely dispose of it. First I take possession. Then I use. In giving away, the two come together.

Summary: I can give up property or leave it to others. But this holds only for things that are external to me.

By: Eduard Gans (Additions)

Eduard Gans (Additions) — Wed, 29 May 1833 13:14:47 +0000

If prescription is an alienation with a will not directly declared, then true alienation is a declaration of the will that I no longer wish to regard the thing as mine. The whole matter can also be grasped in such a way that alienation is a true taking possession. Immediate taking of possession is the first moment of property; through use, property is likewise acquired, and the third moment is then the unity of both, taking possession through alienation.

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) — Sat, 18 Sep 1830 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 492:

§ 492. The contingent side of property is that I place my will into this thing; in this respect my will is arbitrary will, such that I can just as well place it therein or not, and can withdraw it or not. Insofar, however, as my will lies in a thing, only I myself can withdraw it, and it can pass to another only with my will, whose property it likewise becomes only with his will; - contract.

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) — Thu, 24 May 1827 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 492:

§ 492. The subjective and contingent side of property is that I place my will into this thing; in this respect my will is arbitrary will, such that I can just as well place it therein, or not, and can withdraw it, or not. Insofar, however, as my will lies in a thing, only I myself can withdraw it, and it can pass to another only with my will, whose property it likewise becomes only with his will; – contract.

By: Hegel (Notes)

Hegel (Notes) — Thu, 28 Nov 1822 08:10:32 +0000

Not a consuming sublation, but rather separation in general. Interest on account of the following § determinations. In alienation, a property emerges that only comes into being as such – becomes so only in the expression and in relation to the alienation. Taking possession, which is use.
I can take a thing into possession, make it my property, because it – according to its truth, its concept – is a thing – I and the other have done something contrary to the nature of the thing. Only insofar as I have taken possession of myself – am not a slave – can I have private right against another, and he against me. – I am not a selfless thing, but rather [my] own will, which can dispose over me before all else – that this is an absolutely, wholly necessary condition –
If I make myself a slave, then I do the opposite of myself – to be a free will that is none – not to be a free will is [then] my free will. Free will is only that which has itself as its content.
Ethical life, religion – free self-consciousness of my identity with that which is absolute in me, substance, essence – the thinking [element], intellectual – only insofar am I a thinking being – a human being – cannot make myself into an other than I am –

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) — Wed, 30 Apr 1817 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), §§ 407–408:

§ 407. 3) The subjective and contingent side of property is the thing, which is in general something external, immediate, and that I place my will into this thing. The aspect of the predicate of mine, which I have given it, is interest, and my will, in accordance with this, is arbitrary will, such that I can just as well place it therein, or not, and can withdraw it, or not; – right, in its absoluteness, is at the same time, from the side of reality, a formal one.

§ 408. Insofar, however, as my will lies in a thing, only I myself can withdraw it, and it can pass to another only with my will, whose property it likewise becomes only with his will; – contract.