Comments on: 70

By: Hegel (Simple)

Hegel (Simple) — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:37:58 +0000

§ 70: Life is not a thing

So far we have dealt with things I can give away. I can also give away part of my working time. But what about my life as a whole?

My life is nothing I have like a book or a house. My life is I myself. In it my person exists at all.

What follows from this?

I have no right to throw my life away. The right to dispose of a thing presupposes this: I stand above the thing. But I do not stand above myself. I cannot be judge and accused at the same time. Whoever speaks of a right to his own life contradicts himself.

We can understand a human being in great distress. We can understand why he no longer sees a way out. But that is not a right.

Who can demand life, then?

Only something that stands higher than the single person. That is the ethical community, the state. In a war it can demand that citizens risk their lives. We will speak of this later. Death then comes from outside. Either through nature, or in the service of a greater cause, at the hand of another.

Summary: Life is not a thing I can dispose of. It is the existence of my person. That is why I have no right to give it up.

By: Eduard Gans (Additions)

Eduard Gans (Additions) — Wed, 29 May 1833 13:15:58 +0000

The single person is, to be sure, something subordinate, which must dedicate itself to the ethical whole. If the state therefore demands one's life, the individual must give it; but may a human being take his own life? One can, in the first place, regard suicide as a [kind of] bravery, but a poor one, [befitting] tailors and maidservants. Then, again, it can be regarded as a misfortune, in that inner disintegration leads to it. But the main question is: do I have a right to it? The answer will be that I, as this individual, am not master over my life, for the comprehensive totality of activity, [namely] life, is not something external as against personality, which is itself this [totality] immediately. If one speaks, then, of a right that the person has over his life, this is a contradiction, for it would mean that the person has a right over himself. But this he does not have, for he does not stand above himself and cannot sit in judgment over himself. When Hercules burned himself, when Brutus threw himself upon his sword, this was the conduct of the hero against his own personality; but if we are speaking of the simple right to kill oneself, this too must be denied even to the hero.

By: Hegel (Notes)

Hegel (Notes) — Mon, 02 Dec 1822 08:06:32 +0000

α) Misery, pure, abstract misfortune – misfortune as such.
β) Disgrace; this subject too lofty.
Loss –
α) of the external possibility of [social] standing, of honor – can be of a very limited kind – Werther –
β) of the republic, of Rome;
γ) of enjoyment – interest in enjoyment – the blasé Englishman
δ) of a good conscience – through crime –
Judgment – α) whether legally permitted – β) whether ethically permitted – to withdraw oneself from misfortune, disgrace, dishonor – and indeed undeserved [dishonor] –
When a human being descends into this depth – brings the entire compass of his life to [a point of] comparison, of opposition, and into question – then there arises with this the demand that he also descend into the depth of his spirit – before he judges [that] this life has no value. – If nothing is present in him by which he could procure a value for it, then he stands on a subordinate level of his ethical consciousness.
[In] the view of the specific individual – to condemn it as with every crime – a person badly brought up, [some] defect, something repellent in his outward appearance, [his] manners – often embittered within himself – psychological portrayal – e.g., the innkeeper ["Sonnenwirt"] in Schiller ["The Criminal from Lost Honor"].
One can indeed understand it, but not justify it –