Comments on: 71

By: Hegel (Simple)

Hegel (Simple) — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:38:01 +0000

§ 71: From property to contract

My property is something external. That is why it stands in relation to other things. It can rust or burn, or someone steals it.

Something else is more important. My property is the existence of my will. And a will is only really there for another will. A stone does not know that the meadow belongs to me. Only another human being can know and respect this.

So where does freedom really live?

In the relation of will to will. That is its true ground. Something new arises when I have property not only through myself, but also through the will of another. We will something together. That is the contract.

Why do human beings make contracts?

They themselves mostly think: out of need, out of friendship, because it is useful. That is true too. But at bottom, reason lies behind it. Human beings must give, exchange and trade. This is as necessary as having property.

And one more thing:

Whoever makes a contract already recognizes the other as a person. As someone who can have property. This recognition is the basis of every contract. No one makes a contract with a dog.

Summary: Property exists for other human beings. Where two wills agree about property, a contract arises. In it both recognize each other as persons.

By: Eduard Gans (Additions)

Eduard Gans (Additions) — Wed, 29 May 1833 13:16:23 +0000

In contract I have property through a common will: for it is the interest of reason that the subjective will become more universal and raise itself to this realization. The determinacy of this will thus remains in the contract, but in community with another will. The universal will, by contrast, appears here only still in the form and shape of commonality.

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) — Sat, 18 Sep 1830 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 490:

§ 490. In property the person is joined together with itself. But the thing is an abstractly external one, and I am abstractly external therein. The concrete return of myself into myself within this externality is that I — the infinite relation of myself to myself — am, as person, the repulsion of myself from myself, and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons, in my relation to them, and in the being-recognized by them, which is reciprocal.

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) — Thu, 24 May 1827 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 490:

§ 490. In property the person is joined together with itself. But the thing is at the same time an abstractly external one, and I am external therein. This externality is, more precisely, that I, as person — who am the infinite relation of myself to myself, the repulsion of myself from myself — have the higher side of my actualization in the being of other persons and in my relation to them.

By: Hegel (Notes)

Hegel (Notes) — Mon, 02 Dec 1822 08:08:32 +0000

[zu § 71] It is always a higher conception – purpose – that one sets against life – relation to morality – in the case of suicide – a higher idea, in which I make myself judge –
Courage – of a tailor, a maid, a manservant; – want, destitution – them [reduced] even to palpable indolence – courage only as against something fearful – great – powerful – that is, here against my greatness, – my excellence – A wretched fellow does away with himself – a girl who has a child, has stolen, does not know how to help herself – does away with herself – cannot bear the shame; – an incongruity that ought not to occur – is not held to be anything great – but Werther, otherwise a person of great thought, great feeling – that is, his greatness, over which he is supposed to become master – It is the same thing – he is caught up in his feeling, in his situation – such love, such natural feeling is to be satisfied* – is supposed to carry a higher interest within it – does not know how to help himself – it is the same thing – hollowness, emptiness of life, of spirit – something negative – set against the need for interest –
I am master over my life – every other person equally so – Hobbes: anyone can kill another, – hence all men are equal – I alone have the true judgment – Everyone forms a judgment as to whether I deserve to live – [Karl L.] Sand – a wretched fellow – whether I am it – only I am supposed to have the true judgment. I least of all.
Honor – Hannibal, Cato, Brutus – great individuals – this is to be withdrawn – from these circumstances that dishonor them – right of the honor of the individual against these circumstances – the honor – against me in these circumstances.
Hercules burns himself upon the pyre – poisoned by the robe of Deianira – takes on the fate himself –
If a truly high right has been acquired, these circumstances are not adequate to it, too incongruous – a hero – everyone makes himself into such a hero –
Tosses itself about between two opposites
α) A wretch who does not deserve to live – you [are] too wretched for this life – this life is something better than you deserve –
β) A lofty one, of whom life, this life – station – these circumstances – is not worthy – this life is too excellent – this, my life, is the excellent thing – such vanity, arrogance –
Courage – higher duties – a general at the head [of his men] – flings himself among the enemy, is killed – French ship captains – at Isle de France have themselves killed – this is not what is demanded of them –
Misfortune in general – could not endure life. But it is another thing to respect, to honor

[zu § 71 Anm.] Transition
α) I remain owner – of the universal – give up the particular
β) Universality as common will – over the particular – for value lies in the particular –
γ) Exchange – process – acquisition of a thing that belongs to another free will.
a) Existence of freedom – the thing is mine
b) But the thing is a particular one – the sublating of its particularity is – a) this I can only appropriate to myself through use – destruction of it – β) the sublating of its particularity – through alienation
In the one case as in the other I am no longer owner. – A contradiction remains, that the immediate thing is supposed to be my property; – and yet I am supposed to be owner, my freedom is to have existence –
To the immediate singularity of the thing I have, as a person, no other relation than to consume it, use it – or to renounce it –
Side of existence α) as an external thing, β) for another free will –
This true existence of the free will for the other, with the other – recognized through him – I remain owner.
Herein, to me, as owner, in the proper element of freedom – objectively – not feared, but highly esteemed – they leave it to my power –
but objectively α) externality, existence, β) worthy as an existent element of the free will –
Contract – real existence of property.
Transition – a) Immediate taking of possession
There immediately follows b) mediate [possession] – through the will of another.
The preceding mediations are subjective – through signs, through my activity.
*[above it:] Widows in East India

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) — Wed, 30 Apr 1817 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 405:

§ 405. My will is thereby, in the first instance, external and for others. In that I, as person, am the infinite relation of myself to myself, I am the absolute repulsion of myself from myself, have my actualization only in the being of other persons, and only therein am I, for the first time, an actual person for myself.