By: Hegel (Simple)

Hegel (Simple) — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:51:17 +0000

§ 79: A word binds

The agreement is what counts in a contract. As soon as I have agreed, the thing already belongs to the other. Maybe I still hold it in my hand. But that is now only external. I have a duty to hand it over.

Promise or contract?

A promise speaks about the future. “I will help you tomorrow.” That remains my own resolve. I can still change my mind. That is not nice, but it is not a wrong.

A contract is more. With it, I have already given the thing away. I recognize it as the other’s property. My will is no longer only inside me. It is outside, in the common will.

An objection from Fichte:

Fichte thought: My duty begins only when the other starts to perform. Before that, I do not know if he means it seriously. That sounds clever. But it leads into a chain without end. Even when he begins, he can stop again. When would the contract be safe then? After the first piece? After the first hour? One could keep dividing forever.

The point is not what the other thinks inside. The point is whether he has a right to change his mind. He does not. The word, once given, is already the full existence of the will. The performance only follows from it.

And the exceptions?

For some contracts, only the handing over counts. With a loan, for example: I must first get the money before I can pay it back. That is a special case. It changes nothing about the principle.

Summary: With the agreement, the thing already belongs to the other. A contract binds at once, not only at performance. It is more than a mere promise.

By: Hegel (Notes)

Hegel (Notes) — Thu, 05 Dec 1822 08:06:32 +0000

My will is bound, common will – set into one with the will of the other; – that the unity has reality – α) through performance – β) stipulation – in the manner of will as something spiritual, through signs – word, gesture, writing; formality, elaborateness, handshake – the common will is there for both – my will no longer merely subjective for me. What is there is the externalization of my will and its connection with another's; I have given this externalization existence; so that it is no longer merely a subjective one; – thus in action – posited outside me –
The thing, after (post) the contract, is mine –
My property α) of my will, β) of my possession; – that side externalized – stipulation;
The difficulty lies, or lay, in the distinction of the utterance – namely that my will – before the utterance as performance – should be something inner, subjective – hence on my part capable of change; – merely an opinion – something similar occurs: incitement to riot, slander, abusive words – it was only an opinion that I expressed – and indeed only through words – a movement of the air, wind, which has already dispersed as soon as I made it; – what remains? – only the inner, and my opinion, subjective, which would remain only mine.
Such words – are deeds and actions – In the world of representations one does not strike with cudgels, nor trade with gold, silver, etc. – no more than does a bill of exchange, because it is only words, written indeed, but only on paper, in black ink – yet it stands entirely in the place of money, as money stands in the place of goods – not only in its place, but, on account of its content, is fully valid money and value.
Different rights – to fulfillment and to performance – to the kind of actions – that were to be brought – a sorry, crippled distinction – finally thrown together, overturned – thoughtlessness – that is, the universal not brought out –
Pactum is in Roman law a contract – in part equivalent to a mere promise – but lacking the stipulation – namely stipulation as solemn formality – yet praetorian law gradually, and Justinian finally, abolished this distinction. Thibaut [Theorie der logischen Auslegung des römischen Rechts, 1799], see p. 125
– Fichte – likewise concerning older Roman law –: "in the case of the unnamed contracts (that is, particular kinds not named in civil law) the obligation was based merely on the performance that had taken place; but this obligates only the recipient; he could therefore bring the action for fulfillment; but he could also, so long as the counter-performance had not taken place, or the recipient had made no expenditures toward fulfilling the contract commensurate with what he had received, – simply reclaim what had been given, on account of a change of mind, ob poenitentiam". Thibaut [l. c.], p. 124.
Contractus nomin[atus]: each produced a particular action named after it; contractus innomin. required that in each individual case the formula of the action be adapted to the particular case at hand; actio praescriptis verbis.

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By: Hegel (Simple)

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