When two people argue about a thing, it is not a fight against right. On the contrary. Both appeal to right. Both want the thing to belong to whoever has the right to it.

Then what do they argue about?

Only about who has a claim to the thing. Not about whether property exists at all. This is the ordinary lawsuit before a civil court.

A comparison:

If I say, “This rose is not red,” I do not deny that it has a color. I only dispute one particular color. It is the same here. Whoever says, “The car is not yours,” does not deny property. He only disputes that it happens to be yours.

Summary: In an honest dispute, both sides recognize right. They argue only about who owns the thing.

§ 496. Right, as the existence of freedom in the external, falls into a multiplicity of relations to this external and to the other persons (§ 491, 493 ff.). Through this there are (1) several grounds of right, of which — since property is exclusively individual both on the side of the person and of the thing — only one is the right one, but which, because they are against one another, are jointly posited as semblance of right, over against which this is now determined as the right in itself.

§ 496. The principle of right, freedom, in that it thus gives itself existence in the external, thereby falls into several relations to this same [externality] and to the other persons. (§ 491 and 493 ff.) 1) Through this there are several grounds of right, of which — since property is exclusively individual both on the side of the person and of the thing — only one is in itself the right one, but which, as against one another, are jointly posited as semblance.

§ 410. Only for the sake of the externality of possession can I be violated and coerced; but since it, even as against Me as a person, is itself essentially something external, so in and for itself no violation of my personality and no coercion can, and (§ 391) should, take place.

§ 411. The property of the many is, on the one hand, the simply identical relation of persons in recognition; – on the other hand, it is mediated through the arbitrary judgment of each individual, which makes this thing into his property as against the others. Recognition is recognition not only of the abstract but of the real personality of the others, i.e., of this judgment of theirs, and what my property is and can be depends both on theirs and on their judgment concerning mine.