Comments on: 87

By: Hegel (Simple)

Hegel (Simple) — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:51:29 +0000

§ 87: Fraud

In an honest dispute, both want right. Fraud is different. Here the wrongdoer turns right itself into a semblance.

How does that work?

The fraudster lets the other decide freely, or so it seems. He forces him to do nothing. The other consents. But he consents to something that is not true.

An example: Someone sells a ring as real gold. In truth, it only has a thin layer of gold. The buyer pays gladly because he believes in a good deal. The contract looks like a proper contract. After all, both have agreed.

What is missing?

The fraudster has respected the buyer’s will. The buyer decided for himself. But the fraudster has violated right itself. For the buyer does not get the value he pays for. Only the outer shell of the contract remains.

Unlike the honest dispute:

In an honest dispute, both respect right. But neither respects the will of the other. With fraud, it is the other way around. The fraudster respects the will of the other, but he violates right.

Summary: In fraud, the wrongdoer only fakes right. The other agrees, but he loses the value. What remains is the empty form of a contract.

By: Eduard Gans (Additions)

Eduard Gans (Additions) — Wed, 29 May 1833 13:19:53 +0000

The particular will is respected at this second stage of wrong, but universal right is not. In fraud the particular will is not violated, since the person defrauded is led to believe that right is being done to him. The right that is demanded is thus posited as something subjective and merely apparent, and this is what constitutes fraud.

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) — Sat, 18 Sep 1830 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 498:

§ 498. 2. If, however, the semblance of right as such is willed against right-in-itself by the particular will, which thereby becomes evil, then the external recognition of right is severed from its value, and only the former is respected while the latter is violated. This gives the wrong of fraud; - the infinite judgment as identical (§ 173), - the formal relation maintained, with the content omitted.

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) — Thu, 24 May 1827 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 498:

§ 498. 2) The semblance of right is distinct from right-in-itself; the former, willed as such against right-in-itself by the particular — and thus by an evil — will, with the recognition of right severed from its value, – gives the wrong of fraud; – the infinite judgment as identical (§ 173) – the formal relation as against the content, i.e., against the value (§ 494).

By: Hegel (Notes)

Hegel (Notes) — Mon, 09 Dec 1822 08:06:32 +0000

Right – as semblance – is the relation within the sphere of wrong in general – but here semblance is made into a predicate, a determination of right itself; – the subjective, semblance for itself, is asserted, right reduced to an empty existence
Right as abstractly for itself – without and against the in-itself – particular right without the in-itself – my subjective freedom, the subjective side of my will: it is right in my eyes –
Does not go against the (particular) will of the other, but against right in itself and against the thing. Fraud deprives me of the thing, but leaves my subjective will free.
Naive wrong goes against the subjective will of the other, but not against the thing –
Particular will respected
in naive wrong, universal will in itself respected

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) — Wed, 30 Apr 1817 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 413:

§ 413. But secondly, in the syllogism of right the persons themselves relate to one another as immediate extremes reflected into themselves, and their actual recognition comes about only through the sublation of each one's immediacy through his free self-determination, not through compulsion. The reflection of the individual into his subjective immediacy and the negation of the universal side in the predicate of what is his own, namely the negation of the free personality of the other, is an infinite judgment, which as an action is the crime.