Comments on: 90

By: Hegel (Simple)

Hegel (Simple) — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:51:33 +0000

§ 90: Violence and coercion

Now comes the third and worst kind of wrong: crime. Here the wrongdoer respects neither right nor the will of the other. He no longer even pretends.

How is such a thing possible?

My will lives in external things. In my property, in my body. That is good, for in this way my freedom exists in the world. But it also makes me open to attack. Where my will is external, others can also seize it from outside.

Two forms:

Someone can simply use violence against me. He takes something from me or injures me.

Or someone coerces me. He sets a condition: “If you want to keep this, you must do that.” This is how a blackmailer works. He threatens, and I am to give something up or do something.

Summary: Because my will lives in external things, others can attack it there. This happens through violence or through coercion. With this, crime begins.

By: Eduard Gans (Additions)

Eduard Gans (Additions) — Wed, 29 May 1833 13:21:55 +0000

Wrong proper is crime, where neither right in itself nor [right] as it appears to me is respected, so that both sides, the objective and the subjective, are violated.

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) — Sat, 18 Sep 1830 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 499:

§ 499. 3. Insofar, finally, as the particular will sets itself against right in itself in the negation both of the latter itself and of its recognition or semblance (a negatively infinite judgment, § 173, in which both the genus and the particular determinacy – here the appearing recognition – are negated), it is a violently evil will, which commits a crime.

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) — Thu, 24 May 1827 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 499:

§ 499. 3) The particular will presents itself as something simply contingent to right-in-itself, in the negation both of the latter itself and of its semblance; – negatively infinite judgment (§ 173) – violently evil will – crime.

By: Hegel (Notes)

Hegel (Notes) — Tue, 10 Dec 1822 08:06:32 +0000

What has preceded is abstract wrong – wrong within right; partial negations; – ideal wrong – inward, in opinion, in dispute –
Real wrong – wrong that touches the thing itself.
Actual wrong – against will and thing –
Negation α) of the subjective will of the other –
β) of the objective will, the will that is in itself.
Hence assault, coercion.
Neither particular nor universal will respected.
– Objectivity of the will.
The thief avoids semblance, does not give the semblance of right that fraud gives –
Semblance is a) negative – against right, mere, only semblance – b) recognition

By: Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) — Wed, 30 Apr 1817 23:06:32 +0000

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 414:

§ 414. This action, in which the abstract, self-posited singularity of the person actualizes itself, is null and void in and for itself. But in it the agent sets up, as a rational law, one that is nevertheless merely formal and recognized only by himself, and through it has at the same time subsumed himself under it. The demonstrated nullity of this action, and therein the carrying-out of this formal law by a subjective, individual will, is revenge, which, because it proceeds from the interest of immediate, subjective personality, is at the same time only a new violation, continuing on into infinity. This progression likewise sublates itself in a third judgment, one without interest, punishment.