Comments on: 94

By: Hegel (Simple)

Hegel (Simple) — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:51:38 +0000

§ 94: Why we may enforce right by coercion

We may enforce abstract right by coercion. Why?

Because wrong is external violence here. It strikes my freedom in an external thing. So the defense must also be external. It is a second violence that cancels the first.

A mistake in thinking:

Many explain right straight away like this: Right is what one may coerce people to do. That turns the matter on its head. Coercion only comes in by a detour. First, someone must do wrong. Only then may we coerce. Whoever explains right through coercion explains it through a consequence.

What may we not coerce?

A person’s inner attitude. I can only will the good myself. It lives wholly within. No one can force another to be good, to help, or to believe. The state can demand taxes and enforce contracts. Its laws do not reach a person’s inner attitude.

Summary: Abstract right may use coercion because wrong is external violence. But coercion only follows from wrong. No coercion can reach a person’s inner attitude.

By: Eduard Gans (Additions)

Eduard Gans (Additions) — Wed, 29 May 1833 13:22:43 +0000

Here the distinction between the rightful and the moral must chiefly be kept in view. In the moral, that is, in reflection into myself, there is likewise a duality, for the good is an end for me, and I am to determine myself in accordance with this idea. The existence of the good is my resolve, and I actualize it within myself; but this existence is wholly inward, and hence no coercion can take place here. The laws of the state cannot, therefore, seek to extend to disposition, for in the moral sphere I am purely for myself, and force has no meaning here.

By: Hegel (Notes)

Hegel (Notes) — Wed, 11 Dec 1822 08:10:32 +0000

Coercion against wrong; – taxes, military service – are placed at the disposal of the state. – One asks: to what is it permissible to compel? Why not to moral help, religious observances, and so on? It is said that failing to do these is likewise a wrong; – moral wrong, religious wrong, inward wrong; – also external actions which are essentially supposed to proceed from my moral inwardness, having no other ground, that is, which, as regards their content, are not confined to personality and property, to external services to which I am obligated; they are not merely these abstractions. Even rightful actions – keeping a contract, paying taxes, military service – are supposed to proceed morally from my moral will; but the ground is not essentially disposition, but abstract personality – this likewise cannot be directly compelled, that is, [I cannot be compelled] to make something my property, but only on account of a wrong already done – against another's already acquired right to an external thing. A right to moral help is to be acquired only through my arbitrary will, which is still something inward; the arbitrary will, here the essential moment, – an acquired right.
Because the personal will is abstract, it is exhausted in the external thing, and conversely, it is only an external will, not a concrete, spiritual will.
Objectivity – of the right of property – of freedom.
Strict right, – abstract right – does not yet concern the inward – a moral claim, an ethical claim upon feeling or love – because there I want to find my claim – or right, if I wish to call it that – in the feeling, in the love of the other – he is supposed to have this disposition toward me – a claim, a right to compassion – that is, to their feeling – action being merely a consequence of it – I do not have a right, a direct claim to a thing itself – a claim to right – [that] would be a right to right – a claim in general is only an incomplete right –