A. Introduction to the System (Phenomenology of Spirit)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
B. Science of Logic<\/p>\n\n\n\n
C. Philosophy of Nature<\/p>\n\n\n\n
D. Philosophy of Spirit<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The concept of the will, of freedom, and of right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u25bc Click the headings below to open the details \u25bc<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 1: Determination of the subject matter: The philosophical science of right treats the Idea of right (the unity of the concept and its realization).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 2: Scientific method: Right is grasped not through definitions imposed from outside but through the immanent development of the concept (deduction).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 3: Positive law: The distinction between philosophical right and law, which derives its validity from historical circumstances, national character, and application.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 4: The ground of right: Freedom is the substance of the will; the system of right is the realm of realized freedom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 5: First moment of the will (universality): The capacity of the I to abstract from every content (the negative freedom of emptiness).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 6: Second moment of the will (particularization): The transition to determinacy; the will posits for itself a concrete content (finitude).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 7: Third moment of the will (individuality): The unity of universality and particularity; the will remains with itself even in its determinacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 8: Formal determinacy: The will as self-consciousness encounters an external world and translates subjective purposes into objectivity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 9: The content of the will: The will determines itself; its content is a purpose for it (either as representation or as deed).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 10: The will in itself: In its mere immediacy the will is only the possibility of freedom (not yet in its truth).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 11: The natural will: Here the content appears as drives, desires, and inclinations, which the human being finds immediately present.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 12: The resolving will: Only by sublating the indeterminacy of the drives and making a decision does the will become an actual will.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 13: The individuality of the individual: Through resolving, the will sets itself apart, as the willing of a determinate individual, from others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 14: The finite will: The I stands reflectively above its content and is capable of choosing among the various drives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 15: Arbitrary will (Willk\u00fcr): Freedom as mere choice between given contents; it is contingency and the contradiction of freedom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 16: The one-sidedness of choice: Even the particular that is chosen remains something finite; through mere choosing the will does not attain true infinity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 17: The dialectic of the drives: The drives interfere with one another; the will must subordinate or sacrifice them without any fixed standard (arbitrarily).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 18: Judgment of nature: The drives are positive (good) as an expression of life, but negative (evil) as a limitation on spiritual freedom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 19: The purification of the drives: The demand to free the drives from their natural determinacy and to organize them rationally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 20: Happiness: Reflection compares the drives and gathers them into a whole of satisfaction (a universal end).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 21: The will that is free in and for itself: Freedom becomes its own object; thinking recognizes freedom as the essence of the will.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 22: The infinity of the will: The will is truly infinite because its existence is its own inwardness (itself).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 23: True freedom: The will relates only to itself and is independent of any external dependency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 24: Concrete universality: The will is the immanent Idea of self-consciousness, which reaches over and beyond its own determinations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 25: Subjectivity: The will determined as pure I, as arbitrary will, or as the one-sided form of an unexecuted purpose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 26: Objectivity: The will determined as a rational system, as immersion in its condition, or as external existence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 27: The Idea of the will: The absolute determination of spirit is that its freedom becomes for it an objective, rational object.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 28: The realization of the Idea: The activity of the will dialectically sublates the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 29: Definition of right: Every existence that is an existence of the free will is right (freedom as Idea).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 30: The sanctity of right: Right is sacred because it is the existence of freedom; more concrete stages of spirit carry a higher right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 31: The dialectic: The scientific method by which the concept organically brings forth its determinations out of itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 32: Concepts and shapes: The logical moments of the development appear in the world as a series of temporal shapes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 33: Division of the work: The system is divided into: A. Abstract Right, B. Morality, C. Ethical Life (family, civil society, state).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/details>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 34: The will as individual: The free will here appears in its most immediate form, as abstract I.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 35: The person: The subject that knows itself as absolutely infinite and universal; the capacity to be a bearer of rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 36: The imperative of right: ‘Be a person and respect others as persons.’ (A purely formal command.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 37: The separation of person and particularity: For right, it is initially irrelevant what talents or desires (content) the individual has.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 38: The thing: Everything that is not a person is something unfree, impersonal, and thus without rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 39: The necessity of embodiment: In order to be actual as a free person, the will must give itself an external sphere (a space in the world).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 40: Division of abstract right: A. Property, B. Contract, C. Wrong.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A. The Concept of Property (\u00a7\u00a7 41<\/a>\u201353)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 41: The will places itself into a thing: possession becomes property through the recognition of the will within it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 42: The thing as the external: Spirit is the inward, the thing is the absolutely external.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 43: Spiritual goods as things: talents, branches of knowledge, or inventions can, through externalization, become ‘things’ that one can possess.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 44: The right of appropriation: the human being has the absolute right to appropriate every thing; nature has no will of its own against spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 45: Possession vs. property: possession is mere physical control (taking hold of something); property is the right to possession.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 46: Private property: since the person is a single individual, property too must essentially be private (individual).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 47: Immediate possession of the body: the human being is at first immediately conscious of his own body.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 48: Taking possession of the body: only through training and labor does spirit truly take possession of its own body.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 49: The distribution of property: abstract right demands no equality of possessions, only that everyone be able to possess property.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 50: The right of priority: whoever comes first has the right, since he is the first to place his will into the thing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 51: Recognizability: taking possession must be visible to others as an expression of the will.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 52: Form and matter: the will takes possession of the form of the thing; for right, matter is merely the bearer of this form.<\/p>\n\n\n\n B. The Modes of Taking Possession (\u00a7\u00a7 53<\/a>\u201358)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 53: Overview: taking possession occurs through direct physical seizure, through forming, or through mere marking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 54: The act of the will: property is not merely a state but an ongoing relation of the will.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 55: Physical seizure: the most direct form (holding something), but spatially very limited.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 56: Forming: working on a thing (e.g. agriculture or craft); the most spiritual mode of appropriation, since it leaves lasting traces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 57: Disposal over living beings: animals are treated as things; slavery is a wrong, because the human being is in himself no thing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 58: Marking: the most ideal form (a sign, a boundary stone); the will represents itself through a sign, without physically touching the thing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n C. The Use of the Thing (\u00a7\u00a7 59<\/a>\u201364)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 59: The right to use: property without use would be empty; use is the realization of property.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 60: Use and substance: through use the thing is altered or consumed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 61: Temporally limited use: one can give up the use without losing ownership of the substance (e.g. rent).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 62: Identity of use and property: if one has total use permanently, one is in fact the owner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 63: Value: abstracting from concrete usefulness leads to exchange-value (measurable in money).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 64: Prescription (lapse): if the will is no longer present in the thing for a long time (non-use), the right of property lapses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n D. The Relinquishing of Property (\u00a7\u00a7 65<\/a>\u201370)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 65: Freedom to relinquish: I can give a thing away, because it is something external.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 66: Inalienable goods: my personality, my life, and my freedom of conscience are myself, and can never be rightfully sold.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 67: Alienation of powers: one can rent out one’s labor power for a limited time, but not the whole person (the distinction between labor and slavery).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 68: Intellectual property: the particularity of books\/inventions; the buyer owns the copy but not the right to reproduce it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 69: Plagiarism: the violation of the author’s right to the spiritual form of his expression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 70: Moral significance: relinquishment shows that spirit stands above matter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Transition (\u00a7 71):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 71: Property leads to the relation of person to person. The existence of my will no longer lies merely in a thing, but in the will of another person. This is the transition to contract.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At this stage, property is no longer merely a one-sided relation to a thing, but is mediated through the will of another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 72: Property, as the existence of the will, no longer exists merely in a thing, but in relation to the will of another person.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 73: Possession is mediated through contract; one possesses something because one has come to an agreement with another about it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 74: The essence of contract is the common will. Two persons mutually recognize each other as owners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 75: The limit of contract: it applies only to external things. Here Hegel criticizes the idea of a ‘social contract’ for the state, since the state is not a mere contractual relation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 76: The two sides of contract: the agreement (stipulation) and the performance (realization).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 77: The thing in contract: it is regarded as a value, which can be exchanged against another thing or performance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 78: The transfer of property: through contract, property is ideally transferred, even while physical delivery is still outstanding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 79: Contract as formal expression: mere words or a signature make the will objectively valid for others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 80: The division of contracts: here Hegel distinguishes, roughly, between gift, exchange (purchase), and service (loan contract).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 81: The transition to wrong: since contract rests on the particular will (arbitrary will), the possibility arises that this will may diverge from universal right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Here the opposition between right in itself (the universal) and the particular will of the individual comes to the fore.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 82: Definition: wrong is the semblance of right, in which the particular will contradicts universal right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 83: Three kinds of wrong: 1. unpremeditated wrong, 2. fraud, 3. crime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A. Unpremeditated Wrong (\u00a7\u00a7 84<\/a>\u201386)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 84: A mere legal dispute: both parties want what is right, but are mistaken about to whom the thing belongs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 85: Recognition of right: the conflict remains within the recognition of right as such; a decision is sought through a court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 86: Civil proceedings: here the wrong is only a lack of insight, not an evil intent against right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n B. Fraud (\u00a7\u00a7 87<\/a>\u201389)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 87: The semblance of right: the fraudster uses the form of right (e.g. a contract) to violate right at its core.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 88: Deception: the other is made to believe that right is being done to him, while in truth his will is being violated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 89: Transition to coercion: in fraud, right is now merely a pretext; the mask falls in the next step.<\/p>\n\n\n\n C. Coercion and Crime (\u00a7\u00a7 90<\/a>\u2013104)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 90: Coercion: the exercise of physical force against the will of a person.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 91: Vulnerability: because the person has an external existence (body, property), it can be attacked through coercion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 92: Crime: the total negation of right. The criminal disregards not merely a single rule, but the principle of right as such.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 93: The nullity of coercion: coercion is in itself contrary to right; it may be applied only as counter-coercion, to annul a wrong.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 94: The legal principle of coercion: the use of force against someone who has himself exercised force is lawful (self-defense).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 95: The violation of right: a crime is an injury directed against the freedom of the person.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 96: The gravity of the crime: the magnitude of the injury depends on the value of the thing and its significance for personality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 97: Punishment: it is the negation of the negation. Crime is the first negation (of right); punishment annuls this and restores right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 98: Retribution as compensation: in the case of damage to property, punishment can consist in payment of its value.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 99: The purpose of punishment: Hegel rejects deterrence or reform as the primary justification; punishment is an act of justice in itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 100: The criminal’s right: by being punished, the criminal is honored as a rational being, whose own deed reacts back upon him as law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 101: Retaliation (jus talionis): punishment must correspond to the crime in value and quality (an ‘eye for an eye’ in a figurative sense).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 102: Objective punishment: punishment may not be private revenge, but must be carried out by an impartial power (a court).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 103: The end of revenge: revenge is itself a new wrong; only punishment by the state ends the cycle of violence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 104: Transition to morality: through punishment, right is no longer merely external (a thing), but present within the will itself. The will becomes subjective knowledge of right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/details>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 105: The will as subject: it is no longer merely immediate (as the person), but reflected into itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 106: Subjectivity as the side of the concept’s existence; the will is for itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 107: The subjective will as the ground of actions; only what lies in the will counts as one’s own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 108: The action: the expression of the moral will in the external world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 109: The opposition of subjectivity and objectivity: acting is the attempt to sublate this opposition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 110: The right of the subjective will: it recognizes only what it knows as its own (as rational).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 111: The goal of morality: that the will should have its own concept (freedom) as its content.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 112: The externality of action: as soon as the will acts, it enters the sphere of contingency and the laws of nature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 113: The deed as a change in the world: the will is responsible for the changes it has brought about.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 114: Division of morality: 1. Purpose and Responsibility, 2. Intention and Welfare, 3. The Good and Conscience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This concerns what a subject can be held accountable for at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 115: The finitude of acting: the will finds material at hand upon which it acts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 116: Responsibility (imputation): the subject is responsible for a deed insofar as it was his purpose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 117: The right of knowledge: the subject acknowledges as his action only those moments of the deed that he knew in his purpose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 118: The consequences of the deed: the subject bears responsibility for the necessary consequences, but not for external, contingent interferences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Here the action is judged according to its purpose and its value for the subject.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 119: From deed to intention: the action is considered as a universal principle (what do I actually want to achieve by it?).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 120: The right of intention: the action should make sense for the subject and fulfill his purpose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 121: The particularity of the action: in the action, the subject seeks its own satisfaction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 122: Means and end: the will uses things and circumstances as means for its intention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 123: Subjective interest: every deed requires a driving force within the subject (interest).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 124: The right of subjectivity: it is a right of the human being that he find his honor and his happiness in his own doing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 125: Welfare: the sum of the subject’s particular ends; the striving for happiness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 126: Collision of right and welfare: welfare may not violate abstract right (property), but it has its own validity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 127: The right of necessity: in extreme danger to life, abstract right recedes (stealing a loaf of bread to save one’s life is not an ordinary crime).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 128: Transition to the good: when welfare is no longer merely my private welfare but a universal one, it becomes the good.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is the high point of morality, but also the point at which it turns over into its opposite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 129: The good: the unity of abstract right and welfare; realized freedom as the absolute final end of the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 130: Duty: the will ought to do the good. It is the necessity of acting in accordance with the concept.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 131: The subject’s right to insight: I am obligated to do only what I recognize as rational and good.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 132: Conscience: the innermost conviction of the subject as to what is right and duty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 133: Formal certainty: conscience tells me ‘do what is right,’ but it does not yet say concretely what is right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 134: The fulfillment of duty: the subject must find a concrete content, so as not to remain stuck in the abstract.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 135: Critique of Kant: Hegel criticizes the ‘categorical imperative’ because it remains empty (formal identity without concrete content).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 136: True conscience: the agreement of subjective disposition with the objective good.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 137: The right of conscience: it is the highest stage of moral freedom, to act according to one’s own knowledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 138: The danger of subjectivity: conscience can turn against objective right and make itself the standard.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 139: Evil: the arbitrary will that raises itself above the universal; the conscious decision against what is rational.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 140: The forms of moral aberration: here Hegel analyzes hypocrisy, probabilism, the ‘good intention’ as an excuse, and irony.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 141: Transition to ethical life: since conscience alone cannot guarantee the content of the good, it must embody itself in stable, objective institutions (family, state).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/details>\n\n\n\n Here Hegel explains how the subjective and the objective work together in a living unity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 142: Ethical life is the Idea of freedom; it is the living good will that has its existence in the world of institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 143: It is the unity of the subjective will and the concept of right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 144: Ethical substance is the system of laws and institutions that carry absolute authority for the individual.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 145: These laws are not alien, but the individual’s own essence of spirit (they are ‘spirit of its spirit’).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 146: The recognition of the ethical powers: the individual recognizes in them its own substance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 147: The individual’s relation to substance is a relation of trust.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 148: Duty: in ethical life, duty loses its character of compulsion, since it is the individual’s own essence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 149: Duty frees the human being from dependence on mere drives and subjective arbitrariness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 150: Virtue: ethical life as it shows itself in the character of an individual as firm conduct.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 151: Ethical life as second nature: through habit, rational acting becomes the nature of the human being.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 152: Objective ethical life takes the place of mere moral conscience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 153: The individual finds his right and his freedom in being a member of an ethical whole.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 154: Trust as the subjective disposition within ethical life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 155: The ethical is the universal; it pervades all the actions of the individual.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 156: Ethical substance as the true, real spirit of a people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 157: Division of ethical life:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The family (immediate ethical life),<\/p>\n\n\n\n civil society (the stage of separation\/particularity),<\/p>\n\n\n\n the state (concrete universality).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The family is ‘natural ethical life.’ Its principle is love.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A. Marriage (\u00a7\u00a7 161<\/a>\u2013169)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 158: Love as spirit: within the family, one is no longer a separate person for oneself, but part of a whole.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 159: The family as a single person: the members surrender their individual personality within the unity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 160: Moments of the family: marriage, the family’s resources, and the upbringing of children.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 161: Marriage: it is ethical love. It begins as a contract, but through love it sublates the contractual character (the merely legal aspect).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 162: The transition to marriage: it should not rest on mere drive, but on a free, conscious consent to the bond.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 163: The conclusion of marriage: the act of consent makes marriage into an ethical relationship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 164: The solemn ceremony: recognition of the marriage by the community\/the state is what first makes it an objective right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 165: Monogamy: since marriage requires the total surrender of the person, it can exist only between two persons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 166: The difference of the sexes: the man has his essence more in the state and in work, the woman in the family and piety.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 167: Indissolubility: in the Idea, marriage is indissoluble, since it rests on an absolute ethical bond.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 168: Prohibitions on marriage: marriage may not be contracted within the circle of blood relations (the prohibition of incest), since here love is already ‘naturally’ present rather than first grounded ethically.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 169: The end of marriage as mere feeling: the goal is the transformation of love into a stable, lasting institution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n B. The Family’s Resources (\u00a7\u00a7 170<\/a>\u2013172)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 170: Resources: the family needs a common external existence (possessions).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 171: The head of the family: the husband represents the family’s resources externally, but they belong to the family as a whole.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 172: Acquisition and care: labor serves to maintain this common ethical ground.<\/p>\n\n\n\n C. The Upbringing of Children and the Dissolution of the Family (\u00a7\u00a7 173<\/a>\u2013181)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 173: Children: in them the unity of the parents becomes objective and perceptible. They are ‘flesh of flesh.’<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 174: The right of upbringing: children have a right to an upbringing; they are not things belonging to the parents, but persons free in themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 175: The aim of upbringing: to lead children to independence and to ethical freedom, so that they can found families of their own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 176: The dissolution of marriage: as a matter of fact, marriage can end through divorce, when the ethical bond (love) has been irreparably destroyed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 177: Death and inheritance: with the death of the parents, the family as an immediate unity dissolves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 178: The right of inheritance: the family’s resources remain within the family and pass to the children.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 179: The will (testament): Hegel takes a critical view of the right to arbitrary testaments; the children’s right of inheritance is more substantial than the parents’ arbitrary will.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 180: Coming of age: children step out of the family as new, independent persons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 181: Transition to civil society: when many families, as independent units, confront one another, the ‘system of needs’ arises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For Hegel, this section is the stage of difference. Whereas the family is an immediate unity, in civil society individuals emerge as independent, self-interested persons. It is the ‘system of needs,’ in which each is for himself, yet remains unconsciously bound to all others through labor and the market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 182: The concrete person: the individual as a whole of needs and arbitrary will, for whom his own particular end is the highest thing (egoism).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 183: Particularity and universality: I can achieve my own end only by relating myself to others; in this way a universal, all-round dependence arises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 184: Civil society as the realm of division: here spirit steps outside its unity; luxury and misery exist side by side.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 185: The contradiction of civil society: the satisfaction of needs is boundless and tends toward the destruction of ethical life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 186: Formal education (Bildung): in order for needs to be satisfied, the human being must learn to conduct himself in a universal manner (the formation of the understanding).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 187: The individual as ‘son of civil society’: he is no longer merely a member of a family, but stands within a worldwide network of labor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 188: Division:<\/p>\n\n\n\n A. The System of Needs * B. The Administration of Justice * C. The Police and the Corporation<\/p>\n\n\n\n a) The Kind of Need and Satisfaction (\u00a7\u00a7 190<\/a>\u2013195)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 189: The satisfaction of the particular through the mediation of the universal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 190: Animal versus human needs: the human being multiplies his needs and refines them (culture).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 191: The social component: needs arise through comparison with others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 192: Convenience: technology and labor make satisfaction ever easier and more refined.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 193: Social ambition: the craving for recognition through consumption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 194: Liberation through consumption: the human being makes himself independent of mere nature by subjugating it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 195: The opposition of wealth and poverty as a necessary result of the logic of the market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n b) The Kind of Labor (\u00a7\u00a7 196<\/a>\u2013198)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 196: Labor: the mediation between need and thing; the human being gives matter a human form.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 197: The division of labor: through specialization, labor becomes simpler, more abstract, and more productive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 198: The machine: once labor becomes entirely mechanical, the human being can delegate it to machines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n c) Resources and the Estates (\u00a7\u00a7 199<\/a>\u2013208)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 199: Universal resources: the labor of all forms a common pool from which everyone draws.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 200: Inequality: since talents and industriousness differ, inequality of resources is unavoidable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 201: The estates (classes): the division of society according to the kind of labor performed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 202: The three estates:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The substantial estate (farmers).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The estate of trade and industry (craftsmen, merchants).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The universal estate (civil servants).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 203: The substantial estate: its life is shaped by nature, by the land, and by family love.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 204: The estate of trade and industry: it rests on reflection, education, and the exchange of goods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 205: The universal estate: its purpose is the welfare of the universal, and for this it is maintained by the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 206: Choice of estate: the individual’s right to choose his own estate (as opposed to a caste system).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 207: The honor of one’s estate: an individual’s sense of self-worth depends on being a recognized member of an estate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 208: Transition to the administration of justice: right must now hold as law, equally for all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In civil society, abstract right becomes concrete law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 209: Recognition of right: in civil society, the human being is recognized as a ‘human being,’ independent of his estate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 210: Right must be known objectively.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 211: Law: right must be fixed in writing so that it is recognizable to everyone (codification).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 212: Legal validity: in civil society, only the law is binding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 213: Positive law: the application of rational right to the contingent details of actuality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 214: The determinacy of the law: it must lay down clear measures and penalties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 215: Promulgation: a law is just only if it is public and comprehensible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 216: Legal certainty: trust that the law will remain stable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 217: The judge: the personification of the law, who subsumes the particular under the universal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 218: The gravity of an offense: in a stable society, a crime is punished more mildly than in an unstable one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 219: The court: the public institution for the enforcement of right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 220: Justice as a service that society renders to the individual.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 221: Civil proceedings: the formal clarification of legal claims.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 222: The burden of proof: the rational ascertainment of the truth in a trial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 223: Transparency: the trial must proceed according to fixed rules.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 224: Publicity: judicial proceedings must be public, so that citizens have trust in justice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 225: The separation of the facts of the case from the question of law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 226: The jury: the citizen’s right to be judged on the facts by his equals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 227: The judge’s conviction must rest on objective grounds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 228: Equality before the law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 229: Transition to the police: right protects only what already exists; the police must take on responsibility for the provident protection of welfare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Civil society must protect itself against contingency and poverty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 230: The transition to the police: whereas in the administration of justice, right becomes active only once it has been violated (reactively), there now arises the necessity of protecting the right and welfare of individuals in a provident, preventive way. The right to security and subsistence becomes a general concern of society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n a) The Police (\u00a7\u00a7 231<\/a>\u2013249) Note: for Hegel, ‘police’ means the entire public administration and provision of public welfare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 231: External order: the protection of property and security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 232: Oversight of public security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 233: Market regulation: the police ensure that trade and commerce function smoothly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 234: Provision against fraud: the control of weights, measures, and the quality of goods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 235: Public infrastructure: roads, bridges, lighting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 236: Public health: provision against disease and epidemics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 237: Market instability: the police must intervene when the market shows excessive fluctuations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 238: Education: society takes on the task of educating individuals when the family fails.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 239: Protecting the individual from his own arbitrary will.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 240: General oversight of the family.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 241: Poor relief: society is obligated to provide for the poor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 242: The limits of private charity: assistance must be carried out through public institutions, in order to be legally secure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 243: The production of the rabble: civil society necessarily produces a class of people who have needs but cannot find work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 244: The danger of the rabble: when poverty leads to indignation against society, it becomes dangerous.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 245: The insolubility of the problem of poverty: Hegel recognizes that civil society cannot resolve the problem of poverty out of itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 246: Colonization: society must expand outward in order to find new markets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 247: The sea as a trade route: the sea connects peoples and furthers the world spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 248: The founding of colonies as an outlet for the surplus of people and goods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 249: The police as the connecting link between private, civic advantage and the universal interest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n b) The Corporation (\u00a7\u00a7 250<\/a>\u2013256)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 250: The corporation (professional association): the estate of trade and industry organizes itself into corporations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 251: Professional identity: the individual finds his social home within the corporation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 252: The corporation as a ‘second family’: it provides protection and solidarity in the case of illness or unemployment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 253: The honor and dignity of one’s estate: through the corporation, the individual’s labor is socially recognized.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 254: Oversight of qualifications: the corporation guarantees the quality of the work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 255: A preliminary stage of the state: within the corporation, the citizen learns to act, beyond his own self-interest, for a common goal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 256: Transition to the state: civil society finds its conscious unity in the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 257: The state as the actuality of the ethical Idea; the spirit that unfolds itself in the world as will and knowledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 258: The state as rational in and for itself: it is not a means to an end, but the absolute end in itself. It is the union of the universal end and individual interest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 259: The Idea of the state has:<\/p>\n\n\n\n a) Immediate actuality (internal constitutional law).<\/p>\n\n\n\n b) Its relation to other states (external constitutional law).<\/p>\n\n\n\n c) The stage of the world spirit (world history).<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1. The Internal Constitution as Such (\u00a7\u00a7 260<\/a>\u2013271) Here Hegel describes the organic interplay between citizens and the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 260: The principle of the modern state: the unity of subjective freedom and the objective order of the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 261: The unity of duty and right: what is a duty for the state is a right for the citizen (and vice versa).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 262: Mediation through family and civil society: the state needs these spheres as its foundation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 263: The transformation of interest: private welfare becomes, within the state, a universal end.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 264: The knowledge of the substantial: citizens know themselves, within the state, to be in their own essence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 265: Institutions as pillars of freedom: they guarantee that the state is not arbitrary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 266: Spirit as knowledge: the state is a conscious structure, not a blind fate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 267: Patriotism (political disposition): the citizen’s trust in the state as his own foundation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 268: Political consciousness: the habit of regarding the commonwealth as the basis of one’s life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 269: The organization of the state: spirit organically articulates itself into different powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 270: State and religion: religion provides inner depth, but the state is the external, legal actuality. The state protects freedom of religion, but must not allow itself to be ruled by religious arbitrariness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 271: The constitution as the organization of the powers of the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2. The Division of Powers (\u00a7\u00a7 272<\/a>\u2013297) Hegel rejects a rigid separation of powers (checks and balances) and calls instead for an organic articulation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 272: The differentiation of the powers: they are not separate, but parts of a living whole.<\/p>\n\n\n\n a) The power of the crown.<\/p>\n\n\n\n b) The power of government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n c) The legislative power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 274: The sovereignty of the state: the power of the state to decide on and over itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n a) The Power of the Crown (\u00a7\u00a7 275<\/a>\u2013286) The prince (monarch) is the ‘point,’ the final ‘I’ that makes the decision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 275: The monarch: he represents the unity of the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 276: The ideality of the members of the state: in the prince, the multiplicity of the state finds its apex.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 277: Office and person: in the modern state, an office is not bound to the private person, except in the case of the monarch.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 278: Sovereignty internally: the subordination of all particular rights to the welfare of the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 279: The subjective ‘I will’: the monarch places the final point beneath the laws and deliberations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 280: Hereditary monarchy: so that the choice of head of state is not subject to arbitrary will or party strife, it must be fixed naturally (through birth).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 281: The inviolability of the monarch: he is the neutral point above the day-to-day political business.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 282: The right of pardon: the monarch can mitigate the law and let mercy prevail over right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 283: The appointment of ministers: the prince chooses his advisors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 284: The responsibility of the ministers: it is not the monarch who is politically responsible, but the executive government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 285: The government as the executive organ.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 286: The securing of the constitution through loyalty to the monarch.<\/p>\n\n\n\n b) The Power of Government (\u00a7\u00a7 287<\/a>\u2013297) This concerns administration and the civil service.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 287: The executive: the application of the law to the particular case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 288: The tasks of the police and the corporations within the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 289: The civil servants: they form the core of the ‘universal estate.’<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 290: The division of administrative business: specialized ministries and authorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 291: Access to the civil service: every citizen can become a civil servant (the principle of merit).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 292: The filling of posts: examination and qualification rather than arbitrary appointment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 293: Remuneration: civil servants must be economically independent in order to remain impartial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 294: The service relationship as an ethical bond, not a mere contract.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 295: Control of administration: protecting citizens from arbitrariness through a hierarchy of appeal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 296: The ethics of the civil service: objectivity, a sense of duty, and education.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 297: Government as the connecting link between prince and people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n c) The Legislative Power (\u00a7\u00a7 298<\/a>\u2013320)<\/p>\n\n\n\n The legislative power is the power to determine the laws as such and to regulate the internal affairs of the state that concern everyone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 298: Definition: the legislative power concerns the laws as such, and those internal affairs which, in their content, are wholly universal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 299: The content of legislation: on the one hand it determines what the state demands from citizens (services\/contributions), and on the other, the rights of citizens vis-\u00e0-vis the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 300: The cooperation of the powers: legislation is not an isolated power; the monarch has the final decision, and the power of government contributes its expert knowledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 301: The estates element: the participation of private persons in legislation takes place through deputies of the estates. Hegel emphasizes that the people should not act as an ‘unorganized mass.’<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 302: The purpose of the estates: they serve as mediators between the government and the people, dissolved into its particular circles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 303: Organic articulation: the estates rest on the articulation of civil society (the circles of the corporations and professions).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 304: The bicameral division of the Assembly of Estates: to avoid one-sidedness, the assembly is divided into two chambers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Two Chambers of the Estates (\u00a7\u00a7 305<\/a>\u2013313)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 305: The substantial estate (nobility\/landowners): it forms the first chamber. Its position rests on landed property and, through primogeniture (hereditary succession), is independent of the state treasury and market fluctuations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 306: The political role of the nobility: it is the born mediator between throne and people, since it possesses a natural firmness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 307: Independence: this estate needs no election; it is called to participation in state power through its social position.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 308: The estate of trade and industry: it sends deputies to the second chamber. These are elected from the corporations and communities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 309: Deputation rather than direct election: it is not every single individual who votes directly (which would lead to atomization), but the organized communities that send representatives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 310: The qualification of deputies: they must possess expert knowledge and a disposition that keeps the universal welfare in view.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 311: The representation of interests: deputies represent the particular interests of their own spheres of life (trade, craft, etc.), which they know best.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 312: Deliberation: in the assembly, particular interests are raised to universal insight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 313: The publicity of debates: sessions must be public, so that the people learn how affairs of state are handled.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Public Opinion (\u00a7\u00a7 314<\/a>\u2013320)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 314: Political education: through the Assembly of Estates, the public is instructed about the purposes of the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 315: Public opinion: it is the way in which the people think and pass judgment about universal affairs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 316: The essence of public opinion: it contains both the eternal, substantial truths of reason and an infinite amount of prejudice, unreason, and contingency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 317: The paradox of public opinion: ‘It deserves to be as much respected as despised.’ One respects the kernel of truth within it, but despises its superficial form.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 318: The true statesman: he is the one who listens to public opinion, but does what it, at its core, actually wants, without following its fickle moods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 319: Freedom of the press: Hegel supports it, but also emphasizes legal responsibility for defamation and incitement against the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 320: Subjectivity and the state: subjective freedom finds its expression in public opinion, but must measure itself against the objective rationality of the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The state is an individuality, and as such it confronts other states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 321: The state as real individuality: it is an exclusive one, which delimits itself against others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 322: Sovereignty: it shows itself in the fact that the state is externally independent and asserts its own identity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 323: The relation to other states: it is marked by recognition, but also by potential hostility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 324: War: Hegel regards it as a moment that preserves the ‘ethical health’ of peoples, by preventing ossification in purely private prosperity (functional equivalents are possible at more developed stages).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 325: Sacrifice for the whole: in war, the nullity of finite goods (life and property) is demonstrated in the face of the infinity of the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 326: State power in war: in times of emergency, all power concentrates in the monarch as the point of decision that saves the situation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 327: Valor: the disposition to stake one’s own life for the freedom of the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 328: Formal versus substantial valor: it is not a matter of mere love of adventure, but of service to a rational cause.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 329: Command: the power of the crown decides on war and peace and leads the military.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This concerns the ‘treaties’ between sovereign powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 330: International law rests on the relation of independent states to one another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 331: Recognition: a state is such only when it is recognized as sovereign by others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 332: The treaty between states: the means of exchange between states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 333: The problem of international law: since there is no ‘super-state’ (no world praetor), international law rests only on the will of states. Pacta sunt servanda holds, but only so long as it serves the welfare of the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 334: Dispute and war: when wills collide and no treaty helps, war is the sole means of decision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 335: The ground for war: an injury to honor or right suffices as a ground for war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 336: The highest law: the welfare of the state is the supreme criterion in foreign policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 337: Diplomacy: states interact through envoys and recognize one another as legal subjects even in conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 338: Jus in bello (the law of war): war, as a moment of reason, must be conducted in such a way that a later peace remains possible (sparing civilians and private property).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 339: Prisoners and private persons: war is waged between states (the military), not against individuals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 340: The transition to history: since states have no judge over them, their verdict is world history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Hegel regards history as progress in the consciousness and the realization of freedom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 341: World history is the world’s court of judgment: the world spirit decides on the right of peoples.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 342: The world spirit stands above the right of individual states; it uses them as its instruments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 343: Spirit as the actual: history is the unfolding of spirit toward self-knowledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 344: Peoples as organs: each people has an era in which it represents the world spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 345: Dominant peoples: at any one time, only a single people can be the world-historically leading one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 346: The stages of development: history proceeds according to a necessary rationality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 347: The world-historical people: it has the right to carry forward the principles of freedom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 348: Spirit works ‘behind the backs’ of the actors (the cunning of reason).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 349: The right of the world spirit is the absolutely highest right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 350: Civilization versus barbarism: peoples with a higher ethical organization have a right against unorganized peoples.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 351: The task of the state in history: to bring spirit into an objective shape.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 352: The four realms of world history:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 353: Criterion of the realms: how much freedom has been realized?<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 354: 1. The Oriental realm: substantial unity. Only one is free (the ruler).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 355: 2. The Greek realm: beautiful freedom. Some are free (citizens, but slavery remains).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 356: 3. The Roman realm: abstract right. The person is legally recognized, but under an abstract imperial will.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 357: 4. The Germanic realm: the Christian-European world. Spirit recognizes that all human beings are free in themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 358: Reconciliation: the ‘Germanic principle’ leads to the reconciliation of state and church, inwardness and world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 359: The state as the image of reason: here spirit finds its abiding existence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a7 360: The goal: in the philosophy of right, spirit returns to itself and comprehends its freedom as absolute truth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/details>\n\n\n\n A. Introduction to the System (Phenomenology of Spirit) B. Science of Logic C. Philosophy of Nature D. Philosophy of Spirit AA. Philosophy of Subjective Spirit BB. Philosophy of Objective Spirit => Elements of the Philosophy of Right Preface Introduction (\u00a7\u00a7 1\u201332) The concept of the will, of freedom, and of right. Part One: Abstract Right […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-4523","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4523","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4523"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4523\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4536,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4523\/revisions\/4536"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4523"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}I. Preface & Introduction (Detailed)<\/summary>\n\n\n\n
II. Abstract Right (Detailed)<\/summary>\n\n\n\n
Part One: Abstract Right (\u00a7\u00a7 34<\/a>\u2013104)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Preliminary Concept: Personality (\u00a7\u00a7 34<\/a>\u201340)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nI. Property (\u00a7\u00a7 41<\/a>\u201371)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nII. Contract (\u00a7\u00a7 72<\/a>\u201381)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nIII. Wrong (\u00a7\u00a7 82<\/a>\u2013104)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
III. Morality (Detailed)<\/summary>\n\n\n\n
Part Two: Morality (\u00a7\u00a7 105<\/a>\u2013141)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Preliminary Concept: The Moral Standpoint (\u00a7\u00a7 105<\/a>\u2013114)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nI. Purpose and Responsibility (\u00a7\u00a7 115<\/a>\u2013118)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nII. Intention and Welfare (\u00a7\u00a7 119<\/a>\u2013128)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nIII. The Good and Conscience (\u00a7\u00a7 129<\/a>\u2013141)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
IV. Ethical Life (Detailed)<\/summary>\n\n\n\n
Part Three: Ethical Life (\u00a7\u00a7 142<\/a>\u2013360)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Preliminary Concept: Ethical Life (\u00a7\u00a7 142<\/a>\u2013157)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nI. The Family (\u00a7\u00a7 158<\/a>\u2013181)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nII. Civil Society (\u00a7\u00a7 182<\/a>\u2013256)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Preliminary Concept (\u00a7\u00a7 182<\/a>\u2013188)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nA. The System of Needs (\u00a7\u00a7 189<\/a>\u2013208)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nB. The Administration of Justice (\u00a7\u00a7 209<\/a>\u2013229)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nC. The Police and the Corporation (\u00a7\u00a7 230<\/a>\u2013256)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
III. The State (\u00a7\u00a7 257<\/a>\u2013360)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Preliminary Concept: The Essence of the State (\u00a7\u00a7 257<\/a>\u2013259)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nA. Internal Constitutional Law (\u00a7\u00a7 260<\/a>\u2013329)<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
3. Sovereignty Abroad (\u00a7\u00a7 321<\/a>\u2013329)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nB. External Constitutional Law (International Law) (\u00a7\u00a7 330<\/a>\u2013340)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nC. World History (\u00a7\u00a7 341<\/a>\u2013360)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
\n
Art
Religion
Philosophy
<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"