[p. 434]<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the scientific ways of treating natural right, its place in practical philosophy, and its relation to the positive sciences of right<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n First published in 1802\/03 in the \u201cKritisches Journal der Philosophie\u201d (edited by Hegel and Schelling), vol. II, parts 2 and 3. Translated from the German text of the Werke (vol. 2, \u201cJenaer Schriften\u201d). The division into four parts is the editors\u2019.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Print version (PDF):<\/strong> for printing and taking along<\/a> \u2013 each page of the PDF holds exactly one page of the printed edition, with a wide margin for one\u2019s own notes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The figures between vertical bars, e.g. |93|<\/span>, mark the beginning of a page of the printed edition, so that a passage can be found again in one\u2019s own copy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the notes, \u201cEditors:<\/em>\u201d introduces a note by the editors of the German edition and \u201cHegel\u2019s footnote.\u201d one of Hegel\u2019s own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cross-reference:<\/em> The essay out of which the Groundlines<\/em> grow: Hegel examines the empirical<\/em> and the formal<\/em> (Kantian and Fichtean) treatment of natural right and sets absolute ethical life against them. The critique of empty formalism returns in the Groundlines<\/em> in the Remark to \u00a7 135<\/a>, the critique of the state of nature in \u00a7 194<\/a> Remark and \u00a7 258<\/a> Remark; ethical life itself in \u00a7 142<\/a> ff. The German text<\/a> is on the German side of this edition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Page by page:<\/strong> Each web page holds exactly one page of the printed edition. Web page 1 is p. 434, web page 2 is p. 435, and so on; the web page for a printed page thus has the number \u201cprinted page minus 433\u201d. The page number stands at the top of each web page in square brackets. The first and the last page are printed only in part, because the text there begins or ends in the middle of a page.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Find a page:<\/strong> The science of natural right, like other sciences such as mechanics and physics, has indeed long been recognised as an essentially philosophical science and, because philosophy must have parts, as an essential part of it; but it has shared with the others the common fate that the philosophical element of philosophy was located solely in metaphysics and little share in it [was] granted to them, but that they, in their particular principle, were held entirely independent of the Idea. The sciences cited as examples have finally been compelled to confess, more or less, their distance from philosophy, so that they acknowledge what is usually called experience as their scientific principle, thereby renounce the claims to be true sciences, and content themselves with consisting of a collection of empirical items of knowledge and with making use of concepts of the understanding on sufferance, and without wishing to assert anything objective thereby. If that which has called itself philosophical science has first been excluded, against its will, from philosophy and from the category of science in general, and has then in the end let itself be content with this position, this exclusion has its ground not<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 435]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |435|<\/span> in the fact that those so-called sciences did not proceed from the science of philosophy itself and did not keep themselves in conscious connection with it; for every part of philosophy in its individuality is capable of being an independent science and of gaining a perfect inner necessity, because that through which it is true science is the absolute, – in which shape it is alone the peculiar principle which lies above the sphere of its cognition and its freedom and in relation to which it belongs to an external necessity. But from this determinacy the Idea itself remains free and is able to reflect itself so purely in this determinate science as absolute life expresses itself in every living thing, without the scientific element of such a science, or its inner rationality, raising itself out into the light of day into the pure form of the Idea, which is the essence of every science and is, in philosophy as the absolute science, this pure Idea; of that peculiar and yet free scientific development of a science geometry gives a brilliant example, envied by the other sciences. Nor, likewise, is it on the ground that all reality must be denied to the sciences which are constituted like those named above, because they are properly speaking empirical; for as every part or every side of philosophy is capable of being an independent science, so each is immediately thereby also an independent and complete image, and can, in the shape of an image, be taken up and presented by an intuition which purely and happily abstains from contamination with fixed concepts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The perfection of science, however, requires that intuition and the image be just as much united with the logical and taken up into the purely ideal, as that the separated, though true science be relieved of its individuality and its principle be cognised in its higher<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 436]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |436|<\/span> connection and necessity and thereby itself be completely freed, – whereby alone it is also possible to cognise the limits of science, about which without this it must remain in ignorance, because otherwise it would have to stand above itself and cognise the nature of its principle according to its determinacy in the absolute form; for from this cognition there would follow for it immediately the cognition and certainty of the extent of the equality of its various determinacies. As it is, however, it can relate to its limits only empirically and must now make false attempts to overstep them, now think them narrower than they are, and therefore experience wholly unexpected extensions, as geometry likewise – which, for example, knows how to prove the incommensurability of the diameter and the side of the square, but not that of the diameter and the periphery of a circle1)<\/a><\/sup> -, still more arithmetic, and most of all the union of the two, gives the greatest examples of the groping of science in the dark at the limits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1)<\/a> Hegel’s footnote.<\/em> Fichte prides himself (in the introduction to his work on natural right [Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre, Leipzig und Jena 1796\/97; SW, Bd. III<\/em>]) on the simplicity of his insight into the ground of the latter incommensurability: the curved, namely, is in earnest not straight. The superficiality of this ground is evident of itself and is also immediately refuted by the first incommensurability, that of the diameter and the side of the square, both of which are straight, as well as by the quadrature of the parabola. As for the help which is sought in the same place, in healthy common sense, against mathematical infinity, namely that a polygon of infinitely many sides, precisely because it is a polygon of infinitely many sides, cannot be measured, then partly the very same help would have to be available against the infinite progress in which the absolute Idea is supposed to realise itself, and partly nothing is thereby determined about the main point, the positive infinity, which is not an infinite multitude but identity, as to whether this is to be posited, which means as much as that nothing is determined about commensurability or incommensurability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If the critical philosophy has had the important negative effect upon theoretical sciences of demonstrating that the scientific element<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 437]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |437|<\/span> in them belongs not to something objective but to the intermediate thing between nothing and reality, the mixture of being and non-being, and of bringing about their confession that they are only in empirical opining, then its positive side has turned out from this aspect all the poorer and has not been able to give those sciences back to philosophy. On the other hand it has placed the absolute wholly in practical philosophy, and in this it is positive or dogmatic knowing. We must regard the critical philosophy, which also calls itself transcendental idealism, in general, but particularly in natural right, as the culminating point of that opposition which, as the circles on the surface of water spread out concentrically from the point where it is set in motion, finally lose in small movements the relation to a centre and become infinite, grew ever greater in earlier scientific endeavours out of the closedness of barbarism from weaker beginnings, until in the critical philosophy, through the absolute concept of infinity, it came to an understanding with itself and, as infinity, also sublates itself. All significance for the essence of science must therefore be denied to the earlier manners of treatment of natural right and to what would have to be regarded as different principles of it, because they are indeed in opposition and in negativity, but not in absolute negativity or in infinity, which alone is for science, but have the positive as little pure as the negative and are mixtures of both. Only the interest of a curiosity about the history of science could linger over them, both in order to compare them with the absolute Idea and to behold, in the distortion of it itself, the necessity with which the moments of the absolute form, warped by a determinacy which is principle, present themselves and, even under the dominion<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 438]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |438|<\/span> of a restricted principle, nevertheless dominate these attempts, – and also to see the empirical state of the world reflected in the ideal mirror of science.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For as to the latter<\/em>, in the connection of all things the empirical existence and the state of all sciences will indeed likewise express the state of the world, but most immediately the state of natural right, because it relates directly to the ethical, the mover of all human things, and, insofar as the science of it has an existence, belongs to necessity, must be one with the empirical shape of the ethical, which is likewise in necessity, and must as science express the same in the form of universality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As to the former<\/em>, the only true difference in the principle of a science that can be recognised is whether it is in the absolute or whether it is outside the absolute unity, in opposition. In the latter case, however, it could not be science at all, if its principle were not some incomplete and relative unity or the concept of a relation, were it only the empty abstraction of relation itself, under the name of attractive force or force of being-one. To sciences whose principle is no concept of relation, or only the empty force of being-one, nothing ideal is left but the first ideal relation according to which the child is different as against the world, the form of representation, into which they put the empirical qualities and whose manifoldness they can recount; they would preeminently be called empirical sciences. But because practical sciences by their nature aim at something really universal or at a unity which is the unity of the different, so in practical empiricism too the feelings must include in themselves not pure qualities but relations, whether negative, like the drive to self-preservation, or positive, as love and hatred, sociability and the like; and the more scientific<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 439]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |439|<\/span> empiricism distinguishes itself from that pure empiricism not in general by relations being its object more than qualities, but by its fixing these relations in the form of the concept and holding to this negative absoluteness, without however separating this form of unity and its content. We shall call these empirical sciences<\/em>; on the other hand that form of science in which the opposition is absolute and the pure unity or infinity, the negatively absolute, is separated pure from the content and posited for itself, a purely formal<\/em> science.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Although a specific difference has hereby been established between the two spurious kinds of the scientific treatment of natural right, according to which the principle of the one is relations and mixtures of empirical intuition and the universal, that of the other, however, absolute opposition and absolute universality, it is nevertheless evident of itself that the ingredients of both, empirical intuition and concept, are the same, and that formalism, as it passes from its pure negation to a content, likewise can arrive at nothing other than relations or relative identities, because the purely ideal or the opposition [is] posited as absolute, so that the absolute Idea and unity cannot be present, and in relation to intuition – since with the principle of absolute opposition or of the absoluteness of the purely ideal the absolute principle of the empirical is posited – the syntheses, insofar as they are to have not merely the negative significance of the sublation of one part of the opposition but also a positive significance of intuition, can represent only empirical intuitions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These two kinds of the scientific treatment of natural right are first to be characterised more closely<\/em>: the former with regard to the way in which the absolute Idea appears in it according to the moments of the absolute form; the other, how the infinite or the negatively absolute seeks in vain<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 440]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |440|<\/span> to bring it to a positive organisation. The exposition of the latter attempt will lead immediately to the consideration of the nature and the relation of the sciences of the ethical as philosophical sciences<\/em> as well as of their relation to that<\/em> which is called positive science of right<\/em>, which indeed keeps itself outside philosophy and, in that it renounces it of itself, believes it can withdraw from its critique, yet at the same time also claims an absolute subsistence and a true reality, a pretension which is not to be indulged.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cross-reference:<\/em> The empirical manner of treatment. On the critique of starting from the state of nature see \u00a7 194<\/a> Remark and \u00a7 258<\/a> Remark.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As for the manner of treatment<\/em> of natural right which we have called the empirical<\/em>, it cannot, in the first place, enter at all upon the determinacies and concepts of relation themselves, as to their matter, which it seizes upon and asserts under the name of fundamental principles, but it is precisely this separating and fixing of determinacies that must be negated. The nature of this separating brings with it that the scientific element can aim only at the form of unity and that, in an organic relation, out of the many kinds of qualities into which it can be divided, if they are not merely to be recounted – in order to attain a unity over this multitude – some determinacy must be singled out and regarded as the essence of the relation. But precisely thereby the totality of the organic is not attained, and the remainder of it, excluded from that chosen determinacy, comes under the dominion of the latter, which is raised to essence and purpose. Thus, for example, in order to cognise the relation of marriage, now the begetting of children, now the community of goods, etc., is posited, and from such a determinacy, which is made into the law as the essential, the whole organic relation is determined and contaminated; or of punishment [is]<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 441]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |441|<\/span> now the determinacy of the moral improvement of the criminal, now of the damage done, now of the representation of the punishment in others, now of the criminal’s own representation of it preceding the crime, now of the necessity that this representation be made real, the threat carried out, etc., seized upon, and such an individual item made the purpose and essence of the whole; whereupon it naturally follows that, because such a determinacy is not in necessary connection with the remaining determinacies, which are to be further hunted up and distinguished, a tormenting over it arises, in order to find the necessary relation and dominion of the one over the others, which comes to no end, and that, because the inner necessity, which is not in individuality, is lacking, each can very well vindicate its independence from the other. – Such qualities, seized upon out of the plurality of relations into which the organic is splintered by empirical or imperfectly reflected intuition, and posited in the form of the unity of the concept, are what that knowing calls the essence and the purposes and, in that their form of the concept is expressed as the absolute being of the determinacy which constitutes the content of the concept, are set up as fundamental principles, laws, duties, etc., – of which transformation of the absoluteness of the pure form, which however is the negative absoluteness or pure identity, the pure concept, infinity, into the absoluteness of the content and of the determinacy which is taken up into the form, more will be said in connection with the principle of the critical philosophy, which undertakes that transformation with reflection upon it and as absolute reason and duty, whereas in empirical knowing, of which we are speaking here, it happens unconsciously.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This formal unity, into which the determinacy is posited by thinking, is at the same time what gives the semblance of the necessity which science seeks; for the<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 442]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |442|<\/span> unity of opposites, considered in relation to these as real, is their necessity. But because the matter of the formal unity of which we are speaking is not the whole of the opposites but only one<\/em> of the opposites, a determinacy, the necessity too is only a formal, analytical one and relates merely to the form of an identical or analytical proposition in which the determinacy can be presented, through which absoluteness of the proposition, however, an absoluteness of the content is also obtained by stealth, and thus laws and fundamental principles are constituted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But since this empirical science finds itself in the manifoldness of such fundamental principles, laws, purposes, duties, rights, none of which is absolute, there must at the same time hover before it the image and the need of the absolute unity of all these unconnected determinacies and of an original simple necessity, and we consider how it will satisfy this demand descending from reason, or how the absolute Idea of reason will be presented in its moments under the dominion of the opposition of the many and the one, which is insurmountable for this empirical knowing. It is partly interesting in itself to behold, in this scientific endeavour and in its turbid medium, even the reflection and the dominion of the absolute, but at the same time its perversity; partly the forms which the moments of the absolute have received therein have become a kind of prejudices and of undoubted, generally valid thoughts, whose nullity critique must show, in order to justify science in taking no regard of them, – which demonstration of their nullity takes place most evidently by pointing out the reality-less ground and soil out of which they have grown and whose taste and nature grow into them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the first place, what hovers before empirical science is scientific<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 443]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |443|<\/span> totality as a totality of the manifold or as completeness, but before formalism proper as consistency. The former can raise its experiences into universality at will and continue the consistency with its thought determinacies as far as it goes, until other empirical material, which contradicts that, but has just as much its right to be thought and pronounced as a fundamental principle, no longer permits the consistency of the preceding determinacy but compels it to be abandoned. Formalism can extend its consistency as far as the emptiness of its principle in general permits, or a content it has obtained by stealth; in return, however, it is also entitled proudly to exclude from its apriority and science, under the disgusting name of the empirical, whatever is lacking in completeness, for it asserts its formal principles as the a priori and absolute and therefore that of which it cannot make itself master through them as non-absolute and contingent, unless it knows how to help itself otherwise by finding, to the empirical in general and from one determinacy again to the other, the formal transition of progress from the conditioned to the condition and, since this is again a conditioned, so on to infinity, – whereby however it not only gives up every advantage over what it calls the empirical but, since in the connection of the conditioned with the condition these opposites are posited as subsisting absolutely, itself sinks wholly into empirical necessity and lends to this, through the formal identity or the negatively absolute with which it holds it together, the semblance of true absoluteness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This combination of consistency with the completeness of the image – be it of the latter, more complete formal and empty consistency, or of that former one which, with determinate concepts as fundamental principles, from one of which it passes to others, is consistent only in inconsistency – however immediately displaces the position of the manifold,<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 444]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |444|<\/span> as it is for pure empiricism, for which each has equal rights with the other and which prefers to the other no determinacy, one of which is as real as the other, to which we shall return below when comparing pure empiricism with this scientific kind of which we are here speaking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n After this formal totality we must consider how absolute unity appears in the reflex of empirical knowing, both as simple unity, which we can call the original one, and as totality; both unities, which in the absolute are one and whose identity is the absolute, must in that knowing be separated and occur as something different.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As to that unity in the first place, empiricism cannot be concerned with it as the essence of necessity, which for the appearance is an external bond of it; for in the unity which is the essential one the manifold is immediately annihilated and nothing; because manifold being is the principle of empiricism, it is denied it to penetrate to the absolute nothing of its qualities, which for it are absolute and, also through the concept according to which they are absolutely many, are infinitely many. That original unity can therefore signify only a, as far as possible, simple and small multitude of qualities, with which it believes it can suffice for the cognition of the rest. That ideal, in which what roughly counts as arbitrary and contingent is wiped out and the smallest necessary multitude of the manifold is posited, is for empiricism, in the physical as in the ethical, the chaos<\/em>, which in the latter is represented, now more under the image of being by imagination as the state of nature<\/em>, now more under the form of possibility and of abstraction, as an enumeration of the faculties found in man by empirical psychology, [as] the nature and vocation of man<\/em>, and in this way what is asserted on the one hand as absolutely necessary, in itself, absolute, is at the same time on the other hand acknowledged as something<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 445]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |445|<\/span> not real, merely imagined and as a thing of thought, there as a fiction, here as a mere possibility, which is the hardest contradiction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For the common understanding, which keeps to the turbid mixture of what is in itself and what is transient, nothing is more comprehensible than that it can find what is in itself in such a way that, if it separates off from the mixed image of the condition of right everything arbitrary and contingent, the absolutely necessary must remain to it immediately through this abstraction. If one thinks away everything that a turbid presentiment can reckon among the particular and the transient, as belonging to particular customs, to history, to culture and also to the state, then man remains, under the image of the naked state of nature, or the abstract of it with its essential possibilities, and one has only to look in order to find what is necessary. What is recognised as being in relation to the state must also be separated off for the reason that the chaotic image of the necessary cannot contain the absolute unity, but only the simple manifoldness, the atoms with the fewest possible properties, and therefore [that] which can fall under the concept of a linking and ordering of them, as the weakest unity of which the principle of plurality is capable, is excluded from it as what is first later and added to that plurality. Now in that separation empiricism lacks, in the first place, any criterion at all as to where the boundary runs between the contingent and the necessary, hence what is to remain in the chaos of the state of nature or in the abstraction of man and what must be left out. The guiding determination herein can be nothing other than that there be as much in it as one needs for the presentation of what is found in actuality; the judging principle for that a priori is the a posteriori. As to what is to be made valid in the representation of the condition of right<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 446]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |446|<\/span> one has only, in order to show its connection with the original and necessary and thus itself as necessary, to locate for this purpose a special quality or faculty in the chaos, to make hypotheses, in the manner of the sciences proceeding from the empirical in general, for the so-called explanation of actuality, in which this actuality is posited in the same determinacy, only in a wholly formal-ideal shape as force, matter, faculty, so that one is also very easily comprehensible and explicable from the other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On the one side, this turbid presentiment of original and absolute unity, which expresses itself in the chaos of the state of nature and in the abstraction of faculties and inclinations, does not get as far as absolute negative unity, but goes only to the extinction of a great multitude of particularities and oppositions; but there still remains in it an indeterminable multitude of qualitative determinacies, which have, just as little for themselves any other than an empirical necessity, and for one another no inner necessity; they have only the relation of being, as many, and because this many is for one another but without unity, of being determined as opposed to one another and in absolute conflict against one another, and the separated energies of the ethical must be thought in the state of nature or in the abstract of man as in a war of mutual annihilation. But it is for this very reason easy to show that, since these qualities are absolutely opposed to one another and are therefore purely ideal, they cannot subsist in this ideality and separation, as they are nevertheless supposed to, but sublate themselves and reduce to nothing; but to this absolute reflection and to the insight into the nothing of the determinacies in the absolutely simple empiricism cannot attain, but the many nothings remain for it a multitude of realities. To this plurality, however, the positive unity expressing itself as absolute totality must, for empiricism, be added as something other and alien<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 447]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |447|<\/span> , and already in this form of linking the two sides of the absolute identity it is contained that the totality will present itself just as turbid and impure as that of the original unity. The ground of the being of the one of these unities here separated for the other, or of the transition from the first to the second, is as easily given by empiricism as grounding in general comes easy to it. According to the fiction of the state of nature it is left for the sake of the evils which it carries with it, which means nothing other than: what one wishes to arrive at is presupposed, namely that an accord of what conflicts as chaos is the good or that to which one must come; or into the representation of the original qualities as possibilities such a ground of transition is immediately put as drive of sociability, or the concept-form of a faculty is renounced and one proceeds at once to the wholly particular of the appearance of that second unity, to the historical, as subjugation of the weaker by the more powerful, etc. The unity itself, however, according to the principle of absolute qualitative plurality, as in empirical physics, can do nothing but again [posit], in the place of the many atomic qualities, manifold entanglements of the simple and separated many posited as original, superficial contacts of these qualities, which in themselves in their particularity are indestructible and capable of entering only light, partial combinations and mixtures, hence it can present a plurality of the divided or of relations and, insofar as the unity is posited as a whole, posit the empty name of a formless and external harmony under the name of society and the state. Even if this unity is represented as absolute, whether for itself or, in a more empirical relation, according to its origin, as receiving its immediate origin from God, and if in its subsistence too the centre and inner essence are represented as divine, yet this representation again remains<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 448]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |448|<\/span> something formal, hovering only above the plurality, not penetrating it. Be it that God is cognised not only as founder of the union but also as its preserver, and, in relation to the latter, the majesty of the supreme power as his reflection and divine in itself, the divine of the union is something external for the united many, who must be posited with it only in the relation of dominion, because the principle of this empiricism excludes the absolute unity of the one and the many; at which point of this relation it coincides immediately with the opposed principle, for which abstract unity is the first, except that empiricism is not embarrassed by its inconsistencies, which spring from the mixing of things posited as so specifically different as abstract unity and absolute plurality are, and for this very reason also has the advantage of not closing the access to views which, apart from their merely material side, are appearances of a purer and more divine interior than can come about according to the principle of opposition, in which alone ruling and obeying are possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The state of nature and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right, alien to the individuals and therefore itself individual and particular, as well as the relation of the absolute subjection of the subjects under that supreme power, are the forms in which the splintered moments of organic ethical life – the moment of absolute unity and of the same insofar as it comprehends within itself the opposition of unity and plurality and is absolute totality, and the moment of infinity or of the nothing of the realities of the opposition – are fixed as particular essentialities and precisely thereby, as is the Idea, are perverted. The absolute Idea of ethical life, on the other hand, contains the natural condition and the majesty as absolutely identical, in that the latter itself is nothing other than the absolute ethical nature, and no loss of absolute freedom, which one would have to<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 449]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |449|<\/span> understand by natural freedom, or giving up of ethical nature through the majesty’s being real, can be thought; the natural, however, which in the ethical relation would have to be thought as something to be given up, would itself be nothing ethical and thus would least of all present the same in its originality. Just as little is infinity or the nothing of the individual, of the subjects, fixed in the absolute Idea and in relative identity with the majesty as a relation of subjection, in which individuality too would be something absolutely posited, but in the Idea infinity is true, individuality as such nothing and absolutely one with the absolute ethical majesty, which true living, not subjected being-one is alone the true ethical life of the individual.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We have charged scientific empiricism, insofar as it is scientific, with positive nullity and with the untruth of its fundamental principles, laws, etc., because it bestows on determinacies, through the formal unity into which it transposes them, the negative absoluteness of the concept and pronounces them as positively absolute and being in themselves, as purpose and vocation, fundamental principle, law, duty and right, which forms signify something absolute. But in order to obtain the unity of an organic relation which offers to this qualitative determining a multitude of such concepts, a dominion over the other determinacies of the manifoldness must be given to one<\/em> determinacy expressed as purpose, vocation or law, and these must be posited before it as unreal and null. It is in this application and consistency that intuition as inner totality is annihilated; it is therefore inconsistency through which that taking up of determinacies into the concept can rectify itself and sublate the violence done to intuition, for inconsistency immediately annihilates the absoluteness previously bestowed on a determinacy. From this side the old, thoroughly inconsistent<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 450]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |450|<\/span> empiricism must be justified, not in relation to absolute science as such, but in relation to the consistency of the empirical scientificity of which there has so far been talk. A great and pure intuition can in this way express the truly ethical in the purely architectonic of its presentation, in which the connection of necessity and the dominion of the form do not step forth into the visible – like a building which presents the spirit of its author mutely in the scattered mass, without its image itself, gathered into one, being set up in it as a shape. In such a presentation made with the help of concepts it is only a clumsiness of reason that it does not raise to the ideal form what it comprehends and penetrates and does not become conscious of it as Idea. If intuition only remains true to itself and lets itself not be confused by the understanding, it will, insofar as it cannot do without concepts for its expression, conduct itself clumsily with regard to them, assume perverted shapes in passing through consciousness, and be both incoherent and contradictory for the concept; but the arrangement of the parts and of the determinacies modifying themselves let the inner rational spirit, though invisible, be guessed, and insofar as this its appearance is regarded as product and result, it will agree perfectly with the Idea as product.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For the understanding nothing is easier here than to fall upon this empiricism, to set other grounds against those clumsy ones, to point out the confusion and the contradiction of the concepts, to draw from the isolated propositions consequences which express what is hardest and most unreasonable, and in manifold ways to lay bare the unscientific character of empiricism, in which it has its right done to it, especially if it either has the pretension to be scientific or is polemical against science as<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 451]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |451|<\/span> such. On the other hand, when determinacies are fixed and their law is carried through consistently across the sides dug up by empiricism, intuition is subjected to them and in general what is usually called theory is formed, then empiricism is right to charge this with one-sidedness, and through the completeness of the determinacies which it asserts, it is in its power to force that theory by instances to a universality which becomes wholly empty. That limitedness of concepts, the fixing of determinacies, the elevation of a seized-upon side of the appearance into universality and the dominion bestowed on it over the others, is what in recent times has called itself no longer theory but philosophy, and, according as it raised itself to emptier abstractions and took possession of purer negations such as freedom, pure will, humanity, etc., metaphysics, and believed itself to have produced philosophical revolutions in natural right as well as especially in the right of the state and in criminal right, when it tugged these sciences to and fro with such essenceless abstractions and positively expressed negations as freedom, equality, pure state, etc., or with determinacies seized upon from common empiricism, which are just as essenceless as those, like coercion, especially psychological coercion with its whole train of opposition of practical reason and sensuous incentives, and whatever else is native to this psychology, and likewise forced such null concepts, as absolute purposes of reason, principles of reason and laws, with more or less consistency through a science. With right empiricism demands that such philosophising must orient itself by experience. It rightly insists on its tenacity against such a scaffolding and artifice of fundamental principles and prefers its empirical inconsistency, which is grounded on an, albeit turbid, intuition of a whole, to the consistency of<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 452]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |452|<\/span> such philosophising, and its own confusion, e.g. of ethical life, morality, legality or, in a more particular case, in punishment, the confusion of revenge, security of the state, improvement, carrying out of the threat, deterrence, prevention, etc., whether in a scientific regard or in practical life, to the absolute holding apart of these different sides of one and the same intuition and the determining of the whole of it by a single one of these qualities, – asserts with right that theory and that which calls itself philosophy and metaphysics have no application and contradict necessary practice, – which non-applicability would be better expressed by saying that in that theory and philosophy there is nothing absolute, no reality and truth. Finally empiricism rightly also reproaches such philosophising with its ingratitude towards it, in that it is what supplies it with the content of its concepts and must see the same spoilt and perverted by it; for empiricism offers the determinacy of the content in an entanglement and connectedness with other determinacies, which in its essence is a whole, organic and living, which is killed by that dismemberment and by that elevation of essenceless abstractions and individual items to absoluteness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n An empiricism would assert itself against such theory and philosophy with the greatest right, and would regard the multitude of principles, purposes, laws, duties, rights not as something absolute, but as distinctions that are important for the culture through which its own intuition becomes clearer to it, if it were and remained pure itself. But when empiricism appears to enter the struggle with theory, it usually turns out that the one as well as the other is an intuition already contaminated and sublated beforehand by reflection, and a perverted reason, and that what passes itself off as empiricism is only the weaker in abstraction, and is that which, with less self-activity,<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 453]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |453|<\/span> has not itself extracted, distinguished and fixed its limitations, but is entangled in those which, having become firm in general culture, are present as healthy common sense and therefore seem to be taken immediately from experience. Between such a perversity of intuition that has become firm and the abstractions only now fixed, the picture of the conflict is necessarily just as motley as they themselves are; each uses against the other now an abstraction, now a so-called experience, and on both sides it is empiricism that shatters itself against empiricism, and limitedness that shatters itself against limitedness, – now a boasting with principles and laws against philosophy and an exclusion of it as an incompetent judge of such absolute truths, in which the understanding has run itself fast, now a misuse of it for ratiocination and an appeal to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This relative right, which has been conceded to empiricism, when intuition is the ruling element in it, against the mixing of the empirical and the reflected, relates, as was recalled, to its unconscious inner; but the middle between the two, between that inner and its outer, – consciousness, is the side towards which its deficiency and therefore its one-sidedness lies, and its driving towards the scientific and the incomplete connection and mere contact with the concept, through which it only contaminates itself in this way, stems from the necessity that multiplicity and finitude absolutely sink themselves into infinity or into universality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cross-reference:<\/em> The formal manner of treatment (Kant and Fichte). The critique of \u201cempty formalism\u201d returns in the Remark to \u00a7 135<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But it is the side of infinity<\/em> that constitutes the principle of the apriority opposed to the empirical, to the consideration of which we now pass over.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The going of empirical opining and of its mixing<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 454]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |454|<\/span> of the manifold with the simple towards the concept is, in the absolute concept or in infinity, removed from its wavering, and the incomplete separation is decided. In a lower abstraction, infinity has indeed also been singled out as the absoluteness of the subject in the doctrine of happiness in general and in natural right in particular, by those systems that are called anti-socialist and posit the being of the individual as the first and highest, but not in the pure abstraction which it has received in Kantian or Fichtean idealism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It does not belong here to present the nature of infinity and of its manifold transformations; for as it is the principle of movement and of alteration, so its essence itself is nothing other than to be the unmediated opposite of itself, or it is the negatively absolute, the abstraction of form, which, in that it is pure identity, is immediately pure non-identity or absolute opposition; in that it is pure ideality, just as immediately pure reality; in that it is the infinite, the absolutely finite; in that it is the indeterminate, absolute determinacy. The absolute transition into the opposite, which is its essence, and the vanishing of every reality in its opposite cannot be halted otherwise than by empirically fixing the one side of it, namely reality, or the subsisting of the opposed, and abstracting from the opposite, the nothingness of this subsisting. This real opposite is on one side the manifold being or finitude and, over against it, infinity as negation of multiplicity and positively as pure unity; and the absolute concept, constituted in this way, yields in this unity that which has been called pure reason. The relation of this pure unity, however, to the manifold beings standing over against it<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 455]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |455|<\/span> is itself again just as much a doubled relation, either the positive one of the subsisting of both or of the being-annihilated of both; but both that subsisting and this being-annihilated are to be understood only as partial, for were that subsisting of both absolute, there would be no relation of the two at all, and were the complete being-annihilated of both posited, there would not be a subsisting of both. This partial subsisting and partial being-negated of both – the opposing of a divisible I to a divisible not-I in the I, i.e. in the relation, for that very reason likewise partial – is the absolute principle of this philosophy. In the first, the positive relation, pure unity is called theoretical, in the negative relation practical reason; and because in the latter the negation of the opposition is the first, and unity therefore the more subsisting, but in the former the subsisting of the opposition is the first, and multiplicity therefore what subsists first and more, practical reason appears here as the real, theoretical reason however as the ideal. – But one sees that this determination belongs entirely to the opposition and to appearance; for pure unity, which is posited as reason, is admittedly negative, ideal, if the opposed, the many, which is thereby the unreasonable, absolutely has a subsisting, just as it appears as more subsisting and more real if the many is posited as negated or rather as to be negated. But that unreasonable many, as nature is posited against reason as pure unity, is unreasonable only because it is posited as the essenceless abstraction of the many and, on the other hand, reason as the essenceless abstraction of the one; considered in itself, however, both that many is absolute unity of the one and the many, as is this unity, and nature or theoretical reason, which is the many, as absolute unity of the one and the many, must rather, conversely, be determined as the real reason; the ethical, which is the unity, as absolute unity of the one and the many, however, as the ideal, because in<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 456]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |456|<\/span> opposition reality is in multiplicity, but ideality in unity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In what is called practical reason there is therefore to be recognised only the formal<\/em> Idea of the identity of the ideal and the real, and this Idea was supposed to be the absolute point of indifference in these systems; but that Idea does not emerge from difference and the ideal does not arrive at reality, for notwithstanding that in this practical reason the ideal and the real are identical, the real nonetheless remains absolutely opposed. This real is essentially posited outside reason, and practical reason, whose essence is conceived as a relation of causality to the many, – as an identity which [is] absolutely affected with a difference and does not go out from appearance, – is only in difference against it. This science of the ethical, which speaks of the absolute identity of the ideal and the real, thus does not act in accordance with its words, but its ethical reason is in truth and in its essence a non-identity of the ideal and the real.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ethical reason was previously determined as the absolute in the form of unity, and hereby, in that it is itself posited as a determinacy, it seems immediately in this determination to be posited just as essentially with an opposition. The difference, however, is that true reality and the absolute of it is entirely free of this opposition to nature and that it is absolute identity of the ideal and the real. The absolute is cognised according to its Idea as this identity of differents, whose determinacy is, for the one to be unity, for the other multiplicity, and this determinacy is ideal, i.e. it is only in infinity according to the concept of it shown above: this determinacy is sublated just as much as it is posited; each, unity as well as multiplicity, whose identity the absolute is, is itself unity of the one and the many. But the one, whose ideal determination is multiplicity, is the subsisting of the opposed,<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 457]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |457|<\/span> the positive reality, and therefore an opposite, doubled relation is necessary to it itself. Because the real subsists in it, its identity is a relative one, and this relative identity of the opposed is necessity. As it is thus in difference, so its relation itself or the identity of the relation must also be a different; both that in it unity and that multiplicity is the first. This twofold relation determines the doubled side of necessity or of the appearance of the absolute. Since this twofold relation falls on multiplicity, and if we call indifference the unity of the differents, which stands on the other side and in which that reality or the many is sublated, then the absolute is the unity of indifference and of relation; and because the latter is a doubled one, the appearance of the absolute is determined as unity of indifference and of that relation or of that relative identity in which the many is the first, the positive, – and as unity of indifference and of that relation in which unity is the first and positive; the former is physical, the latter ethical nature. And since indifference or unity is freedom, but relation or relative identity is necessity, each of these two appearances is the oneness and indifference of freedom and necessity. Substance is absolute and infinite; in this predicate infinity the necessity of the divine nature or its appearance [is contained], and this necessity expresses itself as reality precisely in a doubled relation. Each of the two attributes itself expresses substance and is absolute and infinite or the unity of indifference and of relation, and in the relation their difference is posited in such a way that in the relation of the one the many, in the relation of the other the one is the first or that which is turned outward against the other. But because in ethical nature itself in its relation unity is the first,<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 458]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |458|<\/span> it is also free in this relative identity, i.e. in its necessity; or because relative identity is not sublated by unity being the first, this second freedom is so determined that the necessary indeed is for ethical nature, but is posited negatively. If we were now to isolate this side of the relative identity of ethical nature and were to recognise as the essence of ethical nature not the absolute unity of indifference and of this relative identity, but the side of the relation or of necessity, we would stand at the same point at which the essence of practical reason is determined as having absolute causality, or that it is indeed free and necessity only negative, but precisely for that reason nonetheless posited, whereby precisely that freedom does not come out of difference, the relation or relative identity is made into the essence, and the absolute is conceived only as negatively absolute or as infinite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The empirical and popular expression by which this representation, which grasps ethical nature merely from the side of its relative identity, has so greatly recommended itself, is that the real, under the names of sensibility, inclinations, lower faculty of desire etc. (moment of the multiplicity of the relation), does not agree (moment of the opposition of unity and multiplicity) with reason (moment of the pure unity of the relation), and that reason consists in willing out of its own absolute self-activity and autonomy and in restricting and dominating that sensibility (moment of the determinacy of this relation, that in it unity or the negation of multiplicity is the first). The reality of this representation is grounded on the empirical consciousness and the general experience of everyone, of finding both that discord and this pure unity of practical reason or the abstraction of the I in itself. Nor can there be any question of denying this standpoint, but it<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 459]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |459|<\/span> has been determined above as the side of relative identity, of the being of the infinite in the finite; but this must be maintained, that it is not the absolute standpoint, as in which, as has been shown, the relation proves itself to be only one side and the isolating of it therefore to be something one-sided, and that, because ethical life is something absolute, that standpoint is not the standpoint of ethical life, but that in it there is no ethical life. And as regards the appeal to common consciousness, in that very same consciousness ethical life itself must just as necessarily occur as that standpoint which, since the relation is isolated for itself, posited as being in itself and not as a moment, is the principle of unethicality. Empirical consciousness is empirical because the moments of the absolute appear in it scattered, side by side, successive, fragmented; but it would itself be no common consciousness if ethical life did not just as much occur in it. Among these manifold appearances of the ethical and the unethical that occur in empirical consciousness, that formal philosophy had the choice, and it is not the fault of common consciousness but of philosophy that it chose the appearance of the unethical and supposed itself to have in negative absoluteness or in infinity the true absolute.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The execution of this practical philosophy rests on the presentation of that which this negative absoluteness is capable of, and we must follow the false attempt to show a truly absolute in the negatively absolute through its principal moments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It follows at once that, since pure unity constitutes the essence of practical reason, there can be so little talk of a system of ethical life that not even a plurality of laws is possible, inasmuch as that which goes beyond the pure concept or – because this, insofar as it is posited as negating the many, i.e. as practical, is duty<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 460]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |460|<\/span> – that which goes beyond the pure concept of duty and the abstraction of a law no longer belongs to this pure reason; as Kant, he who has presented this abstraction of the concept in its absolute purity, recognises very well that all material of the law is lacking to practical reason and that it can make nothing more than the form<\/em> of the suitability<\/em> of the maxim of arbitrary will the supreme law. The maxim of arbitrary will has a content and includes a determinacy in itself; the pure will, by contrast, is free of determinacies; the absolute law of practical reason is to raise that determinacy into the form of pure unity, and the expression of this determinacy taken up into the form is the law. If it is possible that the determinacy is taken up into the form of the pure concept, if it does not sublate itself through this form, then it is justified and has become absolute through negative absoluteness itself, law and right or duty. But the matter of the maxim remains what it is, a determinacy or individuality; and the universality which the taking-up into the form bestows on it is therefore an absolutely analytic unity, and if the unity bestowed on it is pronounced purely as what it is in a proposition, the proposition is an analytic one and a tautology. And in the production of tautologies consists, in truth, the sublime faculty of the autonomy of legislation of pure practical reason; the pure identity of the understanding, expressed in the theoretical as the principle of contradiction, remains, turned to the practical form, the very same. If the question \u201cWhat is truth?\u201d, put to logic and answered by it, presents Kant with the laughable sight of one milking the he-goat while the other holds a sieve beneath, then the question \u201cWhat is right and duty?\u201d, put to that pure practical reason and answered by it, is in the same case. If Kant recognises that a general criterion of truth would be that which would be valid of all cognitions without distinction<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 461]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |461|<\/span> of their objects, but that it is clear that, since in it one abstracts from all content of cognition and truth concerns precisely this content, it is entirely impossible and absurd to ask for a mark of the truth of this content of cognitions, inasmuch as the mark is at the same time not to concern the content of cognitions, he thereby pronounces precisely the judgement on the principle of duty and right that is set up by practical reason. For it is the absolute abstraction from all matter of the will; through a content a heteronomy of arbitrary will is posited. Now, however, it is precisely the interest to know what right and duty then are; the question is asked after the content of the ethical law, and all that matters is this content; but the essence of the pure will and of pure practical reason is that all content is abstracted from, and so it is in itself contradictory to seek, in this absolute practical reason, an ethical legislation, since it would have to have a content, while its essence consists in having no content.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In order, then, for this formalism to be able to pronounce a law, it is necessary that some matter, a determinacy, be posited which makes up the content of the law, and the form which is added to this determinacy is unity or universality; that a maxim of your will must at the same time count as the principle of a universal legislation – this basic law of pure practical reason expresses that some determinacy, which makes up the content of the maxim of the particular will, be posited as concept, as universal. But every determinacy is capable of being taken up into the form of the concept and posited as a quality, and there is nothing at all that could not be made in this way into an ethical law. Every determinacy, however, is in itself a particular and not a universal; the opposite determinacy stands over against it, and it is only determinacy<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 462]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |462|<\/span> insofar as such a one stands over against it. Each of the two determinacies is equally capable of being thought; which of the two it is to be, which is to be taken up into the unity or thought and which abstracted from, this is entirely undetermined and free; if the one is fixed as subsisting in and for itself, then the other indeed cannot be posited; but this other can just as well be thought and, since this form of thinking is the essence, pronounced as an absolute ethical law. That the commonest understanding without instruction can undertake that easy operation and distinguish which form in the maxim is suited for universal legislation or not, Kant shows by the example of the question whether the maxim, to increase my wealth by all safe means – in case such a means presented itself in a deposit – could count as a universal practical law, which would thus be of the content that anyone may deny a deposit the depositing of which nobody can prove to him; this question decides itself, in that such a principle as law would annihilate itself, because it would bring it about that there would be no deposit at all.2)<\/a><\/sup> But that there would be no deposit at all, what contradiction would lie in that? That there be no deposit will contradict other necessary determinacies, just as that a deposit be possible will cohere with other necessary determinacies and thereby be itself necessary. But other purposes and material grounds are not to be called in; rather, the immediate form of the concept is to decide the correctness of the first or the second assumption; but for the form the one of the opposed determinacies is as indifferent as the other; each can be conceived as a quality and this conceiving pronounced as law. If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2)<\/a> Editors:<\/em> Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, A 49<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 463]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |463|<\/span> proposition can be made from it: property is property and otherwise nothing else, and this tautological production is the legislating of this, the practical reason: property, if property is, must be property. But if the opposite determinacy, negation of property, is posited, then through the legislation of the very same practical reason the tautology results: non-property is non-property; if there is no property, then that which wants to be property must be sublated. But it is precisely the interest to prove that property must be; it is concerned solely with that which lies outside the capacity of this practical legislating of pure reason, namely to decide which of the opposed determinacies must be posited; but that this have already happened before and one of the opposed determinacies be posited in advance, pure reason demands, and only then can it carry out its now superfluous legislating.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But the analytic unity and tautology of practical reason is not merely something superfluous, but, in the turn which it receives, something false, and it must be recognised as the principle of unethicality. Through the mere taking-up of a determinacy into the form of unity the nature of the being of it is supposed to change; and the determinacy which by its nature has another determinacy against it, the one of which is the negation of the other and for that very reason neither is something absolute (and it is indifferent to the function of practical reason which of the two it is, for it gives merely the empty form), is supposed, through this connection with the form of pure unity, itself to be made absolute, to be made law and duty. But where a determinacy and individuality is raised to an in-itself, there unreasonableness is posited and, in relation to the ethical, unethicality. – This transformation of the conditioned, unreal into an unconditioned and absolute is easy to recognise in its illegitimacy and to trace out on its sly path. The determinacy, taken up into the form<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 464]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |464|<\/span> of pure unity or of formal identity, produces, when the determinate concept is expressed as a proposition, the tautology of the formal proposition \u201cthe determinacy A<\/em> is the determinacy A<\/em>\u201d. The form, or in the proposition: \u201cthe identity of subject and predicate is something absolute\u201d, [brings] however only something negative or formal [forth], which does not concern the determinacy A<\/em> itself at all; this content is for the form something thoroughly hypothetical. The absoluteness that is in the proposition according to its form, however, acquires in practical reason an entirely different meaning; it is namely also transferred to the content, which by its nature is something conditioned, and this non-absolute, conditioned thing is raised, contrary to its essence, to an absolute through that mixing. It is not the practical interest to produce a tautology, and on account of this idle form, which is nevertheless its only force, not so much fuss would be made of practical reason; through the mixing of the absolute form with the conditioned matter, however, the absoluteness of the form is unawares foisted on the unreal, conditioned element of the content, and in this perversion and sleight of hand lies the nerve of this practical legislation of pure reason. To the proposition \u201cproperty is property\u201d there is foisted, instead of its true meaning: \u201cthe identity which this proposition expresses in its form is absolute\u201d, the meaning: \u201cthe matter of it, namely property, is absolute\u201d, and forthwith every determinacy can be made duty. Arbitrary will has the choice among opposed determinacies, and it would be only a clumsiness if for some action no such ground could be found, one which no longer has merely the form of a probable ground as with the Jesuits, but receives the form of right and duty; and this moral formalism does not go beyond the moral art of the Jesuits and the principles of the doctrine of happiness, which coincide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 465]<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is well to note here that the taking-up of the determinacy into the concept is understood in such a way that this taking-up is something formal, or that the determinacy is to remain, so that matter and form contradict each other, of which the former is determinate, the latter infinite. But were the content truly equated with the form, the determinacy with unity, no practical legislating would take place, but only an annihilating of the determinacy. Thus property itself is immediately opposed to universality; equated with it, it is sublated. – Immediately this annihilation of the determinacy through the taking-up into infinity, universality, also becomes troublesome to practical legislating. For if the determinacy is of such a kind that it itself expresses the sublating of a determinacy, then through the elevation of the sublating into the universal or into being-sublated both the determinacy which is to be sublated and the sublating are annihilated; so a maxim which relates to such a determinacy, which, thought in universality, annihilates itself, would not be capable of becoming the principle of a universal legislation, and would thus be immoral. Or: the content of the maxim, which is the sublating of a determinacy, raised into the concept, contradicts itself; if the determinacy is thought as sublated, the sublating of it falls away; or else this determinacy is to remain, and then again the sublating posited in the maxim is not posited, and the determinacy may thus remain or not, in no case is its sublating possible. But a maxim that is immoral according to the principle (because it contradicts itself) is, since it expresses the sublation of a determinacy, absolutely rational and thus absolutely moral; for the rational is, from its negative side, the indifference of determinacies, the being-sublated of the conditioned. Thus the determinacy of helping the poor expresses the sublation of the determinacy which is poverty; the maxim whose content is that determinacy, tested by elevating it to the principle of a<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 466]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |466|<\/span> universal legislation, will prove to be false, for it annihilates itself. If it is thought that the poor are helped universally, then there are either no poor at all any more or nothing but poor, and then there remain none who can help, and so in both cases the help would fall away; the maxim thus, thought as universal, sublates itself. But should the determinacy which is the condition of the sublating, namely poverty, remain, then the possibility of help remains, but as possibility, not as actuality, as the maxim states; if poverty is to remain so that the duty to help the poor can be exercised, then through that letting-remain of poverty the duty is immediately not fulfilled. Thus the maxim to defend one’s fatherland against enemies with honour, and infinitely many more, sublate themselves when thought as the principle of a universal legislation; for that one, e.g., thus extended, sublates the determinacy of a fatherland as well as of the enemies and of the defence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Just as little as unity has the pure negative meaning of the mere sublating of determinacies, just as little is it the true unity of intuition or the positive indifference of determinacies, and the comparison with the latter will make the perverted essence of that unity clearer from another side. That unity of practical reason, namely, is essentially affected with a difference; be it that it is posited as the fixing of a determinacy, then others are immediately excluded by this, posited negatively, or as an analytic proposition, then the identity of it, this its form, contradicts its content. Which can also be grasped thus: as a proposition it contradicts, with its content, the demand made on the proposition to be a judgement; something was supposed to be said with the proposition, but with the identical proposition nothing is said, for it is not a judgement, because the relation of subject to predicate is merely formal and no difference of them at all is posited. Or let the unity be taken as universality, then it has altogether<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 467]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |467|<\/span> relation to an empirical manifold, and the determinacy is opposed, as present, to an infinite multitude of empirically other ones. The unity of intuition, on the other hand, is the indifference of the determinacies which make up a whole, not a fixing of them as separated and opposed, but a gathering together and objectifying of them; and hereby, since this indifference and the differing determinacies are absolutely united, it is no separation – of the former as possibility, of the latter as actualities, or of the latter itself partly as possible, partly as actual -, but absolute presence. And in this power of intuition and presence lies the power of ethical life in general and naturally also of ethical life in particular, with which that legislating reason is in the first instance concerned and from which rather precisely that form of the concept, of formal unity and of universality, is absolutely to be kept away, for it is precisely this through which the essence of ethical life is immediately sublated, in that it makes what is ethically necessary into something contingent by letting it appear in opposition to something else; but the contingent in ethical life – and the contingent is one with the empirically necessary – is unethical. A pain that is, is raised by the power of intuition out of feeling, in which it is an accident and a contingent, into the unity and into the shape of an objective and necessary being for itself, and through this immediate unity, which does not think left and right of possibilities which the formal unity brings about, is maintained in its absolute presence, but through the objectivity of intuiting and the elevation into this unity of being-for-itself is truly separated from the subject and in the fixed intuiting of it made ideal; whereas it, compared through the unity of reflection with other determinacies or thought as a universal and not found universal, is made contingent in both ways, and thereby the subject<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 468]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |468|<\/span> recognises itself merely in its contingency and particularity, which recognition is the sentimentality and the unethicality of impotence. Or when the ethical relates to relations of individuals to individuals, then it is the pure intuition and ideality which is, e.g., in the trust of a deposit, which is to be held fast and from which the intrusion of formal unity and of the thought of the possibility of other determinations is to be kept away. The expression of that unity of intuition: a property of another entrusted to me is the property of another entrusted to me and nothing else besides, has an entirely different meaning from the generally expressing tautology of practical legislation: a foreign property entrusted to me is a foreign property entrusted to me; for over against this proposition stands just as well the other: a non-property of the other entrusted to me is non-property of the other; i.e. a determinacy which is raised into the concept is thereby ideal, and the one opposed to it can just as well be posited. On the other hand, the expression of intuition contains a This<\/em>, a living relation and absolute presence, with which possibility itself is absolutely bound up and a possibility separated from it or an otherness absolutely annihilated, in which possible otherness unethicality lies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If now the unity of practical reason were not even this positive unity of intuition, but had solely the negative meaning of annihilating the determinate, then it would express purely the essence of negative reason or of infinity, of the absolute concept. But because infinity is fixed and separated from the absolute, it shows itself, in its essence, to be the opposite of itself, and mocks the reflection which wants to hold it fast and grasp an absolute unity in it, in that it absolutely also brings about the opposite of this, a difference and multiplicity, and so between this opposition, which<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 469]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |469|<\/span> reproduces itself infinitely, allows only a relative identity, and thus is itself as infinity the opposite of itself, absolute finitude. And in that it is thus isolated, it is itself only the powerless form, abandoned by the truly annihilating might of reason, which takes the determinacies up into itself and harbours them without annihilating them, but on the contrary perpetuates them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is on the presented opposition, the fixing of it as a reality and its incomplete connection as a relative identity, that the more recent determination of the concept of natural right and of its relation in the whole science of the ethical depends, and we must consider what has so far been set out in general in this closer relation, how the separation, once posited as insurmountable, appears in the science of natural right in its peculiar way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The absolute concept, which is the principle of opposition and opposition itself, presents itself, fixed as it is, in separation in such a way that, as pure unity, it is opposed to itself as plurality, so that it remains the absolute concept under the form of pure unity as well as of pure plurality, and hence in the form of plurality is not a manifoldness of differently determined concepts but, as under unity, so also under plurality is subsumed; in many determinate concepts it<\/em> subsumes and is not a many but one. The absolute concept, as itself a plurality, is a multitude of subjects, and to these it is opposed, in the form of pure unity, as absolute quantity, against this its qualitative positedness. Both are therefore posited: an inner oneness of the opposed, which is the essence of both, the absolute concept, and a separatedness of the same under the form of unity, in which it is right and duty, and under the form of plurality, in which it is thinking and willing subject. That first side, according to which the essence of right and duty and the essence of the thinking and<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 470]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |470|<\/span> willing subject are absolutely one, is – like the higher abstraction of infinity in general – the great side of the Kantian and Fichtean philosophy; but it has not remained faithful to this oneness, but, while it does acknowledge it as the essence and as the absolute, it posits the separation into one and many just as absolutely, the one with equal dignity beside the other. Hereby it is, on the one hand, not the positive absolute that would constitute the essence of both and in which they would be one, but the negative, or the absolute concept; and, on the other, that necessary oneness becomes formal, and the two opposed determinacies, posited as absolute, fall hereby in their subsistence under ideality, which is to that extent the mere possibility of both. It is possible that right and duty have reality independently, as a particular, separated from the subjects, and the subjects separated from that; but it is also possible that both be connected. And it is absolutely necessary that these two possibilities be particular and be distinguished, so that each found a science of its own: the one concerning the oneness of the pure concept and the subjects, or the morality of actions, the other concerning the non-oneness, or legality, and indeed in such a way that, when in this separation of the ethical into morality and legality these two become mere possibilities, for that very reason both are equally positive. The one is indeed negative for the other, but in this way both are; it is not the one that is the absolutely positive, the other the absolutely negative, but each is both in the relation to the other, and because, in the first place, both are only relatively positive, neither legality nor morality is absolutely positive or truly ethical. And then, because both, the one being as positive as the other, are absolutely necessary, the possibility that the pure concept and the subject of duty and of right are not one must be posited unalterably and absolutely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fundamental concepts of the system of legality result<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 471]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |471|<\/span> from this immediately in the following way. It is a condition of pure self-consciousness, and this pure self-consciousness, I, is the true essence and the absolute, notwithstanding which, however, it is conditioned, and its condition is that it proceed to a real consciousness, which [two forms] in this relation of being conditioned remain absolutely opposed to one another. That pure self-consciousness, the pure unity or the empty ethical law, the universal freedom of all, is opposed to real consciousness, that is, to the subject, the rational being, the individual freedom – which Fichte expresses in a more popular way as the presupposition that good faith is lost3)<\/a><\/sup>, and upon this presupposition a system is founded through which, notwithstanding the separation of the concept and the subject of ethical life, but precisely for that reason only formally and externally – and this relation is called coercion<\/em> – both are to be united. Since hereby this externality of oneness is absolutely fixed and posited as something absolutely in itself, inwardness, the rebuilding of the lost good faith, the oneness of universal and individual freedom, and ethical life are made impossible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3)<\/a> Editors:<\/em> Naturrecht, T. I, S. 166 f.; SW, Bd. III, S. 139 f.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n In the system of such an externality – and here we refer to the Fichtean as the most consistent presentation, which is the least formal, and instead really attempts a consistent system that would not need an ethical life and religion foreign to it – there can, as in everything that proceeds from conditioned to conditioned, either be shown no unconditioned, or, if one is posited, then it is the formal indifference, which has the conditioned differing outside itself: essence without form, might without wisdom, quantity without inner quality or infinity, rest without motion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The supreme task in the arrangement<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 472]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |472|<\/span> operating with mechanical necessity4)<\/a><\/sup>, that the activity of each individual be coerced by the universal will, is how this universal will is necessarily real in the subjects who are its organs and administrators – a task whose presupposition is the opposition of the individual will to the universal will; oneness with the universal will can hence not [be] grasped and posited as an inner absolute majesty, but as something that is to be brought about through an external relation or coercion. Here, however, in reality, in the progression of coercing and supervising that is to be posited, one cannot proceed into infinite series and leap from the real to the ideal; there must be a highest positive point from which the coercing according to the concept of universal freedom begins. But this point, like all other points, must be coerced into coercing thus according to the concept of universal freedom; a point that was not coerced in this universal system of coercion would step out of the principle and would be transcendent. The question is thus now how this highest will is likewise, through coercion and supervision, to become adequate to the concept of the universal will, and so the system remain wholly immanent and transcendental. This could happen in no other way than by the might of the whole being distributed to the two sides that stand opposite one another, so that the governed are coerced by the government and the government by the governed. If the might, and hence the possible coercion, is posited on both sides in unequal strength, then, by as much as the one part has more power than the other, or by the surplus of both, only the one part and not the opposed one is coerced, which is not supposed to be. But strictly the overmighty alone is the mighty, for, for something to be a limit for the other, it must be equal to it; the weaker is therefore no limit<\/p>\n\n\n\n 4)<\/a> Editors:<\/em> Naturrecht, T. I, S. 169 ff.; SW, Bd. III, S. 142 ff.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 473]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |473|<\/span> for the same; both must therefore be reciprocally coerced with equal power and coerce one another. Yet if in this way action and reaction, stand and resistance, are equally strong, then the power on both sides reduces itself to equilibrium; all activity, expression of will and acting is hereby sublated – whether the reduction be thought positively or negatively, that action and reaction are as being, as operative, or that they are posited negatively and the equilibrium consists in there being as little an acting as a reacting present. To want to remedy this death by extending the immediate standing-opposite into a circle of effects, and thus having the middle of contact, and the point in which the reduction of the opposed appears, seemingly sublated through the deceptive leaving-empty of this middle, is just as little a true expedient. Against the hierarchy of coercion descending from the supreme power through its ramifications down to all individualities, there is to rise again from these a pyramid of the same kind upward to a supreme apex of counter-pressure against the descending one, and thus the whole is to curve itself in a circle in which the immediacy of contact would vanish, the forces, insofar as they make up a mass, would be held apart and that artificial difference be brought about by intermediate members, and so no member would react immediately upon that by which it is moved (whereby the reduction to equilibrium arises), but always upon another than that by which it is moved – so that the first would move the last and this last in turn that first. But such a perpetuum mobile<\/em>, whose parts are all to move in turn around the series, sets itself, instead of moving, at once in perfect equilibrium and becomes a perfect perpetuum quietum<\/em>, for pressure and counter-pressure, coercing and being coerced, are<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 474]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |474|<\/span> perfectly equal to one another and stand just as immediately opposite one another and bring about precisely the reduction of the forces as in the first representation; pure quantity does not let itself be deceived by such a mediacy, through which no difference or true infinity and form is brought into it at all, but it remains, as before, a wholly undivided, pure, shapeless might. In this way no coercion is possible against might, that it be adequate to the concept of universal freedom, for outside it no power is to be found and within it itself no separation is to be posited.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For that reason, then, recourse is had to a wholly formal distinction. The actual<\/em> power is indeed posited as one<\/em> and united in the government; but what is set over against it is the possible<\/em> power, and this possibility is, as such, to be capable of coercing that actuality. To this second, powerless existence of the common will, namely, is to fall the judging whether the power has left the former, to which it is bound, whether the power no longer conforms to the concept of universal freedom; it is to supervise the supreme power in general and, when in it a private will steps into the place of the universal one, to wrest it from him, and the manner in which this is to happen is to be a public declaration, having absolute effect, of the complete nullity of all acts of the supreme power of the state from this moment on. That the power separate itself of its own accord by its own judgement, which would be insurrection, is not to, may not, happen; for this pure power consists of nothing but private wills, which therefore cannot constitute themselves as common will. But it is that second common will which is to declare this multitude as community, or the pure power, to be united also with the Idea of the universal will, since this is no longer present in the preceding holders of power. Whatever determinacy be posited through which something is to be extorted against the supreme power, then<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 475]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |475|<\/span> with that determinacy not the mere possibility but real power would have to be connected; but since this is in the hands of the other representation of the common will, the latter is capable of preventing any such determinacy and of annulling, whatever functions be entrusted to the ephorate, the supervising, the public declaration of the interdict, and whatever formalities be hatched – and indeed with the same right as those in whose hands the effectiveness of this determinacy would be placed, for these ephors are no less at the same time private wills than those, and whether the private will of the latter has separated itself from the universal will, about this the government can judge just as well as the ephorate about it, and at the same time make this judgement absolutely valid. As is well known, on the occasion of a dissolution, undertaken in recent times by a government, of a legislative power that was rivalling and paralysing it, a man who had himself been implicated in it judged, rightly, regarding the notion that the establishment of a supervisory commission similar to the Fichtean ephorate would have prevented such an act of violence, that such a council, exercising supervision and wanting to oppose the government, would have been treated just as violently. – Finally, however, if the supreme holders of power were voluntarily to permit these second representatives of the universal will to summon the community, so that it might judge between them and the supervisors – what would be done with such a rabble, which is supervised even in everything that is a private matter, still less leads a public life, and which is hence cultivated not at all to the consciousness of the common will and to acting in the spirit of a whole, but solely to the opposite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What has hereby been shown is that the ethical, which is posited solely according to the relation, or externality and coercion, thought as totality, sublates itself. It is thereby indeed proved that coercion is nothing<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 476]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |476|<\/span> real, nothing in itself, but this will become still clearer if we show it in it itself, according to its concept and according to the determinacy which the relation of this relationship has, – for that the relation in general is nothing in itself is partly for dialectic to prove, partly has been briefly presented above.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Of the concepts in general that are connected with coercion and express precisely this relation, it has partly already been shown that they are essenceless abstractions, thought-things or beings of the imagination, without reality; there occurs, in the first place, the null abstraction of a concept of the universal freedom of all, which would be separated from the freedom of individuals, then, on the other side, precisely this freedom of the individual, equally isolated. Each posited for itself is an abstraction without reality; but both, absolutely identical and then posited merely in<\/em> this first underlying identity, are something wholly other than those concepts which have their meaning solely in non-identity. Then natural or original freedom is to restrict itself through the concept of universal freedom; but that freedom which can be posited as restrictable is for that very reason again nothing absolute; and then it is in itself contradictory to compose an Idea that, with absolute necessity, the freedom of the individual be adequate to the concept of universal freedom through the externality of coercion – which means nothing other than that it is represented that the individual is nevertheless, through something not absolute, absolutely equal to the universal. In the concept of coercion itself something external is immediately posited for freedom; but a freedom for which something truly external, alien, were, is no freedom; its essence and its formal definition is precisely that nothing is absolutely external.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The view of freedom is to be wholly rejected according to which it is supposed to be a choice between opposed determinacies, so that, if + A<\/em> and – A<\/em> were at hand, it<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 477]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |477|<\/span> would consist in determining itself either<\/em> as + A or<\/em> as – A<\/em>, and were absolutely bound to this Either-Or<\/em>. Something like this possibility of choice is absolutely an empirical freedom, which is one with empirical common necessity and absolutely not separable from it. It is rather the negation, or ideality, of the opposed, of + A<\/em> as well as of – A<\/em>, the abstraction of the possibility that neither of the two is; something external would be for it only insofar as it were determined solely as + A<\/em> or solely as – A<\/em>, but it is precisely the opposite of this and nothing external for it, and so no coercion is possible for it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Every determinacy is, according to its essence, either + A<\/em> or – A<\/em>, and to the + A<\/em> the – A<\/em>, as to the – A<\/em> the + A<\/em>, is indissolubly chained; as soon as the individual has placed itself in the determinacy of + A<\/em>, it is also bound to – A<\/em>, and – A<\/em> is something external for it and not under its power, but it would be, for the [sake] of the absolute connection of + A<\/em> with – A<\/em>, immediately through the determinacy of + A<\/em> under an alien power of – A<\/em>, and the freedom which would consist in choosing to determine itself either as + A<\/em> or as – A<\/em> would not get out of necessity at all. If it determines itself as + A<\/em>, it has not annihilated – A<\/em>, but this subsists, with absolute necessity, as something external for it, and so conversely, if it determines itself as – A<\/em>. It is freedom solely in that it, positively or negatively, unites – A<\/em> with + A<\/em> and so ceases to be in the determinacy + A<\/em>. In the union of both determinacies both are annihilated; + A – A = 0<\/em>. If this nothing is thought only relatively to + A<\/em> and – A<\/em>, the indifferent A<\/em> itself as a determinacy and a plus or minus against another minus or plus, then absolute freedom is just as exalted above this opposition as above every other opposition and every externality, and absolutely incapable of any coercion, and coercion has no reality at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But this Idea of freedom seems itself to be an abstraction,<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 478]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |478|<\/span> and if, e.g., there were talk of a concrete freedom, the freedom of the individual, then that being of a determinacy, and thereby mere empirical freedom as a possibility of choice, would be [posited], and thus empirical necessity too and the possibility of coercion, in general the opposition of universality and individuality, posited. For the individual is an individuality, and freedom is an annihilating of individuality; through individuality the individual is immediately under determinacies, thereby something external is present for it and thereby coercion possible. But it is one thing to posit determinacies in the individual under the form of infinity, another to posit them absolutely in it. The determinacy under the form of infinity is thereby at the same time sublated, and the individual is only as a free being; that is, since determinacies are posited in it, it is the absolute indifference of these determinacies, and in this consists formally its ethical nature; just as organisation, and hence – because only in organisation is there totality – the positive of ethical life consists in this, that, insofar as individuals in general – be it towards themselves or something else – are different and have a relationship to something external, this externality itself be indifferent and a living relationship. – But the indifference of the individual as an individual is, in relation to the being of the determinacies, a negative one; but where its being as individuality, i.e. a negation positively insurmountable for it, a determinacy through which the external as such holds itself fast, is really posited, there remains to it only the absolutely negative<\/em> absoluteness or infinity – the absolute negation of – A<\/em> as well as of + A<\/em>, or that it absolutely takes up this being-individual into the concept. Since – A<\/em> is something external to the determinacy + A<\/em> of the subject, it is through this relation in alien power; but because it can likewise posit negatively, sublate and alienate its + A<\/em> as a determinacy, it remains, in the face of<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 479]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |479|<\/span> the possibility and the actuality of alien power, absolutely free. Since it negates + A<\/em> as well as – A<\/em>, it is subdued<\/em>, but not coerced<\/em>; it would have to suffer coercion only if + A<\/em> were absolutely fixed in it, whereby an infinite chain of other determinacies could be shackled to it as to a determinacy. This possibility of abstracting from determinacies is without restriction, or there is no determinacy which is absolute, for this would contradict itself immediately; but freedom itself or infinity is indeed the negative, but the absolute, and its being-individual is absolute individuality taken up into the concept, negatively absolute infinity, pure freedom. This negatively absolute, pure freedom, is in its appearance death, and through the capacity for death the subject proves itself free and absolutely exalted above all coercion. Death is the absolute subduing; and because it is absolute, or because in it individuality becomes absolutely pure individuality – namely not the positing of a + A<\/em> with exclusion of – A<\/em> (which exclusion would be no true negation, but only the positing of – A<\/em> as something external and at the same time of + A<\/em> as a determinacy), but sublation of the plus as well as of the minus -, it is the concept of itself, thus infinite and the opposite of itself, or absolute liberation, and the pure individuality which is in death is its own opposite, universality. In subduing, then, there is freedom by its being directed purely to the sublation of a determinacy, both insofar as it is posited as positive and insofar as it is posited as negative, subjective and objective, not merely of one side of it, and so, considered in itself, keeps itself purely negative; or since the sublating itself can also be grasped and expressed positively by reflection, then the sublating of both sides of the determinacy appears as the perfectly equal positing of the determinate according to its two sides.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Applied to punishment, for example, in it alone is<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 480]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |480|<\/span> retribution rational; for through it the crime is subdued. A determinacy + A, which the crime has posited, is supplemented by the positing of – A<\/em> and so both annihilated; or viewed positively: with the determinacy + A<\/em> the opposed – A<\/em> is connected for the criminal and both equally posited, since the crime posited only one. Thus punishment is the restoration of freedom, and the criminal has remained free, or rather been made free, just as the punisher has acted rationally and freely. In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and something absolute, which hereby has its respect and fear in itself; it comes from freedom and remains, even as subduing, in freedom. If, on the other hand, punishment is represented as coercion, then it is posited merely as a determinacy and as something absolutely finite, carrying no rationality in itself, and falls wholly under the common concept of a determinate thing, against another, or of a commodity, for which something else, namely the crime, is to be bought; the state, as judicial power, keeps a market in determinacies which are called crimes and which are for sale to it against other determinacies, and the code of laws is the price list.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cross-reference:<\/em> Absolute ethical life. In the Groundlines<\/em>, \u00a7 142<\/a> ff.; on the relation of the individual and the people \u00a7 257<\/a> f.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
434<\/a> \u00b7 435<\/a> \u00b7 436<\/a> \u00b7 437<\/a> \u00b7 438<\/a> \u00b7 439<\/a> \u00b7 440<\/a>
441<\/a> \u00b7 442<\/a> \u00b7 443<\/a> \u00b7 444<\/a> \u00b7 445<\/a> \u00b7 446<\/a> \u00b7 447<\/a> \u00b7 448<\/a> \u00b7 449<\/a> \u00b7 450<\/a>
451<\/a> \u00b7 452<\/a> \u00b7 453<\/a> \u00b7 454<\/a> \u00b7 455<\/a> \u00b7 456<\/a> \u00b7 457<\/a> \u00b7 458<\/a> \u00b7 459<\/a> \u00b7 460<\/a>
461<\/a> \u00b7 462<\/a> \u00b7 463<\/a> \u00b7 464<\/a> \u00b7 465<\/a> \u00b7 466<\/a> \u00b7 467<\/a> \u00b7 468<\/a> \u00b7 469<\/a> \u00b7 470<\/a>
471<\/a> \u00b7 472<\/a> \u00b7 473<\/a> \u00b7 474<\/a> \u00b7 475<\/a> \u00b7 476<\/a> \u00b7 477<\/a> \u00b7 478<\/a> \u00b7 479<\/a> \u00b7 480<\/a>
481<\/a> \u00b7 482<\/a> \u00b7 483<\/a> \u00b7 484<\/a> \u00b7 485<\/a> \u00b7 486<\/a> \u00b7 487<\/a> \u00b7 488<\/a> \u00b7 489<\/a> \u00b7 490<\/a>
491<\/a> \u00b7 492<\/a> \u00b7 493<\/a> \u00b7 494<\/a> \u00b7 495<\/a> \u00b7 496<\/a> \u00b7 497<\/a> \u00b7 498<\/a> \u00b7 499<\/a> \u00b7 500<\/a>
501<\/a> \u00b7 502<\/a> \u00b7 503<\/a> \u00b7 504<\/a> \u00b7 505<\/a> \u00b7 506<\/a> \u00b7 507<\/a> \u00b7 508<\/a> \u00b7 509<\/a> \u00b7 510<\/a>
511<\/a> \u00b7 512<\/a> \u00b7 513<\/a> \u00b7 514<\/a> \u00b7 515<\/a> \u00b7 516<\/a> \u00b7 517<\/a> \u00b7 518<\/a> \u00b7 519<\/a> \u00b7 520<\/a>
521<\/a> \u00b7 522<\/a> \u00b7 523<\/a> \u00b7 524<\/a> \u00b7 525<\/a> \u00b7 526<\/a> \u00b7 527<\/a> \u00b7 528<\/a> \u00b7 529<\/a> \u00b7 530<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\nContents<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
[I]<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
[II]<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
[III]<\/h4>\n\n\n\n