{"id":903038,"date":"2026-09-17T09:00:37","date_gmt":"2026-09-17T07:00:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/?page_id=903038"},"modified":"2026-09-17T16:30:27","modified_gmt":"2026-09-17T14:30:27","slug":"why-is-hegel-still-relevant-today","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/why-is-hegel-still-relevant-today\/","title":{"rendered":"Why is Hegel still relevant today?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Hegel is not today a figure of the history of philosophy about whom there is agreement. He is read, and in readings that contradict one another \u2014 down to the question whether his philosophy of right can be understood at all without his Logic<\/a>. What follows is a survey of the positions that carry the present debate, with sources. For the historical<\/em> reception \u2014 from Schelling through the Left and Right Hegelians to the international influence \u2014 see For whom was Hegel relevant?<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The great divide: Hegel with or without the Logic<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The non-metaphysical reading<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

One of the basic divisions of present-day Hegel scholarship. This line tries to detach the philosophy of right and the Phenomenology from the Logic: the insights into intersubjectivity, ethical life<\/a> and recognition<\/a> are to hold up even without absolute spirit<\/a> and the logic of the concept, and to remain usable for post-metaphysical societies. The objection is obvious and is loudly made \u2014 that this deprives Hegel of precisely what he took his contribution to be.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Klaus Hartmann, \u201eHegel: A Non-Metaphysical View\u201c, 1972 \u00b7 J\u00fcrgen Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne<\/em>, 1985 \u00b7 Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society<\/em>, 1979<\/p>\n\n\n\n

See also The metaphysical reading<\/a>, The Science of Logic<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The metaphysical reading<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The counter-position. It holds it a fundamental mistake to separate the philosophy of right from the Logic: freedom in Hegel is not in the first place a social phenomenon but a logical concept \u2014 being with oneself in an other \u2014 and only because the Logic develops the structure of self-determination<\/a> can the state be grasped as the actuality of the Idea. Within this direction, however, there is fierce dispute about how much metaphysics is meant; the exchange between Pippin and Houlgate is the best-known case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Stephen Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel\u2019s Logic<\/em>, 2006, and Hegel on Being<\/em>, 2022 \u00b7 Robert Pippin, Hegel\u2019s Idealism<\/em>, 1989 \u00b7 Terry Pinkard, Hegel\u2019s Naturalism<\/em>, 2012<\/p>\n\n\n\n

See also The non-metaphysical reading<\/a>, Robert Pippin<\/a>, Absolute Idealism<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Pittsburgh School<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

An influential and very independent reading, which takes Hegel through the lens of analytic philosophy of language. Concepts on this view are not metaphysical objects but social norms formed in the practice of inference and mutual justification \u2014 in the space of reasons. This yields a remarkably clear Hegel, and one who lacks a good deal that he himself held indispensable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit<\/em>, 1994, and A Spirit of Trust<\/em>, 2019 \u00b7 John McDowell, Mind and World<\/em>, 1994 \u00b7 Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind<\/em>, 1956<\/p>\n\n\n\n

See also The non-metaphysical reading<\/a>, Terry Pinkard<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

What freedom means: recognition or self-determination<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Axel Honneth<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The most prominent representative of modern recognition theory. In his principal work he reads the Jena writings and the Phenomenology as a theory of social pathologies and distinguishes three patterns of recognition that carry a successful identity: love in close relationships, right as recognition of the person<\/a>, social esteem for one\u2019s own achievement. Later he reconstructed the philosophy of right itself as a theory of social freedom. The objection against him is that his psychologically turned reading drops Hegel\u2019s logical claim.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung<\/em>, 1992 \u00b7 Leiden an Unbestimmtheit<\/em>, 2001 \u00b7 Das Recht der Freiheit<\/em>, 2011<\/p>\n\n\n\n

See also Recognition<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Robert Pippin<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

A key figure of the idealist reading. For him the core of Hegel\u2019s thought is self-determination: free is not the one who can choose, but the one who acts from reasons he acknowledges as his own. The philosophy of right then describes the institutions without which such action would not be possible at all. Against Honneth he insists that freedom in Hegel is not a social-psychological but a conceptual relation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Robert Pippin, Hegel\u2019s Idealism. The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness<\/em>, 1989 \u00b7 Hegel\u2019s Practical Philosophy<\/em>, 2008<\/p>\n\n\n\n

See also The metaphysical reading<\/a>, Freedom<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Terry Pinkard<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Defends, like Pippin, a systematic but not supernaturalist reading. Spirit for him is no cosmic subject but the space of social norms and reasons in which we live. The philosophy of right is then the reconstruction of how the norm of freedom came about historically, until in the institutions of the modern state it found the shape in which it is with itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Terry Pinkard, Hegel\u2019s Phenomenology. The Sociality of Reason<\/em>, 1994 \u00b7 Hegel. A Biography<\/em>, 2000 \u00b7 Hegel\u2019s Naturalism<\/em>, 2012<\/p>\n\n\n\n

See also The Pittsburgh School<\/a>, Spirit<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Between liberalism and community<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Communitarianism<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In the Anglophone debate of the eighties and nineties Hegel was brought up as a chief witness against liberalism. The charge was that liberalism starts from an abstract, unencumbered individual; Hegel\u2019s ethical life served as the counter-image: a human being is always already embedded in family<\/a>, occupation and people, and it is from there that his ends come. The appropriation was one-sided \u2014 Hegel nowhere gave up the right of subjectivity \u2014 and promptly called forth a liberal counter-reading.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society<\/em>, 1979, and Sources of the Self<\/em>, 1989 \u00b7 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice<\/em>, 1983 \u00b7 against them John Rawls, A Theory of Justice<\/em>, 1971<\/p>\n\n\n\n

See also Ethical Life<\/a>, The liberal reading<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The liberal reading<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The counter-movement to the communitarian appropriation. It stresses that Hegel\u2019s state is no organic whole devouring the individual, but the institutional condition under which subjective freedom \u2014 conscience, choice of occupation, property \u2014 subsists at all. The evidence stands in Hegel himself: the principle of modern states has its strength precisely in letting personal particularity complete itself into a self-subsistent extreme (\u00a7 260<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Alan Patten, Hegel\u2019s Idea of Freedom<\/em>, 1999 \u00b7 Frederick Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel\u2019s Social Theory<\/em>, 2000 \u00b7 Klaus Vieweg, Das Denken der Freiheit<\/em>, 2012<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the edition: \u00a7 260<\/a> \u00b7 \u00a7 132<\/a> \u2014 see also Subjective Freedom<\/a>, Communitarianism<\/a>, Human rights<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Human rights<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

A contested point. Critics reproach Hegel with subordinating individual rights to the state, and point to sentences such as the one that the highest duty of individuals is to be members of the state (\u00a7 258<\/a>). The defenders reply that abstract right<\/a> \u2014 the right of the person to body, life and property \u2014 is the first and unsublatable foundation of the whole system, and that Hegel expressly knows inalienable and imprescriptible rights (\u00a7 66<\/a>). The state does not abolish these rights; in Hegel it is the one condition under which they are actual at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Ludwig Siep, Aktualit\u00e4t und Grenzen der praktischen Philosophie Hegels<\/em>, 2010 \u00b7 Alan Patten, Hegel\u2019s Idea of Freedom<\/em>, 1999 \u00b7 critically: Ernst Tugendhat, Selbstbewusstsein und Selbstbestimmung<\/em>, 1979<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the edition: \u00a7 36<\/a> \u00b7 \u00a7 66<\/a> \u00b7 \u00a7 258<\/a> \u00b7 \u00a7 270<\/a> \u2014 see also The Person<\/a>, Subjective Freedom<\/a>, The liberal reading<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Disputed questions in the philosophy of right<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The rehabilitation of civil society<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Marx radicalized Hegel\u2019s analysis of civil society<\/a> as the place of alienation<\/a>. Recent scholarship turns it in another direction: it reads the sphere between family and state not merely as an economy but as what is today called civil society \u2014 associations, the public sphere, social movements. Hegel\u2019s corporations<\/a> then appear as the intermediate member that spares the individual the choice between isolation and the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Manfred Riedel, B\u00fcrgerliche Gesellschaft und Staat bei Hegel<\/em>, 1970 \u00b7 Jean L. Cohen \/ Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory<\/em>, 1992<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the edition: \u00a7 182<\/a> \u00b7 \u00a7 250<\/a> to \u00a7 256<\/a> \u2014 see also Civil Society<\/a>, Civil society in the modern sense<\/a>, Police and Corporation<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The monarchy in recent debate<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Hegel\u2019s defence of constitutional monarchy counts for many as the most outdated piece of the philosophy of right. It is being read afresh, however: the \u201eI will\u201c of the monarch is in Hegel no expression of arbitrary choice but the place at which grounding stops and a decision has to be made. The question is then not whether a monarch is needed, but where a modern democracy has that place \u2014 in the head of state, in the constitutional court, in the majority principle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Karl-Heinz Ilting, introduction to Hegel. Vorlesungen \u00fcber Rechtsphilosophie<\/em>, 1973 \u00b7 Dieter Henrich \/ Rolf-Peter Horstmann (eds.), Hegels Philosophie des Rechts<\/em>, 1982 \u00b7 Bernard Bourgeois, Le droit naturel de Hegel<\/em>, 1986<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the edition: \u00a7 275<\/a> to \u00a7 286<\/a> \u00b7 \u00a7 279<\/a> \u00b7 \u00a7 280<\/a> \u2014 see also The Power of the Sovereign<\/a>, The Constitution<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cosmopolitanism and the state<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Hegel\u2019s external law of the state \u2014 war<\/a> as a necessary moment, the league of nations as a mere contract \u2014 runs against Kant\u2019s \u201ePerpetual Peace\u201c and against any cosmopolitan order. The debate asks whether his thought is hopelessly stuck in the nineteenth-century nation state, or whether supra-state institutions can be thought with his means \u2014 recognition and sovereignty<\/a>. In favour of the second possibility is that recognition is for him in any case the relation in which independence first subsists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace<\/em>, 1795 \u00b7 Ludwig Siep, Aktualit\u00e4t und Grenzen der praktischen Philosophie Hegels<\/em>, 2010 \u00b7 J\u00fcrgen Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation<\/em>, 1998<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the edition: \u00a7 321<\/a> to \u00a7 340<\/a> \u2014 see also External Sovereignty<\/a>, War<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Criticism from outside<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The feminist critique<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

It is directed at Hegel\u2019s determination of the family, in particular at \u00a7 166<\/a>, where he assigns woman to the principle of feeling and inwardness and denies her access to the universal \u2014 the state and science. The debate turns on whether this is a judgement of its time that can be struck out without damaging the system, or whether the exclusion is needed for the separation of family and civil society and falls with it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract<\/em>, 1988 \u00b7 Seyla Benhabib, \u201eOn Hegel, Women and Irony\u201c, 1991 \u00b7 Patricia Jagentowicz Mills (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of G. W. F. Hegel<\/em>, 1996<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the edition: \u00a7 158<\/a> \u00b7 \u00a7 166<\/a> \u2014 see also The Family<\/a>, Hegel and the other<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hegel and the other<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Postcolonial criticism takes its start from Hegel\u2019s account of world history<\/a>: from the determination of Africa as without history and of the Germanic-Christian world as the summit. The dispute is whether his system is eurocentric at its core \u2014 because it always grasps the other as a subordinate stage \u2014 or whether it is precisely his dialectic of recognition that provides the sharpest tool for criticizing such relations. Both sides have text on their side; the question is treated separately on this site.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Susan Buck-Morss, \u201eHegel and Haiti\u201c, in: Critical Inquiry<\/em> 26 (2000) \u00b7 Robert Bernasconi against Joseph McCarney, in: Radical Philosophy<\/em> 119 (2003) \u00b7 Domenico Losurdo, Hegel und das deutsche Erbe<\/em>, 1989<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On this site: Was Hegel a racist?<\/a> \u2014 In the edition: \u00a7 341<\/a> to \u00a7 360<\/a> \u2014 see also World History<\/a>, The World Spirit<\/a>, The feminist critique<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Post-Hegelianism<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

A collective term for the philosophy that after Hegel defines itself essentially by criticizing him. Three strands are the most important. The Left Hegelians and Marx reproach him with having sublated alienation only in thought, while it continues economically. Kierkegaard sees in the system the annihilation of the individual and in reconciliation a betrayal of suffering. Poststructuralism, finally, criticizes the claim of the concept to gather all difference and all otherness into a unity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Karl Marx, Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie<\/em>, 1843 \u00b7 S\u00f8ren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript<\/em>, 1846 \u00b7 Jacques Derrida, Glas<\/em>, 1974 \u00b7 Karl L\u00f6with, From Hegel to Nietzsche<\/em>, 1941<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On this site: Did Marx not finally set Hegel on his feet?<\/a> \u2014 see also Alienation<\/a>, Reconciliation<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Slavoj \u017di\u017eek<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The most provocative of today\u2019s readers of Hegel, who takes him through Lacan\u2019s psychoanalysis. For him the most important thing in Hegel is not reconciliation and not the sublating of contradictions, but negativity itself. The state is for him no harmonious solution; the rabble<\/a> is the part that belongs to no part \u2014 the remainder the system produces and cannot accommodate, and in which its untruth becomes visible. Whether one reads this for Hegel or against him is a matter of taste; that \u00a7 245<\/a> stands where it stands is not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Slavoj \u017di\u017eek, Less Than Nothing<\/em>, 2012 \u00b7 Frank Ruda, Hegels P\u00f6bel<\/em>, 2011<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the edition: \u00a7 244<\/a> \u00b7 \u00a7 245<\/a> \u2014 see also The Rabble<\/a>, Contradiction<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n