{"id":903056,"date":"2026-09-17T10:06:51","date_gmt":"2026-09-17T08:06:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/?page_id=903056"},"modified":"2026-09-17T10:06:52","modified_gmt":"2026-09-17T08:06:52","slug":"what-is-idealism-in-the-philosophical-sense","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/what-is-idealism-in-the-philosophical-sense\/","title":{"rendered":"What is idealism \u2013 in the philosophical sense?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201eBeing was the first; determinate being, being for another, being with negation was the second. The third is being-for-itself, simple relation to itself through negation of the other, of determinate being. Here we have ideality; in determinate being, reality. Ideality means that the finite is posited only as sublated; ideality is nothing else than this, that everything finite has no true being, but that being is something sublated, a negative. Being is only a moment of something that is truth. Ideality is then taken in the sense of subjective idealism, that everything is only my representation; therein the things\u2019 own self-subsistence is sublated \u2014 in that I know the things, they are sublated. That is this formal ideality. Subjective idealism is a trivial abstraction, for what matters is the content, how it is constituted; in it I too am something very finite, my representing has no true reality. In comprehending, my subjectivity is itself overcome, for when I comprehend something, I am in the matter itself. <strong>Every true philosophy is idealism, that is, ideality of the finite.<\/strong>\u201c (Lectures on the Science of Logic II, GW 23,2, p. 737)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201eThe proposition that the finite is ideal constitutes idealism. The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than in refusing to recognize the finite as a true being. Every philosophy is essentially idealism, or at least has idealism for its principle.\u201c (Science of Logic. First Volume. The Doctrine of Being (1832), GW 21, p. 142)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In everyday usage \u201eidealism\u201c has two meanings, neither of which is meant here: either (morally) someone who follows high ideals, or (pejoratively) someone who denies reality. Hegel\u2019s philosophical idealism has <em>nothing<\/em> to do with either.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The core claim stands in the second quotation: <strong>\u201eThe proposition that the finite is ideal constitutes idealism.\u201c<\/strong> To understand it, two expressions need clarifying \u2014 \u201ethe finite\u201c and \u201eideal\u201c.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A note on the words: the German has a pair that English lacks. <em>Ideell<\/em> \u2014 here rendered \u201eideal\u201c \u2014 is the opposite of self-subsistently real; it has nothing to do with <em>ideal<\/em> in the sense of perfect, which in German would be <em>ideal<\/em>. Where this page says \u201eideal\u201c, read: not standing on its own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading has-large-font-size\">1. What is \u201ethe finite\u201c?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201eThe finite\u201c is everything we meet with in the world when we consider it <em>in isolation<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>A chair, a stone, a planet.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>A single thought, a feeling, a mood.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>A single person, a single law, an isolated event.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">All these things <em>exist<\/em>, but they are \u201efinite\u201c. That is: they are <em>not out of themselves<\/em>. They are dependent, limited and incomplete. They have their cause and their sense not <em>in themselves<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading has-large-font-size\">2. What is \u201eideal\u201c?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201eIdeal\u201c is the opposite of \u201eself-subsistently real\u201c. When it is said that the finite is ideal, what is meant is: these isolated, finite things \u2014 the chair, the thought, the law \u2014 have <strong>no true being<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Their truth or their actuality lies <em>not<\/em> in their isolation. They are <strong>sublated<\/strong> (see the <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/glossary-of-hegels-key-concepts\/\">glossary<\/a>): only a <strong>moment<\/strong> \u2014 a non-self-subsistent but necessary part \u2014 of something greater, of a whole which alone is truly real.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>An analogy.<\/strong> Consider a single brushstroke in Rembrandt\u2019s \u201eNight Watch\u201c.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>This brushstroke is \u201ethe finite\u201c. It <em>exists<\/em>.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>But is it <em>truly a being<\/em>? No. Its whole truth, its sense and its reality consist only <em>as a moment<\/em> of the entire painting.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Isolate the brushstroke, cut it out, and it loses its sense and its actuality. It is <em>ideal<\/em>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>A second analogy: sentimental value.<\/strong> An everyday example that makes this usage plausible is what German calls the <em>ideeller Wert<\/em> of an object \u2014 as against its merely material value. Think of an old, worn wedding ring.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Its <strong>material value<\/strong> (the gold) is \u201efinite\u201c \u2014 taken in isolation it is next to nothing (a).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Its <strong>ideal value<\/strong> (the memory, the marriage) is however beyond measure (b).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What is called \u201eideal\u201c here is exactly what is meant: the ring has its true being not <em>in itself<\/em> as a finite thing, but only as a <em>moment<\/em> of a whole \u2014 the relationship lived out, the <em>Idea<\/em>. Its real being as a thing is <em>sublated<\/em> in its ideal meaning. The thing made of metal (a) is, <em>although<\/em> it really exists, in truth ideal: its reality (a) is sublated in its truth (b).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading has-large-font-size\">3. What idealism is <em>not<\/em><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The commonest misunderstanding. As the first quotation from the logic lectures already shows, Hegel never confuses his idealism \u2014 the <strong>absolute<\/strong> \u2014 with the <strong>subjective<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Subjective idealism<\/strong> is the view, trivial in Hegel\u2019s eyes, that \u201eeverything is only my representation\u201c \u2014 that the world is in the individual\u2019s head.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Against this he holds: the I, subjective representing, is <em>just as finite<\/em> as the chair it represents. The I too is only a moment of the whole.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading has-large-font-size\">4. What is absolute idealism?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Absolute idealism is the insight that the <em>only<\/em> thing that truly is \u2014 not finite, not ideal \u2014 is the <strong>whole<\/strong> itself: <strong>reason<\/strong>, the <strong>concept<\/strong>, the <strong>Idea<\/strong>, <strong>spirit<\/strong>. It is the position that the <em>logical structure of reason<\/em> and the <em>deep structure of actuality<\/em> are the same.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For reading the <em>Groundlines<\/em> this means:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Abstract right<\/strong> (property) is finite. It is ideal.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Morality<\/strong> (conscience) is finite. It is ideal.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Both truly are only as <em>sublated moments<\/em> in <strong>ethical life<\/strong> \u2014 family, society, state \u2014 which is the concrete <em>Idea<\/em> of freedom.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>\u201eBeing was the first; determinate being, being for another, being with negation was the second. The third is being-for-itself, simple relation to itself through negation of the other, of determinate being. Here we have ideality; in determinate being, reality. Ideality means that the finite is posited only as sublated; ideality is nothing else than this, [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-903056","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/903056","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=903056"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/903056\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":903057,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/903056\/revisions\/903057"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=903056"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}