{"id":903060,"date":"2026-09-17T10:07:42","date_gmt":"2026-09-17T08:07:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/?page_id=903060"},"modified":"2026-09-17T10:07:43","modified_gmt":"2026-09-17T08:07:43","slug":"is-hegels-philosophy-a-philosophy-of-identity","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/is-hegels-philosophy-a-philosophy-of-identity\/","title":{"rendered":"Is Hegel\u2019s philosophy a \u201ephilosophy of identity\u201c?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In brief:<\/strong> No \u2014 and Hegel used the expression polemically himself. \u201ePhilosophy of identity\u201c was the name for Schelling\u2019s absolute, in which all differences vanish. Hegel\u2019s whole procedure is the attempt to achieve the opposite: a unity that does not efface difference but holds it out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where the expression comes from<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Around 1801, philosophy of identity meant Schelling\u2019s system of the absolute indifference of nature and spirit. In his first publication \u2014 The Difference Between Fichte\u2019s and Schelling\u2019s System of Philosophy<\/em> (1801) \u2014 Hegel still took its side. Six years later he broke with it, and in such a way that the friendship broke with it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

for the night [\u2026] in which, as one is wont to say, all cows are black \u2014 [this] is the naivety of emptiness in cognition.<\/p>\nPhenomenology of Spirit, Preface<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The reproach is not that Schelling pitches unity too high, but that a unity from which nothing follows is not cognition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What Hegel says instead<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The famous formula stands in the Science of Logic<\/em>, at the passage on the beginning. Analysing the beginning yields:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

the concept of the unity of being and non-being \u2014 or, in a more reflected form, of the unity of being-differentiated and being-undifferentiated \u2014 or the identity of identity and non-identity<\/em>.<\/p>\nScience of Logic I<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This is no play on words but an instruction: the unity in question contains difference as its moment. Whoever thinks identity alone thinks nothing; whoever thinks difference alone gets no further than an enumeration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Accordingly Hegel treats identity in the logic of essence not as a supreme principle but as the poorest<\/em> of the determinations of reflection. The proposition \u201eA = A\u201c says nothing; as soon as one takes it seriously and asks what A is, one is at difference.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The test in the philosophy of right<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The standard by which Hegel sees Plato\u2019s republic fail is precisely this one. \u00a7 185<\/a> Remark says that the ancient states lacked<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

the truly infinite power which lies solely in that unity which lets the opposition<\/em> of reason go forth into its whole strength<\/em> and has overpowered it, so preserving itself in it and holding it together within itself<\/em>.<\/p>\nGroundlines, \u00a7 185<\/a> Remark<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

\u201eLetting it go forth into its whole strength\u201c \u2014 that is the opposite of a philosophy of identity. And \u00a7 260<\/a> correspondingly requires that the principle of subjectivity be allowed \u201eto complete itself into the self-subsistent extreme<\/em> of personal particularity\u201c. Civil society<\/a>, with its competition, its inequality and its poverty<\/a>, is not harmonized in \u00a7 182<\/a>\u2013\u00a7 256<\/a> but presented in its dividedness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What is nevertheless right about the reproach<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Two things. First: Hegel claims that the oppositions are resolved in a higher unity \u2014 and this claim cannot be proved, only shown in the particular case. Whoever disputes that it succeeds at a given point has the objection that matters. Second: there are places where the unity is asserted rather than derived \u2014 the derivation of the monarch in \u00a7 279<\/a> is the best-known example.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The reproach therefore does not hit the programme, but possibly its execution. That is a distinction worth making.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources.<\/strong> The Difference Between Fichte\u2019s and Schelling\u2019s System of Philosophy<\/em> (1801). \u2013 Phenomenology of Spirit, Preface. \u2013 Science of Logic I, \u201eWith what must the beginning of science be made?\u201c; Logic II, First Section (identity, difference, contradiction); Encyclopaedia (1830) \u00a7\u00a7 115\u2013120. \u2013 Groundlines \u00a7 182<\/a>\u2013\u00a7 256<\/a>, \u00a7 185<\/a> Remark, \u00a7 260<\/a>, \u00a7 279<\/a>. \u2013 Literature.<\/strong> Dieter Henrich, Hegel im Kontext<\/em>, Frankfurt a. M. 1971; Klaus D\u00fcsing, Das Problem der Subjektivit\u00e4t in Hegels Logik<\/em>, Bonn 1976. \u2013 In the glossary: absolute idealism<\/a>, contradiction<\/a>, the speculative<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n