{"id":903080,"date":"2026-09-17T10:55:49","date_gmt":"2026-09-17T08:55:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/?page_id=903080"},"modified":"2026-09-17T10:55:50","modified_gmt":"2026-09-17T08:55:50","slug":"do-the-moments-of-a-dialectical-movement-stand-dualistically-opposed","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/do-the-moments-of-a-dialectical-movement-stand-dualistically-opposed\/","title":{"rendered":"Do the moments of a dialectical movement stand over against each other \u2013 dualistically?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In brief:<\/strong> No \u2014 and this point decides the understanding of the whole method. The moments do not stand over against each other as two fixed quantities between which mediation then takes place. Each is only what it is through the other \u2014 and passes over into the other on its own account. Whoever thinks them as a pair has the understanding<\/a> and not dialectic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The three sides of the logical<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In Encyclopaedia \u00a7 79 Hegel distinguishes three sides which are not three parts but moments of every concept: the understanding<\/em> side, which holds fast to the fixed determination and its difference from others; the dialectical<\/em> or negatively rational, in which these determinations sublate themselves; the speculative<\/em> or positively rational, which grasps the unity of the determinations in their opposition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dualism accordingly belongs to the first side. It is not false \u2014 without it one would arrive at no determinacy \u2014 but it is not the last word. Encyclopaedia \u00a7 81 says that the finite is sublated \u201enot merely limited from outside, but through its own nature\u201c, and passes \u201ethrough itself into its opposite\u201c.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why it is not a standing-opposite<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

An opposition in Hegel\u2019s sense is not a juxtaposition of two things. Being and nothing do not stand side by side like two quantities, between which becoming then mediates: pure being, precisely because it has no determination whatever, is<\/em> not to be distinguished from nothing. The transition lies in the determination itself, not between two determinations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The result is therefore not a mixture of the two either. It is the determinate negation<\/a>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Since what results, the negation, is determinate negation, it has a content. It is a new concept, but a higher, richer concept than the preceding one.<\/p>\nScience of Logic I, Introduction<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Hegel\u2019s own image for it is not the balance but the plant:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The bud disappears in the bursting forth of the blossom, and one might say that the former is refuted by the latter [\u2026]. But their fluid nature makes them at the same time moments of an organic unity, in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other.<\/p>\nPhenomenology of Spirit, Preface<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

An example from the Groundlines<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Right and wrong<\/a> are not a pair of opposites between which punishment mediates. \u00a7 82<\/a> determines wrong as the semblance<\/em> of right against right \u2014 it arises out of right, not alongside it. And \u00a7 99<\/a> says that the violation has \u201eno positive existence<\/em>\u201c except in the particular will of the criminal. Wrong is accordingly no second principle but a shape of right that contradicts itself. That is why punishment can sublate it without anything third being added.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Likewise abstract right<\/a> and morality<\/a> do not stand over against each other as outer and inner, to be set off against each other in ethical life<\/a>. Morality issues from the failure of abstract right (\u00a7 104<\/a>), and ethical life from the failure of morality on its own indeterminacy (\u00a7 141<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where the misunderstanding comes from<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

From the textbook formula thesis \u2013 antithesis \u2013 synthesis<\/em>. It presupposes precisely the picture Hegel disputes: two finished propositions and a third that balances them. The formula does not come from him; he uses it in reporting on Kant and rejects schematic triads as lifeless. Whoever brings it along will find nothing in Hegel that fits it \u2014 and will wrongly conclude that there is nothing there.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources.<\/strong> Encyclopaedia (1830) \u00a7\u00a7 79\u201382 with Additions. \u2013 Science of Logic I, Introduction and First Chapter; Logic II, First Section (opposition, contradiction). \u2013 Phenomenology of Spirit, Preface. \u2013 Groundlines \u00a7 31<\/a> Remark, \u00a7 82<\/a>, \u00a7 99<\/a>, \u00a7 104<\/a>, \u00a7 141<\/a>. \u2013 Literature.<\/strong> Gustav E. Mueller, \u201eThe Hegel Legend of \u201aThesis\u2013Antithesis\u2013Synthesis\u2018\u201c, Journal of the History of Ideas<\/em> 19 (1958); Michael Theunissen, Sein und Schein<\/em>, Frankfurt a. M. 1978. \u2013 In the glossary: contradiction<\/a>, determinate negation<\/a>, understanding<\/a>, the speculative<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n