{"id":903087,"date":"2026-09-17T12:24:23","date_gmt":"2026-09-17T10:24:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/?page_id=903087"},"modified":"2026-09-17T12:24:24","modified_gmt":"2026-09-17T10:24:24","slug":"has-hegel-misunderstood-the-copula-is","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/has-hegel-misunderstood-the-copula-is\/","title":{"rendered":"Has Hegel not simply misunderstood the meaning of the copula \u201eis\u201c?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In brief:<\/strong> No \u2014 he declared it insufficient, and gave his reasons. That is something other than a misunderstanding, but it is not a refutation of formal logic either. Whoever makes the charge must show that Hegel\u2019s reasons do not hold.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The charge<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Sentences like \u201ebeing is<\/em> nothing\u201c (Logic) or \u201ethe state is<\/em> the actuality of the ethical Idea\u201c (\u00a7 257<\/a>) sound absurd to formal logic. The suspicion: that Hegel confuses two different meanings of the copula \u2014<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n
  1. the \u201eis\u201c of predication<\/strong> \u2014 \u201ethe sky is<\/em> blue\u201c: a property is ascribed to a subject;<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. the \u201eis\u201c of identity<\/strong> \u2014 \u201eBerlin is<\/em> the capital of Germany\u201c: A = B.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    \u201eBeing is nothing\u201c would accordingly be a predication passed off as an identity. That would indeed be nonsense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Why this misses the point<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    The charge presupposes that the sentence describes a state of affairs. That is precisely what Hegel disputes \u2014 not covertly but expressly, and with an analysis of his own in the Preface to the Phenomenology<\/em>. In the ordinary sentence the subject lies at rest and has a property attached to it; in the speculative<\/a> sentence the subject passes over into the predicate and dissolves in it. Thinking, accustomed to running on along predicates, suffers in this \u201ea counter-thrust\u201c \u2014 and that is why such sentences have to be read twice (at length: Why are Hegel\u2019s texts so hard to read?<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    In a philosophical context, then, Hegel\u2019s \u201eis\u201c mostly does not stand for \u201ehas the property\u201c but for: passes over into<\/em> \u00b7 turns into<\/em> \u00b7 proves to be<\/em> \u00b7 has its truth in<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    At the model case: \u201eBeing is nothing\u201c (Encyclopaedia \u00a7\u00a7 86\u201388) does not say that the category being has the property nothing. It says: pure, wholly indeterminate being<\/a>, thought through consistently, has no content whatever by which it could be distinguished from pure nothing \u2014 and has thereby passed over into it. The subject does not remain what it was.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The same in the philosophy of right<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    \u201eWrong<\/a> is the semblance of right against right\u201c (\u00a7 82<\/a>) does not mean that a property belongs to wrong, but: abstract right brings forth its own opposite out of itself. And \u201ethe state<\/a> is the actuality of the ethical Idea\u201c (\u00a7 257<\/a>) does not mean that the state is distinguished by a property, but: freedom<\/a> comes to itself in this shape \u2014 the state is the result<\/em> of a movement whose beginning is made by \u00a7 4<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    A warning on this: the textbook formula thesis \u2013 antithesis \u2013 synthesis<\/em> is useless for describing this movement and does not come from Hegel. He uses it in reporting on Kant and expressly rejects schematic triads. What he actually describes is determinate negation<\/a>: from the negation there follows not nothing, but a determinate further thing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    What the objection retains<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    Two things. First: Hegel writes a language whose rules he lays down himself, and thereby makes understanding depend on assent to his procedure \u2014 a circle one can and should argue about. Second: not every passage in which the \u201eis\u201c remains obscure is speculative on that account. Some things in Hegel are simply unclearly put. The distinction is work on the particular case and cannot be replaced by a reference to the speculative sentence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Sources.<\/strong> Phenomenology of Spirit, Preface (the speculative sentence, the \u201ecounter-thrust\u201c). \u2013 Science of Logic I, First Chapter; Encyclopaedia (1830) \u00a7\u00a7 86\u201388 (being, nothing, becoming), \u00a7\u00a7 79\u201382 (the three sides of the logical). \u2013 Groundlines \u00a7 4<\/a>, \u00a7 82<\/a>, \u00a7 257<\/a>. \u2013 That the formula thesis \u2013 antithesis \u2013 synthesis<\/em> does not come from Hegel but was popularized through Heinrich Moritz Chalyb\u00e4us was shown by Gustav E. Mueller (\u201eThe Hegel Legend of \u201aThesis\u2013Antithesis\u2013Synthesis\u2018\u201c, Journal of the History of Ideas<\/em> 19, 1958). \u2013 In the glossary: the speculative<\/a>, determinate negation<\/a>, understanding<\/a>, syllogism<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n