The finding is the reverse of the clich\u00e9, and it is well documented.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Alfred Rosenberg\u2019s Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts<\/em>, the most widely circulated ideological book of the movement, condemns Hegel twice<\/strong> and devotes separate chapters to Schopenhauer and Plato. In the schools Plato was the author who was read, in editions specially prepared with suitably selected passages. Hegel did not belong to the canon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The sharpest witness is Carl Schmitt. In Staat, Bewegung, Volk<\/em> he writes in 1933 that with Hitler\u2019s chancellorship on 30 January one may say: \u201eHegel is dead.\u201c The civil-service state for which Hegel stood had been superseded by the movement. Schmitt was no Hegelian and had no reason to be gentle \u2013 he is describing what happened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n German legal philosophy in the 1920s had turned to Hegel in order to set something against a statutory positivism felt to be empty: Julius Binder, his pupil Karl Larenz, Walther Sch\u00f6nfeld. After 1933 they equated the actuality they found with the concept. The \u201econcrete universal\u201c became the Volksgemeinschaft<\/em>, ethical life<\/a> became the racial order, the person<\/a> became the Volksgenosse<\/em>. In 1935 Larenz wrote the sentence in which what was happening becomes visible: only he who is a member of the people is a subject of rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n With that Hegel\u2019s foundation was expressly annulled. His command of right runs \u201ebe a person and respect others as persons<\/em>\u201c (\u00a7 36<\/a>) and knows no condition; and \u00a7 209<\/a> says that the human being counts because he is a human being. Neo-Hegelianism turned both into their opposite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is not enough to say that this was abuse. It is the realisation of a risk that lies in Hegel\u2019s procedure: if philosophy is to recognise reason in what is actual, everything depends on the examination of whether the shape one finds really corresponds to its concept. Whoever skips that examination still has Hegel\u2019s sentences in hand and says the opposite with them. Hegel\u2019s only defence against this is his own concept of actuality<\/a>: that what merely exists is not thereby actual.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sources.<\/strong> Walter Kaufmann, \u201eThe Hegel Myth and Its Method\u201c, 1959 \u00b7 Carl Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk<\/em>, 1933 \u00b7 Karl Larenz, Rechtsperson und subjektives Recht<\/em>, 1935 \u00b7 Bernd R\u00fcthers, Die unbegrenzte Auslegung<\/em>, 1968 \u00b7 Oliver Lepsius, Die gegensatzaufhebende Begriffsbildung<\/em>, 1994. \u2013 In detail on this website: Hegel and German legal scholarship<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\nWhat happened nonetheless<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
How to place the case<\/h2>\n\n\n\n