{"id":903208,"date":"2026-09-17T16:11:35","date_gmt":"2026-09-17T14:11:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/?page_id=903208"},"modified":"2026-09-17T16:11:36","modified_gmt":"2026-09-17T14:11:36","slug":"what-does-hegel-say-to-readers-from-non-european-traditions","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/what-does-hegel-say-to-readers-from-non-european-traditions\/","title":{"rendered":"What does Hegel say to readers from non-European traditions?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In brief:<\/strong> Hegel is a Eurocentrist, and not by accident but on grounds he gives. That cannot be explained away, and this edition does not try. What can be shown is that the concepts he works with \u2013 above all recognition<\/a> \u2013 are stronger than the world history into which he harnesses them, and have been turned against him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The finding, unvarnished<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In \u00a7 351<\/a> Hegel justifies \u201ecivilized nations\u201c regarding and treating others \u201eas barbarians, with the consciousness of an unequal right\u201c, and their independence as \u201esomething merely formal\u201c. In \u00a7 347<\/a> one<\/em> nation at a time receives the right to be the bearer of world history, \u201eagainst [which] \u2026 the spirits of the other nations are without right\u201c. In \u00a7 206<\/a> note the Indian castes serve as an example of complete degradation. The lectures on the philosophy of history contain passages on Africa and Asia that go beyond condescension and are racist.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is no marginal feature of the system. World history is in Hegel the place where spirit<\/a> comes to itself, and it has a direction \u2013 from east to west. Whoever reads \u00a7 341<\/a>\u2013\u00a7 360<\/a> reads this construction along with it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why the concepts are usable nonetheless<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The reason is simple: Hegel\u2019s most important concept demands exactly the opposite of what he permits in \u00a7 351<\/a>. Recognition<\/a> is in him not something the stronger party grants. It is actual only when it is reciprocal \u2013 whoever does not recognise the other as free is not recognised by someone free, and has gained nothing. That is the point of the analysis of lordship and bondage<\/a> in the Phenomenology<\/a>, and it is Hegel\u2019s own standard.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Measured by that standard, \u00a7 351<\/a> is not an unpleasant subordinate clause but a self-contradiction. It has been used in exactly that way. The anticolonial theories of the twentieth century \u2013 from the Caribbean to South Africa \u2013 argued against European domination not in spite of Hegel but with Hegel\u2019s concept of recognition. The concept was stronger than its author.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What in the Groundlines is worth having<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The sentence from \u00a7 209<\/a> note belongs here, and it refutes the author of \u00a7 351<\/a>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The human being counts<\/em>, thus, because he is a human being<\/em>, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, and so on.<\/p>\nGroundlines, \u00a7 209<\/a> note<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Likewise \u00a7 57<\/a> note on slavery. Hegel there lists the justifications \u2013 physical force, captivity in war, the saving of life, sustenance, upbringing, benefits conferred, \u201eone\u2019s own consent\u201c \u2013 and finds that they all rest on the same mistake: taking the human being as a natural entity. The opposing side he holds to be one-sided, but it has the decisive merit:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The side of the antinomy that asserts the concept of freedom therefore has the merit of containing the absolute starting point<\/em> \u2013 but only the starting point \u2013 for the truth, while the other side, which stops at existence without the concept, does not contain the point of view of rationality and right at all.<\/p>\nGroundlines, \u00a7 57<\/a> note<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

And \u00a7 270<\/a> note demands civil equality for Jews with a grounding that names exactly the level at which \u00a7 351<\/a> fails: \u201ethat they are, first and foremost, human beings<\/em>\u201c.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

How this edition deals with it<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The incriminating passages stand in the text, with commentary, unembellished. A book from which the objectionable paragraphs have been removed is no longer a book but an argument. Whoever has not read \u00a7 351<\/a> cannot join the discussion of Hegel and colonialism \u2013 and whoever has read only \u00a7 351<\/a> just as little.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources.<\/strong> Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a> and note (slavery), \u00a7 66<\/a> note, \u00a7 206<\/a> note, \u00a7 209<\/a> note, \u00a7 270<\/a> note, \u00a7 341<\/a>\u2013\u00a7 360<\/a> (world history), in particular \u00a7 347<\/a> and \u00a7 351<\/a>. \u2013 Phenomenology of Spirit, chapter IV A (independence and dependence of self-consciousness). \u2013 Lectures on the Philosophy of History, introduction, the geographical basis. \u2013 In the glossary: Recognition<\/a>, Lordship and Bondage<\/a>, World History<\/a>. \u2013 Literature.<\/strong> Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History<\/em>, Pittsburgh 2009; Robert Bernasconi, \u201eHegel at the Court of the Ashanti\u201c, in: Stuart Barnett (ed.), Hegel after Derrida<\/em>, London 1998; Frantz Fanon, Peau noire, masques blancs<\/em>, Paris 1952, there the chapter on lord and bondsman.<\/p>\n\n\n\n