{"id":906254,"date":"2026-09-24T14:08:59","date_gmt":"2026-09-24T12:08:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/?page_id=906254"},"modified":"2026-09-24T14:08:59","modified_gmt":"2026-09-24T12:08:59","slug":"grammar-of-logical-concepts","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/grammar-of-logical-concepts\/","title":{"rendered":"The Grammar of Logical Concepts"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>A short school of Hegel\u2019s logic, written as a reading aid to the Philosophy of Right \u2014 to be read once, valid for all 360 paragraphs. It does not explain the individual words; the <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/glossary-of-hegels-key-concepts\/\">Glossary<\/a> does that. It explains the movement in which the words do their work.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading has-x-large-font-size\" id=\"inhalt\">Contents<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n\n<li><a href=\"#wozu\">What it is all for<\/a><\/li>\n\n\n<li><a href=\"#die-bewegung\">The one movement that carries everything<\/a><\/li>\n\n\n<li><a href=\"#gang\">The course of the logic in brief<\/a> \u2014 <a href=\"#gang-sein\">Being<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#gang-wesen\">Essence<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#gang-begriff\">Concept<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#gang-einteilung\">Why this is the structure of the book<\/a><\/li>\n\n\n<li><a href=\"#die-operatoren\">The operators one by one<\/a><br><a href=\"#op-allgemeinheit\">Universality \u2013 particularity \u2013 singularity (Allgemeinheit \u2013 Besonderheit \u2013 Einzelnheit)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-an-sich\">In itself \u2013 for itself (an sich \u2013 f\u00fcr sich)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-unmittelbar\">Immediate \u2013 mediated (unmittelbar \u2013 vermittelt)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-moment\">Moment (Moment)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-setzen\">Positing \u2013 presupposing (setzen \u2013 voraussetzen)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-aufheben\">Sublating (aufheben)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-negativitaet\">Negation, negativity, contradiction (Negation, Negativit\u00e4t, Widerspruch)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-reflexion\">Reflection (Reflexion)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-bestimmtheit\">Determinacy (Bestimmtheit)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-bestimmung\">Determination (Bestimmung)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-dasein\">Existence (Dasein)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-identitaet\">Identity and difference (Identit\u00e4t und Unterschied)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-begriff\">Concept \u2013 Idea \u2013 actuality (Begriff \u2013 Idee \u2013 Wirklichkeit)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-substanz\">Substance and accidents (Substanz und Akzidenzen)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-erscheinung\">Semblance \u2013 appearance (Schein \u2013 Erscheinung)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-form\">Form and content (Form und Inhalt)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-zufaelligkeit\">Contingency and necessity (Zuf\u00e4lligkeit und Notwendigkeit)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-abstrakt\">Abstract \u2013 concrete (abstrakt \u2013 konkret)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-unendlich\">Finite \u2013 infinite (endlich \u2013 unendlich)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-ideell\">Ideal \u2013 real (ideell \u2013 reell)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-schluss\">Judgement and syllogism (Urteil und Schluss)<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#op-uebergang\">Transition and development (\u00dcbergang und Entwicklung)<\/a><\/li>\n\n\n<li><a href=\"#paragraph-7\">One paragraph worked through: \u00a7 7<\/a><\/li>\n\n\n<li><a href=\"#handgriffe\">How to read with them<\/a><\/li>\n\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading has-x-large-font-size\" id=\"wozu\">What it is all for<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Hegel does not teach us which institutions of right and society are the right ones today. Anyone who reads the <em>Philosophy of Right<\/em> for its results \u2014 monarch, estates, corporation \u2014 is reading the answers Hegel gave to his own world and mistaking the shell for the kernel. He named this limit himself, in the Preface, in the most famous passage of the book:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As for the individual, everyone is a son of his time anyway; so also philosophy is its time grasped in thoughts.<\/p>\n<cite>Preface<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What one learns from Hegel is something different and greater: <strong>to grasp one\u2019s own present in thought<\/strong> \u2014 and with particular means that can be learned. These means are the concepts of logic. They are not scholarly ballast standing between the reader and the matter at hand, but the tool itself. Anyone who knows what it means for a determination to be <em>posited<\/em>, what distinguishes a <em>moment<\/em> from a part, and why a contradiction is not a mistake but a driving force, can use this to see through relations of which Hegel knew nothing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this sense this edition is a practice ground: three hundred and sixty paragraphs on which one can watch the tool at work. The present page explains the tool; the commentary \u201cThe Logical Development\u201d beneath each paragraph (so far on the German pages only) shows it at work; the <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/glossary-of-hegels-key-concepts\/\">Glossary<\/a> supplies the supporting passages. Taken together they are meant to be more than a reading aid to an old book \u2014 they are meant to be a short school of Hegel\u2019s logic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading has-x-large-font-size\">Why this text looks the way it does<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Hegel does not write the <em>Philosophy of Right<\/em> in the language of jurisprudence but in that of his own logic. Anyone who opens <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/7\/\">\u00a7 7<\/a> reads in the first sentence: <em>unity, moments, reflected into itself, universality, brought back, particularity, singularity, self-determination, the negative of itself, posit, with itself, identity with itself, determination, relation of negativity to itself, ideal, possibility, concept, substantiality<\/em> \u2014 more than twenty technical terms in a single sentence. This is neither a fault of style nor clumsiness. Hegel introduced these expressions in the <em>Science of Logic<\/em> (1812\u20131816) and in the <em>Encyclopaedia<\/em>, and here he presupposes them as known, just as a mathematician presupposes the signs of his notation. He says so, too: the philosophy of right has \u201cthe speculative mode of cognition as its presupposition\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/2\/\">\u00a7 2<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Two things follow from this. First: it does not help much to look these words up one at a time. \u201cBrought back\u201d (<em>zur\u00fcckgef\u00fchrt<\/em>) has no meaning that one could recite \u2014 it names a <em>step<\/em> in a movement. The sentence is understood only when one sees the movement, not when one knows twenty definitions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Second, and this is the good news: the expressions form a <strong>closed and finite set<\/strong>. A count across the entire work \u2014 Hegel\u2019s own text, without the later Additions \u2014 yields about thirty families that recur again and again. Once you have them together, you can read on fluently from then on. The effort is made once; the return holds for three hundred and sixty paragraphs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This page is therefore ordered not alphabetically but by connection. Anyone looking for a single term is better served by the <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/glossary-of-hegels-key-concepts\/\">Glossary<\/a>; from there, references and supporting quotations lead back into the text. Wherever Hegel expressly cites a passage of his logic, this edition has a footnote that converts his 1817 numbering into the familiar numbering of the 3rd edition of 1830 \u2014 the <em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> paragraphs cited below are throughout those of the 3rd edition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading has-x-large-font-size\" id=\"die-bewegung\">The one movement that carries everything<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Almost every paragraph carries out the same basic figure, only with changing material:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Something is at first in a particular way. If one takes it on its own and pushes it to the extreme, it turns into its opposite or proves to be empty. The truth is neither of the two, but the whole in which both are sublated as <em>moments<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Hegel himself described this figure, namely as the three sides that all logical thinking has (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7\u00a7 79\u201382): the side of the <strong>understanding<\/strong> (<em>das Verst\u00e4ndige<\/em>) holds a determination fast and marks it off from others; the <strong>dialectical<\/strong> side is its turning into its opposite, which does not come from outside but from the determination itself; the <strong>speculative<\/strong> side grasps both in their unity. These are not three methods to choose from but three sides of one matter \u2014 and they are the blueprint of most paragraphs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Hegel formulated these three sides himself in the <em>Encyclopaedia<\/em>, in three sentences worth remembering:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thinking as understanding stops short at fixed determinacy and at its distinctness from other determinacies; such a limited abstraction counts for it as subsisting and being on its own.<\/p>\n<cite>Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed., \u00a7 80<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The dialectical moment is the <em>own<\/em> self-sublating of such finite determinations and their passing over into their opposites.<\/p>\n<cite>Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed., \u00a7 81<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The speculative or positively rational grasps the <em>unity of the determinations in their opposition<\/em>, the affirmative that is contained in their dissolution and their passing over.<\/p>\n<cite>Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed., \u00a7 82<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Two words carry the weight here. \u201c<em>Own<\/em> self-sublating\u201d (<em>eigenes Sichaufheben<\/em>) \u2014 the reversal is not brought about from outside; we do not refute, but watch a determination fail to hold up by itself. And \u201cthe affirmative that is contained in their dissolution\u201d \u2014 at the end there is a gain, not a field of rubble. Hegel expressly adds that the result of dialectic is \u201cin truth not empty, abstract nothingness, but the negation of certain determinations, which for that very reason are contained in the result\u201d (\u00a7 82). Whoever holds on to this has grasped the difference between Hegel\u2019s dialectic and mere scepticism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The decisive point, without which the whole figure looks arbitrary, is <strong>determinate negation<\/strong>. When a determination fails by itself, what remains is not nothing but something quite determinate: precisely what the failed determination lacked. Hegel, in the Introduction to the <em>Science of Logic<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since what results, the negation, is <em>determinate negation<\/em>, it has a content. It is a new concept, but the higher, richer concept compared with the preceding one; for it has become richer by that concept\u2019s negation or opposite, and so contains it, but also more than it, and is the unity of it and its opposite.<\/p>\n<cite>Science of Logic I, Introduction \u2014 in the Glossary under <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/glossary-of-hegels-key-concepts\/#bestimmte-negation\">Determinate Negation<\/a><\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Everything else hangs on this. That is why the order of the paragraphs is not an arrangement that could just as well be laid out differently, but is itself already an argument \u2014 Hegel says expressly in the Remark to <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/33\/\">\u00a7 33<\/a> that the division is not a scheme applied from outside.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Two examples in which the figure can be seen for the first time. <em>Contract<\/em> presupposes two independent persons who come to an agreement; precisely on this it fails as an explanation of marriage (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/75\/\">\u00a7 75<\/a>) and of the state (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/258\/\">\u00a7 258<\/a>), for both are precisely that in which this independence is already sublated \u2014 so contract cannot ground them, because it presupposes that independence. And <em>conscience<\/em> is the highest form of inwardness and, precisely for that reason, taken wholly on its own, turns into arbitrary will and evil (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/139\/\">\u00a7 139<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/140\/\">\u00a7 140<\/a>) \u2014 not because conscientiousness is bad, but because a standard that lies only in me no longer makes any distinction between what I hold to be right and what is right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Whoever asks, when reading a difficult paragraph, <em>What is being taken on its own here, and on what does it fail?<\/em> has usually already found the move.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading has-x-large-font-size\" id=\"gang\">The course of the logic in brief<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Anyone who wants to read the <em>Philosophy of Right<\/em> need not have worked through the <em>Science of Logic<\/em> \u2014 but should know how it is built. For the order of the philosophy of right is the same.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Logic has three parts: the doctrine of <strong>being<\/strong> (<em>Sein<\/em>), the doctrine of <strong>essence<\/strong> (<em>Wesen<\/em>), the doctrine of the <strong>concept<\/strong> (<em>Begriff<\/em>). What distinguishes them is not their object but the <em>kind of movement<\/em>. In being, the determinations <em>pass over<\/em> into one another (<em>\u00fcbergehen<\/em>): something becomes something else and has vanished. In essence they <em>shine<\/em> into one another (<em>scheinen<\/em>): each determination has its opposite not outside itself but in itself \u2014 cause and effect, inner and outer, essence and appearance can only be thought in pairs. In the concept, finally, there is neither passing over nor shining, but <em>development<\/em>: what is distinguished remains with itself while it distinguishes itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is not an interpretation; it is what Hegel says in the three places where he opens the parts:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Being<\/em> is the concept only in itself; its determinations are determinations that simply are, in their distinction others to one another, and their further determination (the form of the dialectical) is a <em>passing over into another<\/em>.<\/p>\n<cite>Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed., \u00a7 84<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Essence<\/em> is thus being as <em>shining within itself<\/em>.<\/p>\n<cite>Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed., \u00a7 112<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The progression of the <em>concept<\/em> is no longer passing over, nor shining into another, but <em>development<\/em>, since what is distinguished is immediately posited at the same time as identical with one another and with the whole, and the determinacy is as a free being of the whole concept.<\/p>\n<cite>Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed., \u00a7 161<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The three words can be used as test questions. Does a determination here <em>pass over<\/em> into another and then vanish? Then we are in the logic of being. Does a determination <em>shine<\/em> in its opposite, so that neither can be thought without the other? Then we are in the logic of essence. Or does what is distinguished <em>remain<\/em> with itself while it distinguishes itself? Then we are in the concept \u2014 and then the thought is complete.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"gang-sein\">Part one: the doctrine of being<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The beginning is pure <strong>being<\/strong> \u2014 wholly indeterminate and therefore indistinguishable from <strong>nothing<\/strong>; the truth of both is <strong>becoming<\/strong>. The first result is <strong>existence<\/strong> (<em>Dasein<\/em>): being with a determinacy, that is, with a limit. From there the way leads via something and other, limit and <strong>restriction<\/strong> (<em>Schranke<\/em>) to <strong>finitude<\/strong>, and from there to the infinite \u2014 first to the <em>bad<\/em> infinity that merely goes on and on, then to the true infinity, which is with itself in its other. There follow <strong>being-for-itself<\/strong>, <strong>quantity<\/strong> (number, degree, ratio) and <strong>measure<\/strong>, in which quality and quantity come together (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7\u00a7 84\u2013111).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What of this is at work in the <em>Philosophy of Right<\/em>: the principle \u201cThat a determinate being should in general be the determinate being of the free will \u2013 this is right\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/29\/\">\u00a7 29<\/a>) is a proposition of the logic of being \u2014 right is freedom that has a limit and thereby a shape. The empty universality of <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/5\/\">\u00a7 5<\/a> is the indeterminate being of the will; the restriction in <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/6\/\">\u00a7 6<\/a> is its existence. And civil society is the place of bad infinity: the multiplication of needs has no measure within itself (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/185\/\">\u00a7 185<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/195\/\">\u00a7 195<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"gang-wesen\">Part two: the doctrine of essence<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here thinking no longer asks what something <em>is<\/em>, but what stands behind it \u2014 and finds that what stands behind is nothing other than the relationship itself. The stages: <strong>semblance<\/strong> (<em>Schein<\/em>) and <strong>reflection<\/strong>; the determinations of reflection, <strong>identity<\/strong>, <strong>difference<\/strong>, <strong>opposition<\/strong>, <strong>contradiction<\/strong>, <strong>ground<\/strong>; then <strong>existence<\/strong> (<em>Existenz<\/em>), <strong>appearance<\/strong>, <strong>relationship<\/strong> (whole and parts, force and its expression, inner and outer); finally <strong>actuality<\/strong> with possibility, contingency and necessity, and the relationships of <strong>substance<\/strong>, <strong>causality<\/strong> and <strong>reciprocity<\/strong> (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7\u00a7 112\u2013159).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is the logical groundwork of the middle part of the philosophy of right. Morality is the sphere of the will reflected into itself (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/105\/\">\u00a7 105<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/106\/\">\u00a7 106<\/a>); civil society is expressly called \u201cthe world of appearance of the ethical\u201d, and for this Hegel refers to the doctrine of semblance and of appearance (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/181\/\">\u00a7 181<\/a>); the family is substance, its members are accidents (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/163\/\">\u00a7 163<\/a>); the difference between the old forms of constitution is a mere difference of number, because it belongs to a relationship in which one and the same thing appears as a mutual opposition of independent existences (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/273\/\">\u00a7 273<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"gang-begriff\">Part three: the doctrine of the concept<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <strong>concept<\/strong> has three moments \u2014 <strong>universality<\/strong>, <strong>particularity<\/strong>, <strong>singularity<\/strong> \u2014 which do not stand side by side; each can be grasped only together with the others. There follow the <strong>judgement<\/strong> as the original division of the concept and the <strong>syllogism<\/strong>, in which what was separated comes together again through a <em>middle<\/em>; after that <strong>objectivity<\/strong>, and finally the <strong>Idea<\/strong> \u2014 life, cognition, the absolute Idea (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7\u00a7 160\u2013244).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The concept is the utterly <em>concrete<\/em> \u2026 The moments of the concept therefore cannot be separated; the determinations of reflection are supposed to be grasped and to hold each on its own, separated from the opposite one; but since in the concept their identity is posited, each of its moments can be grasped immediately only from and with the others.<\/p>\n<cite>Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed., \u00a7 164<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This sentence is the key to <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/7\/\">\u00a7 7<\/a>, and at the same time to Hegel\u2019s concept of the state: a universal that one obtains by leaving out the differences is a universal of the understanding; the universal of the concept is one that brings forth its differences and remains in them. That is why the state is neither the sum of its citizens nor what they have in common (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/258\/\">\u00a7 258<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/260\/\">\u00a7 260<\/a>). And that is why Hegel can develop wrong as a series of forms of judgement (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/85\/\">\u00a7 85<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/88\/\">\u00a7 88<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/95\/\">\u00a7 95<\/a>) and describe the estates as the mediating middle of a syllogism (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/302\/\">\u00a7 302<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"gang-einteilung\">Why this is the structure of the book<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The connection is clearest in <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/33\/\">\u00a7 33<\/a>, where Hegel divides the work. The three words with which he opens the three parts are exactly the three kinds of movement of the logic:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">According to the sequence of stages in the development of the Idea of the will that is free in and for itself, the will is A. <em>immediate<\/em> \u2026 the sphere of abstract or formal right; B. the will <em>reflected<\/em> out of its external determinate being <em>into itself<\/em> \u2026 the sphere of morality; C. <em>the unity and truth of these two abstract moments<\/em> \u2026 ethical life.<\/p>\n<cite><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/33\/\">\u00a7 33<\/a><\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Immediate<\/em> is the category of the logic of being, <em>reflected into itself<\/em> that of the logic of essence, <em>unity and truth of the two<\/em> that of the concept. Abstract right, morality and ethical life are therefore not three topics that Hegel deals with one after another, but three logical stages. Once you have seen this, you no longer read the transitional paragraphs (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/104\/\">\u00a7 104<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/141\/\">\u00a7 141<\/a>) as assertions but as inferences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading has-x-large-font-size\" id=\"die-operatoren\">The operators one by one<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Each section first says what the expression means, then where Hegel introduced it, and finally what work it does in the <em>Philosophy of Right<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-allgemeinheit\">Universality \u2014 particularity \u2014 singularity (Allgemeinheit \u2014 Besonderheit \u2014 Einzelnheit)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The most important triad of the whole work, introduced in \u00a7\u00a7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/5\/\">5<\/a>\u2013<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/7\/\">7<\/a> and presupposed everywhere thereafter. For it Hegel himself refers to the logic of the concept (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7\u00a7 163\u2013165).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Universality<\/strong> (<em>Allgemeinheit<\/em>) is the capacity to look away from everything determinate. I can abstract from every content, every wish, every tie \u2014 even from my own life. Taken on its own, Hegel calls this \u201cthe freedom of emptiness\u201d; turning towards actuality, it becomes \u201cthe fanaticism of the destruction of every existing social order\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/5\/\">\u00a7 5<\/a>, Remark \u2014 Hegel has in mind the Terror of 1793).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Particularity<\/strong> (<em>Besonderheit<\/em>) is the opposite step: committing oneself to <em>this<\/em> content, setting a restriction. Taken on its own, this too is nothing \u2014 mere being driven by changing drives, none of which says which one is to count (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/6\/\">\u00a7 6<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/17\/\">\u00a7 17<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Singularity<\/strong> (<em>Einzelnheit<\/em>) is not a third thing beside the other two, but both in one: restricting oneself and in doing so remaining with oneself, because the restriction is one\u2019s own and can be taken back. That is Hegel\u2019s concept of freedom (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/7\/\">\u00a7 7<\/a>). Two warnings on this. \u201cSingularity\u201d (<em>Einzelnheit<\/em>) here does not mean the isolated single thing of ordinary representation, but this structure. And \u201cuniversal\u201d (<em>allgemein<\/em>) in Hegel mostly does not mean what many things have in common \u2014 that would be the <em>abstract<\/em> universal, obtained by leaving out the differences \u2014 but the whole that realises itself in its differences and in doing so first brings them forth: <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/glossary-of-hegels-key-concepts\/#konkrete-allgemeinheit\">concrete universality<\/a> (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/24\/\">\u00a7 24<\/a>, Remark).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>On the spelling:<\/em> Hegel consistently writes <strong>Einzelnheit<\/strong> \u2014 in the first edition of the <em>Philosophy of Right<\/em> just as in the <em>Science of Logic<\/em> and in all three editions of the <em>Encyclopaedia<\/em>. The widely used edition of the collected works (<em>Werkausgabe<\/em>) turned it into <em>Einzelheit<\/em>; this edition follows the first edition. The word is the same \u2014 but the unfamiliar form is a useful warning sign, for an <em>Einzelheit<\/em> in today\u2019s German sense, that is, a detail, is never meant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The triad recurs in every part of the work: the person in abstract right is universal and therefore abstract (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/35\/\">\u00a7 35<\/a>); civil society is the realm of particularity set loose (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/182\/\">\u00a7 182<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/185\/\">\u00a7 185<\/a>); the state is the place where particularity and universality no longer exclude each other (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/260\/\">\u00a7 260<\/a>). Anyone looking for the arc of the book will find it here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-an-sich\">In itself \u2014 for itself \u2014 in and for itself (an sich \u2014 f\u00fcr sich \u2014 an und f\u00fcr sich)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>In itself<\/strong> (<em>an sich<\/em>) means: in substance, according to its concept, but not yet known and not yet realised. The slave is free \u201cin itself\u201d \u2014 this is no whitewashing, but the proposition from which it follows that slavery is a wrong (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">\u00a7 57<\/a>). <strong>For itself<\/strong> (<em>f\u00fcr sich<\/em>) means: known, willed, explicitly posited. <strong>In and for itself<\/strong> (<em>an und f\u00fcr sich<\/em>) means both together; this is Hegel\u2019s term for completed actuality \u2014 the state is rational \u201cin and for itself\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/258\/\">\u00a7 258<\/a>), that is: it is not rational only because individuals consent to it, nor is it rational without them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Hegel sets the three against one another in a single sentence that contains the method of the whole book:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thus the will is free only <em>in itself<\/em>, or <em>for us<\/em>, or it is the will in general in its <em>concept<\/em>. Only when the will has itself as its object is it <em>for itself<\/em> what it is in itself.<\/p>\n<cite><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/10\/\">\u00a7 10<\/a> \u2014 in the Glossary under <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/glossary-of-hegels-key-concepts\/#an-sich\">In Itself<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/glossary-of-hegels-key-concepts\/#fuer-sich\">For Itself<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/glossary-of-hegels-key-concepts\/#an-und-fuer-sich\">In and For Itself<\/a><\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As a reading aid: wherever \u201cin itself\u201d appears, something has not yet been made good; the paragraph that makes it good comes later. And in the Remark to <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/10\/\">\u00a7 10<\/a> Hegel expressly warns against stopping at mere being-in-itself \u2014 freedom then becomes a mere \u201ccapacity\u201d, that is, a possibility that never has to be made good.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-unmittelbar\">Immediate \u2014 mediated (unmittelbar \u2014 vermittelt)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Immediate<\/strong> (<em>unmittelbar<\/em>) means: without presupposition, simply found, not yet having passed through anything else. In Hegel this is never praise but the mark of a beginning that does not yet know anything. <strong>Mediated<\/strong> (<em>vermittelt<\/em>) means: having passed through something else and thereby being determined.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In substance this is an opposition that does not exist at all \u2014 Hegel says in the Introduction to the <em>Science of Logic<\/em> that there is nothing \u201cin heaven or in nature or in spirit\u201d that does not contain immediacy just as much as mediation (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/glossary-of-hegels-key-concepts\/#unmittelbarkeit-und-vermittlung\">Glossary<\/a>). For the philosophy of right this means: custom, which seems self-evident, is the most mediated thing in the world, and the state, which confronts the citizen as a power he simply finds before him, is in truth the result of all the preceding stages.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Almost every section begins with an immediate shape and ends with a mediated one. The family is immediate ethical life (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/158\/\">\u00a7 158<\/a>), civil society the world of nothing but mediations (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/182\/\">\u00a7 182<\/a>), the state the regained unity that retains mediation within itself (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/256\/\">\u00a7 256<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/257\/\">\u00a7 257<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-moment\">Moment (Moment)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Not a point in time and not a part. A <strong>moment<\/strong> is a distinguishable side of a whole which cannot subsist on its own and remains preserved in the whole. The word is borrowed from mechanics (the moment of a force) and means: something that is what it is only in working together with other things.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Hegel defines it at the place where he explains sublating: something is sublated only insofar \u201cas it has entered into unity with its opposite; in this more precise determination, as something reflected, it may fittingly be called a <em>moment<\/em>\u201d (<em>Science of Logic<\/em> I). So when Hegel says that universality and particularity are \u201cmoments\u201d of the will (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/7\/\">\u00a7 7<\/a>), this means: they can be distinguished but not separated \u2014 there is no will that would be merely the one. And when the members of the family are called \u201caccidents\u201d of the ethical substance (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/163\/\">\u00a7 163<\/a>), or the estates \u201cmoments\u201d of the state (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/302\/\">\u00a7 302<\/a>), the same relation is meant, and never a belittlement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-setzen\">Positing \u2014 presupposing (setzen \u2014 voraussetzen)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Positing<\/strong> (<em>setzen<\/em>) means: bringing forth, and in such a way that what is brought forth remains recognisable as one\u2019s own. The will \u201cposits\u201d a restriction for itself \u2014 that is why the restriction does not bind it, for the will knows it as its own (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/7\/\">\u00a7 7<\/a>). The concept \u201cposits\u201d its differences instead of finding them before it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Presupposing<\/strong> (<em>voraussetzen<\/em>) means: taking something as already present that in truth is only supposed to emerge as a result. The charge that something is \u201cpresupposed\u201d is therefore always an objection in Hegel \u2014 and one of the sharpest. It strikes the contract theory of the state (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/75\/\">\u00a7 75<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/258\/\">\u00a7 258<\/a>), the state of nature (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/93\/\">\u00a7 93<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/187\/\">\u00a7 187<\/a>) and every explanation that mixes the result in with the presuppositions. In the logic of essence the two are one: reflection presupposes what it posits (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7\u00a7 112 ff.).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-aufheben\">Sublating (aufheben) \u2014 two meanings, not three<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The most famous word, and the site of a widespread inaccuracy. Almost every account says that <em>aufheben<\/em> (to sublate) has three meanings in Hegel: to negate, to preserve and to raise to a higher level. At both of the authoritative passages Hegel himself expressly names <strong>two<\/strong> \u2014 in the <em>Science of Logic<\/em> (the Remark \u201cThe expression \u2018to sublate\u2019\u201d, <em>Der Ausdruck: Aufheben<\/em>) and in the <em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> (\u00a7 96): <em>to keep, to preserve<\/em> (<em>aufbewahren, erhalten<\/em>) and at the same time <em>to make cease, to put an end to<\/em> (<em>aufh\u00f6ren lassen, ein Ende machen<\/em>). The \u201craising up\u201d (<em>Emporheben<\/em>) does occur in the same Remark, but as what the Latin <em>tollere<\/em> precisely does <em>not<\/em> achieve; it is the poorer determination against which Hegel shows the superiority of the German word.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Hegel does not deny that something richer and also higher emerges from a sublation \u2014 he says so expressly, but of the <em>result of negation<\/em>, not of the <em>word<\/em>. The gain in height is a consequence of the matter, not a meaning of the word. How what is sublated continues to exist, he states without any \u201chigher\u201d: it has become a <em>moment<\/em>. Treated in detail, with all supporting passages, in the Glossary under <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/glossary-of-hegels-key-concepts\/#aufhebung\">Sublation<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the philosophy of right the movement can be followed throughout: wrong is sublated in punishment (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/99\/\">\u00a7 99<\/a>), abstract right in morality (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/104\/\">\u00a7 104<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/141\/\">\u00a7 141<\/a>), both in ethical life (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/141\/\">\u00a7 141<\/a>). Each time, what came earlier is neither gone nor still there unchanged. Wherever \u201csublate\u201d (<em>aufheben<\/em>) appears, mere abolition is never meant \u2014 and this matters in practice: Hegel does not abolish abstract right when he sublates it; property and contract remain valid in ethical life, only no longer as the last word.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-negativitaet\">Negation, negativity, contradiction (Negation, Negativit\u00e4t, Widerspruch)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In Hegel, <strong>negativity<\/strong> is not a lack but what moves things. \u201cThe I determines itself insofar as it is the relation of negativity to itself\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/7\/\">\u00a7 7<\/a>) \u2014 meaning: I am not this or that content, I can detach myself from any of them, and precisely therein lies my ability to commit myself to one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Contradiction<\/strong> is therefore not the sign of an error in thinking but the point at which the matter drives onward (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7\u00a7 119 f.). Where Hegel points out a contradiction, he does not say \u201csomeone has thought badly here\u201d, but \u201chere the determination does not keep what it promises\u201d. Wrong is such a case: the criminal wants to posit a right as a single individual, and in doing so appeals to the very right he violates (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/95\/\">\u00a7 95<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/97\/\">\u00a7 97<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/100\/\">\u00a7 100<\/a>). That is why Hegel can call punishment the criminal\u2019s own right \u2014 not revenge and not deterrence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-reflexion\">Reflection, reflected into itself (Reflexion, in sich reflektiert)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Reflection<\/strong> (<em>Reflexion<\/em>) is a turning back upon oneself, not pondering (<em>Nachdenken<\/em>). Something is <strong>reflected into itself<\/strong> when it has its determinacy not as an alien restriction but as its own, one that it can know and take back. This is the decisive expression in <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/7\/\">\u00a7 7<\/a> and the reason why freedom can be spoken of there: particularity is \u201creflected into itself and thereby brought back to universality\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To be distinguished from this is <strong>reflection into another<\/strong>: being determined only by the relation to something else. That is the structure of civil society as a whole, where everyone attains his end only by way of others (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/182\/\">\u00a7 182<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/183\/\">\u00a7 183<\/a>) \u2014 and that is why Hegel also calls it a \u201csystem of needs\u201d and not a community. The logic of essence in the <em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> (\u00a7\u00a7 112\u2013122) develops both forms; the philosophy of right shows them in action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-bestimmtheit\">Determinacy \u2014 determining (Bestimmtheit \u2014 bestimmen)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Determinacy (<em>Bestimmtheit<\/em>) is that by which something is <em>this<\/em> and not that. It is therefore always at the same time a limit: every determinacy is a <a href=\"#op-negativitaet\">negation<\/a> and says as much about what the thing is not as about what it is. <strong>To determine<\/strong> (<em>bestimmen<\/em>) means to <a href=\"#op-setzen\">posit<\/a> this limit; <strong>to determine oneself<\/strong> (<em>sich bestimmen<\/em>) means to posit it for oneself \u2014 and throughout the book that is the activity of the will.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At first determinacy is merely a restriction. The I is \u201cthe transition from undifferentiated indeterminacy to differentiation, determining, and the positing of a determinacy as a content and object\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/6\/\">\u00a7 6<\/a>) \u2014 and is thus no longer the empty, free I, but this determinate one. That is why \u00a7 6 is the uncomfortable paragraph of the Introduction: freedom seems to be lost in every determinacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In Hegel, <em>Bestimmtheit<\/em> (determinacy) and <em>Bestimmung<\/em> (determination) are not one word in two forms, but two stages. What the difference consists in is set out in the <a href=\"#op-bestimmung\">next section<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-bestimmung\">Determination (Bestimmung)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Determination (<em>Bestimmung<\/em>) is <a href=\"#op-bestimmtheit\">determinacy<\/a> insofar as it belongs to the something as its <strong>own<\/strong>: as what it is according to its concept and that by which it holds its own against the other. In the Logic Hegel contrasts it with <em>constitution<\/em> (<em>Beschaffenheit<\/em>) \u2014 the same determinacy seen from the side on which it is external and changeable, exposed to the other (<em>Science of Logic<\/em>, Doctrine of Being: \u201cDetermination, Constitution and Limit\u201d).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Hence it is no play on words that in German \u201cBestimmung\u201d also means <strong>vocation<\/strong> (<em>Berufung<\/em>): the determination of a thing is what it is <a href=\"#op-an-sich\">in itself<\/a> and ought to be in it. It is in this sense that Hegel calls the concept of freedom \u201cthe highest determination of spirit\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/30\/\">\u00a7 30<\/a>), and in this sense that the will in <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/7\/\">\u00a7 7<\/a> stands \u201cin this determination to join together only with itself\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The step from determinacy to determination is the movement of the Introduction.<\/strong> In <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/6\/\">\u00a7 6<\/a> the I has a determinacy and is thereby restricted. In <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/7\/\">\u00a7 7<\/a> it \u201cknows it as its own and as ideal, as a mere possibility by which it is not bound, but in which it only exists because it posits itself therein\u201d \u2014 it recognises the limit as its own, not as alien. The limit is thereby no longer mere determinacy but its determination, and freedom consists not in spite of determinacy but in it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Two further uses are common and must be kept apart from this. <strong>\u201cThe determinations of the concept\u201d<\/strong> \u2014 meaning the moments <a href=\"#op-allgemeinheit\">universality, particularity, singularity<\/a>; so in <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/31\/\">\u00a7 31<\/a>, where the concept develops itself out of itself and is \u201conly an immanent progression and production of its determinations\u201d. And <strong>determination as definition<\/strong> \u2014 so in <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/29\/\">\u00a7 29<\/a> on \u201cthe Kantian \u2026 definition\u201d (<em>Bestimmung<\/em>) of right; here the word simply means definition and nothing more.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-dasein\">Existence (Dasein)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Existence (<em>Dasein<\/em>) is determinate being: being that has a limit and thereby a shape (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7\u00a7 89 ff.). Not empty being and not a mere thought, but what occurs in the world and can be distinguished \u2014 in the <a href=\"#gang-sein\">course of the logic<\/a>, the first result after being, nothing and becoming.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The sentence that carries the whole philosophy of right uses exactly this word (<em>Dasein<\/em>): \u201cThat a determinate being should in general be the determinate being of the free will \u2013 this is right\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/29\/\">\u00a7 29<\/a>). Right is therefore neither an ought nor a feeling, but freedom that has taken on a shape in the world \u2014 property, contract, law, institution. Whoever has this one expression has the basic idea of the book.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This holds throughout the work: property is \u201cthe first existence of freedom\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/45\/\">\u00a7 45<\/a>), the body is \u201cimmediate existence\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/48\/\">\u00a7 48<\/a>), and crime violates \u201cthe existence of freedom in its concrete sense\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/95\/\">\u00a7 95<\/a>). When Hegel asks about existence, he never asks whether something can be thought, but whether it stands in the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-identitaet\">Identity and difference (Identit\u00e4t und Unterschied)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For the ordinary understanding the two exclude each other. In Hegel, <strong>identity<\/strong> is always the identity of something differentiated: \u201cto remain \u2026 in its identity with itself and its universality\u201d means precisely not to remain indeterminate (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/7\/\">\u00a7 7<\/a>). Empty identity \u2014 A = A \u2014 he expressly calls unproductive (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7\u00a7 115\u2013117).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For the philosophy of right this is more than a logical subtlety. The equality of persons in abstract right is such an empty identity: all are persons, nothing more (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/36\/\">\u00a7 36<\/a>). It is true, and it is poor. Hegel\u2019s objection to egalitarianism and to the state of estates (<em>St\u00e4ndestaat<\/em>) alike turns on this point both times: whoever sees only identity loses the differences, and whoever sees only the differences loses the connection (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/49\/\">\u00a7 49<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/200\/\">\u00a7 200<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-begriff\">Concept \u2014 Idea \u2014 actuality (Begriff \u2014 Idee \u2014 Wirklichkeit)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In Hegel the <strong>concept<\/strong> (<em>Begriff<\/em>) is not the representation we form of a thing, but what drives the thing itself, its inner determination (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7 160). That is why a thing can <em>fail to correspond<\/em> to its concept \u2014 a bad state is a state, but it is not what a state is. This is exactly the standard with which the <em>Philosophy of Right<\/em> works, and it is something other than an ideal applied from outside.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <strong>Idea<\/strong> (<em>Idee<\/em>) is the concept together with its realisation (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7 213). That is the subject matter of the whole book, as the very first sentence of <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/1\/\">\u00a7 1<\/a> already says: \u201cThe philosophical science of right has as its object the idea of right \u2026\u201d Not the concept alone and not the actual conditions of right alone, but both in their relation to each other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Actuality<\/strong> (<em>Wirklichkeit<\/em>) is narrower than \u201ceverything there is\u201d (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7 142). Only what the concept itself has brought forth is actual; the rest is contingent existence, \u201cidle existence\u201d. Only in this way is the famous sentence of the Preface to be read \u2014 it does not claim that everything that exists is rational; Hegel himself later defended himself against this misunderstanding (see <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/glossary-of-hegels-key-concepts\/#wirklichkeit-und-vernuenftigkeit\">Actuality and Rationality<\/a> in the Glossary).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-substanz\">Substance and accidents (Substanz und Akzidenzen)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Substance<\/strong> is what carries, and it does not stand independently alongside its determinations but exists only in them; the <strong>accidents<\/strong> are not additions but the way in which substance is there at all (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7\u00a7 150 ff., expressly cited by Hegel in <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/163\/\">\u00a7 163<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The family is substance, its members are its accidents (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/163\/\">\u00a7 163<\/a>) \u2014 not because they are unimportant, but because their relation to one another is not that of contracting parties. \u201cEthical substance\u201d is Hegel\u2019s term for the customs and institutions in which individuals always already stand before they make any decision (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/144\/\">\u00a7 144<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/146\/\">\u00a7 146<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/156\/\">\u00a7 156<\/a>). Whoever reads this relation as subordination misses it: the substance is nothing apart from its accidents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-erscheinung\">Semblance \u2014 appearance \u2014 actuality (Schein \u2014 Erscheinung \u2014 Wirklichkeit)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A sequence of stages. <strong>Semblance<\/strong> (<em>Schein<\/em>) is a mere shining without a footing of its own; <strong>appearance<\/strong> (<em>Erscheinung<\/em>) is the shape in which an essence actually comes forth, but still separated from it; <strong>actuality<\/strong> (<em>Wirklichkeit<\/em>) is the unity of the two.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Hegel calls civil society \u201cthe world of appearance of the ethical\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/181\/\">\u00a7 181<\/a>) and for this expressly refers to the doctrine of semblance and of appearance (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7\u00a7 112 ff. and \u00a7\u00a7 131 ff.). That means: the ethical is present in it, but dispersed, external and not yet transparent to itself. This is neither reproach nor praise \u2014 it is an indication of place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-form\">Form and content (Form und Inhalt)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Form<\/strong> is not what is external as opposed to a content, but the way in which the content articulates itself (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7\u00a7 133 f.). When Hegel says \u201cmerely formal\u201d, he means: the way is there, the content is still missing. Formal right (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/36\/\">\u00a7 36<\/a>), the formal freedom of arbitrary will (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/15\/\">\u00a7 15<\/a>), formal conscientiousness (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/137\/\">\u00a7 137<\/a>) \u2014 everywhere the same diagnosis, and everywhere a paragraph follows that supplies the content.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-zufaelligkeit\">Contingency and necessity (Zuf\u00e4lligkeit und Notwendigkeit)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Contingent<\/strong> (<em>zuf\u00e4llig<\/em>) is what could also be otherwise without the concept deciding it (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7\u00a7 145 ff.). Hegel does not explain contingency away but assigns it a place: at many points right has to fix something where the matter itself prescribes nothing \u2014 in the measure of punishment, in time limits, in measures and figures (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/214\/\">\u00a7 214<\/a>). That a decision is made here rather than a proof given is no deficiency of the philosophy of right but a feature of right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Conversely: when Hegel says \u201cnecessary\u201d, he does not mean that things had to turn out this way, but that it follows from the concept. The transition from the family to civil society (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/181\/\">\u00a7 181<\/a>) is necessary in this sense, and yet it is no historical forecast.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-abstrakt\">Abstract \u2014 concrete (abstrakt \u2014 konkret)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here the reversal of ordinary usage matters. In Hegel, <strong>abstract<\/strong> means: poor, torn out, one-sided. <strong>Concrete<\/strong> means: rich in determinations, what has grown together. The clause \u201cand all that is true is concrete\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/7\/\">\u00a7 7<\/a>, Remark) is therefore no empty phrase: for Hegel the true is never the simple, but always the whole with its differences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The title of the first part is to be read in the same way: <em>abstract<\/em> right is not right in general, but the poor right of the mere person, detached from its context (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/34\/\">\u00a7 34<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/35\/\">\u00a7 35<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-unendlich\">Finite \u2014 infinite (endlich \u2014 unendlich)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Finite<\/strong> is what has its limit in something else. <strong>Infinite<\/strong> in the bad sense is mere continuation without end \u2014 always one more need, one more contract, one more law (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7\u00a7 93\u201395). Hegel calls this bad infinity and finds it everywhere in civil society: the multiplication of needs has no measure within itself (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/185\/\">\u00a7 185<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/195\/\">\u00a7 195<\/a>). Truly infinite, by contrast, is what is with itself in its other \u2014 and that again is the concept of freedom (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/22\/\">\u00a7 22<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/23\/\">\u00a7 23<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-ideell\">Ideal \u2014 real (ideell \u2014 reell)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A pair of concepts that describes what happens in a sublation: what is sublated is not gone, it has become <strong>ideal<\/strong> (<em>ideell<\/em>) \u2014 present, but no longer independent. In <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/7\/\">\u00a7 7<\/a> the I knows its determinacy \u201cas its own and as ideal, as a mere possibility by which it is not bound\u201d. And the sovereignty of the state consists in the particular powers being \u201cideal\u201d within it, that is, in their not subsisting on their own (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/276\/\">\u00a7 276<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/278\/\">\u00a7 278<\/a>). More in the Glossary under <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/glossary-of-hegels-key-concepts\/#ideell-reell\">Ideality and Reality<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-schluss\">Judgement and syllogism (Urteil und Schluss) \u2014 the middle<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Two expressions from the logic of the concept that do more work in the <em>Philosophy of Right<\/em> than one would expect. The <strong>judgement<\/strong> (<em>Urteil<\/em>) is the original division (<em>urspr\u00fcngliche Teilung<\/em>) of the concept into its moments (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7\u00a7 166 ff.; Hegel cites the passage in <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/24\/\">\u00a7 24<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/88\/\">\u00a7 88<\/a>). That is why wrong can be developed as a series of forms of judgement: the civil legal dispute as a negative judgement, fraud as an infinite judgement (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/85\/\">\u00a7 85<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/88\/\">\u00a7 88<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/95\/\">\u00a7 95<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <strong>syllogism<\/strong> (<em>Schluss<\/em>) is the figure in which two sides are held together by a <em>middle<\/em> (<em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> \u00a7\u00a7 181 ff.). This is the architecture of Hegel\u2019s state: the estates are the mediating middle between government and people (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/302\/\">\u00a7 302<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/304\/\">\u00a7 304<\/a>), the corporation the middle between the individual and universality (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/251\/\">\u00a7 251<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/255\/\">\u00a7 255<\/a>). Wherever Hegel says \u201cmiddle\u201d (<em>Mitte<\/em>), this figure is always meant, and never mediocrity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size:1.45rem\" id=\"op-uebergang\">Transition and development (\u00dcbergang und Entwicklung)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <strong>transition<\/strong> (<em>\u00dcbergang<\/em>) is the point at which a shape breaks down on its own inadequacy and drives forth the next one. The transitional paragraphs \u2014 for instance <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/33\/\">\u00a7 33<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/104\/\">\u00a7 104<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/141\/\">\u00a7 141<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/181\/\">\u00a7 181<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/256\/\">\u00a7 256<\/a> \u2014 are the most difficult and at the same time the most important: whoever understands them has the structure of the book. Hegel stresses that the division of the work is not a scheme applied from outside, but is itself already the first step of the matter (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/33\/\">\u00a7 33<\/a>, Remark).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Development<\/strong> (<em>Entwicklung<\/em>) accordingly means not growth in time, but the coming forth of what was already there in substance. That is why the order of the paragraphs is not a chronology: the family comes before civil society, although both exist at the same time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading has-x-large-font-size\" id=\"paragraph-7\">One paragraph worked through: \u00a7 7<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Finally, the test case. <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/7\/\">\u00a7 7<\/a> is considered one of the hardest sentences in the book; with the expressions introduced so far it can be taken apart piece by piece. Hegel writes:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b3) The will is the unity of these two moments; \u2014 particularity reflected into itself and thereby brought back to universality; \u2014 individuality; the self-determination of the I, at once to posit itself as the negative of itself, namely as determinate and limited, and yet to remain with itself, i.e., in its identity with itself and its universality, and in this determination to join together only with itself.<\/p>\n<cite><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/7\/\">\u00a7 7<\/a><\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u201cthese two moments\u201d<\/strong> \u2014 meaning universality from <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/5\/\">\u00a7 5<\/a> (being able to abstract from everything) and particularity from <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/6\/\">\u00a7 6<\/a> (committing oneself to something). \u201cMoments\u201d means: neither of the two occurs on its own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u201cparticularity reflected into itself\u201d<\/strong> \u2014 the commitment that does not come from outside. I have not stumbled into this content; in it I have related myself to myself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u201cand thereby brought back to universality\u201d<\/strong> \u2014 and therefore the commitment does not cancel the ability to abstract. I am committed and nevertheless keep what enables me to abstract. \u201cBrought back\u201d (<em>zur\u00fcckgef\u00fchrt<\/em>) names exactly this step and nothing else.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u201cindividuality\u201d (<em>Einzelnheit<\/em>)<\/strong> \u2014 the name for the result. Not a third thing alongside universality and particularity, but both in one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u201cto posit itself as the negative of itself\u201d<\/strong> \u2014 to limit oneself. \u201cNegative\u201d here means: determinate, and determinate means: not everything else. And \u201cposit\u201d means: I bring forth the limit myself; it does not befall me.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u201cand yet to remain with itself\u201d<\/strong> \u2014 the limit does not separate me from myself. That is Hegel\u2019s standing formula for freedom: being with oneself in the other (<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/7\/\">\u00a7 7<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/23\/\">\u00a7 23<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/24\/\">\u00a7 24<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u201cknows it as its own and as ideal, as a mere possibility by which it is not bound\u201d<\/strong> \u2014 the second sentence of the paragraph draws the consequence: because I have posited the limit, I can take it back. The resolution binds, but it does not turn to stone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And then the comparison with which Hegel closes the paragraph: this freedom constitutes the concept of the will, \u201cits gravity, just as gravity constitutes the substantiality of a body\u201d. Freedom, then, is not a property that the will might just as well lack, but what makes it a will at all \u2014 just as a body without gravity would not be a body.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading has-x-large-font-size\" id=\"handgriffe\">How to read with them<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Four moves that almost always help:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">First, <strong>pay attention to Hegel\u2019s italics<\/strong>. What he emphasises is as a rule exactly the operator that matters in that paragraph \u2014 a count across the whole text confirms this: the expressions most often set in italics are <em>in itself<\/em> (<em>an sich<\/em>), <em>existence<\/em> (<em>Dasein<\/em>), <em>universality<\/em> (<em>Allgemeinheit<\/em>), <em>particularity<\/em> (<em>Besonderheit<\/em>), <em>for itself<\/em> (<em>f\u00fcr sich<\/em>), <em>form<\/em> (<em>Form<\/em>), <em>content<\/em> (<em>Inhalt<\/em>), <em>actuality<\/em> (<em>Wirklichkeit<\/em>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Second, <strong>look for the connection<\/strong>. Hardly any paragraph stands on its own; almost every one is the answer to a difficulty in the one before. Where a sentence remains unintelligible, the question is usually not \u201cwhat does this mean?\u201d but \u201cwhere did the previous step fail?\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Third, <strong>distinguish the Remark from the matter itself<\/strong>. The paragraph itself is the matter; the Remark is Hegel\u2019s engagement with other views; the Additions come from students\u2019 lecture notes and were added only after Hegel\u2019s death. Anyone looking for the course of the development should first read the paragraphs alone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Fourth, <strong>ask of every operator what it is doing here<\/strong>, not what it means in general. The same term does different things in different places; only the context decides. That is why this page is laid out as a grammar and not as a dictionary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading has-x-large-font-size\">Where to read on<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/glossary-of-hegels-key-concepts\/\">Glossary of Hegel\u2019s Key Concepts<\/a> treats the individual concepts in detail, with the supporting passages quoted in full. In addition, for every paragraph of this edition there is a short explanation of the step it takes, under the heading \u201cThe Logical Development\u201d (so far on the German pages only).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For those who want to read the passages in the Logic themselves: Hegel\u2019s own references in the <em>Philosophy of Right<\/em> point to the Heidelberg <em>Encyclopaedia<\/em> of 1817, whose numbering differs from that of the familiar 3rd edition (1830). In this edition a footnote giving the number in the 3rd edition is attached at every such place \u2014 for example at <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/7\/\">\u00a7 7<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/24\/\">\u00a7 24<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/88\/\">\u00a7 88<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/161\/\">\u00a7 161<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/163\/\">\u00a7 163<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/181\/\">\u00a7 181<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/273\/\">\u00a7 273<\/a>. For the <em>Science of Logic<\/em> the relevant sections are the Remark \u201cThe expression \u2018to sublate\u2019\u201d and the Introduction to the first volume, as well as the logic of the concept in the second.<\/p>\n\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>A short school of Hegel\u2019s logic, written as a reading aid to the Philosophy of Right \u2014 to be read once, valid for all 360 paragraphs. It does not explain the individual words; the Glossary does that. It explains the movement in which the words do their work. Contents What it is all for Hegel [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-906254","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906254","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=906254"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906254\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":906255,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906254\/revisions\/906255"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=906254"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}