[p. 204]<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Paragraphs which Hegel, as rector of the Nuremberg Gymnasium, dictated to the lower class from 1810 onwards, together with his explanations. Not published in his lifetime; Karl Rosenkranz edited them in 1840 from the papers as the first course of the \u201cPhilosophische Prop\u00e4deutik\u201d (Werke, vol. XVIII, pp. 3 ff.). Translated from the German text of the Werke (vol. 4, \u201cN\u00fcrnberger und Heidelberger Schriften\u201d). Additions in parentheses are Rosenkranz\u2019s, following Hegel\u2019s dictation.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Print version (PDF):<\/strong> for printing and taking along<\/a> \u2013 each page of the PDF holds exactly one page of the printed edition, with a wide margin for one\u2019s own notes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The figures between vertical bars, e.g. |93|<\/span>, mark the beginning of a page of the printed edition, so that a passage can be found again in one\u2019s own copy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the notes, \u201cEditors:<\/em>\u201d introduces a note by the editors of the German edition and \u201cHegel\u2019s footnote.\u201d one of Hegel\u2019s own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cross-reference:<\/em> The whole of practical philosophy on a few pages: abstract right, the society of the state, the doctrine of duties, religion. Much of it returns, worked out, in the Groundlines<\/em>, often in the same words \u2014 compare \u00a7 34<\/a> ff. (abstract right), \u00a7 105<\/a> ff. (morality), \u00a7 142<\/a> ff. (ethical life) and \u00a7 257<\/a> ff. (the state). At each section the corresponding place is noted as a cross-reference. The German text<\/a> is on the German side of this edition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Page by page:<\/strong> Each web page holds exactly one page of the printed edition. Web page 1 is p. 204, web page 2 is p. 205, and so on; the web page for a printed page thus has the number \u201cprinted page minus 203\u201d. The page number stands at the top of each web page in square brackets. The first and the last page are printed only in part, because the text there begins or ends in the middle of a page.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Find a page:<\/strong> (1810 ff.)<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n The object of this doctrine is the human will, namely according to the relation of the particular will to the universal will. As will, spirit behaves practically. The practical<\/em> behaviour, through which it posits in its indeterminacy a determination, or, in place of determinations present in it without its contribution, others out of itself, is to be distinguished from its theoretical<\/em> behaviour.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Consciousness in general is the relation of the I to an object, be it an inner or an outer one. Our knowledge contains in part objects which we cognize through sensuous perceptions, in part however objects which have their ground in spirit itself. The former make up the sensuous<\/em>, the latter the intelligible<\/em> world. The concepts of right, of the ethical and of religion belong to the latter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the relation of the I and the object to one another, the I is 1. as passive<\/em> and the object as the cause of determinations in me. In this case the determinate representations which I have in me come from the fact that immediately present objects make an<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 205]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |205|<\/span> impression on me. This is theoretical<\/em> consciousness. Whether it behaves as perceiving<\/em> or as imagination<\/em> or as thinking<\/em>, its content is always one already given and present, and in thinking what is in itself is its content. 2. On the other hand, the I appears as practical<\/em> consciousness when the determinations of the I are to be not only determinations of its representing and thinking, but are to enter into external existence. Here I determine things or am the cause of alterations of the given objects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The practical faculty determines itself in general inwardly, from itself. The content of its determinations belongs to it, and it cognizes them as its own. – These determinations are, however, at first only inward and therefore separated from the reality of externality, but they are to become external and to realise themselves. This happens through acting<\/em>, through which the inward practical determinations receive an externality, i.e. an external existence. – Conversely, this can also be considered in such a way that an existing externality is sublated and made to accord with the inward determination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The inward determination of practical consciousness is now itself either drive<\/em> or will proper<\/em>. The drive is a natural self-determining which rests on restricted feelings and has a restricted purpose beyond which it does not go, or it is the unfree, immediately determined, lower faculty of desire<\/em>, according to which the human being behaves as a natural being. – Through reflection<\/em> he also goes beyond the drive and its limits. Through it he compares it not only with the means of its satisfaction, but also these means as well as the drives themselves with one another and with the purposes of his essence, and with the conclusion of reflection he either abandons himself to the<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 206]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |206|<\/span> satisfaction of the drive, or he halts it and renounces it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The will proper or the higher faculty of desire<\/em> is 1. pure indeterminacy<\/em> of the I, which as such has no limitation, nor a content immediately present through nature, and is in itself indifferent to every determinateness; 2. I can at the same time pass over to a determinateness<\/em> and make the one or the other my own, which I then translate into actuality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The abstract freedom<\/em> of the will consists, then, in that indeterminacy or equality of the I with itself, in which a determination is only insofar as it makes it its own or posits it in itself, but at the same time remains therein equal to itself and can abstract again from every determination. – Manifold stimuli, motives, laws can indeed be put before the will from outside<\/em>, but if the human being follows them, this happens only insofar as the will itself makes them its own and has resolved upon them. – This is also the case with the determinations of the lower faculty of desire, or with what comes from the natural<\/em> drives and inclinations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The will bears guilt<\/em> 1. insofar as its determination is made its own only by itself<\/em> or belongs to its resolution: I have willed; 2. insofar as a will knows<\/em> the determinations which are produced by its action, as it lies in its resolution, or which are necessarily and immediately connected with it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The deed<\/em> is in general the produced alteration and determination of existence. To the action, however, there belongs only<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 207]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |207|<\/span> that of the deed which lies in the resolution or was in consciousness, which the will thus recognises as its own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The free will, as free, is furthermore not bound to the determinateness and individuality by which one individual distinguishes itself from another, but it is universal will, and the individual, according to his pure will, is a universal being.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The will can indeed take up into itself and make its own manifold external content, i.e. content not proceeding from its essence. Insofar it remains self-equal only in form, namely in that it is conscious of being able at once to abstract again from every content and to restore its purity, but not in content and essence. Insofar<\/em> it is in general only arbitrary will<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But for the will to be truly<\/em> and absolutely free, what it wills, or its content, can be nothing other than itself. It can only will in itself and have itself as its object. The pure will therefore wills not some particular content for the sake of its particularity, but that the will as such be free<\/em> in its doing and be set free<\/em>, or that the universal will come to pass.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The closer determination and development of this universal principle of the will is presented by the doctrine of right, duties and religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Objects are the particular thing that they are through their determination<\/em>, – a sensuous object, e.g., through<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 208]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |208|<\/span> its shape, size, weight, colour, through the more or less firm cohesion of its parts, through the purpose for which it is used, etc. If one now leaves out the determinations of an object in representation, this is called abstracting<\/em>. A less determinate object, or an abstract object<\/em>, is left over. If, however, I pick out in representation only a single such determination, this too is an abstract representation<\/em>. The object, left in the completeness of its determinations, is called a concrete<\/em> object. If I abstract from all<\/em> determinations, there remains to me merely the representation of the wholly abstract object. When one says \u201cthing\u201d, one does mean<\/em> something determinate, but one speaks of something wholly indeterminate, since it is our thought that makes an actual thing into this abstraction of a mere thing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sensuous perception<\/em> is partly external, partly internal. Through the external we perceive things which are in space and time outside us and which we at the same time distinguish from ourselves. Through internal sensuous perception we notice states partly of our body, partly of our soul. A part of the sensuous world contains such objects and their determinations as, e.g., the colours, which have the sensuous as their ground and have received a spiritual form. When I say \u201cthis table is black\u201d, I speak, first, of this single concrete object; second, the predicate black, which I assert of it, is a universal, which no longer holds merely of this single one but pertains to several objects. The black is a simple representation. – Of a proper concrete object we know immediately<\/em>. The immediate becoming-conscious is intuition<\/em>. A universal abstract representation, on the other hand, is a mediated<\/em> representation, because I know of it by means of another, namely through abstraction or the leaving out of other determinations which in the<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 209]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |209|<\/span> concrete are connected with it. – A concrete representation is analysed<\/em> by laying out the determinations which are united in the concrete. The intelligible world receives its content from spirit, in general pure universal representations, e.g. being, nothing, quality, essence and the like.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The first source of our cognition is experience<\/em>. To experience there belongs in general that we have perceived something ourselves<\/em>. A distinction must also be made, however, between perception and experience. Perception at first contains only a single object, which may by chance be constituted now thus, another time otherwise. If I now repeat<\/em> the perception and in the repeated perception notice and hold fast what remains the same in all these perceptions, this is an experience. Experience contains chiefly laws<\/em>, i.e. a connection of two appearances such that, when the one is present, the other always follows too. Experience, however, contains only the universality of such an appearance, not the necessity of the connection. Experience teaches only that something is so, and how it happens or is present, but not yet the grounds or the why.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since there are very many objects regarding which we cannot ourselves have the experience, e.g. the past, we must also rely on the authority<\/em> of others. Those objects too which we hold true on the authority of others are objects of experience. We believe<\/em> on the authority of others what is probable<\/em>. We often hold probable what is in fact improbable, but precisely the improbable is often the true<\/em>. – (An event proves itself above all through the consequences and through the manifold connection of circumstances of which we have had experience ourselves. The men who relate something must have<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 210]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |210|<\/span> credibility<\/em>, i.e. must have been in such circumstances as to be able to have knowledge of the matter. From their tone we can infer their honesty, whether they are in earnest or have some interest in it. If writers write under the government of a tyrant and they bestow eulogies on him, we see that these are flatteries. If we hear someone relate something in which he himself is entangled, one will surely hear that he relates it to his advantage. If someone, however, greatly praises a good quality or action of his enemy, we must rather believe what is said.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Experience thus teaches only how objects are constituted, not how they must be, nor how they ought to be. This cognition proceeds only from the essence<\/em> or the concept<\/em> of the matter. It alone is the truthful one. Since from the concept we learn to cognize the grounds of the object, we must also cognize the concepts of the determinations of right, morality and religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In determining what is right and good we can at first hold to experience in general, and indeed, in the first place, to the external<\/em>, namely to the course of the world<\/em>. We can see what counts as right and good or what proves itself as right and good. On this it is to be remarked 1. that, in order to know which actions are right or good and which wrong or evil, one must already have beforehand<\/em> the concept of the right and good; 2. if one therefore wished to hold to what the course of the world shows as valid too, nothing determinate<\/em> would result on the matter. With regard to the results or the experience one has, it would depend on the view one brings along. In the course of the world, because it is itself this diverse happening, everyone can find confirmation for his subjective view, however different it may be.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But there is also, secondly, an inner<\/em> experience of the right, the good and the religious. We judge through our<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 211]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |211|<\/span> heart<\/em> or feeling<\/em> that something of this way of acting is good or evil; we also have a feeling of religion; we are religiously affected. What feeling says as an approval<\/em> or disapproval<\/em> of it contains merely the immediate pronouncement or assurance that something is so or is not so. Feeling gives no grounds and does not speak according to grounds. What feeling we have, of approval or disapproval, is likewise mere experience of the heart. – Feeling, however, is in general inconstant<\/em> and changeable<\/em>. At one time it is constituted thus, at another otherwise. Feeling is in general something subjective<\/em>. As an object is in feeling, so it is merely in me as a particular individual. When I say: \u201cI feel something thus\u201d or \u201cthus it is in my heart\u201d, I say thereby that it is so only in me. I leave undecided whether it is so in others too. When in something I appeal merely to my feeling, I do not wish to go into grounds, thus not into the universal. I then withdraw into myself and express only how the matter is in me, not how it is in and for itself, objectively and universally. The objective<\/em> or the universal is what belongs to the understanding, or the concept.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If one wants to cognize truly what a rose, carnation, oak etc. is, or to grasp their concept, one must first of all grasp the higher concept which underlies them, here therefore the concept of a plant; and in order to grasp the concept of the plant in turn, one must again grasp the higher concept on which the concept of plant depends, and this is the concept of an organic body. – In order to have the representation of bodies, surfaces, lines and points, one must have the representation of space, because space is the universal; bodies, surface etc., on the other hand, are only particular determinations in space. Thus future, past and present presuppose time as their universal ground, and so it is also with right, with duty and religion, namely they are<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 212]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |212|<\/span> particular determinations of consciousness<\/em>, which is their universal ground.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In consciousness we commonly have the object before us, or we know only of the object and do not know of ourselves. But essentially present in these things is the I<\/em>. Insofar as we represent to ourselves merely an object<\/em>, we have a consciousness, namely of the object. Insofar as we represent to ourselves consciousness<\/em>, we are conscious of consciousness or have a consciousness of consciousness. – In our ordinary life we have consciousness, but we are not conscious that we are consciousness; we have much, even of the bodily, unconsciously<\/em>; e.g. the vital functions which belong to our self-preservation we possess without thereby already having a consciousness of their more exact constitution, which we acquire only in science. Even spiritually we are much that we do not know. – The external<\/em> objects of our consciousness are those which we distinguish from ourselves and to which we ascribe an existence independent of us. The inner<\/em> objects, on the other hand, are determinations or faculties, forces of the I. They do not subsist outside one another, but that in which they subsist is I. – Consciousness behaves either theoretically or practically.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Theoretical<\/em> consciousness contemplates what is and leaves it as it is. The practical<\/em>, on the other hand, is active consciousness, which does not leave what is thus, but produces alterations in it and generates out of itself determinations and objects. – In consciousness, then, two things are present, I and the object, I determined through the object or the object through me. – In the former case I behave theoretically. I take the<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 213]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |213|<\/span> determinations of the object into myself, as they are<\/em>. I leave the object as it is, and seek to make my representations conformable to it. I have determinations in me, and the object also has determinations in itself. The content of my representing is to be constituted as the object is. The determinations of the object in itself are rules for me. The truth<\/em> of my representations consists in their agreeing with the constitution and the determinations of the object itself. The law for our consciousness, insofar as it is theoretical, is not completely passive, but it must direct its activity to receiving what is objective. Something can be an object for our perception without our thereby having a consciousness of it, if we do not direct our activity to it. This activity in receiving is attention<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The representations which we acquire through attention we move about in ourselves through imagination<\/em>, whose activity consists in calling up for us, on the intuition of an object, the image of another object which is or was connected with the former in some way. It is not necessary that the object to which imagination attaches the image of another be present, but it can also be present merely in representation. The most extensive work of imagination is language<\/em>. Language consists in external signs and sounds by which one makes known what one thinks, feels or senses. Language consists in words<\/em>, which are nothing other than signs of thoughts. For these signs, writing<\/em> in the letters<\/em> gives signs in turn. It makes our thoughts known without our having to speak in doing so. – Hieroglyphic writing<\/em> differs from alphabetic writing in that it comprehends immediately whole thoughts<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 214]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |214|<\/span> in itself. In speech<\/em> a certain sound is sensuously present. We have therein the intuition of a sound. We do not stop at this impression, but our imagination attaches to it the representation of an object that is not present. There are thus two things present here, a sensuous determination and another representation attached to it. The representation counts here solely as the essence and as the meaning of what is sensuously present, which thereby is a mere sign. The given<\/em> content stands opposed to a content produced<\/em> by us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In common life one confuses<\/em> representation and thinking, and we also call thinking what is only representation of imagination. In representation<\/em> we have a thing before us also according to its external, inessential existence. In thinking<\/em>, on the other hand, we separate off from the thing the external, merely inessential, and bring out the thing only in its essence. Thinking penetrates through the external appearance to the inner nature of the thing and makes it its object. It leaves out what is contingent in a thing. It does not take a thing as it is as immediate appearance, but divides the inessential from the essential and thus abstracts from the former. – In intuition we have individual objects before us. Thinking relates<\/em> them to one another or compares<\/em> them. In comparison it picks out what they have in common<\/em> with one another and leaves out that through which they differ<\/em> from one another, and thereby obtains universal<\/em> representations. – The universal representation contains less<\/em> determinateness than the single object which falls under this universal, because one obtains the universal precisely only by leaving out the individual. On the other hand, the universal comprehends<\/em> under itself more<\/em> or has a far greater extent. Insofar as thinking produces a universal object, the<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 215]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |215|<\/span> activity of abstracting pertains to it and with it the form<\/em> of universality, as e.g. in the universal object \u201chuman being\u201d. But the content<\/em> of the universal object does not pertain to it, as abstracting, but is given to thinking and is present for itself independently of it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To thinking there belong still manifold determinations which express a connection<\/em> between the manifold appearances that is universal<\/em> and necessary<\/em>. The connection as it is in sensuous intuition is only an external or contingent one, which can be so or also not so. A stone, e.g., by its falling makes an impression in a soft mass. In sensuous intuition lies the falling of the stone and that thereupon, in time, there is a hollow in the mass where the stone touched it. These two appearances, the falling of the stone and the hollowing of the mass, have succeeded one another in time. But this connection contains as yet no necessity, but, according to the expression, under the same conditions the one could happen and the other not follow upon it. If, on the other hand, the relation of these two appearances to one another determines itself as a connection of cause and effect or as causality<\/em>, then this connection is necessary or a connection of the understanding. It lies therein that, if under the same conditions the one happens, the other is contained therein.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These determinations are forms of thinking. Spirit posits them only out of itself<\/em>, but they are at the same time determinations of what is<\/em>. Only through reflection do we come to what ground and consequence, inner and outer, what is essential or inessential are. Spirit is not conscious thereby that it posits these determinations arbitrarily, but it expresses therein something that is present for itself without its contribution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 216]<\/p>\n\n\n\n When it is a matter in general of spirit receiving determinations, the indeterminacy of the I or of spirit is presupposed. The determinations of spirit belong to it, even if it has received them from other objects. Insofar as something in it does not come from it, as a content independent of it, the form nevertheless always belongs to it therein; e.g. in imagination the material indeed comes from intuition, but the form consists in the way in which this material has been connected otherwise than it was originally present in intuition. In a pure representation, e.g. that of the animal, the determinate content belongs to experience, but the universal in it is the form that comes from spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This form is thus the own determining of spirit. In the theoretical faculty it makes the essential difference that only the form lies in the determining of spirit, whereas in the practical the content too comes from spirit. In right, e.g., the content is personal freedom. This belongs to spirit. The practical faculty cognizes determinations as its own insofar as it wills them at all. Even if they appear as alien determinations or as given, they must cease to be alien determinations insofar as I will them. I transform the content into myself, posit it through myself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The theoretical faculty begins from something existent, present, external and makes it into a representation. The practical, on the other hand, begins from an inward determination. This is called resolution<\/em>, intention, direction, and makes the inward actually external, gives it an existence. This passing over from an inward determination to externality is called acting<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 217]<\/p>\n\n\n\n Acting is in general a union of the inner and the outer. The inward determination from which it begins is to be sublated as to form, namely that of being merely inward, and to become external; the content of this determination is to remain; e.g. the intention to build a house is an inward determination whose form consists in being as yet only intention; the content comprises the plan of the house. If here the form is now sublated, the content nevertheless remains. The house which is to be built according to the intention and that which is built according to the plan are the same house.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Conversely, acting is equally a sublating of the external<\/em> as it is immediately present; e.g. for the building of a house the ground, stones, wood and the remaining materials are altered in manifold ways. The shape of the external is made other. It is brought into an entirely different combination from what it was before. This alteration takes place in accordance with a purpose, namely the plan of the house, with which inward determination, then, the external is made to accord.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Animals too have a practical relation to what is external to them. They act from instinct purposively, thus rationally. Since they do so unconsciously, however, one can speak of acting in their case only improperly. They have desire<\/em> and drive<\/em>, but no rational will<\/em>. In the case of the human being one also says will of his drive or his desiring. More exactly speaking, however, one distinguishes the will from desire; the will, in distinction from desire proper, is then called the higher faculty of desire<\/em>. – In animals instinct<\/em> is itself distinguished from their drives and desires, for instinct is indeed a doing from desire or drive, which, however, is not<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 218]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |218|<\/span> concluded with its immediate expression but has a further consequence, likewise necessary for the animal. It is a doing in which there lies a relation also to something else; e.g. the hauling together of grains by many animals. This is not yet the whole action, but there lies further beyond it a purpose, namely their nourishment for the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The drive is, in the first place, something inward<\/em>, something that begins a movement from itself or brings forth an alteration out of itself. The drive proceeds from itself. It is indeed awakened by external circumstances, but notwithstanding was already present. It is not produced thereby. Mechanical causes produce merely external or mechanical effects, which are completely determined by their causes, in which therefore nothing is contained that is not already present in the cause; e.g. if I give a body motion, there is in it nothing but the communicated motion; or if I colour a body, it has nothing more than the communicated colour. On the other hand, if I act upon a living being, this action makes of it something quite other than it is immediately. The activity of the living being is thereby aroused to show itself out of itself in its peculiarity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the second place the drive is 1. restricted<\/em> as to content, 2. contingent<\/em> on the side of its satisfaction, as dependent on external circumstances. The drive does not go beyond its purpose and is insofar called blind. It satisfies itself, whatever the consequences may be.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To this extent the human being does not posit his drives himself, but has them immediately, or they belong to his nature<\/em>. Nature, however, is subject to necessity, because everything in it is limited, relative, or is absolutely only in relation to something else. But what is in relation to something else is not for itself, but dependent on the other. It has its ground therein and is something<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 219]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |219|<\/span> necessary<\/em>. To the extent that the human being has determinate drives immediately, he is subject to nature and behaves as a necessary and unfree being.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet the human being, as a thinking being, can reflect<\/em> upon his drives, which in themselves have necessity for him. Reflection means, in general, abbreviation [?] from the immediate. The reflection of light consists in this, that its rays, which for themselves would propagate themselves in a straight line, are deflected from this direction. – Spirit has reflection. It is not bound to the immediate, but is able to go out beyond it to something else, – e.g. from an occurrence to the representation of its consequence, or of a similar occurrence, or also of its cause. In that spirit goes out to something immediate, it has removed the same from itself. It has reflected itself into itself. It has gone into itself<\/em>. It has cognized the immediate, in so far as it opposes an other to it, as something limited. There is therefore a very great difference whether one merely is<\/em> or has<\/em> something, or whether one also knows<\/em> that one is or has this; e.g. ignorance or coarseness of dispositions or of conduct are limitations which one can have without knowing that one has them. In so far as one reflects upon them or knows of them, one must know of their opposite. Reflection upon them is already a first step beyond them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The drives, as natural determinations, are limitations. Through reflection upon them the human being begins, in general, to go beyond them. The first reflection here concerns the means<\/em>: whether they are suited to the drive, whether the drive is satisfied thereby; further, whether the means are not too important to be sacrificed for this drive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Reflection compares the different drives and their purposes with the fundamental purpose<\/em> of the being. The purposes of the particular drives are limited, but each in<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 220]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |220|<\/span> its own way contributes to the attainment of the fundamental purpose. One, however, is more closely akin to this than another. Reflection therefore has to compare the drives, to see whether they are akin to the fundamental purpose and whether it is furthered the more by their satisfaction. In reflection the transition begins from the lower faculty of desire to the higher. The human being is therein no longer a merely natural being, or no longer stands in the sphere of necessity. Something is necessary in so far as only this and not something else can happen. Before reflection there stands not only the one immediate object, but also another, or its opposite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This reflection just described is, however, properly only a relative<\/em> one. It does go beyond something finite, but always comes again to something finite; e.g. if we go beyond a place in space, another, larger one presents itself to us, but it is always a bounded space or place, and so it goes on to infinity. Likewise, if we go back from the present time into the past, we can represent to ourselves a period of ten or even of thirty thousand years. Such reflection does indeed proceed from a determinate point in space, in time, to another, but out of space or out of time itself it does not come. So it is also in practical-relative reflection. It leaves an immediate inclination, desire or drive and goes to another drive, desire or inclination, leaves this too again, and so on. In so far as it is relative, it only ever falls again into a drive, only drives about among desires and does not raise itself above this whole sphere of drives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Practical absolute<\/em> reflection, however, raises itself above this whole sphere of the finite, or leaves the sphere of the lower faculty of desire, wherein the human being is determined by<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 221]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |221|<\/span> nature and depends on the external. Finitude<\/em> consists, in general, in this, that something has a limit, i.e. that here its non-being<\/em> is posited, or that it ceases here, that it thus relates itself to something else. Infinite<\/em> reflection, however, consists in this, that I no longer relate myself to something else but to myself, or am an object to myself. This pure<\/em> relation to myself is the I<\/em>, the root of the infinite being itself. It is the complete abstraction from everything that is finite. The I as such has no content given by nature or immediate, but has only itself as content. This pure form is at the same time its own content<\/em>. Every content given by nature is 1. something limited: but the I is unlimited; 2. the content of nature is immediate: but the pure I has no immediate content, because it only is by means of abstraction from everything else.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At first the I is the purely indeterminate. But through its reflection it can pass from indeterminacy to determinacy, e.g. to seeing, hearing, and so on. In this determinacy it has become unequal<\/em> to itself, but it has at the same time remained in its indeterminacy, i.e. in that it gives itself over to it, it can return again into itself. To this belongs also resolving, for reflection precedes it and consists in this, that I have several determinacies before me, in an indeterminate multitude, which yet must be at least these two, namely some determination of something or also not this. The resolution sublates the reflection, the going over and across from one to another, fixes one determinacy and makes it its own. The fundamental condition of resolving<\/em>, of the possibility of resolving oneself or of reflecting before acting, is the absolute indeterminacy of the I.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 222]<\/p>\n\n\n\n The freedom of the will is freedom in general, and all other freedoms<\/em> are merely species of it. When one says \u201cfreedom of the will<\/em>\u201d, it is not meant as if there were, apart from the will, a further force, property or faculty that also had freedom. Just as, when one speaks of the omnipotence of God<\/em>, one does not understand thereby that there were other beings besides him who had omnipotence. There is thus civil freedom, freedom of the press, political and religious freedom. These species of freedom are the universal concept of freedom, in so far as it is applied to particular relations or objects. Freedom of religion<\/em> consists in this, that religious representations and religious actions are not forced upon me, i.e. that there are in it only such determinations as I acknowledge as my own and make my own. A religion that is forced upon me, or in regard to which I do not behave as a free being, is not mine, but always remains foreign to me. – The political<\/em> freedom of a people consists in constituting a state of its own and in deciding what counts as the universal national will either through the whole people itself or through those who belong to the people and whom it can acknowledge as its own, inasmuch as every other citizen has equal rights with them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One expresses oneself thus: my will has been determined by these
204<\/a> \u00b7 205<\/a> \u00b7 206<\/a> \u00b7 207<\/a> \u00b7 208<\/a> \u00b7 209<\/a> \u00b7 210<\/a>
211<\/a> \u00b7 212<\/a> \u00b7 213<\/a> \u00b7 214<\/a> \u00b7 215<\/a> \u00b7 216<\/a> \u00b7 217<\/a> \u00b7 218<\/a> \u00b7 219<\/a> \u00b7 220<\/a>
221<\/a> \u00b7 222<\/a> \u00b7 223<\/a> \u00b7 224<\/a> \u00b7 225<\/a> \u00b7 226<\/a> \u00b7 227<\/a> \u00b7 228<\/a> \u00b7 229<\/a> \u00b7 230<\/a>
231<\/a> \u00b7 232<\/a> \u00b7 233<\/a> \u00b7 234<\/a> \u00b7 235<\/a> \u00b7 236<\/a> \u00b7 237<\/a> \u00b7 238<\/a> \u00b7 239<\/a> \u00b7 240<\/a>
241<\/a> \u00b7 242<\/a> \u00b7 243<\/a> \u00b7 244<\/a> \u00b7 245<\/a> \u00b7 246<\/a> \u00b7 247<\/a> \u00b7 248<\/a> \u00b7 249<\/a> \u00b7 250<\/a>
251<\/a> \u00b7 252<\/a> \u00b7 253<\/a> \u00b7 254<\/a> \u00b7 255<\/a> \u00b7 256<\/a> \u00b7 257<\/a> \u00b7 258<\/a> \u00b7 259<\/a> \u00b7 260<\/a>
261<\/a> \u00b7 262<\/a> \u00b7 263<\/a> \u00b7 264<\/a> \u00b7 265<\/a> \u00b7 266<\/a> \u00b7 267<\/a> \u00b7 268<\/a> \u00b7 269<\/a> \u00b7 270<\/a>
271<\/a> \u00b7 272<\/a> \u00b7 273<\/a> \u00b7 274<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\nContents<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Introduction<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
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Explanations of the Introduction<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
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