[p. 279]<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[Fair-copy draft, 1802\/03]<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Hegel\u2019s manuscript from the autumn and winter of 1802\/03, an unfinished fair copy of 22 sheets, not published in his lifetime. The title was given by Karl Rosenkranz; Georg Mollat published a first, incomplete edition in 1893, Georg Lasson the complete text in 1913. Translated from the text of the Gesammelte Werke (vol. 5, \u201cSchriften und Entw\u00fcrfe (1799\u20131808)\u201d, ed. Manfred Baum and Kurt Rainer Meist, 1998, pp. 279\u2013361). Additions by the editors stand in square brackets, as does the heading [Introduction]; the critical apparatus and the page numbers of the manuscript are not reproduced. Towards the end the fair copy turns into brief notes in keyword form.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Print version (PDF):<\/strong> for printing and taking along<\/a> \u2013 each page of the PDF holds exactly one page of the printed edition, with a wide margin for one\u2019s own notes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The figures between vertical bars, e.g. |293|<\/span>, mark the beginning of a page of the printed edition, so that a passage can be found again in one\u2019s own copy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The notes reproduce Hegel\u2019s marginal notes; the italic indication before them (e.g. \u201cAlongside and further down in the margin:\u201d) is the editors\u2019 of the Gesammelte Werke. The enumerators \u03b1, \u03b2, \u03b3, \u03b4 and the Hebrew letters aleph (\u05d0), bet (\u05d1) and gimel (\u05d2) stand thus in Hegel\u2019s manuscript.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cross-reference:<\/em> Hegel\u2019s first draft of a whole practical philosophy, still in Schelling\u2019s conceptual language (intuition and concept, \u201cpotencies\u201d). Many doctrines of the Groundlines<\/em> appear here for the first time: need, labour and the tool (\u00a7 189<\/a> ff.), possession, exchange and contract (\u00a7 45<\/a> ff., \u00a7 72<\/a> ff.), crime and punishment (\u00a7 90<\/a> ff.), the estates (\u00a7 201<\/a> ff.) and the government (\u00a7 272<\/a> ff.). The essay on natural right<\/a>, in which Hegel uses the expression \u201csystem of ethical life\u201d, was written at the same time. At each section the corresponding place is noted as a cross-reference. The German text<\/a> is on the German side of this edition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Page by page:<\/strong> Each web page holds exactly one page of the Gesammelte Werke. Web page 1 is p. 279, web page 2 is p. 280, and so on; the web page for a printed page thus has the number \u201cprinted page minus 278\u201d. The page number stands at the top of each web page in square brackets. The first and the last page are printed only in part.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Find a page:<\/strong> Cross-reference:<\/em> The Idea of absolute ethical life as the unity of intuition and concept. In the Groundlines<\/em> ethical life is \u201cthe Idea of freedom\u201d, \u00a7 142<\/a> ff.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In order to cognise the Idea of absolute ethical life, intuition must be posited as perfectly adequate to the concept, for the Idea is itself nothing other than the identity of the two; but in order that this identity may be cognised, it must be thought as a being-adequate; but because they are held apart in being-equal, they are posited with a difference, the one in the form of universality, the other in the form of particularity, over against the other; so that this equating may thereby become complete, then conversely that which [was] here posited in the form of particularity [must] now be posited in the form of universality, and that which was posited in the form of universality now be posited in the form of particularity. But that which is truly the universal is intuition, while the truly particular is the absolute concept; each must therefore be posited over against the other once under the form of particularity, the other time under the form of universality; the one time intuition subsumed under the concept, the other time the concept under intuition; although the latter relation is the absolute one, for the reason given, the former is just as absolutely necessary, in order that complete equality might be there for cognition; for the latter is itself only one, and only One, relation; and so the absolute equality of intuition and cognition is not posited in it. Now the Idea of absolute ethical life is the taking-back of absolute reality into itself, as into a unity; in such a way that this taking-back and this unity is absolute totality; its intuition is an absolute people; its concept is the absolute being-one of individualities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n First<\/em>, intuition must be subsumed under the concept; through this, absolute ethical life appears as nature; for nature itself is nothing other<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 280]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |280|<\/span> than the subsumption of intuition under the concept, whereby, therefore, intuition, the unity, remains the inner, while the multiplicity of the concept and its absolute movement come forth to the surface. In this subsumption, then, the intuition of ethical life, which is a people, becomes a manifold reality, or a singularity, a single human being, and thereby the absolute taking-back of nature into itself becomes something hovering above this singular one, or something formal, for the formal is precisely the unity which is not in itself absolute concept, or absolute movement. At the same time, precisely because this unity hovers above the singular one, he does not get out of it, he does not abstract from it, but it is in him, though hidden in him; and, in this contradiction, that this inner light does not absolutely flash together and become one with the universal light hovering above him, it appears as something driving him towards it, as drive, striving. Or, the identity of the particular (on whose side intuition has now stepped) and of the universal is thereby determined as an incomplete unification, or as a relation<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cross-reference:<\/em> Natural ethical life: need, labour and enjoyment; in the Groundlines<\/em> the system of needs, \u00a7 189<\/a> ff., on labour and the tool \u00a7 196<\/a>\u2013\u00a7 198<\/a>; on love, parents and children \u00a7 158<\/a> ff. and \u00a7 173<\/a> ff.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Just as in the foregoing, this must be divided; this absolute ethical life according to relation, \u2013 or natural ethical life, must be considered in such a way that the concept is subsumed under intuition, and in such a way that intuition is subsumed under the concept; in the former the unity, the universal, is the inner; in the latter it steps over against it and is again in relation with the concept or the particular. In both, ethical life is a drive, that is, the drive \u03b1) does not become absolutely one with the absolute unity, \u03b2) it goes towards the singular, \u03b3) is satisfied in this singular; this singular satisfaction is itself totality; but \u03b4. at the same time it goes beyond it, though this going-beyond is here something negative, indeterminate, in general.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 281]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |281|<\/span> Satisfaction itself is nothing other than that the concept and intuition are one; it is therefore totality, living, but formal, precisely because this stage on which it stands is itself a determinate one; so that absolute life both hovers above it and remains something inner; but it remains inner because it is not absolute concept, and thus, as inner life, is not at the same time present under the form of the opposed, the external; and for that very reason it is not absolute intuition, because it is not present for the subject in the relation as such, and so its identity, too, cannot be the absolute one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The first potency is natural ethical life as intuition<\/em>; its complete differencelessness, or the being-subsumed of the concept under intuition; thus nature proper.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But the ethical is, in and for itself, according to its essence, a taking-back of difference into itself, reconstruction; identity arises out of difference, is negative in its essence; that it may be this is preceded by there being that which it annihilates. Hence this ethical naturalness, too, is an unveiling, an emergence of the universal against the particular, but in such a way that this emergence is itself wholly a particular one, while the identical, absolute quantity, remains wholly hidden; this intuition is, as such, wholly sunk in the singular feeling<\/em>; and we shall call this the practical<\/em> potency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Its essence is that feeling (not what is called ethical feeling) is something wholly singular and particular, but, as such, divided, a difference which is not to be sublated otherwise than through its negation, that of the division into subjective and objective, which being-sublated is itself a perfect singularity and differenceless identity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The feeling of division is need<\/em>; feeling as the being-sublated of division is enjoyment<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The distinguishing character as potency is that feeling is in the particular,<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 282]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |282|<\/span> and goes towards the singular, and that it is absolutely feeling. But this feeling, which goes towards sublating the division of subjectivity and objectivity, must itself present itself as totality, and must therefore be the totality of the potencies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This feeling a) subsuming the concept b) subsumed under the concept.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When feeling is presented as subsuming the concept, its formal concept is presented: this is properly its concept, which was set out above; that [there are] \u03b1) the being-sublated of the wholly absolutely identical, unconscious, the division, and this division as feeling or need \u03b2) the difference against this division1)<\/a><\/sup> which difference, however, is negative, namely an annihilation of the division; thus an annihilating of the subjective and objective, of the empirical objective intuition according to which the object of need is outside, or effort and labour; \u03b3) the being-annihilated of the object; or the identity of the first two moments; conscious feeling, i.e. one [that] comes out of difference, enjoyment<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1)<\/a> Alongside and further down in the margin:<\/em> Desire ideal determination of the object<\/p>\n\n\n\n The subsumption of feeling under the concept, or the real concept of practical feeling, spread out in its dimensions, necessarily presents feeling a) in its dimensions according to the nature of the form or of the concept, b) but in such a way that in all of them a whole, feeling, remains, and that form is something wholly external to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b1. practical feeling, or enjoyment, an intuitionless and differenceless,<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 283]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |283|<\/span> and thus reasonless, identity, which therefore goes towards the absolute annihilation of the object, and is likewise a complete indifference of the subject, which, for the ethical, is without the bringing-out of a middle uniting the opposites within itself, and is thus not the taking-back of intuiting into itself, and thus no cognising of itself in it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b1\u03b1) need is here an absolute singularity, a feeling restricting itself to the subject, which belongs wholly to nature, and whose multiplicity and system it is not the place here to comprehend. Eating, drinking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b2\u03b2. through this difference an inner and an outer are immediately posited, and this outer is determined absolutely according to the determinacy of the feeling (something edible, something drinkable). This outer thereby ceases to be something universal, identical, quantitative, and becomes a singular particular; the subject, notwithstanding its being-singular in this feeling and in the relation posited in the division, remains in itself something indifferent; it is the universal, the potency, the subsuming; the determinacy which the object of enjoyment receives in this potency is wholly ideal, or subjective; immediately its own opposite; the determinacy does not enter into the objectivity of intuition, so that something would arise for the subject which it would cognise as identity of the subjective and objective; \u2013 or this identity is posited solely in the individual; hence the object, since it is determined purely ideally, is absolutely annihilated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b3\u03b3) this enjoyment, in which the object is determined purely ideally and is wholly annihilated, is the purely sensuous one; satiation, which is the restoration of the indifference and emptiness of the individual, or of its mere possibility of being ethical or rational; it is merely negative, because it goes towards the absolute singularity of the individual and thereby towards the annihilating of the objective and universal. But enjoyment remains practical according to its essence, and distinguishes itself from absolute self-feeling by the fact that it comes out of difference, and that to this extent a consciousness of the negativity of the object is in it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 284]<\/p>\n\n\n\n this feeling in the form of difference, or of the being-subsumed of intuition under the concept, must itself likewise be comprehended as totality;<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b1\u03b1) as negative practical intuiting (labour) \u03b2\u03b2. difference (product and possession) \u03b3\u03b3. tool.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Practical feeling subsumed under the concept presents the moments of totality, thrown apart from one another, as reality; these moments are:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b1)2)<\/a><\/sup> the annihilation of the object, or of intuition, but as moment, in such a way that this annihilation is replaced by another intuition or object; or the pure identity, the activity of annihilating, is fixed; in it, therefore, abstraction is made from enjoyment, i.e. it does not come to that; for here every abstraction is a reality, a being; the object is not annihilated as object in general, but in such a way that another is put in its place; for in this annihilating, as the abstraction, there is not the object, or there is not enjoyment. But this annihilating is labour<\/em>; through which that which is determined by desire, insofar as it is for itself something not determined by desire, real for itself, is sublated, and the being-determined by desire is posited objectively as intuition; in labouring the difference of desire and enjoyment is posited; enjoyment is checked and deferred, it becomes ideal, or a relation, and in this relation through labour there is now immediately posited as coming forth: \u05d0) the relating of the subject to the object, or the ideal determination of the object by desire; this is taking possession<\/em>; \u05d1) then the<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2)<\/a> Alongside and further down in the margin, continued below the text:<\/em> \u03b1 intuition is subsumed under the concept; labouring itself is the subsuming of the object, the subject is the indifference, the subsuming, where the subject is the subsuming, the concept is dominant<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 285]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |285|<\/span> real annihilation of its form, for the objective or the difference remains, or the activity of labour itself, finally \u05d2) the possession<\/em> of the product, or the possibility of annihilating it, as something [real for itself], both through that first relating, according to its matter, and through the second, of the annihilation of its form and of the giving of form by the subject, \u2013 and of passing over to enjoyment, which, however, remains wholly ideal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Possession is not present at all in the first potency of practical feeling, and likewise taking possession purely as moment; or rather they are not real, not held apart, fixed. (Of a ground of right, or a side of possession pertaining to right, there can be no question here at all.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Taking possession is the ideal element of this subsuming, or its rest; labour, the reality, or the movement, the entering of the subsuming subject into the reality of the object; the third, the synthesis, is possession and the storing and saving of the object; in it there is that ideal determination according to the first moment, but as real in the object according to the second.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b2. In \u03b1 the product has already been formally determined; as identity of the ideal determination, but of this as objective, real, checked; but the essential thing was the identity, the activity as such, and hence as something inner, which does not come forth; it must come forth in the object, and this second potency \u03b2\u03b2 considers the relation of checked feeling to the object checked in annihilation, or the difference which is also in labour, namely the difference which lies between the reality and proper nature of the object, and its being ideally determined and being-determined by labour; in \u03b1\u03b1 the object was the subsumed, here it is the subject; or in \u03b1\u03b1 the ideal relation in labour was considered, here the real one; here labour is properly subsumed under<\/em> intuition<\/em>; for the object is in itself the universal; hence, where it is subsuming, the singularity of the subject has its proper rational place; it is concept in itself, difference, and subsumes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Labour in \u03b1\u03b1 is wholly mechanical, for singularity, abstraction, pure causality, is in the form of indifference and is the dominant, and hence something external for the object; for causality is thereby in truth posited, since this subject [is] a singular, absolutely for-itself-being, and thus absolute division and difference. Where, on the other hand, the object and the universal is subsuming, there is<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 286]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |286|<\/span> no causality, for it is in itself the indifference of the particular; and one with the particular, for which particularity is thereby mere external form, not the inner essence, being-subject.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In that the object subsumes labour under itself, it is real in the relation (as previously annihilated, posited as mere abstraction of an object), for as subsuming it is identity of the universal and particular, the latter in abstraction against the subject; hence labour, too, is a real or living labour, and its livingness is to be cognised as totality, but each moment itself as a living labour of its own, as a particular object.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For the subsuming living object and living labour, intuition is subsumed under the concept, then the concept under intuition; and then the identity of both.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b1\u03b1) the living object subsumed under the concept is the plant, bound to the element, or to the pure quantity of the earth, and producing itself against the element of air in an infinitely manifold (through the concept) production of its own whole individuality and totality; each part of the plant is itself an individual, a complete plant; it maintains itself against its inorganic nature only [by] producing itself wholly at each point of contact, or (dies off at the stem); it is given over to producing (to the absolute concept, that of being the opposite of itself). Because it thus stands under the power of the element, labour, too, is directed chiefly against the element, and is mechanical, but it leaves it to the element to compel the plant to produce; labour cannot have, or can have but little, of the plant’s specific livingness; it is the more living through the fact that it wholly alters only the external form of the element, does not destroy it chemically, and that this is an inorganic nature which itself is only in relation to the living; and lets this have its way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b2\u03b2 the concept of the living subsumed under intuition is the animal; for since this subsumption is itself one-sided, not in turn subsuming intuition under the concept in the same way, livingness is an empirically real one, infinitely dispersed, and presenting itself in the most manifold forms;<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 287]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |287|<\/span> for the form, or the absolute concept, is not itself in turn unity, universality; it is thus an individuality without intelligence; not, as with the plant, each unity of the individual itself a multitude of such, but indifference in more extended difference and distinction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Labour against the animal is thus directed less at its inorganic nature than at the organic nature itself, because the objective is not an external element but the indifference of individuality. The subsuming is determined as a subduing of the particularity of the animal for the kind of use that is appropriate to its nature; at times more negative, a subjugating, at times more positive, as a trust of the animal; at times also, as against the plant, elemental, for those animals which are destined to be annihilated in eating, so that merely their natural producing is determined.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If the use of plants is very simple, and if labour for them is to be exhibited as a need of the subject, or as it is present in subjective form, then this is inorganic, or little organised and individualised, nourishment, thus no nourishment of a higher difference of the individual, the human or the animal; a weak irritability, a feeble going-out, an annihilating which, because of the weak individuality of the plant, is itself a weak one \u2013 and then, for pleasure, there are sensuous enjoyments which are finer than annihilating because the plant is not annihilated (smelling, seeing); or this is the potency of the enjoyment of plants, like the potency towards the animal, its taming; it concerns the senses, for the senses are the animal potency in man, an individuality of feeling which, as sense, is an individual, not like an arm etc., but a complete organisation. The eating of the plant is, as enjoyment, subsumption of the concept under intuition as feeling; labour for the plant, on the other hand, is subsumption of intuition under the concept. Thus the cultivation of plants, their taming, is subsumption of the concept under intuition on the side of labour; as3)<\/a><\/sup> enjoyment, the reverse, for the enjoyment of the singular senses is a singularising of it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3)<\/a> Alongside and further down in the margin:<\/em> NB. Enjoyment and labour are the reverse of one another with regard to subsumption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 288]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |288|<\/span> The taming of animals, considered subjectively, is a more manifold need, but insofar as they are means, they cannot yet be considered here, for that would not be a subsumption of the concept under intuition, not the respect of living labour; \u2013 this is an associating of them for movement and strength, and the joyfulness of this augmentation is first of all the respect which belongs here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b3\u03b3) the absolute identity of both potencies is that the concept of the first be one with the identity of the second, or be absolute concept; intelligence. Labour subsumed under this intuition is one-sided subsuming insofar as through it this subsuming itself is sublated; it is totality, precisely because the separated subsuming of the first and second potency is here posited at once; the human being is potency, universality, for the other, but the other likewise, and so his reality, his own peculiar being, makes the acting upon him into a reception into indifference, and he is now the universal against the first; and culture<\/em> is this absolute alternation in the absolute concept, wherein each, being subject and universal absolutely at once, immediately makes his particularity into universality, and, in the wavering, in the momentary positing as potency, precisely posits himself as universal, and thereby has this being-potency, and universality unmediated in the same, against himself, and thus himself becomes a particular. The ideal determination of the other is objective, but in such a way that this objectivity immediately also posits itself subjectively, and becomes cause; for in order that something be potency for the other, it must not merely be universality and indifference in relation to it, but be so as that which is for itself, posited, or a truly absolutely universal; and this is intelligence in the highest degree; in precisely the same respect a universal as it is a particular, both unmediated and absolutely one; whereas plant and animal are so in different respects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That he is the identity of the first two potencies is the concept of this relation, but as totality it is itself under the form of the three potencies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u05d0) as feeling or as pure identity; according to it the object is determined as one that is desired; but here the living is not to be determined through working upon it; it is to be something absolutely living, and its reality, its [being] for itself, is to be absolutely so determined as that which is desired, i.e. through<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 289]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |289|<\/span> nature the relation of desire is perfectly objective, the one in the form of indifference, the other of being-particular; this highest organic polarity in the most perfect individuality of each pole is the highest unity which nature can bring forth; for it cannot go beyond this, that the difference is not real but absolutely ideal; the sexes are absolutely in relation, one the universal, the other the particular; not absolutely equal; hence their being-one, too, is not after the manner of the absolute concept, but, because it is perfect, the differenceless feeling. The annihilation of one’s own form is mutual, but not absolutely equal; each intuits itself in the other as at the same time something alien, and this is love<\/em>; the incomprehensibility of this being-oneself in something alien therefore belongs to nature, not to ethical life, for the latter is, in relation to the different, absolute equality of both; in relation to being-one, absolute being-one through ideality; but that natural ideality remains in inequality and therefore in desire, in which the one is determined as a subjective, the other as an objective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3. this same living relation, in such a way that in it intuition is subsumed under the concept, is ideal as determinacy of the opposed; but in such a way that, on account of the dominion of the concept, the difference remains, but without desire; or the determinacy of the opposed is a superficial one, not natural, real, and the practical does indeed go towards the sublation of this opposed determinacy, yet not in a feeling, but in such a way that it becomes intuition of itself in something alien, and thus ends with a perfect individuality standing over against it, whereby the being-one of nature is the more sublated. This is the relation of parents<\/em> and children<\/em>. The absolute being-one of the two separates immediately into the relation; the child is the subjective human being, but in such a way that this particularity is ideal, something external, only the form; the parents are the universal, and the labour of nature goes towards the sublation of this relation, as does that of the parents, who sublate ever more the external negativity of the child, and precisely thereby posit a greater inner negativity and thus a higher individuality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 290]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |290|<\/span> but the totality of labour is the perfect individuality and thus equality of the opposed, wherein the relation is posited and sublated, enters, appearing in time, at every moment and turns over into the opposite, according to the above; the universal interaction and culture<\/em> of human beings; their absolute equality is here, too, in the inner, and according to the whole potency in which we are, the relation is constant only in the singular. A recognising that is mutual, or the highest individuality and external difference. Here, in these potencies, from the first to the third, things go apart, or the unification of feeling sublates itself; but precisely thereby so do desire and the need corresponding to it, and each is an equal, self-standing being. That the relation is also one of such love and feeling is external form, which does not concern its essence, which is the universality in which they stand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The first two potencies are relative identities; the absolute identity is something subjective, outside them; but since this potency is itself totality, the rational, which lies hidden in the representation of the formal potencies, must come forth as such and be real. This rational is that which steps into the middle, and is of the nature of the subjective and objective, or the mediating of both.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This middle likewise exists under the form of the three potencies<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b1) the concept subsumed under intuition; belongs therefore wholly to nature, because the difference according to which the intelligent is, is not present in it as subsumption of intuition under the concept, and it is thus absolute indifference, not according to the naturalness occurring in the formal potencies, which cannot free itself from difference. At the same time this middle is not the formal identity which hitherto appeared as feeling, but a real absolute identity, a real absolute feeling, which is absolute middle, for itself, in this whole side of reality, exists as individual. Such a middle is the child<\/em>; it is the highest individual natural feeling, a feeling of such a totality of the living<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 291]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |291|<\/span> sexes that they are wholly in it, so that it [is] absolutely real and itself for itself individual and real. The feeling is realised in that it is the absolute indifference of the natural beings, so that in it there is no one-sidedness, no lack of any circumstance; their unity is therefore immediately real, and because by nature itself they are real and separated, and cannot sublate their individuality, the reality of their unity is likewise a being of its own, real, and an individual; in this perfectly individualised and realised feeling the parents intuit their unity as reality; they are it themselves, and it is their visible identity and middle, born forth out of them; the real rationality of nature, wherein the difference of the sexes is completely effaced, and both are in absolute unity; living substance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b2) intuition subsumed under the concept is the middle in difference, or it is solely the form in which the real middle lies, while the substance is dead matter; the middle as such is wholly external according to the difference of the concept; the inner is pure empty quantity. This middle is the tool<\/em>. Because in it the form or the concept is the dominant, it is torn away from nature, to which the middle of sexual love belongs, and is in ideality, as belonging to the concept; or the absolute reality which is present according to the essence of the concept. In the concept the identity is unfilled, empty; it shows only the extremes annihilating themselves; here the annihilation is checked, the emptiness is real, and the extremes are likewise fixed. On one side it is subjective, in the power of the labouring subject, and wholly determined by it, prepared and worked upon; on the other, objective, directed against the object of labour. Through this middle the subject sublates the immediacy of annihilating, for labour, as an annihilating of intuition, is just as much an annihilation of the subject, a negation, something positing mere quantitativeness in it; hand and spirit become dulled by it; i.e. they themselves take on the nature of the negative and formless, just as, on the other side (for the negative, the difference, is twofold), labour is an absolutely singular subjective thing. In the tool the subject makes a middle between itself and the object, and this middle is the real rationality of labour; for that labour<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 292]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |292|<\/span> as such, and the object worked upon, are themselves means is a formal middleness, since that for which they are lies outside them, and so the relating of the subjective to the objective is a completely separated one, remaining merely inside, within the subjective, in the thought of intelligence. In the tool the subject separates its becoming dulled, and objectivity, from itself; it gives up another thing to annihilation, and shifts onto it the subjective part of that annihilation; at the same time its labour ceases to be something singular; the subjectivity of labour is raised in the tool to something universal; anyone can imitate it and labour in the same way; it is to that extent the constant rule of labour.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On account of this rationality of the tool, it stands, as the middle, higher both than labouring and than the object worked upon (for enjoyment, of which we are speaking here), and than enjoyment, or the purpose; and for this reason, too, all peoples standing in the natural potency have so honoured the tool, and in Homer we find respect for it, and the consciousness of it, most beautifully expressed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b3. The tool stands under the dominion of the concept, and therefore belongs to different or mechanical labour; the child is the middle as absolutely pure, simple intuition. But the totality of both must have precisely this simplicity, yet at the same time the ideality of the concept; or, in the child, the ideality of the extremes of the tool must enter into its substantial essence; in the tool, precisely thereby, an ideality must enter [into] the dead inner, and the reality of the extremes disappear; it must be a middle which is perfectly ideal; as absolute ideality there is only the absolute concept, or intelligence; the middle must be intelligent; but not individual, nor subjective; of the former only an infinitely vanishing and self-presenting appearance; a light ethereal body, which passes away as it is formed; not a subjective intelligence, nor an accident of it, but rationality itself, as real, but in such a way that this reality is itself ideal and infinite, and in its being is immediately also its opposite, namely not to be; thus an ethereal body which presents the extremes, and so is real according to the concept, but also has its ideality, in that the essence of this body is to pass away immediately, and its appearance is this immediate<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 293]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |293|<\/span> being-tied-together of appearing and passing away. Such a middle is thereby intelligent; it is subjective, or in the individuals of intelligence, but objectively universal in its corporeality, and that being-subjective is, [on account] of the immediacy of the nature of this essence, immediately as objectivity. This ideal rational middle is speech<\/em>, the tool of reason, the child of intelligent beings. The substance of speech is, like the child, the most indeterminate, purest, most negative, most sexless, and, on account of its absolute softness and transparency, capable of all forms; its reality is completely taken up into ideality; and at the same time it is individual, it has form or a reality, it is a subject, something being for itself; it must thereby be distinguished from the formal concept of speech, for which objectivity as such is a speech; but this objectivity is only an abstraction; for the reality of the object is subjective in another way than it is subjective; objectivity is not itself absolute subjectivity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The totality of speech in the form of the potencies<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u05d0. of nature, or of inner identity, the unconscious assuming of a body which passes away as quickly as it is, but which is a singular, has only the form of objectivity, does not carry itself in itself and upon itself, but appears in an alien reality and substance. Gesture, mien, and the totality of these, the affection of the eye, is not fixed objectivity or the abstraction of it, but it is volatilised, and an accident; a mobile, ideal play; but this ideality is only play in another, which is the subject, its substance; it expresses itself as feeling, and is addressed to feeling, or it is in the form of pure identity, of articulated, changing feeling, to be sure, but which is precisely whole in every moment, without the ideality of its objective, and without its own corporeality, to which nature cannot come forth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u05d1. the intuition of speech subsumed under the concept; thus it has a body of its own, for its ideal nature is posited in the concept, and the concept is the fixed, its bearer; this body is an external matter, which, however, as such, in its substantial inwardness and being-for-itself, is wholly annihilated, without meaning, and ideal; but because the concept is the dominant, this body is something dead, which<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 294]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |294|<\/span> does not infinitely annihilate itself within itself, but is here, in difference, annihilated only externally for it. Thus its being-twofold is likewise an externality; it expresses nothing but the relation to the subject and to the object, whose ideal middle it is; but this connection it receives through something subjective outside it which thinks it; through itself it expresses it negatively, through its being-annihilated as subject, or as having a meaning of its own for itself, through its inner meaninglessness, so that it is the middle insofar as it is a thing, a determinacy for itself, and yet nothing at all for itself, no thing<\/em>; it is immediately this opposite of itself, to be for itself and absolutely not for itself but another, so that the absolute concept is here really objective. Corporeal sign<\/em>; it is the ideality of the tool, as the mien is the ideality of the child, and as it is more rational to make a tool than a child, so a corporeal sign is more rational than gesture. The sign, since it corresponds to the absolute concept, expresses no shape, as which the absolute concept taken up into indifference is; but since it expresses only the concept, it is bound to the formally universal; as mien and gesture are a subjective language, so the corporeal sign is an objective one; as the former does not tear itself loose from the subject nor become free, so the latter remains something objective, and does not carry its subjective element, cognition, immediately in itself; it is therefore also attached to the object, and expresses, on it but free of it, so that it is not a determinacy of the object but has merely been added to it and remains contingent to it, precisely through the contingency of the connection, a relation to something subjective, which, however, is presented wholly indeterminately and must first be added in thought; it therefore also expresses the relation of the possession of an object to the subject.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u05d2. sounding speech<\/em> unites the objectivity of the corporeal sign and the subjectivity of gesture; the articulation of the latter with the being-for-itself of the former; it is the middle of intelligences, Logos, their rational bond. The abstract objectivity, which is a mute recognising, gains in it a body of its own, independent, being for itself, but after the manner of the concept, namely one that immediately annihilates itself; with sounding speech<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 295]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |295|<\/span> the inner immediately comes forth in its determinacy, and the individual, intelligence, the absolute concept, presents itself in it immediately as purely singular and fixed; or it is the corporeality of absolute singularity, through which all indeterminacy is articulated and fixed, and, precisely through this corporeality, immediately absolute recognising. The ringing of metal, the rushing of water, and the roaring of the wind is nothing that transforms itself into its opposite out of the inner, out of absolute subjectivity; rather, they arise through movement from outside. The voice of the animal comes from its punctuality, or its being-concept; but, like the whole of it, it belongs to feeling; most animals cry out in mortal danger; it is absolutely only a going-out of subjectivity, something formal, whose highest articulation, in the song of birds, does not come from intelligence, not from the preceding transformation of nature into something subjective; the absolute solitude in which nature is within intelligence is lacking to the animal; it has not taken nature back into itself, and does not give birth to its voice out of the totality which is in this solitude; rather, the voice is something empty, totalityless, formal. The corporeality of speech, however, presents totality resumed into individuality; the absolute breaking-in into the absolute point of the individual, whose ideality is driven apart internally into a system. \u2013 It is the highest blossom of the first potency, but in this potency not considered according to its content, but formally, as the abstraction of the highest rationality and shape of singularity; but as this pure speech it does not go beyond singularity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The negative of this potency is want, natural death, the force and devastation of nature, also of human beings against one another, or relation to organic nature; but a natural relation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 296]<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cross-reference:<\/em> Possession, exchange, price and contract: \u00a7 45<\/a> ff., on value \u00a7 63<\/a>, on contract \u00a7 72<\/a> ff.; on marriage, which is no contract, \u00a7 75<\/a> Remark and \u00a7 161<\/a> ff.; on lordship and bondage \u00a7 57<\/a> Remark.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is the subsumption of intuition under the concept, or the coming-forth of the ideal, and the being-determined of the particular or singular by it; it has causality, but as purely ideal; for this potency is itself a formal one; the ideal is only the abstraction of the ideal; there is not yet any question of its constituting itself as such for itself and becoming a totality; as in the previous potency the singular, so here the universal is dominant; in the first, the latter remains hidden, something inner, and speech itself is there considered only as a singular, in its abstraction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this subsumption singularity immediately ceases; it becomes a universal, which has absolutely relation to others. But through this formal concept the living natural connection likewise becomes a fixed relation, which it previously was not; over it, too, universality must hover and subjugate it; love, the child, culture, the tool, speech, are objective and universal, connections, relations, but natural, unsubjugated, contingent, ungoverned, not themselves taken up into universality; universality is on and [in] them themselves, not come forth nor opposed to them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If this subsuming universality is regarded from the side of particularity, then there is nothing in this potency which would not have relation to other intelligences, so that an equality among them [is] posited; or it is the universality which thus appears in them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This relation of the opposed universal to the particular, as it appears in the particular, or subsumption of the universal under intuition; the universal, itself dominant in the singular or particular, relates only to this<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 297]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |297|<\/span> singular; or the singular is the first, not the ideal hovering above it, nor a multiplicity of particulars subsumed under it. This is found in the purely practical, real, mechanical relation of labour and of possession.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u05d0 The particular into which the universal is transposed becomes thereby ideal, and this ideality is a dividing of it; the whole object is not annihilated in general according to its determinacy, but this labour, which goes towards the object as a whole, divides itself within itself and becomes a singular labouring; and this singular labouring becomes precisely thereby more mechanical, because multiplicity is excluded from it, and so it itself becomes something more universal, more alien to wholeness. This kind of labouring, which thus divides itself, at the same time presupposes that the rest of the needs are obtained in another way, since these too must be worked up, through the labour of other human beings. But in this dulling of mechanical labour there lies immediately the possibility of separating oneself from it entirely; because labour is wholly quantitative, without multiplicity, and so its subsuming in intelligence sublates itself, something absolutely external, a thing, can be used by virtue of its self-sameness, and likewise in its labour as pure movement; it [depends] only on finding for it a likewise dead principle of movement; a self-differentiating force of nature, such as the movement of water, of the wind, of steam etc., and the tool passes over into the machine<\/em>, in that the restlessness of the subjective, of the concept, is itself posited outside the subject.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u05d1. as the subject and its labour are here determined, so too is the product of labour determined; it is a singularised thing, and therefore pure quantity for the subject; since its quantity is not in relation to the totality of needs, but exceeds it, quantity in general and in abstraction, this possession has lost its meaning with respect to the practical feeling of the subject, is no longer need for it but surplus; its relation to use is therefore a universal one; and this universality thought in its reality, \u2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 298]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |298|<\/span> to the use of others. Because, for itself, in relation to the subject, it is an abstraction of need in general, it is a universal possibility of use, not of the determinate use which it expresses, for this is separated from the subject.<\/p>\n\n\n\n c. The subject is [not] merely determined as one who possesses, but taken up into the form of universality; as a singular in relation to others, and universally negative; as a recognised possessor; for recognising is being-singular, negation, in such a way that it remains fixed as such, but ideally, in others; merely the abstraction of ideality, not ideality, is in them. In this respect possession is property<\/em>; but the abstraction of universality in it is right<\/em>; (it is ridiculous to want to consider everything under the form of this abstraction, as right; it is something wholly formal \u03b1) infinite in its multiplicity, and totalityless; \u03b2) without any content, in itself.) The individual is owner, possessor by right, not absolutely, in and for himself; his personality, or the abstraction of his unity and singularity, is merely an abstraction and a thing of thought; nor is it individuality in which right and property lie, for individuality is absolute identity, or itself an abstraction; rather, it lies solely in the relative identity of possession, insofar as this relative identity has the form of universality; right to property is right to right; right of property is the side, the abstraction, in property according to which it is a right, for whose other, the particular, possession remains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The negative<\/em> of this potency against the universal is the relation of freedom; or the negative insofar as it constitutes itself positively and posits itself in difference against the universal, thus in relation to it; not lack and the enveloping of difference; in this latter, undeveloped, respect the preceding potencies would be its negative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The mechanically negative, which conflicts with and does not fit a particularity determined by the subject, does not belong here; it is not at all for this determinacy insofar as it is practical; rather, this respect belongs wholly to nature. \u2013 The negative comes into consideration here solely insofar as it is in conflict with the universal as such<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 299]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |299|<\/span> and, as a singularity, disavows it and abstracts from it; not insofar as singularity truly annihilates its form, for therein it posits it as truly ideal, and itself as one with it; but rather when it cannot annihilate it, cannot unite itself with it, but is in difference with it. \u2013 The negative thus consists in the non-recognising of property, in its sublation; but property is here itself posited as not necessary, not related to the use and enjoyment of the subject; matter, insofar as it is posited as a universal, is thereby itself posited as a negative; the relation of the subject to it is itself determined as a merely possible one. Negation can therefore concern merely this form, or not matter itself, but matter as universal; a surplus is sublated, which already for itself has no relation to need, which has the determination of stepping out of the relation of possession. Whether this sublation, the negation, accords with the determination or not must emerge from the following potency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A relation of the subject to its surplus labour is posited, which, ideal in this relation to the subject, has no real relation to enjoyment; but at the same time this relation has come forth as a universal, or as a pure abstraction, or infinite: possession in right as property. By its nature, however, that which is possessed has only a real relation to the subject: to annihilation; and the formerly ideal relation of possession to the subject is now to become real. The infinite, as the positive of this potency in general, is the fixed, and is to remain, namely right; likewise the ideal relation of possession; and yet possession is to be realised. The whole potency in general is that of difference; this present dimension is likewise difference; thus difference of difference; previously the resting, here the moved; [in] the concept lies the difference, the relation of a subject to something determined as merely possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 300]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |300|<\/span> Through the new difference the relation of the subject to its labour is sublated, but because infinity, right as such, must remain, there steps into the place of that ideal relation of surplus, according to the concept, the opposite one, the real one, the relation to use and need; the separation is stronger, but precisely therefore so is the drive towards unification; as the magnet holds its poles apart without their having a drive, but, when cut in pieces, this identity sublated, electricity is stronger separation, real opposition, drive towards unification. What is sublated here is the being-one with the object through one’s own labour, one’s own individual determination of it (magnetism); what takes its place is real difference, being-sublated of the identity of subject and object; and thereby real annihilation of the opposed, or a difference which has relation to need. \u2013 In this whole potency (a. and b.) thoroughgoing ideality first begins, and the true potencies of practical intelligence; with surplus labour it ceases, in need and labour, to belong to need and labour. The relation to an object which it acquires for need and use, which is posited here, namely one which it has not itself worked up for its own use, in which it does not annihilate its own labour, is the beginning of rightful, formally ethical enjoyment and possession.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The absolute, the ineradicable, of both potencies is the absolute concept, the infinite itself, right; in the first resting, or subsisting in its opposition, and therefore inwardly concealed and hidden; in the second in movement, the accident sublating itself through the accident, passing through nothing, and so right coming forth, standing over against, as causality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This pure infinity of right, its inseparability, reflected in the thing, in the particular itself, is its equality<\/em> with others, and the abstraction of this equality of a thing with others, the concrete unity and right, is value<\/em>, or rather value itself is equality as abstraction, the ideal measure; but the actually found, empirical measure is price<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the sublation of the individual relation there remain \u03b1) right \u03b2) right appearing in determinate things in the form of equality, or value;<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 301]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |301|<\/span> \u03b3) but the individually related object loses this relation, and \u03b4) there steps into its place an object related to desire, really determined.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The inner essence of this real interchange is, as has been shown, the concept that remains equal to itself; but this concept real in intelligences, and indeed in needy ones, which relate themselves at the same time to a surplus and to a lacking need; each undertakes the transformation of the individual, ideally-objectively related, into something subjectively related, related to need. Such is exchange<\/em>; the realisation of the ideal relation. Property appears in reality through the plurality of the persons engaged in exchange, as mutually recognising one another; value in the reality of things; and in each of them as surplus; the concept as moving itself, annihilating itself in its opposite, taking up the other, opposed, into the place of what was previously possessed; and indeed determined in such a way that the previous is something ideal, that which now enters something real; for the first potency is that of intuition; the present one that of the concept; that ideal one which here is by nature the first, the ideal in the practical before enjoyment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The interchange is, in its externality, a twofold one, or rather a repetition of itself; for the universal object, the surplus, and then the particular object of need, is according to its matter one object, but its two forms are necessarily repetitions of it. But the concept, the essence, is the transformation itself, and since its absolute is the identity of the opposed, the question is how this pure identity, infinity as such, is to be presented in reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The transition in exchange is a manifold, divided, drawn-out series of the singular moments of the whole; it can be in one moment, in One present, through simultaneous transfer of the possession of each party to the other; but if the object is a manifold one, then so is the transition, and the opposite demanded is a manifold one, and the opposite at the same time is not, until it is whole, not at the beginning, not in the course, or it is only as a leap. Thereby exchange itself becomes something uncertain, on account of these empirical conditions, which appear as gradualness of performance<\/em>, postponement of the whole<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 302]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |302|<\/span> performance to a later time etc.; the moment, the present, is lacking in appearance. That performance is something inner, presupposes truthfulness, is something wholly formal; for what is at issue is precisely that the exchange has not happened, the interchange, the transition, is not realised; and the uncertainty rests on multiplicity and on coming apart, and on the possibility<\/em> of abstraction from it, or on freedom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n (the third of this second potency b.)<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b3. This unreason, or the opposition of this empty possibility and freedom to actuality and appearance, is to be sublated; or the inner of the intelligences that exchange must likewise come forth; this freedom must become equal to necessity, so that the transition is withdrawn from its empirical contingencies, and its middle, the identity, is posited as something necessary and fixed. The nature and form of exchange remain, but it is taken up into quantity and universality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This transformation of exchange is contract<\/em>. In it the moment of absolute presence, which is in pure exchange, forms itself into a rational middle, which not only admits the empirical appearances of exchanging, but, in order to be a totality, requires them as a necessary difference, which is indifferentiated in contract.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Through the necessity which the transition receives in contract, the empirical element, the coming apart of the performance of each party in appearance, the unity of the present, becomes indifferent and something contingent, which does no harm to the security of the whole; it is as good as if the performance itself had already taken place; the right of that singular one to his thing is already transferred to the other, the transition itself is to be regarded as having taken place; the external appearance, that performance has not yet been made, that the transition has not presented [itself] in empirical reality, is wholly empirical and contingent, or rather annihilated; property is thus wholly withdrawn from the external relation through which it not only designates itself as possession, but is still possession for the one who has already transferred it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In that contract thus transforms the transition from a real into an ideal one, but in such a way that this ideal transition is the true, necessary one, it must, in order to be this, itself have absolute reality; the ideality or<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 303]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |303|<\/span> universality which the moment of the present receives must therefore exist; but reality itself lies above the sphere of this formal potency; this much emerges formally, that ideality as such and at the same time as reality in general can be nothing other than a spirit, which presents itself as existing, in which the contracting parties are annihilated as singular ones, the universal subsuming them, which is the absolutely objective essence and the binding middle of the contract; through the absolute being-one in it, freedom and possibility are sublated with respect to the members of the transition; the being-one is not something inner, good faith, in which inner the individual subsumes the identity under itself, but the individual is, against the absolutely universal, the subsumed; thus its arbitrary will and peculiarity are excluded, since in contract it invokes this absolute universality; but even if its whole force does enter into the contract, this nevertheless happens only formally; the determinacies which are linked through it and subsumed under it are and remain determinacies; they [are] posited as infinite only empirically, as this or that or whichever it may be, but they are subsisting; they are regarded as singularity of the individuals or of the things about which the contract is made; and therefore true reality cannot fall within this potency; for the side [of] reality is here a finitude subsisting for itself, which is not to be annihilated in ideality; whereby it is impossible that the reality should be a true and absolute one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The third potency is the indifference of the preceding ones; the relation of exchange, and of the recognising of a possession, and thereby property, \u2013 which hitherto related to singular things, becomes here totality, but always within singularity itself; or the second relation is taken up into universality, the concept of the first.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b1) relative identity, or relation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 304]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |304|<\/span> Surplus posited in indifference, as universal and as possibility of all needs, is money<\/em>; just as is labour which goes towards surplus and, mechanically uniform, at the same time towards the possibility of universal exchange and of the acquisition of all necessities. As money is the universal, their abstraction, and mediates them all, so trade<\/em> is this mediation posited as activity, which exchanges surplus for surplus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b2. but the intuition of this totality, though of it as singularity, is the individual as the indifference of all determinacies, and how it presents itself as such, as totality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u05d0. formally, in simplicity, or intuition, the individual is indifference of all determinacies, and as such something formally living<\/em>; and is recognised as such; as previously only as possessing singular things, so here as being for itself in the whole; but because the individual as such is absolutely one with life, not merely in relation with it, it cannot be said of life, as of the other things with which it is only in relation, that the individual possesses it; this has sense only insofar as the individual is not such a one, but an absolutely whole system, and thus its singularity and life are posited, like a thing, as something particular. The recognising of this formal being-alive is, like recognising and empirical intuition in general, a formal ideality; life is the highest indifference of the singular, but it is at the same time absolutely something formal, insofar as it is the empty unity of the singular determinacies, and no totality and wholeness reconstructing itself out of difference is thereby posited. As the absolutely formal, it is for that very reason also absolute subjectivity, or the absolute concept, and the individual considered under this absolute abstraction is the person<\/em>. The life of the individual is the abstraction of his intuition heightened to the utmost; but the person is his pure concept, and indeed this concept is the absolute concept itself. In this recognising of life, or in thinking the other as absolute concept, he is as a free being, as possibility of being the opposite of himself with respect to a determinacy; and in the singular as such there is nothing which could not be regarded as<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 305]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |305|<\/span> determinacy; in this freedom, therefore, the possibility of non-recognition, and of unfreedom, is just as well posited. All things likewise are, through their concept, the possibility of being the opposite of themselves, but they are in absolute determinacy, or lower potencies of necessity; not the indifference of all, but in absolute difference against others; but intelligence, or the life of man, is the indifference of all determinacies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3. This formal, relationless recognising, in relation and in difference, or according to the concept. In this, living individual stands against living individual, but with unequal power of life; the one is therefore the power or potency for the other; it is the indifference, while the other is in difference; the former therefore relates to the latter as cause; it is as its indifference, its life, its soul or spirit. Greater strength or weakness is nothing other than that the one is caught up in a difference, is fixed and determined in some way, according to which the other is not, but is free; the indifference of the unfree is its inner, formal, not brought out, and difference-annihilating element; but it must absolutely be for it; it is its hidden inner, and therefore it intuits it as the opposite, namely as something external, and the identity is a relative one, not an absolute one, nor middle. This relation, in which the indifferent and free is the powerful against the different, is the relation of lordship<\/em> and bondage<\/em>. This relation is posited immediately and absolutely with the inequality of the power of life; there is no thought here of any right or any necessary equality. Equality is nothing other than the abstraction and the formal thought of life, of the first potency, which is merely ideal and without reality; in reality, on the other hand, the inequality of life is posited, and with it the relation [of lordship] and bondage; for in reality there is shape and individuality and appearance, thus diversity of potencies or of power; or the relative identity according to which the one individual is posited as indifferent, but the other as different.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Plurality here is the plurality of individuals, for in the first potency, in the formality of life, absolute singularity was posited as the form of the inner, since life is the form of outer indifference. And where<\/em> there is plurality of individuals, there is a relation of them; and this relation is<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 306]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |306|<\/span> lordship and bondage, which is immediately the very concept of this relation, without transition and inference, as if some other ground had still to be shown. Lordship and bondage belong to nature because individuals stand against one another in this relation; and insofar as, with respect to the most ethical, individuals as such enter into relation, and it is a matter of the shaping of the ethical, as that which takes place through the highest individuality of genius and talent, the relation of lordship and obedience is posited; formally it is the same; the difference lies in this, that in ethical lordship and obedience the potency or power is at the same time an absolutely universal, whereas here it is only a particular; there individuality is only the external and the form, here it is the essence of the relation; and for that reason it is here a relation of bondage; for bondage is obedience towards the singular and particular; the lord is the indifference of determinacies, but merely as person, or as something formally living; he is at the same time subject, or cause; indifference is subsumed under being-subject, or the concept; and the bondsman relates to him as to formal indifference, or to the person. Because that which commands is here as person, it is not the absolute, the Idea, that is the identical of both, that which is posited in the lord in the form of indifference but in the bondsman in the form of difference; rather, it is particularity in general, in the practical, want, that constitutes the bond of both; the lord is in possession of a surplus of what is physically necessary in general, and the other in lack of it; and indeed in such a way that that surplus, like this lack, is not singular sides but the indifference of the necessary needs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u05d2. This relation of bondage, or of person to person, of formal life to formal life, of which the one is under the form of indifference, the other under the form of difference, must be indifferentiated, or be subsumed under the first potency, so that the same relation of personality, of the dependence of the one on the other, remains; but so that the identity is an absolute one, though inner, not born forth; and the relation of difference only the external form. But that the identity remains an inner one is necessary because in this whole potency it is either only a formal one (right), hovering above the<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 307]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |307|<\/span> particular, opposed, or an inner one; namely one which is subsumed under the intuition of particularity, individuality as such, and thus appears as nature; not as an identity subjugating an opposition, or as ethical nature, in which that opposition will likewise be sublated, but in such a way that particularity and individuality become the subsumed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This indifference of the relation of lordship and bondage, in which, therefore, personality and the abstraction of life are absolutely one and the same, and this relation only the external, appearing, is the family<\/em>: in it the totality of nature and everything hitherto is united; the whole particularity hitherto is in it transposed into the universal; it is the identity \u03b1) of external needs, \u03b2) of the sexual relation, the natural difference posited in the individuals themselves, and \u03b3) of the relation of parents to children, or of natural reason come forth, but being as nature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b1) on account of the absolute natural being-one of the man, the woman and the child, in which the opposition of personality and of the subject ceases, surplus is not the property of one; for the indifference is not formal according to right; hence all contract concerning property, service and the like also falls away; for all this is grounded on the presupposition of one’s own personality; rather, surplus, labour, property is absolutely common, in and for itself, and at the death of one there is no transition from one to a stranger, but only the share of the deceased in the common property ceases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The difference is the superficial one of lordship; the man is the lord and administrator; not owner in opposition to the other members of the family; as administrator he has only the semblance of free disposal. Labour is likewise divided according to the nature of each member; but its product is common; each, precisely through this division, works out a surplus, but not as his property; the transition is no exchange, but it is immediately, in and for itself, common.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b2. The relation of sex, of the woman to the man, is likewise made indifferent after its own fashion; that they are one according to the determinacy of personality, i.e. according to<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 308]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |308|<\/span> possession, has been said in \u03b1. But the sexual relation gives the indifference a form of its own; for it is in itself a particular one. The particular as such, made into a universal, into the concept, can only become an empirically universal (in religion it becomes something else); the particularity becomes a constant, lasting, fixed one; the sexual relation restricts itself solely to these two individuals in relation to each other, and it endures for ever; thus it is marriage<\/em>. Since this relation is founded on a particular being of individuals whose peculiarity is fixed even by nature, not by the arbitrary will of an abstraction, this relation seems to be a contract; but it would be a negative contract, which sublates precisely that presupposition on which the possibility of contract in general rests; namely personality, or being a subject, which in marriage annihilates itself, since the whole person gives itself as a whole. But what according to the relation of contract was supposed to become the property of the other could absolutely not come into his possession; it remains, since the relation is personal, the property of the person; just as in general no contract about personal services is possible in itself, since the product alone, not what is personal, can pass into the possession of the other. The bondsman can, as a whole of personality, become property, and so too the wife; but this relation is not marriage, nor is it a contract with the bondsman, but rather a contract about the bondsman or the wife with someone else; as among many peoples the wife is bought from her parents. With her herself, however, no contract is possible; for precisely in so far as she is to give herself freely in marriage, she gives up, together with herself, the possibility of contract, and so does the man; their contract would have as its content to make no contract, and would thus immediately sublate itself. Through a positive contract, however, each would make itself into a thing that is in possession, would posit its whole personality as a determinacy of itself to which it is at the same time absolutely bound; but as a free being it must regard itself as absolutely bound to no determinacy, but rather as the indifference of it; this determinacy would have to be regarded, as Kant does, as the sexual organs; but to posit oneself as an<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 309]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |309|<\/span> absolute thing, as absolute bond with a determinacy, is the highest contrariety to reason and infamy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b3. In the child the family itself is wrested from its contingent, empirical existence, or from the singularity of its members; and it is secured against the concept through which the singularities, or subjects, annihilate themselves; the child is, as against the appearance, the absolute, the rational element of the relation; and what is eternal and lasting; the totality which produces itself again as such. But because in the family, as the highest totality of which nature is capable, the absolute identity itself remains something inner and is not posited in the absolute form itself, the reproduction of the totality is also an appearance, that of the children; in the true totality the form is absolutely one with the essence, so that its being is not the form drawn apart into the isolation of the moments; here, however, what persists is something other than what is; or reality hands over its persistence to an other, which in its turn likewise lasts only by becoming, and transfers its being, which cannot remain in it, to an other; the form or infinity is thus the empirical, negative form of being-other, which sublates a determinacy only by positing another, and is positive only ever in an other; the power and the understanding, the difference of the parents, stand in inverse relation to the youthfulness and strength of the child, and these two sides of life flee each other, and follow upon each other, and are outside each other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cross-reference:<\/em> In the Groundlines<\/em> coercion and crime, \u00a7 90<\/a> ff.; on revenge \u00a7 102<\/a>, on punishment \u00a7 99<\/a> ff.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What has gone before has singularity as its principle; the absolute is subsumed under the concept, and all the potencies express determinacies, and the indifferences are formal, universality opposed to particularity; or the<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 310]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |310|<\/span> particularity is made indifferent only in relation to lower particularities; and these indifferences are themselves in turn particularities. None of them, therefore, is at all absolute; each can be sublated; the indifference, the absolute totality of each potency, is not in itself; it lies under the form, which is what subsumes. The sublation of the determinacies must be the absolute one, the taking up of all determinacies into absolute universality. This taking up is the absolute and positive, but it is also merely negative; just as the absolute form expressed itself in what preceded as the subsistence of the opposition, so it expresses itself in its opposite, or in the being-annihilated of the opposition. But this being-annihilated is either purely negative, and then it is dialectical, the cognition of ideality, and the real sublating of determinacy; the negative is not fixed, is not in opposition, and so it is in the absolute; absolute ethical life raises itself above determinacy by sublating it, but in such a way that it unites it with its opposite in something higher, and thus does not in truth let it subsist and posit it only with negative significance; rather, through the perfect identity with its opposite, it sublates its form, or ideality, takes precisely the negative away from it, and makes it absolutely positive or real. Quite different is negative sublation; it is itself sublation against sublation, opposition against opposition, but in such a way that ideality, the form, likewise subsists in it, though in the reverse sense, namely that it holds fast to the ideal being-determined of singularity and so determines it as a negative; thus it lets its singularity and its being-opposed subsist, does not sublate the opposition, but transforms the real form into the ideal one. In what has gone before, each potency and each reality of a potency is an identity of opposites, absolute in itself; it is subsumed under the form, but this is something external; the real subsists; the form is what is superficial; its determinacy is enlivened, made indifferent; it is indeed something determinate, but not for itself; it is not determined, its essence is not posited as something determinate. Now the form as negative is the essence; the real is posited as something ideal; it is determined by pure freedom. It is the same transformation as when<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 311]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |311|<\/span> feeling is posited as thought; the same determinacy remains; the red that is felt remains red that is thought; but what is thought is determined at the same time as something annihilated, a sublated negative; the freedom of intelligence has raised the determinacy of the feeling of red into the universal, has not withdrawn it from its opposition to other determinacies, but has only made the false attempt to do so; it has reflected on the feeling, taken it up into the infinite, but in such a way that the finitude absolutely remains in existence; it has transformed the objective ideality of time and space into the subjective one; the objective ideality is being-other, the fact that others are beside it, that ideality, infinity, is posited empirically, absolutely in all relations, as something everywhere other; the subjective ideality purifies infinity of this manifoldness, gives it the form of unity; it connects with the determinacy itself the infinity which in the objective lies outside it and is presented as being-other, and in this way makes it into unity, as the absolute determinacy of the subjective, or ideal, in opposition to the real; and whereas the determinacy as something real, as feeling, had the form, infinity, as it were superficially outside itself, it is now connected with it. So in the practical, which is negative in and for itself, a determinacy posited by it is, according to the preceding potency of necessity, itself something objective, ideal, universal; the negation of this practical positing is the restoration of the first original particularity of the opposition; in that this objectivity is sublated, the thing falls into the power of the inorganic, objective potencies; a murder sublates the living being as a singularity, as a subject, but ethical life does this too; but ethical life sublates its subjectivity, its ideal determinacy; murder, however, sublates its objectivity, posits it as a negative, particular thing which returns under the power of the objective from which it had wrested itself by being itself something objective. Absolute ethical life sublates subjectivity immediately by annihilating it only as ideal determinacy, as opposition, but letting its essence absolutely subsist, and precisely in this lets it subsist and makes it real, that it lets its essence be what it is; intelligence remains such in ethical life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This negative, or pure freedom, is therefore directed at the sublation of the<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 312]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |312|<\/span> objective in such a way that it makes the ideal determinacy, which in necessity is only external and superficial, makes the negative, into the essence; it thus negates reality in its determinacy, but fixes this negation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This negation, however, must be counteracted; since the sublation of the determinacy is only formal, the determinacy remains in existence; it is posited as ideal, but it remains in its real determinacy; and life has merely been injured in it, not raised higher; and for that reason this life must be restored. But the injury of life cannot be restored in its actuality (restoration through religion does not bear on actuality); this restoration, however, does bear on actuality, and this reconstruction can only be a formal one, because it bears on an actuality as such, on a being-fixed of the negation. It is therefore external equality; what negates makes itself the cause and posits itself as negative indifference, but for that very reason the proposition must be reversed upon it, and it must likewise be posited under the same determinacy of indifference as it posited; what it negated is likewise to be really negated in it, and it is to be subsumed just as it subsumed; and this reversal of the relation is absolute, for in what is determinate it is possible for reason to assert itself as indifference, and thus in a formal manner, only through the equal positing of the two opposites. With crime<\/em> avenging justice<\/em> stands absolutely in connection; it is absolute necessity which binds them, for the one is the opposite of the other; the one is the opposite subsumption of the other. Crime, as negative vitality, as the concept constituting itself into intuition, subsumes the universal, objective, ideal; conversely, avenging justice, as something universal and objective, in turn subsumes that negation which constitutes itself into intuition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is to be remarked here that what is being spoken of is the real counteraction or reversal, and that the ideal, immediate one is indeed contained according to the abstract necessity of the concept in general, but in this form of ideality is only an abstraction and something incomplete. This ideal reversal is<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 313]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |313|<\/span> conscience<\/em>, and only something inner, not inner and outer at once; something subjective, not objective at once; immediately, in what the criminal apparently injures externally and as something alien to him, he has likewise ideally injured and sublated himself; in so far the external deed is at the same time an inner one; the crime committed against what is alien is likewise committed against himself. But the consciousness of this his own annihilation is something subjective, inner; or the bad conscience; it is in so far incomplete and must also present itself externally as avenging justice; because it is something inner and incomplete, it drives towards its totality; it betrays, reveals, and works through itself until it sees the ideal counteraction or reversal externally threatening its reality, and facing it as its enemy; then it [begins] to be satisfied, because it beholds in it the beginning of its reality; it produces an attack upon itself so that it may defend itself, and through resistance against the attack it calms itself in the fact that it defends the most universal demand, indifference and totality, namely life, of which conscience itself is a determinacy, against the threatened negation. Through victory in this posited struggle that drive of conscience repeats itself, and its reconciliation lies solely in the danger of death, and ceases with it; but through every victory, when it occurs, the fear, the ideal being-annihilated, grows greater; it presses into the living strength, and so brings on weakness, and thus the reality of avenging justice; and if the enemy does not at once appear externally, and the reversal of the subsumption is not present as reality, it generates this itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The first potency of the negation so determined is the formal one, according to the subsumption of the concept under intuition; annihilation for itself, without being related to anything else or presupposing a determinate lack; rather it presupposes a completely indeterminate, universal one, directed at nothing singular, but turned against the abstraction of what has been formed. This is natural annihilation<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 314]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |314|<\/span> , or purposeless destruction, devastation. Thus nature is turned against the formation which intelligence imparts to it, as well as against its own producing of organised things; and just as the element, the objective, is subsumed under intuition and life, so the element in turn subsumes what is organised and individualised under itself and annihilates it; and this annihilation is devastation. Thus in the human race forming alternates with destroying; when forming has done harm long enough to inorganic nature and has determined its formlessness on all sides, the oppressed indeterminacy breaks loose, and the barbarism of destruction falls upon what has been formed, clears it away, and makes everything free and level and equal. Devastation appears in its greatest splendour in the Orient, and a Genghis Khan, a Tamerlane, as the brooms of God, sweep whole parts of the world completely clean. The northern barbarians who constantly attack the south are in the determinacy of the understanding; their poor enjoyment, which they have formed into a slight manifoldness, has a determinacy thereby, and their devastating is not indifferent, purely for the sake of devastating. The fanaticism of devastation, because it is an absolute element and assumes the form of nature, is invincible from without; for difference and the determinate succumb to indifference and indeterminacy; but it has, like negation in general, its negation within itself; the formless drives itself into indeterminacy until, because it is after all not absolutely formless, it expands like a water bubble until it bursts into infinitely small drops; it passes over from its pure unity into its opposite, the absolute formlessness of absolute multiplicity; and thereby becomes completely formal form, or absolute particularity, and with that the weakest. This progression of devastation to absolute devastation, and to the absolute transition into its opposite, is fury<\/em>, which, because devastation is wholly in the concept, must infinitely intensify the pure, the opposite, until it is its opposite, and has thus annihilated itself; standing at the extreme, at absolute abstraction, it is the absolute drive without means; the absolute concept in its complete indeterminacy, the unrest of infinity, of the absolute concept<\/em>, which is nothing but this, and in its annihilating of the opposites through each other annihilates itself, the being-real of absolute subjectivity; the absolute concept, the<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 315]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |315|<\/span> immediate opposite of itself, is real, because the product is absolutely no identity of the subjective and objective, but pure objectivity, formlessness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This devastation, subsumed under the concept, as a relation with difference and determinacy, is directly turned against the positive relation of difference. The devastation of nature, in so far as it is in determinacy, can only wrest away possession; it is presupposed that it is in the very same determinacy as is present, and thus lets it subsist; the indifference of possession, or right, does not concern it; it is only in particularity. But the ethical, by its nature of being intelligence, is at the same time objectively universal, and thus in an indifferent relation with an other; the annihilation of a particularity of it \u2013 and no annihilation other than that of an ethical being occurs here \u2013 is at the same time annihilation of the indifference, and positing of it as a negative; the positive element of this positing lies in the fact that the determinacy remains as such, and is only posited with negative determinacy. Such a letting-subsist of the determinacy, but annihilation of the indifference of recognition; it is an injury of right, whose appearance as a real annihilation of recognition is also a severing of the relation of the determinacy to the subject; for recognition recognises precisely this relation, which in itself is merely ideal, as a real one; through recognition it is a matter of indifference whether the subject has actually united the determinacy with itself inseparably, absolutely, or is only in relative relation with it, whether this union is posited only in the form of possibility; through recognition the relative relation itself becomes indifferent, its subjectivity at the same time objective. The real sublation of recognition also sublates that relation, and is robbery<\/em>, or, in so far as it bears purely on the related object, theft<\/em>. In this relation of the object to the subject which lies in property, the annihilation of the indifference, or of right, does indeed leave the determinacy as it is; this remains indifferent in the process; the robbed object remains what it is; but not the subject, which here in the particular is itself the indifference<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 316]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |316|<\/span> of the relation. In so far, then, as it is not the abstraction of its relation to the object that is sublated, but rather it itself is injured in that relation and something in it is sublated, and what is sublated in it is not the diminution of its possession, for this does not concern it as a subject, but the annihilation of it as indifference through and in this singular act; since, then, the indifference of the determinacies is the person<\/em>, and this is injured here, the diminution of property is a personal injury; and here, in this whole potency of particularity, it is necessarily such. For immediately it is not personal if only the abstraction of the relation of the subject to the object is injured; but this abstraction as such has not been made in this potency; it does not yet have its reality and support in something that is itself universal, but has it solely in the particularity of the person; and for that reason every robbery is personal; the relation is personal, which it otherwise is only when it is real or empirical, when the possessor is just looking at the object of his possession, or holding it, or has it otherwise locked up within his domain, which he counts as part of the space he occupies with his possession; this empirical relation, as a particular one, is here the relation of this potency in general, for no way has yet been indicated in it by which the empirical relation itself would be made indifferent and property would be protected without it; i.e. by which the ideal relation, without being empirical, would be real, so that through injury of the ideal relation, of possession as property, the personal relation would not be injured.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Theft is therefore here just as much personal and robbery; and the subsumption of a possession that is property under the desire of another, or the negation of the indifference, and the assertion of the quantitatively greater particularity against the quantitatively lesser one, the subsumption of the more different under the lesser, that is, force, not in general but against property, or robbery, must also have its counteraction, or the reversed subsumption. As subjugation has taken place here, i.e. the lesser force has been subsumed under the greater force, so conversely the force that is now greater must be posited as the lesser; and according to absolute reason this reversal is as necessary in and for itself as that subsumption is actually robbery. But robbery exists only<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 317]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |317|<\/span> where the relation of lordship and bondage does not. Where this does exist, however, where one individual is more indifferent, and thus the higher potency, than the other, there is by nature no robbery, except in so far as it is absolutely devastating and destructive, not in so far as it would be robbery proper; and by its passing over into the personal, person measures himself against person, and the one subjugated becomes the bondsman of the other; and this becoming a bondsman is properly the appearance of that relation which, in this relation of subsumption, belongs to each of the individuals; without relation they cannot be side by side. Robbery is the singular subsumption, not bearing on the totality of personality, and in so far that which makes this personal injury the affair of its whole personality must retain the upper hand and make the reversal real, because it posits itself as totality, whereas the other posits itself only as particularity; and the reality of this relation is subjection, while the appearance of its becoming is subjugation<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the preceding relation the reversal is absolutely annihilating, because the annihilation itself is absolute; hence the reaction, as against a beast of prey, is absolute subjugation or death. In this one, however, the reaction cannot be merely the taking back of what was robbed, for the sake of the personal character of the injury, but is either only a momentary positing of lordship and bondage, so that being subsumed becomes real in the robber only for a moment, and only for this determinacy, according to the determinacy of the personal insult occurring in it; but precisely because the assailant has not staked his whole personality on it, the relation too cannot end with the totality of personality in the relation of subjection, but can only be for a moment; only in the case of war, of personalities that recognise each other mutually, or of need in respect of the whole of life which, as also in war, comes from human beings, \u2013 but otherwise from nature, does bondage occur; otherwise the reaction is formally the wholeness of this relation, and admission into the family, but as regards its matter it is likewise singular and particular; for he who has robbed is too base even to be a bondsman, for he has not shown trust in the whole personality of himself, since he remained in the particular.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 318]<\/p>\n\n\n\n The indifference or totality of these two negations bears on the indifference of the determinacies, or life, and whole personality; and the reversal, which is posited as doubtful and is not one-sided, so that the relation would be wholly determinate and certain on one side, is likewise the loss of personality, through bondage or death. Because the negation can only be a determinacy, this determinacy must, so that the whole may be at stake, be intensified into a whole. But by being personal it is immediately the whole; for the determinacy belongs to the person, who is the indifference of the whole, and a particularity of the person that is negated is only an abstraction, for in the person it is absolutely taken up into indifference; what is living is injured. But because the abstraction of the injured particularity stands over against this indifference, the latter too is posited as ideal through the former, and what is injured is honour<\/em>. Through honour the singular becomes a whole and something personal, and the apparent negation of something singular alone is the injury of the whole, and so there arises the struggle of the whole person against the whole person. There can be no question of the justice of the occasion of such a struggle; as soon as the struggle as such arises, justice is on both [sides], for the equality of danger is posited, and indeed of the freest danger, because the whole is at stake. The occasion, i.e. the determinacy which is posited as taken up into indifference and as personal, is absolutely nothing in and for itself, precisely because it is something only as personal; and as such anything posited in absolutely many ways can be taken; no exclusion and limit can be set in this regard. Force, or rather force posited as individualised, strength, decides the subsumption, and here, where the whole real personality is the subject, the relation of lordship and bondage must immediately arise; or, if absolute equality is presupposed, the impossibility of such a different relation, and thus the impossibility that one should be the indifferent and the other the different, then in the struggle, as absolute difference and mutual negation, indifference is to be preserved and the<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 319]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |319|<\/span> dispute settled solely through death; in which subjugation is absolute, and precisely through the absoluteness of the negation its opposite, freedom, is absolutely asserted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Something else, however, is inequality in the negation, and the one-sidedness of the struggle, which then is no struggle at all; this inequality, where the subsumption is posited absolutely on one side only, not wavering, and the middle is posited as possibility<\/em> and for that very reason as the indifference of both, is oppression, and when it proceeds to absolute negation, murder. Oppression and murder are not to be confused with the relation of lordship, and with struggle; true unjust oppression is personal attack and injury in a manner through which all struggle is absolutely sublated, through which it is impossible for the other to be on his guard and thereby to posit the struggle. In itself, however, this impossibility cannot be proved and demonstrated (the Italians give as the ground of the lawfulness of assassination the immediacy of the declaration of war through the insult); only then is the impossibility to be regarded as actually present when there is no insult, and the murder takes place for absolutely nothing personal; thus for the sake of robbery. But even if an insult has preceded, so that personality and wholeness are at stake, the insult is wholly unequal to the total negation in relation to reality; honour is indeed injured, but honour is distinguishable from life, and in that the latter is staked in order [to restore] to the former its reality, which as injured honour is only ideal, the linking of the ideality of honour with its reality takes place solely through the injured determinacy being raised to the whole reality; and honour consists in this, that once a single determinacy has been negated, the totality of the determinacies, or life4)<\/a><\/sup>, is also to be spent on it; hence one’s own life must be staked, as that through which alone that negation of singularity is made into a whole, which is what it is meant to be.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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321<\/a> \u00b7 322<\/a> \u00b7 323<\/a> \u00b7 324<\/a> \u00b7 325<\/a> \u00b7 326<\/a> \u00b7 327<\/a> \u00b7 328<\/a> \u00b7 329<\/a> \u00b7 330<\/a>
331<\/a> \u00b7 332<\/a> \u00b7 333<\/a> \u00b7 334<\/a> \u00b7 335<\/a> \u00b7 336<\/a> \u00b7 337<\/a> \u00b7 338<\/a> \u00b7 339<\/a> \u00b7 340<\/a>
341<\/a> \u00b7 342<\/a> \u00b7 343<\/a> \u00b7 344<\/a> \u00b7 345<\/a> \u00b7 346<\/a> \u00b7 347<\/a> \u00b7 348<\/a> \u00b7 349<\/a> \u00b7 350<\/a>
351<\/a> \u00b7 352<\/a> \u00b7 353<\/a> \u00b7 354<\/a> \u00b7 355<\/a> \u00b7 356<\/a> \u00b7 357<\/a> \u00b7 358<\/a> \u00b7 359<\/a> \u00b7 360<\/a>
361<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\nContents<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
[Introduction]<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
I. Absolute ethical life according to relation<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
A.<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
a)<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
b<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
c<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
B. Second potency of infinity, ideality, in the formal, or in relation<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
a.<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
b. The subsumption of intuition under the concept<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
c.<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
II. The negative, or freedom, or crime<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
a.<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
b.<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
c.<\/h5>\n\n\n\n