[p. 185]<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[Realphilosophie: Philosophy of Spirit, 1805\/06]<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n The second part of Hegel\u2019s manuscript for his lectures on \u201cRealphilosophie\u201d (philosophy of nature and of spirit), written in 1805\/06 for the winter semester 1805\/06 and revised in 1806; Hegel certainly delivered the lectures in the summer semester of 1806. Not published in his lifetime; first edited by Johannes Hoffmeister in 1931 as \u201cJenenser Realphilosophie II\u201d, hence the customary title. Translated from the text of the Gesammelte Werke (vol. 8, \u201cJenaer Systementw\u00fcrfe III\u201d, ed. Rolf-Peter Horstmann with Johann Heinrich Trede, 1976, pp. 185\u2013287). Additions by the editors stand in square brackets, as do headings that are not Hegel\u2019s; the critical apparatus and the leaf numbers of the manuscript are not reproduced. Hegel\u2019s emphases (letter-spaced or in small capitals in the edition) appear in italics.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Print version (PDF):<\/strong> for printing and taking along<\/a> \u2013 each page of the PDF holds exactly one page of the printed edition, with a wide margin for one\u2019s own notes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The figures between vertical bars, e.g. |293|<\/span>, mark the beginning of a page of the printed edition, so that a passage can be found again in one\u2019s own copy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The notes reproduce Hegel\u2019s marginal notes; the italic indication before them (e.g. \u201cIn the margin:\u201d) is the editors\u2019 of the Gesammelte Werke. Asterisks within a note refer to Hegel\u2019s own additions to it. The enumerators \u03b1, \u03b2, \u03b3, \u03b4 stand thus in Hegel\u2019s manuscript.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cross-reference:<\/em> Hegel\u2019s last working-out of the philosophy of spirit before the Phenomenology<\/em>, and the first in which recognition, contract, crime, law, the estates and government are developed out of the will \u2013 the path of the Groundlines<\/em>, which begin with the will (\u00a7 4<\/a> ff.). Many pieces return there: property and recognition (\u00a7 41<\/a> ff., \u00a7 71<\/a>), contract (\u00a7 72<\/a> ff.), crime and punishment (\u00a7 90<\/a> ff.), wealth and poverty (\u00a7 241<\/a> ff.), the estates (\u00a7 201<\/a> ff.), war (\u00a7 324<\/a> ff.), state and religion (\u00a7 270<\/a> Remark). Written earlier is the System of Ethical Life<\/a>. At each section the corresponding place is noted as a cross-reference. The German text<\/a> is on the German side of this edition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Page by page:<\/strong> Each web page holds exactly one page of the Gesammelte Werke. Web page 1 is p. 185, web page 2 is p. 186, and so on; the web page for a printed page thus has the number \u201cprinted page minus 184\u201d. The page number stands at the top of each web page in square brackets. The first and the last page are printed only in part.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Find a page:<\/strong> Cross-reference:<\/em> Intelligence and will: in the Groundlines<\/em> the distinction of thinking and will, \u00a7 4<\/a> Remark; the concept of the will \u00a7 5<\/a>\u2013\u00a7 7<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The subsistence of the object, its space<\/em>, is in spirit being<\/em>; it is the abstract pure concept of subsistence. I and the thing are in space<\/em>;1)<\/a><\/sup> it is posited as essentially different<\/em> from its content, it is not the essence of its filling itself, it is only something formally universal that is separated from its particular; but the subsistence of spirit is truly universal<\/em>; it contains the particular itself; the thing is<\/em>, it is not in<\/em> being \u2013 but it is<\/em> itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1)<\/a> In the margin:<\/em> attention<\/em> in general, singling out a single<\/em> point, distinguishing for spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is immediately the essence<\/em> of intuition<\/em>; knowing of something that is<\/em>. But spirit is this which mediates itself with itself, it is only as sublating what it immediately<\/em> is, stepping back from it; or the movement in it is to be considered, how that which is<\/em> becomes the universal for it,2)<\/a><\/sup> or how it makes it so, posits it as what it is \u2013 being is the form of immediacy, but it is to be posited in its truth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2)<\/a> In the margin:<\/em> how it posits the thing<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b1) As intuiting in general, so that for it a being<\/em> is, it is immediate \u2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 186]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |186|<\/span> but it [turns] out of this immediacy, back into itself, [is] for itself; it sets itself free from this immediacy<\/em>, first removing itself from it, it is, like the animal, time<\/em> that is for itself, and likewise freedom of time; this pure subject which is free of its content; but also lord<\/em> over it, as space and time are not, which are the selfless; it goes [out] from this being, and posits the same within itself as something not-being<\/em>, as something sublated in general, thus it is representing imagination<\/em> in general \u2013 It is the self, over against itself. \u2013 It itself is first intuiting<\/em>; this self it sets over against itself \u2013 not the object<\/em>, but its intuiting is object to it, i.e. the content of perception as its own<\/em>. \u2013 In intuiting, what is intuited is<\/em> in me, \u2013 for it is indeed I<\/em> who intuit \u2013 it is my<\/em> intuition \u20133)<\/a><\/sup> Out of this intuiting spirit steps forth and intuits its<\/em> intuiting, i.e. the object as its own<\/em>; the object sublated as something that is<\/em>, the image<\/em>. In intuiting spirit is<\/em> the image \u2013 for it as consciousness it is a being<\/em>, separated from the I; \u2013 but for us unity of both. This comes to be for spirit itself \u2013 it is in and for itself<\/em>; in intuiting it is at first only in itself<\/em>, it completes this through the for-itself, \u2013 through negativity, separation of the in-itself, and goes back into itself \u2013 and its first self is object to it; the image<\/em>, being<\/em> as mine<\/em>, as sublated. This4)<\/a><\/sup> image belongs to it<\/em>,5)<\/a><\/sup> it is in possession of it, it is lord over it; it is preserved in its treasury<\/em>, in its night<\/em> \u2013 it is unconscious<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n 3)<\/a> In the margin:<\/em> \u03b1) like the animal, it is in itself arbitrary movement, freedom, the self of time and space, arbitrarily posits the content here or there in space<\/em> and time<\/em>; \u2013 time and space is the external relation<\/em>, this external relation<\/em> as form<\/em> it sublates; \u03b2) being<\/em>, this belongs properly to the I as such, not space and time;<\/p>\n\n\n\n 4)<\/a> In the margin:<\/em> \u03b1) night of preservation<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n 5)<\/a> In the margin:<\/em> to its simple self \u2013 but the simple has no distinction, so here too, it is in it<\/em> as undistinguished<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 187]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |187|<\/span> i.e. without being set forth as object before representation. Man is this night, this empty nothing, which contains everything in its simplicity \u2013 a wealth of infinitely many representations, images, none of which occurs to him just now \u2013, or which are not as present. This the night, the interior of nature, which here exists \u2013 pure self<\/em>, \u2013 in phantasmagorical representations it is night all around, here then a bloody head shoots forth, \u2013 there another white shape suddenly, and vanish likewise \u2013 This night one glimpses when one looks a human being in the eye \u2013 into a night which becomes terrible<\/em>, \u2013 the night of the world here hangs out towards one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In6)<\/a><\/sup> this night that which is has gone back \u2013 But7)<\/a><\/sup> the movement of this power is likewise posited. \u03b1) the image is a manifold \u2013 form is in it as determinacy, and thereby other determinates, multiplicity in general. The I is the form not only as simple self, but as movement; the relation<\/em> of the parts of the image, \u2013 positing the form, relation<\/em>, as its own; \u2013 insofar as it makes up a part<\/em> of the content<\/em> \u2013 it alters the same8)<\/a><\/sup> \u2013 For itself<\/em> here is free arbitrary will<\/em> \u2013 to tear images apart and to link them in the most unbound way. \u2013 If in its drawing forth of the images it lets itself be led by the received<\/em> relation, then it stands under the dominion of the so-called association of ideas<\/em> \u2013 an English word, for these still to this day call the mere image of a dog, e.g., an idea<\/em>. The laws of this association of ideas mean nothing more than the passive order of representation \u2013 seen at the same time<\/em>, also reproduces itself together etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 6)<\/a> In the margin:<\/em> \u03b2 self-positing; inner consciousness, doing<\/em>, sundering.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 7)<\/a> In the margin:<\/em> power to draw the images forth out of this night, or to let them fall down<\/em> \u2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n 8)<\/a> In the margin:<\/em> an entirely different movement from that of space and time, a free one, subsisting before this movement that is<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 188]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |188|<\/span> This arbitrary will is empty freedom, for its content is one after another, it lies merely in the form, and concerns only this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b2 The object has thereby in general received the form, the determination of being mine; and when it is intuited<\/em> again, its being<\/em> no longer has this pure meaning of being, but of the mine<\/em>, it is already known<\/em> to me; or I recollect<\/em> it. Or I have immediately the consciousness of myself<\/em> in it \u2013 in immediate intuiting only the consciousness of it<\/em>; but when it is known, it comes to be so for me with this express determination; we are also made to recollect something by another, merely the image of the object brought into us \u2013 recollection adds the moment of being-for-itself \u2013 I have seen<\/em> it once before,9)<\/a><\/sup> or heard<\/em> it; I recollect<\/em>; I do not merely see, hear the object, but go thereby within myself<\/em> \u2013 inwardize<\/em> \u2013 myself<\/em>, take myself<\/em> out of the mere image, and posit myself in myself<\/em>; I posit myself particularly in relation to the object.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 9)<\/a> In the margin:<\/em> being-for-me<\/em> superficially attached to the intuition<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u03b3) This being-for-me<\/em>, which I add<\/em> to the object, is that night, that self into which I sank it, which, now drawn forth, is object to myself \u2013 and what is before me is the synthesis<\/em> of both,10)<\/a><\/sup> content<\/em> and I<\/em>. But the external object itself<\/em> has precisely therein been sublated \u2013 [become] something other than it is<\/em>, it has come under the dominion of the self, it has lost the meaning of being immediate, self-standing. Not only has a synthesis taken place, but the being<\/em> of the object has been sublated; it is thus this, that the object is<\/em> not what<\/em> it is. The content is not free of its being<\/em>; being is self<\/em>, \u2013 the content is its simple essence in general \u2013 this is something other than its being<\/em>; it counts as a whole<\/em> other, has another essence<\/em>, self another meaning; or counts as a sign<\/em>. In the sign being-for<\/em>-itself is, as the essence<\/em> of the object, object, and it as sublated in its totality,<\/p>\n\n\n\n 10)<\/a> In the margin:<\/em> its being<\/em> is determined as this being-for-me<\/em>, inner<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [p. 189]<\/p>\n\n\n\n |189|<\/span> according to its content; its content no longer has any free value of its own; its being is the I itself \u2013 idealism, which becomes object to itself; the thing is<\/em> not what it is<\/em>; that being is self; \u2013 my being-for-me<\/em> is object as the essence<\/em> of the thing, in recollection only synthetically, externally attached. The I is here object as the interior<\/em> of the thing itself, this inwardness of the thing is still separated from its being, it is not yet universality, or the thing posited as thing<\/em>. This,11)<\/a><\/sup> that I intuit the thing only as sign, but its essence as I, as meaning, as reflection into itself, is likewise itself object<\/em>; it is thus only at first immediate<\/em> inwardness, it must also enter into existence, become object, conversely this inwardness be external; return to being<\/em>. This is language<\/em>, as the name-giving power<\/em>,12)<\/a><\/sup> \u2013 imagination only the empty-form-giving, designating [power], which posits the form as inward, but language [posits the inward] as something that is<\/em>. This then is the true being<\/em> of spirit as spirit in general \u2013 it is there<\/em> as the unity of two free selves; and an existence which is in accordance with its concept, \u2013 it likewise immediately sublates itself \u2013 dies away, but is apprehended<\/em>. At first language speaks only with this self, the meaning<\/em> of the thing, gives it a name, and expresses this as the being<\/em> of the object; what is<\/em> this? we answer, it is<\/em> a lion, ass etc. it is<\/em>, i.e. it is not at all something yellow, having feet and so forth, something of its own, self-standing, but a name<\/em>, a sound<\/em> of my voice; something quite other than it is in intuition, and this its true being<\/em>. This is only its name<\/em>, the thing itself is something else; i.e. we then fall back into sensuous representation<\/em>; \u2013 or only<\/em> a name in a higher sense, for the name is itself only at first the very superficial spiritual being<\/em>. \u2013 Through the name, then, the<\/p>\n\n\n\n
185<\/a> \u00b7 186<\/a> \u00b7 187<\/a> \u00b7 188<\/a> \u00b7 189<\/a> \u00b7 190<\/a>
191<\/a> \u00b7 192<\/a> \u00b7 193<\/a> \u00b7 194<\/a> \u00b7 195<\/a> \u00b7 196<\/a> \u00b7 197<\/a> \u00b7 198<\/a> \u00b7 199<\/a> \u00b7 200<\/a>
201<\/a> \u00b7 202<\/a> \u00b7 203<\/a> \u00b7 204<\/a> \u00b7 205<\/a> \u00b7 206<\/a> \u00b7 207<\/a> \u00b7 208<\/a> \u00b7 209<\/a> \u00b7 210<\/a>
211<\/a> \u00b7 212<\/a> \u00b7 213<\/a> \u00b7 214<\/a> \u00b7 215<\/a> \u00b7 216<\/a> \u00b7 217<\/a> \u00b7 218<\/a> \u00b7 219<\/a> \u00b7 220<\/a>
221<\/a> \u00b7 222<\/a> \u00b7 223<\/a> \u00b7 224<\/a> \u00b7 225<\/a> \u00b7 226<\/a> \u00b7 227<\/a> \u00b7 228<\/a> \u00b7 229<\/a> \u00b7 230<\/a>
231<\/a> \u00b7 232<\/a> \u00b7 233<\/a> \u00b7 234<\/a> \u00b7 235<\/a> \u00b7 236<\/a> \u00b7 237<\/a> \u00b7 238<\/a> \u00b7 239<\/a> \u00b7 240<\/a>
241<\/a> \u00b7 242<\/a> \u00b7 243<\/a> \u00b7 244<\/a> \u00b7 245<\/a> \u00b7 246<\/a> \u00b7 247<\/a> \u00b7 248<\/a> \u00b7 249<\/a> \u00b7 250<\/a>
251<\/a> \u00b7 252<\/a> \u00b7 253<\/a> \u00b7 254<\/a> \u00b7 255<\/a> \u00b7 256<\/a> \u00b7 257<\/a> \u00b7 258<\/a> \u00b7 259<\/a> \u00b7 260<\/a>
261<\/a> \u00b7 262<\/a> \u00b7 263<\/a> \u00b7 264<\/a> \u00b7 265<\/a> \u00b7 266<\/a> \u00b7 267<\/a> \u00b7 268<\/a> \u00b7 269<\/a> \u00b7 270<\/a>
271<\/a> \u00b7 272<\/a> \u00b7 273<\/a> \u00b7 274<\/a> \u00b7 275<\/a> \u00b7 276<\/a> \u00b7 277<\/a> \u00b7 278<\/a> \u00b7 279<\/a> \u00b7 280<\/a>
281<\/a> \u00b7 282<\/a> \u00b7 283<\/a> \u00b7 284<\/a> \u00b7 285<\/a> \u00b7 286<\/a> \u00b7 287<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\nContents<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
[I. Spirit according to its concept]<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
[a. Intelligence]<\/h5>\n\n\n\n