{"id":906487,"date":"2026-11-18T20:22:27","date_gmt":"2026-11-18T19:22:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/"},"modified":"2026-11-18T20:39:14","modified_gmt":"2026-11-18T19:39:14","slug":"lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/","title":{"rendered":"Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Introduction"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 11]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"grl-provenance wp-block-paragraph\"><em>From the \u201cLectures on the Philosophy of Religion\u201d, which Hegel gave in Berlin in 1821, 1824, 1827 and 1831. The text is not a single transcript but the compilation of the Friends\u2019 Edition (ed. Philipp Marheineke, 2nd edition 1840) from Hegel\u2019s manuscript and transcripts of several years. Reproduced after the Werkausgabe (vol. 16), in our own English translation.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Print version (PDF, German):<\/strong> <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/religionsphilosophie-einleitung-2.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">to print and take along<\/a> \u2013 each page of the PDF contains exactly one printed page, with a wide margin for your own notes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The numbers between vertical bars, for example <span class=\"ed-s\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|93|<\/span>, mark the beginning of a page of the printed edition; this way one finds the passage again in one\u2019s own copy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">In the notes, \u201cWerkausgabe:\u201d stands before remarks of the editors, \u201cHegel\u2019s footnote.\u201d before Hegel\u2019s own notes, and \u201cDeleted in the manuscript:\u201d before text that Hegel himself deleted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Cross-reference:<\/em> Continuation: <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/\">The Concept of Religion<\/a>. The concise systematic version of the same line of thought stands in the <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/encyclopaedia-absolute-spirit\/\">Encyclopaedia, \u00a7\u00a7 553\u2013577<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Page by page:<\/strong> Each web page contains exactly one printed page. Web page 1 is p. 11, web page 2 is p. 12 and so on; the web page for a printed page thus has the number \u201cprinted page minus 10\u201d. The page number stands at the top of each web page in square brackets. The first and the last page are only partly printed, because the text begins or ends there in the middle of the page.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Find a page:<\/strong><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/\">11<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/2\/\">12<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/3\/\">13<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/4\/\">14<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/5\/\">15<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/6\/\">16<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/7\/\">17<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/8\/\">18<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/9\/\">19<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/10\/\">20<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/11\/\">21<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/12\/\">22<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/13\/\">23<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/14\/\">24<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/15\/\">25<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/16\/\">26<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/17\/\">27<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/18\/\">28<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/19\/\">29<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/20\/\">30<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/21\/\">31<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/22\/\">32<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/23\/\">33<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/24\/\">34<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/25\/\">35<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/26\/\">36<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/27\/\">37<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/28\/\">38<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/29\/\">39<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/30\/\">40<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/31\/\">41<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/32\/\">42<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/33\/\">43<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/34\/\">44<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/35\/\">45<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/36\/\">46<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/37\/\">47<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/38\/\">48<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/39\/\">49<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/40\/\">50<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/41\/\">51<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/42\/\">52<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/43\/\">53<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/44\/\">54<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/45\/\">55<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/46\/\">56<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/47\/\">57<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/48\/\">58<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/49\/\">59<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/50\/\">60<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/51\/\">61<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/52\/\">62<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/53\/\">63<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/54\/\">64<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/55\/\">65<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/56\/\">66<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/57\/\">67<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/58\/\">68<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/59\/\">69<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/60\/\">70<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/61\/\">71<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/62\/\">72<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/63\/\">73<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/64\/\">74<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/65\/\">75<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/66\/\">76<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/67\/\">77<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/68\/\">78<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/69\/\">79<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/70\/\">80<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/71\/\">81<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/72\/\">82<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/73\/\">83<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/74\/\">84<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/75\/\">85<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/76\/\">86<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/77\/\">87<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/78\/\">88<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Contents<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/#re-einleitung\">Introduction<\/a><\/li><li>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/6\/#re-a-das-verhaeltnis-der-religionsphilosophie-zu-ihre\">A. The Relationship of the Philosophy of Religion to Its Presuppositions and to the Principles of the Age<\/a><\/li><li>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/44\/#re-b-vorfragen\">B. Preliminary Questions<\/a><\/li><li>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/54\/#re-c-einteilung\">C. Division<\/a><\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-einleitung\">Introduction<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I have considered it necessary to make religion for itself the object of philosophical consideration and to add this consideration as a particular part to the whole of philosophy. For the purpose of the introduction, however, I shall first A. present the <em>division of consciousness<\/em> that awakens the need our science has to satisfy, and describe the <em>relation<\/em> of our science to philosophy and religion as well as to the principles of the age in religious consciousness. After I have then B. touched on some <em>preliminary questions<\/em> that arise from those relations of our science, I shall C. give its <em>division<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">First of all we must recall in general what <em>object<\/em> we have before us in the philosophy of religion and what our <em>representation<\/em> of religion is. We know that in religion we are removed from temporality and that it is that region for our consciousness in which all the riddles of the world are solved, all the contradictions of more deeply musing thought unveiled, all the pains of feeling silenced: the region of eternal truth, of eternal rest, of eternal peace. What makes man man is thought in general, concrete thought, more precisely the fact that he is spirit; from him as spirit there then proceed the manifold formations of the sciences, the arts, the interests of his political life, relationships that relate to his freedom, to his will. But all these manifold formations and further entanglements of human relationships, activities, enjoyments, everything that has worth and respect for man, in which he seeks his happiness, his fame, his pride, finds its final centre in religion, in the thought, consciousness, feeling of God. God is therefore the beginning of everything and the<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 12]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s12\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 12\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|12|<\/span> end of everything; as everything proceeds from this point, so everything also goes back into it; and likewise he is the centre that enlivens everything, inspirits it and, preserving them, ensouls all those configurations in their existence. In religion man places himself in relationship to this centre, into which all his other relationships converge, and he thereby raises himself to the highest level of consciousness and into the region that, free from relation to anything else, is what is absolutely sufficient, the unconditioned, free, and final end for itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Religion, as the occupation with this ultimate final end, is therefore absolutely free and is end for itself, for into this final end all other ends run back, and before it they vanish, though valid for themselves until then. No other holds out against it, and in it alone they find their settlement. In the region where spirit occupies itself with this end, it discharges itself of all finitude and gains final satisfaction and liberation; for here spirit no longer relates itself to something other and restricted, but to the unrestricted and infinite, and that is an infinite relationship, a relationship of freedom and no longer of dependence; there its consciousness is absolutely free and itself true consciousness, because it is consciousness of absolute truth. Determined as sensation, this relationship of freedom is the enjoyment we call blessedness; as activity it does nothing other than manifest the honour of God and reveal his glory, and in this relationship man is no longer concerned with himself, with his interest, his vanity, but with the absolute end. All peoples know that religious consciousness is that in which they possess truth, and they have always regarded religion as their dignity and as the Sunday of their life. Whatever awakens doubt and anxiety in us, all grief, all care, all the restricted interests of finitude we leave behind on the sandbank of temporality; and as on the<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 13]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s13\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 13\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|13|<\/span> highest peak of a mountain range, removed from every determinate view of the earthly, we calmly survey all the limitations of the landscape and of the world, so it is with the spiritual eye: man, lifted out of the hardness of this actuality, regards it only as a semblance which, in this pure region, only in the ray of the spiritual sun, reflects its shadings, differences and lights, softened into eternal rest. In this region of spirit flow the waters of forgetfulness, from which Psyche drinks, in which she sinks all pain, and the darknesses of this life are here softened into a dream image and transfigured into a mere outline for the radiance of the eternal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This image of the absolute can offer to religious devotion more or less present liveliness, certainty, enjoyment, or be presented as something longed for, hoped for, distant, beyond; yet it always remains certainty and shines as something divine into temporal present, and it gives the consciousness of the efficacy of truth even beside the anxious things that still torment the soul here in this region of temporality. Faith recognizes it as the truth, as the substance of the existences present, and this content of devotion is what ensouls the present world, makes itself effective in the life of the individual and governs it in what it does and leaves undone. That is the general intuition, sensation, consciousness, or whatever we want to call it, of religion. To consider, investigate and know its nature is the aim of these lectures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">First, however, we must have the definite consciousness about our purpose that philosophy is not concerned with producing religion in a subject; rather it is presupposed as the basis in everyone. <em>As regards substance, nothing new<\/em> is to be brought into people; this would be as perverse as if one wanted to bring spirit into a dog by letting it chew printed writings. Whoever has not widened his breast out of<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 14]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s14\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 14\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|14|<\/span> the bustle of the finite, has not accomplished the elevation of himself in longing, presentiment or feeling of the eternal and has not gazed into the pure aether of the soul, would not possess the material that is to be comprehended here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It may be the case that religion is awakened in the mind through philosophical cognition; but this is not necessary, and it is not the intention of philosophy to edify, just as little as it has to <em>prove itself<\/em> by having to produce religion in this or that subject. For philosophy indeed has to develop the <em>necessity of religion in and for itself<\/em> and to comprehend that spirit must advance from the other modes of its willing, representing and feeling to this absolute mode; but in this way it accomplishes the <em>universal destiny of spirit<\/em>, &#8211; it is another matter to raise the <em>individual subject<\/em> to this height. The arbitrariness, perversity, slackness of individuals can interfere with the necessity of universal spiritual nature, deviate from it and try to give themselves a peculiar standpoint and hold fast to it. This possibility of letting oneself go in inertia at the standpoint of untruth, or of lingering there knowingly and willingly, lies in the freedom of the subject, whereas planets, plants, animals cannot deviate from the necessity of their nature, from their truth, and become what they ought to be. But in human freedom being and ought are separated; it bears arbitrariness within itself, and it can separate itself from its <em>necessity<\/em>, from its law, and work against its determination. So even if <em>cognition<\/em> saw the necessity of the religious standpoint, even if the <em>will<\/em> experienced in actuality the nullity of its separation, all this does not prevent it from being able to persist in its <em>self-will<\/em> and keep itself removed from its necessity and truth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 15]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s15\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 15\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|15|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the usual shallow manner it has been used as an argument against cognition to say that this or that person possesses cognition of God and yet remains far from religion, has not become pious. But cognition neither wants nor is supposed to lead to that; it is supposed to know the religion that <em>is there<\/em>, not first to move this or that, this single empirical subject, to religion, if it has or wanted to have nothing of religion in itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But in fact no human being is so corrupt, so lost and so bad, and we can regard no one as so wretched, that he would have nothing at all of religion in himself, even if it were only that he had fear of it or longing for it or hatred against it; for even in the last case he is inwardly occupied and entangled with it. As a human being religion is essential to him and a sensation not alien to him. Yet what essentially matters is the <em>relationship of religion to his other view of the world<\/em>, and to this philosophical cognition essentially relates and on this it works. In this relationship lies the source of the division against the original, absolute urge of spirit towards religion, and here in general the most manifold forms of consciousness and the most diverse relations of them to the interest of religion have formed. Before the philosophy of religion can gather itself to its own concept, it must work its way through all those entanglements of the interests of the age that have at present concentrated themselves in the great circle of the religious domain. At first the movement of the principles of the age still stands outside philosophical insight; but it drives itself on to entering into contact, struggle and opposition with philosophy, and this opposition and its resolution we have to consider once we have investigated the opposition as it still keeps itself outside philosophy and have seen it develop to its completion, where it draws philosophical cognition into itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 16]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s16\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 16\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|16|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-a-das-verhaeltnis-der-religionsphilosophie-zu-ihre\">A. The Relationship of the Philosophy of Religion to Its Presuppositions and to the Principles of the Age<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-i-die-entzweiung-der-religion-mit-dem-freien-weltl\">I. The Division of Religion from Free Worldly Consciousness<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Cross-reference:<\/em> The division of the spiritual and the worldly and its reconciliation: <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/360\/\">\u00a7 360<\/a> (conclusion of the <em>Groundlines<\/em>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">a) Already in the relationship that religion itself, in its immediacy, has to the rest of human consciousness there lie germs of division, since both sides are caught in a <em>separation<\/em> from each other. Even in their unselfconscious relationship they make up two kinds of occupation, two regions of consciousness, between which one passes back and forth only <em>alternately<\/em>. Thus man, in his actual, worldly doing, has a number of working days on which he occupies himself with his particular interests, with ends of worldliness in general and with the satisfaction of his needs, &#8211; and then a Sunday on which he lays all this aside, collects himself for himself and, released from immersion in finite bustle, lives for himself and for the higher that is in him, for his true essence. Into this separation of the two sides, however, a twofold modification at once enters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b1) Let us consider first the religion of the pious person, i.e. of one who really deserves this name. Faith is here still presupposed as <em>without regard to anything else<\/em> and <em>without opposition<\/em>. To believe in God in its simplicity is something different from saying, with reflection and with the consciousness that something else stands over against this faith: I <em>believe<\/em> in God; there the need of justification, of argumentation, of polemic already enters. That religion of the unselfconscious, pious person is now not kept by him closed off and separated from the rest of his existence and life; rather it spreads its breath over all his sensations and actions,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 17]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s17\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 17\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|17|<\/span> and his consciousness relates <em>all the ends and objects of his worldly life to God<\/em> as to their infinite and ultimate source. Every moment of his finite existence and activity, suffering and rejoicing, he raises out of its restricted sphere, and in this elevation brings forth the representation and sensation of his eternal essence. The rest of his life likewise stands in the mode of trust, custom, obedience, habit; he <em>is<\/em> what circumstances and nature have made him, and his life, his relationships and rights he takes, as he has received all this, as an uncomprehended destiny: <em>It is so<\/em>. Or, in relation to God, he takes what is his gratefully, or also freely sacrificing it to him, as a gift of arbitrary grace. The rest of consciousness is thus <em>unselfconsciously<\/em> <em>subordinated<\/em> to that higher region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b2) From the <em>worldly<\/em> side, however, the difference in that relationship develops into <em>opposition<\/em>. The development of this side does indeed seem not to affect religion adversely, and all doing seems here to keep itself <em>restricted<\/em> to that side; by declared acknowledgement religion is still esteemed as the highest; but in fact matters stand otherwise, and from the worldly side <em>corruption and division creep over into religion<\/em>. The development of this difference we can in general designate as the cultivation of the understanding and of human ends. When the understanding has awakened in human life and in science and reflection has become independent, the will sets itself absolute ends, e.g. right, the state, objects that are supposed to be in and for themselves; so research too recognizes the laws, the constitution, order and particularities of natural things and of the activities and productions of spirit. These experiences and cognitions, as well as the willing and actuality of those ends, are now a <em>work<\/em> of man and of his understanding and will. In them he has his <em>property<\/em> before him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 18]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s18\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 18\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|18|<\/span> Even if he starts from what <em>is<\/em>, from what he finds before him, he <em>is<\/em> no longer merely the one who knows, who <em>has<\/em> these rights; rather what he <em>makes<\/em> of what he found in cognition and in will is <em>his<\/em> affair, <em>his<\/em> work, and he has the consciousness that he has produced it. The productions therefore make up his honour and his pride and create an immense, infinite wealth &#8211; that world of his insight, his knowledge, his external possessions, his rights and deeds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thus spirit has entered into opposition, still unselfconsciously, to be sure, without knowing it at first, &#8211; but it also becomes a <em>conscious<\/em> opposition. For spirit now moves between two sides whose difference has actually developed. The one side is that in which it knows itself as its own, where it finds itself in its ends and interests and determines itself from itself independently and self-reliantly. The other side is that where it acknowledges a higher power, absolute duties, duties without rights proper, and what it receives for the exercise of its duties always remains only grace. There the independence of spirit is the basis; here it behaves humbly, dependently. Its religion now distinguishes itself from that region of independence in that it restricts <em>cognition<\/em>, <em>science<\/em>, to the <em>worldly side<\/em> and leaves sensation, faith, for the sphere of religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b3) Nevertheless that side of <em>independence<\/em> too contains this, that its doing is a <em>conditioned<\/em> one, and cognition and willing must <em>experience<\/em> this conditionedness. Man demands his right; whether it actually becomes his is independent of him, and in this he is referred to something other. In his cognition he starts from the arrangements and the order of nature, and this is something <em>given<\/em>. The content of his sciences is a material outside him. Thus both sides, that of independence and that of being conditioned, enter into <em>relation to each other<\/em>, and this relation leads man to the <em>admission<\/em> that <em>everything is made by God<\/em>,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 19]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s19\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 19\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|19|<\/span> all the things that make up the content of his knowledge, which he takes possession of and uses as means for his ends, as well as he himself, spirit and the spiritual faculties which, as he says, he makes use of in order to arrive at that cognition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But this concession is cold and dead, because in it what makes up the <em>liveliness<\/em> of this consciousness, where it is with itself and is self-consciousness, this <em>insight<\/em> and cognition, is lacking here. Everything <em>determinate<\/em> rather falls into the sphere of <em>cognition<\/em> and of human, <em>self-posited ends<\/em>, and here only the own activity of self-consciousness is present. So that concession too is now unfruitful, because it stops at the <em>abstract universal<\/em>, namely at this, that everything is a work of God; and with the most diverse objects (course of the stars and its laws, ant, man) that relation stops at one and the same thing, that God made it. Since this religious relation of the single objects always sounds the same and is monotonous, it would become boring and burdensome if it were repeated <em>with each single thing<\/em>. One therefore settles the matter with the <em>one<\/em> concession that God made everything, thereby satisfies this religious side <em>once and for all<\/em>, and in the course of cognition and the pursuit of ends it is then no longer thought of. That concession can then seem to have been made only in order to be rid of it, perhaps also in order to be covered, as it were, on this side as towards the outside; in short, one may be in earnest about it or not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Piety does not grudge the effort of raising its gaze to God in each and every thing, even though it does so daily and hourly in the same way. But as pious sensation it stands altogether <em>in singularity<\/em>; it is in each moment <em>wholly<\/em> what it is, and without reflection and comparing consciousness. Here, on the other hand, where cognition and self-determination count, this <em>comparing<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 20]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s20\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 20\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|20|<\/span> and the consciousness of that <em>sameness<\/em> are essentially present, and so a universal proposition is pronounced once and for all. On the one side the understanding goes about its business; opposite it has the religious feeling of dependence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">b) Piety, too, is not exempt from the destiny of falling into division. Division is rather already present in it in itself, in that its <em>actual content<\/em> is only a <em>manifold<\/em>, <em>contingent<\/em> one. The two relationships of piety and of the comparing understanding, however different they seem to be, have this in common, that the relation of God to the other side of consciousness is <em>indeterminate<\/em> and <em>universal<\/em>. The second of those relationships has stated and pronounced this without further ado in the expression cited, \u201cGod has created everything\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b1) The mode of consideration that piety adopts, however, and through which it gives its reflection greater detail, consists in considering the constitutions and arrangements according to the <em>relationship of ends<\/em>, and likewise considering all the incidents of individual life as well as the great events of history as proceeding from divine ends or directed towards them and steered back to them. Here, then, it does not stop at the universal divine relation; this becomes a <em>determinate relating<\/em>, and a more precise content thus enters; the most manifold materials are set in relationship to one another, and God then counts as what activates this relationship. The animals and their surroundings are found to be arranged in such and such a way that they have food, nourish their young, are armed against what is harmful, can endure the winter and defend themselves against enemies. In human life one finds how through this or that apparent accident, perhaps a misfortune, man is led to his happiness, be it eternal or temporal. In short, the doing, the will of God is here considered in determinate actions, natural relationships, events and so on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 21]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s21\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 21\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|21|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But this content itself, these ends, a finite content, are <em>contingent<\/em>, taken up only for the moment, and <em>inconsistently<\/em> lose themselves at once. If, for example, the wisdom of God in nature is admired because the animals are armed partly to get their food, partly to protect themselves against enemies, experience at once shows that these weapons are of no help and that the creatures regarded as ends are consumed by others as means.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is then in fact cognition advancing further that has degraded and displaced this external consideration of ends: the higher cognition, which at first at least demands <em>consistency<\/em> and recognizes such ends as are assumed to be divine ends as subordinate, finite ones, as something that in the same experience and observation proves itself in its nullity and not as an object of the eternal divine will.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That consideration, if it is accepted and its inconsistency thereby disregarded, is then indeterminate and superficial for the very reason that each and every content &#8211; no matter what it is like &#8211; can be taken up into it; for there is nothing, no arrangement of nature, no event, of which a use in some direction could not be pointed out. And piety is now no longer present at all as the <em>unselfconscious<\/em>, feeling piety; rather it starts from the <em>universal thought<\/em> of an end, of a good, and argues by subsuming the things present under these universal thoughts. With this argumentation, however, piety comes into the embarrassment that, in this immediate appearance of natural things, however much purposiveness and however much use it points out in them, just as much unpurposiveness and just as much harm can be held up against it. What serves the use of one is to the disadvantage of the other and is therefore unpurposive:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 22]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s22\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 22\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|22|<\/span> the preservation of life and of the interests connected with existence, which are furthered at one time, are just as much endangered and destroyed at another. Thus there lies a <em>division within itself<\/em> in the fact that, contrary to God\u2019s eternal mode of working, finite things are raised to essential ends. The representation of God that he and his mode of working are universal and necessary is contradicted by that inconsistency, and it even destroys that universal determination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If piety, then, considered the external ends and the externality of the matter according to which it is useful for something other, the <em>natural determinacy<\/em> from which one starts does indeed seem to be only <em>for something other<\/em>. But this, considered more closely, is its own relation, its own nature, the <em>immanent nature of what is related<\/em>, its <em>necessity<\/em>. So for piety the <em>actual transition<\/em> is made to the other side, which was earlier designated as the moment of the <em>selfhood<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b2) Piety is therefore thrown out of its argumentation, and once a beginning has been made with thinking and relationships of thought, thinking must above all demand and seek [what] is its own, namely first consistency and necessity, and set these against that standpoint of the contingent. With this the principle of selfhood at the same time fully develops. I, as simple, universal, as thinking, am relation in general; since I am for myself, self-consciousness, the relations are also supposed to be for me. To the thoughts, representations that I make my own, I give the determination that I myself am. I am this simple point, and what is for me I want to know in this unity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cognition to that extent goes towards what <em>is<\/em> and towards its <em>necessity<\/em>, and grasps this in the relationship of cause and effect, ground and consequence, force and its expression, of the universal of the genus as against the single<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 23]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s23\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 23\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|23|<\/span> existences, which fall precisely into the sphere of the contingent. Cognition and science in this way set the most manifold material in mutual relation, take from it the contingency it has through its immediacy, and in considering the relationships that the wealth of finite appearance has, they close off the world of finitude within itself into a <em>system of the universe<\/em>, so that cognition needs nothing outside this system for it. For what a thing is, what it is according to its essential determinacy, emerges from its perception and observation. From the constitution of things one goes on to their relationships, where they stand in relation to an other, but not in a contingent but in a <em>determinate relation<\/em>, and where they point to the original thing of which they are something derived. So one asks for the grounds and causes of things, and this question has here the meaning that it wants to know the <em>particular<\/em> causes. So it is no longer enough to give God as the cause of lightning or of the fall of the republican constitution in Rome or of the French Revolution; one soon finds that this cause is only quite <em>universal<\/em> and does not provide the explanation demanded. Of a natural appearance or of this or that law as effect or consequence one also wants to know the ground as the ground of <em>this<\/em> appearance, i.e. not the ground that fits everything, but the one that fits <em>exclusively<\/em> only this <em>determinate<\/em> thing. And so the ground of <em>such particular<\/em> appearances, and <em>such<\/em> a ground being the <em>nearest<\/em>, must be sought and taken up in the <em>finite<\/em> and must itself be a <em>finite<\/em> one. This cognition therefore does not get beyond the sphere of the finite and does not demand to get beyond it, since in its finite sphere it knows how to know everything and has advice and answers for everything. The<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 24]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s24\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 24\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|24|<\/span> science thus forms a <em>universe of cognition<\/em> that for itself has no need of God, lies <em>outside religion<\/em> and has directly nothing to do with it. In this realm cognition disports itself in its relationships and connections and thereby has <em>all determinate material and content<\/em> on its side, and for the other side, the side of the infinite and eternal, nothing remains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b3) Thus both sides have fully developed in their opposition. On the side of religion the mind is filled with the divine, but without freedom, self-consciousness and without consistency as regards the determinate; this rather has the form of the contingent. The consistent connection of the determinate falls to the side of cognition, which is at home in the finite and moves freely in the thought-determinations of the manifold connections, but can create only a system without absolute solidity, without God. To the religious side falls the absolute material and end, but only as something abstractly positive. Cognition has taken possession of all finite material and drawn it into its circle; all determinate content has fallen to its share; but even if it gives it a necessary connection, it cannot give it the absolute connection. Since finally science has taken possession of cognition and is the consciousness of the necessity of the finite, religion has become devoid of cognition and has shrunk into simple feeling, into the contentless elevation of the spiritual to the eternal, but can say nothing of the eternal; for everything that would be cognition would be a drawing down of the eternal into the sphere and connection of the finite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When now both sides thus developed enter into relation with each other, each is <em>mistrustful<\/em> of the other. Religious feeling is mistrustful of the finitude that lies in cognition and reproaches science with <em>vanity<\/em>, because in it the subject holds to itself, is within itself, and the I<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 25]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s25\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 25\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|25|<\/span> as the cognizing is for itself against everything external. On the other side cognition is mistrustful of the <em>totality<\/em> in which feeling holds itself and throws all expansion and development together into one. It fears losing its freedom if it complied with the demand of feeling and acknowledged unconditionally a truth it does not determinately see into. And when religious feeling steps out of its universality, gives itself ends, passes over to the <em>determinate<\/em>, cognition can see in this only <em>arbitrary caprice<\/em>, and if it were likewise to pass over to the determinate, it would see itself abandoned to <em>chance<\/em>. When reflection, therefore, as cultivated reflection, must carry itself into religion, it cannot endure it there and becomes impatient with all its determinations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">c) If the opposition has now come to this development, where whenever one side approaches the other, the latter repels it as its enemy, the <em>need for a settlement<\/em> arises, for which the infinite appears in the finite and the finite in the infinite and each of the two no longer forms a <em>particular realm<\/em>. This would be the <em>reconciliation of religious<\/em>, <em>solid feeling with cognition and intelligence<\/em>. In this reconciliation the highest demand of <em>cognition<\/em> and of the concept must be met, for these can give up nothing of their dignity. But just as little can anything be conceded of the <em>absolute content<\/em> and it be drawn down into finitude, and over against it the finite form of knowing must give itself up.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the Christian religion, however, the need for this reconciliation had to come forth more than in the other religions. For<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b1) it itself begins from <em>absolute division<\/em> and starts from pain, in tearing apart the natural unity of spirit and destroying natural peace. Man appears in it as evil from the outset, and is thus<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 26]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s26\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 26\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|26|<\/span> in his innermost something negative with himself, and spirit, as it is driven back into itself, finds itself divided against the infinite, absolute essence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b2) <em>Reconciliation<\/em>, the need for which is heightened to the utmost, appears first for <em>faith<\/em>, but not in such a way that this can be only an <em>unselfconscious<\/em> faith. For spirit is <em>turned into itself against its immediate naturalness<\/em>; as sinful it is <em>something other as against the truth<\/em>, removed from it, <em>alienated<\/em> from it. I, placed into this separation, am not the truth, and this is therefore given as an <em>independent content of representation<\/em>, and the truth is at first represented on authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b3) But if I am thereby placed into an intellectual world in which the nature of God, the determinations and modes of action of God are offered to cognition, and whether it really is so rests on the intuition and assurance of others, I am nevertheless at the same time referred <em>into myself<\/em>, since <em>in me there is thinking<\/em>, cognition, reason, and my <em>freedom<\/em> is set before my eyes in sinfulness and in reflection on it. <em>Cognition<\/em> therefore lies in the Christian religion itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the Christian religion I am to keep my freedom, or rather to become free in it. In it the subject, the salvation of the soul, the rescue of the single individual as single individual, not only the species, is an essential end. This subjectivity, <em>selfhood<\/em> (not selfishness), is precisely the principle of cognition itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Because it now stands in the principle of cognition, the Christian religion gives its content <em>development<\/em>, for the representations about the universal object are immediately or in themselves <em>thoughts<\/em> and must spread themselves out as such. On the other hand, however, because the content is essentially for representation, it is separated from immediate opinion and intuition; it goes through separation. In short, it counts as against subjectivity as an absolute content that is in and for itself. The Christian religion therefore<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 27]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s27\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 27\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|27|<\/span> itself touches on the <em>opposition<\/em> of feeling, of immediate intuition, and of reflection and knowing. It has cognition essentially within itself and has occasioned it to develop in its whole consistency as <em>form<\/em> and as a <em>world of form<\/em>, and thereby at the same time to set itself against the form in which that content is as <em>given truth<\/em>. On this rests the discord of our time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So far we have considered the development of the oppositions still in the form where they have not yet developed into actual philosophy or still stand outside it. The question therefore arises first: 1. How does philosophy in general relate to religion, 2. how does the philosophy of religion relate to philosophy, and what is 3. the relationship of the philosophical consideration of religion to positive religion?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-ii-die-stellung-der-religionsphilosophie-zur-philo\">II. The Position of the Philosophy of Religion in Relation to Philosophy and to Religion<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Cross-reference:<\/em> Art, religion and philosophy as the three modes in which spirit knows itself: <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/341\/\">\u00a7 341<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/360\/\">\u00a7 360<\/a>; worked out in the <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/encyclopaedia-absolute-spirit\/\">Encyclopaedia, \u00a7\u00a7 553\u2013577<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-1-verhaeltnis-der-philosophie-zur-religion-ueberha\">1. The Relationship of Philosophy to Religion in General<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When we said above that philosophy makes religion the object of its consideration, and when now this <em>consideration<\/em> seems to have the position of being different from its object, it seems that we still stand in that relationship where both sides are independent of each other and remain separated. In the relationship of this consideration we would then step out of that region of devotion and enjoyment which religion is, and the object and the consideration, as the movement of thought, would be as different as, e.g., the spatial figures in mathematics are different from the spirit considering them. But that is only the relationship as it first appears, when cognition still stands in that division with the religious side and is <em>finite<\/em> cognition. Rather, if we only look more closely, it turns out that<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 28]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s28\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 28\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|28|<\/span> in fact the content, the need and the interest of philosophy are shared in common with those of religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The object of religion as of philosophy is <em>the eternal truth<\/em> in its objectivity itself, God and nothing but God and the explication of God. Philosophy is not worldly wisdom, but cognition of the <em>non-worldly<\/em>; not cognition of the external mass, of empirical existence and life, but cognition of what is eternal, of what God is and what flows from his nature. For this nature must reveal and develop itself. Philosophy therefore explicates only itself in explicating religion, and in explicating itself it explicates religion. As occupation with the eternal truth that is in and for itself, and indeed as the occupation of thinking spirit, not of arbitrariness and particular interest, with this object, it is the same activity that religion is; and as philosophizing, spirit sinks itself with equal liveliness into this object and likewise renounces its particularity in penetrating its object, as religious consciousness does, which also wants to have nothing of its own, but only to sink itself into this content.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thus religion and philosophy coincide in one; philosophy is in fact itself worship, is religion, for it is the same renunciation of subjective notions and opinions in the occupation with God. Philosophy is thus identical with religion; but the difference is that it is so in a <em>peculiar way<\/em>, distinct from the way that is usually called religion as such. What they have in common is to be religion; what distinguishes them falls only into the kind and manner of religion. In this peculiarity of the occupation with God the two differ. But therein lie the difficulties, which seem so great that it is even held to be impossible that philosophy could be one with religion. Hence the apprehension<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 29]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s29\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 29\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|29|<\/span> of theology towards philosophy, the hostile position of religion and philosophy. According to this hostile position (as which theology takes it), philosophy seems to have a corrupting, destroying, desecrating effect on the content of religion, and its occupation with God seems to be absolutely different from religion. That is this old opposition and contradiction which we already see among the Greeks; among the Athenians, this free, democratic people, writings were burned, Socrates [was] condemned to death. Now, however, this opposition counts as acknowledged, and more so than the unity of religion and philosophy just asserted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But as old as this opposition is, so old too is the linking of philosophy and religion. Already for the Neopythagoreans and Neoplatonists, who still stood within the pagan world, the gods of the people were not gods of fantasy, but had become gods of thought. Then that linking took place among the most eminent of the Church Fathers, who in their religiosity behaved essentially in a comprehending way, starting from the presupposition that theology is religion with thinking, comprehending consciousness. To their philosophical cultivation the Christian church owes the first beginnings of a content of Christian doctrine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This union of religion and philosophy was carried through still further in the Middle Ages. People believed so little that comprehending cognition was harmful to faith that they held it to be essential for the further development of faith itself. These great men, Anselm, Abelard, developed the determinations of faith further from philosophy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cognition, as it built its world over against religion, had made only the <em>finite content<\/em> its own; but as it has developed further into true philosophy, it has the same content as religion. If we now look provisionally for the <em>difference<\/em> between religion and philosophy as<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 30]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s30\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 30\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|30|<\/span> it comes forth in this <em>unity of content<\/em>, it is the following.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">a) Speculative philosophy is the consciousness of the Idea, such that everything is grasped as Idea; the Idea, however, is the true in thought, not in mere intuition or representation. The true in thought is, more precisely, this: that <em>it is concrete<\/em>, <em>posited as divided within itself<\/em>, and indeed in such a way that the two sides of what is divided are <em>opposed determinations of thought<\/em>, as whose <em>unity<\/em> the <em>Idea<\/em> must be grasped. To think speculatively means to dissolve something actual and to oppose it to itself in such a way that the differences are opposed according to determinations of thought and the object is grasped as the unity of both. Our intuition has the whole of the object before it; our reflection distinguishes, grasps different sides, recognizes a manifoldness in them and divides them. In these differences reflection does not hold fast their <em>unity<\/em>; it forgets at one time the whole, at another the differences, and when it has both before it, it nevertheless separates the properties from the object and places both in such a way that that in which both are one becomes a <em>third<\/em> that is <em>different<\/em> from the object and the properties. With mechanical objects, which fall into externality, this relationship can take place: the object is only the dead substrate for the differences, and the quality of its being one is the collection of external aggregates. In the true object, however, which is not merely an aggregate, an externally assembled plurality, the object is one with the distinguished determinations, and it is only speculation that grasps the <em>unity<\/em> <em>in the opposition<\/em> itself as such. That is in general the business of speculation: to grasp all objects of pure thought, of nature and of spirit in the form of thought and thus as <em>unity of difference<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">b) Religion is now itself a standpoint of consciousness of the true that is in and for itself; it is thus the stage<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 31]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s31\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 31\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|31|<\/span> of spirit on which the <em>speculative content<\/em> in general is <em>object<\/em> for consciousness. Religion is not consciousness of this or that truth in single objects, but of the absolutely true, of it as the universal, the all-embracing, outside which nothing more lies. The content of its consciousness is further the universally true, which is in and for itself, determines itself and is not determined from outside. Whereas the finite needs an other for its determinacy, the true has its determinacy, its limit, its end within itself; it is not limited by an other, but the other falls within it. This speculative element is what comes to consciousness in religion. In every other sphere truth is indeed contained, but not the highest, absolute truth, for this is only in the <em>complete universality of determination<\/em> and in being determined in and for itself, which is not simple determinacy over against an other, but contains the other, the difference, within itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">c) Religion is now this speculative element, as it were, as a <em>state of consciousness<\/em> whose sides are not <em>simple determinations of thought<\/em>, but <em>concretely filled<\/em> ones. These moments can be none other than the <em>moment of thinking, active universality<\/em>, the efficacy of thinking, and actuality as <em>immediate<\/em>, <em>particular self-consciousness<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">While in philosophy the hardness of these two sides is lost through <em>reconciliation in thought<\/em>, because <em>both sides are thoughts<\/em>, not the one pure universal thinking and the other empirical, single character, religion comes to the enjoyment of unity only by lifting these two hard extremes out of division, working on them and joining them together. But by religion stripping its extremes of the form of division, making the opposition fluid in the element of universality and bringing it to reconciliation,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 32]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s32\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 32\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|32|<\/span> it always remains akin to thought in form and movement as well, and philosophy, as thinking that is absolutely active and unites the opposition, has moved immediately close to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The thinking consideration of religion has now raised the determinate moments of religion themselves to thoughts, and the question arises how this <em>thinking consideration of religion<\/em>, as <em>a member in the system of philosophy<\/em>, relates to philosophy in general.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-2-verhaeltnis-der-religionsphilosophie-zum-system\">2. The Relationship of the Philosophy of Religion to the System of Philosophy<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">a) In philosophy the highest is called the absolute, the <em>Idea<\/em>; it is superfluous to go further back here and mention that in Wolffian philosophy this highest was called <em>ens<\/em>, thing; for that at once announces itself as such an abstraction that corresponds too little to our representation of God. The absolute in more recent philosophy is not so full of abstraction, but it is not on that account yet synonymous with what we call God. To make the difference itself noticeable, we must first consider what <em>meaning<\/em> itself means. When we ask: what does this or that mean?, two things are asked about, and indeed opposite things. First we call what we intend the sense, the purpose, the universal thought of that expression, work of art etc.; we ask about the inner. This is what we want to bring to representation; it is the <em>thought<\/em>. When we thus ask: what is God? what does the expression God mean?, we want the thought; the representation we already have. Accordingly it has the meaning that the concept is to be stated, and so the <em>concept<\/em> is the meaning; it is the absolute, the nature of God grasped in thought, the logical knowing of him, that we want to have. This is the one meaning of meaning, and to that extent what we<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 33]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s33\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 33\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|33|<\/span> call the absolute is synonymous with the expression God.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">b) But we also ask in a second sense, which demands the opposite. When we begin from pure determinations of thought and not from representation, it can be that spirit does not find itself satisfied in them, is not at home in them, and asks what this pure determination of thought is supposed to mean. Thus, e.g., there occurs the determination of unity of the subjective and objective, of unity of the real and ideal; one can understand each by itself, know what unity, objective, subjective etc. is, and yet one can very well say that one does not understand this determination. When we ask in such a case, the meaning is the opposite of before. Namely, here a representation of the determination of thought is demanded, an example of the content that was previously given only in thought. When we find a content of thought difficult, the difficulty lies in our having no representation of it; through the example it becomes clear to us; only thus is spirit present to itself in this content.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If we now begin from the representation of God, the philosophy of religion has to consider its meaning, that God is the Idea, the absolute, the essence grasped in thought and concept, and it has this in common with <em>logical philosophy<\/em>; the logical Idea is God as he is in himself. But God is this: not only to be in himself; he is just as essentially for himself, absolute spirit, which is not only the essence keeping itself in thought, but also the essence that <em>appears<\/em>, that gives itself <em>objectivity<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">c) Thus, considering the <em>Idea of God<\/em> in the philosophy of religion, we at the same time also have before us the <em>mode of his representation<\/em>: he represents only himself to himself. This is the side of the <em>existence<\/em> of the absolute. In the philosophy of religion we thus have the absolute as object, but not merely in the form of thought, but also in the form of its<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 34]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s34\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 34\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|34|<\/span> manifestation. The universal Idea is therefore to be grasped in the absolutely concrete meaning of <em>essentiality<\/em> in general as well as of its activity of setting itself out, of <em>appearing<\/em>, of <em>revealing<\/em> itself. We say popularly: God is the Lord of the natural world and of the realm of spirits; he <em>is<\/em> the absolute harmony of both and what produces and activates this harmony. Here neither thought and concept is lacking nor the manifestation of it, its existence. This side of existence, however, is itself in turn (since we are in philosophy) to be grasped in thought.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Philosophy thus considers the absolute first as logical Idea, the Idea as it is in thought, as its content is itself the determinations of thought. Further it shows the absolute in its activity, in its productions; and this is the way of the absolute to become for itself, to become spirit, and God is thus the result of philosophy, of which it is recognized that it is not merely the result, but eternally produces itself, is what precedes. The one-sidedness of the result is sublated in the result itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nature, finite spirit, the world of consciousness, of intelligence and of the will are embodiments of the divine Idea, but they are determinate configurations, particular modes of the appearance of the Idea, configurations in which the Idea has not yet broken through to itself so as to be as absolute spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the philosophy of religion, however, we consider the logical Idea that is in itself not merely as it [is] determined as pure thought, nor in the finite determinations where it is in a finite mode of its appearance, but as it is <em>in itself<\/em> in thought and at the same time as it appears, manifests itself, but in the infinite appearance as spirit, which reflects itself into itself; spirit that does not appear <em>is<\/em> not. In this determination of appearance <em>finite<\/em> appearance too &#8211; that is the world of nature and the world of finite spirit &#8211; is contained;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 35]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s35\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 35\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|35|<\/span> but spirit is as their power, as producing them from itself and itself from them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is the position of the philosophy of religion in relation to the other parts of philosophy. God is the result of the other parts; here this end is made the beginning, our particular object, as absolutely concrete <em>Idea<\/em> with its <em>infinite appearance<\/em>, &#8211; and this determination concerns the <em>content<\/em> of the philosophy of religion. But we consider this content with thinking reason; and this concerns the form and leads us to the position of the philosophy of religion in relation to religion as it appears as <em>positive religion<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-3-verhaeltnis-der-religionsphilosophie-zur-positiv\">3. The Relationship of the Philosophy of Religion to Positive Religion<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is well known that the faith of the church, more precisely of the Protestant church, is fixed as a <em>system of doctrine<\/em>. This content has universally counted as truth; and as the determination of what God is and what man is in relation to God, it has been called the <em>Credo<\/em>, in the subjective sense what is believed, and objectively [that] which is to be known as content in the Christian community and as which God has revealed himself. As a common fixed doctrine this content is laid down partly in the Apostles\u2019 Creed, partly in the later symbolic books. In this the determination held in the Protestant church that the Bible is the essential foundation of doctrine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">a) In the cognition and determination of the content of doctrine <em>reason<\/em> has now asserted itself as <em>argumentation<\/em>. At first, to be sure, this still happened in such a way that the content of doctrine and the Bible as its positive foundation were to remain standing and thinking, as <em>exegesis<\/em>, was only to take up the thoughts of the Bible. But in fact the understanding had fixed its views, its thoughts, for itself beforehand, and then it was looked to see how the words of Scripture could be explained accordingly. The words of the Bible are a discourse that<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 36]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s36\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 36\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|36|<\/span> is not systematic; they are Christianity as it appeared at the beginning; it is spirit that grasps and explicates the content. Through this exegesis consulting reason it has now come about that a so-called theology of reason has arisen, which is opposed to that doctrinal system of the church, partly by itself, partly by that to which it opposes itself. In this exegesis takes over the written word, interprets it and claims only to assert the <em>understanding of the word<\/em>, to want to remain faithful to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But whether the Bible has been taken as the basis more for honour\u2019s sake or in fact in complete earnest, the nature of interpretative explanation brings it with it that thought has its say in it; thought contains for itself determinations, principles, presuppositions, which then assert themselves in the business of interpreting. If interpretation is not merely explanation of words but explanation of sense, it must bring its own thoughts into the underlying word. Mere interpretation of words can only be such that for one word another of equal scope is put; but in explaining, further determinations of thought are connected with it, for a development is progress to further thoughts; seemingly one stays with the sense, but in fact one develops further thoughts. The commentaries on the Bible do not so much acquaint us with the content of Scripture as contain rather the mode of representation of their time. It is indeed supposed to be stated what sense the word contains; but stating the sense means drawing the sense out into <em>consciousness<\/em>, <em>into representation<\/em>, and the <em>otherwise determined representation<\/em> then asserts itself in the presentation of what the sense is supposed to be. It is the case even with the presentation of a philosophical system already developed in itself, e.g. that of Plato or Aristotle, that the presentations turn out differently according to the mode of representation, already determined in itself, of those who undertake them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 37]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s37\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 37\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|37|<\/span> From Scripture, therefore, the most opposed opinions have been proved exegetically by theology, and so this so-called Holy Scripture has been made into a nose of wax. All heresies have, together with the church, appealed to Scripture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">b) The theology of reason that arose in this way did not, however, stop at keeping itself only as exegesis still on the ground of the Bible; rather, as <em>free cognition<\/em>, it gave itself a relationship to religion and to its content in general. In this more universal relationship the occupation and the result can be none other than that cognition takes possession of everything that is something <em>determinate<\/em> on the side of religion. The doctrine of God goes on, namely, to determinations, to properties, actions of God. Of this determinate content cognition takes possession and shows that it <em>belongs to it<\/em>. It grasps the <em>infinite<\/em> on the one hand <em>in its finite way<\/em> as something <em>determinate<\/em>, as an <em>abstract<\/em> infinite, and then finds on the other hand that all particular properties are <em>inadequate<\/em> to this infinite. It thereby annihilates the religious content in its way and makes the absolute object completely poor. The finite and determinate that it has drawn into its circle does indeed point, for this cognition, to a <em>beyond<\/em>, but this beyond it itself grasps in a <em>finite<\/em> way, as an <em>abstract<\/em>, <em>highest being<\/em>, to which no character at all belongs. The Enlightenment &#8211; for this is the completion of finite cognition just described &#8211; thinks it places God really high when it calls him the infinite, for which all predicates are inadequate and unjustified anthropomorphisms. In reality, however, when it grasps him as the highest being, it has made God hollow, empty and poor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">c) If it now seems that the philosophy of religion finds itself on the same ground as this theology of reason of the Enlightenment and thus in the same opposition against the content of religion, this is a semblance that at once dissolves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 38]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s38\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 38\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|38|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b1) For by that rational consideration of religion, which was only abstract metaphysics of the understanding, God was grasped as an abstraction, which is empty ideality and which the finite confronts externally; and so on this standpoint too <em>morality<\/em>, as a particular science, made up the knowledge of what fell on the side of the actual <em>subject<\/em> with regard to acting and conduct. The side of man\u2019s relation to God stood separated for itself. Thinking reason, on the other hand, which no longer keeps itself abstract, but starts from man\u2019s faith in the dignity of his spirit and is driven by the courage of truth and freedom, grasps the truth as something <em>concrete<\/em>, as fullness of content, as ideality in which <em>determinacy<\/em>, the finite, is contained as a moment. God is therefore not the empty for it, but spirit; and this determination of spirit does not remain for it only a word or a superficial determination; rather the nature of spirit develops for it in that it recognizes God essentially as the triune God. Thus God is grasped as making himself the object of himself, and then the object in this distinction remains identical with God; God loves himself in it. Without this determination of the <em>Trinity<\/em> God would not be spirit and spirit an empty word. But if God is grasped as spirit, this concept includes the <em>subjective<\/em> side within itself or develops itself into it, and the philosophy of religion, as thinking consideration of religion, encompasses the entire <em>determinate<\/em> content of religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b2) As regards, however, that form of thinking consideration which holds to the <em>word of Holy Scripture<\/em> and claims to explain it with reason, the philosophy of religion stands only seemingly on common ground with it as well. For that consideration, by its own sovereign authority, lays <em>its<\/em> argumentations at the basis of Christian doctrine, and even if it still lets the biblical words stand, particular opinion nevertheless remains the<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 39]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s39\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 39\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|39|<\/span> main determination, to which the presupposed biblical truth must submit. That argumentation therefore <em>keeps<\/em> <em>its presuppositions<\/em> and moves in the relationships of the understanding proper to reflection, without these being subjected to a critique. The philosophy of religion, however, as rational cognition, is opposed to the arbitrariness of this argumentation and is the <em>reason of the universal<\/em>, which presses for unity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Philosophy is therefore so far from being found on the common highway of that theology of reason and of this exegetical argumentation that these tendencies rather contest it most and try to cast suspicion on it. They protest against philosophy, but only in order to reserve for themselves the arbitrariness of their argumentation. They call philosophy something <em>particular<\/em>, whereas it is nothing but rational, truly universal thinking. They regard philosophy as something ghostlike, of which one does not know what it is, about which there is something altogether uncanny; but with this representation they only show that they find it more comfortable to stop at their irregular, arbitrary reflections, which philosophy does not let count. Those theologians who move with their argumentations in exegesis, and appeal to the Bible for all their notions when they deny the possibility of cognition against philosophy, have indeed gone so far and so degraded the authority of the Bible that, if it were so and according to correct explanation of the Bible no cognition of the nature of God were possible, spirit would have to look round for another source in order to gain a truth rich in content.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b3) In the manner of that metaphysics of the understanding and of argumentative exegesis, therefore, the philosophy of religion cannot stand opposed to positive religion and to the doctrine of the church that has still preserved its content. It will rather turn out that it stands infinitely closer to positive doctrine than appears at first sight, indeed that the<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 40]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s40\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 40\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|40|<\/span> restoration of the church doctrine reduced by the understanding to the minimum is so much its work that, precisely because of this its true content, it is decried by the merely understanding theology of reason as an obscuring of spirit. The anxiety of the understanding and its hatred of philosophy come from the apprehension that it sees that philosophy leads its reflecting back to the ground, i.e. to the affirmative in which it perishes, and yet arrives at a content, at a cognition of the nature of God, after all content already seemed to have been sublated. Every content appears to this negative tendency as a darkening of spirit, whereas it only wants to remain in the night that it calls enlightenment and there must indeed hold the ray of the light of cognition to be hostile.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here it may suffice to remark about the supposed opposition of the philosophy of religion and positive religion only that there cannot be <em>two kinds of reason<\/em> and <em>two kinds of spirit<\/em>, not a divine reason and a human one, not a divine spirit and a human one, that would be <em>absolutely different<\/em>. Human reason, the consciousness of its essence, is reason in general, the divine in man; and spirit, insofar as it is the spirit of God, is not a spirit beyond the stars, beyond the world, but God is present, omnipresent and as spirit in all spirits. God is a living God, who is effective and active. Religion is a product of the divine spirit, not an invention of man, but a work of divine working and producing in him. The expression that God governs the world as <em>reason<\/em> would be <em>without reason<\/em> if we did not assume that it also relates to religion and that the divine spirit works in its determination and configuration. To this spirit, however, the development of reason accomplished in thinking is not opposed, and it can thus not be absolutely<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 41]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s41\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 41\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|41|<\/span> different from his work which he has produced in religion. The more man in rational thinking lets the matter itself hold sway in him, renounces his particularity, relates himself as <em>universal<\/em> consciousness, the less his reason seeks its own in the sense of something particular, the less will it fall into that opposition; for it, <em>reason<\/em>, is itself the <em>matter<\/em>, spirit, the divine spirit. The church or the theologians may disdain this succour or take it amiss when their doctrine is made rational; they can even reject with proud irony the efforts of philosophy, when these are not directed with hostility against religion but rather want to fathom its truth, and mock the \u201cmade\u201d truth. But this disdain no longer helps and is vanity once the need of cognition and its discord with religion has awakened. Then insight has its rights, which can in no way be refused any longer, and the triumph of cognition is the reconciliation of the opposition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Although philosophy as philosophy of religion distinguishes itself so much from the tendencies of the understanding that are at bottom hostile to religion and is by no means so ghostlike a thing as it is usually represented to be, we nevertheless still today see the strongest opposition of philosophy and religion set up as the shibboleth of the age. All the principles of religious consciousness that have developed at present &#8211; however much their forms may differ from one another &#8211; agree in this, that they are hostile to philosophy, seek in any case to keep it from occupying itself with religion; and so it is still our business to consider philosophy in its relationship to these <em>principles of the age<\/em>. We have all the more reason to promise ourselves success from this consideration because it will turn out that, for all that hostility to philosophy, though it may come from ever so many sides, indeed from almost all sides of present consciousness, the time has nevertheless now<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 42]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s42\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 42\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|42|<\/span> come when philosophy can occupy itself with religion partly in an unprejudiced, partly in a happy and fruitful way. For those opponents are either those forms of divided consciousness that we considered above; they stand partly on the standpoint of the metaphysics of the understanding, for which God is something empty and the content has vanished, partly on the standpoint of feeling, which after the loss of the absolute content has withdrawn into its empty inwardness, but agrees with that metaphysics in the result that every determination is inadequate to the eternal content &#8211; for it is only an abstraction. Or we shall even see how the assertions of the opponents of philosophy contain nothing other than what philosophy contains as its principle and as the foundation of its principle. This contradiction, that the opponents of philosophy are the opponents of religion overcome by it, and that they nevertheless possess in themselves the principle of philosophical cognition in their reflections, is grounded in the fact that they are the historical <em>element<\/em> out of which completed philosophical thinking has taken shape.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-iii-das-verhaeltnis-der-philosophie-der-religion-z\">III. The Relationship of the Philosophy of Religion to the Principles of the Age in Religious Consciousness<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If philosophy in our time is met with hostility because of its occupation with religion, this can admittedly not surprise us, given the general character of the age. Everyone who attempts to concern himself with the cognition of God and to comprehend his nature in thought must be prepared for people either to pay no heed to it or to turn and band together against him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The more the cognition of <em>finite things<\/em> has spread, the extent of the sciences having become almost boundless and all domains of knowledge having been extended beyond survey, the more has the circle of<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 43]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s43\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 43\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|43|<\/span> knowledge <em>of God<\/em> narrowed. There was a time when all knowledge was science of God. Our time, by contrast, has the distinction of knowing about each and every thing, about an infinite multitude of objects, only nothing of God. Formerly spirit had its highest interest in knowing of God and fathoming his nature; it had and found no rest but in this occupation; it felt unhappy if it could not satisfy this need; the spiritual struggles that the cognition of God calls forth within were the highest that spirit knew and experienced in itself, and every other interest and cognition was held in low esteem. Our time has calmed this need, its labours and struggles; we have <em>finished<\/em> with it, and it is <em>done with<\/em>. What Tacitus said of the ancient Germans, that they were <em>securi adversus deos<\/em>, we have again become with regard to cognition: <em>securi adversus deum<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It no longer grieves our age to know nothing of God; rather it counts as the highest insight that this cognition is not even possible. What the Christian religion declares to be the highest, absolute commandment, \u201cYou shall know God\u201d, counts as a folly. Christ says: \u201cYou shall be perfect, as your Father in heaven is perfect\u201d<sup><a href=\"#vpr1-fn1\" id=\"vpr1-fnr1\">1)<\/a><\/sup>, &#8211; this lofty demand is an empty sound to the wisdom of our time. It has made of God an infinite ghost that is far from us, and likewise of human cognition a vain ghost of finitude or a mirror into which only shadows, only appearances fall. How, then, are we still to respect the commandment and grasp its sense when it says: \u201cYou shall be perfect, as your Father in heaven is perfect\u201d, since we know nothing of the perfect, our knowing and willing are referred solely and entirely to <em>appearance<\/em>, and truth is supposed to be and remain absolutely only a beyond?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"vpr1-fn1\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\"><a href=\"#vpr1-fnr1\">1)<\/a> <em>Werkausgabe:<\/em> Matth. 5, 48<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 44]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s44\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 44\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|44|<\/span> And what, we must further ask, what else would be worth the trouble of comprehending, if God is incomprehensible?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This standpoint must be regarded, as to its <em>content<\/em>, as the last stage of the <em>abasement<\/em> of man, in which he is admittedly all the more arrogant at the same time, since he believes he has proved this abasement to be the highest and his true determination. But although such a standpoint is directly opposed to the great nature of the Christian religion &#8211; for according to it we are to know God, his nature and his essence, and to esteem this cognition as the very highest; the difference whether this knowing is brought about through faith, authority, revelation or through reason is indifferent here -, although this standpoint has thus finished with the content that revelation gives of the divine nature just as much as with the rational, it has nevertheless, in all its low ramifications, in the blind presumption peculiar to it, not shrunk from turning against philosophy, which is after all the <em>liberation of spirit<\/em> from that disgraceful abasement and has drawn religion forth again from the stage of deepest suffering that it had to undergo on that standpoint. Even the theologians who are at home only in that stage of vanity have dared to accuse philosophy of its <em>destructive<\/em> tendency, theologians who <em>no longer possess anything of the substance<\/em> <em>that could be destroyed<\/em>. To reject these objections, which are not only unfounded but still more frivolous and unscrupulous, we need only look briefly at how the theologians have rather done everything to dissolve the <em>determinate<\/em> element of religion, in that 1. they have pushed the dogmas into the background or declared them <em>indifferent<\/em>, or 2. regard them only as <em>alien determinations of others<\/em> and as <em>mere appearances of a past history<\/em>. When we have thus reflected on the side of the <em>content<\/em> and seen how philosophy<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 45]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s45\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 45\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|45|<\/span> restores it and secures it against the devastations of theology, we shall 3. reflect on the <em>form<\/em> of that standpoint and see here how the tendency that is hostile to philosophy from the side of form is so <em>ignorant<\/em> of itself that it does not even know how in itself it contains precisely the <em>principle<\/em> of philosophy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-1-die-philosophie-und-die-gegenwaertige-gleichguel\">1. Philosophy and the Present Indifference to Determinate Dogmas<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If, then, the reproach is made to philosophy in its relationship to religion that the content of the doctrine of revealed positive religion, expressly of the Christian, is degraded by it, that it destroys and corrupts the dogmas of the Christian religion, this obstacle has been cleared out of the way, and indeed by recent theology itself. Very few dogmas of the earlier system of the church confessions have been left with the importance formerly attributed to them, and no other dogmas have been put in their place. One can easily convince oneself, if one considers what the church dogmas really count for now, that in general religiosity a far-reaching, almost <em>universal indifference<\/em> has set in towards doctrines of faith formerly held to be essential. A few examples will show this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Christ is indeed still made the centre of faith as mediator, reconciler and redeemer; but what was formerly called the work of redemption has received a very prosaic and merely psychological meaning, so that precisely the essential was extinguished from the old church doctrine, even if the edifying words were retained.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cGreat energy of character, steadfastness in the conviction for which he did not value his life\u201d &#8211; these are the general categories through which Christ is drawn down to the ground, not indeed of ordinary, everyday, but nevertheless of<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 46]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s46\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 46\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|46|<\/span> human action in general and of moral intentions, into the circle of a mode of action of which pagans like Socrates too were capable. Even if for many Christ is the centre of faith and devotion in a deeper sense, the whole of what is Christian restricts itself to this direction of devotion, and the important doctrines of the Trinity, of the resurrection of the body, the miracles in the Old and New Testament are neglected as indifferent and have lost their importance. The divinity of Christ, the dogmatic, what is peculiar to the Christian religion, is set aside or reduced to something merely universal. Indeed, this has happened not only on the side of the Enlightenment, but happens even on the part of the <em>more pious theologians<\/em>. The Trinity, they say together with the former, came into Christian doctrine from the Alexandrian school, from the Neoplatonists. But even if it must be admitted that the Church Fathers studied Greek philosophy, it is first of all indifferent where that doctrine came from; the only question is whether it is <em>true in and for itself<\/em>; but that is not investigated, and yet that doctrine is the basic determination of the Christian religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If a large part of these theologians were induced to say, hand on heart, whether they hold faith in the Trinity to be indispensably necessary for salvation, whether they believe that the absence of faith in it leads to damnation, there can be no doubt what the answer is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Even eternal blessedness and eternal damnation are words one may not use in good society; they count as \u1f04\u03f1\u03f1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1, as things one shrinks from uttering. Even if one does not want to deny the matter, one will find oneself embarrassed if one were expressly induced to declare oneself affirmatively.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the doctrines of faith of these theologians one will find<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 47]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s47\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 47\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|47|<\/span> that the dogmas have become very thin and shrunk with them, even if many words are otherwise made.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If one takes up a multitude of devotional books, collections of sermons, in which the foundations of the Christian religion are supposed to be set forth, and one is to judge the majority of these writings in conscience and say whether one finds in a large part of this literature the basic doctrines of Christianity contained and pronounced in the orthodox sense without ambiguity and back door, the answer is likewise not doubtful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It seems that the theologians themselves, given the general education of most of them, attach the importance formerly attached to the main doctrines of positive Christianity, when they also counted for it, only when these doctrines are placed in a fog by an indeterminate semblance. If, then, philosophy always counted as the opponent of church doctrines, it can no longer be an opponent, since in general conviction the doctrines no longer count which it seemed to threaten with ruin. On this side, then, a large part of the danger should be removed for philosophy when it considers those dogmas comprehendingly, and it can behave more freely with regard to the dogmas that have sunk so much in interest with the theologians themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-2-die-historische-behandlung-der-dogmen\">2. The Historical Treatment of the Dogmas<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The greatest sign, however, that the importance of these dogmas has sunk shows itself to us in the fact that they are mainly treated historically and placed in the relationship of being convictions that belong to <em>others<\/em>, of being histories that do not take place <em>in our spirit<\/em> itself, do not lay claim to the need of our spirit. What is of interest is how matters stand with others, how they came about with others, &#8211; this contingent<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 48]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s48\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 48\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|48|<\/span> origin and appearance; at the question what conviction one has oneself, one is astonished.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>absolute mode of origin<\/em> from the depth of spirit, and thus the necessity, truth of these doctrines, which they also have for <em>our<\/em> spirit, is pushed aside in the historical treatment: it is occupied with these doctrines with much zeal and learning, but not with the content, but with the externality of the disputes about them and with the passions that have attached themselves to this external mode of origin. There theology is placed low enough by itself. If the <em>cognition of religion<\/em> is grasped only <em>historically<\/em>, we must regard the theologians who have brought it to this conception as clerks in a trading house, who keep books and accounts only of others\u2019 wealth, who act only for others without getting any property of their own; they do receive a salary, but their merit is only to serve and to register what is the property of others. Such theology is no longer at all in the field of thought; it no longer has to do with infinite thought in and for itself, but with it only as a <em>finite fact<\/em>, opinion, representation and so on. History occupies itself with truths that <em>were<\/em> truths, namely for <em>others<\/em>, not with such as would be the property of those who occupy themselves with them. With the true content, with the cognition of God, those theologians have nothing to do at all. As little as the blind man sees the painting, even if he feels the frame, so little do they know of God. They only know how a certain dogma was laid down by this or that council, what reasons the members of such a council had for it, how this or that view came to dominate. One is always dealing with religion here, and yet it is not religion itself that comes into consideration. They tell us much about the history of the painter of a painting, about the fate of the painting itself, what price it had at different times,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 49]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s49\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 49\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|49|<\/span> into whose hands it came, but of the painting itself they let us see nothing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In philosophy and religion, however, what essentially matters is that spirit <em>itself<\/em> enter into inner relation with the very highest interest, not merely occupy itself with something alien to it, but draw its content from the essential and hold itself worthy of cognition. There man is concerned with the worth of his <em>own<\/em> spirit, and he may not humbly keep outside and loiter about at a distance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-3-die-philosophie-und-das-unmittelbare-wissen\">3. Philosophy and Immediate Knowing<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Cross-reference:<\/em> The appeal to feeling and immediate knowing is already opposed in the <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/\">Preface<\/a> of the <em>Groundlines<\/em>, likewise in the Remark to <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/270\/\">\u00a7 270<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If, because of the <em>contentlessness<\/em> of the standpoint considered, it could seem that we <em>mentioned<\/em> the reproaches it raises against philosophy only in order to declare expressly against it that we have the purpose, and do not give it up, of doing the opposite of what it holds to be the highest, namely to know God, it nevertheless has in its <em>form<\/em> a side where it must really have a <em>rational interest<\/em> for us, and on this side the recent position of theology is still more favourable to philosophy. For with the fact that all objective determinacy has collapsed into the <em>inwardness of subjectivity<\/em> is connected the conviction that God is <em>immediately revealed<\/em> in man, that religion is precisely this, that man knows immediately of God; this <em>immediate knowing<\/em> is called reason, also faith, but in a different sense from that in which the church takes faith. All knowing, all conviction, piety, it is now said on this standpoint, rests on this, that <em>in spirit as such the consciousness of God is immediately together with the consciousness of itself<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">a) This assertion in the direct sense, without its having given itself a polemical direction against philosophy, counts as one that needs no proof, no corroboration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 50]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s50\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 50\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|50|<\/span> This general representation, which has now become a prejudice, contains the determination that the highest, the religious content makes itself known <em>in spirit itself<\/em>, that spirit manifests itself in spirit, and indeed <em>in this my<\/em> spirit, that this faith has its source, its root, in my deepest ownness, and that it is what is most my own and as such inseparable from the consciousness of pure spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With the fact that knowing is immediately in myself, all <em>external authority<\/em>, all alien attestation is thrown away; what is to count for me must have its confirmation in my spirit, and for me to believe, the testimony of my spirit is required. It may well come from outside, but the external beginning is indifferent; if it is to count, this validity can form itself only on the foundation of everything true, <em>in the testimony of spirit<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This principle is the <em>simple principle of philosophical cognition itself<\/em>, and philosophy not only does not reject it, but it makes up a basic determination in philosophy itself. In this way it is altogether to be regarded as a gain, a kind of good fortune, that basic principles of philosophy itself live in general representation and have become general prejudices, so that the philosophical principle can all the more easily expect the assent of general culture. In this general disposition of the spirit of the age philosophy has therefore not only won an externally favourable position &#8211; it is never concerned with the external, least of all where it and the occupation with it themselves exist as an institution of the state -, but it is inwardly favoured when its principle already lives of itself in spirit and in minds as a presupposition. For it has this <em>in common<\/em> with that culture, that reason is the place of spirit where God reveals himself to man.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">b) But the principle of immediate knowing does not stop at this simple determinacy, this unprejudiced content, and does not express itself merely affirmatively, but<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 51]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s51\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 51\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|51|<\/span> comes forward <em>polemically against cognition<\/em> and is directed in particular against the cognition and comprehension of God: it is not only supposed to be believed and known immediately in this way; it is not only asserted that the consciousness of God is linked with self-consciousness, but that the relationship to God is <em>only<\/em> an immediate one. The immediacy of the connection is taken <em>exclusively against the other determination of mediation<\/em>, and it is then said of philosophy, because it is a mediated knowing, that it is only a finite knowing of the finite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Further, the immediacy of this knowing is supposed to stop at this, that one knows <em>that<\/em> God is, not <em>what<\/em> he is; the content, the fulfilment in the representation of God, is negated. We call it cognition when of an object it is known not only that it is, but also <em>what<\/em> it is, and when what it is is not only known in general in such a way that one has a certain acquaintance, certainty, of what it is, but the knowing of its determinations, its content, must be a <em>fulfilled<\/em>, confirmed knowing, in which the <em>necessity of the connection of these determinations<\/em> is known.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If we now consider more closely what lies in the assertion of immediate knowing, consciousness is supposed to relate to its content in <em>such<\/em> a way that it itself and this content, God, are inseparable. This relation in general, knowing of God and this inseparability of consciousness from this content, is what we call religion in general. But it also lies in that assertion that we are to stop at the consideration <em>of religion as such<\/em>, more precisely at the consideration of the <em>relation to God<\/em>, and that there is not to be progress to the cognition of God, not to the divine content as it would essentially be <em>in itself<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this sense it is further said: we can know only our relation to God, not what God himself is; and only our relation to God falls into what is called religion in general. Thereby it happens that today we<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 52]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s52\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 52\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|52|<\/span> hear only of religion, do not find investigations into what the nature of God, God in himself, is, how the nature of God must be determined. God as such is not himself made the object; knowing does not spread itself out within this object and does not point out distinguished determinations in it, so that he himself would be grasped as the relationship of these determinations and as <em>relationship within himself<\/em>. God is not before us as an object of cognition, but only our relation to God, <em>our relationship to him<\/em>; and while the expositions of the nature of God have become fewer and fewer, now it is only demanded that man should have religion, stay with religion, and that there should be no progress to a divine content.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">c) But if we take out what lies in the proposition of immediate knowing, what is immediately said with it, then precisely <em>God<\/em> is expressed <em>in relation to consciousness<\/em>, such that this relation is something <em>inseparable<\/em>, or that we must consider <em>both<\/em>. Thereby, first, the <em>essential difference<\/em> that the concept of religion contains &#8211; on the one side <em>subjective consciousness<\/em> and on the other <em>God as object in himself<\/em> &#8211; is acknowledged. At the same time, however, it is said that there is an <em>essential relation<\/em> between the two, and that it is this inseparable relation of religion that matters, not what one opines about God, what notions one has.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What this assertion contains as its proper true kernel is <em>the philosophical Idea itself<\/em>, except that this is held back by immediate knowing in a restriction that is dissolved by philosophy and shown in its one-sidedness and untruth. According to the philosophical concept God is spirit, concrete; and if we ask more precisely what spirit is, the basic concept of spirit is the one whose development is the whole doctrine of religion. Provisionally we can say that spirit is this: to manifest itself, <em>to be for spirit<\/em>. Spirit is<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 53]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s53\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 53\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|53|<\/span> for spirit, and indeed not only in an external, contingent way; rather it is spirit only insofar as it is for spirit; this makes up the concept of spirit itself. Or, to express it more theologically, God is essentially spirit insofar as he is in his community. It has been said that the world, the sensuous universe, must have spectators and be for spirit, &#8211; so God must be for spirit much more still.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The consideration can thus not be one-sided, merely a consideration of the subject according to its finitude, according to its contingent life, but insofar as it has the infinite, absolute object as its content. For if the <em>subject is considered for itself<\/em>, it is considered <em>in finite knowing<\/em>, in the knowing of the finite. Likewise, when it is asserted on the other side that God is not to be considered for himself, that one knows of God only <em>in relation to consciousness<\/em>, &#8211; then the <em>unity and inseparability of both determinations<\/em>, of the knowing of God and of self-consciousness, itself presupposes what is expressed in identity, and precisely in it the feared <em>identity<\/em> is contained.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In fact we thus see the basic philosophical concept present as a general <em>element<\/em> in the culture of the age, and it is shown here too how philosophy does not stand above its time in such a form that it would be something absolutely different from its general determinacy; rather <em>one<\/em> spirit goes through actuality and through philosophical thinking, except that this thinking is the <em>true self-understanding of the actual<\/em>. Or it is <em>one<\/em> movement by which the age and its philosophy are borne. The difference is only that the determinacy of the age still appears as present <em>contingently<\/em>, is not <em>justified<\/em>, and so can still stand <em>in an unreconciled<\/em>, <em>hostile relationship<\/em> to <em>truly essential<\/em> substance, whereas philosophy, as the justification of the principle, is also the <em>universal pacification and reconciliation<\/em>. As the Lutheran Reformation led <em>faith<\/em> back to the first<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 54]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s54\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 54\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|54|<\/span> centuries, so the principle of immediate knowing has led Christian <em>cognition<\/em> back to the <em>first elements<\/em>; but if this reduction at first still <em>volatilizes the essential content<\/em>, it is philosophy that recognizes this <em>principle<\/em> of immediate knowing itself as <em>content<\/em> and leads it on as such to its <em>true expansion within itself<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The unconsciousness, however, of what opposes philosophy goes beyond all bounds. Precisely assertions that regard themselves as contesting philosophy and think they are most sharply opposed to it show themselves, when one looks at their <em>content<\/em>, in themselves in agreement with what they combat. The result of the study of philosophy, by contrast, is that these dividing walls, which are supposed to separate absolutely, become transparent, that if one looks to the ground, one finds absolute agreement where one thinks there is the greatest opposition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-b-vorfragen\">B. Preliminary Questions<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Before going on to the treatment of our object itself, it seems indispensable to settle several <em>preliminary questions<\/em>, or rather to undertake investigations of them in the sense that it would first be made dependent on the result of these investigations whether such a treatment, a rational cognition of religion, is <em>possible<\/em> at all. The investigation of these questions and their answer seem indispensably necessary because they have mainly occupied the philosophical and popular interest of reflection in our time and because they concern the principles on which the views of the age about the religious content and about its cognition rest. At least, if we <em>omit<\/em> such an investigation, it will be necessary<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 55]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s55\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 55\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|55|<\/span> to show that this omission does not happen <em>contingently<\/em> and that we have the <em>right<\/em> to it, because the essential element of that investigation <em>falls within our science itself<\/em> and all those questions can be settled only in it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here, therefore, we have only to face the obstacles that the culture and view of the age considered so far set against the justification of knowing religion comprehendingly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">1. First, we do not have religion in general before us as object, but <em>positive<\/em> religion, of which it is acknowledged that it is given by God, which rests on more than human authority and therefore appears outside the range of human reason and elevated above it. The first obstacle in this respect is that we would first have to establish the competence and the capacity of reason to occupy itself with such truth and doctrine of a religion as is supposed to be withdrawn from the range of human reason. Comprehending cognition, however, does come and must come into relation with positive religion. It has indeed been said and is still said: positive religion is for itself; its doctrines we leave as they are, respect and esteem them; on the other side stand reason and comprehending thought, and <em>the two are not supposed to come into relation<\/em>, and reason is not supposed to relate to that doctrine. Formerly people wanted to reserve the freedom of philosophical investigation for themselves in this way. It was said that it was a matter for itself which was not supposed to do any harm to positive religion, and its result was then also, no doubt, subjected to the doctrine of positive religion. This position, however, we do not want to give our investigation. It is something false that both, faith and free philosophical investigation, could subsist calmly side by side. It is unfounded that faith in the content of positive religion can subsist when reason has convinced itself of the opposite; consistently and rightly, therefore, the church did not allow it to come about that reason<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 56]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s56\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 56\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|56|<\/span> could be opposed to faith and yet submit to it. The human spirit is not, in its innermost, something so divided that two things contradicting each other could subsist in it. If the <em>quarrel<\/em> between insight and religion has arisen, it leads, if it is not settled <em>in cognition<\/em>, to <em>despair<\/em>, which takes the place of reconciliation. This despair is <em>reconciliation carried through one-sidedly<\/em>. One throws away the one side, holds fast to the other alone, but does not thereby gain true peace. Either the spirit divided within itself then throws away <em>the demand of insight<\/em> and wants to return to unprejudiced religious feeling. But spirit can do this only if it does itself <em>violence<\/em>; for the independence of consciousness demands satisfaction, does not let itself be pushed away by force, and the healthy spirit is not able to want to renounce independent thinking. Religious feeling becomes <em>longing<\/em>, <em>hypocrisy<\/em>, and retains <em>the moment of non-satisfaction<\/em>. The other one-sidedness is <em>indifference towards religion<\/em>, which one either leaves as it is and lets rest, or finally combats. That is the consequence of shallow souls.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This, then, is the first preliminary question, according to which the right of reason to make such doctrine of religion its occupation is to be proved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">2. In the previous sphere it is only asserted that reason cannot know the truth of the nature of God; the possibility of knowing other truths is not denied it, only the highest truth is supposed to be unknowable for it. According to another assertion, however, reason is denied altogether the ability to know <em>truth in general<\/em>. It is asserted that cognition, when it relates to spirit in and for itself, to life, to the infinite, produces only errors, and that reason must renounce every claim to grasp anything of the infinite in an affirmative way; infinity is sublated by thinking, degraded to the finite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 57]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s57\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 57\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|57|<\/span> This result with regard to reason, the negation of reason, is even supposed to be a result of rational cognition itself. Accordingly one would first have to investigate reason itself as to whether the capacity to know God, and hence the possibility of a philosophy of religion, lies in it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">3. Connected with this is that the knowing of God is not supposed to be placed in comprehending reason, but that the consciousness of God springs only <em>from feeling<\/em> and the relationship of man to God lies only in the sphere of feeling and is not to be drawn over into thinking. If God is excluded from the domain of rational insight, of necessary, substantial subjectivity, then admittedly nothing remains but to assign him the domain of contingent subjectivity, that of feeling, and one must only be surprised that <em>objectivity<\/em> is still ascribed to God at all. In this the materialist views, or whatever else they may be called, the empirical, historical, naturalistic ones, have at least been more consistent: that, in thinking they have taken spirit and thinking for something material and traced them back to sensations, they have also taken God for a product of feeling and denied him objectivity; the result has then been atheism. God is thus a historical product of weakness, of fear, of joy or of selfish hope or greed and lust for power. What is rooted only in my feeling is only for me, mine, but not its own self, not independent in and for itself. Accordingly it seems necessary first to show that God does not merely have feeling as his root, is not merely <em>my<\/em> God. Earlier metaphysics therefore always proved first that a God is and not merely a feeling of God. So there is also the demand for the philosophy of religion to <em>prove God<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It may seem as if the other sciences had an advantage over philosophy in that their content is already<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 58]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s58\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 58\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|58|<\/span> acknowledged beforehand and that they are relieved of the proof of the being of their content. In arithmetic numbers, in geometry space, in medicine human bodies, illnesses are granted from the outset, and they are not expected to prove that there is, e.g., a space, bodies, illnesses. Philosophy in general therefore seemingly has the disadvantage of having to secure a being for its objects before it begins; if it is perhaps allowed to pass that there <em>is<\/em> a world, it is on the other hand at once challenged if it wanted likewise to presuppose the actuality of the incorporeal in general, of a thinking and a spirit free from matter, still more of God. But the object of philosophy is also not of that kind, and is not supposed to be, that it should only be <em>presupposed<\/em>. Philosophy, and more precisely the philosophy of religion, would thus first have to prove its object and work towards proving, before it exists, that it is; it would have to prove its existence before its existence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These, then, would be the preliminary questions which, as it seems, would have to be settled beforehand, and only in whose settlement would the possibility of a philosophy of religion lie. But if such points of view count, philosophy of religion is immediately impossible, since in order to show its possibility those obstacles would first have to be removed. So it seems at first sight. We leave them aside, however; why we do this is to be mentioned briefly in its main moments, in order to remove this difficulty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first demand is that one should first investigate reason, the <em>faculty of cognition<\/em>, before going on to <em>cognizing<\/em>. Cognizing is then represented as if it happened by means of an <em>instrument<\/em> with which one wants to take hold of truth. Considered more closely, however, the demand first to know this instrument is clumsy. The critique of the faculty of cognition is a position of the Kantian philosophy,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 59]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s59\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 59\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|59|<\/span> altogether a position of the age and its theology. People believed they had made a great find in this; but they deceived themselves, as so often happens in the world. For usually, when people have a notion that they think really clever, they are most foolish about it, and the satisfaction consists in their having found an excellent turn of phrase for their folly and ignorance. Altogether they are inexhaustible in turns of phrase when it is a matter of giving themselves a good conscience about their laziness and of getting away from the matter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Reason is to be investigated, &#8211; how? It is to be investigated <em>rationally<\/em>, to be known; this, however, is itself again possible <em>only through rational thinking<\/em>, in no other way, and so a demand is made that sublates itself. If we were not to go on to philosophizing without having known reason rationally, we could not begin at all, for in cognizing we comprehend rationally; but this we are supposed to refrain from, since we are first to know reason. It is the same demand that the Gascon made who did not want to go into the water until he could swim. One cannot investigate rational activity beforehand without being rational.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here in the philosophy of religion the object is, more precisely, God, reason in general, for God is essentially rational, rationality that is in and for itself as spirit. In philosophizing about reason, then, we investigate cognition; only we do it in such a way that we do not mean to settle this <em>beforehand<\/em>, outside the object; rather the cognition of reason is precisely the <em>object<\/em> that matters. Spirit is only this, to be for spirit; with this finite spirit is then posited, and <em>the relationship of finite spirit<\/em>, <em>of finite reason, to the divine<\/em> generates itself within the philosophy of religion itself and must be treated there,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 60]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s60\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 60\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|60|<\/span> and indeed at the necessary place where it first generates itself. That makes the difference between a science and notions about a science. These are contingent; but insofar as they are thoughts relating to the matter, they must fall within the treatment itself; they are then not contingent bubbles of thought.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Spirit that makes itself object essentially gives itself the shape of <em>appearing<\/em>, of something coming to finite spirit in a higher way; therein lies, then, that spirit comes to a positive religion. Spirit becomes for itself in the shape of representation, in the shape of the other; and for the other, for which it is, the <em>positive element of religion<\/em> is brought forth. Likewise within religion lies the determination of reason according to which it is <em>cognizing<\/em>, activity of comprehending and thinking; this standpoint of cognition falls within religion, as does the standpoint of feeling. Feeling is the subjective, what belongs to me as this single individual and for which I appeal to myself; this standpoint too, insofar as God gives himself this last singularization of the <em>This<\/em>, of the one who feels, falls within the development of the concept of religion, because there is a spiritual relationship, spirituality, in this feeling. The determination, too, that God <em>is<\/em> is a determination that falls essentially within the consideration of religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Altogether, however, religion is the last and highest sphere of human consciousness, be it view, will, representing, knowing, cognizing, &#8211; the absolute result, this region into which man passes over as into the region of absolute truth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For the sake of this <em>universal<\/em> determination it must already have happened that consciousness in this sphere has raised itself above <em>the finite<\/em> in general, above finite existence, conditions, ends, interests, likewise above finite thoughts, finite relationships of every kind; in order to be present in religion, one must have done with these.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 61]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s61\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 61\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|61|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But although for ordinary consciousness too religion is already the elevation above the finite, it nevertheless happens against this basic determination, when people speak against philosophy in general and in particular against philosophy about God, about religion, that for the purpose of this polemical speaking <em>finite thoughts<\/em>, relationships of restrictedness, categories and forms of the finite are brought in. From such forms of the finite opposition is made against philosophy, especially against the highest philosophy, the philosophy of religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We want to touch on this only briefly. Such a finite form is, e.g., immediacy of knowing, fact of consciousness; such categories are the oppositions of finite and infinite, subject and object. But these oppositions &#8211; finite <em>or<\/em> infinite, subject <em>or<\/em> object &#8211; are abstract forms that are not in their place in this absolutely rich concrete content which religion is. In the spirit, the mind that has to do with religion, quite other determinations are rather present than finitude and so on, and yet what is supposed to matter in religion is made to rest on such determinations. They must admittedly occur, since they are <em>moments of the essential relationship<\/em> that underlies religion, but the main thing is that their nature must have been investigated and known long before: this first, logical cognition must lie behind us when we deal with religion scientifically; with such categories one must long since have finished. But what is usual is that one rises up from them against the concept, the Idea, rational cognition. Those categories are used without any critique, in a wholly naive way, just as if not even the Kantian Critique of Pure Reason existed, which at least contested these forms and, in its way, had the result that through these categories one can know only appearances. And<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 62]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s62\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 62\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|62|<\/span> in religion one is surely dealing not with appearances, but with absolute content. But the Kantian philosophy seems to have been there for that argumentation only so that one might proceed all the more unabashedly with those categories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is wholly inappropriate, indeed absurd, to bring up these categories, such as immediacy, facts of consciousness, <em>against<\/em> philosophy and to tell it that the infinite is different from the finite, the object from the subject, as if any human being, any philosopher, had not known that or had first to learn such a triviality. Nevertheless people are not ashamed to bring up such cleverness triumphantly, as if they had thereby made a new discovery.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We remark here only this, that such determinations as finite and infinite, subject and object are admittedly &#8211; which always makes up the basis of that so clever and over-wise talk &#8211; <em>different<\/em>, but also at the same time <em>inseparable<\/em>. We have the example of this in physics at the north and south pole of the magnet. So it is also said: those determinations are as different as heaven and earth. That is correct; they are absolutely different, but, as the image brought forward already indicates, inseparable: one cannot point to earth without heaven and conversely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is hard to engage with those who contend against the philosophy of religion and think they triumph over it; for they say quite bluntly that immediacy is after all something other than mediation, but in doing so show too great an ignorance, complete unfamiliarity with the forms and categories in which they make their attacks and pass judgement on philosophy. They give assurances quite naively, without having reflected on these objects or having looked thoroughly in external nature and in the inner experience of their consciousness, their spirit, to see how these determinations occur there. <em>Actuality<\/em> is not present to them, but alien and<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 63]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s63\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 63\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|63|<\/span> unknown. Their talk directed with hostility against philosophy is therefore <em>school chatter<\/em>, which hooks itself onto empty, contentless categories, whereas with philosophy we are not in the so-called school, but <em>in the world of actuality<\/em>, and in the wealth of its determinations have not a yoke under which we would be bound, but free movement in them. And then those who combat and disparage philosophy are, through their finite thinking, even incapable of grasping a philosophical proposition, and even in perhaps repeating its words they have inverted it; for they have not grasped its infinity, but carried their <em>finite relationships<\/em> into it. Philosophy is so <em>indefatigable<\/em> and takes the great trouble of investigating carefully what there is in its opponent. That is admittedly necessary according to its concept, and it only satisfies the inner urge of its concept when it knows both, itself and what is opposed to it (<em>verum index sui et falsi<\/em>); but it ought nevertheless to be able to expect as recompense the service in return that now the opposition too would let go of its enmity and calmly know its essence. That, admittedly, does not happen, and the magnanimity of wanting to acknowledge the opponent and heap coals of fire on his head does not help it, for the opponent does not keep still and persists in himself. But when we see the opposition crumble like a ghost and dissolve into mist, we want thereby only to <em>give an account to ourselves and to comprehending thought<\/em>, not merely to keep the right <em>against the other<\/em>. And to convince him, this personal influence on him, is impossible, since he stops at his restricted categories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thinking spirit must be beyond those forms of reflection; it must know their nature, the true relationship that takes place in them, the <em>infinite relationship<\/em>, i.e. the one in which their finitude is sublated. Then it also turns out that immediate knowing, like mediated knowing, is completely one-sided. The true is their unity,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 64]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s64\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 64\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|64|<\/span> an immediate knowing that is just as much mediated, a mediated knowing that is just as much simple within itself, immediate relation to itself. Since the one-sidedness is sublated by such a connection, it is a relationship of infinity. There is union in which the difference of those determinations is just as much sublated as, preserved ideally, they at the same time have the higher determination of serving as the pulse of liveliness, as drive, movement, unrest of spiritual as of natural life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since in the following treatment we begin with religion, the highest and last, we ought now to be able to presuppose that the vanity of those relationships has long since been overcome. But at the same time, because we do not begin science in general from the beginning, but consider religion specifically, regard must also be had within it to the relationships of the understanding that usually come into consideration with it in particular.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With this reference to the following treatment itself we now give at once the general overview, the <em>division<\/em> of our science.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-c-einteilung\">C. Division<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There can be only <em>one<\/em> method in all science, since method is the concept explicating itself, nothing else, and this is only one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">According to the moments of the concept, therefore, the presentation and development of religion will take place in three parts. We shall consider the concept of religion first in <em>general<\/em>, then in its <em>particularity<\/em> as the concept dividing and distinguishing itself, which is the side of judgement, of restrictedness, of difference and of finitude, and thirdly the concept that closes together with itself, the <em>syllogism<\/em> or the return of the concept from its determinacy,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 65]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s65\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 65\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|65|<\/span> in which it is unequal to itself, to itself, so that it comes to equality with its form and sublates its restrictedness. This is the rhythm, the pure, eternal life of spirit itself, and if it did not have this movement, it would be the dead. Spirit is to have itself as object; that is its manifestation; but at first it is there a relationship of objectivity, and in this relationship it is something finite. The third is that it is object to itself in <em>such<\/em> a way that in the object it is reconciled with itself, is with itself and has thereby come to its freedom: for freedom is to be with oneself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This rhythm, however, in which the <em>whole<\/em> of our science and the entire development of the concept moves, also <em>recurs in each of the three moments indicated<\/em>, since each of them in its determinacy is <em>in itself the totality<\/em>, until this is <em>posited as such<\/em> in the last moment. If, therefore, the concept appears first in the form of universality, then in the form of particularity and finally in the form of singularity, or if the total movement of our science is that the concept becomes judgement and completes itself in the syllogism, then in each sphere of this movement the same development of the moments will occur, only that in the <em>first<\/em> sphere it is <em>held together in the determinacy of universality<\/em>, in the <em>second<\/em> sphere, in that of particularity, it <em>lets the moments appear independent<\/em>, and only in the sphere of singularity does it return to the actual syllogism mediating itself in the <em>totality of determinations<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This division is thus the movement, nature and doing of spirit itself, which we, so to speak, only watch. It is necessary through the concept; but the necessity of the progression has first to present, explicate and prove itself in the development itself. The division, whose distinct parts and content we now want to state more determinately, is therefore only historical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 66]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s66\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 66\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|66|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-i-der-allgemeine-begriff-der-religion\">I. The Universal Concept of Religion<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>first<\/em> is the concept in its <em>universality<\/em>, which is followed only as the second by the <em>determinacy<\/em> of the concept, the concept in its determinate forms; these are necessarily connected with the concept itself. In the philosophical mode of consideration it is not the case that the universal, the concept, is put at the front, as it were, for honour\u2019s sake. Elsewhere concepts of right, of nature, are universal determinations that are put at the front and with which one is really in embarrassment; but one does not take them seriously either and then has the representation that they do not matter, but the content proper, the single chapters, does. The so-called concept has no further influence on this further content than merely to indicate roughly the ground on which one finds oneself with these materials, and to prevent one from drawing content from another ground; the content, e.g. magnetism, electricity, counts as the matter, the concept as the formal. In such a mode of consideration, however, the concept put first, e.g. right, can also become a mere name for the most abstract, most contingent content.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In philosophical consideration too the beginning is the concept; but it is the content itself, the absolute matter, the substance, as is, e.g., the germ from which the whole tree develops. In it all determinations are contained, the whole nature of the tree, the kind of its sap, its branching, but not preformed in such a way that, if one took a microscope, one would see the branches, leaves in miniature, but in a spiritual way. Thus the concept contains the whole nature of the object, and cognition itself is nothing but the development of the concept, of what is contained in itself in the concept, has not yet entered existence, been explicated, laid out. So we begin with the concept of religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 67]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s67\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 67\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|67|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-1-das-moment-der-allgemeinheit\">1. The Moment of Universality<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first in the concept of religion is itself again the purely <em>universal<\/em>, the moment of thinking in its complete universality. Not this or that is thought, but <em>thinking thinks itself<\/em>; the object is the universal, which as active is thinking. As elevation to the true, religion is a going out from sensuous, finite objects; if this becomes merely a going on to an other, it is the bad progression to infinity and the talk that does not get from the spot. Thinking, however, is elevation from the restricted to the absolutely universal, and religion is only through thinking and in thinking. God is not the highest sensation, but <em>the highest thought<\/em>; even if he is drawn down into representation, the substance of this representation nevertheless belongs to the realm of thought. The most foolish delusion of our time is the opinion that thinking is harmful to religion and that religion subsists all the more securely the more thinking is given up. This misunderstanding comes from a radical misjudgement of the higher spiritual relationships. Thus with regard to right good will is taken by itself as something that stands over against intelligence, and man is credited with an all the more truly good will the less he thinks. Rather, right and ethical life are solely in this, that I am a thinking being, i.e. do not regard my freedom as that of my empirical person, which would belong to me as this <em>particular<\/em> person, where I could then subjugate the other through cunning or force, but that I regard freedom as something <em>that is in and for itself<\/em>, something <em>universal<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If we now say that religion has <em>the moment of thinking in its complete universality<\/em> within it, and that the unrestrictedly universal is the <em>highest<\/em>, <em>absolute thought<\/em>, we do not yet make here the <em>distinction between subjective and objective thinking<\/em>. The universal is<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 68]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s68\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 68\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|68|<\/span> object and is thinking pure and simple, but not yet developed and further determined within itself. All differences are still absent and sublated in it; in this aether of thinking everything finite has passed away, everything has vanished as well as being at the same time embraced. But this element of the universal is not yet more closely determined; out of this water and in this transparency nothing has yet taken shape.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The progression now consists in this universal determining itself for itself, and this self-determining then makes up the development of the Idea of God. In the <em>sphere of universality<\/em> it is first <em>the Idea itself that is the material of determining<\/em>, and the progression appears in divine shapes; but the other, the configuration, is held within the divine Idea, which is still in its substantiality, and in the determination of eternity it remains in the womb of universality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-2-das-moment-der-besonderheit-oder-die-sphaere-der\">2. The Moment of Particularity, or the Sphere of Difference<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Particularization, which in the sphere of the universal is still held back, therefore makes up, when it actually comes to appearance as such, <em>the other as against the extreme of universality<\/em>, and this other extreme is <em>consciousness<\/em> in its singularity as such, the subject according to its immediacy, as this subject with its needs, states, sins and so on, in general according to its wholly empirical, temporal character.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>relation<\/em> of the two sides in this their determination is I myself in religion. I, the thinking, this raising of myself, the <em>active universal<\/em>, and I, the <em>immediate subject<\/em>, are <em>one and the same I<\/em>; and further, the <em>relation of these<\/em> sides standing so harshly over against each other &#8211; of absolutely finite consciousness and being and of the infinite &#8211; is <em>for me<\/em> in religion. I raise myself in thinking<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 69]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s69\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 69\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|69|<\/span> to the absolute above everything finite and am <em>infinite consciousness<\/em>, and at the same time I am <em>finite self-consciousness<\/em>, and indeed according to my whole empirical determination; both, as well as their relation, are for me. Both sides seek each other and flee each other. At one time, e.g., I lay the accent on my empirical, finite consciousness and set myself over against infinity; at another time I exclude myself from myself, condemn myself and give infinite consciousness the preponderance. The middle of the syllogism contains nothing other than the determination of both extremes themselves. They are not the pillars of Hercules standing harshly over against each other. I am, and there is <em>in me<\/em>, for me, this conflict and this union; I am determined in myself as infinite against myself as finite and as finite consciousness against my thinking as infinite. I am the feeling, the intuition, the representation of this oneness and this conflict, and the <em>holding together<\/em> of what conflicts, the effort of this holding together and the labour of the mind to master this opposition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I am thus the relation of these two sides, which are not abstract determinations like \u201cfinite and infinite\u201d, but each itself the <em>totality<\/em>. The two extremes are <em>each itself the I<\/em>, what relates; and the holding together, relating, is itself this which fights itself in one and unites itself in the fight. Or <em>I am the fight<\/em>; for the fight is precisely this conflict, which is not <em>indifference of the two as different<\/em>, but the <em>being bound together<\/em> of both. I am not <em>one<\/em> of those caught up in the fight, but I am <em>both<\/em> fighters and the fight itself. I am the fire and water that touch, and the touching and unity of what absolutely flees itself; and precisely this touching is itself this twofold, conflicting relation, as relation of what is now separated, divided, now reconciled and at one with itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 70]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s70\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 70\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|70|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As forms of this relation of the two extremes, however, we shall come to know<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>a<\/em>) <em>feeling<\/em>,<br><em>b<\/em>) <em>intuition<\/em>, <br><em>c<\/em>) <em>representation<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The entire circle of these relations, insofar as, as elevation of finite consciousness to the absolute, it contains the forms of religious consciousness in general, we shall have to know in its <em>necessity<\/em> before we enter it. In seeking out this necessity of religion we shall have to grasp it as <em>posited through an other<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this mediation, to be sure, when it opens for us the entrance into the circle of those forms of consciousness, religion will already present itself as <em>a result<\/em> which precisely <em>sublates<\/em> <em>being a result<\/em>; it will thus present itself as the first, through which everything is mediated and on which everything else depends. We shall thus see in what is mediated the counter-thrust of the movement and of the necessity that goes forward and likewise thrusts back. But this mediation of necessity is now also to be posited <em>within religion<\/em> itself, namely in such a way that <em>the relation and the essential connection<\/em> of the two sides that the religious spirit embraces is known as <em>necessary<\/em>. The forms of feeling, intuition and representation, as they necessarily proceed one from the other, now also drive themselves on to that sphere in which the <em>inner mediation of their moments<\/em> proves itself necessary, i.e. to the <em>sphere of thinking<\/em>, in which <em>religious consciousness<\/em> will grasp itself in its <em>concept<\/em>. These <em>two mediations of necessity<\/em>, of which one <em>leads to<\/em> religion, while the other takes place <em>within religious self-consciousness<\/em> itself, therefore enclose the forms of religious consciousness as it <em>appears<\/em> as feeling, intuition and representation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 71]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s71\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 71\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|71|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-3-die-aufhebung-der-differenz-oder-der-kultus\">3. The Sublation of Difference, or the Cult<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The movement in the preceding sphere is in general the movement of the concept of God, of the Idea, to become objective to itself. This movement we have at once in the expression of representation: God is a spirit. This is not a single individual, but is spirit only insofar as he is objective to himself and intuits himself in the other as himself. The highest determination of spirit is <em>self-consciousness<\/em>, which encloses this <em>objectivity<\/em> within itself. God as Idea is something subjective for something objective and something objective for something subjective. When the moment of subjectivity determines itself further, so that the <em>difference<\/em> is made between God as object and the knowing spirit, then in this difference the subjective side determines itself as the one that falls on the side of finitude, and both at first stand over against each other in such a way that the separation makes up the opposition of finitude and infinity. This infinity, however, because it is still burdened with the opposition, is not the true one; for the subjective side, which is for itself, the absolute object is still an <em>other<\/em>, and the relation to it is not self-consciousness. But in this relationship there is also present the <em>relation<\/em> that the finite in its separation knows itself as <em>null<\/em> and its object as the absolute, as its <em>substance<\/em>. Here there first takes place the relationship of fear towards the absolute object, since against it singularity knows itself only as accident or as something passing, vanishing. This standpoint of separation, however, is not the true one, but what knows itself as null and is therefore to be sublated, and its relationship is not only a <em>negative<\/em> one, but in itself <em>positive<\/em>. The subject knows the absolute substance, into which it has to sublate itself, at the same time as <em>its<\/em> essence, as <em>its<\/em> substance, in which self-consciousness is thus preserved in itself. This <em>unity<\/em>, <em>reconciliation<\/em>, restoration<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 72]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s72\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 72\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|72|<\/span> of the subject and of its self-consciousness, the positive feeling of having a share, of participation in that absolute, and actually giving oneself unity with it, this sublation of division makes up the sphere of the cult. The cult embraces this entire inner and outer doing that has this restoration to unity as its end. Usually the expression \u201ccult\u201d is taken only in the more restricted meaning that one understands by it only <em>external<\/em>, <em>public action<\/em>, and does not so much emphasize the inner action of the mind. We shall, however, grasp the cult as this doing that encompasses <em>inwardness<\/em> as well as external appearance, which in general brings forth the restoration of unity with the absolute and is thereby also essentially an <em>inner conversion of spirit and mind<\/em>. Thus the Christian cult, e.g., contains not only the sacraments, church actions and duties, but it also contains the so-called order of salvation as an absolutely inner history and as a sequence of stages of actions of the mind, in general a movement that takes place and is supposed to take place in the soul.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This side of self-consciousness, thus of the cult, and the side of consciousness or representation we shall, however, always find <em>corresponding<\/em> to each other at every stage of religion. As the content of the concept of God, or <em>consciousness<\/em>, is determined, so too is the relationship of the subject to him, or so too is <em>self-consciousness<\/em> determined in the cult; the one moment is always the imprint of the other; each points to the other. Both modes, of which the one holds fast only objective consciousness, the other pure self-consciousness, are one-sided and each sublates itself in itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thus it was one-sided when the former natural theology grasped God only <em>as object of consciousness<\/em>. This consideration of the Idea of God, for which God could really only be the essence, even if it advanced to the words spirit<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 73]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s73\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 73\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|73|<\/span> or person, was inconsistent, for if really carried through it would have had to lead to the other side, the subjective side, that of self-consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is equally one-sided to grasp religion only as something <em>subjective<\/em> and thus really to make the subjective side the only one. Here, then, the cult is completely bare, empty, its doing a movement that does not get from the spot, its direction towards God a relation to a zero and a shooting into the blue. But this merely subjective doing too is inconsistent in itself and must dissolve. For if the subjective side is to be determined at all in any way, it lies in the concept of spirit that it is consciousness and that <em>its determinacy becomes object for it<\/em>. The richer the mind were, the more determined, the richer the object would then also have to be for it. The <em>absoluteness<\/em> of that feeling which is supposed to be <em>substantial<\/em> would further have to contain precisely this, that it <em>frees itself from its subjectivity<\/em>; for the substantial that is supposed to be its own is directed precisely against the accidental element of opinion and inclination and is rather what is firm in and for itself, <em>independent<\/em> of our feeling, our sensation, and the objective that subsists in and for itself. If the substantial remains enclosed only in the heart, it is not acknowledged as the higher, and God is himself only something subjective, and the direction of subjectivity remains at most a drawing of lines into the void. For the acknowledgement of something higher, which may still be pronounced in this, this acknowledgement of something indeterminate, these lines drawn towards it, have no hold, no connection through the objective itself, and are and remain one-sidedly <em>our<\/em> doing, our lines, something subjective, and the finite does not come to the true, actual externalization of itself, whereas in the cult spirit, on the contrary, is supposed to free itself from its finitude and feel and know itself in God. If what subsists for itself and is binding in its relation to us is not present, all cult has<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 74]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s74\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 74\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|74|<\/span> shrunk into subjectivity. The cult essentially contains actions, enjoyments, assurances, confirmations and verification of something higher; but such <em>determinate acting<\/em>, <em>such actual enjoyments<\/em> and assurances can have no place if the objective, binding moment is lacking to them, and the cult would really be annihilated if the subjective side were grasped as the whole. Like the going out of consciousness to objective <em>knowing<\/em>, so the going out from the subjective heart to <em>action<\/em> would thereby be cut off. The one is most intimately connected with the other. What man thinks he has to do in relation to God is connected with his representation of God; his self-consciousness corresponds to his consciousness, and conversely he cannot think he has to do anything determinate with regard to God if he has, or thinks he has, no knowledge, no determinate representation at all of him as object. Only when religion is actually relationship, contains the difference of consciousness, is the cult, as the sublation of what is divided, actually given shape and a living process. This movement of the cult, however, does not restrict itself only to inwardness, in which consciousness frees itself from its finitude, is consciousness of its essence, and the subject, as knowing itself in God, has entered into the ground of its life; rather this its human life now also develops <em>outwards<\/em>; for the worldly life that the subject leads also has that substantial consciousness as its foundation, and the way in which the subject determines its ends in worldly life depends on the consciousness of its essential truth. This is the side according to which religion reflects itself into <em>worldliness<\/em> and the <em>knowing of the world<\/em> comes to appearance. This going out into the actual world is essential to religion, and in this transition into the world religion appears as <em>morality in relation to the state<\/em> and its entire life. As<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 75]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s75\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 75\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|75|<\/span> the religion of peoples is constituted, so too their morality and constitution are constituted; these depend entirely on whether a people has grasped only a restricted representation of the freedom of spirit or has the true consciousness of freedom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As the more precise determinations of the cult there will emerge for us the moment of <em>presupposed unity<\/em>, the sphere of <em>separation<\/em>, and <em>freedom restoring itself in separation<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">a) The cult is thus in general the eternal process of the subject of positing itself as identical with its essence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This process of the sublation of division seems to fall only on the <em>subjective side<\/em>, but this determination is also posited <em>in the object of consciousness<\/em>. Through the cult oneness is gained; but what is not originally one cannot be posited as one. This oneness, which appears as doing, as its result, must also be recognized as <em>being in and for itself<\/em>. For what is object for consciousness is the absolute, and its determination is that it is the <em>unity of its absoluteness with particularity<\/em>. This unity is thus in the object itself, e.g. in the Christian representation of the incarnation of God.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Altogether this unity that is in itself, more determinately the human shape, the incarnation of God, is an <em>essential moment of religion<\/em> and must occur <em>in the determination of its object<\/em>. In the Christian religion this determination is completely developed, but it also occurs in lower religions, even if only in such a way that the infinite appears in unity with the finite in the mode of appearing as <em>this<\/em> being, as this immediate existence in stars or animals. Further, this too belongs here, that God shows human or other shape of existence only momentarily, that he appears externally or reveals himself inwardly in a dream or as an inner voice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 76]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s76\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 76\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|76|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is the moment of <em>presupposed unity<\/em>, which must lie in the concept of God, so that the object of consciousness (God) shows the whole concept of religion in its content and is itself the totality. The moments of the concept of religion thus occur here in the determination of union. The sides of the true Idea are each itself the same totality that the whole is. The determinations of content in the two sides are therefore not different in themselves, but only their form. The absolute object therefore determines itself for consciousness as totality at one with itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">b) This totality now also occurs in the form of <em>separation<\/em> and <em>finitude<\/em>, which stands over against that totality at one with itself as the other side. The moments of content of the whole concept are posited here in the mode of stepping apart, of difference, thus as abstractions. The first moment on this side of difference is that of <em>being-in-itself<\/em>, of being identical with oneself, of the formless, of objectivity in general. This is <em>matter<\/em> as the indifferent, unconcerned subsisting. Form can also be brought to this, but still in abstract being-for-itself. Then we call it <em>world<\/em>, which in relation to God appears partly as his garment, dress, shape, or comes forward over against him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Over against this moment of indifferent being-in-itself now stands <em>being-for-itself<\/em>, in general the <em>negative<\/em>, form. This negative, in its at first indeterminate form, appears as the negative in the world, while the world is the positive, subsisting. Negativity against this subsisting, against this sensing of oneself, existence, preservation, is <em>ill<\/em>. Over against God, this reconciled unity of being-in-itself and being-for-itself, the difference comes forward: the world as positive subsisting and in it destruction and contradiction, and there fall in the questions that belong to all religions with more or less developed consciousness: how ill is to be<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 77]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s77\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 77\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|77|<\/span> united with the absolute unity of God, and where the origin of evil lies. This negative appears at first as the ill in the world; but it also takes itself back to identity with itself, in which it is the <em>being-for-itself of self-consciousness<\/em>, <em>finite spirit<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The negative gathering itself into itself is now itself again something positive, because it relates itself simply to itself. As ill it appears <em>in entanglement<\/em> with positive subsisting. But negativity that is present for itself, not in an other that is supposed to subsist, the <em>inner<\/em>, <em>infinite negativity reflecting itself into itself<\/em>, which is object to itself, is the <em>I<\/em> in general. In this self-consciousness and in its inner movement itself <em>finitude<\/em> comes forth, and into it falls <em>contradiction<\/em> with itself. So the disturbance is in it; evil comes to light in it, and this is <em>the evil of the will<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">c) But I, the free, can abstract from everything; this negativity and separation is what constitutes my essence. Evil is not the whole of the subject; the subject rather also has <em>unity with itself<\/em>, which makes up the <em>positive<\/em> side (being good) and the absoluteness, <em>infinity of self-consciousness<\/em>. It is the essential moment of the separateness of spirit that I can abstract from everything immediate, everything external. This separateness is removed from temporality, from the alteration and change of the being of the world, from ill and division, and as the absoluteness of self-consciousness it is represented in the thought of the <em>immortality of the soul<\/em>. At first the outstanding determination in this is <em>duration in time<\/em>; this being lifted above the power and the change of alteration, however, is represented as already belonging <em>originally in itself<\/em> to spirit, not as first <em>mediated through reconciliation<\/em>. So the other determination is added, that the self-consciousness of spirit is an <em>eternal<\/em>, <em>absolute moment in eternal life<\/em>, into which it is carried away beyond time, this abstraction of alteration,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 78]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s78\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 78\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|78|<\/span> and beyond the real element of alteration, beyond division, when it is <em>taken up into the unity and reconciliation<\/em> that is <em>presupposed<\/em> as originally present in the object of consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-ii-das-urteil-oder-die-bestimmte-religion\">II. The Judgement, or Determinate Religion<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When in the first part we consider religion in its concept, its simple concept, and the determinacy of content, the universal, then from this sphere of universality we must now go on to <em>determinacy<\/em>; the concept as such is the still enveloped concept, in which the determinations, moments are contained but not yet laid out and have not yet received the right of their <em>difference<\/em>. This they receive only through the judgement. When God, the concept, judges and the category of determination enters, only then do we have <em>existing<\/em> religion, at the same time <em>determinately existing<\/em> religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The course from the abstract to the concrete is grounded in our method, in the concept, not because much particular content is present. From this our view distinguishes itself entirely. Spirit, to which absolute, highest being belongs, is only as activity, i.e. insofar as it posits itself, is for itself and produces itself. In this its activity, however, it is <em>knowing<\/em>, and it is what it is only as knowing. So it is essential to religion not only to be in its <em>concept<\/em>, but to be the <em>consciousness<\/em> of what the concept is; and the material in which the concept carries itself out, as it were as the plan, which it makes its own, forms in accordance with itself, is human consciousness; as, e.g., right too only is by existing in spirit, taking possession of the will of men and their knowing of it as the determination of their will. Only thus does the Idea realize itself, whereas before it is itself at first posited only as form of the concept. Spirit is altogether not immediate; immediate are<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 79]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s79\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 79\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|79|<\/span> natural things, and they remain in this being. The being of spirit is not thus immediate, but only as producing itself, making itself for itself through negation as subject; otherwise it is only substance; and this coming to itself of spirit is movement, activity and mediation of itself with itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The stone is immediate, is finished. But already the living is this activity; so the first existence of the plant is this weak one of the germ, and from this it must develop and first produce itself. Finally the plant sums itself up in its unfolding in the seed; this beginning of the plant is also its last product. Likewise man is first a child and, as something natural, runs through this circle of generating an other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With the plant there are two kinds of individuals: this seed grain that begins is another than the one that is the completion of its life, into which this unfolding ripens. Spirit, however, is precisely this, because it is living in general: to be at first only in itself or in its concept, then to enter existence, to unfold, produce, ripen, produce the concept of itself, what it is in itself, so that what is in itself is its concept for itself. The child is not yet a rational human being, has only the disposition, is at first only reason, spirit in itself; only through its education, development, is it spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This, then, means <em>to determine oneself<\/em>, to enter existence, to be for an other, to bring one\u2019s moments into difference and lay oneself out. These differences are no other determinations than those the concept itself contains within itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The unfolding of these differences and the course of the directions that arise from them are the way of spirit to come to itself; but it itself is the goal. The absolute goal, that it knows itself, grasps itself, is object to itself as it is in itself, comes to the complete cognition of itself, this goal is only its true being. Now this process of spirit producing itself, this<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 80]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s80\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 80\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|80|<\/span> its way, contains <em>distinct moments<\/em>. But the way is not yet the goal, and spirit is not at the goal without having run through the way; it is not at the goal from the outset; the most perfect must run the way to the goal in order to attain it. In these stations of its process spirit is not yet perfect; its knowing, consciousness of itself, is not the true one, and <em>it is not yet manifest to itself<\/em>. Since spirit is essentially this activity of producing itself, stages of its consciousness arise from this; but it is always conscious of itself only in accordance with these stations. These stages now give determinate religion; there religion is <em>consciousness of universal spirit<\/em>, which is not yet <em>for itself as absolute<\/em>. This consciousness of spirit at each stage is <em>determinate consciousness<\/em> of itself, the way of the education of spirit. We thus have to consider determinate religion, which, precisely as a stage on the way of spirit, is imperfect.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The different forms, determinations of religion are on the one hand <em>moments of religion in general<\/em> or of <em>consummate<\/em> religion. But they also have this independent shape, that in them religion has developed in time and historically.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Religion, insofar as it is determinate and has not yet run through the circle of its determinacy, [so] that it is finite religion, exists as finite, is <em>historical<\/em> religion, a <em>particular<\/em> shape of religion. Since in the sequence of stages, in the development of religion, the main moments are shown as these stages also existed historically, this forms a series of configurations, a history of religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What is determined by the concept has had to exist, and the religions, as they have followed one another, have not arisen in a <em>contingent<\/em> way. It is spirit that governs the inner, and it is absurd, in the manner of historians, to see only contingency here. The <em>essential moments<\/em> of the concept of religion appear<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 81]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s81\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 81\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|81|<\/span> and come forth at every stage where it has existed at all; the difference from the true form of the concept enters only through their not yet being posited <em>in its totality<\/em>. The determinate religions are indeed not <em>our<\/em> religion; but as essential, if subordinate, moments that may not be lacking to absolute truth, they are contained in ours. In them, then, we are dealing not with something alien, but <em>with what is ours<\/em>, and the cognition that it is so is the reconciliation of the true religion with the false. Thus at lower stages of development the moments of the concept of religion still appear as presentiments and sprouted contingently like natural flowers and formations. But the thoroughgoing determinacy of these stages is <em>the determinacy of the concept itself<\/em>, which can be lacking at no stage. The thought of incarnation, e.g., goes through all religions. In other spheres of spirit too such universal concepts assert themselves. The substantial element of ethical relationships, e.g., property, marriage, defence of the prince and the state, and the final decision lying in subjectivity about what is to be done for the whole, is present in an undeveloped society as in the completed state; only the determinate form of this substantial element differs at the stages of its development. What especially matters here, however, is that the concept <em>in its totality<\/em> also be actually <em>known<\/em>, and according as this knowing is present, a stage of religious spirit is higher or lower, richer or poorer. Spirit can have a good in its possession without having a developed consciousness of it. The immediate, own nature of spirit, thus its physical, organic nature, it <em>has<\/em>, but does not know it in its determinacy and truth and has only an approximate, general representation of it. People live in the state; they themselves are the liveliness, activity, actuality of the state; but the <em>positing<\/em>, <em>becoming conscious<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 82]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s82\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 82\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|82|<\/span> of what the state is is not present on that account, and the completed state is only this, that everything that is <em>in itself<\/em> in it, i.e. in its concept, is developed, posited, made into rights and duties, into <em>law<\/em>. Thus in the determinate religions the moments of the concept <em>are<\/em> <em>there<\/em>, present in intuitions, feelings, immediate shapes, but the <em>consciousness<\/em> of these moments is not yet developed, or they are not yet raised to the <em>determination of the absolute object<\/em>, and God is not yet represented under these determinations <em>of the totality of the concept of religion<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The determinate religions of the peoples admittedly show us often enough the most distorted and bizarre monstrosities of representations of the divine essence and then of duties and modes of conduct in the cult. But we must not make the matter so easy for ourselves and grasp it so superficially as to reject these religious representations and customs as <em>superstition<\/em>, <em>error and deception<\/em>, or to see in them only that they come from piety and to let them count <em>as something pious<\/em>, however they may otherwise be constituted. Nor can the mere collection and working up of the <em>external<\/em> and <em>apparent<\/em> satisfy us. The higher need is rather to recognize the sense, <em>the true and the connection with the true<\/em>, in short the <em>rational<\/em> in them. It is <em>human beings<\/em> who have hit upon such religions; there must therefore be <em>reason<\/em> in them and, in all contingency, a <em>higher necessity<\/em>. This justice we must do them, for the human, the rational in them is also <em>ours<\/em>, even if in our higher consciousness <em>only as a moment<\/em>. To grasp the history of religions in this sense means also to <em>reconcile<\/em> oneself with what is horrible, terrible or absurd in them, and to <em>justify<\/em> it. We are by no means to<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 83]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s83\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 83\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|83|<\/span> <em>find it correct or true<\/em> as it occurs in its whole <em>immediate shape<\/em> &#8211; there is no question of that -, but at least to recognize the beginning, the <em>source<\/em> from which it has proceeded, as something <em>human<\/em>. That is the reconciliation with this whole domain, the reconciliation that completes itself in the concept. The religions, as they follow one another, are determined by the concept, not determined externally, but rather by the nature of spirit, which has pressed in the world to bring itself to consciousness of itself. In considering these determinate religions according to the concept, this is a purely philosophical consideration of what is. Philosophy altogether considers nothing that is not, and it has nothing to do with something so powerless that it does not even have the strength to drive itself on to existence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In development as such, insofar as it has not yet come to the goal, the moments of the concept still fall apart, so that <em>reality has not yet become equal to the concept<\/em>, and the historical appearance of these <em>moments<\/em> are the <em>finite religions<\/em>. To grasp these in their truth, one must consider them from two sides: on the one hand how God is known, how he is determined, and on the other hand how the subject thereby knows itself. For the further determination of both sides, the objective and the subjective, there is <em>one<\/em> foundation, and <em>one<\/em> determinacy goes through both sides. The representation man has of God corresponds to the one he has of himself, of his freedom. In knowing himself in God, he thereby knows his imperishable life in God; he knows of the truth of his being; here, then, the representation of the <em>immortality of the soul<\/em> enters the history of religion as an essential moment. The representations of God and of immortality have a necessary relation to each other: when man truly knows of God, he also truly knows of himself; both sides correspond to each other. God is at first<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 84]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s84\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 84\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|84|<\/span> something wholly indeterminate; but in the course of development the <em>consciousness<\/em> of what God is gradually develops further, loses more and more its initial indeterminacy, and with this the development of actual <em>self-consciousness<\/em> also advances further. Into the sphere of this further development fall also the <em>proofs of the existence of God<\/em>, which have the purpose of showing the necessary elevation to God. For the difference of the determinations that are ascribed to God in this elevation is posited through the difference of the starting point, and this in turn is grounded in the nature of the respective historical stage of actual self-consciousness. The different forms of this elevation will always give us the <em>metaphysical spirit<\/em> of each stage, to which the <em>actual representation<\/em> of God and the sphere of the <em>cult<\/em> correspond.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If we provisionally give the more precise division of this stage of determinate religion too, what especially matters here is the <em>kind of divine appearance<\/em>. God is appearing, but not only in general; rather as the spiritual he determines himself as appearing to himself; i.e. he is not object in general, but object to himself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">1. As regards appearance in general, or <em>abstract appearing<\/em>, this is <em>naturalness<\/em> in general. Appearing is being for an other, an externality of distinct things towards one another, and indeed an immediate one, not yet reflected into itself. This logical determination, taken here in its concrete meaning, is the natural. What is for an other is for that very reason in a sensuous way. Thought that is to be posited for another thought, which is distinguished as existing, i.e. as an independent subject over against the former, is communicable to it only through the sensuous medium of the sign, of speaking, in general through a bodily mediation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But since God essentially is only as <em>appearing to himself<\/em>, that abstract relationship of man to <em>nature<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 85]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s85\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 85\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|85|<\/span> does not belong to religion; rather the natural is in religion only a <em>moment of the divine<\/em>, and it must therefore, as it is for religious consciousness, at the same time have in it <em>the determination of the spiritual mode<\/em>; it thus does not keep itself in its pure, natural element, but receives the determination of the divine that dwells in it. Of no religion can one say that people worshipped the sun, the sea, nature; in worshipping these, they are precisely no longer for them this prosaic thing they are for us; since these objects are divine to them, they are indeed still natural, but by being objects of religion they are at the same time represented in a spiritual mode. The consideration of the sun, the stars etc. as these <em>natural appearances<\/em> is outside religion. The so-called prosaic view of nature, as it is for the understanding consciousness, is only a later separation; for it to be present, a reflection going back much more deeply is required. Only when spirit has posited itself independently for itself, free from nature, does nature come forward for it as something other, external.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>first<\/em> mode of appearance, naturalness, thus has the subjectivity, the spirituality of God only <em>in general<\/em> as its centre. These two determinations have therefore not yet entered into relationship in a reflected way. That this happens is now the <em>second<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">2. In himself God is spirit; this is our concept of him. But precisely for that reason he must also be posited as spirit, i.e. the mode of his appearance must itself be a <em>spiritual<\/em> one and thus the negation of the natural; for this it is required that his determinacy, the side of reality in the Idea, be equal to the concept, and the relationship of reality to the divine concept is completed when spirit is as spirit, i.e. the concept and also the reality is as this spirit. At first, however, we see that naturalness makes up that <em>determinacy of the concept of God<\/em> or the side of reality in the Idea. The coming forth of spirituality, of subjectivity,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 86]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s86\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 86\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|86|<\/span> from naturalness therefore appears at first only as a <em>struggle of the two sides<\/em>, which are still entangled with each other in the struggle. This stage of determinate religion too therefore still remains in the sphere of naturalness and, together with the preceding one, forms in general the stage of <em>natural religion<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">3. Still within the sequence of determinate religions the movement of spirit makes the attempt <em>to set determinacy equal to the concept<\/em>; but this determinacy appears here still as <em>abstract<\/em>, or the concept still as the <em>finite<\/em> one. These attempts, in which the principle of the preceding stages, <em>essence<\/em>, strives to gather itself together into <em>infinite inwardness<\/em>, are: a) the <em>Jewish<\/em> religion, b) the <em>Greek<\/em>, c) the <em>Roman<\/em>. The Jewish God is oneness, which itself still remains <em>abstract unity<\/em>, is not yet concrete within itself. This God is indeed God in spirit, but not yet <em>as<\/em> spirit, &#8211; something non-sensuous, an abstraction of thought, which does not yet have within itself the fulfilment that makes it spirit. The <em>freedom<\/em> to which the concept seeks to develop in the Greek religion still lives under the sceptre of the <em>necessity of essence<\/em>, and the concept as it appears in the Roman religion and wants to gain its independence is still <em>restricted<\/em>, since it is related to an externality standing over against it, in which it is only supposed to be objective, and is thus <em>external purposiveness<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These are the main determinacies that appear here as the mode of reality of spirit. As <em>determinacies<\/em> they are not adequate to the concept of spirit and are <em>finitudes<\/em>, even this infinity, that there is <em>one<\/em> God, this abstract affirmation. And if one wanted to set this determination of the appearance of God in consciousness, as pure ideality of the One, as extinction of the manifoldness of external appearing, over against natural religion as the true, it is rather itself only <em>one<\/em> determinacy over against the totality of the concept of spirit. To this totality<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 87]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s87\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 87\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|87|<\/span> it corresponds as little as its opposite; these determinate religions are thus altogether not yet the true religion, and God is not yet known in them in his truthfulness, since they lack the absolute content of spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"re-iii-die-offenbare-religion\">III. The Manifest Religion<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Manifestation, development and determining do not go on <em>to infinity<\/em> and do not stop <em>contingently<\/em>; the true progression consists rather in this reflection of the concept into itself breaking off by <em>actually going back into itself<\/em>. Thus <em>appearance<\/em> itself is <em>the infinite<\/em> appearance, the content in accordance with the concept of spirit and the appearance such as spirit is in and for itself. The concept of religion has in religion become <em>objective to itself<\/em>. Spirit, which is in and for itself, now no longer has before it in its unfolding single forms, determinations of itself, no longer knows itself as spirit in some determinacy, restrictedness; rather it has now overcome those restrictions, this finitude, and is for itself as it is in itself. This knowing of spirit for itself as it is in itself is the being-in-and-for-itself of knowing spirit, the consummate, <em>absolute<\/em> religion, in which it is manifest what spirit, God, is; this is the <em>Christian<\/em> religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That spirit, as in everything, so in religion must run through its course is necessary in the concept of spirit: it is spirit only by being for itself as the negation of all finite forms, as this absolute ideality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I have representations, intuitions; that is a certain content: this house and so on. They are my intuitions, represent themselves to me; but I could not represent them to myself if I did not grasp this content into myself and had not posited it in myself in a simple, ideal way. <em>Ideality<\/em> means that this external being, spatiality, temporality, materiality,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 88]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr1-s88\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 88\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|88|<\/span> mutual externality is sublated; in my knowing it, they are not representations existing outside one another, but they are gathered together in me in a simple way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Spirit is knowing; but for knowing to be, it is required that the content of what it knows has attained this <em>ideal form<\/em> and has been negated in this way; what spirit is must have become its own in such a way; it must have gone through this circuit; and those forms, differences, determinations, finitudes must have been, so that it can make them its own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That is the way and the goal: that spirit has attained its own concept, what it is in itself; and it attains it only in this way, which has been indicated in its abstract moments. The revealed religion is the <em>manifest<\/em> one, because in it God has become wholly manifest. Here everything is adequate to the concept; there is nothing secret about God any more. Here there is the consciousness of the developed concept of spirit, of being reconciled, not in beauty, serenity, but <em>in spirit<\/em>. The manifest religion, while otherwise it was always still veiled, not in its truth, has come in its time; this is not a contingent time, a whim, a notion, but a time determined in the essential, eternal counsel of God, i.e. in the eternal reason, wisdom of God; it is the concept of the matter, the divine concept, the concept of God himself, which has determined itself to this development and set its goal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This course of religion is the true theodicy; it shows all the products of spirit, every shape of its self-cognition, to be necessary, because spirit is living, working, and the drive to press through the series of its appearances to the consciousness of itself as all truth.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>[p. 11] From the \u201cLectures on the Philosophy of Religion\u201d, which Hegel gave in Berlin in 1821, 1824, 1827 and 1831. The text is not a single transcript but the compilation of the Friends\u2019 Edition (ed. Philipp Marheineke, 2nd edition 1840) from Hegel\u2019s manuscript and transcripts of several years. Reproduced after the Werkausgabe (vol. 16), [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":906472,"menu_order":2,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-906487","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906487","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=906487"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906487\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":906491,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906487\/revisions\/906491"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906472"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=906487"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}