{"id":906489,"date":"2026-11-18T20:38:11","date_gmt":"2026-11-18T19:38:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/"},"modified":"2026-11-18T20:38:11","modified_gmt":"2026-11-18T19:38:11","slug":"lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/","title":{"rendered":"Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: The Concept of Religion"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 91]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"grl-provenance wp-block-paragraph\"><em>From the \u201cLectures on the Philosophy of Religion\u201d, which Hegel gave in Berlin in 1821, 1824, 1827 and 1831. The text is not a single transcript but the compilation of the Friends\u2019 Edition (ed. Philipp Marheineke, 2nd edition 1840) from Hegel\u2019s manuscript and transcripts of several years. Reproduced after the Werkausgabe (vol. 16), in our own English translation.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Print version (PDF, German):<\/strong> <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/religionsphilosophie-begriff-der-religion-2.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">to print and take along<\/a> \u2013 each page of the PDF contains exactly one printed page, with a wide margin for your own notes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The numbers between vertical bars, for example <span class=\"ed-s\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|93|<\/span>, mark the beginning of a page of the printed edition; this way one finds the passage again in one\u2019s own copy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">In the notes, \u201cWerkausgabe:\u201d stands before remarks of the editors, \u201cHegel\u2019s footnote.\u201d before Hegel\u2019s own notes, and \u201cDeleted in the manuscript:\u201d before text that Hegel himself deleted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Cross-reference:<\/em> It is preceded by the <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-introduction\/\">Introduction<\/a>. The concise systematic version stands in the <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/encyclopaedia-absolute-spirit\/\">Encyclopaedia, \u00a7\u00a7 553\u2013577<\/a>. Most important for the <em>Groundlines<\/em> is the section on the relationship of religion to the state at the end (counterpart to the Remark to <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/270\/\">\u00a7 270<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Page by page:<\/strong> Each web page contains exactly one printed page. Web page 1 is p. 91, web page 2 is p. 92 and so on; the web page for a printed page thus has the number \u201cprinted page minus 90\u201d. The page number stands at the top of each web page in square brackets. The first and the last page are only partly printed, because the text begins or ends there in the middle of the page.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Find a page:<\/strong><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/\">91<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=2\">92<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=3\">93<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=4\">94<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=5\">95<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=6\">96<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=7\">97<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=8\">98<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=9\">99<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=10\">100<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=11\">101<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=12\">102<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=13\">103<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=14\">104<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=15\">105<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=16\">106<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=17\">107<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=18\">108<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=19\">109<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=20\">110<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=21\">111<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=22\">112<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=23\">113<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=24\">114<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=25\">115<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=26\">116<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=27\">117<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=28\">118<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=29\">119<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=30\">120<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=31\">121<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=32\">122<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=33\">123<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=34\">124<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=35\">125<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=36\">126<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=37\">127<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=38\">128<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=39\">129<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=40\">130<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=41\">131<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=42\">132<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=43\">133<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=44\">134<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=45\">135<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=46\">136<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=47\">137<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=48\">138<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=49\">139<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=50\">140<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=51\">141<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=52\">142<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=53\">143<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=54\">144<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=55\">145<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=56\">146<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=57\">147<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=58\">148<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=59\">149<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=60\">150<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=61\">151<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=62\">152<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=63\">153<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=64\">154<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=65\">155<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=66\">156<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=67\">157<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=68\">158<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=69\">159<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=70\">160<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=71\">161<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=72\">162<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=73\">163<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=74\">164<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=75\">165<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=76\">166<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=77\">167<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=78\">168<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=79\">169<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=80\">170<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=81\">171<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=82\">172<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=83\">173<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=84\">174<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=85\">175<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=86\">176<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=87\">177<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=88\">178<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=89\">179<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=90\">180<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=91\">181<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=92\">182<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=93\">183<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=94\">184<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=95\">185<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=96\">186<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=97\">187<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=98\">188<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=99\">189<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=100\">190<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=101\">191<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=102\">192<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=103\">193<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=104\">194<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=105\">195<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=106\">196<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=107\">197<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=108\">198<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=109\">199<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=110\">200<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=111\">201<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=112\">202<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=113\">203<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=114\">204<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=115\">205<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=116\">206<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=117\">207<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=118\">208<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=119\">209<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=120\">210<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=121\">211<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=122\">212<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=123\">213<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=124\">214<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=125\">215<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=126\">216<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=127\">217<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=128\">218<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=129\">219<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=130\">220<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=131\">221<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=132\">222<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=133\">223<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=134\">224<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=135\">225<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=136\">226<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=137\">227<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=138\">228<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=139\">229<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=140\">230<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=141\">231<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=142\">232<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=143\">233<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=144\">234<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=145\">235<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=146\">236<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=147\">237<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=148\">238<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=149\">239<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=150\">240<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=151\">241<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=152\">242<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=153\">243<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=154\">244<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=155\">245<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=156\">246<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=157\">247<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Contents<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li><a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/#rb-erster-teil-der-begriff-der-religion\">Part One. The Concept of Religion<\/a><\/li><li>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=2#rb-a-von-gott\">A. Of God<\/a><\/li><li>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=11#rb-b-das-religioese-verhaeltnis\">B. The Religious Relationship<\/a><\/li><li>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=15#rb-i-die-notwendigkeit-des-religioesen-standpunktes\">I. The Necessity of the Religious Standpoint<\/a><\/li><li>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=24#rb-ii-die-formen-des-religioesen-bewusstseins\">II. The Forms of Religious Consciousness<\/a><\/li><li>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=61#rb-iii-die-notwendigkeit-und-vermittlung-des-religioe\">III. The Necessity and Mediation of the Religious Relationship in the Form of Thinking<\/a><\/li><li>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=112#rb-c-der-kultus\">C. The Cult<\/a><\/li><li>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=113#rb-i-der-glaube\">I. Faith<\/a><\/li><li>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=130#rb-ii-die-bestimmtheit-und-die-besonderen-formen-des\">II. The Determinacy and the Particular Forms of the Cult<\/a><\/li><li>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/excursuses\/lectures-philosophy-of-religion-concept-of-religion\/?page=146#rb-iii-das-verhaeltnis-der-religion-zum-staat\">III. The Relationship of Religion to the State<\/a><\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-erster-teil-der-begriff-der-religion\">Part One. The Concept of Religion<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What we have to begin with is the question: how are we to gain a <em>beginning<\/em>? It is an at least formal demand of all science, especially of philosophy, that nothing occur in it that is not <em>proved<\/em>. To prove, in the superficial sense, means that a content, proposition, concept is shown as resulting from something preceding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But when one is to begin, one has not yet proved, for one is not yet at something resulting, at something mediated, posited through another. In the beginning one is at the immediate. The other sciences have it easy in their way, for to them the object is present as a given one; so, e.g., geometry begins: there is a space, a point. There is no question there of proving the object; it is granted immediately.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In philosophy it is not permitted to make a beginning with \u201cthere is, it is\u201d, for in it we are not supposed to presuppose the object. This can make up a difficulty with regard to philosophy in general. But here we do not begin philosophy from the start; the science of religion is a science within philosophy, presupposes to that extent the other philosophical disciplines, and is thus a result. On the philosophical side we are here already at a result of premises that lie behind our back. As an expedient, however, we can turn to our ordinary consciousness, take up something granted, presupposed in a subjective way, and make the beginning from it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The beginning of religion is, according to its general content, the still enveloped concept of religion itself: that God is the absolute truth, the truth of everything, and that<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 92]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s92\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 92\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|92|<\/span> religion alone is absolutely true knowing. We thus have to treat of God and make the beginning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-a-von-gott\">A. Of God<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What God is, is for us who have religion something familiar, a content present in subjective consciousness; but considered scientifically, God is at first a general abstract name that has not yet received any true substance. For only the philosophy of religion is the development, the cognition of what God is, and only through it does one learn in a cognizing way what God is. God is this very well <em>known<\/em> representation, but one not yet scientifically developed, <em>cognized<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With reference to this development, which justifies itself in our science, we take it up <em>at first<\/em> as an assurance that it is the result of philosophy that God is the <em>absolutely true<\/em>, the <em>universal in and for itself<\/em>, what embraces, contains everything and gives everything its subsistence. And with regard to this assurance we can likewise appeal at first to religious consciousness, which has the conviction that God is the absolutely true in general, from which everything proceeds and into which everything returns, on which everything depends, and that nothing else has absolute, true independence. That, then, is the content of the beginning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This beginning is still abstract scientifically; however full the breast may be of this representation, in science what matters is not what is in the breast, but what is set out as object for consciousness, more precisely for thinking consciousness, &#8211; what has attained the form of thought. To give this fullness the form of thought, of the concept, is the business of our science.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 93]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s93\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 93\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|93|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">a) The beginning as abstract, as the first content, <em>universality<\/em>, thus still has, as it were, a <em>subjective position<\/em>, has the position as if the universal were so universal only for the <em>beginning<\/em> and did not remain in this universality. The beginning of the content, however, is itself to be grasped in such a way that in all further developments of this content &#8211; as this universal will show itself to be something absolutely concrete, full of content, rich &#8211; we at the same time do not step out of this universality, so that this universality, which we on the one hand leave as regards form, in that it goes on to a determinate development, nevertheless preserves itself as <em>absolute<\/em>, <em>lasting foundation<\/em> and is not to be taken as a merely subjective beginning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">God is for us, insofar as he is the universal, in relation to development what is closed within itself, in absolute unity with itself. When we say: God is what is closed, this is expressed in relation to a development that we expect; but closedness, what we have called the universality of God, is in this relation to God himself, to the content itself, not to be grasped as an abstract universality outside which the particular, against which the particular would still be independent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So now this universality is to be grasped as the absolutely full, fulfilled one. God as this universal, what is concrete, full in itself, is this, that God is only <em>One<\/em>, and not in opposition to many gods; rather there is only the One, God.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The things, developments of the natural and spiritual world, are manifold shapes, infinitely many-formed existence; they have a being of differing degree, force, strength, content. But the being of all these things is such as is not independent, but absolutely only a borne, posited being, does not have true independence. When we ascribe a being to particular things, it is only a borrowed being, only the semblance of a being, not the absolutely independent being that God is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 94]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s94\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 94\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|94|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">God in his universality, this universal in which there is no limit, finitude, particularity, is absolute subsisting and alone subsisting; and what subsists has its root, its subsisting, only in this One. If we grasp this first content thus, we can express ourselves: God is the <em>absolute substance<\/em>, the alone true actuality. Everything else that is actual is not actual for itself, has no subsisting for itself; the only absolute actuality is God alone; thus he is the absolute substance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If one holds fast to this thought so abstractly, it is admittedly Spinozism. Substantiality, substance as such, is not yet distinguished at all from subjectivity. But to the presupposition made this also belongs: God is spirit, absolute spirit, the eternally simple spirit essentially with itself. This ideality, subjectivity of spirit, which is transparency, ideality of everything particular, is likewise this universality, this pure relation to itself, absolute being and remaining with itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When we say \u201csubstance\u201d, there lies in it that this universal is not yet grasped as concrete in itself; if it is so grasped, as concrete in itself, it is spirit; spirit, even in its concrete determination within itself, remains this unity with itself, this <em>one<\/em> actuality which we just called substance. It is a further determination that substantiality, the unity of absolute actuality with itself, is only foundation, <em>one<\/em> moment in the determination of God as spirit. The disparagement of philosophy proceeds mainly from this side: it is said that philosophy must be Spinozism if it is consistent; and thus it is atheism, fatalism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But at the beginning one does not yet have distinct determinations, one and an other: at the beginning one is only at the One, not at the other. From such a beginning we have the content at first still in the form of substantiality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 95]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s95\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 95\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|95|<\/span> Even when we say \u201cGod, spirit\u201d, these are indeterminate words, representations. What matters is what has entered consciousness. First the simple, the abstract enters consciousness. In this first simplicity we have God still in the determination of universality, at which, however, we do not stop.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This content nevertheless remains the foundation; in all further development God does not step out of his unity with himself. When he, as is usually said, creates the world, there does not arise an evil, an other, that would be independent, self-subsistent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">b) This beginning is object for <em>us<\/em> or content in us; <em>we<\/em> have this object. So the immediate question is: who are <em>we<\/em>? We, I, spirit, is itself something very concrete, manifold: I am intuiting, I see, hear and so on. All that I am, this feeling, seeing. The more precise sense of this question is thus: according to which of those determinations is this content for our senses? Representation, will, fantasy, feeling? Which is the <em>place<\/em> where this content, object, is at home? Which is the <em>ground of this substance<\/em>?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If one recalls the current answers in this respect, God is in us as believing, feeling, representing, knowing. These forms, faculties, sides of ours, feeling, faith, representation, we shall have to consider more closely afterwards, especially in relation to this point itself. We do not look round for an answer of any kind, do not go by experiences, observations that we have God in feeling and so on; at first we keep to what we have before us, this One, <em>universal<\/em>, this fullness, which is this self-equal, transparent aether.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If we take this One before us and ask: for which of our faculties, activities of spirit is this One, absolutely universal?, we can only name the corresponding activity of our spirit as the ground on which this content can be at home. That is <em>thinking<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 96]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s96\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 96\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|96|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thinking alone is the ground of this content, the <em>activity of the universal<\/em>, the universal in its activity, efficacy; or if we express it as <em>apprehending<\/em> the universal, then that for which the universal is is always thinking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This universal, which can be produced by thinking and is for thinking, can be quite abstract; so it is the immeasurable, infinite, the sublation of every limit, particularity. This at first negative universal has its seat only in thinking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When we think of God, we also express this course: that we raise ourselves above the sensuous, external, single; an elevation is expressed to the pure, to what is one with itself. This elevation is a going beyond the sensuous and mere feeling into the pure region of the universal, and this region is thinking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is, in the subjective mode, the ground for this content. The content is this absolutely undivided, uninterrupted, what remains with itself, the universal, and thinking is the mode for which this universal is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So we have a <em>difference<\/em> between <em>thinking<\/em> and the <em>universal<\/em> that we at first called God; it is a difference that at first belongs only to our reflection, that <em>for itself is not yet contained at all in the content<\/em>. It is a result of philosophy, as it is already a faith of religion, that God is the one true actuality, and no other at all. In this one actuality and pure clarity the actuality and the difference that we call the thinking one have as yet no place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What we have before us is this <em>one absolute<\/em>. This content, this determination, we cannot yet call religion; for that subjective spirit, consciousness, is required. Thinking is the place of this universal, but this place is at first absorbed in this One, Eternal, being in and for itself. In this true, absolute determination, which only is not yet developed, completed, God remains absolute substance in all development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 97]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s97\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 97\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|97|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This universal is the starting point and point of departure, but absolutely this abiding unity, not a mere ground out of which differences grow; rather all differences remain enclosed in this universal. But it is also not an inert, abstract universal, but the absolute womb, the infinite drive and source-point, from which everything proceeds and into which everything returns and in which it is eternally kept.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The universal thus never steps out of this aether of equality with itself and of being with itself. God as this universal cannot come to be in fact with an other whose subsisting would be more than a play of semblance. Against this pure unity and clear transparency matter is nothing impenetrable, and spirit, the I, does not have the brittleness of possessing true substantiality for itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">c) This representation people have wanted to designate with the name <em>pantheism<\/em>; more correctly one would call it: representation of substantiality. God is there at first determined only as substance; the absolute subject, spirit, also remains substance, but it is not only substance, but also determined within itself as subject. Of this difference those usually know nothing who say that speculative philosophy is pantheism; they overlook the main thing, as always, and they disparage philosophy by making something false of it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Pantheism usually has in this reproach the sense: everything, the All, the universe, this <em>complex of everything existing<\/em>, these infinitely <em>many finite things<\/em>, are God; and this accusation is made against philosophy, that it asserts that <em>everything<\/em> is God, i.e. this infinite manifoldness of single things, not the universality that is in and for itself, but the single things in their empirical existence, as they are <em>immediately<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If one says: God is <em>all this<\/em>, this paper and so on, that is pantheism as it is grasped in that reproach, i.e.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 98]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s98\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 98\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|98|<\/span> God is everything, all single things. When I say \u201cgenus\u201d, that too is a universality, but a quite different one from \u201callness\u201d, in which the universal is only the gathering together of all single existences, and what is, the underlying, the content proper, is all single things.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This fact, that such pantheism has existed in any religion, is completely false; it has never occurred to any human being to say: everything is God, i.e. things in their singularity, contingency; much less has this been asserted in a philosophy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Oriental pantheism, or more correctly Spinozism, we shall come to know later in determinate religion. Spinozism itself as such, and oriental pantheism too, contains that in everything the divine is only the <em>universal<\/em> of a content, the <em>essence<\/em> of things, but in such a way that this is also represented as the determinate essence of things.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When Brahma says: \u201cI am the radiance, the shining in metals, the Ganges among rivers, the life in the living\u201d and so on, the single is thereby <em>sublated<\/em>. Brahma does not say: \u201cI am the metal, the rivers, the single things of every kind themselves as such, as they immediately exist.\u201d The radiance is not the metal itself, but the universal, substantial, lifted out from the single, no longer the \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd, the All as single. There what is called pantheism is already no longer said; rather the essence in such single things is said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To the living belong temporality, spatiality; but what is lifted out is only the imperishable in this singularity. The \u201clife of the living\u201d is, in this sphere of life, the unrestricted, universal. But if it is said: everything is God, then <em>singularity<\/em> is taken according to all its <em>limits<\/em>, its finitude, perishability. This representation of pantheism comes from lifting out abstract, not spiritual unity;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 99]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s99\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 99\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|99|<\/span> and then, in a religious representation where only substance, the One, counts as true actuality, they forget that precisely before this One the single finite things have vanished, no actuality is ascribed to them; instead one still retains them materially beside the One. They do not believe the Eleatics, who said: \u201cThere is only the One\u201d, and expressly added: \u201cand nothing is not at all\u201d.<sup><a href=\"#vpr2-fn1\" id=\"vpr2-fnr1\">1)<\/a><\/sup> Everything finite would be restriction, negation of the One; but nothing, restriction, finitude, limit and the limited, is not at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"vpr2-fn1\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\"><a href=\"#vpr2-fnr1\">1)<\/a> <em>Werkausgabe:<\/em> cf. Parmenides, Diels-Kranz 28 B 2<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Spinozism has been reproached with atheism; but the world, this \u201ceverything\u201d, <em>is<\/em> not at all in Spinozism. It does appear; one speaks of its existence, and our life is to be in this existence. In the philosophical sense, however, the world has no actuality at all, is not at all. No actuality is ascribed to these single things; they are finitudes, and of these it is said that they are not at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Spinozism, runs the general accusation, is this consequence: if everything is one, such philosophy asserts that good is one with evil, that there is <em>no difference between good and evil<\/em>, and thereby all religion is sublated. It is said that the difference of good and evil does not hold in itself; thereby it is indifferent whether one is good or evil. It can be admitted that the difference between good and evil is sublated <em>in itself<\/em>, i.e. <em>in God<\/em>, the only true actuality. In God there is no evil; the difference between good and evil would be only if God were evil. But one will not admit that evil is something affirmative and that this affirmative is in God. God is good and alone good; the difference of evil and good is not present in this One, this substance; it enters only with <em>difference in general<\/em>. God is the One, what absolutely remains with itself; in<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 100]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s100\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 100\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|100|<\/span> substance there is no difference. With the difference of God from the world, in particular from man, the difference of good and evil enters. In Spinozism, with regard to this difference of God and man, it is the basic determination that man must have God alone as his goal. There, for difference, for man, the law is the love of God, to be directed to this love of God alone, not to assert one\u2019s difference, not to want to persist in it, but to have one\u2019s direction only towards God.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That is the most sublime morality: that evil is the null and man is not to let this difference, this nullity, count. Man can want to persist in this difference, drive this difference to opposition against God, the universal in and for itself, &#8211; then he is evil. But he can also regard his difference as null, place his truth only in God and his direction towards God, &#8211; then he is good.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In Spinozism, admittedly, distinctness of good and evil enters &#8211; God and man over against each other &#8211; and enters with this determination, that evil is to be regarded as the null. In God as such, in this determination as substance, the difference is not; but for man this difference is, also that between good and evil.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This superficiality with which polemic is made against philosophy also says that philosophy is a <em>system of identity<\/em>. It is quite correct: substance is this one identity with itself, but so equally is spirit. Identity, unity with itself, is in the end everything. But if one speaks of philosophy of identity, one stops at <em>abstract identity<\/em>, unity in general, and disregards what alone matters, the <em>determination of this unity within itself<\/em>, whether it is determined as substance or as spirit. The whole of philosophy is nothing other than the study of the determinations of unity; likewise the philosophy of religion is a sequence<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 101]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s101\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 101\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|101|<\/span> of unities, always unity, but such that it is always further determined.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the physical sphere there are many unities. Water and earth brought together, that too is unity, but a mixture. When I have a base and an acid and salt, crystal, arises from them, I also have water, but cannot see it; there is not the least moisture present. There the unity of the water with this matter is a quite differently determined unity from when I mix water and earth. The main thing is the difference of this determination. The unity of God is always unity; but everything depends solely on the kinds and modes of the <em>determination of this unity<\/em>; this determination of unity is overlooked, and precisely thereby what matters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first is this divine universality, spirit wholly in its indeterminate universality, for which there is no difference at all. On this absolute foundation &#8211; we state this at first still as a fact -, however, <em>difference<\/em> in general now also comes forth, which, as <em>spiritual<\/em> difference, is <em>consciousness<\/em>, and only with this does <em>religion as such<\/em> begin. Since absolute universality advances to <em>judgement<\/em>, i.e. to positing itself as determinacy, and God as spirit is for spirit, we have the standpoint that God is object of consciousness and that thinking, at the beginning universal, distinguishing, has entered into <em>relationship<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-b-das-religioese-verhaeltnis\">B. The Religious Relationship<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the doctrine of God we have God before us as object absolutely only for himself; then, admittedly, the relation of God to men is also added, and while according to the earlier usual representation this did not appear to belong essentially to it,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 102]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s102\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 102\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|102|<\/span> recent theology, by contrast, treats more of religion than of God: it is only demanded that man should have religion. This is the main thing, and it is even set down as indifferent whether one knows anything of God or not; or it is held that this is only something wholly subjective, that one does not really know what God is. In the Middle Ages, by contrast, people considered and determined more the essence of God. We have to acknowledge the truth that lies in this, that God is not considered separated from subjective spirit, only not for the reason that God is something unknown, but because God is essentially <em>spirit<\/em>, as <em>knowing<\/em> spirit. It is thus a relation of spirit to spirit. This <em>relationship<\/em> of spirit to spirit underlies religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If we were now relieved of beginning with the proof that God is, we would nevertheless have to prove that religion <em>is<\/em> and that it is <em>necessary<\/em>; for philosophy does not have its object as a given one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">One could, to be sure, say that that proof is not necessary and appeal to the fact that <em>all<\/em> peoples have religion. But this is only something assumed, and one does not altogether deal particularly well with the expression \u201call\u201d. Then there are also peoples of whom one could hardly say that they have religion: their highest, which they perhaps venerate, is sun, moon, or whatever else strikes them in sensuous nature. There is also the appearance of an extreme of culture in which the being of God has been denied altogether, and likewise that religion is the truthfulness of spirit; indeed, in this extreme it has been seriously asserted that priests are only deceivers in instilling a religion into people, for in doing so they had only the intention of making people subservient to themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A further attempt to prove the necessity of religion arrives only at <em>external<\/em>, <em>conditioned necessity<\/em>, in which religion is made into a <em>means<\/em> and into<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 103]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s103\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 103\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|103|<\/span> something intended, but thereby degraded to something <em>contingent<\/em>, which does not count in and for itself, but can be arbitrarily removed by me just as it can be used with intention. The true view, the substantial relationship, and the false relationship stand very close to each other here, and the crookedness of the latter seems to be only a slight displacement of the former.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In ancient and modern times it has been said that this city, this state, these families or individuals perished through contempt of the gods; the veneration of the gods, on the other hand, and reverence for them preserve and bless states, and the happiness and advancement of individuals are furthered by their religiosity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Admittedly righteousness becomes something firm and the fulfilment of duties receives its confirmation only when religion underlies them. The innermost of man, conscience, has in it for the first time absolute obligation and the security of it. Thus the <em>state<\/em> must rest on <em>religion<\/em>, because in it the security of disposition, of duties towards the state, is first absolute. Every other mode of obligation knows how to procure excuses, exceptions, counter-reasons, knows how to belittle the laws, institutions and individuals of government and authority, to bring them under points of view by which one frees oneself from respect for them. For all these determinations are not only what they are in themselves and within themselves, but at the same time have a present, finite existence; they are of such a constitution that they invite reflection to investigate them, to accuse them as well as to justify them, and so call forth subjective consideration, which can dispense itself from them. Only religion strikes down, annihilates all this subjective judging and weighing and brings about an infinite, absolute obligation. In short, the veneration of God or of the gods strengthens and preserves individuals, families, states; contempt of God or of the gods dissolves the rights and<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 104]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s104\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 104\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|104|<\/span> duties, the bonds of families and states, and leads them to ruin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is admittedly a most true and important consideration, which contains the <em>essential<\/em>, <em>substantial connection<\/em>. If now from that proposition, as the result of an experience, it is inferred: therefore religion is necessary, this is an external kind of inference, but can still be defective solely with regard to <em>subjective cognition<\/em>, so that the content is not thereby yet given a crooked turn or position. But if the inference now runs: therefore religion is useful <em>for the ends<\/em> of individuals, governments, states etc., a relationship is thereby introduced in which religion is posited as <em>means<\/em>. But with religion one is dealing with spirit, the many-sided. Just as already the organic body in its illnesses is at the same time, as to the remedies, <em>indifferent in their speciality<\/em>, however much they exercise a necessity of operation on it, and a <em>choice<\/em> among a multitude of remedies is open, so spirit even more degrades what it has as means and can use to something <em>particular<\/em>, and it then has the consciousness of its freedom to be able to use it or also another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So if religion is a means, spirit knows that it can use it, but that it can also take hold of other means; indeed, it stands over against it in such a way that it can want to rely on itself. It further has the <em>freedom of its ends<\/em> &#8211; its force, cunning, mastery of people\u2019s opinion etc. are also means -, and precisely in the freedom of <em>its<\/em> ends, which lies precisely in <em>its<\/em> ends being supposed to be what <em>counts<\/em> and religion only a means, it has the freedom to make its power and dominion its end, thus to set itself ends for which it can <em>do without<\/em> religion or which go precisely <em>against<\/em> it. What matters is rather that it should resolve upon, or know itself obliged to, such ends as, with setting aside<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 105]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s105\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 105\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|105|<\/span> other <em>arbitrary<\/em> ones, altogether with sacrifice of <em>particular<\/em> ends, count objectively, <em>in and for themselves<\/em>. Objective ends demand the giving up of subjective interests, inclinations and ends, and this <em>negative<\/em> is contained in it when it is said that the veneration of God founds the true welfare of individuals, peoples and states. If this is a consequence of that veneration, the veneration is the main thing, has its determination and determinacy for itself and regulates the ends and views of men, which as particular ends are not the <em>first<\/em>, what is supposed to determine itself for itself. Thus a slight turn of the position of reflection changes and wholly corrupts that first sense and makes of necessity a mere usefulness, which, as contingent, can be inverted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here, rather, the talk is of <em>inner<\/em> necessity that is in and for itself, a necessity which arbitrariness, evil, can admittedly set itself against; but this arbitrariness then falls <em>outside<\/em>, on the side of the I, which as free can place itself on the peak of its being-for-itself, and no longer belongs to necessity itself and is no longer its <em>own self-inverting nature<\/em>, as is the case as long as it is grasped only as <em>usefulness<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-i-die-notwendigkeit-des-religioesen-standpunktes\">I. The Necessity of the Religious Standpoint<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>universal necessity<\/em> of the concept now develops in such a way that religion 1. is grasped as <em>result<\/em>, but 2. as a result that likewise <em>sublates<\/em> being a result, and that 3. it is the <em>content itself<\/em> that, in and through itself, passes over to positing itself as result. That is <em>objective necessity<\/em>, not a merely subjective business; it is not <em>we<\/em> who set this necessity in motion, but it is the <em>doing of the content<\/em> itself, or the object produces itself. Subjective derivation and movement of cognition occurs, e.g., in geometry:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 106]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s106\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 106\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|106|<\/span> the triangle does not itself go the way that we cover in cognizing and proving.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With religion as something <em>spiritual<\/em> in general, however, it is immediately the case that in its <em>existence<\/em> itself it is this <em>process<\/em> and this <em>passing over<\/em>. With natural things, e.g. the sun, we have before us an immediate <em>resting<\/em> existence, and in the intuition or representation of it the consciousness of a transition is not contained. Religious consciousness, on the other hand, is in itself the <em>separating from<\/em> and <em>leaving<\/em> of the immediate, <em>finite<\/em>, and transition to the intellectual or, determined objectively, the gathering of the perishable into its absolute, substantial essence. Religion is the consciousness of what is true in and for itself <em>in opposition<\/em> to sensuous, finite truth and to perception. It is accordingly <em>elevation<\/em>, reflection, passing over from the immediate, sensuous, single, for the immediate is the first and therefore not elevation, &#8211; thus a going out and going on to an <em>other<\/em>, but not to a third and so on, for then the other would itself again be something <em>finite<\/em>, not an other, &#8211; thus progression to a second, but such that this going on and producing of a second sublates itself, and rather this second is the <em>first<\/em>, the truly unmediated and <em>non-posited<\/em>. The standpoint of religion shows itself in this transition as the standpoint of truth, in which the whole wealth of the natural and spiritual world is contained. Every other mode of existence of this wealth must prove itself there as an external, meagre, paltry and self-contradicting and self-destroying mode of actuality, which has in it the end of truth, the side of untruth, and only on the standpoint of religion returns into its ground and its source. In this proof the insight is then grounded that spirit can stop and hold itself at none of those stages, and that religion only then is true <em>actuality of self-consciousness<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 107]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s107\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 107\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|107|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As regards the proof of this necessity, the following may suffice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the fact that something is to be shown as necessary there lies, then, that one starts from an <em>other<\/em>. This other of true, divine being is here <em>undivine being<\/em>, the <em>finite world<\/em>, <em>finite consciousness<\/em>. If one now begins from this as the immediate, finite, untrue, and indeed from it as an object of our knowing and as we apprehend it immediately as what it is in its determinate quality &#8211; if one thus begins from the first in this way, it shows itself in the progression <em>not<\/em> to <em>be<\/em> what it immediately presents itself as, but as destroying itself, <em>becoming<\/em>, sending itself on to an other. Of the finite with which we begin, therefore, it is not <em>our<\/em> reflection and consideration, our judgement, that tells us that it has something true as its ground; it is not <em>we<\/em> who bring its ground in; rather it shows in itself that it dissolves into an other, into something higher than it itself is. We follow the object as it goes back for itself to the source of its truth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since the object from which one begins perishes in its truth and sacrifices itself, it has not thereby <em>vanished<\/em>; its content is rather posited in the <em>determination of its ideality<\/em>. An example of this sublation and ideality we have in consciousness: I relate myself to an object and then consider it as it is. The object, which I at the same time distinguish from myself, is independent; I have not made it, it has not waited for me in order to be, and it remains even if I go away from it. Both, I and the object, are thus two independent things; but consciousness is at the same time the relation of these two independent things, in which both are posited as one; in my knowing of the object, these two, I and the other, are in one in my simple determinacy. If we grasp this truly, we have not only the <em>negative result<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 108]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s108\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 108\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|108|<\/span> that the being-one and the being-independent of two sublate themselves. The sublation is not only empty negation, but the negative of those from which I started. The nothing is thus only <em>the nothing of the independence of both<\/em>, the nothing in which both determinations are sublated and ideally contained.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If we now wanted to see in this way how the natural and the spiritual universe go back into their truth, into the religious standpoint, the detailed consideration of this going back would form the whole circle of the philosophical sciences. We would have to begin here with nature; this is the immediate; over against nature would then stand spirit, and both are finite insofar as they stand over against each other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here <em>two modes of consideration<\/em> could now be distinguished.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>First<\/em> we could consider what nature and spirit are <em>in themselves<\/em>. This consideration would show that they are in themselves <em>identical in the one Idea<\/em> and both only the reflection of one and the same, or that they have their <em>one<\/em> root in the Idea. But this would itself still be an <em>abstract<\/em> consideration, which restricts itself to what those oppositions are <em>in themselves<\/em> and does not grasp them according to <em>Idea<\/em> and <em>reality<\/em>. The <em>differences<\/em> that essentially belong to the Idea would be left unregarded. This absolute Idea is the necessary, is the <em>essence<\/em> of both, of nature and of spirit, in which what makes up their difference, their limit and finitude, falls away. The <em>essence<\/em> of spirit and of nature is one and the same, and in this identity they are no longer what they are in their separation and quality. In this consideration, however, it is <em>our cognizing activity<\/em> that strips these two of their difference and sublates their finitude. It falls <em>outside<\/em> these limited worlds that they are limited and that their limit vanishes in the Idea, which is their unity. This falling away of the limit is a looking away that falls into our cognizing<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 109]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s109\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 109\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|109|<\/span> activity. <em>We<\/em> sublate the form of their finitude and come to their truth. This way of grasping is to that extent more of a <em>subjective<\/em> kind, and what presents itself as the truth of this finitude is the Idea that is in itself &#8211; Spinozist <em>substance<\/em> or the <em>absolute<\/em> as Schelling grasped it. One shows of natural things as of the spiritual world that they are finite, that the true is the <em>vanishing of their limit<\/em> in absolute substance, and that this is the absolute identity of both, of the subjective and objective, of thinking and being. But it <em>is<\/em> only this identity. Determinacy of form and quality is removed by us and does not fall into substance, which is therefore rigid, cold, <em>motionless necessity<\/em>, in which cognition, subjectivity, cannot satisfy itself, because it does not find its liveliness and its differences again in it. This appearance is also found in ordinary devotion: one raises oneself above finitude, forgets it; but because one has forgotten it, it is not yet truly sublated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>second<\/em> is the grasping of necessity in such a way that the self-sublation of the finite and the positing of the absolute are of an <em>objective<\/em> nature. It must be shown of nature and of spirit that they sublate <em>themselves<\/em> according to their concept, and their finitude may not be removed merely by subjective removal of their limit. This is then the movement of thinking that is equally the movement of the matter, and it is the process of nature and spirit themselves from which the true proceeds. Thus<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">a) <em>nature<\/em> is considered as what it is in itself, as the <em>process<\/em> whose final truth is the transition to spirit, so that spirit proves itself to be the truth of nature. That is nature\u2019s own determination: that it sacrifices itself, burns itself, so that from this burnt offering Psyche breaks forth and the Idea raises itself into its own element, into its own aether. This sacrifice of nature is its process and has more precisely the determination that it appears as<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 110]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s110\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 110\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|110|<\/span> progression through a ladder of stages, where the differences are there in the form of <em>being outside one another<\/em>. The connection is only something inner. The moments that the Idea runs through in the garment of nature are a series of independent shapes. Nature is the Idea in itself and <em>only<\/em> in itself, and the mode of its existence is <em>to be outside itself<\/em> in complete externality. The more precise mode of its progression, however, is that the concept enclosed in it breaks through, draws the rind of being-outside-itself into itself, idealizes it and, by making the shell of the crystal transparent, itself enters appearance. The inner concept becomes external, or conversely: nature deepens itself into itself, and the external makes itself into the mode of the concept. Thus an externality comes forth that is itself ideal and held in the unity of the concept. This is the truth of nature, <em>consciousness<\/em>. In consciousness I am the concept, and what is for me, of which I have a consciousness, is my existence in general. In nature this is something not known, only something external, and only spirit knows externality and posits it as identical with itself. In <em>sensation<\/em>, the highest peak and the end of nature, a being-for-itself is already contained, so that the determinacy that something has is at the same time ideal and taken back into the subject. The qualities of a stone are external to one another, and the concept we grasp of it is not in it. In sensation, on the other hand, there are not external qualities as such; rather they are reflected into themselves, and here soul, subjectivity, begins. There the identity which, as gravity, is only drive and ought, has entered existence. In gravity there still always remains a being-outside-one-another; the different points repel one another, and this one point that sensation is, being-within-itself, does not come forth. The whole urging and life of nature, however, goes towards sensation and towards spirit. Since now spirit appears in this progression as necessary through nature, as mediated by it,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 111]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s111\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 111\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|111|<\/span> this mediation is one that at the same time sublates itself. What proceeds from the mediation shows itself to be the ground and the truth of that from which it proceeded. For philosophical cognition the progression is a stream flowing on in <em>opposite directions<\/em> to the other, but at the same time acting back in such a way that what appears as the last, as grounded in what precedes, appears rather as the first, as the ground.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">b) <em>Spirit<\/em> itself is at first <em>immediate<\/em>; it is for itself through coming to itself, and its liveliness is to become for itself through itself. In this process two sides are essentially to be distinguished: first what spirit is <em>in and for itself<\/em>, and second <em>its finitude<\/em>. At first it is <em>without relationship<\/em>, ideal, enclosed in the Idea; in the second, in its finitude, it is <em>consciousness<\/em> and stands, since something other is for it, in relationship. Nature is only appearance; it is Idea for us in thinking consideration; thus this its own transfiguration, spirit, falls outside it. The determination of spirit, on the other hand, is that the Idea falls into spirit itself and the absolute, what is true in and for itself, is for it. In its immediacy spirit is still finite, and this finitude has the form that at first what it is <em>in and for itself<\/em> is <em>distinguished<\/em> from what falls into its <em>consciousness<\/em>. Its <em>determination<\/em> and its infinity, however, is that its consciousness and its Idea come <em>into balance<\/em>. This completion of spirit and the balancing of the differences of that relationship can be grasped according to this twofold side, of being in and for itself and of the consciousness of it. Both are at first distinguished: what is in and for itself is not for consciousness, and it still has the shape of the other for spirit. But both also stand in such interaction that the progression of the one is at the same time the further development of the other. In the <em>Phenomenology of Spirit<\/em> spirit is considered in its appearance as consciousness, and the necessity of its progression up to the absolute standpoint<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 112]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s112\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 112\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|112|<\/span> is considered. There the shapes of spirit, the stages it produces, are considered as they fall into its consciousness. But what spirit knows, what it is as <em>consciousness<\/em>, is only the one; the other is the <em>necessity<\/em> of what spirit knows and what is for it. For the one, that its world is for spirit, merely <em>is<\/em> and appears as contingent; the other, the necessity that this world has <em>come to be<\/em> for it, is not for spirit at this stage of consciousness, goes on in secret behind its back, is only for philosophical consideration and falls into the development of what spirit is according to its <em>concept<\/em>. In this development, now, it comes to a stage where spirit attains its <em>absolute consciousness<\/em>, at which <em>rationality<\/em> is for it as a <em>world<\/em>; and since on the other side, according to the mode of consciousness, it develops itself to the consciousness of the being-in-and-for-itself of the world, here is the point where the two modes, which were at first different, coincide. The completion of consciousness is that the <em>true object<\/em> is for it, and the completion of the object, of the substantial, of substance, is that it is for itself, i.e. distinguishes itself from itself and has itself as object. Consciousness drives itself on to consciousness of the substantial, and this, the concept of spirit, drives itself on to appearance and to the relationship of being for itself. This last point, where the movement of both sides meets, is the <em>ethical world<\/em>, the state. There the freedom of spirit, which goes on its way independently like the sun, is a present object found before one, as a necessity and existing world. Likewise consciousness is completed here, and each finds himself in this world of the state already made and has his freedom in it. Consciousness, being-for-itself and the substantial essence have come into balance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">c) This appearance of divine life, however, is itself still in finitude, and the sublation of this finitude<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 113]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s113\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 113\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|113|<\/span> is the <em>religious standpoint<\/em>, on which God, as the absolute power and substance into which the whole wealth of the natural as of the spiritual world has gone back, is object of consciousness. The religious standpoint, as the development of the natural and spiritual universe, results in this progression as <em>what is absolutely true and first<\/em>, which has nothing lying behind it as an <em>abiding<\/em> presupposition, but has consumed the whole wealth into itself. The necessity is rather that this entire wealth has sunk into its truth, namely into the universal that is in and for itself. But since this universal is determined <em>in and for itself<\/em> and as concrete, as Idea, is itself this, to repel itself from itself, it develops <em>determinacy<\/em> out of itself and posits itself for <em>consciousness<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The forms of this development and self-determination of the universal are the main logical moments, which likewise make up the form of all the wealth mentioned earlier. The development of God within himself is thus the same logical necessity as that of the universe, and this is divine in itself only insofar as it is at every stage the development of this form.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At first this development differs, to be sure, with regard to the <em>material<\/em>, since, proceeding in <em>pure universality<\/em>, it gives only <em>divine configurations<\/em> and moments, whereas in the field of <em>finitude<\/em> it gives finite shapes and spheres. This material, then, and its configurations are to that extent quite different, notwithstanding that the form of necessity is the same. But further, these two materials too &#8211; the development of God within himself and the development of the universe &#8211; are not absolutely different. The divine Idea has the meaning that it is the absolute subject, the <em>truth<\/em> of the universe of the natural and spiritual world, not merely an <em>abstract other<\/em>. It is therefore the same material. It is the intellectual, divine world, divine life within itself, that develops; but these<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 114]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s114\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 114\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|114|<\/span> circles of its life are the same as those of the life of the world. This, divine life in the mode of appearance, in the form of finitude, is intuited in that eternal life in its eternal shape and truth, <em>sub specie aeterni<\/em>. So we have finite consciousness, finite world, nature, what occurs in the world of appearance. This altogether makes up the opposition of the other to the Idea. In God too the other of the simple Idea, which is still in its substantiality, occurs; but there it retains the determination of its eternity and remains in love and in divinity. This other remaining in the state of <em>being in and for itself<\/em>, however, is the <em>truth of the other<\/em> as it appears as finite world and as <em>finite consciousness<\/em>. The material whose necessity we have considered is therefore in and for itself the same as it occurs in the divine Idea as in and for itself and as it appears as the wealth of the finite world, for this world has its truth and transfiguration only in that world of the Idea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The necessity that seemed to lie behind the religious standpoint when it is derived from the preceding stages of the natural and spiritual world thus lies, as we now see, within it itself and is thus to be posited as its inner form and development. In now passing over to this development, we ourselves begin again with the form of <em>appearance<\/em> and consider first <em>consciousness<\/em> as it <em>appears in relationship<\/em> on this standpoint and <em>works out<\/em> and develops the <em>forms<\/em> of this relationship, until <em>inner<\/em> necessity develops and completes itself in the <em>concept<\/em> itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-ii-die-formen-des-religioesen-bewusstseins\">II. The Forms of Religious Consciousness<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first thing that comes into consideration in the sphere of the appearance of religious spirit are the forms of the religious relationship, which, as being of a psychological kind, fall on the side of finite spirit. The universal, first of all, is<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 115]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s115\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 115\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|115|<\/span> consciousness of God; this is not only consciousness, but more precisely also certainty. The more precise form of this is faith, this certainty insofar as it is in faith, or insofar as this knowing of God is <em>feeling<\/em> and in feeling; that concerns the subjective side.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The second is the objective side, the mode of the content. The form in which God is at first for us is the mode of <em>intuition<\/em>, of <em>representation<\/em>, and finally the form of <em>thinking<\/em> as such.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first, then, is <em>consciousness of God in general<\/em>: that he is object for us, that we have representations of him in general. But consciousness is not only that we have an object and a representation, but that this content also <em>is<\/em>, is not merely a representation. That is the <em>certainty<\/em> of God.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Representation, or that something is object in consciousness, means that this content is in me, is <em>mine<\/em>. I can have representations of wholly invented, fantastic objects; this content is here mine, but <em>only<\/em> mine, only in representation; I know of this content at the same time that it is not. In a dream too I am consciousness, have objects, but they are not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But we grasp consciousness of God in such a way that the content is <em>our representation<\/em> and at the same time <em>is<\/em>, i.e. the content is not merely mine, in the subject, in me, in my representing and knowing; it is <em>in and for itself<\/em>. That lies in this content itself: God is this universality that is in and for itself, not merely for me, &#8211; outside me, independent of me.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Two kinds of determinations are thus connected here. This content is just as much <em>inseparable<\/em> from me as it is <em>independent<\/em>, i.e. it is mine and equally not mine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Certainty is this <em>immediate relation of the content and myself<\/em>; if I want to express this certainty intensively, I say: I know this as certainly as I myself am. Both, the certainty of this external being and my certainty, are<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 116]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s116\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 116\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|116|<\/span> one certainty, and I would sublate my being, not know of myself, if I sublated that being. This unity of certainty is the inseparability of this content, which is different from me, and myself, the inseparability of both, which are distinguished from each other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">One can now stop here, and it is also asserted that one must stop at this certainty. But one at once makes, as happens with everything, this distinction: something can be <em>certain<\/em>; another question is whether it is <em>true<\/em>. Truth is set against certainty; in something being certain, it is not yet true.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The immediate form of this certainty is that of <em>faith<\/em>. Faith really has an <em>opposition<\/em> within itself, and this opposition is more or less indeterminate. Faith is set against knowing; if it is opposed to knowing in general, it is an empty opposition: what I believe I also know; that is content in my consciousness. Believing is a knowing; but by knowing one usually means a mediated, cognizing knowing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">More precisely, one calls a certainty faith insofar as it is partly not an <em>immediate<\/em>, <em>sensuous<\/em> certainty, partly insofar as this knowing is also not a <em>knowing of the necessity<\/em> of a content. What I see immediately before me I know: I do not believe that there is a sky above me; I see it. On the other hand, when I have rational insight into the necessity of a matter, we also do not say: I believe, e.g., in the Pythagorean theorem. There one presupposes that someone does not merely accept the proof of it on authority, but has seen into it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In recent times faith has now been taken in the sense of certainty that stands in opposition to insight into the necessity of a content. That is especially the meaning of faith that <em>Jacobi<\/em> brought up. Thus Jacobi says: we only believe that we have a body; we do not know it. There knowing has this more precise meaning:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 117]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s117\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 117\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|117|<\/span> acquaintance with necessity. Namely I see this &#8211; this, says Jacobi, is only a believing, for I intuit, feel; such a sensuous knowing is wholly immediate, unmediated, &#8211; there is no ground. Here faith in general has the meaning of <em>immediate<\/em> certainty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So now the expression \u201cfaith\u201d is used mainly of the certainty that there is a God, insofar as one does not have insight into the necessity of this content. Faith is to that extent something <em>subjective<\/em>, insofar as one calls the necessity of the content, its being proved, the objective, objective knowing, cognition. One believes in God insofar as one does not have insight into the necessity of this content, that he is what he is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">One also says \u201cfaith in God\u201d according to ordinary usage because we have no immediate sensuous intuition of God. One does indeed also speak of a ground of faith, but that is already improperly spoken: if I have grounds, and indeed objective, proper grounds, it is proved to me. But the grounds themselves can be of a subjective nature; then I let my knowing <em>count<\/em> as a proved knowing, and insofar as these grounds are subjective, I say faith.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first, simplest and still most abstract form of this subjective grounding is that in the <em>being of the I<\/em> the <em>being of the object<\/em> is also contained. This grounding and this appearance of the object is given as the first and immediate one in <em>feeling<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-1-die-form-des-gefuehls\">1. The Form of Feeling<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Cross-reference:<\/em> On feeling as a mere form of the religious content cf. the Remark to <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/270\/\">\u00a7 270<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this form the following determinations count at first: a) We <em>know<\/em> of God, and indeed <em>immediately<\/em>; God is not supposed to be comprehended; there is not supposed to be argument about God, because it would not work with rational cognition. b) We must ask for a hold for this knowing. We know only in ourselves; it is thus only subjective; therefore<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 118]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s118\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 118\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|118|<\/span> a ground, the place of divine being, is asked for, and it is said: God is in feeling. Feeling thus receives the position of a <em>ground<\/em> in which the <em>being of God<\/em> is given.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These propositions are quite correct, and none of them is to be negated; but they are so trivial that it is not worth the trouble to speak of them here. If the science of religion is restricted to these propositions, it is not worth having, and one cannot see why there is theology at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">a) We know immediately that God is. This proposition has at first a wholly unprejudiced sense, but then also a not unprejudiced one, namely that this so-called immediate knowing is the only knowing of God; and modern theology is to that extent opposed [both] to revealed religion and to rational cognition, which likewise deny the proposition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What is true in it is to be considered more closely. We know that God is, and know this immediately. What does <em>knowing<\/em> mean? It is distinguished from <em>cognizing<\/em>. We have the expression \u201ccertain\u201d and set certainty against truth. Knowing expresses the subjective mode in which something is for me, in my consciousness, so that it has the determination of something that is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Knowing is thus in general this, that the object <em>is the other<\/em> and <em>its being is linked with my being<\/em>. I can also know what it is, from immediate intuition or as a result of reflection; but when I say: \u201cI know it\u201d, I know only its <em>being<\/em>. This being is admittedly not empty being; I also know of more precise determinations, constitutions of it, but of them too only that they <em>are<\/em>. Knowing is also used as \u201chaving a representation\u201d, but there always lies in it only that the content <em>is<\/em>. Knowing is thus abstract behaviour and immediate relation, whereas the expression \u201ctruth\u201d recalls a stepping apart of certainty and objectivity and the mediation of both. We say <em>cognizing<\/em>, on the other hand,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 119]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s119\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 119\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|119|<\/span> when we know of <em>something universal<\/em>, but also grasp it according to its <em>particular determination<\/em> and as <em>a connection within itself<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We cognize nature, spirit, but not <em>this<\/em> house, not <em>this<\/em> individual; the former is universal, the latter particular, and the rich content of that universal we cognize according to its necessary relation of its parts to one another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Considered more closely, this knowing is <em>consciousness<\/em>, but wholly <em>abstract<\/em> consciousness, i.e. <em>abstract activity of the I<\/em>, whereas consciousness proper already contains further determinations of content and distinguishes these from itself as object. This knowing is thus merely this, that some content <em>is<\/em>, and it is thus the abstract relation of the I to the object, whatever the content may be. Or immediate knowing is nothing other than thinking taken quite abstractly. But thinking too is the self-identical activity of the I, thus, taken in general, immediate knowing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">More precisely, thinking is that in which its <em>object<\/em> too has the determination of something <em>abstract<\/em>, the activity of the universal. This thinking is contained in everything, however concretely one may behave; but one calls it thinking only insofar as the content has the determination of something abstract, universal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here now the knowing is not an immediate knowing of a bodily object, but of God; God is the wholly universal object, not some particularity, the most universal personality. Immediate knowing of God is immediate knowing of an object that is wholly <em>universal<\/em>, so that only the product is immediate; it is thus <em>thinking<\/em> of God, for thinking is the activity for which the universal is. God has here as yet no content, no further meaning; he is only nothing sensuous, a universal of which we<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 120]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s120\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 120\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|120|<\/span> only know that it does not fall into immediate intuition. Thinking is in truth completed only as <em>mediating movement<\/em>, in that it begins from an other, passes through it and in this movement transforms it into something universal. Here, however, thinking has as object the merely universal, the <em>indeterminately universal<\/em>, i.e. a determination, a content, that <em>is itself<\/em>, where it is precisely immediately, i.e. abstractly, with itself. It is the light that shines but has no other content than precisely the light. It is just the same immediacy as when I ask: what does feeling feel, what does intuition intuit?, and the only answer given is: feeling has feeling, intuiting intuits. For the sake of this tautology the relationship is an immediate one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Knowing of God thus means nothing but: I <em>think<\/em> God. Now the further point is to be added: this content of thinking, this product, <em>is<\/em>, is something that is; God is not only thought, but he is; he is not merely a determination of the universal. Now account is further to be given from the concept, and it is to be seen to what extent the universal receives the determination that it is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">From logic we must bring here what being is. Being is universality taken in its empty, most abstract sense, <em>pure relation to itself<\/em>, without further reaction outwards or inwards. Being is universality as abstract universality. The universal is essentially identity with itself; this is also being; it is simple. The determination of the universal does indeed at once contain the relation to the single; this particularity I can represent to myself as outside the universal or &#8211; more truly &#8211; within it, for the universal is also this relation to itself, this pervasiveness in the particular. Being, however, removes all relation; every determination that is concrete is without further reflection, <em>without relation to an other<\/em>. Being is thus contained in the universal, and when I say: the universal is, I express only<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 121]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s121\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 121\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|121|<\/span> its dry, pure, abstract relation to itself, this barren immediacy which being is. The universal is not something immediate in this sense; it is also supposed to be a particular; the universal is supposed to be in itself; this activating of itself into the particular is not the abstract, immediate. The abstractly immediate, on the other hand, this barren relation to itself, is expressed with being. When I say, then: this object is, there is thereby expressed the last peak of dry abstraction; it is the emptiest, poorest determination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Knowing is thinking, and this is the universal and contains the determination of the <em>abstractly universal<\/em>, the <em>immediacy of being<\/em>. This is the sense of immediate knowing<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We are thus in abstract logic; this always happens when one thinks one is on concrete ground, on the ground of immediate consciousness; but this is precisely the poorest in thoughts, and those contained in it are the barest, emptiest. It is the greatest ignorance to believe that immediate knowing is outside the region of thinking; one struggles with such distinctions, and considered more closely they shrink away. Even according to that poorest determination of immediate knowing, religion belongs to thought.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">More precisely, we then ask whereby what I know in immediate consciousness <em>is different from other things<\/em> I know. I know nothing yet but that the universal is. What further content God has is to be spoken of in what follows. The standpoint of immediate consciousness gives no more than the being stated. That one cannot know God is the standpoint of the Enlightenment, and this coincides with immediate knowing of God. Further, however, God is an <em>object of my consciousness<\/em>; I <em>distinguish<\/em> him from myself; he is an other from me and I from him. When we<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 122]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s122\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 122\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|122|<\/span> compare other objects in this way according to what we know of them, we also know this of them: they <em>are<\/em> and are an other than we, are for themselves; they are then a universal or not, they are a universal and at the same time particular, have some determinate content. The wall is, is a thing; thing is a universal, and so much I also know of God. We know far more of other things; but if we abstract from all their determinacies and say, as just now, of the wall only: \u201cit is\u201d, we know as much of it as of God. So God has been called abstractly <em>ens<\/em>. But this <em>ens<\/em> is the emptiest, against which the other <em>entia<\/em> show themselves far more fulfilled.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We have said: God is in immediate knowing. We too are; to the <em>I<\/em> too this <em>immediacy of being<\/em> belongs. All other, concrete, empirical things also are, are identical with themselves; this is abstractly their being as being. This being is <em>common with me<\/em>; but the object of my knowing is so constituted that I can also <em>abstract<\/em> its being from it. I represent it to myself, believe in it; but this believed is a being only <em>in my consciousness<\/em>. Thus <em>universality<\/em> and this determination of <em>immediacy<\/em> step apart, and they must. This reflection must enter, for we are two and must be distinguished; otherwise we would be one; i.e. a determination must be attributed to the one that does not belong to the other. Such a determination is being. I am; the other, the object, therefore is not. Being I take upon myself, onto my side; I do not doubt my existence; it therefore falls away with the other. Since being is only the being of the object, so that the object is only this <em>known being<\/em>, it lacks a being in and for itself, and receives it only in consciousness; it is known only as <em>known<\/em> being, not as being in and for itself. Only the I is; the object is not. I can indeed doubt everything, but not the being of myself, for the I is what doubts, doubt<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 123]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s123\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 123\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|123|<\/span> itself. If doubt becomes the object of doubt, if the doubter doubts doubt itself, doubt vanishes. The I is immediate relation to itself; in the I there is being. <em>Immediacy<\/em> is thus fixed against universality and falls on <em>my side<\/em>. In the I being is absolutely in myself; I can abstract from everything; from thinking I cannot abstract, for abstracting is itself thinking; it is the activity of the universal, simple relation to itself. In abstracting itself there is being. I can indeed kill myself; but that is the freedom to abstract from my existence. I am: in the I the am is already contained.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In now pointing out the object, God, as being, one has taken being upon oneself; the I has vindicated being for itself; it has fallen away from the object. If the object is nevertheless to be pronounced as being, a <em>ground<\/em> must be stated. It must be shown of God that he is in my being; and now the demand runs thus: since we stand here in empirical experience and observation, the <em>state<\/em> is to be shown in which God is in me, in which we are not two, something observable where difference falls away, where God is in this being that remains to me in that I am, &#8211; a place in which the universal is in me as something that is and inseparable from me. This place is <em>feeling<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">b) One speaks of <em>religious feeling<\/em> and says that in it faith in God is given to us; it is this innermost ground on which it is absolutely certain to us that God is. Of certainty we have already spoken. This certainty is that two kinds of being are posited in reflection as <em>one<\/em> being. Being is abstract relation to itself. There are now two beings; but they are only <em>one<\/em> being, and this inseparate being is <em>my<\/em> being: this is <em>certainty<\/em>. This certainty, with a content in a more concrete way, is feeling, and this feeling is given as the ground of faith and knowing of God. What is in our feeling we<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 124]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s124\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 124\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|124|<\/span> call knowing, and so God <em>is<\/em>; feeling thus receives the position of ground. The form of knowing is the first, then the differences; and with this the differences between the two enter and the reflection that being is my being, belongs to me. And then there is the need that the object too is in this being that I take for myself: this, then, is feeling. One is thus referred to feeling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I feel something hard; when I speak thus, the I is the one, the second is the something: there are two of them. The expression of consciousness, the common element, is hardness. There is hardness in my feeling, and the object too is hard. This community exists in feeling; the object touches me, and I am filled with its determinacy. When I say: I and the object, both are still for themselves; only in feeling does the double being vanish. The <em>determinacy of the object<\/em> becomes <em>mine<\/em>, and indeed so much mine that <em>reflection<\/em> against the object at first falls away entirely; insofar as the other remains independent, it is not felt, tasted. But I, who am determined in feeling, behave <em>immediately<\/em> in it; I am in feeling as this <em>single empirical I<\/em>, and the <em>determinacy<\/em> belongs to <em>this<\/em> empirical self-consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>In itself<\/em>, then, a <em>difference<\/em> is contained in feeling. On the one side I am, the universal, the subject, and this clear, pure fluidity, this immediate reflection into me, is clouded by an <em>other<\/em>; but in this other I preserve myself completely with myself; the alien determination becomes fluid in my universality, and what is an other to me I <em>make mine<\/em>. When another quality is posited in the lifeless, this thing too has received another quality; but I, as feeling, preserve myself in the other that penetrates into me, and remain I in the determinacy. The <em>difference<\/em> of feeling is at first an <em>inner<\/em> one in the I itself; it is the difference between me in my <em>pure fluidity<\/em> and me in my <em>determinacy<\/em>. This inner difference, however, is also<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 125]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s125\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 125\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|125|<\/span> just as much posited as such when <em>reflection<\/em> is added; I take myself back out of my determinacy, set it over against myself as <em>other<\/em>, and subjectivity is for itself <em>in relation<\/em> to objectivity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is usually said that feeling is something merely <em>subjective<\/em>; but I am surely subjective only against an object of intuition or representation, in setting an other over against myself. It thus seems that feeling, because in it the difference of subjectivity and objectivity has not yet entered, cannot be called subjective. In fact, however, this division, that I am <em>subject<\/em> against objectivity, is a <em>relation<\/em> and <em>identity<\/em> that is at the same time <em>distinguished<\/em> from this <em>difference<\/em>, and <em>universality<\/em> begins in it. For in relating myself to an other and distinguishing the object from myself in intuiting, representing, I am the relation of these two, myself and the other, and a distinguishing in which an identity is posited, and I relate myself to the object by <em>overreaching<\/em> it. In feeling as such, on the other hand, the I is in this immediate simple <em>unity<\/em>, in this being filled with the determinacy, and does not yet go beyond this determinacy. But thus I am, as feeling, wholly particular, sunk through and through in the determinacy, and in the proper sense only subjective without objectivity and without universality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If now the essential religious relationship is in feeling, this <em>relationship<\/em> is identical with my <em>empirical self<\/em>. The determinacy as the infinite thinking of the universal and I as wholly empirical subjectivity are gathered together in feeling in me; I am the immediate union and resolution of the struggle of the two. But since I find myself <em>so determined<\/em> as this <em>empirical subject<\/em> and, on the contrary, find myself determined as raised into a wholly <em>other<\/em> region, and sense the passing back and forth from one to the other and their <em>relationship<\/em>, <em>I precisely therein find myself determined against myself, or myself as<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 126]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s126\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 126\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|126|<\/span> <em>distinguished from myself<\/em>; i.e. in this my feeling itself I am driven by its content <em>into opposition<\/em>, to reflection and to distinguishing subject and object.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This <em>transition to reflection<\/em> is not peculiar to religious feeling alone, but to human feeling in general. For man is spirit, consciousness, representing; there is no feeling that would not contain within itself this transition to reflection. In every other feeling, however, it is only the <em>inner necessity<\/em> and nature of the matter that drives to reflection; it is only this necessity that the I distinguishes itself from its determinacy. Religious feeling, on the other hand, contains in its <em>content<\/em>, in its <em>determinacy itself<\/em>, not only the <em>necessity<\/em> but the <em>actuality<\/em> of the opposition itself and thereby <em>reflection<\/em>. For the substance of the religious relationship is on the one hand the thinking of the universal, which is itself already reflection, then the other moment of my empirical consciousness, and the relation of the two. In religious feeling, therefore, I am <em>externalized from myself<\/em>, for the universal, thinking that is in and for itself, is the negation of my particular empirical existence, which by contrast appears as something null that has its truth only in the universal. The religious relationship is oneness, but contains the force of judgement. In feeling the moment of empirical existence, I feel that side of the universal, of negation, as a determinacy falling <em>outside me<\/em>; or, in being in this, I feel myself alienated from myself in my empirical existence, denying myself and <em>negating<\/em> my empirical consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Because the subjectivity contained in religious feeling is empirical, particular, it is in feeling in particular interest, in <em>particular determinacy<\/em> in general. Religious feeling itself contains this determinacy: that of empirical self-consciousness and of universal thinking and their relation and unity; it hovers<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 127]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s127\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 127\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|127|<\/span> therefore between the determinacy of their opposition and their oneness and satisfaction, and is distinguished according to how the relationship of my subjectivity to the universal is determined by the <em>particular<\/em> mode of my interest in which I happen to exist. The relation of the universal and of empirical self-consciousness can accordingly be of very different kinds: highest tension and hostility of the extremes and highest oneness. In the determinacy of <em>separation<\/em>, in which the universal is the <em>substantial<\/em> against which empirical consciousness feels itself and at the same time its <em>essential nullity<\/em>, but according to its positive existence still wants to <em>remain<\/em> what it is, there is the feeling of <em>fear<\/em>. One\u2019s own <em>inner existence<\/em> and disposition, feeling itself as <em>null<\/em>, and self-consciousness, at the same time on the side of the universal and condemning that existence, gives the feeling of <em>repentance<\/em>, of <em>pain over oneself<\/em>. The empirical existence of self-consciousness, <em>feeling itself furthered<\/em> as a whole or in some respect, and indeed not, say, through its own self-activity, but through a connection and power lying outside its strength and prudence, which is thought as the <em>universal<\/em> in and for itself and to which that furtherance is ascribed, gives the feeling of <em>gratitude<\/em> and so on. The higher oneness of my self-consciousness in general with the universal, the certainty, security and feeling of this identity, is <em>love<\/em>, <em>blessedness<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">c) If now, in this progress of feeling to <em>reflection<\/em> and in the <em>distinguishing of the I and its determinacy<\/em>, so that this appears as <em>content<\/em> and <em>object<\/em>, feeling is given the position that it is <em>in itself<\/em> already the <em>justification of the content<\/em> and the proof of its <em>being<\/em> or <em>truth<\/em>, the following is to be remarked. Feeling can have the most manifold content of all; we have feeling of right, of wrong, God, colour, hatred, enmity, joy and so on; the most contradictory content is found in it: the basest and the highest,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 128]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s128\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 128\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|128|<\/span> noblest has its place in it. It is a matter of experience that feeling has the <em>most contingent<\/em> content; this can be the truest and the worst. God, when he is in feeling, has no advantage over the worst; rather the most royal flower sprouts on the same ground beside the most rampant weed. That a content is in feeling makes nothing excellent for <em>it itself<\/em>. For not only what is comes into our feeling, not merely the real, what is, but also the invented, the lied, all good and all bad, everything actual and everything non-actual is in our feeling; the most opposed is in it. All imaginings of objects I feel; I can be enthusiastic about the most unworthy. I have hope. Hope is a feeling; in it, as in fear, is the future, immediately such as is not yet, perhaps will only be, perhaps will never be. Likewise I can be enthusiastic about what is past, but also about what has neither been nor will be. I can imagine myself to be an able, great, a noble and excellent human being, capable of sacrificing everything for right, for my opinion; I can imagine I have been of much use, achieved much; but the question is whether it is true, whether I in fact <em>act<\/em> so nobly and really <em>am<\/em> as able as I imagine myself to be. Whether my feeling is of a true kind, good, depends on its <em>content<\/em>. That content is in feeling <em>at all<\/em> does not decide it; for the worst is in it too. Whether the content exists likewise does not depend on whether it is in feeling; for imagined things that have never existed and never will exist are in it. Feeling is accordingly a form for all possible content, and this content receives in it no determination that would concern its <em>being in and for itself<\/em>. Feeling is the form in which the content is posited as completely contingent, since it can be posited just as much by my liking, my arbitrariness, as by nature. The content thus has in feeling the form of not being determined in and for itself, not posited by the universal, not by<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 129]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s129\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 129\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|129|<\/span> the concept. It is therefore in its essence the <em>particular<\/em>, the <em>restricted<\/em>, and it is indifferent that it is this content, since another content too can be in my feeling. If, then, the being of God is demonstrated in our feeling, it is as contingent in it as anything else to which this being can belong. That we then call subjectivity, but in the worst sense; personality, self-determination, the highest intensity of spirit within itself is also subjectivity, but in a higher sense, in a freer form; here, however, subjectivity means only contingency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">People often appeal to their feeling when reasons run out. Such a person one must leave standing; for with the appeal to one\u2019s own feeling <em>community<\/em> among us is broken off. On the ground of thought, of the concept, on the other hand, we are on that of the universal, of rationality; there we have the nature of the matter before us, and about it we can come to an understanding, since we submit to the matter and it is what we have in common. But if we go over to feeling, we leave this common element and withdraw into the sphere of our contingency and merely watch how the matter is found there. In this sphere each then makes the matter <em>his<\/em> matter, his particularity, and if the one demands: you ought to have such feelings, the other can answer: I simply do not <em>have<\/em> them, I just <em>am<\/em> not like that; for that demand concerns only my contingent being, which can be thus or thus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Feeling is further what man has in common with the animal: it is the animal, sensuous form. If, then, what right, ethical life, God are is pointed out in feeling, this is the worst way in which such a content can be demonstrated. God is essentially in thinking. The suspicion that he is <em>through<\/em> thinking, only <em>in<\/em> thinking, must already arise in us from the fact that only man has religion, not the animal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 130]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s130\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 130\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|130|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Everything in man whose ground is thought can be placed into the form of feeling. Right, freedom, ethical life etc., however, have their root in the higher determination through which man is not animal but spirit. Everything belonging to these higher determinations can be placed into the form of feeling; but feeling is only the <em>form<\/em> for this content, which belongs to a wholly different ground. We thus have feelings of right, freedom, ethical life, but it is not the merit of feeling that its content is this true one. The cultivated person can have a true feeling of right, of God, but this does not come from feeling; he owes it to the cultivation of thought; only through this is the content of representation and so the feeling present. It is a deception to put the true, the good, down to the account of feeling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But a true content not only <em>can<\/em> be in our feeling, it <em>ought<\/em> to be and <em>must<\/em> be, as people used to say: one must have God in one\u2019s heart. <em>Heart<\/em> is already more than feeling; feeling is only momentary, contingent, fleeting. But when I say I have God in my heart, feeling is expressed here as an <em>enduring<\/em>, <em>firm mode of my existence<\/em>. The heart is what I am, &#8211; not merely what I am momentarily, but what I am in general, my character. The form of feeling as universal is then called principles or habits of my being, firm manner of my mode of action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the Bible, however, evil as such is expressly ascribed to the heart; the heart is thus also its seat, this <em>natural particularity<\/em>. The good, the ethical, however, is not that man asserts his particularity, self-seeking, selfhood; if he does that, he is evil. The selfish is the evil that we in general call heart. If one now says in this way that God, right etc. ought also to be in my feeling, in my heart, one thereby only expresses that it ought to be not merely something represented by me,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 131]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s131\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 131\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|131|<\/span> but inseparately <em>identical with me<\/em>. I as actual, as <em>this one<\/em>, ought to be determined so through and through; this determinacy ought to be proper to my character, make up the universal mode of my actuality, and so it is essential that all true content be in feeling, in the heart. Religion is thus to be brought into the heart, and here falls the necessity that the individual be religiously educated. The heart, feeling, must be purified, cultivated; this cultivating means that something other, higher, is and becomes the true. But <em>because<\/em> the content is in feeling, it is not yet true, not yet in and for itself, not good, excellent in itself. If what is in feeling were true, everything would have to be true, the worship of Apis and so on. Feeling is the point of subjective, contingent being. It is therefore the individual\u2019s business to give his feeling a true content. But a theology that only describes feelings remains stuck in the empirical, in history and such contingencies; it has not yet anything to do with thoughts that have a content.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cultivated representation and cognition do not exclude feeling and sensation. On the contrary, feeling nourishes itself and makes itself enduring <em>through<\/em> representation, and renews and kindles itself again on it. Anger, indignation, hatred are just as busy entertaining themselves through the representation of the manifold sides of the wrong suffered and of the enemy as love, goodwill, joy enliven themselves by making present to themselves the equally manifold relations of their objects. Without <em>thinking<\/em>, as one says, of the object of hatred, anger or love, the feeling and the inclination die out. If the object vanishes from representation, the feeling vanishes, and every <em>occasion coming from outside<\/em> stirs up the pain and the love again. It is a means of weakening sensation and feeling to <em>distract<\/em> spirit, to bring <em>other objects<\/em> before its intuition and representation, and to place it in other situations<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 132]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s132\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 132\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|132|<\/span> and circumstances in which those manifold relations are not present for representation. Representation is supposed to <em>forget<\/em> the object, &#8211; and forgetting is more for hatred than forgiving, as in love it is more than merely becoming unfaithful, and being forgotten more than merely being unheard. Man as spirit, because he is not merely animal, is in feeling at the same time essentially knowing, consciousness, and he knows of himself only by taking himself back out of immediate identity with the determinacy. If, therefore, religion is supposed to be only as feeling, it fades away into what is <em>without representation<\/em> as into what is without action, and loses all determinate content.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Indeed, feeling is so far from being that in which alone and truly we could find God that, if we were to <em>find<\/em> this content in it, we would have to <em>know<\/em> it already from elsewhere. And if it is said that we cannot cognize God, cannot know anything of him, how are we then to say that he is in feeling? We must first have looked around elsewhere in consciousness for determinations of the content that is distinct from the I; only then can we demonstrate feeling as religious, insofar, namely, as we <em>find again<\/em> these determinations of the content in it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In recent times one no longer speaks of the heart, but of <em>conviction<\/em>. With the heart one still expresses one\u2019s immediate character; but when one speaks of acting according to conviction, there lies in it that the content is a power that governs me; it is my power, and I am its; but this power rules me in the mode of inwardness, in such a way that it is already more mediated by <em>thought<\/em> and insight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As regards in particular the point that the heart is the <em>germ<\/em> of its content, this can be wholly admitted; but not much is said with it. It is the source, that means perhaps: it is the <em>first mode<\/em> in which such content<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 133]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s133\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 133\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|133|<\/span> <em>appears<\/em> in the subject, its first place and seat. At first man perhaps has religious feeling, perhaps not. In the former case the heart is admittedly the germ; but as with a vegetable seed grain this is the undeveloped mode of existence of the plant, so too feeling is this enveloped mode.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This seed grain, however, with which the life of the plant begins, is even only in appearance, <em>empirically<\/em>, the first; for it is equally product, <em>result<\/em>, the last; it is the result of the fully developed life of the tree and encloses this complete development of the nature of the tree within itself. That originality is thus only a <em>relative<\/em> one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thus in feeling too this whole content is in our subjective actuality in this enveloped way; but it is something quite different that this <em>content as such<\/em> belongs to feeling as such. Such content as God is a content universal in and for itself; likewise the content of right and duty is a determination of the rational will.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I am will, not only desire; I do not only have inclination. The I is the universal; but as will I am in my freedom, in my universality itself, in the universality of my self-determination, and if my will is rational, its determining is in general a universal one, a determining according to the pure concept. The rational will is very different from contingent will, from willing according to contingent drives, inclinations; the rational will determines itself <em>according to its concept<\/em>, and the concept, the substance of the will, is pure freedom, and all determinations of the will that are rational are developments of freedom, and the developments that proceed from the determinations are duties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Such content belongs to rationality; it is determination through, according to the pure concept and thus belongs equally to thinking: the will is rational only insofar as it is thinking. One must therefore give up the usual representation according to which will and intelligence are two kinds of compartments<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 134]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s134\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 134\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|134|<\/span> and the will can be rational and thereby ethical without thinking. So too it has already been recalled of God that this content belongs equally to thinking, that the ground on which this content is grasped as well as generated is thinking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If we have now named feeling as the place in which the being of God is to be pointed out immediately, we have not met in it <em>being<\/em>, the <em>object<\/em>, God, as we demanded, namely not as free <em>being in and for itself<\/em>. God is, is independent in and for himself, is free; this independence, this free being, we do not find in feeling, any more than the content as content that is in and for itself; rather any particular content can be in it. If feeling is to be true, of genuine nature, it must be so through its content; feeling as such, however, does not make the content of true nature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is the nature of this ground of feeling and the determinations that belong to it. It is feeling of some content and at the same time self-feeling. In feeling we thus at the same time enjoy ourselves, <em>our<\/em> being filled with the matter. Feeling is so popular because man has his <em>particularity<\/em> before him in it. Whoever lives in the matter, in the sciences, in practical life, forgets himself in it, has no feeling about it, insofar as feeling is a reminiscence of oneself, and he is then, in that forgetting of himself, a minimum with his particularity. Vanity and self-complacency, on the other hand, which love and keep nothing better than themselves and want to remain only in the enjoyment of themselves, appeal to their own feeling and therefore do not come to objective thinking and acting. The person who has to do only with feeling is not yet finished, is a beginner in knowing, acting and so on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We must now therefore look round for another ground. In feeling we have found God neither according to his independent being nor according to his content. In immediate knowing the object was not something that is; rather<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 135]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s135\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 135\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|135|<\/span> its being fell into the knowing subject, which found the ground of this being in feeling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Of the determinacy of the I that makes up the content of feeling, however, we already saw that it is not only distinguished from the pure I, but is also so distinguished by feeling in its own movement that the I finds itself <em>determined as against itself<\/em>. This difference is now also to be <em>posited<\/em> as such, so that the <em>activity<\/em> of the I enters of removing its determinacy as not its own, setting it outside and making it <em>objective<\/em>. The I, we further saw, is in feeling <em>externalized from itself<\/em> in itself and has in the universality it contains the <em>negation of its particular empirical existence<\/em> in itself. In now setting its determinacy out of itself, the I externalizes itself, sublates its immediacy altogether, and has entered the sphere of the universal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At first, however, the determinacy of spirit, the object, is posited as <em>external<\/em> in general and in the complete objective determination of externality in <em>spatiality<\/em> and <em>temporality<\/em>, and the consciousness that <em>posits<\/em> it in this externality and relates to it is <em>intuition<\/em>, which we have to consider here in its completion as <em>artistic intuition<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-2-die-anschauung\">2. Intuition<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Art has been generated by the absolute spiritual need that the divine, the spiritual Idea, be <em>object<\/em> for consciousness and first of all for immediate intuition. The law and content of art is truth as it appears in spirit, thus is <em>spiritual truth<\/em>, but at the same time in such a way that it is a <em>sensuous<\/em> truth for <em>immediate intuition<\/em>. Thus the presentation of truth is brought forth by man, but posited externally, so that it is posited by him in a sensuous way. As the Idea appears immediately in nature, and the true is there also in spiritual relationships<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 136]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s136\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 136\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|136|<\/span> and in dispersed manifoldness, the Idea is not yet gathered into <em>one centre<\/em> of appearances and still appears in the form of being outside one another. In immediate existence the <em>appearance<\/em> of the concept is not yet posited as <em>harmonious with truth<\/em>. Sensuous intuition as art brings it forth, on the other hand, is necessarily something <em>produced by spirit<\/em>, is not immediate sensuous configuration, and has the Idea as its enlivening centre.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In what we count within the range of art, something else can also be contained than what we have just stated. Truth has a twofold sense there; first that of <em>correctness<\/em>, that the presentation agrees with the object otherwise known. In this sense art is <em>formal<\/em> and the <em>imitation<\/em> of given objects, whatever the content may be. Then its law is not <em>beauty<\/em>. But even insofar as beauty is the law, art can still be taken as <em>form<\/em> and otherwise have a <em>restricted<\/em> content, as can genuine truth itself. This, however, in its true sense is the <em>agreement of the object with its concept<\/em>, the <em>Idea<\/em>; and this, as the free expression of the concept, stunted by no contingency or arbitrariness, is the content of art that is in and for itself, and indeed a content that concerns the <em>substantial<\/em>, <em>universal elements<\/em>, essentialities and powers <em>of nature and of spirit<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The artist now has to present truth in such a way that the reality in which the concept has its power and dominion is at the same time something sensuous. The Idea is thus in sensuous shape and in an individualization for which the contingencies of the sensuous cannot be dispensed with. The work of art is conceived <em>in the spirit of the artist<\/em>, and in this the union of concept and reality has taken place <em>in itself<\/em>; but once the artist has released his thoughts into externality and the work is completed, he steps <em>back<\/em> from it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 137]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s137\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 137\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|137|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thus the work of art, as posited for intuition, is at first a wholly common <em>external object<\/em>, which does not sense itself and does not know itself. The form, the subjectivity that the artist has given his work, is only <em>external<\/em>, not the absolute form of what knows itself, of <em>self-consciousness<\/em>. Completed subjectivity is lacking to the work of art. This self-consciousness falls into <em>subjective consciousness<\/em>, into the intuiting subject. As against the work of art, which is not in itself what knows, the moment of self-consciousness is therefore the <em>other<\/em>, but a moment that absolutely belongs to it and that <em>knows<\/em> what is presented and represents it as the <em>substantial truth<\/em>. The work of art, as not knowing itself, is incomplete in itself and, because self-consciousness belongs to the Idea, needs the complement it receives through the relation of the self-conscious to it. Into this consciousness falls further the <em>process<\/em> whereby the work of art ceases to be only object and self-consciousness posits as <em>identical<\/em> with itself what appears to it as an other. This is the process that sublates the externality in which truth appears in the work of art, extinguishes these dead relationships of immediacy, and brings it about that the intuiting subject gives itself the conscious feeling of having <em>its<\/em> essence in the object. Since this determination of going into itself out of externality falls into the subject, there is a <em>separation<\/em> between it and the work of art; the subject can consider the work wholly externally, can smash it or make forward, aesthetic and learned remarks about it, &#8211; but that process <em>essential<\/em> for intuition, that necessary complement of the work of art, sublates this prosaic separation again.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the oriental substantiality of consciousness the advance to this separation has not yet been made, and therefore artistic intuition is not completed either, for this presupposes the higher freedom of self-consciousness, which can set its truth and substantiality freely over against itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 138]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s138\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 138\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|138|<\/span> Bruce<sup><a href=\"#vpr2-fn2\" id=\"vpr2-fnr2\">2)<\/a><\/sup> showed a Turk in Abyssinia a painted fish, but he said: \u201cThe fish will accuse you on the Last Day of not having given it a soul.\u201d The oriental wants not only the shape but also the soul; he remains in unity and does not go on to separation and to the process in which truth stands on one side as bodily without soul and on the other the intuiting self-consciousness, which sublates this separation again.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"vpr2-fn2\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\"><a href=\"#vpr2-fnr2\">2)<\/a> <em>Werkausgabe:<\/em> <em>James Bruce, Travels to Discover the Sources of the Nile in the Years 1768-73, 5 vols., 1790<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If we now look back on the progress the religious relationship has made in the development so far, and compare intuition with feeling, truth has indeed come forth in its <em>objectivity<\/em>, but the defect of its appearance is that it keeps itself in sensuous, <em>immediate independence<\/em>, i.e. in that which sublates itself again, is not in and for itself, and proves itself just as much <em>produced by the subject<\/em> as it gains subjectivity and self-consciousness only in the intuiting subject. In intuition the <em>totality of the religious relationship<\/em>, the object and self-consciousness, has <em>fallen apart<\/em>. The religious process really falls only into the intuiting <em>subject<\/em> and is nevertheless not <em>complete<\/em> in it, but needs the sensuous, intuited object. On the other hand the <em>object<\/em> is the <em>truth<\/em> and yet, in order to be true, needs self-consciousness falling <em>outside it<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The progress that is now necessary is that the totality of the religious relationship is actually posited as such and as <em>unity<\/em>. Truth gains the <em>objectivity<\/em> in which its content, as being in and for itself, is not <em>merely posited<\/em>, but is essentially in the form of <em>subjectivity<\/em> itself, and the entire process takes place in the element of self-consciousness. Thus the religious relationship is at first <em>representation.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 139]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s139\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 139\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|139|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-3-die-vorstellung\">3. Representation<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We distinguish very well what an image is and what a representation is; it is something different whether we say we have a representation or an image of God; the same is the case with sensuous objects. The <em>image<\/em> takes its content from the sphere of the sensuous and presents it in the immediate mode of its existence, in its singularity and in the arbitrariness of its <em>sensuous appearance<\/em>. But since the infinite multitude of the single, as it is present in immediate existence, cannot be reproduced in one whole even by the most detailed presentation, the image is always necessarily a <em>restricted<\/em> one, and in religious intuition, which knows how to present its content only in the image, the Idea falls apart into a <em>multitude of shapes<\/em>, in which it restricts and finitizes itself. The universal Idea, which appears in the circle of these finite shapes, but only in them, only underlies them, therefore remains hidden <em>as such<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Representation, on the other hand, is the image as it is raised into the <em>form of universality<\/em>, of thought, so that the <em>one basic determination<\/em> that makes up the essence of the object is held fast and hovers before the representing spirit. If we say, e.g., world, we have gathered and united in this one sound the whole of this infinite wealth. When the consciousness of the object is reduced to this simple determinacy of thought, it is representation, which for its appearance needs only the <em>word<\/em>, this simple expression that remains within itself. The manifold content that representation simplifies can stem from the inner, from freedom; so we have representations of right, ethical life, of evil; or it can also be taken from external appearance, as when, e.g., we have a representation of battles, of wars in general. When religion is raised into the form of representation,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 140]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s140\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 140\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|140|<\/span> it at once has something <em>polemical<\/em> about it. The content is not grasped immediately in sensuous intuition, not in a pictorial way, but <em>mediately<\/em> by way of <em>abstraction<\/em>, and the sensuous, pictorial is raised into the universal; and with this elevation the negative behaviour towards the pictorial is then necessarily linked. This negative direction, however, concerns not only the form, so that the difference of intuition and representation would lie only in it, but it also touches the <em>content<\/em>. For intuition the <em>Idea<\/em> and the <em>mode of presentation<\/em> hang together so closely that both appear as <em>one<\/em>, and the pictorial has the meaning that the Idea is essentially tied to it and cannot be separated from it. Representation, by contrast, starts from the view that the absolutely true Idea cannot be grasped through an image and that the pictorial mode is a restriction of the content; it therefore sublates that unity of intuition, rejects the oneness of the image and its meaning, and lifts the meaning out for itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Finally religious representation has the meaning of truth, of <em>objective content<\/em>, and is thus directed against <em>other modes of subjectivity<\/em>, not merely against the pictorial mode. Its content is what counts in and for itself, remains substantially firm against my opinion and meaning, and is rigid against the back and forth of my wishes, my liking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This concerns the essence of representation in general. As regards its more precise determinacy, the following is to be noted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">a) We saw that in representation the essential content is posited in the form of thought, but it is not thereby yet posited <em>as<\/em> thought. When we said, therefore, that representation is directed polemically against the sensuous and pictorial and behaves <em>negatively<\/em> towards it, this does not yet contain that it has <em>freed itself absolutely from the sensuous<\/em> and posited it <em>ideally<\/em> in a completed way. This is attained only in actual thinking, which<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 141]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s141\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 141\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|141|<\/span> raises the sensuous determinations of the content to universal determinations of thought, to the inner moments or to the own determinacy of the Idea. Since representation is not this concrete elevation of the sensuous to the universal, its negative behaviour towards the sensuous means nothing other than: it is not truly freed from it; it is still <em>essentially entangled<\/em> with it, and it needs it and this struggle against the sensuous in order itself to be. The sensuous thus belongs essentially to it, even if it may <em>never let it count as independent<\/em>. Further, the universal of which representation is conscious is only the <em>abstract universality<\/em> of its object, is only its indeterminate <em>essence<\/em> or its <em>approximation<\/em>. To determine it, representation again needs the sensuously determinate, the pictorial, but gives this, as the sensuous, the position of being <em>different<\/em> from the <em>meaning<\/em>, and of not being something at which one may stop, of serving only to make representable the content proper that is different from it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Therefore representation now stands in constant unrest between immediate sensuous intuition and thought proper. The determinacy is of a sensuous kind, taken from the sensuous, but thinking has put itself into it, or the sensuous is raised into thinking by way of abstraction. But the two, the sensuous and the universal, do not interpenetrate inwardly; thinking has not yet completely overpowered sensuous determinacy, and even if the content of representation is something universal, it is still burdened with the determinacy of the sensuous and needs the form of naturalness. But what then always remains is that this moment of the sensuous does not count for itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thus in religion there are many forms of which we know that they are not to be taken in the proper sense. E.g. \u201cSon\u201d, \u201cbegetter\u201d is only an image, taken from a natural relationship, of which we well know that it is not supposed to be meant in its immediacy, that<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 142]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s142\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 142\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|142|<\/span> the meaning is rather a relationship that is only <em>approximately<\/em> this, and that this sensuous relationship has in itself most correspondence to the relationship that is <em>properly<\/em> meant with God. Further, when there is talk of the wrath of God, his repentance, revenge, we soon know that it is not taken in the proper sense, is only similarity, simile. Then we also find detailed images. So we hear of a tree of the knowledge of good and evil. With the eating of the fruit it already begins to become ambiguous whether this tree is to be taken as a proper, historical tree, as something historical, likewise the eating, or whether this tree is to be taken as an image. When one speaks of a tree of the knowledge of good and evil, this is so contrasting that it very soon leads to the recognition that it is no sensuous fruit and the tree is not to be taken in the proper sense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">b) With regard to the sensuous there also belongs to the mode of representation what is to be taken not merely as image, but as <em>something historical as such<\/em>. Something can be set forth in a historical way, but we do not take it quite seriously, do not ask whether it is in earnest. So we behave towards what Homer tells us of Jupiter and the other gods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But then there is also something historical that is a <em>divine history<\/em>, and such that it is supposed to be a history in the proper sense: the <em>history of Jesus Christ<\/em>. This does not count merely as a myth after the manner of images, but as something completely historical. That, then, is for representation, but it also has yet another side: it has the <em>divine<\/em> as its content, divine doing, divine, <em>timeless<\/em> happening, absolutely divine action, and this is the inner, true, substantial element of this history and is precisely what is object of reason. This twofold element is in general in every history, just as a myth has a meaning within it. There are admittedly myths in which external appearance predominates; but usually<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 143]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s143\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 143\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|143|<\/span> such a myth contains an allegory, like the myths of Plato.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Every history in general contains this external series of events and actions; but these are events of a human being, of a spirit. The history of a state is action, doing, fate of a <em>universal spirit<\/em>, of the spirit of a people. Such a thing already has something universal within it in and for itself; if one takes it in the superficial sense, it can be said: one can draw a moral from every history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The moral that is drawn from it contains at least the <em>essential ethical powers<\/em> that worked in it, that brought it about. These are the inner, the substantial. History thus has this isolated side, the single, individualized to the utmost; but in it the universal laws, powers of the ethical are also recognizable. These are not for representation as such: for it history is in the way it presents itself as history and is in appearance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In such history, however, there is something even for the human being whose thoughts, concepts have not yet received determinate development; he feels these powers in it and has an obscure consciousness of them. In such a way religion is essentially for ordinary consciousness, for consciousness in its ordinary development. It is a content that presents itself at first sensuously, a sequence of actions, sensuous determinations that follow one another in time, then stand side by side in space. The content is empirical, concrete, manifold, but it also has an inner; there is spirit in it that works on spirit: subjective spirit bears witness to the spirit that is in the content, at first through obscure acknowledgement, without this spirit being developed for consciousness. c) All spiritual content, relationship in general, is finally<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 144]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s144\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 144\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|144|<\/span> representation through the form that its <em>inner determinations<\/em> are grasped as they <em>relate simply to themselves and are in the form of independence<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When we say: God is all-wise, good, just, we have determinate content; but each of these determinations of content is single and independent; \u201cand\u201d, \u201calso\u201d is the mode of connection of representation. All-wise, all-good are also concepts; they are no longer something pictorial, sensuous or historical, but spiritual determinations; but they are not yet analysed within themselves, and the differences are not yet posited <em>as they relate to one another<\/em>, but taken only in abstract, simple relation to themselves. Insofar as the content does indeed already contain manifold relations within it, but the relation is only external, <em>external identity<\/em> is thereby posited. \u201cSomething is this, then that, then it is thus\u201d; these determinations thus at first have the form of contingency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Or if representation contains <em>relationships<\/em> that are already closer to thought, e.g. that God created the world, the relationship is still grasped by it in the form of <em>contingency<\/em> and <em>externality<\/em>. Thus in the representation of creation God remains on the one side for himself, the world on the other, but the connection of the two sides is not posited in the form of necessity; it is expressed either according to the analogy of natural life and happening or, when it is designated as creation, designated as one that is supposed to be wholly peculiar and incomprehensible for itself. But if one uses the expression \u201cactivity\u201d from which the world has proceeded, this is indeed something more abstract, but not yet the concept. The essential content stands firm for itself in the form of simple universality in which it is enveloped, and <em>its passing over through itself into an other<\/em>, its identity with an other, is lacking to it; it is only <em>identical with itself<\/em>. The single points lack the bond of necessity and the unity of their difference.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 145]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s145\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 145\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|145|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As soon, therefore, as representation makes a start at grasping an essential <em>connection<\/em>, it leaves it standing in the form of <em>contingency<\/em> and does not go on here to its true in-itself and to its eternal, self-interpenetrating unity. Thus in representation there is the thought of providence, and the movements of history are gathered together and grounded in the eternal counsel of God. But there the connection is at once transferred into a sphere where it is supposed to be incomprehensible and unsearchable for us. The thought of the universal is thus not determined within itself and, as soon as it is pronounced, is at once given up again.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Having seen the general determinacy of representation, this is the place to touch on the pedagogical question of recent times whether religion can be <em>taught<\/em>. Teachers who do not know what to do with the doctrines of religion hold instruction in it to be improper. But religion has a <em>content<\/em> that must be representable in an objective way. In this lies the fact that this represented content can be communicated, for representations are communicable through the word. It is something else to warm the heart, to stir up sensations; that is not teaching; that is an interesting of my subjectivity in something, and it can well make a rhetorical sermon, but it cannot be doctrine. If one does start from <em>feeling<\/em>, sets it as the first and original and then says that religious representations come from feeling, this is on the one hand correct insofar as the <em>original determinacy<\/em> lies in the nature of spirit itself. But on the other hand feeling is so indeterminate that everything can be in it, and the <em>knowing<\/em> of what lies in feeling does not belong to feeling itself, but is given only through cultivation and teaching, which communicate representation. Those educators want children and people in general to remain in their subjective sensation of love, and they represent the love of God to themselves like<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 146]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s146\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 146\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|146|<\/span> that of parents for their children, whom they love and are supposed to love as they are; they boast of remaining in the love of God, trample all divine and human laws underfoot, and think and say they have not injured love. But if love is to be pure, it must first have renounced selfishness, have freed itself, and spirit is freed only by having come <em>outside itself<\/em> and having once intuited the substantial as <em>something other than itself<\/em>, something higher. Only thereby does spirit truly return to itself: by having related itself to the absolute power, to the <em>immense object<\/em>, having come outside itself in it and freed itself from itself and given itself up. I.e. the <em>fear of God<\/em> is the presupposition of true love. What is true in and for itself must appear to the mind as something independent in which it renounces itself, and only through this mediation, through the restoration of itself, does it gain true freedom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When objective truth is for me, I have externalized myself, kept nothing for myself and at the same time comprehended this truth as <em>mine<\/em>. I have identified myself with it and preserved myself in it, but as pure self-consciousness free of desire. This relation, <em>faith<\/em> as absolute identity of the content with me, is the same as religious feeling, but in such a way that it at the same time expresses the <em>absolute objectivity<\/em> that the content has for me. The church and the Reformers knew very well what they meant by faith. They did not say that one is saved through feeling, through sensation, \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03d1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, but through faith, so that I have in the absolute object the freedom that essentially contains the renunciation of my own opinion and of particular conviction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since now, in comparison with feeling, in which the content is a determinacy of the subject and therefore contingent, for representation the substance is raised to objectivity, it falls more to its side that on the one hand the <em>content<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 147]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s147\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 147\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|147|<\/span> <em>justifies itself for itself<\/em> and on the other hand the necessity of its <em>essential linkage<\/em> with <em>self-consciousness<\/em> is developed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But as regards first the content for itself, it counts in representation as something <em>given<\/em>, of which it is only known that it <em>is so<\/em>. Over against this abstract, immediate objectivity the <em>linkage<\/em> of the content with self-consciousness then also appears at first as one that is still of a purely <em>subjective<\/em> nature. The content, it is then said, appeals to me in itself, and the <em>testimony of the spirit<\/em> teaches me to acknowledge it as truth, as my essential determination. Admittedly, e.g., the infinite Idea of the incarnation of God &#8211; this speculative centre &#8211; has such great force within it that it penetrates irresistibly into the mind not yet darkened by reflection. But in this way the connection of myself with the content is not yet truly developed, and it appears only as something <em>instinctive<\/em>. The I that thus turns to the content need not be merely this simple and unprejudiced one; it can already be worked over in many ways within itself. Thus incipient <em>reflection<\/em>, going beyond holding fast to the given, may already have confused me, and confusion in this region is all the more dangerous and serious because through it the ethical and every other hold in me and in life, in action and in the state, become unsteady. Now the experience that I cannot help myself through reflection, cannot stand on myself at all, and the circumstance that I nevertheless long for something firm, throws me back from reflection and leads me to holding fast to the content in the shape in which it is given. But this return to the content is not mediated by the form of inner necessity and is only a consequence of <em>despair<\/em>, that I know no way out and know no other way of helping myself than by that step. Or one reflects on how wonderfully religion has spread and how millions<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 148]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s148\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 148\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|148|<\/span> have found comfort, satisfaction and dignity in it. To separate oneself from this authority is declared dangerous, and over against it the authority of one\u2019s own opinion is set back. But this too is still a crooked turn: that one\u2019s own conviction is thus subjected to the authority of the universal and calmed down against it. The reassurance lies only in the <em>supposition<\/em> that, as millions regard it, so it must surely be right, and there remains the possibility that the matter, if one looks at it <em>once more<\/em>, shows itself differently.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">All these turns can be brought into the form of <em>proofs of the truth of religion<\/em>, and they have received this form from the apologists. But thereby only the form of <em>argumentation<\/em> and reflection is brought in, a form that does not concern the content of truth in and for itself, only points out credibilities, probabilities etc., and is able to grasp truth, instead of considering it in its being in and for itself, only in <em>connection<\/em> with <em>other<\/em> circumstances, events and states. Moreover, although apologetics with its argumentations passes over to <em>thinking<\/em> and <em>inferring<\/em> and wants to set up <em>grounds<\/em> that are supposed to be different from authority, its main ground is nevertheless again only an <em>authority<\/em>, namely the <em>divine<\/em> one, that God has revealed to men what is to be represented. Without this authority apologetics cannot move even for <em>one<\/em> moment, and this constant <em>interplay<\/em> of thinking, inferring and authority is essential to its standpoint. But as it is unavoidable on this standpoint that argumentation must go <em>to infinity<\/em>, so too that highest, divine authority is again one that itself first needs grounding and rests on an authority. For we were not there and did not see God when he revealed. It is always only <em>others<\/em> who tell us and assure us of it, and precisely the <em>testimonies<\/em> of these others, who experienced the historical or first<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 149]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s149\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 149\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|149|<\/span> learned of it from eyewitnesses, are supposed, according to that apologetics, to join conviction together with the content separated from us in time and space. But this mediation too is not absolutely secure; for what matters here is how the <em>medium<\/em> that stands between us and the content, the perception of others, is constituted. The capacity to perceive demands <em>prosaic understanding<\/em> and its cultivation, thus conditions that were not present among the ancients, for they lacked the capacity to grasp history according to its <em>finitude<\/em> and to take out what is the <em>inner meaning<\/em> in it, since for them the opposition of the poetic and the prosaic was not yet posited in its whole sharpness. And if we place the divine in the historical, we always fall into the wavering and unsteady that is proper to everything historical. The miracles the apostles report are opposed by prosaic understanding and unbelief and, on the objective side, by the disproportion of miracle and the divine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But even if all those ways of mediating the connection of the content of representation with self-consciousness <em>once<\/em> reach their purpose, if apologetic argumentation with its grounds has brought <em>many a one<\/em> to conviction, or I have found comfort and reassurance in the content of religion with the needs, drives and pains of my heart, it is only <em>contingent<\/em> that it happened so, and depends on this standpoint of reflection and of the mind happening not yet to have been disturbed and not yet to have awakened in itself the presentiment of something higher. It thus depends on a contingent <em>defect<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But I am not merely this heart and mind, or this good-natured reflection compliant with the apologetics of the understanding and meeting it unprejudiced, which can only rejoice when it hears the grounds that correspond to and suit it; rather I have still other, higher<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 150]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s150\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 150\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|150|<\/span> needs. I am also concretely determined in a wholly <em>simple<\/em>, <em>universal<\/em> way, so that the determinacy in me is <em>pure simple determinacy<\/em>. I.e. I am absolutely concrete I, thinking determining itself within itself &#8211; I am as <em>the concept<\/em>. This is another way in which I am concrete; there I seek not only reassurance for my heart, but the concept seeks satisfaction, and it is against this that the religious content in the mode of representation retains the form of externality. Even if many a great and rich mind and many a deep sense has found satisfaction in religious truth, it is nevertheless the concept, this thinking concrete within itself, that is not yet satisfied and asserts itself first as the drive of rational insight. If the word \u201creason, rational insight\u201d, still indeterminate in itself, is not merely reduced to something being certain in me as an external determination, but thinking has determined itself to this, that the object stands firm for me for itself and is <em>grounded in itself<\/em>, then it is the concept as <em>universal thinking<\/em>, which particularizes itself within itself and in particularization remains identical with itself. Whatever further content I have in the rational with regard to will, intelligence: what is always substantial is that such content is known by me as grounded in itself, that I have in it the <em>consciousness of the concept<\/em>, i.e. not only conviction, certainty and conformity with principles otherwise held to be true, under which I subsume it, but that I have in it truth <em>as<\/em> truth, in the <em>form<\/em> of truth &#8211; in the form of the absolutely concrete and of what agrees absolutely and purely within itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thus representation dissolves into the form of thinking, and that determination of <em>form<\/em> is what philosophical cognition adds to truth. But it is evident from this that philosophy is concerned with nothing less than overthrowing religion and now perhaps asserting that the content of religion cannot be<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 151]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s151\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 151\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|151|<\/span> truth for itself; rather religion is precisely the true content, only in the form of representation, and philosophy is not first to give the substantial truth, nor has humanity had to wait for philosophy in order to receive the consciousness of truth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-iii-die-notwendigkeit-und-vermittlung-des-religioe\">III. The Necessity and Mediation of the Religious Relationship in the Form of Thinking<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The inner connection and absolute necessity into which the content of representation is placed in thinking is nothing other than the concept in its <em>freedom<\/em>, so that all content becomes a determination of the concept and is brought into balance with the I itself. The determinacy is here absolutely mine; spirit has in it <em>its essentiality<\/em> itself as object, and the being-given, the authority and the externality of the content as against me vanish.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thinking thus gives self-consciousness the absolute relationship of freedom. Representation still keeps itself in the sphere of <em>external necessity<\/em>, since all its moments, in relating to one another, do so in such a way that they do not give up their independence. The relationship of these configurations in thinking, on the other hand, is the relationship of <em>ideality<\/em>, so that no configuration stands separated independently for itself; rather each has the mode of a <em>semblance<\/em> as against the other. Every difference, every configuration is thus something transparent, not subsisting darkly and impenetrably for itself. With this the distinguished are not such as offer resistance independently for themselves one to the other; rather they are posited in their ideality. The relationship of unfreedom, of the <em>content<\/em> as well as of the <em>subject<\/em>, has now vanished, because the absolute adequacy of <em>content<\/em> and form has entered. The <em>content is free within itself<\/em>, and its shining within itself is its absolute form, and in the object the <em>subject<\/em> has before it the doing of the Idea, of the concept that is in and for itself, which it <em>itself<\/em> is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 152]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s152\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 152\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|152|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In now presenting thinking and its development, we have first to see how it 1. appears in relation to representation, or rather as the <em>inner dialectic of representation<\/em>, then 2. how, as <em>reflection<\/em>, it seeks to <em>mediate<\/em> the essential moments of the religious relationship, and finally 3. how it completes itself as speculative thinking in the <em>concept of religion<\/em> and sublates reflection in the free necessity of the Idea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-1-die-dialektik-der-vorstellung\">1. The Dialectic of Representation<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">a) What is to be considered here first is that thinking <em>dissolves<\/em> this form of the simple in which the content is in representation, and that is precisely the reproach usually made to philosophy when it is said that it does not let the form of representation stand, but changes it or strips it from the content. And because for ordinary consciousness truth is tied to that form, it thinks that if the form is changed it loses the content and the matter, and declares that transformation to be destruction. When philosophy transforms what is in the form of representation into the form of the concept, there admittedly emerges the difficulty of separating, in a content, what is content as such, thought, from what belongs to representation as such. But to dissolve the simple of representation means at first only to grasp and point out <em>distinct determinations<\/em> in this simple, so that it is known as something manifold within itself. This we have at once when we ask: what is that? Blue is a sensuous representation. If one asks: what is blue?, one shows it, to be sure, so that one receives the intuition; but in representation this intuition is already contained. With that question, rather, if it is seriously meant, one wants to know the <em>concept<\/em>, wants to know blue as <em>relationship of itself within itself<\/em>, distinct determinations and their unity. Blue, according to Goethe\u2019s theory, is a<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 153]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s153\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 153\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|153|<\/span> unity of light and dark, and indeed in such a way that the dark is the ground and what clouds this dark is an other, something brightening, a medium through which we see this dark. The sky is night, darkness, the atmosphere bright; through this bright medium we see the blue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thus God as content of representation is still in the form of simplicity. Now we think this simple content; there distinct determinations are to be stated whose unity, the sum so to speak, more precisely their identity, makes up the object. The orientals say: God has an infinite multitude of names, i.e. of determinations; one cannot exhaustively state what he is. But if we are to grasp the concept of God, distinct determinations are to be given, these are to be reduced to a narrow circle, so that through them and the unity of the determinations the object is complete.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">b) A closer category is: insofar as something is thought, it is posited <em>in relation to an other<\/em>; either the object [is] known within itself as relation of distinct things to one another, or as relation of itself to an other that we know outside it. In representation we always have distinct determinations, whether they belong to one whole or are set apart.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In thinking, however, there comes to consciousness their <em>contradiction<\/em>, they being supposed at the same time to make up <em>One<\/em>. If they contradict each other, it does not seem that they could belong to One. If, e.g., God is good and also just, goodness contradicts justice. Likewise: God is almighty and wise. He is thus on the one hand the power before which everything vanishes, is not; but this negation of everything determinate is a contradiction against wisdom: this wants something determinate, has a purpose, is a restriction of the indeterminate, which power is. In representation everything has its place calmly side by side: man is free, also dependent; there is good, also evil in the world. In thinking<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 154]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s154\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 154\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|154|<\/span> this is related to one another; the contradiction thus comes to light.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Peculiar is the doing of reflecting thought when it appears as <em>abstract understanding<\/em> and directs itself at representation as representation designates the inner determinations and relationships in a sensuous, natural or altogether <em>external way<\/em>. Just as the reflecting understanding elsewhere always has presuppositions of <em>finitude<\/em>, lets these count absolutely, makes them the rule or standard and, holding them up against the Idea and absolute truth, overturns these, so too it makes the sensuous and natural determinacies, in which representation nevertheless wants the <em>thought of the universal<\/em> acknowledged at the same time, into wholly determinate, <em>finite relationships<\/em>, holds fast this finitude and now declares representation an error. In part this activity of the understanding still contains the <em>own dialectic of representation<\/em>, and therein lies the immense importance of the Enlightenment, which was that activity of the understanding, for the enlightening of thought. In part, however, the dialectic of representation is thereby also driven beyond its true scope and transferred into the domain of <em>formal arbitrariness<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thus, e.g., in the representation of original sin the inner relationship of thought is at the same time grasped in the determinacy of the natural; but when representation speaks thus, it nevertheless wants, with the expression \u201csin\u201d, the <em>natural<\/em> that lies in the determination of inheritance to be known as raised into the sphere of the universal. The understanding, by contrast, grasps the relationship in the mode of finitude and thinks <em>only<\/em> of natural property or hereditary disease. In this sphere it is admittedly granted that it is contingent for the children that the parents had property or were afflicted with disease; there the children inherit nobility, property or the ill without merit or guilt. If one then reflects further that the freedom of self-consciousness is raised above this relationship of contingency and that in the<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 155]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s155\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 155\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|155|<\/span> absolutely spiritual domain of the good each has, in what he does, <em>his<\/em> doing, <em>his<\/em> guilt, it is easy to show the contradiction that what absolutely belongs to my freedom is supposed to have come upon me from elsewhere in a natural way, unconsciously and externally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is similar when the understanding directs itself against the representation of the Trinity. In this representation too the inner relationship of thought is grasped in the mode of externality, for number is thought in the abstract determination of externality. But the understanding now holds fast to externality <em>alone<\/em>, stops at counting and finds each of the three completely external to the other. If one now makes this determinacy of number the foundation of the relationship, it is admittedly again completely contradictory that these, completely external to one another, are nevertheless at the same time supposed to be One.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">c) Finally the category of <em>necessity<\/em> also enters. In representation there <em>is<\/em>, there <em>exists<\/em> a space; thinking demands to know the necessity. This necessity lies in the fact that in thinking a content is not taken only as <em>something that is<\/em>, as in simple determinacy, in this simple relation to itself, but essentially in relation to something else and as <em>relation of distinct things<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This we call necessary: if the one is, the other is also posited with it; the determinacy of the first is only insofar as the second is, and conversely. For representation the finite is the <em>is<\/em>. For thinking the finite is at once only such as is not for itself, but requires an other for its being, is through an other. For thinking in general, for determinate thinking, more precisely for comprehending, there is nothing immediate. <em>Immediacy<\/em> is the main category of representation, where the content is known in its simple relation to itself. For thinking there is only what essentially contains mediation. These are the abstract,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 156]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s156\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 156\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|156|<\/span> general determinations, this abstract difference of religious representing and of thinking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If we consider this more closely in relation to the question in our field, there belong in this respect to the side of representation all forms of immediate knowing, faith, feeling and so on. This question falls here: is religion, the knowing of God, an immediate or a mediated knowing?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-2-die-vermittlung-des-religioesen-bewusstseins-in\">2. The Mediation of Religious Consciousness within Itself<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In now passing over to the determination of thinking and of necessity and thereby to mediation, the demand for such a mediated knowing enters into opposition to immediate knowing, and it is first to be considered in this opposition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-a-das-unmittelbare-wissen-und-die-vermittlung\">a. Immediate Knowing and Mediation<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is a very general view and assurance that the knowing of God is only in an immediate way; it is a <em>fact of our consciousness<\/em>; it <em>is<\/em> so; we have a representation of God and [the certainty] that this is not only subjective, in us, but that God also <em>is<\/em>. It is said: religion, the knowing of God, is <em>only<\/em> faith; mediated knowing is to be excluded; it corrupts the certainty, security of faith and the content of what faith is. There we have this opposition of immediate and mediated knowing. Thinking, concrete thinking, comprehending is mediated knowing. But immediacy and mediation of knowing are a one-sided abstraction, the one as much as the other. It is not the opinion, presupposition, that correctness, truth is to be attributed to the one to the exclusion of the other, to the one for itself or to the other, to either of the two in isolation. Further on we shall see that true thinking,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 157]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s157\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 157\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|157|<\/span> comprehending, unites both within itself, does not exclude either of the two.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b1) To <em>mediated<\/em> knowing belongs <em>inferring<\/em> from one to the other, the dependence, conditionedness of one determination on another, the form of <em>reflection<\/em>. Immediate knowing removes all differences, these modes of connection, and has only something <em>simple<\/em>, <em>one<\/em> connection, knowing, the subjective form; and then: it is. Insofar as I know certainly that God is, knowing is a connection of myself and this content, the being of myself &#8211; as certainly as I am, so certainly God is -; my being and the being of God are <em>one<\/em> connection, and the relation is being; this being is a simple and at the same time a twofold one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In immediate knowing this connection is wholly simple; all modes of relationship are extinguished. First we ourselves want to grasp it in an empirical way, i.e. place ourselves on the same standpoint on which immediate knowing stands. This is in general what we call empirical knowing: I just know it; that is a fact of consciousness; I find in myself the representation of God and that he is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The standpoint is: only the <em>empirical<\/em> is supposed to count; one is not supposed to go beyond what one finds in consciousness; why I find it, how it is necessary, is not asked. That would lead to cognition, and that is precisely the ill to be kept off. There the empirical question is: <em>is there<\/em> an immediate knowing?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To mediated knowing belongs knowing of necessity; what is necessary has a cause; it must be; it is essentially an other through which it is, and in that this is, it itself is, &#8211; there is connection of distinct things. The mediation can be only the merely <em>finite<\/em> one; the effect, e.g., is assumed as something on the one side, the cause as something on the other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The finite is something <em>dependent<\/em> on an other, is not in and for itself, through itself; to its<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 158]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s158\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 158\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|158|<\/span> existence an other belongs. Man is physically dependent; for this he needs an external nature, external things. These are not posited by him, appear as being themselves over against him, and he can sustain his life only insofar as they are and are usable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The higher mediation of the concept, of reason, is a mediation with itself. To mediation belongs this distinctness and connection of two, and such a connection that the one is only insofar as the other is. This mediation is now excluded in the mode of immediacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b2) But even if we behave only externally, empirically, <em>there is nothing immediate at all<\/em>; there is nothing to which only the determination of immediacy would belong to the exclusion of the determination of mediation; rather what is immediate is just as much mediated, and immediacy is essentially itself mediated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Finite things are this, that they are mediated; finite things, the star, the animal, are created, generated. The man who is a father is just as much generated, mediated, as the son. If we begin from the father, he is at first the immediate and the son, as the generated, [the] mediated. But everything living, in that it is something generating, determined as beginning, immediate, is something generated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Immediacy means being in general, this simple relation to itself; it is immediate insofar as we remove the relationship. If we determine this existence as such, which in the relationship is one of the sides of the relationship, as effect, then what is without relationship is recognized as such as is mediated. Likewise the cause is only in having an effect, for otherwise it would not be a cause at all; only in this relationship, thus only in this <em>mediation<\/em>, is it cause. Everything that exists &#8211; we are not yet speaking of mediation with itself -, since it needs an other for its being, i.e. for its immediacy, is to that extent mediated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 159]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s159\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 159\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|159|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The logical is the dialectical, where being as such is considered, which as immediate is untrue. The truth of being is becoming; becoming is <em>one<\/em> determination, relating itself to itself, something immediate, a wholly simple representation, but contains the two determinations: being and non-being. There is nothing immediate; that is rather only a wisdom of the schools; there is something immediate only in this bad understanding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Likewise with immediate knowing, a particular mode, a kind of immediacy: there is no immediate knowing. Immediate knowing is where we do not have the <em>consciousness<\/em> of mediation; but mediated it <em>is<\/em>. Feelings we have; that is immediate; we have intuition; that appears under the form of immediacy. But when we have to do with <em>determinations of thought<\/em>, one must not stop at how it appears to one <em>at first<\/em>, but [ask] whether it is so <em>in fact<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If we consider an intuition, I am, knowing, intuiting, and then there is an other, an object or a determinacy, if it is not grasped as objective but as subjective; I am mediated in sensation only through the object, through the <em>determinacy<\/em> of my sensing. There is always a <em>content<\/em>; two belong to it. Knowing is wholly simple, but I must know <em>something<\/em>; if I am only knowing, I know nothing at all. Likewise pure seeing: there I do not see at all. Pure knowing one can call immediate; this is simple; but if knowing is an actual knowing, there is a knower and a known; there is <em>relationship<\/em> and <em>mediation<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">More precisely, with regard to religious knowing it is the case that it is essentially a mediated one; but just as little may we one-sidedly regard merely mediated knowing as a real, true one. Whatever religion one may be in, everyone knows that he was brought up in it, received instruction in it. This instruction, this education, procures me my knowing; my knowing is mediated through teaching, cultivation and so on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 160]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s160\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 160\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|160|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If one speaks of positive religion anyway, it is revealed, and indeed in a way external to the individual; there the faith of religion is essentially mediated through revelation. These circumstances &#8211; teaching, revelation &#8211; are not contingent, accidental, but essential. Admittedly they concern an external relationship; but its being an external relationship does not make it inessential.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If we now look round to the other, inner side and forget that faith, conviction is thus something mediated, we are on the standpoint of considering it for itself. Here it is mainly that the assertion of immediate knowing falls: we know immediately of God; that is a revelation in us. This is a great principle, which we must essentially hold fast; there lies in it that positive revelation cannot bring about religion in such a way that it would be something mechanically produced, worked from outside and placed into man.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here belongs the old saying of Plato: man learns nothing; he only recollects; it is something that man originally bears within himself; in an external, non-philosophical way it is said that he recollects a content that he knew earlier in a preceding state. There it is presented mythically; but this is in it: religion, right, ethical life, everything spiritual is only stirred up in man; he is spirit in himself; truth lies in him, and it is only a matter of bringing it to consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Spirit bears witness to spirit; this testimony is the own, inner nature of spirit. There is this important determination in it, that religion is not brought into man externally, but lies in himself, in his reason, freedom in general. If we abstract from this relationship and consider what this knowing is, how this religious feeling, this self-revealing in spirit, is constituted, it is indeed immediacy, like all knowing, but immediacy that just as much contains mediation<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 161]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s161\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 161\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|161|<\/span> within itself. For when <em>I<\/em> represent <em>God<\/em> to myself, this is at once mediated, although the relation goes wholly directly, immediately to God. I am as knowing, and then there is an object, God, thus a relationship, and knowing as this relationship is mediation. I as religiously knowing am such only <em>by means of this content<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b3) If we consider religious knowing more closely, it shows itself not only as simple relation of myself to the object; rather this knowing is a much more concrete one; this whole simplicity, the knowing of God, is <em>movement within itself<\/em>, more precisely <em>elevation<\/em> to God. We express religion essentially as this <em>passing over<\/em> from one content to another, from finite content to the absolute, infinite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This passing over, in which what is peculiar to mediating is determinately expressed, is of a twofold kind: [first] from finite things, from things of the world or from the finitude of our consciousness and this finitude in general, [as] which we call ourselves &#8211; I, this particular subject -, to the infinite, this infinite more precisely determined as God. The second kind of passing over has more abstract sides, which relate according to a deeper, more abstract opposition. There, namely, the one side is determined as God, the infinite in general as known by us, and the other side, to which we pass over, is determinacy as objective in general or as being. In the former transition the common element is being, and this content of both sides is posited as finite and infinite; in the second the common element is the infinite, and this is posited in the form of the subjective and the objective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now the relationship of the knowing of God within itself is to be considered. Knowing is relationship within itself, mediated, either mediation through an other or within itself; mediation in general, because there is relation of myself to an object, God, which is an other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 162]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s162\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 162\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|162|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I and God are <em>different<\/em> from each other; if both were one, there would be immediate, unmediated relation, relationless, i.e. undifferentiated unity. Since both are different, the one is not what the other is; but if they are nevertheless <em>related<\/em>, have <em>identity<\/em> at the same time as their difference, this identity is itself different from their being different, something different from these two, because otherwise they would not be different.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Both are different; their unity is not they themselves. That in which they are one is that in which they are different; but they are different, so their unity is different from their difference. Mediation is thus more precisely in a <em>third<\/em> over against the different; so we have a syllogism: two different things and a third that brings them together, in which they are mediated, identical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It thus lies not only near but in the matter itself that, insofar as there is talk of knowing God, there is at once talk of the form of a syllogism. Both are different, and there is a unity in which both are set as one through a third: that is [a] syllogism. We thus have to speak more closely of the nature of the knowing of God, which is essentially mediated within itself. The more precise form of the knowing of God occurs under the form of <em>proofs<\/em> of the existence of God: this is the knowing of God represented as a mediated one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Only what is one, abstractly one, is unmediated. The proofs of the existence of God present the knowing of God because it contains mediation within itself. That is religion itself, knowing of God. The explication of this knowing, which is mediated, is the explication of religion itself. But this form of proofs admittedly has something crooked about it when this knowing is represented as proving the existence of God. Against this critique has been directed; but the one-sided moment of form that is in this mediated knowing does not make the whole matter nothing. What matters is to bring the proofs of the existence of God back<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 163]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s163\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 163\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|163|<\/span> into honour by stripping them of what is inadequate. We have God and his existence &#8211; existence [Dasein] is determinate, finite being; the being of God is not in any way a restricted one; existence [Existenz] too is taken in a determinate sense -; we thus have God in his being, actuality, objectivity, and the proving has the purpose of showing us the <em>connection<\/em> between the two determinations, because they are different, not immediately one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Immediately each is in its relation to itself, God as God, being as being. Proving is showing that these, at first different, also have a connection, identity, &#8211; not pure identity; that would be immediacy, sameness. To show connection means proving in general; this connection can be of different kinds, and in proofs it is indeterminate what kind of connection is meant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There is wholly external, mechanical connection: we see that a roof is necessary to the walls; the house has this determination against weather and so on; one can say: it is proved that a house must have a roof; the purpose is what links the walls with the roof. This does belong together, is connection, but we have at the same time the consciousness that this connection does not concern the being of these objects; that wood, bricks make up a roof does not concern their being, is for them merely external connection. Here proving consists in showing a connection between such determinations as the connection itself is external to.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Then there are other connections that lie in the matter, the content itself. That is the case, e.g., with geometrical theorems. If there is a right-angled triangle, there is at once present a relationship of the square of the hypotenuse to the squares of the other two sides. That is necessity<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 164]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s164\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 164\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|164|<\/span> of the matter; here there is relation not of such things as the connection is external to; rather here the one cannot be without the other; with the one the other too is posited here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But in this necessity the kind of our insight into the necessity differs from the connection of the determinations in the matter itself. The course we take in proving is not the course of the matter itself; it is another than the one in the nature of the matter. We draw auxiliary lines; it will occur to no one to say that, in order for a triangle to have three angles equal to two right angles, it takes this course of extending one of its angles, and only thereby attains this. There our insight, the mediation we go through, and the mediation in the matter itself are different from each other. The construction and the proof are only for the purpose of our subjective cognition; that is not an objective way in which the matter arrives at this relationship through this mediation; rather only we arrive at insight through this mediation; that is merely subjective necessity, not connection, mediation in the object itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This kind of proofs, these connections, are unsatisfactory at once for themselves with regard to the knowing of God, to the connection of the determinations of God within himself and the connection of our knowing of God and his determinations. More precisely the unsatisfactoriness appears thus: in that course of <em>subjective necessity<\/em> we start from certain first determinations, from what is already known to us. There we have <em>presuppositions<\/em>, certain conditions, &#8211; that the triangle, the right angle <em>is<\/em>. Certain connections precede, and we show in such proofs: if this determination is, that one too is; i.e. we make the result dependent on given, already present conditions. The relationship is this: what we arrive at is<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 165]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s165\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 165\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|165|<\/span> represented as something dependent on presuppositions. Geometrical proving, as merely understanding proof, is admittedly the most perfect; understanding proof is carried through most consistently in it, in that something is shown as dependent on something else. When we apply this to the being of God, the inadequacy of wanting to show such a connection in God appears at once. It appears, namely, especially in the first course, which we called elevation to God, so that, if we grasp this in the form of proof, we have the relationship that the finite is the <em>foundation<\/em> from which the being of God is proved; in this connection the being of God appears as consequence, as dependent on the being of the finite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There the inadequacy of this progression that we call proving appears with what we represent to ourselves under God, that he is precisely what is not derived, what is absolutely in and for itself. That is the crookedness. But if one now thinks that through such a remark one has shown this course to be null altogether, this is likewise a one-sidedness that at once contradicts the general consciousness of mankind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Man considers the world and, because he is thinking, rational, since he finds no satisfaction in the contingency of things, raises himself from the finite to the absolutely necessary and says: because the finite is something contingent, there must be something necessary in and for itself, which is the ground of this contingency. That is the course of human reason, of the human spirit, and this proof of the existence of God is nothing but the description of this elevation to the infinite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Likewise people will always take this more concrete course: because there is living being in the world, which for its liveliness, as living, organized within itself, is such an agreement of its different parts, and because these living beings likewise need external objects, air etc., which are independent over against them, &#8211; because these, which are not posited by<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 166]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s166\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 166\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|166|<\/span> them themselves, agree in this way, there must be an inner ground of this agreement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This agreement is in and for itself, and it presupposes an activity that has brought it forth, something acting according to purposes. That is what is called admiring the wisdom of God in nature, this wonder of the living organism and the agreement of external objects with it: from this man raises himself to the consciousness of God. If one thinks that, if the form of the proofs of the existence of God is contested, they have also been antiquated as regards their <em>content<\/em>, one is mistaken.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But the content is admittedly not presented in its purity. This defect can also be pointed out thus. It is said that one remains cold with the proofs; one is dealing with objective content; one can indeed see that this and that is; but the cognizing is external; this seeing remains only something external; this course is too objective; it is cold conviction; this insight is not in the heart; conviction must be in the mind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this reproach of defectiveness there lies that precisely this course is supposed to be our own elevation, not that we behave contemplatively towards a connection of external determinations; rather it is the feeling, believing spirit, spirit in general, that is supposed to raise itself. The <em>spiritual movement<\/em>, the movement of ourselves, of our knowing, is supposed to be in it too, and this we miss when we say it is an external connection of determinations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>elevation<\/em> and the <em>movement of the objective content<\/em>, however, in fact fall into one, into <em>thinking<\/em>. I myself as thinking am this passing over, this spiritual movement, and thinking is now to be considered as this movement. At first, however, it is <em>empirical observation and reflection<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 167]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s167\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 167\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|167|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-b-das-vermittelte-wissen-als-beobachtung-und-als-r\">b. Mediated Knowing as Observation and as Reflection<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This standpoint, which is altogether peculiar to our time, proceeds according to empirical psychology, takes up what is found in ordinary consciousness and how it is found there, <em>observes the appearance<\/em> and places <em>outside<\/em> it what is the <em>infinite<\/em> in it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Religion on this standpoint is man\u2019s consciousness of something higher, beyond, being outside him and above him. Consciousness, namely, finds itself dependent, <em>finite<\/em>, and in this its sensing it is consciousness to the extent that it <em>presupposes an other<\/em> on which it depends and which counts for it as the essence, because it itself is determined as the negative, finite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This observation and reflection, if we consider it first in its <em>general form<\/em>, develops in the following shape.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In consciousness, insofar as I know of an object and am reflected into myself against it, I know <em>the object<\/em> as <em>the other of myself<\/em>, and myself therefore as <em>restricted<\/em> and <em>finite<\/em> by it. We find ourselves finite; that is this determination; nothing further seems to be said about it. We find an end everywhere; the end of the one is where an other begins. Already by having an object we are finite: where it begins, I am not; thus finite. We know ourselves as finite in many respects. On the physical side: life is finite; as life we are externally dependent on others, have needs etc. and have the consciousness of this limit. This feeling we have in common with the animal. The plant, the mineral is also finite, but it has no feeling of its limit; it is a privilege of the living to know its limit, and still more of the spiritual; it has fear, anxiety, hunger, thirst etc.; in its self-feeling there is an interruption, a negation, and there is a feeling of it<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 168]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s168\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 168\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|168|<\/span> present. If one says that religion rests on this feeling of dependence, the animal too would have religion. For man this limit is only insofar as he goes beyond it; in the feeling, in the consciousness of the limit, lies being beyond it. This feeling is a comparison of his <em>nature<\/em> with his <em>existence<\/em> in this moment; his existence does not correspond to his nature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For us the stone is restricted, not for itself; we are beyond its determinacy; it is immediately identical with what it is; what makes up its determinate being is not for it a non-being. The animal\u2019s feeling of limit is a comparison of its universality with its existence in this determinate moment. The animal as living is universal to itself; it feels its restriction as negated universality, as need. Man is essentially likewise negative unity, identity with himself, and has the certainty of unity with himself, the self-feeling of himself, of his relation to himself; this is contradicted by the feeling of a negation in him. The subject also feels itself as power against its negation and sublates this accidental, i.e. it satisfies its need. All drives in man as in the animal are this affirmation of its self, and the animal thus restores itself against the negation in it. The living is only in sublating the limit, and it reconciles itself with itself in this. This want in it appears at the same time as an object outside it, of which it takes possession and so restores its self.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The limit of finitude, then, is for us insofar as we are beyond it. This so abstract reflection is not made on this standpoint of consciousness; rather it <em>stops at the limit<\/em>. The object is its non-being; for it to be posited as different from the I, it is required that it is <em>not<\/em> what the I is. I am the finite. Thus the <em>infinite<\/em> is what is beyond the limits; it is an <em>other<\/em> than the restricted; it is the<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 169]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s169\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 169\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|169|<\/span> unrestricted, infinite. So we have <em>finite and infinite<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But it is already contained in this that both sides are <em>in relation<\/em> with each other, and it is to be seen how this relation is determined; this happens in a wholly simple way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The infinite, this as my object, is the non-finite, non-particular, non-restricted, the universal; the finite in relation to the infinite is posited as the negative, dependent, what dissolves in the relationship to the infinite. When the two are brought together, a <em>unity<\/em> arises through the <em>sublation of the one<\/em>, and indeed of the <em>finite<\/em>, which cannot hold out against the infinite. This relationship, expressed as feeling, is that of <em>fear<\/em>, of <em>dependence<\/em>. This is the relation of the two; but there is still another determination in it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On the one hand I determine myself as the finite; the other is that I do not perish in the relation, that I relate myself to myself. I am, I subsist, I am also the <em>affirmative<\/em>; on the one hand I know myself as null, on the other as affirmative, as counting, so that the infinite lets me be. One can call this the <em>goodness<\/em> of the infinite, as the sublation of the finite can be called <em>justice<\/em>, according to which the finite must be manifested as finite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is the consciousness thus determined, beyond which observation does not go. One now says, when one goes so far, that the whole of religion is contained in this. But we can also go further, recognize that one can know God; but here one holds fast, as it were with arbitrariness, or because one wants to behave only observingly one must stop at this determination of consciousness. Observing can go only to the subject and get no further, because it wants to proceed only empirically, to keep only to what is immediately present, given, and God is not something that can be observed. Here therefore only that can be object which is in<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 170]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s170\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 170\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|170|<\/span> <em>us<\/em> as such and what we are as the <em>finite<\/em>, and God determines himself for this standpoint only as the infinite, as the other of the finite, as its <em>beyond<\/em>; as far as he is, I am not; as far as he touches me, the finite shrinks away. God is thus determined with an opposition that appears absolute. It is said: the finite cannot grasp, reach, comprehend the infinite; one cannot go beyond this standpoint. It is said: we have in this everything we need to know of God and religion, and what is beyond it is of evil. One could even still observe that we can know God, that we know of a wealth of his liveliness and spirituality; but that would be of evil.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When one has placed oneself on the standpoint of the empirical procedure, of observing, one truly cannot go further; for <em>to observe<\/em> means to keep its content <em>external<\/em> to oneself; this external, restricted, however, is the <em>finite<\/em>, which is <em>external over against an other<\/em>, and this other, as the infinite, is its <em>beyond<\/em>. If I now go further, begin to consider from a spiritually higher standpoint of consciousness, I no longer find myself observing; rather I forget myself, going into the object; I sink myself into it in seeking to know, to comprehend God; I give myself up in it, and when I do this, I am no longer in the relationship of empirical consciousness, of observing. If God is no longer a beyond for me, I am no longer a pure observer. Insofar as one wants to observe, then, one must remain on this standpoint. And that is the whole wisdom of our time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">One stops at the <em>finitude of the subject<\/em>; it counts here as the highest, the last, as immovable, unchangeable, brazen, and over against it there is then an other at which this subject has an end. This other, called God, is a beyond, after which we seek in the feeling of our<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 171]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s171\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 171\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|171|<\/span> finitude, nothing more, for we are firm and absolute in our finitude.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The reflection of <em>being over and beyond the limit<\/em> is admittedly still granted too; but this going beyond is only something attempted, a mere <em>longing<\/em>, which does not reach what it seeks; to reach the object, to know it, would surely mean to give up my finitude; but this is the last, is not to be given up, and we are finished in it, satisfied and reconciled with it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This whole standpoint is now to be looked at still more closely, and it is to be seen what makes up its general determinacy, and its essential element is to be judged. In it there is the determinacy of my finitude, of my relativity; the infinite stands over against it, but as a beyond. With the negation as which I am essentially determined <em>alternates<\/em> my affirmation, the determination that I am. We shall see that both, negation and affirmation, collapse into one and the absoluteness of the I will come out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">1. On the one hand there is here the going out from my finitude to something higher; on the other hand I am determined as the negative of this higher; this remains an other, undeterminable by me, unreached, insofar as the determination is supposed to have an objective sense. All that is present is my going out, as a direction into the distance; I remain on this side and have the longing for a beyond.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">2. It is to be remarked that this direction towards a beyond is entirely only <em>mine<\/em>, my doing, my direction, my emotion, my willing, my striving. When I use the predicates all-good, almighty as determinations of this beyond, they have sense only <em>in me<\/em>, a subjective, not objective sense, and they fall entirely only into that <em>direction of mine<\/em>. My absolute, fixed finitude prevents me from reaching the beyond; to give up my finitude and to reach it would be one. The interest in <em>not<\/em> reaching it and in preserving <em>myself<\/em> is identical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 172]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s172\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 172\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|172|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">3. It is evident from this that the twofold negativity, of myself as finite and of an infinite against me, has its seat in the I itself; on the one hand it is only a division in me, the determination that I am the negative; on the other hand, however, the negative is also determined as other against me. This second determination belongs to me just as much; they are different directions, one towards myself and one outwards, which however falls just as much <em>into me<\/em>; my direction to the beyond and my finitude are determinations in me; I remain <em>with myself<\/em> in them. Thereby, then, the I has become <em>affirmative<\/em> to itself, and this is what makes up the other side of this standpoint. My affirmation expresses itself thus: I am. This is something distinct from my finitude and the sublation of my finitude. With regard to longing, striving, ought in general, it means: <em>I am<\/em> <em>what I ought to be<\/em>, i.e. I am good by nature, i.e. I am, and indeed insofar as I am <em>immediately good<\/em>. In this respect it is only a matter of preserving myself so; there is indeed also in me a possibility of relation to something other, of sins, faults etc.; but this is then at once determined as something later, externally <em>accidental<\/em>. I am &#8211; that is a relation to myself, an affirmation; I am as I ought to be. What is faulty is what the I is not, and that is not at my root, but a <em>contingent entanglement<\/em> in general.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this standpoint of affirmation it is thus indeed contained that I can also relate myself to something external, that the good can be clouded. My affirmation in relation to such wrong then also becomes mediated affirmation, restoring itself from such singularization, mediated through the sublation of faultiness, which is in itself only contingent. The good of my nature has returned to equality with itself; this reconciliation then removes <em>nothing inner<\/em>, does not touch it, but removes only something external. The world, the finite, reconciles itself with itself in this way. If, then, it used to be said that God<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 173]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s173\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 173\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|173|<\/span> has reconciled the world with himself, this reconciliation now takes place <em>in me as finite<\/em>; I <em>as single individual<\/em> am good; falling into fault, I need only throw off something accidental from myself, and I am reconciled with myself. The inner is clouded only on its surface, but this clouding does not reach down to the ground; <em>spirit<\/em> has not thereby entered into relationships; it remains out of the game; the inner, spirit, is the originally good, and the negative is not determined within the nature of spirit itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the old theology, on the other hand, there was the representation of eternal damnation; it presupposed the will as absolutely free: what I am does not depend on my nature, but on <em>my self-conscious<\/em> will, and I am guilty through the will. Thus my nature, the original, is not the good; I can ascribe no being good to myself <em>outside my will<\/em>; this falls only on the side of my self-conscious spirit. Here, by contrast, only the good originality is assumed, whose being touched by something else is sublated by the restoration of the original. To this good originality nothing further can be added than the <em>knowing<\/em> of it, the <em>conviction<\/em>, <em>opinion of being good<\/em>, and that reconciling mediation consists merely in this <em>consciousness<\/em>, knowing, that I am good by nature, &#8211; is thus a vain, empty system of swinging. For I swing over within myself into longing and into the direction towards the beyond or into the recognition of my faults committed, and I swing back to myself in that longing and in the emotion, which take place only in me; I am immediately with myself in it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is the abstract determination; developed further, all the views of the age would fall into it, e.g. that the good lies only in my conviction, and here my ethical life rests on this conviction, and what is good again rests only in my nature. My conviction, it is said, is sufficient as regards me. That I <em>know<\/em> the action as good is enough as regards me. A further consciousness<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 174]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s174\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 174\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|174|<\/span> of the <em>substantial nature<\/em> of the action is not needed. But if everything depends solely on that consciousness, I can really commit no fault at all; for I am <em>only affirmative<\/em> to myself, while the division remains formal, a semblance that does not cloud my essential inner. My longing, my emotion is the substantial. In this standpoint lie all the views of recent times since the Kantian philosophy, which first set up this faith in the good.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is the standpoint of subjective consciousness, which develops the oppositions that concern consciousness, but which remain in it and which it keeps in its power, because it is the affirmative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now it is to be considered what finitude in general is and what true relationship the finite has to the infinite; that the human spirit is finite we hear assured daily. We want to speak of finitude first in the popular sense one means when one says man is finite, then of its true sense and the rational view of it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There are <em>three<\/em> forms in which <em>finitude<\/em> appears, namely in <em>sensuous existence<\/em>, in <em>reflection<\/em>, and in the way it is <em>in spirit and for spirit<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-die-endlichkeit-in-der-sinnlichen-existenz\">\u03b1. Finitude in Sensuous Existence<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That man is finite has at first the sense: I, man, relate myself to something other; there is present <em>an other<\/em>, <em>a negative of myself<\/em>, with which I stand in connection, and that makes up my finitude; we are both exclusive and behave independently towards each other. So I am as <em>sensuously sensing<\/em>; everything living is exclusive in this way. In hearing and seeing I have only something single before me, and behaving practically I always have to do only with <em>single things<\/em>; the objects of my satisfaction are likewise single. This is the standpoint of <em>natural being<\/em>, of natural existence; according to it I am<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 175]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s175\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 175\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|175|<\/span> in manifold relationships, manifold external being, in sensations, needs, practical and theoretical relationships; all are restricted and dependent, finite, as regards their content. Within this finitude the <em>sublation of the finite<\/em> already falls; every drive, as subjective, relates to something other, is finite, but it sublates this relation, this finite, in satisfying itself. This return into its affirmation is satisfaction; but on the other hand it remains finite, for the satisfied drive awakes again, and the sublation of negation falls back into need. Satisfaction, this infinity, is only an infinity of <em>form<\/em> and therefore not a truly concrete one; the content remains finite, and so satisfaction too remains just as finite as need as such has the lack and is finite; but on the formal side this, that need satisfies itself, is a sublation of its finitude. The satisfaction of hunger is sublation of the separation between me and my object, is sublation of finitude, but only a formal one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The natural is not in and for itself; rather that it is <em>something not posited by itself<\/em> makes up the finitude of its nature. Our sensuous consciousness too, insofar as we have to do in it with single things, belongs to this natural finitude; this has to manifest itself. The finite is determined as the negative, must free itself from itself; this first, natural, unselfconscious freeing of the finite from its finitude is <em>death<\/em>; this is the renunciation of the finite, and here what natural life is <em>in itself<\/em> is <em>posited<\/em> really, actualiter. The sensuous liveliness of the single individual has its end in death. The single sensations, as single, are passing: one displaces the other; one drive, one desire drives out the other. This sensuous posits itself realiter as what it is, in its perishing. In death the finite is posited as sublated. But death is only the <em>abstract negation of what is negative in itself<\/em>; it is itself something<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 176]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s176\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 176\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|176|<\/span> <em>null<\/em>, <em>manifest<\/em> nullity. But <em>posited<\/em> nullity is at the same time sublated nullity and the <em>return to the positive<\/em>. Here the ceasing, the getting free from finitude, enters. This getting free from finitude is <em>in consciousness<\/em> not what death is; rather this higher is in thinking, &#8211; already in representation, insofar as thinking is active in it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-die-endlichkeit-auf-dem-standpunkt-der-reflexion\">\u03b2. Finitude on the Standpoint of Reflection<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In now raising ourselves from immediate consciousness to the standpoint of <em>reflection<\/em>, we again have to do with a <em>finitude<\/em> that comes forward <em>in determinate opposition to infinity<\/em>. This opposition has different forms, and the question is: which are these?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On this standpoint there is a <em>getting free from finitude<\/em>, but true infinity is in this sphere too only as <em>sublated finitude<\/em>. The question thus is: does reflection come to posit the finite as what is null in itself, or does reflection come as far as nature; can it make die what is mortal, or is the null immortal for it? Because it is null, we ought to let it vanish, for what nature is able to do, infinite spirit must be able to do still more. Thus reflection, like nature, points out the finite as null. But nature always falls back again into the finite, and likewise it is the standpoint of reflection to <em>hold fast<\/em> perennially to the <em>opposition<\/em>, to <em>finitude<\/em> as against infinity. Precisely the relation of these two is the standpoint of reflection; both belong to the opposition peculiar to this standpoint. For one advances to the infinite only as the <em>abstract negation<\/em> of the finite, as the non-finite, which, however, as not having the finite <em>as itself within itself<\/em>, remains something <em>other<\/em> over against it and thus itself something <em>finite<\/em>,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 177]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s177\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 177\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|177|<\/span> which again advances to an infinite and so on to infinity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b1\u03b1) <em>The mutual externality of finitude and universality<\/em>. &#8211; If we consider the <em>first<\/em> opposition of finite and infinite in reflection, finitude is a different, <em>manifold mutual externality<\/em>, each of which is something <em>particular<\/em>, <em>restricted<\/em>; <em>over against it<\/em> the manifold determines itself in its <em>universality<\/em>, <em>unrestrictedness<\/em>, the <em>universal in this plurality<\/em>. This form occurs in more concrete shape in our consciousness thus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We know of many things, but always only of <em>single<\/em> ones. As willing, spirit is determined according to <em>particular<\/em> purposes and interests. In both relations, however, as representing and willing, spirit behaves as exclusive particularity and thus stands in connection with independent other things. Here too the opposition enters, in that spirit compares its <em>existing<\/em> singularity with its singularity determined, represented as <em>universal<\/em>. The wealth of the knowledge I <em>possess<\/em> I compare with the <em>represented<\/em> mass of knowledge, find both, my actuality and the represented universality, inadequate, and it is demanded that the actual plurality be advanced further, completed, exhausted and brought to universality. Likewise in the practical sphere one can make one\u2019s plan a <em>universality<\/em> of satisfaction, completeness of drives, enjoyments, which one then calls happiness. The one totality is called universality of knowing, the other totality that of possession, of satisfaction, of desire, of enjoyment. But <em>totality<\/em> is thought here only as <em>plurality<\/em> and <em>allness<\/em>, and it therefore remains standing over against finitude, which cannot possess <em>everything<\/em>. The I is thus still something exclusive against something exclusive; thus many is absolutely exclusive against another many, and <em>all<\/em> is only an abstraction that remains external to the many. So it is now found that knowledge has no limit; so the<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 178]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s178\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 178\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|178|<\/span> flight from stars to stars is unlimited, and one can well think that natural science knows all animals, but not down to their subtlest determinacies; likewise with the satisfaction of drives: man can reach many interests and purposes, but not all or happiness itself; allness is an unreachable ideal. This finitude <em>remains<\/em> precisely because it is something true; what is untrue is the unity, the universality; plurality would have to give up its character in order to be placed under unity. The ideal is therefore unreachable precisely because it is untrue in itself, a unity of many that is at the same time supposed to remain a manifold mutual externality. The purpose further, and the ideal on this side of which one stops, is itself essentially something finite, and for that very reason I must stop on this side of it; for in reaching it I would after all only reach something finite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b2\u03b2) <em>The opposition of finite and infinite<\/em>. &#8211; Now the form of the opposition of finite against infinite is to be considered as it is in <em>reflection as such<\/em>. This is finitude in opposition to infinity, <em>both posited for themselves<\/em>, not merely as predicate, but as <em>essential<\/em> opposition and such that the one is determined as the other of the other. Finitude <em>remains<\/em> here too for the very reason that the <em>infinite<\/em> that stands over against it is itself something finite, and indeed such as is posited as the <em>other of the first<\/em>. Only the truly infinite, which posits itself as finite, at the same time overreaches itself as its other and remains in it, because it is <em>its other<\/em>, in unity with itself. But if the One, infinite, is determined only as the non-many, non-finite, it remains beyond the many and finite, and so the many of the finite itself likewise remains standing for itself without being able to reach its beyond.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We must now ask whether this opposition has truth, i.e. whether these two sides fall apart and subsist outside each other. In this respect it has already been said that<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 179]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s179\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 179\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|179|<\/span> when we posit the finite as finite, we are beyond it. In the limit we have a limit, but only in being beyond it; it is no longer the affirmative; in being at it, we are no longer at it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The finite relates to the infinite; <em>both exclude each other<\/em>; considered more closely, the finite is supposed to be the <em>limited<\/em> and the <em>limit of it the infinite<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the first form one particular limited another; here the finite has a limit in the infinite itself. If now the finite is limited by the infinite and stands on one side, the infinite itself is also something limited; it has a limit in the finite; it is what the finite is not, has a beyond and is thus something finite, limited. We thus have, instead of the highest, something <em>finite<\/em>. We do not have what we want; we have only something finite in this infinite. Or if one says on the other side that the infinite is not limited, then the finite is not limited either; if it is not limited, it is not different from the infinite, but flows together with it, is identical with it in infinity as before in finitude. This is the abstract nature of this opposition. We must keep this in consciousness; to hold this fast is of thoroughgoing importance with regard to all forms of reflecting consciousness and of philosophy. Precisely in <em>absolute opposition<\/em> the opposition itself vanishes; both sides of the relationship vanish into empty moments, and what is and remains is the <em>unity<\/em> of both, in which they are sublated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The finite grasped <em>more concretely<\/em> is the I, and the infinite is first the beyond of this finite, its negative; as the negative of the negative, however, the infinite is the affirmative. To the side of the infinite thus falls <em>affirmation<\/em>, what is, the beyond of the I,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 180]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s180\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 180\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|180|<\/span> of my self-consciousness, of my consciousness as being able, as willing. But it has been remarked that it is <em>the I itself<\/em> that has here first determined the beyond as the affirmative; this, however, is opposed by that I which we earlier determined as the <em>affirmative<\/em>: I am immediately, I am one with myself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When consciousness determines itself as finite and the infinite is beyond, this I makes the same reflection that we have made, that that infinite is only something vanishing, only a <em>thought posited by me<\/em>. I am the one who produces that beyond and thereby determines myself as finite; both are my product; they are vanishing in me; I am lord and master of this determination, and so the second is posited, that <em>I<\/em> am the <em>affirmative<\/em> placed beyond; I am the negation of the negation; I am the one in whom the opposition vanishes, I the reflection that brings it to nothing. The I thus ruins, through its own reflection, those self-dissolving oppositions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b3\u03b3) <em>The absolute assertion of the finite in reflection<\/em>. &#8211; Here we now stand at this point and want to see what happens to the finite, whether one can really, actually get free of it and it receives its right, namely to be <em>truly sublated<\/em>, to make itself infinite, or whether it <em>remains in its finitude<\/em> and only receives the <em>form<\/em> of the infinite through the infinite over against it being something finite. It seems to be the case here that reflection does not want to let the null stand and as if self-consciousness wanted to be in earnest with its finitude and truly externalize itself from it. But that is precisely what does not happen here, but is only semblance; rather what happens here is that the finite <em>preserves itself<\/em>, I hold on to myself, do not give up my nullity, but make myself in it into the infinite, into the <em>effective, active infinite<\/em>. What we thus have is that the finite I, in being the positing of an infinite beyond itself, has<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 181]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s181\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 181\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|181|<\/span> posited the infinite itself as something finite and is in it identical with itself as the likewise finite, and now, as identical with the infinite, becomes the infinite to itself. This is the highest peak of subjectivity that holds fast to itself, finitude that remains and makes itself in it into the infinite, infinite subjectivity that finishes with all content; but this subjectivity itself, this peak of finitude, still preserves itself. All content is volatilized and frustrated in it; but it is only this vanity that does not vanish. This peak has the semblance of renouncing the finite; but it is that in which finitude <em>as such<\/em> still asserts itself. More precisely, abstract self-consciousness is pure thinking as the absolute power of negativity to finish with everything, but the power that still preserves itself as <em>this<\/em> I in giving up the whole of finitude and pronouncing this finite as infinity, as the universal affirmative. The defect is that of objectivity. With true renunciation what matters is whether this peak still has an object.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The standpoint considered is <em>reflection in its completion<\/em>, abstract subjectivity, the I, the absolutely idealizing, as that for which all difference, determination, content is sublated and posited only by it. What determines is I, and <em>only<\/em> I, and I am it as <em>this<\/em> single one, as the immediate self, as I who am immediately.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In all content I am the <em>immediate relation to myself<\/em>, i.e. <em>being<\/em>, and am it as <em>singularity<\/em>, as the relation of negativity to itself. What is posited by me is, as posited distinct from me, the <em>negative<\/em> and so as negated, as <em>merely<\/em> posited. I am thus <em>immediate negativity<\/em>. So I, this excluding one, as I am immediately &#8211; i.e. according to my feelings, opinions, according to the arbitrariness and contingency of my sensation and my willing -, am the <em>affirmative in general<\/em>, good. All objective content, law,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 182]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s182\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 182\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|182|<\/span> truth, duty, vanishes for me; I acknowledge nothing, nothing objective, no truth; God, the infinite, is a beyond for me, kept away from me. I alone am the positive, and no content counts in and for itself; it no longer has affirmation in itself, but only insofar as I posit it; the true and the good is only <em>my being convinced<\/em>, and for something to be good there is required only this my being convinced, this my acknowledgement. In this ideality of all determinations I alone am the real.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This standpoint now first gives itself out as that of humility, and this its humility consists in the I excluding the infinite, the knowing and cognition of God, from itself, renouncing it and determining itself as finite over against it. But this humility thereby refutes itself; it is rather arrogance; for I <em>exclude precisely the true from myself<\/em>, so that I <em>as this one<\/em> in the here and now am <em>alone<\/em> the affirmative and what is in and for itself, against which everything else vanishes. True humility, on the contrary, renounces itself, <em>this one as the affirmative<\/em>, and acknowledges only the true and what is in and for itself as the affirmative. That false humility, however, in acknowledging the finite as the negative, restricted, makes it at the same time into the only affirmative, infinite and absolute: I, this one, alone am the only essential, i.e. I, this finite, am the infinite. The <em>infinite pronounced as beyond<\/em> is posited only <em>through me<\/em>. In this determination the unity of finite and infinite is contained, but such a unity in which the finite has not perished, but has become the fixed, absolute, perennial. Through this unity being posited by the finite I, it itself becomes a finite unity. The I feigns humility, while out of pride of vanity and nullity it does not know what to do with itself. On the other hand, since knowing of something higher falls away and only subjective emotion, liking, remains, nothing <em>objectively common<\/em> binds individuals together, and with the<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 183]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s183\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 183\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|183|<\/span> arbitrary diversity of their feeling they are directed hostilely against one another with hatred and contempt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This version of the standpoint, at the outermost, contentless peak of finite subjectivity positing itself as absolute, makes up the difficulty in grasping this standpoint.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Its first difficulty is that it is such an abstraction; the second is its approach to the philosophical concept. It borders on the philosophical standpoint, for it is the highest of reflection. It contains expressions which, looked at superficially, seem the same as those philosophy has. It contains ideality, negativity, subjectivity, and all this, considered for itself, is a true and essential moment of freedom and of the Idea. Further it contains the unity of finite and infinite; this must also be said of the Idea. Admittedly it is subjectivity that develops all objectivity out of itself and thus as form converts itself into content and only becomes true form through its true content. Notwithstanding this, however, what thus appears as nearest is the most remote from itself. This ideality, this fire in which all determinations consume themselves, is on this standpoint still <em>incomplete negativity<\/em>; I as <em>immediate<\/em>, <em>this one<\/em>, am the only reality; all other determinations are posited as ideal, burnt. Only I preserve myself, and all determinations count if I will. Only the determination of myself, and that everything is posited only through me, counts. Ideality is not carried through; this last peak still contains what must be negated: that I as this one do not have truth, reality. I alone am still positive myself, whereas everything is supposed to become affirmative only through negation. The standpoint thus contradicts itself. It posits ideality as principle, and what carries out ideality is itself not ideal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>unity of finite and infinite<\/em> that is posited in reflection is admittedly a definition of the Idea,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 184]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s184\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 184\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|184|<\/span> but in such a way that the infinite is the positing of itself as the finite, while the finite is the finite of itself and, through this being sublated, the negation of its negation and thus the infinite, this infinite, however, being only as positing of itself within itself as the finite and as the sublation of this finitude as such. On the subjective standpoint, by contrast, this unity is still placed in the one-sidedness that, posited by the <em>finite<\/em> itself, it is still <em>under the determination of the finite<\/em>; I, this finite one, am the infinite. Thus this infinity is itself finitude. From this affirmation, from this infinite, there is still to be separated this singularity of my finite being, my immediate I-hood. Reflection is itself what separates; but here it neglects its business of separating and distinguishing and comes to unity, which however is only finite unity. It here omits to separate the immediate singularity of the I, of this one, from the infinite and affirmative, and instead of sinking the single, which has no hold for itself, into universality and grasping affirmation in its absolute universality, in which it encloses the single within itself, it grasps singularity itself immediately as the universal. This is the defect of this standpoint. The oppositions can be judged only when one leads them back to the last thought.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is the standpoint of our time, and philosophy thereby enters into a peculiar relationship. If one compares this standpoint with earlier religiosity, one easily notices that formerly this religious consciousness had a content that was in and for itself, a content that described the nature of God. It was the standpoint of truth and of dignity. The highest duty was to know God, to worship him in spirit and in truth, and to holding this content true, knowing of it, salvation or damnation, absolute worth or worthlessness of man was tied. Now the highest is to know nothing of<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 185]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s185\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 185\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|185|<\/span> truth, nothing of God, and thereby one also does not know what right and duty is. All objective content has volatilized into this pure, formal subjectivity. In this standpoint it is expressly developed that I am <em>good by nature<\/em>; it is not <em>through myself<\/em> or through my willing that I am so; rather in being <em>unconscious<\/em> I am good. The opposite insight contains rather: I am good only through my self-conscious, spiritual activity, freedom; it is not originally through nature that I am good; rather it must come forth in my consciousness; it belongs to my spiritual world. The grace of God has its work there; but my being present in it as consciousness and as <em>my<\/em> willing also necessarily belongs to it. Now being good is my arbitrariness, for everything is posited through me.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this remarkable opposition in religious views we must recognize an immense revolution in the Christian world: a wholly different <em>self-consciousness<\/em> about the true has entered. All duty, all right depends on the innermost consciousness, the standpoint of religious self-consciousness, the root of spirit, and this is the foundation of all actuality. Yet it has truth only when it is the form for <em>objective content<\/em>. On that contentless standpoint, by contrast, <em>no religion at all is possible<\/em>, for I am the affirmative, whereas the Idea that is in and for itself must in religion be posited absolutely through itself and not through me; there can thus be no religion here, any more than on the standpoint of sensuous consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Philosophy is something particular in this respect. If general culture is placed in consciousness, philosophy is a business, a way of looking at things, that is outside the community, a business that has a particular place, and so the philosophy of religion too, according to the view of the age, is something that can have no significance in the community, and it has rather to expect opposition, hostility from all sides.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 186]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s186\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 186\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|186|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If, then, the first relationship of the finite to the infinite was the <em>natural<\/em> and untrue one, because the multitude and plurality of particularity was held fast against universality, and if we further see as the second relationship the one in <em>reflection<\/em>, where finitude lies in the wholly completed abstraction of pure thinking, which does not grasp itself actually as universal, but remains as I, as this one, then that relationship is to be considered as it reveals itself in <em>reason<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-die-vernuenftige-betrachtung-der-endlichkeit\">\u03b3. The Rational Consideration of Finitude<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This standpoint is first to be considered as it stands <em>in relationship<\/em> with the form of reflection at its highest peak. The transition from this standpoint must by its nature be dialectical and be made dialectically; this, however, belongs to logic. We want to proceed by presenting it concretely and, as regards the necessity of the transition, appealing only to the own consistency of this standpoint. It says: <em>I as finite am something null<\/em>, which is to be sublated; but this sublation is surely not accomplished if this <em>immediate singularity<\/em> at the same time <em>remains<\/em>, and remains in such a way that <em>only<\/em> this I becomes the affirmative, as the standpoint of reflection states. The finite that enhances itself into the infinite is only <em>abstract identity<\/em>, <em>empty<\/em> within itself, the highest form of untruth, the lie and evil. A standpoint must therefore be pointed out where the I in this singularity in deed and actuality renounces itself. I must be particular subjectivity that is in fact <em>sublated<\/em>; thus something <em>objective<\/em> must be acknowledged by me which in fact counts for me as true, which is acknowledged as the affirmative, posited for me, in which I as this I am negated, but in which my freedom is at the same time preserved. The freedom of reflection is such as lets nothing arise within itself and, since it nevertheless must let something arise, proceeds in this positing without law and order,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 187]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s187\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 187\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|187|<\/span> i.e. lets nothing objective arise. If something objective is really to be acknowledged, it is required that I be determined as <em>universal<\/em>, preserve myself, count for myself only as universal. This is now nothing other than the standpoint of thinking reason, and religion itself is this doing, this activity of thinking reason and of the one thinking rationally, of positing oneself as single as the universal and, sublating oneself as single, finding one\u2019s true self as the universal. Philosophy is likewise thinking reason, only that with it this doing which religion is appears in the form of thinking, whereas religion, as reason thinking unselfconsciously, so to speak, stops in the mode of representation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">From this standpoint the general determinations, the more precise determinations of thought, are now to be pointed out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">First it is said that subjectivity gives up its single element in the object, acknowledging something objective in general. This object can be <em>nothing sensuous<\/em>; of the sensuous object I know; there the matter is what subsists for me, but my freedom is not yet in it; the untruth of sensuous consciousness we must presuppose here. The necessary determination is that this objective is as true, affirmative <em>in the determination of the universal<\/em>; in this acknowledgement of an object, of a universal, I renounce my finitude, myself as this one. The universal counts for me; such a universal would not be if I am preserved as this one. This is also present in immediate knowing of God; I know of the objectively universal that is in and for itself, but because it is only immediate behaviour and reflection does not yet enter, this universal, this object of the universal, is itself only something subjective, which lacks objectivity that is in and for itself. The last reflection, then, is only that these determinations are placed only in feeling, enclosed in subjective consciousness, which, relating itself to itself according to its immediate particularity<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 188]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s188\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 188\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|188|<\/span> has not yet renounced itself, so that this determination of the objectively universal as such is not yet sufficient. It is rather required that the abstractly universal also have a <em>content<\/em>, <em>determinations<\/em> within itself; only thus is it present for me as being in and for itself. If it is empty, the determinacy is only a <em>meant<\/em> one; it falls to <em>me<\/em>; all content remains to me; all activity, all liveliness, determining and objectifying is only mine; I have only a dead, empty God, a so-called highest being, and this emptiness, this representation, remains only subjective, does not bring it to true objectivity. On this latter standpoint there is only <em>certainty<\/em>, but no <em>truth<\/em>, and I can in it still remain wholly determined as this one, finite. Objectivity is then only semblance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Not merely for philosophy is the object full of content; rather this is something common to philosophy and religion; a difference in the view of the two is not yet present here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To this the question attaches: how is the subject determined in it? It is determined as <em>thinking<\/em> in relation to the acknowledged object. Thinking is the activity of the universal, having a universal as object; here the universal is supposed to be the absolutely universal. The relation to such an object is therefore the thinking of the subject; the object is the essence, what is for the subject. The thought is not merely subjective, but also objective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In thought about the matter, reflecting, I am subjective, have my thoughts about it; thinking the matter, thinking its thought, the relation of <em>myself as particular<\/em> as against the matter is taken away, and I behave objectively; I have in this renounced myself as this one according to his particularity and am universal; this and thinking that the universal is my object is the same; I here renounce myself <em>actualiter<\/em>, <em>realiter<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 189]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s189\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 189\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|189|<\/span> Working and living in objectivity is the true confession of finitude, real humility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It can be remarked that it is an essential determination of thinking that it is <em>mediating activity<\/em>, mediated universality, which as negation of the negation is affirmation. It is mediation through sublation of mediation. Universality, substance are such thoughts as are only through negation of the negation. Thus the mode of immediacy is contained in it, but no longer alone. So the expression occurs: we know immediately of God. Knowing is pure activity and is only [as] negating the impure, the immediate. In an empirical way we can know of God; this universal object is thus immediately before me, without proofs. This immediacy in the empirical subject is partly itself the result of many mediations, partly only one side of this activity. A difficult piano piece can be played easily after it has been repeated often, gone through in its single parts; it is played with immediate activity as the result of so many mediating actions. The same is the case with habit, which has become second nature to us. The simple result of the discovery of Columbus is the result of many preceding single activities, deliberations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>nature<\/em> of such an activity is different from its <em>appearance<\/em>; thus the nature of thinking is this equality with itself, this pure transparency of activity, which is in itself negation of the negative, and it is the result that makes itself into the immediate, appears as immediate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I am thus determined as thinking in relation to the object, and indeed not merely in philosophy, but also in affirmative religion; in <em>devotion<\/em>, which comes from <em>thinking<\/em> and <em>what is thought<\/em>, God is for me. This thinking of the universal is then a determinate mode of how I am, as purely thinking. The further point is that in<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 190]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s190\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 190\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|190|<\/span> devotion, in this relation to universal substance, I am <em>reflected into myself<\/em>, <em>distinguish<\/em> myself from this object and it from myself, for I have to give up <em>myself<\/em>; in this lies the consciousness <em>of myself<\/em>, and insofar as I have devotion only as giving myself up against God, I am at the same time only as reflection out of God into myself. How am I now determined in this respect, the I that reappears? Here I am determined <em>as finite<\/em> in a true way, finite as distinguished from this object, as the particular against the universal, as the accidental in this substance, as a difference, as a moment that at the same time is not for itself, but has renounced itself and knows itself as finite. Thus, then, I remain in the consciousness of myself, and this comes from the fact that the <em>universal object<\/em> is now <em>in itself<\/em> <em>thought<\/em> and has the content within itself, substance moving itself within itself and, as inner process in which it generates its content, not empty, but absolute fulfilment. All <em>particularity<\/em> belongs to it; as universal it <em>overreaches<\/em> me, and so I intuit myself as finite: that I am a <em>moment in this life<\/em>, as that which has its particular being, its subsisting, only in this substance and in its essential moments. Thus I am posited as finite not only in myself, but also actualiter. For precisely this reason I do not keep myself as immediate, as affirmative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If we have so far considered concretely the relationship of the I to universal substance, we would still have to consider the <em>abstract relationship<\/em> of the finite to the infinite in general.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In <em>reflection<\/em> the finite stands over against the infinite only in such a way that <em>the finite is doubled<\/em>. The true is the <em>inseparable unity of both<\/em>. This is what we have just considered in more concrete form as the relationship of the subjective I to the universal. The finite is only an essential moment of the infinite; the infinite is absolute negativity, i.e. affirmation, which however is mediation<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 191]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s191\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 191\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|191|<\/span> within itself. The <em>simple<\/em> unity, identity and abstract affirmation of the infinite is no truth in itself; rather it is essential to it to <em>sunder itself within itself<\/em>; in this there is first affirmation, then second distinction, and third affirmation comes forth as negation of the negation and only so as the true. The standpoint of the finite is just as little the true; rather it must sublate itself, and this negating is only the true. The finite, then, is an essential moment of the infinite in the nature of God, and so one can say: it is God himself who finitizes himself, <em>posits determinations within himself<\/em>. This might at first seem undivine to us; but we already have it in the ordinary representations of God too, for we are accustomed to believe in him as creator of the world. God creates a world; God determines; outside him there is nothing to determine; he determines himself in thinking himself, sets an other over against himself; he and the world are two. God creates the world out of nothing; i.e. outside the world there is nothing external, for it is externality itself. Only God is; but God only through mediation of himself with himself; he wills the finite; he posits it for himself as an other and thereby himself becomes an other of himself, a finite, for he has an other over against himself. This otherness, however, is the contradiction of himself with himself. He is thus the finite against the finite; but the truth is that this finitude is only an appearance in which he has himself. Creating is the activity; in it lies the difference and in it the moment of the finite. But this subsisting of the finite must also sublate itself again, for it is God\u2019s; it is his other and is nevertheless in the determination of God\u2019s <em>other<\/em>. It is the other and <em>not<\/em> the other; it dissolves itself; it is not itself, but an other; it ruins itself. Thereby, however, otherness has wholly vanished in God, and God recognizes himself in it, whereby he preserves himself as result of himself through himself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 192]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s192\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 192\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|192|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">According to this consideration the two infinities are to be well distinguished: the true one and the merely bad one of the understanding. So, then, the finite is a moment of divine life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-c-uebergang-zum-spekulativen-begriff-der-religion\">c. Transition to the Speculative Concept of Religion<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For the developed rational consideration of the finite the simple forms of a <em>proposition<\/em> no longer count. \u201cGod is infinite, I finite\u201d: these are false, bad expressions, forms not adequate to what the Idea is, what the nature of the matter is. The finite is not what is; likewise the infinite is not fixed: these determinations are only <em>moments of the process<\/em>. God is just as much as finite, and the I just as much as infinite. The \u201cis\u201d which in such propositions is regarded as something fixed has, grasped in its truth, no other sense than only that of <em>activity<\/em>, liveliness and spirituality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Predicates too do not suffice for determination, least of all <em>one-sided<\/em> and merely <em>passing<\/em> ones. Rather what is true and the Idea is altogether only as <em>movement<\/em>. Thus God is this movement within himself and only thereby alone a living God. But this subsisting of finitude must not be held fast, but sublated: God is the movement to the finite and thereby, as its sublation, to himself; in the I, as what sublates itself as finite, God returns to himself and is God only as this return. Without the world God is not God.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The ancients especially had these abstractions; they are products of the beginning of reflecting, abstract thinking. Plato, however, already recognized the infinite as the bad and the determinate as the higher, the limit limiting itself within itself as higher than the unlimited. The true is the unity of the infinite in which the finite is contained. The result is that we must free ourselves from the bogey of the<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 193]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s193\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 193\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|193|<\/span> opposition of finite and infinite. Against the attitude of wanting to know of God and to have a positive relation to him, the bogey is let loose that this is a presumption, and people speak against it with much unction and edification and with peevish humility; this presumption, however, does indeed belong to philosophy as to religion. On this standpoint it is indifferent whether I cognize the content, God, in thinking, or hold it true on authority or with the heart, with inner illumination or however else; against all this the bogey of the presumption of wanting to know God, to grasp the infinite through the finite, is set up. We must rid ourselves wholly of this opposition, and indeed through the insight into what is really at stake with it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Whoever does not rid himself of this phantom sinks into vanity; for he posits the divine as the powerlessness to be able to come to itself, while he holds fast to his own subjectivity and from it assures the powerlessness of his cognition. This, then, is subjective untruth in the full sense, hypocrisy, which keeps the finite for itself, confesses the vanity of the finite, but nevertheless retains this admitted, confessed vain thing and makes it into the absolute and thereby keeps away from cognition and from religion and religiosity rich in objective content, and annihilates them or does not let them arise. &#8211; This vanity of self-preserving subjectivity, this I, we have escaped by sinking ourselves into the matter; the vanity is taken in earnest. This is a consequence with regard to our doing in science.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>negative<\/em> relationship of consciousness to the absolute is supported by <em>observation<\/em>. For consciousness, it is said, there is only the finite; the infinite, on the other hand, is only devoid of determination (and thereby in itself, as we have seen, only subjective), and consciousness has only a negative relationship to it. Because, it is now said, only such a<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 194]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s194\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 194\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|194|<\/span> relationship is <em>found<\/em> in observation, it is <em>impossible<\/em> to know of the absolute, of truth. Something more is to be remarked about this turn.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If one takes <em>possibility and impossibility<\/em> in general, insofar as they have a <em>determinate<\/em> sense, both concern the <em>inner<\/em>, <em>the concept<\/em> of an object, what it is in itself; they must therefore be decided by the nature of the concept itself. On the standpoint of consciousness as observing, on this standpoint of <em>observation<\/em>, however, one can<em>not<\/em> speak of the inner, of the concept, for it renounces knowing what concerns the inner; it has before it only what falls into external consciousness as such. Possibility and impossibility thus do not fall into this sphere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But this standpoint claims that precisely what is, i.e. what falls into this perceiving consciousness, is what provides the <em>standard<\/em> of <em>possibility<\/em> and from this the concept of it; what goes against experience is impossible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Against this it is to be remarked that this observing <em>arbitrarily restricts itself to the sphere of finite consciousness<\/em>. But there are still other spheres that <em>can be observed<\/em>, not merely this one whose content is only finite against finite, but such where the divine is in consciousness as being in and for itself. The affirmative consciousness of the absolute in the form of unprejudiced religiosity, of devotion, or in the form of philosophical cognition can <em>also<\/em> be observed and gives a wholly different result from the standpoint of finite consciousness, whether the observing subject now observes these higher forms of consciousness <em>in others<\/em> or <em>in himself<\/em>. For given the perversity of that standpoint it may well be that <em>religious sensation<\/em> is more affirmative and richer in substance than <em>consciousness<\/em>: there can be more in the heart than in consciousness insofar as it is determinate, cognizing, observing consciousness; the two can be different. What matters is only to bring cognition in consciousness<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 195]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s195\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 195\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|195|<\/span> into balance with what I as spirit am in and for myself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The conviction, however, that spirit has only a negative relationship to God ruins, corrupts sensation, devotion, religious behaviour; for thinking is the source, the ground on which the universal in general, God, is; the universal is in thinking and for thinking. Only spirit in its freedom, i.e. as thinking, has the content of divine truth and supplies it to sensation; <em>its<\/em> content is the substance of sensation with regard to all true devotion and piety. If one holds fast in thinking consciousness to there being no affirmative relationship to God, all content thereby runs out of sensation; as that sphere makes itself empty, so too sensation is hollow, as I cannot see without external light. If the content is negated, driven out on this ground, what can provide the true determination of sensation is no longer present. If, therefore, it must be admitted on the one hand that there can be more in devotion than in religious consciousness, it is on the other hand arbitrariness or clumsiness that what is present in oneself or in others is not observed. Really, however, this arbitrariness, this clumsiness does not first enter here; rather if one is only to <em>observe<\/em>, observation is thereby <em>restricted<\/em> to the field of finitude; for to observe means to relate oneself <em>to something external<\/em>, which is supposed to <em>remain<\/em> external in it. This is posited only insofar as it is external to itself; that is the finite. If one stands on such a standpoint, then, one also has before one only what is worthy of this standpoint and adequate to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If observation wants to observe the infinite according to its true nature, it must itself be <em>infinite<\/em>, i.e. no longer observation of the matter, but the <em>matter itself<\/em>. Speculative thinking too can be observed, but it is only for the thinker himself; likewise piety<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 196]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s196\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 196\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|196|<\/span> is only for the pious, i.e. for one who at the same time <em>is<\/em> what he observes. Here it is the case that there is not merely observation at all; rather the observer is in a relationship to the object such that the observing is not a purely external one; he is not purely observer, not merely in a negative relationship to what he observes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It follows from this that, in order to find the ground of religion, we must give up the relationship of observing; we must leave this empirical standpoint, precisely because it is only this and because, as we saw, it has sublated itself through itself. Reflection does have the relationship of the finite to the infinite; this, however, is itself posited only as a negation. It does go on to the demand to posit the finite as infinite, but it has been shown that this demand must be only in relation to the affirmative; i.e. in observation the finite is made into the infinite and yet has remained as finite and held fast. And at the same time the demand for the sublation of the finite is nevertheless present.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But now that the finite and the standpoint of reflection have sublated themselves for us, we have arrived at the standpoint of infinite observation and of the speculative concept, i.e. at the sphere in which the true concept of religion will open itself to us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-3-der-spekulative-begriff-der-religion\">3. The Speculative Concept of Religion<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Reason is the ground on which alone religion can be at home. The basic determination is the affirmative behaviour of consciousness, which is only as negation of the negation, as the <em>self-sublation of the determinations of opposition<\/em> that are taken by <em>reflection<\/em> as <em>persisting<\/em>. The ground of religion is to that extent this rational element and more precisely the speculative. Religion, however, is not only such an abstraction, an affirmative behaviour towards the universal as just determined; if it were only that, all<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 197]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s197\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 197\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|197|<\/span> further content would be found outside it, would come in from outside; if it were then in actuality, there would have to be still other actuality outside religion. The standpoint of religion is this, that the true to which consciousness relates has <em>all content<\/em> within itself, and this relating is thereby itself its highest, its absolute standpoint.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Reflection is the activity of fixing oppositions and going from one to the other, but without bringing about their connection and pervading unity. The ground of religion, on the other hand, is absolute consciousness, such that God is all content, all truth and actuality itself. To such an object mere reflecting is not adequate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When we have so far used the expression \u201cconsciousness\u201d, this expresses only the side of the appearance of spirit, the essential <em>relationship<\/em> of knowing to its object. I am thus determined as relationship; but spirit is essentially this: not merely to be in relationship. Into consciousness falls the finite; the object remains standing independently in it. Spirit is not only such a knowing, where the being of the object is separated from knowing itself, not only in the mode of relationship, not merely form of consciousness. Abstracting from this relationship, we speak of <em>spirit<\/em>, and <em>consciousness then falls as a moment into the being of spirit<\/em>; we thereby have an affirmative relationship of spirit to absolute spirit. Only this identity, that knowing posits itself for itself in its object, is spirit, reason that is objective for itself. Religion, then, is relation of spirit to absolute spirit. Only thus is spirit <em>as the knowing the known<\/em>. This is not merely a <em>behaviour<\/em> of spirit towards absolute spirit; rather absolute spirit itself is <em>what relates itself<\/em> to what we have placed as difference on the other side, and more highly, religion is thus the Idea of spirit that relates itself to itself, <em>the self-consciousness<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 198]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s198\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 198\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|198|<\/span> <em>of absolute spirit<\/em>. Into this falls its consciousness, which was earlier determined as relationship. Consciousness as such is finite consciousness, the knowing of an other than the I. Religion too is consciousness and thus has finite consciousness in it, but sublated as finite; for the other of which absolute spirit knows is itself, and it is absolute spirit only in knowing itself. The finitude of consciousness enters in that spirit distinguishes itself within itself; but this finite consciousness is a moment of spirit itself; it itself is the self-distinguishing, the self-determining, i.e. <em>positing itself as finite consciousness<\/em>. Thereby, however, it is only as mediated through consciousness or finite spirit, so that it has to finitize itself in order to become knowing of itself through this finitization. Thus religion is the knowing of divine spirit of itself <em>through the mediation of finite spirit<\/em>. In the highest Idea, therefore, religion is not the affair of a human being; rather it is essentially the highest determination of the absolute Idea itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Absolute spirit in its consciousness is <em>knowing itself<\/em>; if it knows something else, it ceases to be absolute spirit. On this determination it is asserted here that this content, which the knowing of absolute spirit has of itself, is absolute truth, all truth, so that this Idea grasps within itself all the wealth of the natural and spiritual world, is the only substance and truth of this wealth, and everything has truth only in it as a moment of its essence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>proof of the necessity<\/em> that this content of religion is thus absolute truth, insofar as it begins from the <em>immediate<\/em> and shows that content as the result of another content, lies before our science and already behind us. When we gave this proof above in its place, we already saw how the <em>one-sidedness of its course<\/em>, that the content appears not as absolute but as result, <em>sublates itself<\/em>. For precisely the first &#8211; either<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 199]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s199\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 199\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|199|<\/span> the logical abstraction of being or the finite world -, this first, <em>immediate<\/em>, appearing as not posited, is posited in the result itself as something <em>posited<\/em>, not immediate, and degraded from immediate to posited, so that absolute spirit is rather the true, the positing of the Idea as of nature and of finite spirit. Or absolute spirit conscious of itself is the first and only true, in which the finite world, which is thus something posited, is as a moment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That course, then, which at first showed itself as a course <em>before<\/em> religion, where one begins from the immediate without reference to God, so that God only <em>comes to be<\/em> through it, is now rather a moment <em>within<\/em> religion itself, but in another shape and form than in that first way, where it is, as it were, only unselfconscious with regard to God; here God is rather absolutely the <em>first<\/em>, and that course is the <em>activity and movement of the Idea of absolute spirit within itself<\/em>. Spirit is for itself, i.e. makes itself into object, is, over against the concept, subsisting for itself, what we call world, nature; this diremption is the first moment. The other is that this object moves itself back to this its source, to which it remains belonging and to which it must return; this movement makes up divine life. Spirit as absolute is first <em>what appears to itself<\/em>, being-for-itself that is for itself; <em>appearance as such is nature<\/em>, and it is not only what appears, not only being-for-one, but <em>being for itself<\/em>, <em>what appears to itself<\/em>; with this it is consciousness of itself as spirit. Thus the moment first considered as necessity is within spirit itself, and we have that necessity, as to its essence, also within religion, but not as immediate existence, but as appearance of the Idea, not as being, but as appearance of the divine. The concrete fulfilment of the concept of religion is now its production through itself. It is itself that<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 200]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s200\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 200\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|200|<\/span> makes itself concrete and completes itself into the <em>totality of its differences<\/em>, so that the concept, in being only through these differences, becomes object to itself. The concept that we have thus established is the self-consciousness of absolute spirit, this self-consciousness that it is for itself; for itself it is spirit; that in which there is a difference of itself from itself is the moment of nature. Popularly spoken, this means: God is the unity of the natural and the spiritual; but spirit is lord of nature, so that both are not with equal dignity in this unity, but such that the unity is spirit, not a third in which both are neutralized; rather this indifference of both is itself spirit. It is at one time one side and at the other time that which overreaches the other side and is thus the unity of both. In this further concrete determination of spirit it happens that the concept of God completes itself into the Idea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The spiritual is the absolute unity of the spiritual and the natural, so that the latter is only something posited, held by spirit. In this Idea there are the following moments: a) The substantial, absolute, subjective <em>unity<\/em> of both moments, the Idea in its self-equal affirmation. b) The <em>distinguishing<\/em> of spirit within itself, so that it now posits itself as being for this distinguished &#8211; posited by itself. c) Since this distinguishing is itself posited <em>in that unity<\/em> of affirmation, it becomes negation of the negation, affirmation as infinite, as <em>absolute being-for-itself<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>first two moments<\/em> are those of the <em>concept<\/em>, the way in which the relation of the spiritual and the natural is contained in the concept. The further point is that they are not merely moments of the concept, but themselves the <em>two sides of the difference<\/em>. The moment of distinguishing is in spirit what is called <em>consciousness<\/em>. Distinguishing is the positing of two that have no other determination of their difference than precisely those moments themselves. Distinguishing,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 201]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s201\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 201\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|201|<\/span> which thereby becomes a <em>relationship<\/em>, therefore has as its <em>two sides<\/em>: [1.] on the one side that <em>solid substantial unity<\/em> of the Idea itself, God as being, as unity relating itself to itself, and [2.] on the other the <em>distinguishing<\/em>, which, as <em>consciousness<\/em>, is the side for which the solid unity is and which therefore determines itself as the <em>finite<\/em> side.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">God is thus determined as <em>being for consciousness<\/em>, as <em>object<\/em>, as <em>appearing<\/em>; but essentially he is, as the <em>spiritual unity<\/em> in his substantiality, not only determined as appearing, but as appearing <em>to himself<\/em>, thus appearing to the other in such a way that he <em>appears to himself in it<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This distinguishing is therefore itself to be grasped as going back into absolute affirmation or <em>sublating<\/em> itself &#8211; as distinguishing that just as eternally sublates itself into the truth of appearance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If we first distinguished substantial unity from distinguishing itself and then determined as the <em>third<\/em> the return of the second moment into the first, then now, according to the determination of the content of the relationship, those two determinations themselves are to be taken only as one side of the relationship, so that both make up only the <em>one<\/em> determinacy of it, and the <em>second<\/em> moment is then the one that appeared as the third. These two determinations are what, according to the concept, make up what is altogether to be counted as the <em>reality of the Idea<\/em>. The one as the <em>relationship<\/em> into which the concept sunders itself, <em>consciousness<\/em>, the <em>appearance of God<\/em>, and the other as <em>the self-sublation of this merely relative<\/em>, <em>opposed relation<\/em>. In the first, the <em>relationship<\/em>, finite consciousness is the one side, and the way in which its finitude is determined is the way, coming to light in it, in which its <em>object<\/em> is determined for it. Here falls the kind of divine appearance, representation or the <em>theoretical<\/em> side. In the other relation, by contrast, the <em>practical<\/em> one, as the <em>activity of<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 202]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s202\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 202\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|202|<\/span> <em>sublating division<\/em>, it is in consciousness that activity appears. On this side, then, falls the form of <em>freedom<\/em>, <em>subjectivity<\/em> as such, and <em>self-consciousness<\/em> is to be considered in its movement. This is <em>appearance as cult<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-c-der-kultus\">C. The Cult<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The separation of subject and object first has its actual appearance in the will. In the will I am something actual and free for myself and thus set myself over against the object as an other, in order to assimilate it to myself out of this separation. In the theoretical there is still this <em>immediate unity<\/em>, immediate knowing; in the cult, however, I stand on the one side and God on the other, and the determination is now to join myself together in God and God in me and to bring forth this <em>concrete unity<\/em>. Or if we designate that first, theoretical unity as the mode of representation of <em>what is<\/em>, of the <em>objective<\/em>, the cult now, as against the fixed relationship, which as representing consciousness of God as being in and for himself is theoretical, makes up the practical relationship insofar as it has the <em>opposition<\/em> of the subject to the object and insofar as it sublates the division with the object that can appear as being in the first behaviour. Here, now, the side of freedom, of subjectivity, is to be considered as against the first side, which is that of being. We can thus say: the first is God in his being, the second the subject in its subjective being. God is, is there, i.e. has relation to consciousness. Thus the cult itself is at first <em>theoretical<\/em>, insofar as it itself, after sublation of the opposition, likewise leaves representation as it is. God is determinate and thus not yet the true God; insofar as he is no longer determinate and restricted in<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 203]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s203\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 203\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|203|<\/span> his existing appearance, he is spirit, appearance that is in and for itself. To the being of God therefore belongs relation to consciousness; only as abstract God is he for it as beyond, as other. In being in his appearance as he is in himself, he is in and for himself; into his appearance therefore falls consciousness and essentially self-consciousness, for every consciousness is self-consciousness. God is thus essentially self-consciousness. The determination of consciousness also falls into the first, and what we have called the representation of God is also likewise called the being of God.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Knowing thus falls to the cult, and the general form in which it belongs to the cult is <em>faith<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-i-der-glaube\">I. Faith<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Cross-reference:<\/em> Faith and trust over against the immediate identity of the ethical: <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/147\/\">\u00a7 147<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">1. Faith belongs to this practical relationship according to its subjective side, to the knowing one, insofar as self-consciousness in it does not only know theoretically of its object, but is <em>certain<\/em> of it, and indeed as of what absolutely is and alone is true, and has thereby given up in it its being-for-itself, as which it would have truth in its formal knowing of itself. Since faith must be determined as the testimony of spirit to absolute spirit or as <em>a certainty of truth<\/em>, this relationship contains, with regard to the difference of object and subject, <em>a mediation<\/em> &#8211; but <em>within itself<\/em> -, for in faith as it is determined here external mediation and every particular kind of it have already vanished. This mediation thus belongs to the nature of spirit in and for itself and is the <em>substantial<\/em> unity of spirit with itself, which is essentially just as much <em>infinite form<\/em>. Expressed in more concrete determinations, the certainty of faith of truth, or this union of the absolute content with knowing, is <em>the absolute divine<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 204]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s204\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 204\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|204|<\/span> <em>connection<\/em> itself, according to which the knowing one, self-consciousness, insofar as it knows of the true content as <em>free<\/em>, as doing away with all peculiarity of its particular content, knows of itself, but only of <em>its essence<\/em>. In this free, absolute certainty of itself it has itself the certainty of truth; &#8211; as knowing it has an <em>object<\/em>, and this as the essence is the absolute <em>object<\/em>, and it is at the same time no <em>alien<\/em>, no other, beyond object of consciousness, but it is <em>its<\/em> in-itself, its essence, &#8211; for as absolutely certain it is precisely identical with this certainty. This content is the <em>in-itself<\/em> of self-consciousness, and this determination is for us; and insofar as it is only being-in-itself, it has objectivity for self-consciousness, or it makes up the side of its <em>consciousness<\/em>. &#8211; This is the innermost, abstract point of personality, which can be grasped only speculatively as this unity of self-consciousness and consciousness, or of the knowing of its essence, of infinite form and absolute content, which unity is absolutely only as the knowing of this unity in an objective way, as of the essence that is <em>my<\/em> essence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this exposition so much depends on each single moment and at the same time on their essential union that, if either only one of them is held fast in abstraction from the other, or if they are held fast more completely but without their identity, this concept can easily seem to amount only to one-sided forms of reflection considered earlier and can be confused with them. This semblance arises all the more easily since precisely those forms of reflection are nothing other than the moments of the concept expounded, held fast singly and one-sidedly; the setting out of this difference will serve to elucidate more closely the true concept as well as those forms of reflection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If, then, it has been shown that in the certainty of spiritual, pure self-consciousness truth itself is contained<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 205]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s205\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 205\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|205|<\/span> and inseparably identical with it, this determination can easily seem the same as the representation of <em>immediate knowing<\/em> of God, in which, as immediate, the being of God is as certain to me as the I, my certainty of myself. But this assertion essentially insists on the <em>immediacy<\/em> of knowing as such without having the insight that knowing in general as such is mediation within itself, an immediate affirmation that is this absolutely only as negation of the negation. Connected with this, then, is that the immediacy of the knowing subject does not vanish, but this persists in its <em>finite being-for-itself<\/em>, so that both it remains spiritless and so does its object; only the speculative nature of both moments and of the spiritual substance is not grasped and does not come to be expressed. In faithful devotion the individual forgets himself and is filled with his object; he gives up his heart and does not keep himself as immediate. When the subject, in the fire and warmth of devotion, sinks itself into its object, it is indeed still <em>itself<\/em> present in it; it is precisely the subject that has itself in this devotional occupation; it is the one that prays there, speaks, goes through representations, is concerned with its elevation. But the subject does not preserve itself in devotion in its particularity, but only in its movement in the object and only <em>as this spirit moving itself<\/em>. &#8211; The further development of unsublated immediacy then gives the infinity of the vain subject as such; this vain peak remains. If this too is <em>the unity<\/em> of the certainty of itself with the content, this unity is one in which the vain as such is determined as the true, the absolute. That subjectivity, on the other hand, is determined to be the true one only insofar as it is free knowing, freed from immediacy as well as from being-for-itself reflecting itself into itself against substance and holding fast, only this unity of infinite form with substance that is negative against its particular<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 206]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s206\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 206\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|206|<\/span> peculiarity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With the concept stated one can also be reminded of another representation or of the bare accusation of <em>pantheism<\/em>, which is made against that concept even by theologians. For there are also theologians who themselves often, when they otherwise think they have removed themselves very far from it, are so bound to the highway of the common culture of reflection of our time that, if they do not see God spoken of in the position of being determined as an absolute beyond, their thought does not know how to get further than to grasp such affirmative relation only as common, abstract identity. One does not know how to know God as spirit; spirit is an empty representation, synonymous only with rigid, abstract substance. Pantheism sees and knows God in the sun, the stone, the tree, the animal only insofar as the sun as sun, the tree as tree, the animal as such is and persists in this immediate, natural existence. The sun, the air etc. are in fact also universal matter; still more the plant, the animal are life, and if one knows no higher determination of God than that of universal being, universal life, universal substance and the like, such existences contain this so-called divine essence, and indeed as a spiritless universal. Likewise, if single self-consciousness is determined as a natural, simple <em>thing<\/em>, in which determination the soul is usually understood, it likewise enters into the pantheistic view of taking it as divine existence; but likewise if self-consciousness, though not as a natural thing, is taken as something actual according to <em>immediacy<\/em>, so that it would truly be as <em>immediately<\/em> knowing, as thinking according to its merely original determinacy, &#8211; if it is thus taken in this sense for a divine actuality, it is also still taken up into that<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 207]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s207\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 207\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|207|<\/span> pantheistic view. And this representation cannot free itself from such a determination of the single self-conscious being. I <em>am<\/em>, I <em>am<\/em> thinking: this form of immediate being that representing grasps as what makes up the last definition and the persisting shape of the thinking one. Even if it is also called spirit, it remains a senseless word, since that merely <em>existing I<\/em>, that merely <em>immediate<\/em> knowing &#8211; immediately knowing whatever it may be, even God &#8211; is only spiritless spirit as yet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is from this grasping of spirit as spiritless that the two assertions flow: that man can <em>know<\/em> of God only <em>immediately<\/em>, and that he is, as <em>original<\/em>, <em>good by nature<\/em>. Or conversely, if these two assertions are made, it follows that spirit is taken only as <em>existing<\/em> I and this <em>existing<\/em> I as the last true determination of self-consciousness and even as absolute eternal being. Spirit is only spirit as concrete freedom, as letting its naturalness or immediacy dissolve in its <em>universality<\/em> in general or more determinately in its essence as its object, sinking its natural singularity, determining itself as finite, into the <em>matter<\/em>, i.e. here the absolute content determining itself as object. If, in the immediacy to be given up, one thinks only of bodily immediacy, giving it up represents itself partly as <em>natural death<\/em>, through which man could be united with God, &#8211; partly, however, as thinking, which abstracts from sensuous life and sensuous representations and is a withdrawal into the free region of the supersensuous; but if it here stops at itself as <em>abstract<\/em> thinking, it keeps for itself the reflected vanity of simple, immediate being-for-itself, of the brittle One of the existing I, which behaves <em>exclusively<\/em> against its essence and negates it <em>within<\/em> itself. It is rightly said of this I that<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 208]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s208\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 208\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|208|<\/span> God would not be in it nor it in God, and that it would have to do with God only in an external way, as well as that it would be the pantheistic view, unworthy of God, if it were taken as an actual existence of God, since God must at least abstractly be determined as the absolutely universal essence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But the relationship of self-consciousness to God as to spirit is wholly different from this pantheistic kind, since in such behaviour it is itself spirit and, through giving up its <em>exclusive<\/em> determination, which it has as immediate One, places itself in affirmative relation, in a spiritually living relationship to God. If theologians see pantheism in this relationship, and thus count among \u201ceverything\u201d &#8211; <em>all things<\/em>, among which they still count the soul and the I reflected into its being-for-itself, and which they are then entitled to exclude from God according to their individual actuality, in which they are finite &#8211; also <em>spirit<\/em>, and know it too only as negation of God, they forget not only the doctrines that man was created in the image of God, but above all the doctrine of the grace of God, of justification through Christ, and most immediately the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, who leads the community into all truth and lives eternally in his community. The present catchword against this, however, is: pantheism. But if the I is knowing of infinite content, such that this form itself belongs to the infinite content, the content is absolutely adequate to the form; it is there not in finite existence, but in absolute appearance of itself, and that is not pantheism, which has before it the existence of the divine in a particular form. If, on the contrary, man is <em>immediately God<\/em>, i.e. if he knows of God as <em>this one<\/em>, that is pantheistic. The church, by contrast, says that only through the sublation of this naturalness (which sublation, represented naturally, is natural death) is man united with God. If we grasp [what] the church<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 209]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s209\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 209\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|209|<\/span> teaches in the concept, in thought, the speculative determinations stated lie in it, and if there are theologians who cannot keep up with such doctrines, which admittedly concern the innermost depths of the divine essence, with the concept, they should leave them alone. Theology is the comprehending of the religious content; those theologians should therefore admit that <em>they<\/em> cannot comprehend it, but not want to judge comprehending, least of all with such expressions as pantheism and so on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Older theologians grasped this depth most intimately, while among present-day Protestants, who have only criticism and history, philosophy and science have been set wholly aside. Meister Eckhart, a Dominican monk, says among other things in one of his sermons about this innermost: \u201cThe eye with which God sees me is the eye with which I see him; my eye and his eye are one. In justice I am weighed in God and he in me. If God were not, I would not be; if I were not, he would not be. This, however, is not needful to know, for these are things that are easily misunderstood and that can be grasped only in the concept.\u201d<sup><a href=\"#vpr2-fn3\" id=\"vpr2-fnr3\">3)<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"vpr2-fn3\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\"><a href=\"#vpr2-fnr3\">3)<\/a> <em>Werkausgabe:<\/em> cf. the German sermons \u201cQui audit me\u201d, \u201cJustus in perpetuum vivet\u201d, \u201cBeati pauperes spiritu\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">2. Faith must now essentially be given <em>the form of mediation<\/em>; it is in itself already this form, since it is knowing of God and of his determination, and this knowing is within itself a process, a movement, liveliness, mediation. Precisely in the <em>freedom<\/em> that is the inner determination of faith there lies that it is not what we first called substantial, <em>solid unity<\/em>, not <em>representation<\/em>; rather in freedom I am as this <em>activity<\/em> in affirmation, which is infinite negation within itself. If one now wants to give mediation the form of an external mediation as ground of faith, this is a crooked form. This mediation, whose ground is something <em>external<\/em>, is false. The content of faith<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 210]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s210\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 210\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|210|<\/span> can come to me through instruction, miracles, authority etc.; this can be the ground of faith as subjective faith; but in this position of the content, that it is as ground for me, precisely this is the crookedness, and if it comes to faith, this external element must <em>fall away<\/em>; in faith I make my own what thus comes to me, and it thus ceases to be an other for me. Immediate faith we can determine as being the <em>testimony of spirit to spirit<\/em>; therein lies that no finite content has a place in it; spirit bears witness only to spirit, and only finite things have their mediation through external grounds. The true ground of faith is spirit, and the testimony of spirit is living within itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Attestation can at first appear in that external formal way; but this must fall away. So it can be that faith in a religion begins from such testimonies, from miracles, in a finite content. Christ, however, himself spoke against miracles and reproached the Jews for demanding miracles of him, and said to his disciples: \u201cThe spirit will lead you into all truth.\u201d<sup><a href=\"#vpr2-fn4\" id=\"vpr2-fnr4\">4)<\/a><\/sup> Faith that begins in such an external way is still formal, and true faith must take its place. This must be distinguished; if this does not happen, people are expected to believe things in which, at a certain standpoint of cultivation, they can no longer believe. Miracles are supposed to be believed in this way, and this is supposed to be a means of believing in Christ; it may be a means, but it is nevertheless always also demanded <em>for itself<\/em>. This faith thus demanded is faith in a content that is finite and contingent, i.e. that is not the true one; for true faith has no contingent content. This is especially to be remarked with regard to the Enlightenment; it<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"vpr2-fn4\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\"><a href=\"#vpr2-fnr4\">4)<\/a> <em>Werkausgabe:<\/em> John 16, 13<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 211]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s211\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 211\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|211|<\/span> has become master over this faith; and when orthodoxy demands such faith, it cannot obtain it given certain representations of people, because it is faith in a content that is not divine, not testimony of God to himself as spirit in spirit. This is especially to be remarked with regard to miracles. Whether at the wedding at Cana the guests got more or less wine is wholly indifferent, and it is likewise contingent whether that man\u2019s withered hand was healed; for millions of people go about with withered and crippled limbs whom no one heals. So it is told in the Old Testament that at the exodus from Egypt red signs were made on the doors of the Jewish houses so that the angel of the Lord could recognize them. Should this angel not have recognized the Jews without the sign? This faith has no interest for spirit. Voltaire\u2019s bitterest sallies are directed against the demand for such a faith. He says among other things that it would have been better if God had given the Jews instruction about the immortality of the soul than that he taught them to go to the privy (<em>\u00e0 aller \u00e0 la selle<\/em>). Latrines thus become a content of faith (Deut. 23, 13-15).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The unspiritual is by its nature no content of faith. When God speaks, this is spiritual; for spirit reveals itself only to spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In recent times theology in exegesis has likewise laid weight on how many codices this or that disputed passage is found in. Thus there is a passage in the New Testament which according to the Greek text reads: God ([abbreviated] \u0398\u03c2) blessed for ever; an old piece of parchment found in Oxford, by contrast, says: who [\u039f\u03c2] (Christ) blessed for ever; a difference produced by the stroke in the \u0398; but now it has again been shown that the stroke shows through from the other side, and so on. When criticism, regarding what we know of the nature of God, lights on such things,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 212]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s212\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 212\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|212|<\/span> these are testimonies that are no testimonies. The content of religion is the eternal nature of God, not such contingent, external things.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When Mendelssohn was called upon to convert to the Christian religion, he replied that his religion did not command him to believe in eternal truths, but only certain laws, modes of action, ceremonial laws; he regarded it as an advantage of the Jewish religion that eternal truths were not commanded in it; for reason sufficed to find these; those positive statutes had been laid down by God, but these eternal truths were the laws of nature, truths of mathematics and so on. &#8211; We must admittedly grant that they are eternal; but they are of very restricted content, are no content of eternal spirit in and for itself. Religion, however, must contain nothing other than religion, and as such contains only eternal truths of spirit; this is its determination. Those positive statutes then concern external modes of worship; or if these commandments of God concern moral actions, then again the spiritual, the disposition, is the main thing. But this commanding, at its highest peak, is the highest harshness and can become irreligious and relate to restricted content. What is to be believed, however, must have a <em>religious<\/em>, <em>spiritual<\/em> content.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">3. Faith and attestation as mediation we have now determined in the concept of the cult as its inner, or as the first moments in it. In the cult God is on the one side, I on the other, and the determination is to join myself together with God within myself, to know myself in God as my truth and God in me &#8211; this <em>concrete unity<\/em>. For our consideration theoretical consciousness too is concrete, but only in itself; that it also become concrete for the subject is the practical. The cult is to give oneself this highest, absolute enjoyment, &#8211; there is feeling in it; there I am present with my<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 213]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s213\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 213\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|213|<\/span> particular personality. It is thus the certainty of absolute spirit in its community, the knowing of the community of its essence; this is substantial unity of spirit with itself, which is essentially infinite form, knowing within itself. More precisely, then, there is contained in it first <em>subjective self-consciousness<\/em>, which however is still subjective only in a <em>formal<\/em> way; for self-consciousness already knowing of the absolute content is <em>free<\/em>, i.e. it does away with the brittleness of being-for-itself, which as single excludes itself from its object. It thus knows of <em>its essence<\/em>, and that this is its essence it gives testimony of to the object, which testimony is thus the product of absolute spirit, which likewise only in it produces itself as absolute spirit. As knowing, self-consciousness has an object; as essence it is the <em>absolute object<\/em>, and this is for self-consciousness, insofar as it is free, no other than the testimony of spirit. Spirit is known by self-consciousness only in its freedom; insofar, then, as this knowing is the free one, the unity of self-consciousness is present, and the absolute content is the substantial unity, so that singularity is absolutely sublated, rather determined as universal against single, so that the latter is only as semblance. I, this empirical existence, from which the essence is admittedly still different, am the essenceless.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Subjective consciousness itself, however, is a restricted, determinate consciousness: <em>particular spirit<\/em>. For this particular spirit, spirit with determinacy, truth too is only in this <em>determinate<\/em> way. As subjective spirit is constituted, so too is objective truth for it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In God, however, there lies consciousness and knowing itself. It is a content, and inseparable from it is the form that this content is object of consciousness. There we are at particular spirit, and at the stages of development of spirit faith modifies itself and determines itself<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 214]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s214\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 214\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|214|<\/span> to other content. So one rightly speaks even with the child of God, its creator, and it thereby receives a representation of God, of something higher: this is grasped early by consciousness, but only in a restricted way, and such a foundation then develops further. The <em>one<\/em> spirit is the substantial foundation in general; it is the spirit of a people, as it is determined in the single periods of world history &#8211; the national spirit; this makes up the <em>substantial foundation<\/em> in the individual; each is born in his people and belongs to its spirit. This spirit is the substantial in general and the identical, as it were by nature: it is the <em>absolute ground<\/em> of faith. According to it is determined what counts as truth. This substantial is in this way for itself in distinction from individuals and is their <em>power<\/em> in relation to them as single, and in this relationship to them it is their absolute <em>authority<\/em>. Every individual, as belonging to his people\u2019s spirit, is thus born in the faith of his fathers without his guilt and without his merit, and the faith of the fathers is something holy to the individual and his authority. This makes up the ground of faith given by historical development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here the question arises how a religion is founded, i.e. in what way substantial spirit comes to the consciousness of peoples. This is something historical; the beginnings are inconspicuous: those who know how to express this spirit are the prophets, the poets; Herodotus says: Homer and Hesiod made the Greeks their gods. Homer and Hesiod have an authority here, but only because their pronouncements were adequate to the Greek spirit. These poets too were preceded by still earlier beginnings, which were the first glimmer of the divine; for one cannot say that in the developed form in which it appears in Homer it was there from the beginning. The shudder before the supersensuous<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 215]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s215\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 215\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|215|<\/span> at first still expressed itself in an uncultivated way. Fear is the beginning, and to remove it and make that supersensuous power favourable, magic formulas were used and prayers made in hymns. So consciousness develops little by little; and the few who know what the divine is are the <em>patriarchs<\/em>, the <em>priests<\/em>, or a caste or a particular <em>family<\/em> can also be destined to administer doctrine and worship. Every individual lives his way into these representations and sensations, and so a spiritual contagion is spread in the people, and education happens in this, that the individual lives in the fragrance of his people. So the children go along to worship adorned and dressed up, join in the functions or have a task in them; in any case they learn the prayers, hear the representations of the community, of the people, place themselves into them and accept them in the same immediate way as the same manner of dressing and the customs of daily life are propagated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That is <em>natural authority<\/em>, but its power is the greatest in the spiritual. The individual may imagine ever so much about his independence; he cannot fly over this spirit, for it is the substantial, his spirituality itself. &#8211; At first this authority is wholly <em>unselfconscious<\/em> and stands immediately firm in the people <em>without prohibition of the opposite<\/em>. The individuals are in it neither free nor unfree, since there is no opposition at all of reflection and of subjective thinking. <em>We<\/em> say that the peoples <em>believed<\/em> this; they themselves do not call it \u201cfaith\u201d, insofar as this contains in itself the consciousness of an opposition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now, however, there are <em>different<\/em> forms of faith, different religions, which can come into collision with one another. As regards this encounter, it can happen on the ground of <em>representation<\/em> and reflection, and defence can rest on grounds and <em>proofs of<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 216]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s216\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 216\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|216|<\/span> <em>truth<\/em>; but it can also take the form that peoples compel others to submit to their faith; faith thus becomes <em>compelling state power<\/em>, partly within the state itself, partly also outwards. This collision has caused countless wars. Here belong, e.g., the wars of the Mohammedans, the religious wars between Catholics and Protestants, also the courts against heretics, further the battles among the Indians between the worshippers of Shiva and Vishnu. It is the honour of God for which one fights in such collisions, that God be acknowledged in consciousness and the truth of the people come to be acknowledged. Against such compulsion <em>freedom of faith<\/em> in general rises up; but this freedom can then also give itself more precisely the position of standing <em>above<\/em> the different content that asserts itself as truth. As <em>formal<\/em> in this way it is what freedom of faith as such is, where what is believed is supposed to remain out of the game. That is then the formal demand of freedom, which does not look to the truth of faith and relates only to subjective freedom; the content may be of whatever constitution. There the difference enters between the inner, the place of conscience, in which I am with myself, and the essential content. The inner is the holy, the place of my freedom, which is to be respected; that is an essential demand that man makes insofar as the consciousness of freedom awakens in him. The ground here is no longer the substantial content of faith, but the formal element of faith.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Freedom of faith, however, at once appears as a <em>contradiction in itself<\/em> when one considers the matter from <em>abstract<\/em> thinking; for in precisely believing, one accepts something <em>given<\/em>, present; but freedom demands that this be posited, produced by me. But in that demand for freedom faith is in fact grasped as my personal faith, as <em>my<\/em> very own and innermost<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 217]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s217\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 217\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|217|<\/span> certainty. In this certainty of myself, in which <em>my<\/em> conviction, <em>my<\/em> faith has its source and its place, I am free for myself against others, whatever kind faith itself may be; or the determinate grounds, reflections and feelings on which it is built are indifferent here. Admittedly faith in itself is still unfree as regards <em>content<\/em>, and it is only <em>thinking<\/em> that seeks to be free with regard to content as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here now, where freedom also relates to <em>content<\/em>, here it is that the <em>break between thinking and faith<\/em> comes forth, this break that we already see in Greece at the time of Socrates. Thinking is a new relation against faith. The side of form, namely, enters into relation against the substantial element of truth. In the Christian religion this principle is present from the beginning; it does indeed begin on the one hand from an external history that is believed, but at the same time this history has the meaning of being the explication of the nature of God. Christ, according to the distinction that at once enters there, is not only a man who had this fate, but he is also the Son of God. The explication of the history of Christ is then the deeper; it has happened in thought and has brought forth <em>dogmatics<\/em>, the doctrine of the church. With this the demand of inwardness, of thinking, is present. The break of thinking and faith then develops further. Thinking knows itself free, not only as regards form, but also with regard to content. In thinking, however, freedom is not without authority; it has certain principles which are indeed its own and to which it reduces everything: but these principles themselves belong to development; an age has certain principles, and to that extent there is also <em>authority<\/em> in it. The last analysis, where there are no more presupposed principles, is only the advance to philosophy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 218]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s218\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 218\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|218|<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The still religious mediation of faith, as it appears in the cult, is the activity of bringing forth the unity determined earlier and of enjoying it, so that what is in itself in faith is also accomplished, felt, enjoyed. According to this side of the will the cult is practical, and this activity has at first the form of restrictedness and singularity. It is often said that man is infinite in his will, finite in his comprehending, cognizing. This is said childishly; the opposite is much more correct. In the will man is against an other, singularizes himself as individual, has a purpose, an intention within himself against an other, behaves as separated from the other; here, then, finitude enters. In action man has a purpose, and action consists in this, that the content, the purpose, <em>is<\/em>, loses the form of representation, or that the purpose, as it is at first subjective, is stripped of this subjectivity and now gains objective existence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Insofar as the cult is also an <em>acting<\/em>, it has a <em>purpose<\/em> within itself, and this, faith, is <em>the reality, concrete within itself, of the divine and of consciousness<\/em>. What the cult has to accomplish is not that it separates something from the objective, changes it, asserts itself on it; rather its purpose is in and for itself absolute reality, and it is not this purpose that is first to be <em>brought forth<\/em>; rather it is only to <em>have actuality in me<\/em>; it is therefore directed against me, against my particular subjectivity. This is the husk that is to be stripped off; I am to be in spirit and the object in me as spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is a two-sided doing, God\u2019s grace and man\u2019s sacrifice. With the doing, the grace of God, representation gets into difficulty because of the freedom of man. But the freedom of man consists precisely in the knowing and willing of God, is only through sublation of human knowing and willing. So man is not the stone in this, such that grace would merely work practically<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 219]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s219\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 219\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|219|<\/span> and man would perhaps be the passive material, without being present. Rather the purpose, the divine, is to come to be in me through me, and what the action, which is my action, goes against is giving up myself altogether, who no longer keeps himself for himself. This twofold activity is the cult, and its purpose is thus the existence of God in man.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I am to make myself in accordance with this, that spirit dwell in me, that I be spiritual. This is my, the human work; the same is God\u2019s from his side. He moves himself to man and is in him through the sublation of man. What appears as my doing is then God\u2019s doing, and likewise conversely. This is admittedly opposed to the merely moral standpoint of Kant and Fichte; there the good is always first <em>supposed<\/em> to be brought forth, realized, with the determinacy that it also remains at the <em>ought<\/em>, as if it were not already there in and for itself. There, then, outside me is a world which, abandoned by God, waits for me first to bring the purpose, the good, into it. The circle of moral working is restricted. In religion, by contrast, the good, reconciliation, is <em>absolutely accomplished<\/em> and in and for itself; the divine unity of the spiritual and the natural world is <em>presupposed<\/em> &#8211; to the latter belongs particular self-consciousness -, and it is only a matter <em>of me<\/em> and <em>against me<\/em>, that I do away with my subjectivity and take my share in this work, which eternally accomplishes itself, and have my share in it. The good is accordingly not something that ought to be, but divine power, eternal truth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Likewise, when nowadays one is always at pains to bring faith to people, and talk always aims at producing misery in them and thereby faith that God is, this is not only not cult; rather this, always wanting first <em>to produce religion<\/em>, is outside religion. The cult is rather within religion, and the knowing that<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 220]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s220\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 220\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|220|<\/span> God is and is actuality is there the ground to which I have only to assimilate myself. Unhappy age, which must content itself with always being told only that there is a God!<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since rather the cult presupposes the being-in-and-for-itself of the final end of the world, but from this presupposition is directed against empirical self-consciousness and against its particular interests, there is a <em>negative moment<\/em> contained in it, but such that it is practical activity of the subject in itself to release its empirical, particular subjectivity. This, then, is the concept of the cult in <em>general<\/em>, which is based on the determination of what is called faith.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-ii-die-bestimmtheit-und-die-besonderen-formen-des\">II. The Determinacy and the Particular Forms of the Cult<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In faith lies the concept of absolute spirit itself. This content is as the concept at first for us; we have grasped it so, but it is thereby not yet posited in existence as such. The concept is the inner, substantial, and as such is present only through us in us in comprehending cognition; but this shape and this content the Idea does not yet have <em>in existing self-consciousness<\/em> in general. The Idea is thus at first as the concept, as the substance identical with subjective self-consciousness, so that subjective self-consciousness has its essence, its truth, in the object; in the Idea the subject is grasped essentially as free, but has at first only relative freedom, freedom of the subject against its universal essence, such that it does not separate itself from it or stand firm in a determinacy that is against this its universality, but subsists only in unhindered continuity with its object. Or freedom is only this formal freedom of the subject, that the consciousness of the subject is in accordance with its concept. The<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 221]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s221\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 221\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|221|<\/span> true faith according to the determination so far, however, presupposes the self-consciousness of the absolute freedom of spirit, the consciousness that man according to his basic determination <em>is free in and for himself<\/em> and knows himself as infinite personality. But if this self-consciousness is still <em>immediate<\/em>, it is at first only formally free and <em>caught in a natural determinacy<\/em>, not the consciousness of its infinite freedom. God himself is not immediately as spirit, and likewise not the consciousness of him. Therefore freedom itself and reconciliation in the cult are at first <em>formal reconciliation and freedom<\/em>; for the subject to be in accordance with its concept, it is required that its concept, absolute spirit, be object to it <em>as<\/em> spirit; for only thus can subjective spirit be free within itself, in relating itself in that absolute content to its essence. The true is that it remains absolute for itself and, as infinite subjectivity, has the consciousness that it has infinite worth for itself and is the object of the infinite love of God.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In accordance with the representation of God explicated above, the cult too develops thus. God is at one time as <em>unity of the natural and the spiritual<\/em>, at another the <em>absolute unity<\/em> that is itself <em>spiritual<\/em>. To this difference correspond the determinate sides of the cult.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">1. God is determined immediately as an abstraction and with a <em>natural determinacy<\/em>, not as absolute, infinite spirit. Insofar as this natural determinacy is posited in him, as he has it within himself in an affirmative way, he is indeed the unity of it and the spiritual; but insofar as natural determinacy <em>remains subsisting<\/em>, the unity of the two is also immediate, itself only a <em>natural<\/em>, not truly spiritual unity. With man the body is just as much an affirmative ingredient as the soul when one says he <em>consists<\/em> of body and soul, and grasped thus the unity of the two too is only natural immediate unity. Thus now in the cult too man is determined with an<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 222]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s222\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 222\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|222|<\/span> <em>immediate naturalness<\/em> or unfreedom of freedom. Since man is only something <em>naturally free<\/em> &#8211; a determination that really contradicts itself -, his relation to his object, his essence, his truth, is also such a <em>natural unity<\/em>, and his faith, his cult, therefore has the basic determination that it is thus an immediate relation or a being reconciled with his object from the outset. This is a determinacy of the cult in all the religions in which the absolute essence of God is not yet manifest. There man is not yet free in his freedom. This is then the <em>pagan<\/em> cult, which needs no reconciliation. There the cult is already what man represents to himself as his ordinary way of life; he lives in this substantial unity; cult and life are not distinguished, and a world of absolute finitude has not yet set itself over against an infinity. Thus among the pagans the consciousness of their happiness prevails, that God is near them as the god of the people, of the city, &#8211; this feeling that the gods are friendly to them and give them the enjoyment of the best. If in this way Athena is known by the Athenians as their divine power, they know themselves originally one with it and know the deity as the spiritual power of their people itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At the first stage of the immediate unity of finite and infinite, <em>self-consciousness<\/em> is not yet developed into <em>totality<\/em>; it is to that extent not in earnest with difference. <em>Negativity<\/em> in general must indeed occur, but since it is not the own imagining of self-consciousness, the negative is excluded from the inner relationship of subjectivity; it stands over there and is, as a realm of darkness and of evil, <em>to be separated from immediate unity<\/em>. Struggle and strife with that negative can also arise, but in such a way that it is represented more as an <em>external war<\/em>, and the enmity and the return from it are not an essential<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 223]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s223\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 223\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|223|<\/span> moment of self-consciousness. Into this stage therefore no reconciliation proper falls either, for this presupposes the absolute division of the mind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The cult thus here has essentially the determination that it makes up <em>not something peculiar<\/em>, something separated from the rest of life, but a constant life in the realm of light and in the good. The <em>temporal life of neediness<\/em>, this immediate life, is <em>itself cult<\/em>, and the subject has not yet distinguished its essential life from the maintenance of its temporal life and from the tasks for immediate, finite existence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At this stage there must indeed occur an <em>express consciousness<\/em> of its god as such, an elevation to the thought of the absolute essence and a worshipping and praising of it. This, however, is at first an <em>abstract relationship for itself<\/em>, into which concrete life does not enter. As soon as the relationship of the cult takes on a <em>more concrete<\/em> shape, it takes into itself the <em>whole external actuality of the individual<\/em>, and the whole range of ordinary, daily life, eating, drinking, sleeping and all actions for the satisfaction of natural needs stand in relation to the cult, and the course of all these actions and tasks forms a holy life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since nevertheless <em>externality<\/em> and <em>neediness<\/em> are proper to these tasks, <em>particular attention<\/em> must be directed to them when they are raised into that essential unity, and, with the exclusion of arbitrariness, they are carried out in a deliberate, settled way. So solemnity and dignity prevail in the commonest actions of life. The concrete existence of finite life is not yet regarded as indifferent, not yet degraded by freedom to externality, because the freedom of the inner has not yet given itself an independent sphere. The doing of daily and ordinary life is thus still placed thoroughly in relation to the religious and counts as a substantial doing. For<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 224]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s224\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 224\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|224|<\/span> this, which we regard as a contingent doing, to be adequate to the form of substantiality, it is required that it happen with solemnity, calm and becoming regularity and order. All this is thus determined in a universal way by prescriptions, and the semblance of contingency is not present, since finitization has not yet torn itself loose for itself and given itself its own scope. His body and finite business and its execution the oriental who stands on this standpoint does not regard as his own, but as <em>a service towards another<\/em>, towards the universal, essential will; he must therefore have dignity and deliberateness in the slightest tasks, so that he accomplishes them becomingly, as is in accordance with that universal will.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That solemnity, however, is only a <em>form<\/em>, and the content is nevertheless <em>doing and being of the finite<\/em>, and the opposition is therefore not in truth sublated. Since the order with which the actions of daily life are done is thus only an external form on that finite content, the <em>actual difference<\/em> between external life and what the absolute object is for consciousness is still present. Subjective existence must therefore be <em>expressly<\/em> sublated, and the way in which this happens here concerns <em>reflection on finitude and on its opposition to the infinite<\/em>. The negativity of the finite, however, can also happen only <em>in a finite way<\/em>. This is now what is called <em>sacrifice<\/em> in general.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sacrifice contains immediately the <em>giving up of an immediate finitude<\/em> in the sense of testifying that it is to be <em>not my own<\/em> and that I do not want to have such finitude for myself; sacrifice is thus, on this standpoint of religious self-consciousness, sacrifice proper. Negativity cannot reveal itself here in an <em>inner<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 225]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s225\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 225\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|225|<\/span> <em>process<\/em>, because the depth of the mind is not yet present. Sacrifice does not consist in a conversion of the mind, of the heart and of the natural inclinations, such that these are broken. Rather what the subject <em>is for itself<\/em>, it is <em>in immediate possession<\/em>, and in giving up its finitude in the cult, this is only a giving up of an immediate possession and of a natural existence. In this sense there is no longer any sacrifice in a spiritual religion; rather what is called sacrifice there can be so only in a figurative sense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sacrifice can now more precisely be a mere <em>sacrifice of veneration<\/em>, <em>of praise<\/em>, the testimony that I have nothing of my own, but give it up in thinking myself in relationship to the absolute. The one to whom the possession is given up is not supposed to become richer thereby; rather the subject only gives itself thereby the consciousness of sublated separation, and its doing is to that extent absolutely <em>joyful doing<\/em>. This is also the sense of gifts in the Orient in general; thus subjects and the vanquished bring gifts to the king, not that he should become richer, for everything is ascribed to him anyway and everything belongs to him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sacrifice can then further determine itself as <em>sacrifice of purification<\/em> with regard to a <em>determinate<\/em> defilement. A <em>sin in the proper sense<\/em> is not committed on this standpoint; the determinate sacrifices of purification rather accompany all finite doing in general. They are also <em>no penance<\/em>, <em>no punishment<\/em>, nor do they have a spiritual conversion as their purpose, and they are altogether no loss and no damage that would be suffered. It is not regarded in such a way that one has done something bad and must suffer an ill again for it. All these determinations would include the representation of a justification of the subject; but that is a representation that does not yet mix in here at all. According to our standpoint such sacrifices would be regarded as a loss, since a property is thereby given up. Such a view<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 226]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s226\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 226\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|226|<\/span> does not, however, take place at that standpoint; here the sacrifice is rather essentially something <em>symbolic<\/em>. A defilement has occurred, and it must be removed in an equally immediate way; but the subject cannot undo what has happened, nor can it repent of having acted so. Therefore an <em>exchange<\/em> must necessarily take place, and something other than the existence that was really at issue must be given up. What is sacrificed may be of much lower value than what I receive, what I have acquired. So with the harvest I have gathered, the animal I have slaughtered; these I take into possession, and if it is now to be shown that I am not in earnest with this possession, this happens in a symbolic way. It is not as though what I do <em>ought not<\/em> to happen, for these actions are <em>necessary<\/em>; the sacrifice merely sublates again this <em>finitization in general<\/em>, this <em>being-for-me<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The general character of this act of worship is what we call the <em>ceremonious<\/em>. This ceremonious consists in everyday, common actions &#8211; as we regard them &#8211; being at the same time necessary actions, determined by prescription. We have the right to behave arbitrarily here or to follow habit without awareness; likewise we do not consider a purification necessary insofar as such actions as harvesting and slaughtering an animal are necessary. Since, further, in those sacrifices and purifications there is a relation to the religious side, there is no difference to which importance is not ascribed. Thus the various foods are not considered merely with regard to taste and health. Likewise, with regard to purification and sacrifice, <em>the diversity of combination<\/em> comes in: the action by which purification from another action is accomplished can have <em>no necessary relation<\/em> to it, and the combination can therefore only be a<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 227]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s227\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 227\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|227|<\/span> <em>contingent<\/em> and <em>external<\/em> one. From this arises what is <em>painful<\/em> in this cult. If there is or was a <em>sense<\/em> in those ceremonies and combinations, it is a <em>trivial<\/em> and <em>superficial<\/em> one, and as such actions become <em>habit<\/em>, they <em>lose<\/em> even the little sense they may have had.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At this standpoint there now also arises determinate <em>punishment<\/em>, insofar as an act opposed to a determinate prescription is to be sublated and a transgression is at issue. The punishment for such a violation is again a <em>violation<\/em>, and something is given up: life, property, and so on. But here this punishment has the sense of a wholly dry, <em>formal punishment<\/em> in the manner of <em>civil punishment<\/em>. This, however, is not immediately concerned with the improvement of the criminal, whereas ecclesiastical penance in our sense is a punishment whose essential purpose is the improvement and conversion of the one punished. At this standpoint punishment cannot have such a moral or rather religious sense. <em>Civil and state laws<\/em> are here altogether <em>identical with the religious laws<\/em>. The law of the state is a law of freedom, presupposes personality, human dignity, and relates essentially to the will; a sphere of <em>arbitrariness<\/em> remains for deciding contingent, indifferent things. At this standpoint, however, this separation is not yet present, and in general a condition of <em>mere necessity<\/em> prevails.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">From the finite being and doing that the cult just described brings into relation with what is in and for itself, a further determined doing now also separates itself, one that is <em>purposive<\/em>. Whereas the performance of the actions that relate immediately to our need does not happen according to a purpose but is immediately regulated, purposive doing, by contrast, is not merely needy doing according to habit; it determines itself<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 228]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s228\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 228\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|228|<\/span> according to <em>representations<\/em>. It is thus indeed still finite doing, insofar as it has a finite purpose; but since the principle here is first of all that <em>the finite be elevated to the infinite<\/em>, the finite purposes too are to be expanded into an <em>infinite purpose<\/em>. So religious <em>labour<\/em> comes in, which produces works of devotion that are not destined for a finite purpose but are to be something that is in and for itself. This labour is here itself cult. Its works and productions are not to be regarded like our church buildings, which are undertaken only because they are needed; rather, labour as <em>pure producing<\/em>, and as <em>perennial<\/em> labour, is the purpose for itself and is thus never finished.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This labour is of various kinds and various degrees, from the merely bodily movement of the dance to the enormous colossal buildings. These latter works then chiefly have the sense of monuments whose erection is endless, since one must always begin again from the start when one generation has finished a work. In such works what determines is not yet <em>free imagination<\/em>; rather, what is produced has the character of the <em>monstrous<\/em> and colossal. Producing is still essentially chained to the <em>natural<\/em> and the <em>given<\/em>, and what is left free to the activity is limited to exaggerating the <em>measures<\/em> and carrying the given shapes into the monstrous.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">All these labours, too, still fall within the sphere of <em>sacrifice<\/em>. For as there, the purpose is the universal, in face of which the subject&#8217;s peculiarity and interests must give themselves up in the doing. All activity is in general a <em>giving up<\/em>, but no longer of a merely external thing, rather of <em>inner subjectivity<\/em>. This giving up and sacrificing that lies in activity is, as activity, at the same time objectifying, brings something about, but not in such a way that<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 229]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s229\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 229\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|229|<\/span> the produced being comes from me alone; rather, it happens according to a <em>purpose rich in content<\/em>. Human labour, through which the unity of the finite and infinite comes about only insofar as it has passed through spirit and been wrested from its doing, is, however, already a deeper sacrifice and an advance over sacrifice as it originally appears, merely as the giving up of an immediate finitude. For in that producing, sacrifice is <em>spiritual doing<\/em> and the exertion which, as negation of particular self-consciousness, holds fast the purpose living within and in representation and brings it forth externally for intuition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So far we have considered the cult of this standpoint as it starts from the <em>presupposed unity of self-consciousness and the object<\/em>. Here, however, a <em>deviation from this original unity<\/em> often occurs too, from this being reconciled or from the absence of the need to be reconciled. These deviations lie partly in the arbitrariness of the subject, in the enjoyment that the individual has in its world &#8211; for it is not spiritually self-conscious, and so is still inclination, desire -, or they come from another side, from the power of nature, from the misfortune of the human being, of the individual, of peoples, of states. After such disturbances, by which the unity is interrupted, a serious negation is then always needed to restore it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here there is the <em>separation of the divine and the human<\/em>, and the sense of the cult is not to enjoy this oneness but to sublate the rupture. Here too there is still the presupposition of the reconciliation that is in and for itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">2. This <em>separation<\/em> is at first one that occurs in the <em>natural<\/em>, and it then appears as an <em>external calamity<\/em> that befalls a people. God is here the substantial power, the power of the spiritual as of the natural; if, then, crop failure, the misfortunes of war, plague and other calamities oppress the land, the direction of the cult is<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 230]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s230\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 230\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|230|<\/span> to regain the goodwill of the gods, which was originally present. Here <em>misfortune<\/em> constitutes the separation; it concerns only the natural sphere, the external condition as regards bodily existence, namely that these external circumstances are not as the claims to happiness demand. The presupposition is that this natural condition is <em>not a contingent one<\/em> but depends on a higher power that determines itself as God; God has posited it, brought it forth. A further determination is that this will which decrees the misfortune stands in a <em>moral connection<\/em>, so that it goes well or ill with a person or a people <em>because<\/em> that person or people has <em>deserved it through their guilt<\/em>. That is why the course of nature is disturbed against human purposes, so that it opposes their benefit and happiness as hostile. In the case of this separation it is required to restore the oneness of the divine will with human purposes. The cult thus takes the shape of <em>atonement<\/em>: this is accomplished through acts of remorse and penance, through sacrifices and ceremonies, by which the human being shows that he is in earnest about giving up his particular will.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Underlying this is in general the intuition that God is the power over nature, that nature depends on a higher will. The question that arises here is only to what extent the divine will presents itself in natural events, how it is to be recognized in them. At this standpoint the presupposition holds that the power of nature is not only <em>natural<\/em> but contains purposes within itself that are alien to it as such, namely <em>purposes of the good<\/em>, which concern the well-being of human beings and on which that well-being depends. This we too acknowledge as true; but the good is the <em>abstract<\/em>, universal; when people speak of their good, they have quite <em>particular purposes<\/em> for themselves, and so they grasp it in<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 231]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s231\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 231\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|231|<\/span> limited, natural existence. But when one thus descends from the divine will to particular purposes, one descends into the realm of <em>finitude<\/em> and <em>contingency<\/em>. Piety, the pious thought that the individual misfortune depends on the good, does indeed also rise from the individual to God, to the universal; thereby the sovereignty of the universal over the particular is acknowledged. But the further step is the application of this universal to the particular, and here the defective enters into the representation. Peoples visited by calamities look for a transgression that might be its occasion; refuge is then further sought with a power that determines itself according to purposes; and even if this universal is granted, the application to the particular leads to a disproportion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the disturbances that we find at this first stage, <em>the unity appears as something limited<\/em>; it can be torn apart; it is <em>not absolute<\/em>, for it is an original, unreflected one. So above this presupposed, immediate and therefore destructible harmony, and above its celebration and enjoyment, there still hovers something higher, a highest, for the original unity is only natural oneness, and thus limited for spirit; burdened with a natural element, spirit does not have a reality such as it ought to have according to its concept. This <em>disunity<\/em> must be present <em>for consciousness<\/em>, for consciousness is in itself thinking spirit; the need for an <em>absolute unity<\/em> must emerge in it, a unity that hovers above that satisfaction of enjoyments but remains only <em>abstract<\/em>, because the fulfilled living foundation is that original harmony. Above this sphere hovers a separation that is not resolved; thus through the joy of that living unity there sounds an unresolved note of mourning and pain; a <em>fate<\/em>, an unknown power, a compelling necessity, acknowledged without being known, without reconciliation, to which consciousness submits, but only with the negation of itself,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 232]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s232\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 232\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|232|<\/span> hovers over the heads of gods and humans. This is a moment that is bound up with this determination of self-consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is here, then, that a particular side of the cult emerges. In that first unity, namely, the negation of the subject is superficial and contingent, and only the feeling of mourning, the thought of necessity, which is something negative over against that living unity, hovers above it. But this negativity must itself become actual and prove itself the higher over that unity. This necessity does not remain mere representation; it becomes earnest with the human being. The natural human being passes away, death becomes earnest with him, fate consumes him without consolation; for the reconciliation, the unity, is precisely not that of the deep, the innermost; rather, natural life is still an essential moment and has not been given up; the rupture has not yet gone so far, but a unity of the natural and the spiritual has remained in which the former retains an affirmative determination. This fate must now be reshaped in representation, in a subjective way, into something affirmative: thus the shades of the dead are what is unreconciled and must be reconciled; they must be avenged for the wrong of their death. This, then, is the <em>cult of the dead<\/em>, an essential side of the cult.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">3. What is higher than this standpoint of the cult is then that <em>subjectivity has come to the consciousness of its infinity within itself<\/em>; here religion and cult enter wholly into the domain of <em>freedom<\/em>. The subject knows itself as infinite, and indeed as subject. This requires that what was earlier unrevealed has in itself the moment of being singularity, which thereby receives <em>absolute value<\/em>. But singularity has value only as this absolute and therefore utterly <em>universal singularity<\/em>. Here the individual is only <em>through the sublation of his immediate singularity<\/em>, by which sublation he generates absolute singularity within himself, and is therefore free within himself. This<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 233]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s233\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 233\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|233|<\/span> freedom is, as the movement of absolute spirit in him, through the sublation of the natural, the finite. The human being, [precisely] in having come to the consciousness of the infinity of his spirit, has posited <em>the highest rupture against nature in general and against himself<\/em>; it is this that brings forth the domain of true freedom. Through this knowledge of absolute spirit the highest opposition to finitude has entered, and this rupture is the bearer of reconciliation. Here it is no longer said that the human being is by origin, that is, according to his immediacy, good and reconciled with absolute spirit, but on the contrary that precisely because his concept is the absolutely free unity, his natural existence proves itself immediately to be opposed and thus something to be sublated. Naturalness, the immediate heart, is what must be renounced, because this moment does not leave spirit free and spirit as natural spirit is not posited through itself. If naturalness is retained, spirit is not free; what it is, it then is not through itself, for itself, but it finds itself so; in that higher sphere, by contrast, everything that the human being ought to be is placed in the domain of freedom. Here, then, the cult passes essentially into the domain of <em>the inner<\/em>; here the heart is to break, that is, <em>the natural will<\/em>, natural consciousness, is to be given up. On the one hand there are also <em>actual sins<\/em> that the human being has to repent, that is, sins which, as single ones, are something contingent and do not concern human nature as such; on the other hand, however, in the abstraction of finitude and infinity, in this <em>universal opposition<\/em>, the finite in general counts as evil. The separation that is said to lie originally in the human being is to be sublated. And the natural will is indeed not the will as it ought to be, for it ought to be free, and the will of desire is not free. Spirit is not by nature as it ought to be; it is this only through freedom; this is represented here as the will being <em>evil by nature<\/em>. But the human being is guilty<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 234]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s234\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 234\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|234|<\/span> only insofar as he stops at his naturalness. Right and ethical life are not the natural will, for in the latter the human being is selfish and wills only his singularity as such. Through the cult, then, evil is to be sublated. The human being is not to be innocent in the sense of being neither good nor evil; such natural innocence does not come from human freedom; rather, the human being is educated to freedom, which is essential only when it wills the essential will, and this is also the good, the right, the ethical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The human being is to become <em>free<\/em>, that is, a righteous and ethical human being, and indeed by way of education. In that representation this education is expressed as the overcoming of evil and is thereby placed <em>on the ground of consciousness<\/em>, whereas education happens unconsciously. &#8211; In this form of cult there is the sublation of the opposition of good and evil; the natural human being is presented as evil, but evil is the side of separation and estrangement, and this estrangement is to be negated. The presupposition is that reconciliation has been accomplished in itself; in the cult the human being produces this assurance for himself and lays hold of the reconciliation accomplished in itself. But it is accomplished in and through God, and this divine reality the human being is to make his own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This appropriation of reconciliation, however, happens by means of the negation of estrangement, that is, through <em>renunciation<\/em>, and the question now is: what more precisely is it that the human being is to renounce? One is to renounce one&#8217;s particular will, one&#8217;s desires and natural drives. This can be understood as though the natural drives were to be rooted out, not merely purified, as though the liveliness of the will were to be killed. This is quite incorrect; the truth is that only the <em>impure content<\/em> is to be refined, that is, their content is to be made adequate to the ethical will; by contrast, when renunciation is grasped in an<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 235]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s235\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 235\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|235|<\/span> abstract way, it is falsely demanded that the drive of liveliness be sublated within oneself. What is the human being&#8217;s own also includes possession, his property: it is his with his will; so it could also be demanded that the human being give up his possession; celibacy is a similar demand. Freedom and conscience also belong to the human being: in the same sense one can also demand that the human being give up his freedom, his will, so that he sinks into a dull, will-less creature. This is the extreme of that demand. &#8211; To this further belongs my undoing my actions and suppressing the stirrings of evil doing; renunciation then means that I do not want to regard certain actions I have performed as mine, that I want to regard them as not having happened, that is, to <em>repent<\/em> them; in time the action has indeed passed, so that it is annihilated by time, but according to its inner content, insofar as it belongs to <em>my will<\/em>, it is still preserved within, and its annihilation then means giving up the disposition in which it ideally exists. If punishment is the annihilation of evil in actuality, this annihilation within is <em>penance<\/em> and <em>remorse<\/em>, and spirit can perform this renunciation, since it has the energy to change itself in itself and to annihilate within itself the maxims and intentions of its will. When the human being renounces in this way his selfishness and his rupture with the good, he has become a partaker of reconciliation and has attained peace within himself through mediation. So it happens that here spirit appears in the subject as it truly is in and for itself and in accordance with its content, and that this content is no longer one beyond, but free subjectivity has in it its essence as object. The cult is thus finally the <em>presence<\/em> of the content that constitutes absolute spirit, whereby the history of the content of God is essentially also <em>the history of humanity<\/em>, the movement<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 236]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s236\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 236\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|236|<\/span> of God toward human beings and of the human being toward God. The human being knows himself to be essentially contained in this history, interwoven with it; as he immerses himself in it intuitively, his immersion in it is his going through this content and process along with it, and he gives himself the certainty and enjoyment of the reconciliation contained in it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This working-through of subjectivity, this purification of the heart from its immediate naturalness, when carried out thoroughly and creating an enduring <em>condition<\/em> that corresponds to its <em>universal<\/em> purpose, completes itself as <em>ethical life<\/em>, and on this path religion passes over into <em>custom<\/em>, into the <em>state<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thus there arises that connection which is also called the <em>relationship of religion to the state<\/em>, and of this we must speak in more detail.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-iii-das-verhaeltnis-der-religion-zum-staat\">III. The Relationship of Religion to the State<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Cross-reference:<\/em> The counterpart in the <em>Groundlines<\/em> is the long remark to <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/270\/\">\u00a7 270<\/a>. In the <em>Encyclopaedia<\/em>, the remark to <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/objective-spirit-right-morality-ethical-life-enc-%c2%a7%c2%a7-483-552\/#o-552\">\u00a7 552<\/a> belongs to it. See also the FAQ <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/is-the-state-god-for-hegel\/\">Is the State God for Hegel?<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">1. The state is the true mode of actuality; in it the true, ethical will comes to actuality and spirit lives in its truthfulness. Religion is divine knowing, the knowledge of the human being of God and his knowledge of himself in God. This is divine wisdom and the field of absolute truth. Now there is a second wisdom, the wisdom of the world, and the question is how it relates to that divine wisdom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In general, religion and the foundation of the state are one and the same; they are <em>identical in and for themselves<\/em>. In the patriarchal relationship, in the Jewish theocracy, the two are not yet distinguished and are still externally identical. But the two are also different, and so in the further course they are strictly separated from each other, and then again posited as truly identical. The unity that is in and for itself is already evident from what has been said: religion is knowledge of the highest truth, and this truth, more precisely determined, is <em>free spirit<\/em>. In religion<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 237]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s237\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 237\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|237|<\/span> the human being is free before God; in making his will conform to the divine will, he is not opposed to the highest will but has himself in it; he is free in that he has achieved, in the cult, the sublation of the rupture. The state is only <em>freedom in the world<\/em>, in actuality. What matters essentially here is the concept of freedom that a people carries in its self-consciousness; for in the state the concept of freedom is realized, and to this realization belongs essentially the consciousness of the freedom that is in itself. Peoples who do not know that the human being is free in and for himself live in dullness both with regard to their constitution and their religion. &#8211; There is <em>one<\/em> concept of freedom in religion and state. This one concept is the highest that the human being has, and it is realized by the human being. A people that has a bad concept of God also has a bad state, bad government, bad laws.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To consider this connection between state and religion in its fully developed detail properly belongs to the philosophy of world history. Here it is to be considered only in the determinate form in which it appears to representation, in which it entangles itself in contradictions, and how it finally comes to the opposition of the two that forms the interest of modern times. We therefore consider that connection first<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">2. as it is <em>represented<\/em>. People have a consciousness of it, but not as it is the <em>absolute connection<\/em> and is known in philosophy; rather, they know it in general and represent it to themselves. The representation of the connection expresses itself in this way: the laws, the authorities, the constitution of the state <em>come from God<\/em>; thereby they are authorized, and indeed by the highest authority given to representation. The laws are the development of the concept of freedom, and this concept, reflecting itself thus upon existence, has as its foundation and truth the concept of freedom as it is grasped in religion. With<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 238]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s238\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 238\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|238|<\/span> this it is expressed that these laws of ethical life and of right are eternal and unchangeable rules for human conduct, that they are not arbitrary but endure as long as religion itself. We find the representation of this connection among all peoples. It can also be expressed in the form that one obeys God by following the laws and the authorities, the powers that hold the state together. This proposition is on the one hand correct, but it is also exposed to the danger that it can be taken quite abstractly, since it is not determined how the laws are explicated and which laws are appropriate for the fundamental constitution; expressed so formally, that proposition means: one is to obey the laws, <em>be they what they may<\/em>. Governing and legislating are in this way left to the <em>arbitrariness<\/em> of the government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This relationship has occurred in <em>Protestant<\/em> states, and it can take place only in such states, for there that unity of religion and state is present. The laws of the state count as rational and as something divine because of this <em>presupposed original harmony<\/em>, and religion does not have its own principles contradicting those that hold in the state. But when one stops at the formal, free scope is thereby given to arbitrariness, tyranny and oppression. This came to light especially in England (under the last kings of the house of Stuart), when a <em>passive obedience<\/em> was demanded and the proposition held that the ruler owed an account of his actions to God alone. The presupposition here is that only the ruler also determinately <em>knows<\/em> what is essential and necessary for the state; for in him, in his will, lies the more precise determination that he is an <em>immediate revelation<\/em> of God. Through further consequence, however, this principle was developed to the point where it turned <em>into its opposite<\/em>; for the distinction between priests and laity is not present among<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 239]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s239\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 239\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|239|<\/span> Protestants, and the priests are not privileged to possess divine revelation, still less is there such a <em>privilege<\/em> belonging exclusively to one layman. Against the principle of the ruler&#8217;s divine authorization, therefore, was set the principle of the same authorization belonging to the laity in general. Thus in England a Protestant sect arose which claimed that it had been inspired by revelation as to how one must govern; following such an inspiration of the Lord, they stirred up a rebellion and beheaded their king. &#8211; So if it is indeed established in general that the laws exist through the divine will, it is an equally important side to know this divine will, and this is nothing particular but belongs to all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To know what the rational is, is the business of the cultivation of thought and especially the business of philosophy, which in this sense may well be called worldly wisdom. It is quite indifferent in what external appearance the true laws have asserted themselves (whether they were wrested from the rulers or not); the further development of the concept of freedom, of right, of humanity among human beings is necessary for itself. &#8211; With that truth that the laws are the divine will, what matters especially, then, is that it be determined <em>which these laws are<\/em>. Principles as such are only abstract thoughts, which have their truth only in their development; held fast in their abstraction, they are what is wholly untrue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">3. Finally, state and religion can also be <em>at variance<\/em> and have <em>different laws<\/em>. The ground of the secular and the religious is a different one, and so a difference can also arise with regard to principle. Religion does not remain merely on its own ground; it also approaches the subject, gives him prescriptions with respect to his religiosity and thereby with respect to<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 240]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s240\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 240\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|240|<\/span> his activity. These prescriptions that religion gives the individual can differ from the principles of right and ethical life that hold in the state. This opposition expresses itself in the form that the demand of religion aims at <em>holiness<\/em>, that of the state at <em>right and ethical life<\/em>; on the one side the destiny is for <em>eternity<\/em>, on the other for <em>temporality<\/em> and temporal well-being, which must be sacrificed for eternal salvation. Thus a <em>religious ideal<\/em> is set up, a heaven on earth, that is, the <em>abstraction of spirit<\/em> against <em>the substantial of actuality<\/em>; <em>renunciation<\/em> of actuality is the basic determination that emerges, and with it struggle and flight. Against the substantial foundation, the true, something else that is supposed to be higher is set in opposition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>first<\/em> ethical life in substantial actuality is <em>marriage<\/em>. The love that God is, is in actuality marital love. As the first appearance of the substantial will in existing actuality, this love has a natural side; but it is also an ethical duty. Over against this duty renunciation, <em>celibacy<\/em>, is set as something holy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Secondly<\/em>: the human being as an individual has to struggle with natural necessity; it is an ethical law for him to make himself independent through his activity and understanding, for the human being is by nature dependent in many respects; he is compelled to earn his livelihood through his spirit, through his honesty, and so to make himself free of that natural necessity &#8211; that is the <em>rectitude<\/em> of the human being. A religious duty that has been set against this secular one demands that the human being not be active in this way, not trouble himself with such cares. The whole circle of acting, of all activity relating to acquisition, industry and so on, is thus rejected; the human being is not to occupy himself with such purposes. But here need is more rational<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 241]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s241\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 241\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|241|<\/span> than such religious views. Human activity is on the one hand represented as something unholy; on the other hand it is even demanded of the human being that, if he has a possession, he not only not increase it by his activity but give it away to the <em>poor<\/em> and especially to the church, that is, to those who do nothing, do not work. What is held in high esteem in life as rectitude is thus rejected as unholy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Thirdly<\/em>: the highest ethical life in the state rests on the rational universal will being put into action; in the state the subject has his <em>freedom<\/em>; it is actualized there. Against this a religious duty is set up according to which freedom may not be the final purpose for the human being; rather he is to submit to a strict <em>obedience<\/em>, persist in will-lessness, and more still, he is to be selfless even in his conscience, in his faith; in the deepest inwardness he is to renounce himself and cast away his self.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When religion in this way lays claim to human activity, it can give him peculiar prescriptions opposed to the rationality of the world. Against this, <em>worldly wisdom<\/em> has arisen, which knows the true in actuality; in the consciousness of spirit the principles of its freedom have awakened, and then the claims of freedom have come into conflict with the religious principles that demanded that renunciation. In the Catholic states religion and state thus stand opposed to each other when subjective freedom opens up in the human being.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this opposition religion expresses itself only in a negative way and demands of the human being that he renounce all freedom; this opposition is more precisely this, that the human being in his actual consciousness is in general in himself <em>without rights<\/em>, and religion recognizes no absolute rights in the domain of actual ethical life. This is the enormous difference that has thereby entered the modern world,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 242]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s242\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 242\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|242|<\/span> namely that the question is asked at all whether the freedom of human beings is to be recognized as something true in and for itself or whether it may be rejected by religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It has already been said that agreement between religion and state can be present; this is the case in general in principle, but in an abstract way, in the Protestant states; for Protestantism demands that the human being believe only what he knows, that his conscience be inviolable as something holy; in divine grace the human being is nothing passive; he is essentially involved with his subjective freedom, and in his knowing, willing, believing the moment of subjective freedom is expressly demanded. In the states of another religion, by contrast, it can be that the two sides do not agree, that religion is different from the principle of the state; this we see in a widely extended circle: on the one hand a religion that does not recognize the principle of freedom, on the other a constitution that makes it its foundation. When one says that the human being is free by his nature, that is a principle of infinite worth; but if one stops at this abstraction, it allows no organism of the constitution to arise, for this requires an articulation in which duties and rights are limited; that abstraction admits no inequality, which must come in if an organism and thereby true liveliness is to take place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Such principles are true, but they must not be taken in their abstraction; the knowledge that the human being is free by nature, that is, according to the concept, belongs to modern times; but whether one stops at the abstraction or not, it can be that these principles are confronted by religion, which does not recognize them but regards them as without right and only arbitrariness as rightful. Thus a struggle necessarily arises which cannot be settled<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 243]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s243\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 243\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|243|<\/span> in a true way. Religion demands the sublation of the will; the secular principle, by contrast, takes the will as its foundation; if those religious principles assert themselves, it cannot happen otherwise than that governments proceed with force and suppress the opposing religion or treat those who belong to it as a party. Religion as church may well be clever and outwardly yielding, but then <em>inconsistency<\/em> enters people&#8217;s minds. The world holds fast to a determinate religion and at the same time clings to opposed principles; insofar as one carries these out and yet still wants to belong to that religion, this is a great inconsistency. Thus the French, for example, who hold fast to the principle of secular freedom, have in fact ceased to belong to the Catholic religion, for this can give up nothing but consistently demands in everything unconditional submission to the church. Religion and state stand in contradiction in this way: religion is then left lying to one side, it may fare as it will; it counts only as a matter for individuals with which the state need not concern itself, and then it is further said that religion is not to be mixed into the constitution of the state. The positing of those principles of freedom claims that they are true because they are connected with the innermost self-consciousness of the human being. But if it is indeed reason that finds these principles, then it has their verification, insofar as they are true and do not remain formal, only in leading them back to the knowledge of absolute truth, and this is the object of philosophy alone; but philosophy must have gone back completely and to the final analysis, for if knowledge does not complete itself within itself, it is exposed to the one-sidedness of formalism; but if it goes to the ultimate ground, it comes to what is recognized as the highest, as God. So it can well be said that the constitution should remain on one side, religion<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 244]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s244\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 244\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|244|<\/span> on the other; but then there is the danger that those principles remain burdened with one-sidedness. Thus at present we see the world full of the principle of freedom, and this related especially to the constitution: these principles are correct, but burdened with formalism they are prejudices, since knowledge has not gone to the ultimate ground; there alone is reconciliation with the utterly substantial present.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The other thing that comes into consideration with that separation is this side: when the principles of actual freedom are taken as the foundation and develop into a system of right, given, <em>positive<\/em> laws arise from this, and these receive the form of juridical laws in general in relation to individuals. The maintenance of legislation is entrusted to the courts; whoever transgresses the law is brought before the court, and the existence of the whole is placed in such <em>juridical form<\/em> in general. Opposite it then stands <em>disposition<\/em>, the inner, which is precisely the ground of religion. So there are two sides opposed to each other that belong to actuality &#8211; positive legislation and the disposition with regard to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With respect to the constitution there are two <em>systems<\/em> here: the modern system, in which the determinations of freedom and their whole edifice are maintained in a <em>formal<\/em> way, without heeding disposition; the other system is that of <em>disposition<\/em> &#8211; the Greek principle in general, which we find developed especially in Plato&#8217;s Republic. A few estates form the foundation here; otherwise the whole rests on <em>education<\/em>, on cultivation, which is to advance to science and philosophy. Philosophy is to be what rules, and through it the human being is to be led to ethical life: all estates are to partake of \u03c3\u03c9\u03d5\u03f1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Both sides, disposition and that formal constitution, are <em>inseparable<\/em> and cannot do without each other;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 245]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s245\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 245\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|245|<\/span> but in recent times the <em>one-sidedness<\/em> has come to light that on the one hand the constitution is supposed to support itself, and on the other disposition, religion, conscience are supposed to be set aside as indifferent, since it is no concern of the constitution which disposition and religion individuals profess. How one-sided this is, however, is evident from the fact that the laws are administered by judges, and then their integrity as well as their insight matter; for the law does not rule; human beings are to make it rule: this putting into action is something concrete; the will of human beings as well as their insight must contribute their share. The intelligence of the subject must also often decide because the civil laws carry determination very far and yet cannot touch every particular. But disposition for itself is likewise something one-sided, a defect from which Plato&#8217;s Republic suffers. In present times people do not want to rely on insight at all but want everything guided by positive laws. We have experienced a great example of this one-sidedness in the most recent history of the day: at the head of the French government a religious disposition was seen that was of such a kind that to it the state as such counted as something without right, and that it came forward with hostility against actuality, against right and ethical life. The last revolution<sup><a href=\"#vpr2-fn5\" id=\"vpr2-fnr5\">5)<\/a><\/sup> was now the consequence of a religious conscience that contradicted the principles of the constitution, and yet according to the same constitution it is now not supposed to matter which religion the individual professes; this collision is still very far from being resolved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"vpr2-fn5\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\"><a href=\"#vpr2-fnr5\">5)<\/a> <em>Werkausgabe:<\/em> July Revolution, 1830<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Disposition does not necessarily take the form of religion; it can also remain more with the indeterminate. But in what is called the people, the<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 246]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s246\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 246\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|246|<\/span> ultimate truth is not in the form of thoughts and principles; rather, what is to count as right for the people can do so only insofar as it is something <em>determinate<\/em>, particular. For the people, this determinate element of right and ethical life has its ultimate confirmation only in the form of an <em>existing religion<\/em>, and if this is not connected with the principles of freedom, there is always the split and an unresolved rupture, a hostile relationship, which precisely ought not to take place in the state. Under Robespierre terror ruled in France, and indeed against those who were not of the disposition of freedom, because they were <em>suspect<\/em>, that is, for the sake of disposition. So too the ministry of Charles X was suspect. According to the formal side of the constitution the monarch was not subject to any responsibility; but this formal side did not hold: the dynasty was toppled from the throne. So it turns out that in the formally developed constitution the last sheet anchor is after all disposition, which had been set aside in it and now asserts itself in contempt of all form. It is from this contradiction, and from the prevailing unawareness of it, that our time suffers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rb-uebergang-in-den-folgenden-abschnitt\">Transition to the following division<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We have distinguished the determinate, limited cult and the cult in the element of freedom, and have thus found the same distinction that falls in general within the representation of God.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The two sides of spirit &#8211; in its objectivity, in which it is preeminently called God, and in its subjectivity &#8211; constitute the reality of the absolute concept of God, which, as the absolute unity of these two moments of its own, is absolute spirit. The determinacy in one of these sides corresponds to the other side; it is the pervading universal form in which the idea stands and which in turn<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-small-font-size wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:300\">[p. 247]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><span class=\"ed-s\" id=\"vpr2-s247\" title=\"Werkausgabe vol. 16, p. 247\" style=\"font-size:.7em;color:#a2977f;letter-spacing:.03em;white-space:nowrap;\">|247|<\/span> constitutes a stage in the totality of its development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As regards these <em>stages of realization<\/em>, the general distinction has already been established in what has gone before: according to the one form of reality spirit is <em>caught in a determinacy of its being and of its self-consciousness<\/em>, while according to the other it is its <em>absolute reality<\/em>, in which it has the developed content of the idea of spirit as its object. This form of reality is the true religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In accordance with this distinction it is now <em>determinate<\/em> religion that is considered first in the following division.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>[p. 91] From the \u201cLectures on the Philosophy of Religion\u201d, which Hegel gave in Berlin in 1821, 1824, 1827 and 1831. The text is not a single transcript but the compilation of the Friends\u2019 Edition (ed. Philipp Marheineke, 2nd edition 1840) from Hegel\u2019s manuscript and transcripts of several years. Reproduced after the Werkausgabe (vol. 16), [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":906472,"menu_order":3,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-906489","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906489","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=906489"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906489\/revisions"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906472"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=906489"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}