{"id":906501,"date":"2026-11-18T21:01:31","date_gmt":"2026-11-18T20:01:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/being-nothing-becoming\/"},"modified":"2026-11-18T21:02:00","modified_gmt":"2026-11-18T20:02:00","slug":"being-nothing-becoming","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/being-nothing-becoming\/","title":{"rendered":"Being-Nothing-Becoming"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Science of Logic &#8211; Chapter One: Being<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\">A. Being<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Being, pure being<\/em>, &#8211; without any further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself and also not unequal with respect to another; it has no diversity within itself nor outwardly. If any determination or content were distinguished in it, or if it were posited by such as distinguished from an other, it would not be held fast in its purity. It is pure indeterminacy and emptiness. &#8211; There is <em>nothing<\/em> to be intuited in it, if one can speak of intuiting here; or it is only this pure, empty intuiting itself. There is just as little anything to be thought in it, or it is likewise only this empty thinking. Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact <em>nothing<\/em>, and neither more nor less than nothing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\">B. Nothing<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Nothing, pure nothing<\/em>; it is simple equality with itself, complete emptiness, absence of determination and content; undistinguishedness in itself. &#8211; Insofar as intuiting or thinking can be mentioned here, it counts as a distinction whether something or <em>nothing<\/em> is intuited or thought. To intuit or think nothing thus has a meaning; the two are distinguished, so nothing <em>is<\/em> (exists) in our intuiting or thinking; or rather it is empty intuiting and thinking itself, and the same empty intuiting or thinking as pure being. &#8211; Nothing is therefore the same determination, or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as what pure <em>being<\/em> is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\">C. Becoming<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\">a. Unity of Being and Nothing<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Pure being and pure nothing are therefore the same<\/em>. What the truth is, is neither being nor nothing, but that being &#8211; does not pass over but has passed over &#8211; into nothing, and nothing into being. But just as much the truth is not their undistinguishedness, but that <em>they are not the same<\/em>, that they are <em>absolutely distinct<\/em>, yet equally unseparated and inseparable, and that <em>each immediately vanishes in its opposite<\/em>. Their truth is therefore this <em>movement<\/em> of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other: <em>becoming<\/em>; a movement in which the two are distinguished, but by a distinction which has equally immediately dissolved itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Remark 1<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Nothing<\/em> is usually opposed to <em>something<\/em>; but something is already a determinate being that distinguishes itself from another something; so the nothing opposed to the something, the nothing of some something, is also a determinate nothing. Here, however, nothing is to be taken in its indeterminate simplicity. &#8211; Should one consider it more correct to oppose to being, instead of nothing, <em>non-being<\/em>, there would be no objection as regards the result, for <em>non-being<\/em> contains the relation to <em>being<\/em>; both, being and its negation, are expressed in <em>one<\/em>, nothing as it is in becoming. But what is at issue first is not the form of opposition, that is, at the same time of <em>relation<\/em>, but abstract, immediate negation, nothing purely for itself, relationless negation &#8211; which, if one likes, could also be expressed by the mere <em>not<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The simple thought of <em>pure being<\/em> was first expressed by the <em>Eleatics<\/em>, especially <em>Parmenides<\/em>, as the absolute and as the only truth, and, in the fragments of him that remain, with the pure enthusiasm of thinking that grasps itself for the first time in its absolute abstraction: <em>only being is, and nothing is not at all<\/em>. &#8211; In oriental systems, essentially in Buddhism, <em>nothing<\/em>, the void, is, as is well known, the absolute principle. &#8211; The <em>profound<\/em> Heraclitus brought forward against that simple and one-sided abstraction the higher, total concept of becoming and said: <em>being is no more than nothing is<\/em>, or also: everything <em>flows<\/em>, that is: everything is becoming. &#8211; The popular, especially oriental sayings that everything that is has the seed of its passing away in its very birth, and that death conversely is the entrance into new life, express at bottom the same union of being and nothing. But these expressions have a substrate in which the transition takes place; being and nothing are held apart in time, represented as alternating in it, but not thought in their abstraction, and therefore also not in such a way that they are in and for themselves the same.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">&#8220;<em>Ex nihilo nihil fit<\/em>&#8221; is one of the propositions to which great significance was ascribed in metaphysics. In it is to be seen either only the empty tautology: nothing is nothing; or, if <em>becoming<\/em> was supposed to have actual significance in it, then, since only <em>nothing becomes<\/em> out of <em>nothing<\/em>, there is in fact no <em>becoming<\/em> present in it, for nothing remains nothing in it. Becoming contains that nothing does not remain nothing but passes over into its other, into being. &#8211; When later, chiefly Christian metaphysics rejected the proposition that out of nothing comes nothing, it asserted a transition from nothing into being; however synthetically or merely representationally it took this proposition, even in the most imperfect union there is nevertheless contained a point in which being and nothing meet and their distinctness vanishes. &#8211; The proposition &#8220;<em>Out of nothing comes nothing, nothing is just nothing<\/em>&#8221; has its proper importance through its opposition to <em>becoming<\/em> in general and thus also to the creation of the world out of nothing. Those who assert the proposition &#8220;nothing is just nothing&#8221;, even getting heated about it, are unaware that in doing so they subscribe to the abstract <em>pantheism<\/em> of the Eleatics, and in substance also to the Spinozist one. The philosophical view for which &#8220;being is only being, nothing is only nothing&#8221; counts as principle deserves the name of identity system; this abstract identity is the essence of pantheism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If the result that being and nothing is the same strikes one as surprising for itself or seems paradoxical, no further attention need be paid to this; one should rather wonder at that wonder which shows itself so new in philosophy and forgets that in this science quite different determinations occur than in ordinary consciousness and in so-called common sense, which is not exactly sound understanding but the understanding educated up to abstractions and to faith, or rather superstition, in abstractions. It would not be difficult to point out this unity of being and nothing in every example, in <em>every<\/em> actual thing or thought. What was said above about immediacy and mediation (the latter of which contains a relation to each <em>other<\/em>, and thereby <em>negation<\/em>) must be said of <em>being<\/em> and <em>nothing<\/em>: <em>that nowhere in heaven or on earth is there anything which does not contain both, being and nothing, within itself<\/em>. Of course, since here one comes to speak of <em>some something<\/em> and of something <em>actual<\/em>, those determinations are no longer present in it in the complete untruth in which they are as being and nothing, but in a further determination, and are grasped, for example, as <em>positive<\/em> and <em>negative<\/em>, the former being posited, reflected being, the latter posited, reflected nothing; but positive and negative contain, the former being, the latter nothing, as their abstract foundation. &#8211; Thus in God himself quality, <em>activity<\/em>, <em>creation<\/em>, <em>power<\/em> and so on essentially contain the determination of the negative &#8211; they are a bringing forth of an <em>other<\/em>. But an empirical elucidation of that assertion by examples would be altogether superfluous here. Since henceforth this unity of being and nothing, as the first truth, lies at the basis once and for all and constitutes the element of everything that follows, all further logical determinations besides becoming itself &#8211; existence, quality, in general all concepts of philosophy &#8211; are examples of this unity. &#8211; But the so-called common or sound understanding, insofar as it rejects the inseparateness of being and nothing, may be directed to the attempt to find an example in which the one is to be found separated from the other (something from limit, boundary, or the infinite, God, as just mentioned, from activity). Only the empty thought-entities, being and nothing themselves, are these separated ones, and it is they that are preferred by that understanding to the truth, the inseparateness of the two, which is everywhere before us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">One cannot intend to meet on all sides the confusions into which ordinary consciousness gets itself with such a logical proposition, for they are inexhaustible. Only a few can be mentioned. One reason for such confusions, among others, is that consciousness brings to such an abstract logical proposition representations of a concrete something and forgets that what is at issue is not such a thing but only the pure abstractions of being and nothing, and that these alone are to be held fast.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Being and non-being is the same; <em>therefore<\/em> it is the same whether I am or am not, whether this house is or is not, whether these hundred thalers are in my assets or not. &#8211; This inference or application of that proposition completely alters its sense. The proposition contains the pure abstractions of being and nothing; but the application makes a determinate being and a determinate nothing of them. Yet, as said, determinate being is not at issue here. A determinate, a finite being is one that relates itself to another; it is a content that stands in a relationship of necessity with other content, with the whole world. With regard to the mutually determining connection of the whole, metaphysics could make the &#8211; at bottom tautological &#8211; assertion that if a single speck of dust were destroyed, the whole universe would collapse. In the instances raised against the proposition in question, it appears not indifferent whether something is or is not, not for the sake of being or non-being, but for the sake of its <em>content<\/em>, which connects it with other things. If a determinate content, some determinate existence, is <em>presupposed<\/em>, this existence, because it is <em>determinate<\/em>, is in manifold relation to other content; it is not indifferent to it whether a certain other content with which it stands in relation is or is not; for only through such relation is it essentially what it is. The same is the case in <em>representing<\/em> (when we take non-being in the more determinate sense of representing as against actuality), in whose context the being or the absence of a content that is represented as determinate, in relation to another, is not indifferent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This consideration contains the same thing that constitutes a main moment in the Kantian critique of the ontological proof of the existence of God, which, however, is considered here only with respect to the distinction occurring in it between being and nothing in general and <em>determinate<\/em> being or non-being. &#8211; As is well known, that so-called proof presupposed the concept of a being to which all realities belong, and hence also existence, which was likewise assumed to be one of the realities. The Kantian critique held chiefly to the point that <em>existence<\/em> or being (which count as synonymous here) is not a <em>property<\/em> or not a <em>real predicate<\/em>, that is, not a concept of something that could be added to the <em>concept<\/em> of a thing<sup data-fn=\"5d60bf5e-5d36-4fa1-af0e-0de4a7d5144c\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"#5d60bf5e-5d36-4fa1-af0e-0de4a7d5144c\" id=\"5d60bf5e-5d36-4fa1-af0e-0de4a7d5144c-link\">1<\/a><\/sup><a href=\"#N_12_\">)<\/a><a id=\"X_12_\"> <\/a> &#8211; Kant means by this that being is not a determination of content. Therefore, he continues, the possible contains no more than the actual; a hundred actual thalers do not contain the least bit more than a hundred possible ones; &#8211; that is, the former have no other determination of content than the latter. For this content, considered as isolated, it is in fact indifferent to be or not to be; there lies in it no distinction of being or non-being; this distinction does not touch it at all; the hundred thalers do not become fewer if they are not, and not more if they are. A distinction must first come from elsewhere. &#8211; &#8220;But&#8221;, Kant reminds us, &#8220;in my financial situation there is more with a hundred actual thalers than with the mere concept of them (that is, their possibility). For with actuality the <em>object<\/em> is not merely contained analytically in my concept, but <em>is added synthetically to my concept<\/em> (which is a <em>determination<\/em> of my <em>state<\/em>), without these thought hundred thalers themselves being in the least increased by this being outside my concept.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Two kinds of state are <em>presupposed<\/em> here, to stay with the Kantian expressions, which are not without a confused clumsiness: the one, which Kant calls the concept, by which representation is to be understood, and another, the financial state. For the one as for the other, assets as well as representing, a hundred thalers are a determination of content, or, as Kant puts it, they are added to such a state <em>synthetically<\/em>; I as <em>possessor<\/em> of a hundred thalers or as non-possessor of them, or also I as <em>representing<\/em> a hundred thalers to myself or not representing them, is certainly a different content. Taken more generally: the abstractions of being and nothing both cease to be abstractions when they receive a determinate content; being is then reality, the determinate being of 100 thalers, nothing is negation, the determinate non-being of them. This determination of content itself, the hundred thalers, also taken abstractly for itself, is in the one unchanged the same as in the other. But when, further, being is taken as financial state, the hundred thalers enter into relation with a state, and for this state such determinacy as they are is not indifferent; their being or non-being is only <em>alteration<\/em>; they are transposed into the sphere of <em>existence<\/em>. If, therefore, against the unity of being and nothing it is urged that it is surely not indifferent whether this or that (the 100 thalers) is or is not, it is a deception that we push the distinction off merely onto being and non-being, whether I <em>have<\/em> or <em>do not have<\/em> the hundred thalers &#8211; a deception which, as has been shown, rests on the one-sided abstraction that leaves out the <em>determinate existence<\/em> present in such examples and holds fast merely being and non-being, just as conversely it transforms the abstract being and nothing that is supposed to be grasped into a determinate being and nothing, into an existence. Only <em>existence<\/em> contains the real distinction of being and nothing, namely a <em>something<\/em> and an <em>other<\/em>. &#8211; This real distinction is what representation has in mind, instead of abstract being and pure nothing and their merely meant distinction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As Kant puts it, &#8216;through existence something enters into the context of the whole of experience&#8217;, &#8216;we thereby get one more object of <em>perception<\/em>, but our <em>concept<\/em> of the object is not thereby increased&#8217;. &#8211; As follows from what has been explained, this means: through existence, essentially because something is determinate existence, it is in connection with <em>other<\/em> things, and among others also with a perceiver. &#8211; The concept of the hundred thalers, Kant says, is not increased by perceiving. The <em>concept<\/em> here means the hundred thalers noted above, represented in <em>isolation<\/em>. In this isolated way they are indeed an empirical content, but cut off, without connection and determinacy with respect to <em>other<\/em> things; the form of identity with itself deprives them of relation to other things and makes them indifferent as to whether they are perceived or not. But this so-called <em>concept<\/em> of the hundred thalers is a false concept; the form of simple relation to itself does not belong to such a limited, finite content itself; it is a form put on it and lent to it by the subjective understanding; a hundred thalers are not something relating itself to itself, but something alterable and transient.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thinking or representing that has in mind only a determinate being, existence, is to be referred back to the beginning of science mentioned above, which Parmenides made, who purified and elevated his representing, and thereby also the representing of later times, to <em>pure thought<\/em>, to being as such, and thereby created the element of science. &#8211; What is <em>first<\/em> in <em>science<\/em> had to show itself <em>historically<\/em> as the <em>first<\/em>. And we have to regard the Eleatic <em>one<\/em> or <em>being<\/em> as the first of the knowledge of thought; <em>water<\/em> and similar material principles are <em>supposed<\/em> to be the universal, but as materials they are not pure thoughts; <em>numbers<\/em> are neither the first simple thought nor the thought that remains with itself, but the thought that is wholly external to itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The referral back from <em>particular finite<\/em> being to being as such in its wholly abstract universality is to be regarded as the very first theoretical, and even practical, demand. For when a fuss is made about the hundred thalers, that it makes a difference to my financial state whether I <em>have<\/em> them or <em>not<\/em>, still more whether I am or not, whether other things are or not, then &#8211; without mentioning that there will be financial states for which such possession of a hundred thalers will be indifferent &#8211; it may be recalled that the human being ought to raise himself in his disposition to this abstract universality, in which it is in fact indifferent to him whether the hundred thalers, whatever quantitative relation they may have to his financial state, are or are not, just as much as it is indifferent to him whether he is or not, that is, is in finite life or not (for a state, determinate being, is meant) and so on &#8211; even <em>si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae<\/em>, a Roman said<sup data-fn=\"0d469196-1938-4eda-90a0-eb0c42b71ece\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"#0d469196-1938-4eda-90a0-eb0c42b71ece\" id=\"0d469196-1938-4eda-90a0-eb0c42b71ece-link\">2<\/a><\/sup><a href=\"#N_13_\">)<\/a><a id=\"X_13_\"> <\/a>, and the Christian ought to find himself in this indifference even more.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We must further note the immediate connection in which the elevation above the hundred thalers and finite things in general stands with the ontological proof and the Kantian critique of it cited above. This critique has made itself generally plausible through its popular example; who does not know that a hundred actual thalers are different from a hundred merely possible thalers? that they make a difference to my financial state? Because this difference thus comes out in the hundred thalers, the concept, that is, the determinacy of content as empty possibility, and being are different from each other; <em>therefore<\/em> God&#8217;s concept is also different from his being, and just as little as I can get the actuality of the hundred thalers out of their possibility, just as little can I &#8220;pick out&#8221; his existence from the concept of God; but the ontological proof is supposed to consist in this picking out of God&#8217;s existence from his concept. Now if it is indeed correct that the concept is different from being, God is still more different from the hundred thalers and other finite things. It is the <em>definition of finite things<\/em> that in them concept and being are different, concept and reality, soul and body separable, and that they are thereby transient and mortal; the abstract definition of God, by contrast, is precisely this, that his concept and his being are <em>unseparated<\/em> and <em>inseparable<\/em>. The true critique of the categories and of reason is precisely this: to make cognition understand this distinction and to keep it from applying the determinations and relationships of the finite to God.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Remark 2<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A further reason must be cited which contributes to the aversion to the proposition about being and nothing; this reason is that the expression of the result that emerges from the consideration of being and nothing through the proposition &#8220;<em>being and nothing are one and the same<\/em>&#8221; is imperfect. The accent is laid preferably on the being-<em>one-and-the-same<\/em>, as in judgement in general, in which the predicate first states what the subject <em>is<\/em>. The sense therefore seems to be that the distinction is denied, which nevertheless at the same time occurs immediately in the proposition; for it states the <em>two<\/em> determinations, being and nothing, and contains them as distinct. &#8211; At the same time it cannot be meant that they are to be abstracted from and only the unity held fast. This sense would declare itself one-sided, since what is supposed to be abstracted from is nevertheless present and named in the proposition. &#8211; Insofar, then, as the proposition &#8220;<em>being and nothing are the same<\/em>&#8221; states the identity of these determinations but in fact equally contains them both as distinct, it contradicts itself within itself and dissolves itself. If we hold this fast more closely, a proposition is posited here which, considered more closely, has the movement of vanishing through itself. But thereby there happens in it itself what is supposed to constitute its proper content, namely <em>becoming<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The proposition thus <em>contains<\/em> the result; it is this result <em>in itself<\/em>. But the circumstance to which attention must be drawn here is the defect that the result is not itself <em>expressed<\/em> in the proposition; it is an external reflection that recognizes it in it. &#8211; On this, the general remark must be made right at the beginning that the proposition, in the <em>form of a judgement<\/em>, is not suited to express speculative truths; familiarity with this circumstance would be apt to remove many misunderstandings of speculative truths. Judgement is an <em>identical<\/em> relation between subject and predicate; it abstracts from the fact that the subject has further determinacies than that of the predicate, as well as from the fact that the predicate is wider than the subject. But if the content is speculative, the <em>non-identical<\/em> of subject and predicate is also an essential moment, and this is not expressed in judgement. The paradoxical and bizarre light in which much of recent philosophy appears to those not familiar with speculative thinking falls in many ways on the form of the simple judgement when it is used for the expression of speculative results.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For the purpose of expressing speculative truth, the defect is first supplemented by adding the opposite proposition, the proposition &#8220;<em>being and nothing are not the same<\/em>&#8220;, which was likewise stated above. But so the further defect arises that these propositions are unconnected and thus present the content only in antinomy, while their content nevertheless relates to one and the same thing, and the determinations expressed in the two propositions are supposed to be simply united &#8211; a union which can then only be expressed as an <em>unrest<\/em> of what is at the same time <em>incompatible<\/em>, as a <em>movement<\/em>. The most common wrong done to speculative content is to make it one-sided, that is, to single out only one of the propositions into which it can be resolved. It cannot then be denied that this proposition is asserted; <em>as correct as the statement is, so false is it<\/em>, for once <em>one<\/em> proposition is taken from the speculative, at least the other would have to be equally heeded and stated. &#8211; The so to speak unfortunate word &#8220;unity&#8221; must also be mentioned especially here; <em>unity<\/em> designates, still more than <em>identity<\/em>, a subjective reflection; it is taken chiefly as the relation that arises from <em>comparison<\/em>, from external reflection. Insofar as this finds the same in two <em>different objects<\/em>, a unity is present in such a way that the complete <em>indifference<\/em> of the objects themselves that are compared with respect to this unity is presupposed, so that this comparing and the unity do not concern the objects themselves and are a doing and determining external to them. Unity therefore expresses wholly <em>abstract<\/em> sameness and sounds all the harsher and more striking the more the things of which it is stated show themselves to be utterly distinct. Instead of unity it would therefore in this respect be better to say only <em>unseparatedness<\/em> and <em>inseparability<\/em>; but then the <em>affirmative<\/em> of the relation of the whole is not expressed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So the whole, true result that has emerged here is <em>becoming<\/em>, which is not merely the one-sided or abstract unity of being and nothing. Rather it consists in this movement: that pure being is immediate and simple, that it is therefore just as much pure nothing, that their distinction <em>is<\/em>, but just as much <em>sublates itself<\/em> and <em>is not<\/em>. The result therefore just as much asserts the distinction of being and nothing, but as one that is only <em>meant<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">One <em>means<\/em> that being is rather the utterly other than nothing is, and nothing is clearer than their absolute distinction, and nothing seems easier than to be able to state it. But it is just as easy to convince oneself that this is impossible, that it is <em>unsayable<\/em>. <em>Those who want to insist on the distinction of being and nothing may challenge themselves to state what it consists in<\/em>. If being and nothing had any determinacy by which they were distinguished, they would, as has been recalled, be determinate being and determinate nothing, not pure being and pure nothing, as they still are here. Their distinction is therefore completely empty; each of the two is in the same way the indeterminate; it therefore does not subsist in them themselves, but only in a third, in <em>meaning<\/em>. But meaning is a form of the subjective, which does not belong in this series of the presentation. But the third, in which being and nothing have their subsistence, must also occur here; and it has also occurred here; it is <em>becoming<\/em>. In it they are as distinct; becoming is only insofar as they are distinct. This third is other than they; &#8211; they subsist only in an other, which likewise means that they do not subsist for themselves. Becoming is the subsistence of being as much as of non-being; or their subsistence is only their being in <em>one<\/em>; precisely this subsistence of theirs is what equally sublates their distinction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The challenge to state the distinction between being and nothing also includes that of saying what, then, <em>being<\/em> is and what <em>nothing<\/em> is. Those who resist recognizing the one as well as the other only as a <em>passing over<\/em> into each other, and assert this or that of being and of nothing, may state <em>what<\/em> they are talking about, that is, set up a <em>definition<\/em> of being and nothing and show that it is correct. Without having satisfied this first demand of the old science, whose logical rules they otherwise accept and apply, all those assertions about being and nothing are only assurances, scientific nullities. When it has otherwise been said that existence, insofar as one at first takes it as synonymous with being, is the <em>complement<\/em> to <em>possibility<\/em>, another determination, possibility, is thereby presupposed, and being is expressed not in its immediacy, even as not independent, as conditioned. For being that is <em>mediated<\/em> we shall reserve the expression <em>existence<\/em>. But one probably <em>represents<\/em> being &#8211; perhaps under the image of pure light, as the clarity of untroubled seeing; nothing, however, as pure night &#8211; and ties their distinction to this well-known sensuous difference. In fact, however, if one represents this seeing more precisely, one can easily become aware that in absolute clarity one sees as much and as little as in absolute darkness, that the one seeing is as good as the other, pure seeing, seeing of nothing. Pure light and pure darkness are two voids which are the same. Only in determinate light &#8211; and light is determined by darkness -, thus in troubled light, and likewise only in determinate darkness &#8211; and darkness is determined by light -, in illuminated darkness, can something be distinguished, because only troubled light and illuminated darkness have the distinction in themselves and are thereby determinate being, <em>existence<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Remark 3<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The unity whose moments, being and nothing, are as inseparable is at the same time different from them themselves, thus a <em>third<\/em> as against them, which in its most proper form is <em>becoming<\/em>. <em>Passing over<\/em> is the same as becoming, only that in the former the two, from one of which one passes over to the other, are represented more as resting outside each other and the passing over as happening <em>between<\/em> them. Wherever and however being or nothing is spoken of, this third must be present; for they do not subsist for themselves, but are only in becoming, in this third. But this third has many empirical shapes, which are set aside or neglected by abstraction in order to hold fast those products of it, being and nothing, each for itself, and to show them as protected against passing over. Against such a simple procedure of abstraction one need only recall, just as simply, the empirical existence in which that abstraction itself is only something, has an existence. Or there are otherwise forms of reflection by which the separation of the inseparable is supposed to be fixed. In such a determination the opposite of itself is present in and for itself, and without going back to the nature of the matter and appealing to it, that determination of reflection is to be confounded in itself by being taken as it gives itself and by its other being shown in it itself. It would be vain trouble to want, as it were, to catch all the turns and notions of reflection and its argumentation, in order to deprive it of the evasions and leaps by which it conceals from itself its contradiction with itself, and to make them impossible. For this reason I also refrain from taking account of the many so-called objections and refutations that have been raised against the thesis that neither being nor nothing is anything true, but only becoming is their truth; the cultivation of thought required to see the nullity of those refutations, or rather to drive such notions away oneself, is brought about only by critical cognition of the forms of the understanding; but those who are most prolific in such objections fall upon the very first propositions with their reflections, without helping themselves, or having helped themselves, through further study of logic, to a consciousness of the nature of these crude reflections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Some of the phenomena shall be considered that arise when being and nothing are isolated from each other and one is posited outside the range of the other, so that passing over is thereby negated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Parmenides<\/em> held fast to being and was the most consistent in saying at the same time of nothing that it <em>is not at all<\/em>; only being is. Being, thus wholly for itself, is the indeterminate and therefore has no relation to another; it therefore seems that <em>from this beginning<\/em> one cannot <em>advance<\/em> any further, namely out of it itself, and that an advance could only happen by something alien being tied to it <em>from outside<\/em>. The advance, that being is the same as nothing, thus appears as a second, absolute beginning &#8211; a passing over that is for itself and is added externally to being. Being would not be the absolute beginning at all if it had a determinacy; it would then depend on an other and would not be immediate, not the beginning. But if it is indeterminate and thus a true beginning, it also has nothing by which it leads itself over to an other; it is at the same time the <em>end<\/em>. Just as little can anything break forth from it as anything can break into it; with Parmenides as with Spinoza, there is to be no advance from being or absolute substance to the negative, the finite. If, nevertheless, there is an advance, which, as noted, can only happen in an external way from relationless and therefore advance-less being, then this advance is a second, new beginning. Thus <em>Fichte&#8217;s<\/em> most absolute, unconditioned principle is <em>positing A = A<\/em>; the second is <em>opposing<\/em>; this is supposed to be <em>partly<\/em> conditioned, <em>partly<\/em> unconditioned (thus contradiction within itself). This is an advance of external reflection which just as much negates again that with which it begins as an absolute &#8211; opposing is the negation of the first identity &#8211; as it at once expressly makes its second unconditioned at the same time into something conditioned. But if there were any justification at all for advancing, that is, for sublating the first beginning, it would have to lie in this first itself that an other could relate to it; it would therefore have to be something <em>determinate<\/em>. But <em>being<\/em>, or absolute substance too, does not give itself out as such; on the contrary. It is the <em>immediate<\/em>, what is still utterly <em>indeterminate<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The most eloquent, perhaps forgotten descriptions of the impossibility of getting from an abstraction to something further and to a union of the two are given by <em>Jacobi<\/em>, in the interest of his polemic against the Kantian <em>synthesis<\/em> of self-consciousness a priori, in his treatise <em>\u00dcber das Unternehmen des Kritizismus, die Vernunft zu Verstande zu bringen<\/em> [On the Undertaking of Criticism to Bring Reason to Understanding] (Werke, vol. III [Leipzig 1816]). He states the task (p. 113) as follows: in something <em>pure<\/em>, be it of consciousness, of space or of time, the arising or producing of a synthesis is to be shown. &#8220;Let space be <em>one<\/em>, let time be one, let consciousness be <em>one<\/em> &#8230; Just tell me how one of these three ones <em>purely<\/em> makes itself manifold within itself, &#8230; each is only <em>one<\/em> and <em>no other<\/em>; a oneness, a <em>Der-Die-Das-Selbigkeit<\/em> [a sameness of the masculine, feminine and neuter article]! without Derheit, Dieheit, Dasheit; for these still slumber with the <em>der, die, das<\/em> in the infinite <em>= 0<\/em> of the indeterminate, from which each and every <em>determinate<\/em> thing is also first supposed to emerge! What brings &#8230; <em>finitude<\/em> into those three infinities; what fertilizes space and time a priori with number and measure and transforms them into a <em>pure manifold<\/em>; what brings <em>pure spontaneity<\/em> (I) to oscillation &#8230; ? How does its pure vowel come to the consonant, or rather how does its <em>soundless<\/em> uninterrupted <em>blowing<\/em> interrupt itself and <em>stop<\/em>, in order to gain at least a kind of vowel sound, an <em>accent<\/em>?&#8221; &#8211; One sees that Jacobi recognized very determinately the <em>mischief<\/em> of abstraction, be it so-called absolute, that is, only abstract space, or such time, or such pure consciousness, I; he persists in it for the purpose of asserting the impossibility of an advance to an other, the condition of a synthesis, and to synthesis itself. The synthesis which constitutes the interest must not be taken as a linking of determinations already present <em>externally<\/em> &#8211; partly it is a matter of the generation of a second to a first, of something determinate to the indeterminate beginning, partly of <em>immanent<\/em> synthesis, synthesis a priori &#8211; the unity, in and for itself, of the distinct. <em>Becoming<\/em> is this immanent synthesis of being and nothing; but because the sense of an external bringing together of things present externally to each other lies closest to synthesis, the name synthesis, synthetic unity, has rightly been put out of use. &#8211; Jacobi asks <em>how<\/em> the pure vowel of the I comes to the consonant, <em>what<\/em> brings determinacy into indeterminacy? The <em>what<\/em>? would be easily answered, and Kant answered this question in his way; but the question about the <em>how<\/em>? means: in what manner, according to what relationship and the like, and thus demands the statement of a particular category; but manner and categories of the understanding cannot be at issue here. The question about the how? itself belongs to the bad manners of reflection, which asks about comprehensibility but presupposes its fixed categories and thus knows itself armed in advance against the answer to what it asks about. Nor does it have with Jacobi the higher sense of a question about the <em>necessity<\/em> of synthesis, for, as said, he remains firmly fixed in the abstractions, for the assertion of the impossibility of synthesis. He describes especially vividly (p. 147) the procedure for arriving at the abstraction of space. &#8220;I must &#8230; for so long try purely to forget that I ever saw, heard, stirred and touched anything, myself expressly not excepted. Purely, purely, purely I must forget all movement, and make precisely this <em>forgetting<\/em>, because it is the hardest, my most earnest concern. Everything in general, just as I have thought it away, I must also let be wholly and completely <em>done away with<\/em>, and keep nothing at all except the intuition, remaining <em>by force<\/em>, of infinite <em>unchangeable space<\/em> alone. I may therefore not <em>think myself back into it<\/em> as something distinct from it and yet connected with it; I may not merely let myself be <em>surrounded<\/em> and <em>penetrated<\/em> by it, but I must wholly <em>pass over<\/em> into it, become one with it, transform myself into it; I must leave nothing of myself except <em>this intuition of mine<\/em> itself, in order to regard it as a truly self-standing, independent, one and only representation.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With this wholly abstract purity of continuity, that is, indeterminacy and emptiness of representing, it is indifferent whether one calls this abstraction space or pure intuiting, pure thinking; &#8211; it is all the same as what the Indian calls <em>Brahma<\/em> when, outwardly motionless and likewise unmoved in sensation, representation, imagination, desire and so on, he looks for years only at the tip of his nose, saying only <em>Om, Om, Om<\/em> inwardly to himself, or nothing at all. This dull, empty consciousness, grasped as consciousness, is <em>being<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this void, Jacobi now says further, the opposite happens to him of what, according to the Kantian assurance, ought to happen to him; he does not find himself as something <em>many<\/em> and <em>manifold<\/em>, but rather as one without any plurality and manifoldness; indeed, &#8220;I am <em>impossibility<\/em> itself, am the <em>annihilation<\/em> of everything manifold and many, &#8230; <em>cannot restore<\/em> even the least of it out of my pure, absolutely simple, unchangeable essence or conjure it into myself like a ghost &#8230; Thus (in this purity) &#8230; all being outside and beside one another, all manifoldness and plurality resting solely on this being outside and beside one another, reveals itself as something <em>purely impossible<\/em>.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This impossibility means nothing other than the tautology: I hold fast to abstract unity and exclude all plurality and manifoldness, keep myself in the undistinguished and indeterminate and look away from everything distinguished and determinate. The Kantian synthesis a priori of self-consciousness, that is, the activity of this unity of dividing itself and preserving itself in this division, is thinned out by Jacobi into the same abstraction. That &#8220;synthesis <em>in itself<\/em>&#8220;, the &#8220;<em>original judging<\/em>&#8220;, he makes [p. 125] one-sidedly into the &#8220;<em>copula in itself<\/em> &#8211; an <em>is, is, is<\/em>, without beginning and end and without what, who and which. This repeating of repetition, going on into infinity, is the sole business, function and production of the very purest synthesis; it itself is mere, pure, absolute repeating itself&#8221;. Or in fact, since there is no break in it, that is, no negation, no distinguishing, it is not a repeating but only undistinguished simple being. &#8211; But is this still synthesis, when Jacobi leaves out precisely that by which the unity is synthetic unity?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">First, when Jacobi thus establishes himself in absolute, that is, abstract space, time, and also consciousness, it must be said that in this way he transposes himself into, and holds fast to, something <em>empirically<\/em> false; there <em>is<\/em>, that is, there is empirically present, no space and time that would be an unlimited spatial and temporal not filled in its continuity with manifoldly limited existence and alteration, so that these limits and alterations belong unseparated and inseparably to spatiality and temporality; likewise consciousness is filled with determinate sensing, representing, desiring and so on; it does not exist separated from some particular content. &#8211; The empirical <em>passing over<\/em> is self-evident anyway; consciousness can indeed make empty space, empty time and empty consciousness itself, or pure being, its object and content; but it does not stay there; it not only goes but presses out of such emptiness towards a better, that is, in some way more concrete content, and however bad a content may otherwise be, it is to that extent better and truer; precisely such a content is a synthetic one in general, synthetic taken in a more general sense. Thus Parmenides has to do with semblance and opinion, the opposite of being and truth; thus Spinoza with the attributes, the modes, extension, movement, understanding, will and so on. Synthesis contains and shows the untruth of those abstractions; in it they are in unity with their other, thus not as subsisting for themselves, not as absolute, but simply as relative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But showing the empirical nullity of empty space and so on is not what is at issue. Consciousness can indeed, by abstracting, also fill itself with that indeterminate, and the abstractions held fast are <em>the thoughts<\/em> of pure space, time, pure consciousness, pure being. The thought of pure space and so on, that is, pure space and so on <em>in itself<\/em>, is to be shown to be null, that is, that as such it is already its opposite, that in itself its opposite has already penetrated into it, that for itself it is already the having-gone-out of itself, determinacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But this results immediately in them. They are, as Jacobi describes at length, results of abstraction, are expressly determined as the <em>indeterminate<\/em>, which &#8211; to go back to its simplest form &#8211; is being. But precisely this <em>indeterminacy<\/em> is what constitutes its determinacy; for indeterminacy is opposed to determinacy; it is thus, as something opposed, itself the determinate or negative, and indeed the pure, wholly abstract negative. This indeterminacy or abstract negation, which being thus has in itself, is what external as well as internal reflection expresses when it equates being with nothing, declares it an empty thought-entity, nothing. &#8211; Or, one can express it thus: because being is what lacks determination, it is not the (affirmative) determinacy that it is, not being, but nothing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the pure reflection of the beginning, as it is made in this logic with <em>being<\/em> as such, the transition is still hidden; because <em>being<\/em> is posited only as immediate, <em>nothing<\/em> breaks forth in it only immediately. But all subsequent determinations, such as <em>existence<\/em> right away, are more concrete; in it what contains and produces the contradiction of those abstractions, and hence their passing over, is already <em>posited<\/em>. With being as that simple, immediate thing, the recollection that it is the result of complete abstraction, and thus already from that side abstract negativity, nothing, is left behind the science, which within itself, expressly from <em>essence<\/em> onwards, will present that one-sided <em>immediacy<\/em> as a mediated one, where being is <em>posited<\/em> as <em>concrete existence<\/em> and the mediating of this being, the ground, is posited.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With that recollection, the transition from being into nothing can be represented as something itself easy and trivial, or also, as one calls it, <em>explained<\/em> and made <em>comprehensible<\/em>: of course the being that has been made the beginning of science is nothing, for one can abstract from everything, and when one has abstracted from everything, nothing remains. But, one can continue, the beginning is therefore not something affirmative, not being, but precisely nothing, and nothing is then also the <em>end<\/em>, at least as much as immediate being, and even much more so. The shortest way is to let such argumentation have its way and to see what sort of results it insists on. That according to it nothing would be the result of that argumentation, and the beginning should now be made with nothing (as in Chinese philosophy), would not make a hair&#8217;s breadth of difference, for before one could turn one&#8217;s hand this nothing would just as much have turned into being (see above: B. Nothing). But further, if that abstraction from <em>everything<\/em>, which everything is after all <em>something that is<\/em>, were presupposed, it is to be taken more precisely; the result of abstraction from everything that is is first abstract being, <em>being<\/em> in general; just as in the cosmological proof of the existence of God from the contingent being of the world, above which one rises in it, <em>being<\/em> is still brought up along with it, being is determined as <em>infinite being<\/em>. But one <em>can<\/em> of course also abstract from this pure being, add being too to everything from which one has already abstracted; then nothing remains. One <em>can<\/em> now, if one wants to forget the <em>thinking<\/em> of nothing, that is, its turning over into being, or knew nothing of it, continue in the style of that <em>can<\/em>; one can namely (thank God!) also abstract from nothing (as indeed the creation of the world is an abstraction from nothing), and then nothing does not remain, for it is precisely from this that one abstracts; rather one has thus arrived again at being. &#8211; This <em>can<\/em> yields an external play of abstracting, in which abstracting itself is only the one-sided doing of the negative. First of all, it lies in this can itself that being is as indifferent to it as nothing, and that, as much as each of the two vanishes, just as much each also arises; but it is equally indifferent whether one starts from the doing of nothing or from nothing; the doing of nothing, that is, mere abstracting, is neither more nor less something true than mere nothing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The dialectic by which <em>Plato<\/em> treats the one in the <em>Parmenides<\/em> is likewise to be regarded rather as a dialectic of external reflection. Being and the one are both Eleatic forms that are the same. But they are also to be distinguished; so Plato takes them in that dialogue. After he has removed from the one the various determinations of whole and parts, of being in itself, in an other and so on, of figure, time and so on, the result is that being does not belong to the one, for being does not belong to a something otherwise than in one of those ways (Steph. 141 e). Thereupon Plato treats the proposition: &#8220;<em>the one is<\/em>&#8220;; and one should look up in him how, from this proposition, the transition to the <em>non-being<\/em> of the one is brought about; it happens through the comparison of the two determinations of the presupposed proposition: &#8220;the <em>one is<\/em>&#8220;; it contains the one <em>and<\/em> being, and &#8220;the one <em>is<\/em>&#8221; contains more than if one only says: &#8220;the one&#8221;. In the fact that they are <em>different<\/em>, the moment of negation that the proposition contains is shown. It is evident that this way has a presupposition and is an external reflection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Just as the one is here put in connection with being, so being, which is supposed to be held fast abstractly <em>for itself<\/em>, is most simply shown, without engaging in thinking, in a connection that contains the opposite of what is supposed to be asserted. Being, taken as it is immediately, belongs to <em>a subject<\/em>, is something stated, has an empirical <em>existence<\/em> in general and thus stands on the ground of limit and of the negative. In whatever expressions or turns the understanding may couch itself when it resists the unity of being and nothing and appeals to what is immediately present, it will find in this very experience nothing but <em>determinate<\/em> being, being with a limit or negation &#8211; that unity which it rejects. The assertion of immediate being thus reduces itself to an empirical existence, the <em>pointing out<\/em> of which it cannot reject, because it is immediacy outside thinking that it wants to hold on to.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The same is the case with <em>nothing<\/em>, only in the opposite way, and this reflection is well known and has been made about it often enough. Nothing, taken in its immediacy, shows itself as <em>being<\/em>; for by its nature it is the same as being. Nothing is thought, represented, spoken of; it therefore <em>is<\/em>; nothing has its being in thinking, representing, speaking and so on. But this being is further also distinguished from it; it is therefore said that nothing is indeed in thinking, representing, but that it is not therefore it that is, that being does not belong to it as such, that only thinking or representing is this being. In this distinguishing it is just as little to be denied that nothing stands in <em>relation<\/em> to a being; but in the relation, even though it also contains the distinction, a unity with being is present. In whatever way nothing is stated or pointed out, it shows itself in connection or, if one likes, contact with a being, unseparated from a being, precisely in an <em>existence<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But when nothing is thus pointed out in an existence, this distinction of it from being usually still hovers before the mind: that the existence of nothing is not at all something belonging to it itself, that it does not have being for itself in it, that it <em>is<\/em> not being <em>as<\/em> such; nothing is only absence of being, darkness thus only <em>absence<\/em> of light, cold only absence of warmth and so on. Darkness has meaning only in relation to the eye, in external comparison with the positive, light; likewise cold is only something in our sensation; light and warmth, like being, on the other hand, are for themselves the objective, real, effective, of utterly different quality and dignity from those negatives, from nothing. One can often find it presented as a very important reflection and significant insight that darkness is <em>only absence<\/em> of light, cold <em>only absence<\/em> of warmth. About this acute reflection it can be noted empirically, in this field of empirical objects, that darkness does indeed show itself effective in light, by determining it to colour and thereby first giving it visibility, since, as said earlier, in pure light one sees just as little as in pure darkness. But visibility is effectiveness in the eye, in which that negative has as much share as the light that counts as the real, the positive; likewise cold makes itself known sufficiently to water, to our sensation and so on, and if we deny it so-called objective reality, nothing at all is gained against it. But further it would have to be criticized that here too, as above, one speaks of a negative with a determinate content and does not stay with nothing itself, to which being is neither inferior nor superior in empty abstraction. &#8211; But cold, darkness and such determinate negations are at once to be taken for themselves, and it is to be seen what is thereby posited with regard to their universal determination, according to which they are brought in here. They are supposed to be not nothing in general but the nothing of light, warmth and so on, of something determinate, a content; so they are determinate nothings with content, if one may say so. But a determinacy is, as will occur further on, itself a negation; so they are negative nothings; but a negative nothing is something affirmative. The turning over of nothing through its determinacy (which appeared before as an <em>existence<\/em> in the subject, or in whatever else it may be) into something affirmative appears to consciousness that stands fast in the abstraction of the understanding as the most paradoxical thing; simple as the insight is, or even because of its very simplicity, the insight that the negation of negation is something positive appears as something trivial, which the proud understanding therefore need not heed, although the matter is correct &#8211; and it has not only this correctness but, because of the universality of such determinations, its infinite extension and universal application, so that it might well be heeded.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It can further be noted about the determination of the transition of being and nothing into each other that it is likewise to be grasped without any further determination of reflection. It is immediate and wholly abstract, because of the abstraction of the moments that pass over, that is, since in these moments the determinacy of the other, by means of which they would pass over, is not yet posited; nothing is not yet <em>posited<\/em> in being, although being is <em>essentially<\/em> nothing and vice versa. It is therefore inadmissible to apply further determinate mediations here and to grasp being and nothing in any relationship &#8211; that passing over is not yet a relationship. It is thus not permissible to say: &#8220;Nothing is the <em>ground<\/em> of being&#8221; or &#8220;being is the <em>ground<\/em> of nothing&#8221;, &#8220;nothing [is] the <em>cause<\/em> of being&#8221; and so on; or &#8220;one can pass over into nothing only <em>on the condition<\/em> that something <em>is<\/em>, or into being only <em>on the condition<\/em> of non-being&#8221;. The kind of relation cannot be further determined without the related sides being further determined at the same time. The connection of ground and consequence and so on no longer has mere being and nothing as the sides it connects, but expressly being that is ground, and something which is indeed only something posited, not independent, but which is not abstract nothing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Remark 4<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It follows from what has been said so far what to make of the dialectic against the <em>beginning of the world<\/em>, and also its ending, by which the <em>eternity<\/em> of matter was supposed to be proved, that is, of the dialectic against <em>becoming<\/em>, arising or passing away in general. &#8211; The Kantian antinomy about the finitude or infinity of the world in space and time will be considered more closely below with the concept of quantitative infinity. &#8211; That simple, ordinary dialectic rests on holding fast the opposition of being and nothing. It is proved in the following way that no beginning of the world or of something is possible:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nothing can begin, neither insofar as something is, nor insofar as it is not; for insofar as it is, it does not first begin; but insofar as it is not, it does not begin either. &#8211; If the world or something had begun, it would have begun in nothing; but in nothing, or nothing, is not a beginning; for beginning includes a being, but nothing contains no being. Nothing is only nothing. In a ground, cause and so on, when nothing is so determined, an affirmation, being, is contained. &#8211; For the same reason something cannot cease either. For then being would have to contain nothing; but being is only being, not the opposite of itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is evident that here nothing is brought forward against becoming, or beginning and ceasing, this <em>unity<\/em> of being and nothing, except to deny it assertorically and to ascribe truth to being and nothing, each separated from the other. &#8211; This dialectic is, however, at least more consistent than reflecting representation. For the latter it counts as perfect truth that being and nothing are only separated; on the other hand, however, it accepts beginning and ceasing as equally true determinations; but in these it factually assumes the unseparatedness of being and nothing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On the presupposition of the absolute separateness of being from nothing, beginning or becoming is indeed &#8211; as one so often hears &#8211; something <em>incomprehensible<\/em>; for one makes a presupposition that sublates the beginning or becoming which one nevertheless grants <em>again<\/em>, and this contradiction, which one posits oneself and whose resolution one makes impossible, is called the <em>incomprehensible<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What has been cited is also the same dialectic that the understanding uses against the concept which higher analysis gives of <em>infinitely small magnitudes<\/em>. This concept is dealt with in more detail further below. &#8211; These magnitudes have been determined as such that <em>are in their vanishing<\/em>, not <em>before<\/em> their vanishing, for then they are finite magnitudes &#8211; not <em>after<\/em> their vanishing, for then they are nothing. Against this pure concept it has been objected, and constantly repeated, that such magnitudes are <em>either<\/em> something <em>or<\/em> nothing; that there is no <em>intermediate state<\/em> (state is an unsuitable, barbaric expression here) between being and non-being. &#8211; Here too the absolute separation of being and nothing is assumed. Against this, however, it has been shown that being and nothing are in fact the same or, to speak in that language, that there <em>is<\/em> nothing at all that is not an <em>intermediate state between being and nothing<\/em>. Mathematics owes its brilliant successes to the assumption of that determination which the understanding contradicts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The argumentation cited, which makes the false presupposition of the absolute separatedness of being and non-being and stops there, is to be called not <em>dialectic<\/em> but <em>sophistry<\/em>. For sophistry is an argumentation from a groundless presupposition that one accepts without criticism and thoughtlessly; but we call dialectic the higher rational movement in which such things as appear utterly separated pass over into each other through themselves, through what they are, and the presupposition [of their separatedness] sublates itself. It is the dialectical immanent nature of being and nothing themselves that they show their unity, becoming, as their truth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\">b. Moments of Becoming<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Becoming, arising and passing away, is the unseparatedness of being and nothing; not the unity that abstracts from being and nothing; rather, as unity <em>of being<\/em> and <em>nothing<\/em>, it is this <em>determinate<\/em> unity, or [the one] in which both being and nothing <em>are<\/em>. But since being and nothing are each unseparated from its other, <em>each is not<\/em>. They <em>are<\/em> therefore in this unity, but as vanishing, only as <em>sublated<\/em>. They sink from their initially represented <em>independence<\/em> to <em>moments<\/em>, <em>still distinct<\/em>, but at the same time sublated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Grasped according to this distinctness of theirs, each is in <em>it<\/em> as unity with the <em>other<\/em>. Becoming thus contains being and nothing as <em>two such unities<\/em>, each of which is itself unity of being and nothing; the one being as immediate and as relation to nothing; the other nothing as immediate and as relation to being: the determinations are of unequal value in these unities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Becoming is in this way in a double determination; in the one, nothing is as immediate, that is, it begins from nothing, which relates itself to being, that is, passes over into it; in the other, being is as immediate, that is, it begins from being, which passes over into nothing &#8211; <em>arising<\/em> and <em>passing away<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Both are the same, becoming, and even as these directions thus distinguished they interpenetrate and paralyse each other. The one is <em>passing away<\/em>; being passes over into nothing, but nothing is just as much the opposite of itself, passing over into being, arising. This arising is the other direction; nothing passes over into being, but being just as much sublates itself and is rather the passing over into nothing, is passing away. &#8211; They do not sublate each other mutually, the one does not sublate the other externally; rather each sublates itself in itself and is in itself the opposite of itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\">c. Sublation of Becoming<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The equilibrium into which arising and passing away put themselves is at first becoming itself. But this equally collapses into <em>quiet unity<\/em>. Being and nothing are in it only as vanishing; but becoming as such is only through their distinctness. Their vanishing is therefore the vanishing of becoming, or the vanishing of vanishing itself. Becoming is an unrest without hold which collapses into a quiet result.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This could also be expressed thus: becoming is the vanishing of being into nothing and of nothing into being and the vanishing of being and nothing in general; but at the same time it rests on their distinction. It therefore contradicts itself within itself, because it unites within itself what is opposed to itself; but such a union destroys itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This result is having-vanished, but not as <em>nothing<\/em>; as such it would only be a relapse into one of the determinations already sublated, not a result of nothing <em>and of being<\/em>. It is the unity of being and nothing that has become quiet simplicity. But quiet simplicity is <em>being<\/em>, yet likewise no longer for itself, but as a determination of the whole.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Becoming, thus [as] passing over into the unity of being and nothing, which is as <em>being<\/em> or has the shape of the one-sided <em>immediate<\/em> unity of these moments, is <em>existence<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Remark<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>To sublate<\/em> and the <em>sublated<\/em> (the <em>ideal<\/em>) is one of the most important concepts of philosophy, a basic determination that recurs absolutely everywhere, whose sense is to be grasped determinately and especially to be distinguished from nothing. &#8211; What sublates itself does not thereby become nothing. Nothing is the <em>immediate<\/em>; something sublated, by contrast, is something <em>mediated<\/em>; it is what is not, but as a <em>result<\/em> that has proceeded from a being; it therefore <em>still has in itself the determinacy from which it comes<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Aufheben<\/em> [to sublate] has in the language the double sense that it means as much as to keep, to <em>preserve<\/em>, and at the same time as much as to make cease, <em>to put an end to<\/em>. Keeping itself already includes the negative that something is taken out of its immediacy and thus out of an existence open to external influences, in order to preserve it. &#8211; Thus the sublated is something at the same time kept, which has only lost its immediacy but is not therefore annihilated. &#8211; The two determinations of <em>aufheben<\/em> just stated can be listed lexically as two <em>meanings<\/em> of this word. But it must strike one as remarkable that a language has come to use one and the same word for two opposed determinations. For speculative thinking it is gratifying to find words in language that have a speculative meaning in themselves; the German language has several such. The double sense of the Latin <em>tollere<\/em> (which became famous through Cicero&#8217;s witticism &#8220;tollendum esse Octavium&#8221;) does not go so far; the affirmative determination goes only as far as lifting up. Something is sublated only insofar as it has entered into unity with its opposite; in this closer determination as something reflected it can fittingly be called a <em>moment<\/em>. With the lever, <em>weight<\/em> and <em>distance<\/em> from a point are called its mechanical <em>moments<\/em>, on account of the <em>sameness<\/em> of their effect despite all other difference between something real, such as a weight is, and something ideal, the mere spatial determination, the line; see <em>Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences<\/em>, 3rd edition [1830], \u00a7 261 Remark. &#8211; The observation will force itself upon one still more often that the technical language of philosophy uses Latin expressions for reflected determinations, either because the mother tongue has no expressions for them or, if it has them as here, because its expression is more reminiscent of the immediate, while the foreign language is more reminiscent of the reflected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The closer sense and expression that being and nothing receive, now that they are <em>moments<\/em>, must emerge in the consideration of existence as the unity in which they are kept. Being is being and nothing is nothing only in their distinctness from each other; but in their truth, in their unity, they have vanished as these determinations and are now something else. Being and nothing are the same; <em>precisely because they are the same, they are no longer being and nothing<\/em> and have a different determination; in becoming they were arising and passing away; in existence, as a differently determined unity, they are again differently determined moments. This unity now remains their foundation, from which they no longer step out into the abstract meaning of being and nothing.<\/p>\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-footnotes\"><li id=\"5d60bf5e-5d36-4fa1-af0e-0de4a7d5144c\"><em>Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd ed. [B], pp. 626 ff.<\/em> <a href=\"#5d60bf5e-5d36-4fa1-af0e-0de4a7d5144c-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 1\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li><li id=\"0d469196-1938-4eda-90a0-eb0c42b71ece\"><em>Horace, Carmina III, 3<\/em>: &#8220;If the frame of the world crashes down, its ruins will still strike a hero&#8221; <a href=\"#0d469196-1938-4eda-90a0-eb0c42b71ece-link\" aria-label=\"Jump to footnote reference 2\">\u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li><\/ol>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The Science of Logic &#8211; Chapter One: Being A. Being Being, pure being, &#8211; without any further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself and also not unequal with respect to another; it has no diversity within itself nor outwardly. If any determination or content were distinguished in it, or if [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":"[{\"content\":\"<em>Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd ed. [B], pp. 626 ff.<\/em>\",\"id\":\"5d60bf5e-5d36-4fa1-af0e-0de4a7d5144c\"},{\"content\":\"<em>Horace, Carmina III, 3<\/em>: \\\"If the frame of the world crashes down, its ruins will still strike a hero\\\"\",\"id\":\"0d469196-1938-4eda-90a0-eb0c42b71ece\"}]"},"class_list":["post-906501","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906501","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=906501"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906501\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":906503,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906501\/revisions\/906503"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=906501"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}