{"id":906514,"date":"2026-11-18T21:48:37","date_gmt":"2026-11-18T20:48:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/the-doctrine-of-being-enc-84-111\/"},"modified":"2026-11-18T21:48:37","modified_gmt":"2026-11-18T20:48:37","slug":"the-doctrine-of-being-enc-84-111","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/the-doctrine-of-being-enc-84-111\/","title":{"rendered":"The Doctrine of Being (Enc. \u00a7\u00a7 84\u2013111)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Quality, quantity and measure. From the <em>Groundlines<\/em>, the footnotes to \u00a7 33 (\u00a7\u00a7 84\u201386) and to \u00a7 7 (\u00a7 95) refer here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The text follows the third edition of 1830 as given in the Werkausgabe, with the Additions from the lectures. The versions of 1827 and 1817 will be added later.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Contents<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li>The Doctrine of Being: <a href=\"#l-84\">\u00a7 84<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-85\">\u00a7 85<\/a><\/li><li>The Doctrine of Being \u2192 A. Quality \u2192 a. Being: <a href=\"#l-86\">\u00a7 86<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-87\">\u00a7 87<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-88\">\u00a7 88<\/a><\/li><li>The Doctrine of Being \u2192 A. Quality \u2192 b. Existence: <a href=\"#l-89\">\u00a7 89<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-90\">\u00a7 90<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-91\">\u00a7 91<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-92\">\u00a7 92<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-93\">\u00a7 93<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-94\">\u00a7 94<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-95\">\u00a7 95<\/a><\/li><li>The Doctrine of Being \u2192 A. Quality \u2192 c. Being-for-itself: <a href=\"#l-96\">\u00a7 96<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-97\">\u00a7 97<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-98\">\u00a7 98<\/a><\/li><li>The Doctrine of Being \u2192 B. Quantity \u2192 a. Pure Quantity: <a href=\"#l-99\">\u00a7 99<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-100\">\u00a7 100<\/a><\/li><li>The Doctrine of Being \u2192 B. Quantity \u2192 b. Quantum: <a href=\"#l-101\">\u00a7 101<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-102\">\u00a7 102<\/a><\/li><li>The Doctrine of Being \u2192 B. Quantity \u2192 c. Degree: <a href=\"#l-103\">\u00a7 103<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-104\">\u00a7 104<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-105\">\u00a7 105<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-106\">\u00a7 106<\/a><\/li><li>The Doctrine of Being \u2192 C. Measure: <a href=\"#l-107\">\u00a7 107<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-108\">\u00a7 108<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-109\">\u00a7 109<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-110\">\u00a7 110<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-111\">\u00a7 111<\/a><\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Doctrine of Being<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-84\">\u00a7 84<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/33\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 33<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Being is the concept only <em>in itself<\/em>; its determinations <em>are<\/em>, in their distinction they are <em>others<\/em> with respect to one another, and their further determination (the form of the dialectical) is a <em>passing over into another<\/em>. This further determining is at once a <em>setting forth<\/em> and thus an unfolding of the concept that is <em>in itself<\/em>, and at the same time the <em>going-into-itself<\/em> of being, its deepening into itself. The explication of the concept in the sphere of being becomes the totality of being just as much as the immediacy of being, or the form of being as such, is thereby sublated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-85\">\u00a7 85<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/33\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 33<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Being itself, as well as the following determinations, not only of being but logical determinations in general, can be regarded as definitions of the absolute, as the <em>metaphysical definitions<\/em> of God; more precisely, however, always only the first simple determination of a sphere, and then the third, as the return from difference to simple relation to itself. For to define God metaphysically means to express his nature in <em>thoughts<\/em> as such; but logic comprises all thoughts as they still are in the form of thoughts. The <em>second<\/em> determinations, by contrast, which are a sphere in its <em>difference<\/em>, are the definitions of the <em>finite<\/em>. But if the form of definitions were used, it would imply that a substrate of representation is in view; for even <em>the absolute<\/em>, which is supposed to express God in the sense and form of thought, remains, in relation to its predicate, the determinate and actual expression in thought, only a <em>meant<\/em> thought, a substrate undetermined for itself. Because the thought, the matter that alone is at issue here, is contained only in the predicate, the form of a proposition, like that subject, is something completely superfluous (cf. \u00a7 31 and below, chapter on judgement [\u00a7\u00a7 166 ff.]).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>Each sphere of the logical idea proves to be a totality of determinations and a presentation of the absolute. So too being, which contains within itself the three stages of <em>quality<\/em>, <em>quantity<\/em> and <em>measure<\/em>. <em>Quality<\/em> is first the determinacy identical with being, in such a way that something ceases to be what it is if it loses its quality. <em>Quantity<\/em>, by contrast, is the determinacy external to being, indifferent to it. Thus, for example, a house remains what it is whether it is larger or smaller, and red remains red whether it is lighter or darker. The third stage of being, <em>measure<\/em>, is the unity of the first two, qualitative quantity. All things have their measure, that is, they are quantitatively determined, and their being of this or that size is indifferent to them; but at the same time this indifference also has its limit, and when this is exceeded by a further more or less, things cease to be what they were. From measure there then results the advance to the second main sphere of the idea, to <em>essence<\/em>. The three forms of being named here are, precisely because they are the first, at the same time the poorest, that is, the most abstract. Immediate, sensuous consciousness, insofar as it behaves at the same time in a thinking way, is chiefly confined to the abstract determinations of quality and quantity. This sensuous consciousness is usually regarded as the most concrete and thus at the same time the richest; but it is so only as regards material, whereas with regard to its thought-content it is in fact the poorest and most abstract.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Doctrine of Being \u2192 A. Quality \u2192 a. Being<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-86\">\u00a7 86<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/33\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 33<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Pure being<\/em> makes the beginning, because it is both pure thought and the undetermined, simple immediate, while the first beginning cannot be anything mediated and further determined.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">All doubts and admonitions that could be raised against beginning science with abstract, empty <em>being<\/em> are settled by the simple consciousness of what the nature of the beginning entails. Being can be determined as I = I, as <em>absolute indifference<\/em> or <em>identity<\/em> and so on. In the need to begin either with something utterly <em>certain<\/em>, that is, the certainty of oneself, or with a definition or intuition of the <em>absolutely true<\/em>, these and other such forms can be regarded as having to be the first. But since within each of these forms there is already <em>mediation<\/em>, they are not truly the first; mediation is a having gone out from a first to a second and a proceeding from distinct terms. If I = I, or intellectual intuition too, is truly taken only as the first, then in this pure immediacy it is nothing other than <em>being<\/em>, just as pure being conversely, as no longer this abstract being but being that contains mediation within itself, is pure thinking or intuiting. If <em>being<\/em> is stated as the predicate of the absolute, this gives the first definition of it: <em>the absolute is being<\/em>. This is the (in thought) utterly initial, most abstract and meagrest definition. It is the definition of the <em>Eleatics<\/em>, but at the same time also the familiar one that <em>God is the sum total of all realities<\/em>. For one is supposed to abstract from the limitation that is in every reality, so that God is only the <em>real<\/em> in all reality, the <em>most real<\/em>. Since reality already contains a reflection, this is expressed more immediately in what Jacobi says of Spinoza\u2019s God, that he is the principium <em>of being in all existence<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 1. <\/em>When we begin to think, we have nothing but thought in its pure lack of determination, for determination already requires one and an other; but at the beginning we do not yet have an other. The undetermined, as we have it here, is the immediate, not mediated lack of determination, not the sublation of all determinacy, but the immediacy of lack of determination, lack of determination before all determinacy, the undetermined as the very first. But this we call being. It is not to be sensed, not to be intuited and not to be represented; it is pure thought, and as such it makes the beginning. Essence too is something undetermined, but the undetermined which, as having already gone through mediation, already contains determination within itself as sublated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 2. <\/em>We find the various stages of the logical idea in the history of philosophy in the shape of philosophical systems that have emerged one after another, each of which has a particular definition of the absolute as its foundation. Just as the unfolding of the logical idea proves to be an advance from the abstract to the concrete, so too in the history of philosophy the earliest systems are the most abstract and thus at the same time the poorest. But the relationship of the earlier to the later philosophical systems is in general the same as the relationship of the earlier to the later stages of the logical idea, and indeed of such a kind that the earlier contain the later within themselves as sublated. This is the true meaning of the refutation of one philosophical system by another, and more precisely of the earlier by the later, that occurs in the history of philosophy and is so often misunderstood. When the refutation of a philosophy is spoken of, this is usually taken at first only in the abstractly negative sense, as if the refuted philosophy no longer counts at all, as if it were set aside and done with. If that were so, the study of the history of philosophy would have to be regarded as an altogether sad business, since this study teaches how all the philosophical systems that have emerged in the course of time have found their refutation. But just as it must be granted that all philosophies have been refuted, it must at the same time also be asserted that no philosophy has been refuted, nor can be refuted. The latter is the case in a twofold respect: first, every philosophy that deserves this name has the idea in general as its content, and second, every philosophical system is to be regarded as the presentation of a particular moment or a particular stage in the process of development of the idea. To refute a philosophy therefore only means that its limit is overstepped and that its determinate principle is reduced to an ideal moment. The history of philosophy, in its essential content, therefore has to do not with what is past but with what is eternal and utterly present, and in its result it is to be compared not to a gallery of aberrations of the human spirit but rather to a pantheon of divine figures. These divine figures, however, are the various stages of the idea as they emerge one after another in dialectical development. While it remains for the history of philosophy to show more precisely to what extent the unfolding of its content that takes place in it on the one hand agrees with and on the other hand deviates from the dialectical unfolding of the pure logical idea, it need only be mentioned here that the beginning of logic is the same as the beginning of the history of philosophy proper. We find this beginning in the Eleatic, and more precisely in the philosophy of Parmenides, who grasps the absolute as being when he says: &#8220;only being is, and nothing is not&#8221;. This is to be regarded as the proper beginning of philosophy because philosophy is in general thinking cognition, and here pure thinking was for the first time held fast and became objective to itself. Human beings have of course thought from the beginning, for only through thinking do they differ from animals; but it took millennia before thinking came to be grasped in its purity and at the same time as the utterly objective. The Eleatics are famous as bold thinkers; but this abstract admiration is often joined by the remark that these philosophers went too far after all, in recognizing merely being as the true and denying truth to everything else that forms the object of our consciousness. Now it is quite correct that one must not stop at mere being; but it is thoughtless to regard the rest of the content of our consciousness as lying, as it were, <em>beside<\/em> and <em>outside<\/em> being, or as something that merely <em>also<\/em> exists. The true relationship, by contrast, is this: that being as such is not something fixed and ultimate, but rather turns over dialectically into its opposite, which, likewise taken immediately, is <em>nothing<\/em>. It thus remains the case that being is the first pure thought, and that, whatever else one may begin with (with I = I, with absolute indifference or with God himself), this other is at first only something represented and not something thought, and that according to its thought-content it is precisely only being.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-87\">\u00a7 87<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This pure being is now <em>pure abstraction<\/em>, and thus the <em>absolutely negative<\/em>, which, likewise taken immediately, is <em>nothing<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">1. From this there followed the second definition of the absolute, that it is <em>nothing<\/em>; in fact it is contained in saying that the thing-in-itself is the undetermined, utterly without form and therefore without content &#8211; or also that God <em>is<\/em> <em>only<\/em> the <em>highest being<\/em> and nothing further, for as such he is expressed as the very same negativity; the nothing which the <em>Buddhists<\/em> make the principle of everything as well as the final end and goal of everything is the same abstraction. &#8211; 2. When the opposition is expressed in this immediacy as <em>being<\/em> and <em>nothing<\/em>, it seems too striking that it is null for one not to try to fix being and preserve it against the transition. In this respect reflection must hit upon looking for a fixed determination for being by which it would be distinguished from nothing. One takes it, for example, as what persists in all change, as infinitely determinable <em>matter<\/em> and so on, or also, without reflection, as some <em>single<\/em> existence, the first sensuous or spiritual thing to hand. But all such further and more concrete determinations no longer leave being as <em>pure being<\/em>, as it is here immediately at the beginning. Only in and because of this pure indeterminacy is it <em>nothing<\/em> &#8211; something <em>unsayable<\/em>; its distinction from nothing is a mere <em>opinion<\/em>. &#8211; What matters is precisely only the consciousness of these beginnings, namely that they [are] nothing but these empty abstractions and each of the two is as empty as the other; the <em>drive<\/em> to find a fixed meaning in being or in both is this very <em>necessity<\/em> which leads being and nothing further and gives them a true, that is, concrete meaning. This advance is the logical elaboration and the course that presents itself in what follows. The <em>reflection<\/em> that <em>finds<\/em> deeper determinations for them is logical thinking, through which such determinations produce themselves, only not in a contingent but in a necessary way. &#8211; Every subsequent meaning they receive is therefore to be regarded only as a <em>closer determination<\/em> and <em>truer definition of the absolute<\/em>; such a definition is then no longer an empty abstraction like being and nothing, but rather something concrete in which both, being and nothing, are moments. &#8211; The highest form of nothing for itself would be <em>freedom<\/em>, but freedom is negativity insofar as it deepens itself into itself to the highest intensity and is itself affirmation, indeed absolute affirmation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>Being and nothing are <em>supposed<\/em> to be only distinguished at first, that is, their distinction is at first only <em>in itself<\/em>, but it is not yet <em>posited<\/em>. Whenever we speak of a distinction, we thereby have <em>two<\/em>, to each of which a determination belongs that is not found in the other. But being is precisely only what is utterly without determination, and nothing is the same lack of determination. The distinction between these two is thus only a meant one, the wholly abstract distinction that is at the same time no distinction. In all other distinguishing we always also have something common which comprises the distinct terms under it. If we speak, for example, of two different species, the genus is what is common to both. Likewise we say: there are natural and spiritual beings. Here being [Wesen] is something belonging to both. With being and nothing, on the other hand, the distinction is in its groundlessness, and precisely for that reason it is none, for both determinations are the same groundlessness. If one wanted to say, perhaps, that being and nothing are after all both thoughts, and thought is thus what is common to both, one would overlook that being is not a particular, determinate thought, but rather the thought that is still wholly undetermined and precisely for that reason not to be distinguished from nothing. &#8211; One may then also represent being as absolute wealth and nothing, by contrast, as absolute poverty. But if we consider the whole world and say of it that everything is, and nothing further, we leave out everything determinate and then have, instead of absolute fullness, only absolute emptiness. The same then also applies to the definition of God as mere being, a definition which is opposed with equal justification by the definition of the Buddhists that God is nothing, in consequence of which it is then also asserted that the human being becomes God by annihilating himself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-88\">\u00a7 88<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Nothing<\/em>, as this immediate, self-equal nothing, is likewise conversely <em>the same<\/em> as <em>being<\/em> is. The truth of being as well as of nothing is therefore the <em>unity<\/em> of the two; this unity is <em>becoming<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">1. The proposition <em>&#8220;being and nothing are the same&#8221;<\/em> appears to <em>representation<\/em> or the understanding as such a paradoxical proposition that it perhaps does not take it to be seriously meant. In fact it is also among the hardest things thinking expects of itself, for being and nothing are opposition in all its <em>immediacy<\/em>, that is, without a determination already being <em>posited<\/em> in the one which would contain its relation to the other. But they <em>contain<\/em> this determination, as was shown in the preceding \u00a7, the determination that is precisely the same in both. The deduction of their unity is to that extent wholly <em>analytic<\/em>; just as in general the whole advance of philosophizing, as methodical, that is, as <em>necessary<\/em>, is nothing other than the mere <em>positing<\/em> of what is already contained in a concept. &#8211; But just as correct as the unity of being and nothing is <em>also<\/em> that <em>they are utterly different<\/em> &#8211; the one <em>is not<\/em> what the other is. But because the distinction has not yet determined itself here, for being and nothing are precisely still the immediate, it is, as it is in them, the <em>unsayable<\/em>, mere <em>opinion<\/em>. 2. It does not take much expenditure of wit to make fun of the proposition that being and nothing are the same, or rather to bring forward absurdities with the untrue assurance that they are consequences and applications of that proposition; for example, that according to it it is the same whether my house, my fortune, the air to breathe, this city, the sun, right, spirit, God <em>is<\/em> or <em>is not<\/em>. In such examples, partly <em>particular purposes<\/em>, the <em>usefulness<\/em> that something has for <em>me<\/em>, are slipped in, and it is asked whether it is indifferent to <em>me<\/em> whether the useful thing is or is not. In fact philosophy is precisely this doctrine: to free the human being from an infinite mass of finite purposes and intentions and to make him indifferent towards them, so that it is indeed the same to him whether such things are or are not. But in general, as soon as a <em>content<\/em> is spoken of, a connection is thereby posited with <em>other<\/em> existences, purposes and so on, which are <em>presupposed<\/em> as valid; whether the being or non-being <em>of a determinate content is the same<\/em> or not is then made dependent on <em>such presuppositions<\/em>. A distinction <em>full of content<\/em> is slipped in for the empty distinction of being and nothing. &#8211; Partly, however, it is purposes essential in themselves, absolute existences and ideas, that are placed merely under the determination of <em>being<\/em> or non-being. Such concrete objects are something quite other than merely <em>things that are<\/em> or also <em>things that are not<\/em>; meagre abstractions like being and nothing &#8211; and because they are precisely only the determinations of the beginning, they are the very meagrest there are &#8211; are quite inadequate to the nature of those objects; true content is long since beyond these abstractions themselves and their opposition. &#8211; Whenever something concrete is slipped in for being and nothing, thoughtlessness does its usual thing: it gets something quite different before representation and speaks of that instead of what is at issue, and here only abstract being and nothing are at issue. 3. It can easily be said that one does not <em>comprehend<\/em> the unity of being and nothing. But its concept is stated in the preceding \u00a7\u00a7, and it is nothing further than what is stated there; to comprehend it means nothing other than to grasp this. But by comprehending one also understands something more than the concept proper; a more manifold, richer consciousness, a representation, is demanded, so that such a concept may be presented as a concrete case with which thinking in its ordinary practice would be more familiar. Insofar as the inability to comprehend only expresses lack of practice in holding fast abstract thoughts without any sensuous admixture and in grasping speculative propositions, nothing further is to be said than that the kind of philosophical knowing is indeed different from the kind of knowing one is used to in common life, as also from that which prevails in other sciences. But if not comprehending only means that one cannot <em>represent<\/em> the unity of being and nothing to oneself, this is in fact so little the case that everyone rather has infinitely many representations of this unity, and that one has no such representation can only mean that one does not recognize the present concept in any of those representations and does not know them as an example of it. The example of it that lies closest is <em>becoming<\/em>. Everyone has a representation of becoming and will likewise grant that it is <em>one<\/em> representation; further, that if one analyses it, the determination of <em>being<\/em>, but also of what is utterly other than it, <em>nothing<\/em>, is contained in it; further, that these two determinations are unseparated in this <em>one<\/em> representation, so that becoming is thus unity of being and nothing. &#8211; An equally obvious example is the <em>beginning<\/em>; the matter <em>is not yet<\/em> in its beginning, but the beginning is not merely its <em>nothing<\/em>; its <em>being<\/em> is already in it too. The beginning is itself also becoming, but it already expresses the regard to further advance. &#8211; In order to accommodate oneself to the more usual course of the sciences, one could begin logic with the representation of the beginning purely as thought, thus of the beginning as beginning, and analyse this representation; then one would perhaps more readily accept, as the result of the analysis, that being and nothing show themselves as unseparated in one. 4. It must further be noted, however, that the expression &#8220;being and nothing are <em>the same<\/em>&#8221; or &#8220;<em>the unity<\/em> of being and nothing&#8221;, like all other such <em>unities<\/em>, of subject and object and so on, are rightly objectionable, because what is skewed and incorrect in them is that the <em>unity<\/em> is singled out, and the difference does indeed lie in it (because it is, for example, being and nothing whose unity is posited), but this difference is not at the same time expressed and acknowledged, so that it seems only to be improperly abstracted from, not considered. In fact a speculative determination cannot be correctly expressed in the form of such a proposition; the unity is to be grasped in the difference that is at the same time <em>present<\/em> and <em>posited<\/em>. <em>Becoming<\/em> is the true expression of the result of being and nothing, as their unity; it is not only the <em>unity<\/em> of being and nothing, but is <em>unrest<\/em> within itself &#8211; the unity which is not merely motionless as relation-to-itself, but which, through the difference of being and nothing that is in it, is within itself against itself. &#8211; <em>Existence<\/em>, on the other hand, is this <em>unity<\/em>, or becoming in this form of unity; that is why existence is <em>one-sided<\/em> and <em>finite<\/em>. The opposition is as if it had vanished; it is contained in the unity only <em>in itself<\/em>, but not <em>posited<\/em> in the unity. 5. The proposition that being is the passing over into nothing and nothing the passing over into being &#8211; the proposition of <em>becoming<\/em> &#8211; is opposed by the proposition &#8220;<em>out of nothing comes nothing<\/em>&#8220;, &#8220;something comes only from something&#8221;, the proposition of the eternity of matter, of pantheism. The ancients made the simple reflection that the proposition &#8220;out of something comes something&#8221; or &#8220;out of nothing comes nothing&#8221; in fact sublates becoming; for that out of which it becomes and that which becomes are one and the same; only the proposition of abstract identity of the understanding is present. But it must strike one as amazing to see the propositions &#8220;out of nothing comes nothing&#8221; or &#8220;out of something comes only something&#8221; put forward quite naively even in our times, without any consciousness that they [are] the foundation of pantheism, and without knowledge that the ancients exhausted the consideration of these propositions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>Becoming is the first concrete thought and thus the first concept, whereas being and nothing are empty abstractions. If we speak of the concept of being, it can only consist in being becoming, for as being it is empty nothing, but as nothing it is empty being. In being, therefore, we have nothing, and in nothing being; but this being which remains with itself in nothing is becoming. In the unity of becoming the distinction must not be left out, for without it one would return again to abstract being. Becoming is only the being-posited of what being is according to its truth. One very often hears it asserted that thinking is opposed to being. With such an assertion, however, one would first have to ask what is understood by being. If we take up being as reflection determines it, we can only say of it that it is the utterly identical and affirmative. If we now consider thinking, it cannot escape us that it too is at least the utterly self-identical. The same determination thus belongs to both, being and thinking. But this identity of being and thinking is not to be taken concretely, and so it is not to be said that the stone, as something that is, is the same as the thinking human being. Something concrete is quite other than the abstract determination as such. But with being nothing concrete is at issue, for being is precisely only what is wholly abstract. Accordingly the question about the being of God, who is what is infinitely concrete within himself, is also of little interest. Becoming, as the first concrete determination of thought, is at the same time the first true one. In the history of philosophy it is the system of Heraclitus that corresponds to this stage of the logical idea. When Heraclitus says: &#8220;Everything flows&#8221; (\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03f1\u0374\u03b5\u03b9<!--\u0342-->), <em>becoming<\/em> is thereby expressed as the basic determination of everything that is, whereas, as was noted earlier, the Eleatics grasped being, rigid, processless being, as alone true. With reference to the principle of the Eleatics, Democritus then further says: &#8220;Being is no more than non-being&#8221; (\u03bf\u03c5\u0313\u03b4\u03b5\u0300\u03bd \u03bc\u03b1<!--\u0342-->\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u0300 \u03bf\u0313\u0300\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5<!--\u0342--> \u03bc\u03b7\u0300 \u03bf\u0313\u0300\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u0313\u03c3\u03af), whereby precisely the negativity of abstract being is expressed, and its identity, posited in becoming, with nothing, which in its abstraction is equally without hold. &#8211; We have here at the same time an example of the true refutation of one philosophical system by another, which refutation consists precisely in the principle of the refuted philosophy being shown in its dialectic and reduced to an ideal moment of a higher concrete form of the idea. &#8211; But further, becoming in and for itself is still a highly poor determination and has to deepen and fill itself further within itself. We have such a deepening of becoming within itself, for example, in <em>life<\/em>. Life is a becoming, but its concept is not exhausted by that. We find becoming in a still higher form in <em>spirit<\/em>. Spirit too is a becoming, but a more intensive, richer one than merely logical becoming. The moments whose unity spirit is are not the mere abstractions of being and nothing, but the system of the logical idea and of nature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Doctrine of Being \u2192 A. Quality \u2192 b. Existence<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-89\">\u00a7 89<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Being in becoming, as one with nothing, and likewise nothing [as] one with being, are only vanishing terms; becoming, through its contradiction within itself, collapses into the unity in which both are sublated; its <em>result<\/em> is therefore <em>existence<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With this first example, what is stated in \u00a7 82 and the Remark there must be recalled once and for all: what alone can ground an advance and a development in knowing is to hold fast the results in their truth. When the contradiction is shown in any object or concept (and there is nowhere <em>anything at all<\/em> in which contradiction, that is, opposed determinations, cannot and must not be shown; the abstracting of the understanding is the forcible holding fast to <em>one<\/em> determinacy, an effort to obscure and remove the consciousness of the other [determinacy] that lies in it) &#8211; when such contradiction is recognized, one usually draws the conclusion: &#8220;<em>Therefore<\/em> this object is <em>nothing<\/em>&#8220;; as <em>Zeno<\/em> first showed of motion that it contradicts itself and therefore <em>is<\/em> not, or as the ancients recognized <em>arising<\/em> and <em>passing away<\/em>, the two kinds of becoming, as untrue determinations with the expression that the <em>One<\/em>, that is, the absolute, neither arises nor passes away. This dialectic thus stops merely at the negative side of the result and abstracts from what is at the same time actually present, a <em>determinate<\/em> result, here a pure <em>nothing<\/em>, but [a] <em>nothing<\/em> which includes <em>being<\/em> within itself, and likewise a being which includes nothing within itself. Thus 1. existence is the unity of being and nothing, in which the immediacy of these determinations, and thereby their contradiction in their relation, has vanished &#8211; a unity in which they are now only moments; 2. since the result is sublated contradiction, it is in the form of <em>simple unity<\/em> with itself, or itself as a <em>being<\/em>, but a being with negation or determinacy; it is becoming posited in the <em>form<\/em> of <em>one<\/em> of its moments, being.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>Our representation too contains this: that when there is a becoming, something comes out of it, and that becoming therefore has a result. But here the question arises how becoming comes not to remain mere becoming but to have a result. The answer to this question follows from what becoming showed itself to us to be before. Becoming contains within itself being and nothing, and indeed in such a way that these two utterly turn over into each other and mutually sublate each other. Becoming thereby proves to be what is altogether restless, but which cannot maintain itself in this abstract restlessness; for since being and nothing vanish in becoming and only this is its concept, it is thereby itself something vanishing, a fire, as it were, which dies out within itself in consuming its material. But the result of this process is not empty nothing, but being identical with negation, which we call <em>existence<\/em> and whose meaning first proves to be this: to have <em>become<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-90\">\u00a7 90<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b1) <em>Existence<\/em> is being with a <em>determinacy<\/em> that is as immediate or existent determinacy, <em>quality<\/em>. Existence, as reflected <em>into itself<\/em> in this its determinacy, is <em>something existent<\/em>, <em>something<\/em>. &#8211; The categories that develop in existence need only be stated summarily.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em><em>Quality<\/em> is in general the immediate determinacy identical with being, as distinct from <em>quantity<\/em>, to be considered next, which is likewise a determinacy of being, but no longer immediately identical with it; rather a determinacy indifferent to being and external to it. &#8211; Something is what it is through its quality, and when it loses its quality it thereby ceases to be what it is. Further, quality is essentially only a category of the finite, which for that reason also has its proper place only in nature and not in the spiritual world. Thus, for example, in nature the so-called simple substances, oxygen, nitrogen and so on, are to be regarded as existing qualities. In the sphere of spirit, on the other hand, quality occurs only in a subordinate way and not as though some determinate shape of spirit were exhausted by it. If we consider, for example, subjective spirit, which forms the object of psychology, we can indeed say that the logical meaning of what is called <em>character<\/em> is that of quality; but this is not to be understood as though character were a determinacy pervading the soul and immediately identical with it in the same way as is the case in nature with the simple substances mentioned before. On the other hand, quality as such also shows itself more determinately in spirit insofar as spirit is in an unfree, diseased condition. This is the case especially with the condition of passion and of passion intensified to madness. Of a madman whose consciousness is wholly pervaded by jealousy, fear and so on, one can fittingly say that his consciousness is determined as quality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-91\">\u00a7 91<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Quality, as <em>existent<\/em> determinacy over against the <em>negation<\/em> contained in it but distinguished from it, is <em>reality<\/em>. Negation, no longer abstract nothing but as an existence and <em>something<\/em>, is only form in this; it is as <em>otherness<\/em>. Quality, since this otherness is its own determination but is at first distinguished from it, is <em>being-for-other<\/em> &#8211; a breadth of existence, of the something. The <em>being<\/em> of quality as such, over against this relation to other, is <em>being-in-itself<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>The foundation of all determinacy is negation (<em>omnis determinatio est negatio<\/em>, as Spinoza says). Thoughtless opinion regards determinate things as merely positive and holds them fast under the form of being. But mere being does not settle the matter, for it is, as we saw earlier, what is utterly empty and at the same time without hold. (Incidentally, in the confusion mentioned here of existence, as determinate being, with abstract being there lies the correct point that in existence the moment of negation is indeed contained, as it were, only as still enveloped, which moment of negation then only emerges freely and comes into its right in being-for-itself. &#8211; If we now further consider existence as existent determinacy, we have in it what is understood by <em>reality<\/em>. Thus one speaks, for example, of the reality of a plan or an intention and then understands by it that such a thing is no longer merely something inner, subjective, but has stepped out into existence. In the same sense the body can then also be called the reality of the soul, and right the reality of freedom, or, quite generally, the world the reality of the divine concept. But further, reality is also usually spoken of in another sense, by which is understood that something behaves in accordance with its essential determination or its concept. So, for example, when it is said: this is a real occupation, or: this is a real human being. Here it is not immediate, external existence that is at issue, but rather the agreement of something existent with its concept. Understood in this way, however, reality is then no longer distinguished from ideality, which we shall first get to know as being-for-itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-92\">\u00a7 92<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b2) Being held fast as distinct from determinacy, <em>being-in-itself<\/em>, would be only the empty abstraction of being. In existence determinacy is one with being, and determinacy, posited at the same time as negation, is <em>limit<\/em>, <em>boundary<\/em>. Hence otherness is not something indifferent outside it but its own moment. <em>Something<\/em> is, through its quality, first <em>finite<\/em> and second <em>alterable<\/em>, so that finitude and alterability belong to its being.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>Negation is in existence still immediately identical with being, and this negation is what we call <em>limit<\/em>. Something is what it is only <em>in<\/em> its limit and <em>through<\/em> its limit. One must therefore not regard the limit as merely external to existence; rather it goes through the whole of existence. The conception of the limit as a merely external determination of existence has its ground in the confusion of quantitative with qualitative limit. Here it is first the qualitative limit that is at issue. If we consider, for example, a piece of land three acres in size, this is its quantitative limit. But further this piece of land is also a meadow and not forest or pond, and this is its qualitative limit. &#8211; The human being, insofar as he wants to be actual, must exist, and to that end he must limit himself. Whoever is too fastidious towards the finite comes to no actuality at all, but remains in the abstract and smoulders away within himself. If we now consider more closely what we have in the limit, we find that it contains a contradiction within itself and thus proves to be dialectical. For the limit on the one hand constitutes the reality of existence, and on the other hand it is its negation. But further, the limit, as the negation of the something, is not an abstract nothing in general but an existent nothing, or what we call an other. With something the other at once occurs to us, and we know that there is not only something but also other. But the other is not such that we merely find it, so that something could also be thought without it; rather something is <em>in<\/em> itself the other of itself, and in the other its limit becomes objective to the something. If we now ask about the distinction between the something and the other, it turns out that both are the same, which identity is also expressed in Latin by designating both as <em>aliud-aliud<\/em>. The other, over against the something, is itself a something, and accordingly we say: <em>something<\/em> other; likewise on the other hand the first something, over against the other likewise determined as something, is itself an other. When we say: <em>something<\/em> other, we at first represent that something, taken for itself, is only something, and that the determination of being an other belongs to it only through a merely external consideration. We think, for example, that the moon, which is something other than the sun, could well exist even if the sun did not. But in fact the moon (as something) has its other in itself, and this constitutes its finitude. Plato says: &#8220;God made the world out of the nature of the one and of the other (\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5<!--\u0342--> \u03b5\u0314\u03c4\u03b5\u03f1\u03bf\u03c5<!--\u0342-->); these he brought together and formed from them a third, which is of the nature of the one and of the other.&#8221; &#8211; This expresses in general the nature of the finite, which as something does not stand indifferently over against the other but is in itself the other of itself and thereby alters. In alteration the inner contradiction shows itself with which existence is afflicted from the outset and which drives it beyond itself. To representation existence at first appears as simply positive and at the same time as quietly persisting within its limit; we then also know, to be sure, that everything finite (and existence is such) is subject to alteration. But this alterability of existence appears to representation as a mere possibility whose realization is not grounded in existence itself. In fact, however, it lies in the concept of existence to alter, and alteration is only the manifestation of what existence is in itself. The living dies, and indeed simply because, as such, it carries the seed of death within itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-93\">\u00a7 93<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Something becomes an other, but the other is itself a something, so it likewise becomes an other, and so on to <em>infinity<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-94\">\u00a7 94<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This <em>infinity<\/em> is <em>bad<\/em> or <em>negative<\/em> infinity, since it is nothing but the negation of the finite, which, however, arises again just as much and is thus just as much not sublated &#8211; or this infinity expresses only the <em>ought<\/em> of sublating the finite. The progress to infinity stops at expressing the contradiction which the finite contains, that it is both <em>something<\/em> and its <em>other<\/em>, and is the perennial continuation of the alternation of these determinations that bring each other on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>If we let the moments of existence, something and other, fall apart, we have this: something becomes an other, and this other is itself a something, which as such then likewise alters, and so on to infinity. Reflection here thinks it has arrived at something very high, indeed at the highest. But this progress to infinity is not the truly infinite, which rather consists in being with itself in its other or, expressed as process, in coming to itself in its other. It is of great importance to grasp the concept of true infinity properly and not merely to stop at the bad infinity of the infinite progress. When the infinity of space and time is spoken of, it is first the infinite progress that one usually holds to. Thus one says, for example: &#8220;<em>this time<\/em>&#8220;, &#8220;<em>now<\/em>&#8220;, and this limit is then continually gone beyond, backwards and forwards. It is the same with space, about whose infinity edifying astronomers bring forward much empty declamation. It is then usually also asserted that thinking must succumb when it undertakes the consideration of this infinity. This much is indeed correct: that we finally give up advancing further and further in such consideration, not, however, because of the sublimity but because of the tediousness of this business. Losing oneself in the consideration of this infinite progress is tedious because the same thing is continually repeated here. A limit is posited, it is gone beyond, then again a limit, and so on endlessly. We thus have here nothing but a superficial alternation that always remains in the finite. If one thinks one frees oneself from the finite by striding out into that infinity, this is in fact only the liberation of flight. But the one who flees is not yet free, for in fleeing he is still conditioned by what he flees from. If one then further says that the infinite cannot be reached, this is quite correct, but only because the determination of being something abstractly negative is put into it. Philosophy does not knock about with such empty and merely otherworldly things. What philosophy has to do with is always something concrete and utterly present. &#8211; The task of philosophy has also been posed in such a way that it has to answer the question how the infinite resolves to go out of itself. To this question, which rests on the presupposition of a fixed opposition between infinite and finite, the only answer is that this opposition is something untrue and that the infinite is in fact eternally out of itself and eternally also not out of itself. &#8211; Incidentally, when we say that the infinite is the <em>non<\/em>-finite, we have in fact already expressed the truth, for the non-finite, since the finite itself is the first negative, is the negative of negation, negation identical with itself and thus at the same time true affirmation. The infinity of reflection discussed here is only the attempt to reach true infinity, an unhappy half-way house. It is in general that standpoint of philosophy which has been asserted in recent times in Germany. The finite <em>ought<\/em> here only to be sublated, and the infinite ought to be not merely a negative but also a positive. In this ought there always lies the impotence that something is recognized as justified and yet is unable to assert itself. The Kantian and the Fichtean philosophy, with regard to the ethical, stopped at this standpoint of the ought. Perennial approximation to the law of reason is the utmost one reaches in this way. The immortality of the soul has then also been grounded on this postulate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-95\">\u00a7 95<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/7\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 7<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b3) What is in fact present is that something becomes other, and the other in general becomes other. Something, in relation to an other, is itself already an other with respect to it; thus, since that into which it passes over is entirely the same as that which passes over &#8211; both have no further determination than one and the same, to be an <em>other<\/em> -, something in its passing over into other only <em>comes together with itself<\/em>, and this relation to itself in passing over and in the other is <em>true infinity<\/em>. Or, considered negatively: what is altered is the <em>other<\/em>; it becomes the <em>other<\/em> of the <em>other<\/em>. Thus being is restored, but as negation of negation, and is <em>being-for-itself<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The dualism that makes the opposition of finite and infinite insuperable does not make the simple observation that in this way the infinite is at once only <em>one of the two<\/em>, that it is thereby made into something merely <em>particular<\/em>, to which the finite is the other particular. Such an infinite, which is only a particular, which is <em>beside<\/em> the finite and has its boundary, its limit, precisely in it, is <em>not<\/em> what it ought to be, not the infinite, but is only <em>finite<\/em>. &#8211; In such a relationship, where the finite is placed <em>on this side<\/em> and the infinite <em>over there<\/em>, the first <em>here<\/em>, the other <em>beyond<\/em>, the finite is ascribed the <em>same dignity<\/em> of <em>subsistence<\/em> and <em>independence<\/em> as the infinite; the being of the finite is made into an absolute being; in such dualism it stands firm for itself. Touched, so to speak, by the infinite, it would be annihilated; but it is supposed not to be able to be touched by the infinite; an abyss, an unbridgeable gulf is supposed to lie between the two, the infinite utterly over there and the finite <em>persisting<\/em> here. Since the assertion of the firm persistence of the finite over against the infinite thinks it is beyond all metaphysics, it stands wholly on the ground of the most ordinary metaphysics of the understanding. The same happens here as is expressed by the infinite progress: at one time it is granted that the finite <em>is not in and for itself<\/em>, that <em>no<\/em> independent actuality, no <em>absolute<\/em> being belongs to it, that it is only something passing; at <em>another time<\/em> this is at once forgotten and the finite is represented only over against the infinite, utterly separated from it and exempt from annihilation, as independent, persisting for itself. &#8211; When thinking in this way believes it is raising itself to the infinite, the opposite happens to it &#8211; it comes to an infinite that is only a finite, and rather always retains the finite it had left, makes it into an absolute. If, after the consideration undertaken of the nullity of the understanding&#8217;s opposition of finite and infinite (with which Plato&#8217;s <em>Philebus<\/em> can usefully be compared), one may easily fall here too into the expression that the infinite and the finite are thereby <em>one<\/em>, that the true, true infinity, is determined and stated as the <em>unity<\/em> of the infinite and the finite, such an expression does contain something correct, but it is just as skewed and false as was noted before about the <em>unity<\/em> of being and nothing. It further leads to the justified reproach of the finitization of infinity, of a finite infinite. For in that expression the finite appears as left as it is; it is not expressly stated as <em>sublated<\/em>. &#8211; Or, if one reflected that the finite, posited as one with the infinite, could certainly not remain what it was outside this unity and would at least suffer something in its determination (as potash combined with acid loses some of its properties), the same would happen to the infinite, which, as the negative, would for its part likewise be blunted by the other. In fact this does happen to the abstract, one-sided infinite of the understanding. But the true infinite does not behave merely like the one-sided acid; rather it preserves itself; the negation of negation is not a neutralization; the infinite is the affirmative, and only the finite is what is sublated. In being-for-itself the determination of <em>ideality<\/em> has entered. <em>Existence<\/em>, grasped at first only according to its being or its affirmation, has <em>reality<\/em> (\u00a7 91); thus finitude too is at first in the determination of reality. But the truth of the finite is rather its <em>ideality<\/em>. Equally the infinite of the understanding, which, placed <em>beside<\/em> the finite, is itself only one of the two finites, is something untrue, something <em>ideal<\/em>. This ideality of the finite is the main proposition of philosophy, and every true philosophy is therefore <em>idealism<\/em>. Everything depends solely on not taking for the infinite what in its very determination is at once made into something particular and finite. &#8211; Attention has therefore been drawn to this distinction at greater length here; the basic concept of philosophy, the true infinite, depends on it. This distinction is settled by the quite simple, therefore perhaps unimpressive, but irrefutable reflections contained in the \u00a7.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">29) cf. <em class=\"qua\">Timaeus, Steph. 34 f.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Doctrine of Being \u2192 A. Quality \u2192 c. Being-for-itself<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-96\">\u00a7 96<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b1) Being-for-itself, as relation to itself, is <em>immediacy<\/em>, and as relation of the negative to itself it is something being-for-itself, the <em>one<\/em> &#8211; what is without distinction within itself, and thus <em>excludes<\/em> the <em>other<\/em> from itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>Being-for-itself is completed quality and as such contains within itself being and existence as its ideal moments. As <em>being<\/em>, being-for-itself is simple relation to itself, and as <em>existence<\/em> it is determined; but this determinacy is then no longer the finite determinacy of the something in its distinction from the other, but the infinite determinacy that contains distinction within itself as sublated. We have the nearest example of being-for-itself in the <em>I<\/em>. We know ourselves as existing, at first distinguished from other existing things and related to them. But further we also know this breadth of existence as brought to a point, as it were, in the simple form of being-for-itself. When we say: <em>I<\/em>, this is the expression of infinite and at the same time negative relation to itself. One can say that the human being distinguishes himself from the animal, and thus from nature in general, by knowing himself as I, whereby it is at the same time expressed that natural things do not attain free being-for-itself but, being confined to existence, are always only being-for-other. &#8211; Further, being-for-itself is in general to be grasped as <em>ideality<\/em>, whereas existence was earlier designated as <em>reality<\/em>. <em>Reality<\/em> and <em>ideality<\/em> are often regarded as a pair of determinations standing over against each other with equal independence, and accordingly it is said that besides reality there is <em>also<\/em> an ideality. But ideality is not something that exists outside and beside reality; rather the concept of ideality expressly consists in being the <em>truth<\/em> of reality, that is, reality posited as what it is in itself proves itself to be ideality. One must therefore not believe one has paid ideality the necessary honour if one merely concedes that reality does not settle the matter, but that besides it one must also recognize an ideality. Such an ideality, beside or even above reality, would in fact be only an empty name. Ideality has a content only insofar as it is the ideality of something; but this something is then not merely an indeterminate this or that, but existence determined as reality, to which, held fast for itself, no truth belongs. It has not wrongly been held that the distinction of nature and spirit is to be grasped in such a way that the former is to be traced back to reality and the latter to ideality as their basic determination. But nature is precisely not something fixed and finished for itself, which could therefore subsist even without spirit; rather it reaches its goal and its truth only in spirit; and likewise spirit for its part is not merely an abstract beyond of nature; rather it truly <em>is<\/em>, and proves itself, as spirit only insofar as it contains nature within itself as sublated. Here the double meaning of our German expression <em>aufheben<\/em> [to sublate] must be recalled. By aufheben we understand on the one hand as much as to clear away, to negate, and accordingly we say, for example, that a law, an institution and so on have been aufgehoben [abolished]. But further aufheben also means as much as to <em>keep<\/em>, and we speak in this sense of something being well aufgehoben [kept safe]. This double sense in linguistic usage, according to which the same word has a negative and a positive meaning, must not be regarded as accidental, nor even reproached against language as giving occasion to confusion; rather it is to be recognized as the speculative spirit of our language, which strides beyond the mere either-or of the understanding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-97\">\u00a7 97<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b2) The relation of the negative to itself is <em>negative<\/em> relation, thus the distinguishing of the one from itself, the <em>repulsion<\/em> of the one, that is, the positing of <em>many ones<\/em>. According to the <em>immediacy<\/em> of what is for itself, these many are <em>things that are<\/em>, and the repulsion of the ones that are becomes to that extent their repulsion <em>against one another<\/em> as present things, or mutual <em>exclusion<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>When the one is spoken of, the <em>many<\/em> usually occur to us first. Here the question then arises where the many come from. In representation there is no answer to this question, since it regards the many as immediately present and the one counts precisely only as one among the many. According to the concept, on the other hand, the one forms the presupposition of the many, and it lies in the thought of the one to posit itself as the many. For the one that is for itself is as such not something relationless like being, but is relation just as much as existence is; but it does not relate itself as something to an other; rather, as unity of the something and the other, it is relation to itself, and indeed this relation is negative relation. The one thereby proves to be what is utterly incompatible with itself, what repels itself from [itself], and what it posits itself as is the <em>many<\/em>. We can designate this side in the process of being-for-itself with the figurative expression <em>repulsion<\/em>. One speaks of repulsion first in considering matter and understands by it precisely this, that matter as a many behaves, in each of these many ones, as excluding towards all the others. Incidentally, one must not conceive the process of repulsion as though the one were what <em>repels<\/em> and the many what is <em>repelled<\/em>; rather the one, as was noted before, is precisely only this: to exclude itself from itself and to posit itself as the many; but each of the many is itself one, and since it behaves as such, this all-round repulsion thereby turns over into its opposite &#8211; <em>attraction<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-98\">\u00a7 98<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b3) But the <em>many<\/em> are the one what the other is; each is one, or also one of the many; they are therefore one and the same. Or, if repulsion is considered in itself, then, as negative <em>behaviour<\/em> of the many ones towards one another, it is just as essentially their <em>relation<\/em> to one another; and since those to which the one relates itself in its repelling are ones, it relates itself in them to itself. Repulsion is therefore just as essentially <em>attraction<\/em>; and the excluding one, or being-for-itself, sublates itself. Qualitative determinacy, which in the one has reached its being-determined-in-and-for-itself, has thereby passed over into determinacy <em>as sublated<\/em>, that is, into being as <em>quantity<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Atomistic<\/em> philosophy is this standpoint, at which the absolute determines itself as being-for-itself, as one, and as many ones. The repulsion that shows itself in the concept of the one has also been assumed as its basic force; but not attraction; rather <em>chance<\/em>, that is, what is thoughtless, is supposed to bring the ones together. Since the one is fixed as one, its coming together with others is indeed to be regarded as something wholly external. &#8211; The <em>void<\/em>, which is assumed as the other principle beside the atoms, is repulsion itself, represented as the <em>existent<\/em> nothing between the atoms. &#8211; Modern atomism &#8211; and physics still retains this principle &#8211; has given up the atoms insofar as it holds to small particles, molecules; it has thereby brought itself closer to sensuous representation but abandoned the thinking determination. &#8211; Further, since an attractive force is set beside the repulsive force, the opposition is indeed made <em>complete<\/em>, and much has been made of the discovery of this so-called force of nature. But the relation of the two to each other, which constitutes what is concrete and true in them, would have to be torn out of the murky confusion in which it is still left even in Kant&#8217;s <em>Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science<\/em>. &#8211; Even more important than in the physical sphere, the atomistic view has become in recent times in the <em>political<\/em> sphere. According to it the will of the <em>single individuals<\/em> as such is the principle of the state; what attracts is the particularity of needs and inclinations, and the universal, the state itself, is the external relationship of contract.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 1. <\/em>Atomistic philosophy forms an essential stage in the historical development of the idea, and the principle of this philosophy is in general being-for-itself in the shape of the many. If atomism still stands in great favour today among those natural scientists who want to know nothing of metaphysics, it must be recalled here that one does not escape metaphysics, and more precisely the reduction of nature to thoughts, by throwing oneself into the arms of atomism, since the atom is in fact itself a thought and the conception of matter as consisting of atoms is thus a metaphysical conception. Newton did indeed expressly warn physics to beware of metaphysics; to his honour, however, it must be noted that he himself by no means acted in accordance with this warning. Pure, mere physicists are in fact only the animals, since they do not think, whereas the human being, as a thinking being, is a born metaphysician. What matters then is only whether the metaphysics one applies is of the right kind, and in particular whether, instead of the concrete logical idea, it is one-sided determinations of thought fixed by the understanding that one holds to and that form the foundation of our theoretical as well as our practical activity. It is this reproach that strikes atomistic philosophy. The ancient atomists regarded everything (as is still often the case today) as a many, and chance was then supposed to be what brings together the atoms floating about in the void. But the relation of the many to one another is by no means merely contingent; rather this relation (as was noted before) is grounded in them themselves. It is Kant to whom the merit is due of having completed the conception of matter by regarding it as the unity of repulsion and attraction. The correct point in this is that attraction is indeed to be recognized as the other moment contained in the concept of being-for-itself, and that attraction therefore belongs to matter just as essentially as repulsion. But this so-called dynamic construction of matter suffers from the defect that repulsion and attraction are simply postulated as present and not deduced, and from such a deduction the how and why of their merely asserted unity would also have followed. Incidentally, while Kant expressly insisted that matter must not be regarded as present for itself and then (as it were incidentally) equipped with the two forces mentioned here, but as consisting solely in their unity, and German physicists for a time accepted this pure dynamics, the majority of these physicists have in recent times again found it more convenient to return to the atomistic standpoint and, against the warning of their colleague, the late K\u00e4stner, to regard matter as consisting of infinitely small little things called atoms, which atoms are then supposed to be brought into relation with one another through the play of the attractive, repulsive or other arbitrary forces attached to them. This too is a metaphysics, and there would indeed be sufficient reason to beware of it because of its thoughtlessness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 2. <\/em>The transition of quality into quantity stated in the preceding \u00a7 is not found in our ordinary consciousness. To it quality and quantity count as a pair of determinations subsisting independently side by side, and accordingly it is said that things are determined not only qualitatively but <em>also<\/em> quantitatively. Where these determinations come from and how they relate to each other is not asked about further here. But quantity is nothing other than sublated quality, and it is the dialectic of quality considered here by which this sublation comes about. We first had <em>being<\/em>, and becoming emerged as its truth; this formed the transition to existence, whose truth we recognized as alteration. But alteration showed itself in its result as being-for-itself, withdrawn from relation to other and from passing over into it, which being-for-itself then finally, in the two sides of its process, repulsion and attraction, proved to be the sublation of itself and thus of quality in general, in the totality of its moments. This sublated quality, however, is neither an abstract nothing nor equally abstract and undetermined being, but only being that is indifferent to determinacy, and it is this shape of being that also occurs in our ordinary representation as <em>quantity<\/em>. Accordingly we first consider things from the point of view of their quality, and this counts for us as the determinacy identical with the being of the thing. If we then go on to consider quantity, it at once gives us the representation of indifferent, external determinacy, in such a way that a thing, although its quantity changes and it becomes larger or smaller, nevertheless remains what it is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">30) Abraham Gotthelf K\u00e4stner, 1719-1800, mathematician and philosopher<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Doctrine of Being \u2192 B. Quantity \u2192 a. Pure Quantity<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-99\">\u00a7 99<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Quantity<\/em> is pure being in which determinacy is no longer posited as one with being itself, but as <em>sublated<\/em> or <em>indifferent<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">1. The expression <em>magnitude<\/em> is not suitable for quantity insofar as it chiefly designates <em>determinate<\/em> quantity. 2. Mathematics usually defines magnitude as what can be <em>increased<\/em> or <em>diminished<\/em>; however faulty this definition is, since it contains the definiendum itself again, it nevertheless implies that the determination of magnitude is one that is posited as <em>alterable<\/em> and <em>indifferent<\/em>, so that, notwithstanding an alteration of it, an increased extension or intension, the thing, for example a house, red, does not cease to be a house, red. 3. The absolute is pure quantity &#8211; this standpoint coincides in general with giving the absolute the determination of <em>matter<\/em>, in which form is indeed present but is an indifferent determination. Quantity also constitutes the basic determination of the absolute when it is grasped in such a way that in it, the absolutely indifferent, all distinction is only quantitative. &#8211; Otherwise pure space, time and so on can be taken as examples of quantity, insofar as the real is supposed to be grasped as <em>indifferent<\/em> filling of space or time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>The definition of magnitude usual in mathematics, as what can be increased or diminished, seems at first sight more illuminating and plausible than the determination of the concept contained in the preceding \u00a7. Looked at more closely, however, it contains, in the form of presupposition and representation, the same thing that has resulted as the concept of quantity only by way of logical development. For when it is said of magnitude that its concept consists in its being able to be increased or diminished, it is precisely thereby expressed that magnitude (or more correctly quantity) &#8211; as distinct from quality &#8211; is a determination towards whose alteration the determinate thing behaves as indifferent. As regards the defect of the usual definition of quantity criticized above, it consists more precisely in the fact that increasing and diminishing mean precisely only determining the magnitude otherwise. Quantity would thereby at first be only something alterable in general. But quality too is alterable, and the distinction of quantity from quality mentioned before is then expressed by the increasing <em>or<\/em> diminishing, which implies that in whatever direction the determination of magnitude may be altered, the thing nevertheless remains what it is. &#8211; It must further be noted here that in philosophy what matters is not at all merely correct definitions, and still less merely plausible ones, that is, definitions whose correctness is immediately evident to representing consciousness, but rather <em>proven<\/em> ones, that is, definitions whose content is not merely taken up as something found but is recognized as grounded in free thinking and thus at the same time in itself. This applies to the present case in such a way that, however correct and immediately evident the definition of quantity usual in mathematics may be, this would still not satisfy the demand to know to what extent this particular thought is grounded in universal thinking and is thereby necessary. To this is then connected the further consideration that, when quantity is taken up immediately from representation without being mediated by thinking, it very easily happens that it is overestimated with regard to the range of its validity, and even raised to an absolute category. This is in fact the case when only those sciences whose objects can be subjected to mathematical calculation are recognized as <em>exact<\/em> sciences. Here that bad metaphysics mentioned earlier (\u00a7 98 Addition) shows itself again, which puts one-sided and abstract determinations of the understanding in the place of the concrete idea. It would indeed be a sorry state of our cognition if, with regard to such objects as freedom, right, ethical life, indeed God himself, because they cannot be measured and calculated or expressed in a mathematical formula, we had to renounce exact cognition and content ourselves in general merely with an indeterminate representation, and then, as regards their closer or particular aspects, it were left to the discretion of each individual to make of them what he wants. &#8211; What practically pernicious consequences follow from such a view is immediately evident. Considered more closely, moreover, the exclusively mathematical standpoint mentioned here, at which quantity, this determinate stage of the logical idea, is identified with the idea itself, is no other standpoint than that of <em>materialism<\/em>, as indeed this finds its full confirmation in the history of scientific consciousness, especially in France since the middle of the last century. What is abstract in matter is precisely this: form is indeed present in it, but only as an indifferent and external determination. &#8211; Incidentally, one would greatly misunderstand the discussion undertaken here if one wanted to take it as though the dignity of mathematics were thereby infringed, or as though, by designating quantitative determination as a merely external and indifferent determination, a good conscience were to be given to sloth and superficiality and it were to be asserted that one can let quantitative determinations rest or at least need not take them so precisely. Quantity is in any case a stage of the idea which as such must also receive its due, first as a logical category and then further also in the objective world, in the natural as well as the spiritual. But here the distinction also shows itself at once that the determination of magnitude is not of equal importance with objects of the natural world and with objects of the spiritual world. For in nature, as the idea in the form of otherness and at the same time of being-outside-itself, quantity has for that very reason a greater importance than in the world of spirit, this world of free inwardness. We do indeed also consider spiritual content from the quantitative point of view, but it is at once evident that when we consider God as the triune, the number <em>three<\/em> has a much more subordinate meaning here than when we consider, for example, the three dimensions of space or even the three sides of a triangle, whose basic determination is precisely only to be a surface bounded by three lines. Further, the distinction mentioned of greater and lesser importance of quantitative determination is also found within nature, and indeed in such a way that in inorganic nature quantity plays, so to speak, a more important role than in organic nature. If we then further distinguish, within inorganic nature, the mechanical domain from the physical and chemical in the narrower sense, the same distinction shows itself here again, and mechanics is admittedly the scientific discipline in which the help of mathematics can least be dispensed with, indeed in which hardly a step can be taken without it, and which for that reason is usually regarded, next to mathematics itself, as the exact science par excellence, in connection with which the above remark about the coincidence of the materialistic and the exclusively mathematical standpoint is again to be recalled. &#8211; Incidentally, after everything that has been set out here, it must be called one of the most disturbing prejudices precisely for exact and thorough cognition when, as often happens, all distinction and all determinacy of what is objective is sought merely in the quantitative. Spirit is indeed, for example, more than nature, the animal more than the plant; but one also knows very little of these objects and their distinction if one merely stops at such a more or less and does not advance to grasping them in their peculiar, here first qualitative, determinacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-100\">\u00a7 100<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Quantity, at first in its immediate relation to itself or in the determination of equality with itself posited by attraction, is <em>continuous<\/em>; in the other determination contained in it, that of the <em>one<\/em>, it is <em>discrete<\/em> magnitude. But the former quantity is just as much discrete, for it is only continuity of the <em>many<\/em>; the latter just as much continuous, [for] its continuity is the one as the <em>same<\/em> of the many ones, <em>unity<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">1. Continuous and discrete magnitude must therefore not be regarded as <em>species<\/em> in the sense that the determination of the one does not belong to the other; rather they are distinguished only in that <em>the same whole<\/em> is posited at one time under the one, at another under the other of its determinations. 2. The antinomy of space, time or matter, with regard to their divisibility to infinity or else their consisting of indivisibles, is nothing other than the assertion of quantity at one time as continuous, at another as discrete. If space, time and so on are posited only with the determination of continuous quantity, they are <em>divisible<\/em> to <em>infinity<\/em>; but with the determination of discrete magnitude they are <em>divided<\/em> in themselves and consist of indivisible ones; the one is as one-sided as the other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>Quantity, as the next result of being-for-itself, contains the two sides of its process, repulsion and attraction, within itself as ideal moments and is accordingly both continuous and discrete. Each of these two moments also contains the other within itself, and there <em>is<\/em> therefore neither a merely continuous nor a merely discrete magnitude. If nevertheless both are spoken of as two particular kinds of magnitude standing over against each other, this is merely the result of our abstracting reflection, which in considering determinate magnitudes looks away at one time from the one and at another from the other of the moments contained in inseparable unity in the concept of quantity. Thus one says, for example, that the space this room occupies is a continuous magnitude, and these hundred people assembled in it form a discrete magnitude. But space is continuous and discrete at the same time, and accordingly we speak of points of space and also divide space, for example a certain length into so-and-so many feet, inches and so on, which can only happen on the presupposition that space is <em>in itself<\/em> also discrete. Likewise, on the other hand, the discrete magnitude consisting of a hundred people is at the same time continuous, and what is common to them, the genus human being, which runs through all the individuals and connects them with one another, is that in which the continuity of this magnitude is grounded.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Doctrine of Being \u2192 B. Quantity \u2192 b. Quantum<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-101\">\u00a7 101<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Quantity essentially <em>posited<\/em> with the excluding determinacy contained in it is <em>quantum<\/em>; limited quantity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>Quantum is the <em>existence<\/em> of quantity, whereas pure quantity corresponds to being and degree (to be considered next) to <em>being-for-itself<\/em>. &#8211; As regards the details of the advance from pure quantity to quantum, it is grounded in this: while in pure quantity the distinction, as distinction of continuity and discreteness, is at first present only in itself, in quantum the distinction is posited, and indeed in such a way that quantity in general now appears as distinguished or limited. But thereby quantum at the same time falls apart into an indeterminate multitude of quanta or determinate magnitudes. Each of these determinate magnitudes, as distinguished from the other, forms a unity, just as, on the other hand, considered by itself alone, it is a many. In this way, however, quantum is determined as <em>number<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-102\">\u00a7 102<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Quantum has its development and complete determinacy in <em>number<\/em>, which contains within itself, as its element, the one, and as its qualitative moments, according to the moment of discreteness, <em>amount<\/em>, and according to that of continuity, <em>unit<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In arithmetic the <em>operations of calculation<\/em> are usually presented as contingent ways of treating numbers. If there is to be a necessity and thus an understanding in them, it must lie in a principle, and this can only lie in the determinations contained in the concept of number itself; this principle shall be briefly shown here. &#8211; The determinations of the concept of number are <em>amount<\/em> and <em>unit<\/em>, and number itself is the unity of the two. But unity, applied to empirical numbers, is only their <em>equality<\/em>; so the principle of the operations of calculation must be to put numbers into the relationship of unit and amount and to bring about the equality of these determinations. Since the ones, or the numbers themselves, are indifferent to one another, the unity into which they are put appears in general as an external combining. Calculating is therefore in general <em>counting<\/em>, and the distinction of the <em>kinds<\/em> of calculating lies solely in the qualitative character of the numbers that are counted together, and for this character the determination of unit and amount is the principle. <em>Numbering<\/em> is the first: making number <em>in general<\/em>, a combining of any number of <em>ones<\/em>. &#8211; But a <em>kind<\/em> of calculation is the counting together of those that are already numbers, no longer the mere one. Numbers are <em>immediately<\/em> and <em>first<\/em> wholly undetermined numbers in general, therefore unequal in general; the combining or counting of such numbers is <em>adding<\/em>. The <em>next<\/em> determination is that the numbers are <em>equal<\/em> in general; thereby they constitute <em>a unit<\/em>, and there is an <em>amount<\/em> of them; to count such numbers is <em>multiplying<\/em> &#8211; in which it is indifferent how the determinations of amount and unit are distributed to the two numbers, the factors, which is taken for the amount and which for the unit. The <em>third<\/em> determinacy is finally the <em>equality<\/em> of <em>amount<\/em> and <em>unit<\/em>. The counting together of numbers so determined is <em>raising to a power<\/em> &#8211; and first to the <em>square<\/em>. &#8211; Further raising to powers is the formal continuation, running out again into an indeterminate amount, of multiplying the number by itself. &#8211; Since in this third determination the complete equality of the only distinction present, amount and unit, is reached, there cannot be more than these three kinds of calculation. &#8211; To counting together corresponds the resolving of numbers according to the same determinacies. Besides the three kinds mentioned, which can to that extent be called the <em>positive<\/em> ones, there are therefore also three <em>negative<\/em> ones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>Since number is in general quantum in its complete determinacy, we use it to determine not only so-called discrete but likewise so-called continuous magnitudes. Number must therefore also be called upon in geometry, where it is a matter of stating determinate figurations of space and their relationships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Doctrine of Being \u2192 B. Quantity \u2192 c. Degree<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-103\">\u00a7 103<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>limit<\/em> is identical with the whole of the quantum itself; as manifold <em>within itself<\/em> it is <em>extensive<\/em> magnitude, but as determinacy <em>simple<\/em> within itself it is <em>intensive<\/em> magnitude or <em>degree<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The distinction of continuous and discrete magnitudes from extensive and intensive ones consists in this, that the former concern <em>quantity in general<\/em>, while the latter concern its <em>limit<\/em> or determinacy as such. &#8211; Likewise extensive and intensive magnitude are not two species either, each of which would contain a determinacy that the other did not have; what is extensive magnitude is just as much intensive, and vice versa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em><em>Intensive magnitude<\/em> or <em>degree<\/em> is in its concept different from <em>extensive magnitude<\/em> or <em>quantum<\/em>, and it must therefore be called inadmissible when, as often happens, this distinction is not recognized and the two forms of magnitude are simply identified. This is the case especially in physics, when, for example, the difference in specific gravity is explained by saying that a body whose specific gravity is twice as great as that of another contains within the same space twice as many material parts (atoms) as the other. It is the same with heat and with light, when the various degrees of temperature and brightness are supposed to be explained by a more or less of particles (or molecules) of heat or light. The physicists who use such explanations do, to be sure, usually excuse themselves, when their inadmissibility is pointed out to them, by saying that nothing at all is thereby to be decided about the (admittedly unknowable) in-itself of such phenomena, and that the expressions mentioned are used only for the sake of greater <em>convenience<\/em>. As regards first the greater convenience, it is supposed to relate to the easier application of calculation; but it is not evident why intensive magnitudes, which after all likewise have their determinate expression in number, should not be just as convenient to calculate as extensive magnitudes. It would of course be even more convenient to dispense altogether with calculating as well as with thinking itself. Against the excuse mentioned it must further be noted that, in engaging in explanations of this kind, one in any case oversteps the domain of perception and experience and enters the domain of metaphysics and of speculation (declared on other occasions to be idle, indeed pernicious). In experience it will indeed be found that, when of two purses filled with thalers the one is twice as heavy as the other, this is the case because one of these purses contains two hundred and the other only a hundred thalers. These coins can be seen and in general perceived with the senses; atoms, molecules and the like, on the other hand, lie outside the range of sensuous perception, and it is a matter for thinking to decide about their admissibility and significance. But (as was mentioned earlier, \u00a7 98 Addition) it is the abstract understanding that fixes the moment of the many contained in the concept of being-for-itself in the shape of atoms and holds it fast as something ultimate, and it is the same abstract understanding that in the present case, in contradiction as much with unprejudiced intuition as with true concrete thinking, regards extensive magnitude as the only form of quantity and, where intensive magnitudes are found, does not recognize them in their peculiar determinacy but endeavours, supported by a hypothesis without hold in itself, to reduce them forcibly to extensive magnitudes. If among the reproaches made against recent philosophy one has heard especially often that it reduces everything to identity, and it has then even been given the nickname of identity philosophy, it can be gathered from the discussion undertaken here that it is precisely philosophy that insists on distinguishing what is different both according to the concept and according to experience, whereas it is professional empiricists who raise abstract identity to the highest principle of cognition, and whose philosophy would therefore more fittingly be designated as identity philosophy. Incidentally, it is quite correct that, just as there are no merely continuous and merely discrete magnitudes, so there are no merely intensive and merely extensive magnitudes either, and that the two determinations of quantity therefore do not stand over against each other as independent species. Every intensive magnitude is also extensive, and it is likewise the other way round. Thus, for example, a certain degree of temperature is an intensive magnitude, to which as such a quite simple sensation also corresponds; if we then go to the thermometer, we find that a certain extension of the column of mercury corresponds to this degree of temperature, and this extensive magnitude changes together with the temperature as intensive magnitude. It is likewise in the domain of spirit; a more intensive character reaches further with its effect than a less intensive one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-104\">\u00a7 104<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In degree the <em>concept<\/em> of quantum is <em>posited<\/em>. It is magnitude as indifferent <em>for itself<\/em> and simple, but in such a way that it has the determinacy by which it is quantum utterly <em>outside it<\/em>, in other magnitudes. In this contradiction, that the indifferent limit <em>that is for itself<\/em> is absolute <em>externality<\/em>, the <em>infinite<\/em> quantitative <em>progress<\/em> is posited &#8211; an <em>immediacy<\/em> that immediately turns over into its opposite, into <em>being mediated<\/em> (going beyond the quantum just posited), and vice versa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Number<\/em> is thought, but thought as a being completely external to itself. It does not belong to intuition, because it is thought, but it is the thought that has the externality of intuition as its determination. &#8211; Quantum therefore <em>can<\/em> not only be increased or diminished to infinity; through its concept it is itself this <em>sending out<\/em> beyond itself. The infinite quantitative progress is likewise the thoughtless repetition of one and the same contradiction, which is quantum in general and, posited in its determinacy, degree. About the superfluousness of expressing this contradiction in the form of the infinite progress, <em>Zeno<\/em> rightly says in Aristotle: &#8220;it is the same to say something <em>once<\/em> and to say it <em>always<\/em>&#8220;.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 1. <\/em>If, according to the definition usual in mathematics mentioned earlier (\u00a7 99), magnitude is designated as what can be increased and diminished, and there is nothing to object to the correctness of the intuition underlying this, the question nevertheless remains first how we come to assume such a thing that can be <em>increased<\/em> or <em>diminished<\/em>. If, to answer this question, one wanted simply to appeal to experience, this would not suffice, because, apart from the fact that we would then have merely the representation and not the thought of magnitude, magnitude would prove to be merely a possibility (of being increased and diminished), and we would lack insight into the necessity of its behaving so. By way of our logical development, on the other hand, not only has quantity resulted as a stage of self-determining thinking, but it has also been shown that it lies in the <em>concept<\/em> of quantity to send itself utterly out beyond itself, and that we are therefore dealing here not merely with something possible but with something necessary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 2. <\/em>It is chiefly the quantitative infinite progress that the reflecting understanding usually holds to when it is concerned with infinity in general. But of this form of infinite progress the same first holds that was noted earlier about the qualitatively infinite progress, namely that it is not the expression of true infinity but only of that bad infinity which does not get beyond the mere <em>ought<\/em> and thus in fact remains in the finite. As regards more closely the quantitative form of this finite progress, which Spinoza rightly designates as a merely imagined infinity (<em>infinitum imaginationis<\/em>), poets too (especially Haller and Klopstock) have not infrequently used this representation in order to illustrate thereby not only the infinity of nature but also that of God himself. We find in Haller, for example, a famous description of the infinity of God, in which it says:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I heap up monstrous numbers, pile mountains of millions high, I set time upon time and world upon world in heaps, and when from the dreadful height I look again, dizzy, towards Thee: all the power of number, multiplied a thousandfold, is not yet a part of Thee.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here, then, we first have that constant sending out of quantity, and more precisely of number, beyond itself, which Kant designates as dreadful, in which, however, the really dreadful thing may only be the tediousness that a limit is constantly posited and sublated again, so that one does not get from the spot. But further the poet named aptly adds as conclusion to that description of bad infinity:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I take them away, and Thou liest whole before me &#8211;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">whereby it is precisely expressed that the truly infinite is not to be regarded as a mere beyond of the finite, and that, in order to attain consciousness of it, we have to renounce that <em>progressus in infinitum<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 3. <\/em>Pythagoras, as is well known, philosophized in numbers and grasped the basic determination of things as number. This conception must at first sight appear to ordinary consciousness as altogether paradoxical, even mad, and so the question arises what is to be thought of it. To answer this question, it must first be recalled that the task of philosophy in general consists in reducing things to thoughts, and indeed to determinate thoughts. But number is indeed a thought, and indeed the thought that stands closest to the sensuous, or, expressed more determinately, the thought of the sensuous itself, insofar as we understand by it in general being-outside-one-another and the many. We thus recognize in the attempt to grasp the universe as number the first step towards metaphysics. Pythagoras stands in the history of philosophy, as is well known, between the Ionian philosophers and the Eleatics. While the former, as Aristotle already notes, still stopped at regarding the essence of things as something material (als eine \u03c5\u0314\u0301\u03bb\u03b7), and the latter, and more precisely Parmenides, advanced to pure thinking in the form of being, it is the Pythagorean philosophy whose principle forms, as it were, the bridge between the sensuous and the supersensuous. From this it also follows what is to be thought of the view of those who think that Pythagoras obviously went too <em>far<\/em> in grasping the essence of things as mere numbers, and then remark that one can indeed count things, there is nothing to object to that, but that things are nevertheless <em>more<\/em> than mere numbers. As regards the <em>more<\/em> ascribed to things here, it is readily to be granted that things are more than mere numbers; only it depends on what is understood by this <em>more<\/em>. Common sensuous consciousness will, in keeping with its standpoint, not hesitate to answer the question raised here by referring to sensuous perceptibility and thus to remark that things are not merely countable but besides also visible, smellable, tangible and so on. The reproach made against Pythagorean philosophy would thus, expressed in our modern way, reduce to this, that it is too idealistic. But in fact it is precisely the other way round, as can already be gathered from what was noted before about the historical position of Pythagorean philosophy. For if it must be granted that things are <em>more<\/em> than mere numbers, this is to be understood in such a way that the mere thought of <em>number<\/em> is not yet sufficient to express the determinate essence or the concept of things. Instead of asserting, then, that Pythagoras went too far with his philosophy of numbers, it should rather conversely be said that he did not yet go <em>far enough<\/em>, and indeed it was already the Eleatics who took the next step towards pure thinking. &#8211; But further there are also, if not things, then states of things and natural phenomena in general whose determinacy rests essentially on determinate numbers and numerical relationships. This is the case especially with the difference of tones and their harmonious consonance, a phenomenon about which, as is well known, it is told that Pythagoras was first prompted by perceiving it to grasp the essence of things as number. Now although it is of decided scientific interest to trace back those appearances that are based on determinate numbers to these numbers, it is nevertheless in no way admissible to regard the determinacy of thought in general as merely numerical determinacy. One may indeed at first feel prompted to link the most universal determinations of thought to the first numbers and accordingly say that <em>one<\/em> is the simple and immediate, <em>two<\/em> distinction and mediation, and <em>three<\/em> the unity of these two. These connections are, however, wholly external, and it does not lie in the numbers named as such to be the expression of precisely these determinate thoughts. Incidentally, the further one advances in this way, the more the mere arbitrariness in connecting determinate numbers with determinate thoughts shows itself. Thus one can, for example, regard 4 as the unity of 1 and 3 and of the thoughts connected with them; but 4 is just as well the doubling of 2, and likewise 9 is not merely the square of 3 but also the sum of 8 and 1, of 7 and 2 and so on. If even today certain secret societies lay great weight on all sorts of numbers and figures, this is to be regarded on the one hand as a harmless game and on the other as a sign of clumsiness in thinking. It is then also said that there is a deep sense behind such things and that one can think a great deal in connection with them. In philosophy, however, what matters is not that one can <em>think<\/em> something in connection with it, but that one <em>actually<\/em> thinks, and the true element of thought is to be sought not in arbitrarily chosen symbols but only in thinking itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-105\">\u00a7 105<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This <em>being-external<\/em>-to-itself of quantum in its determinacy <em>that is for itself<\/em> constitutes its <em>quality<\/em>; in it, it is precisely itself and related to itself. Externality, that is, the quantitative, and being-for-itself, the qualitative, are united in it. &#8211; Quantum, so posited <em>in itself<\/em>, is the quantitative <em>ratio<\/em> &#8211; determinacy which is just as much an <em>immediate<\/em> quantum, the exponent, as <em>mediation<\/em>, namely the <em>relation<\/em> of some quantum to another &#8211; the two sides of the ratio, which at the same time do not count according to their immediate value, but whose value is only in this relation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>The quantitative infinite progress appears at first as a continual sending out of number beyond itself. Considered more closely, however, quantity proves in this progress to return to itself, for what is contained in it according to thought is in general the being-determined of number by number, and this gives the <em>quantitative ratio<\/em>. If we say, for example, 2 : 4, we thereby have two magnitudes which do not count in their immediacy as such, but in which only their mutual relation to each other is at issue. But this relation (the exponent of the ratio) is itself a magnitude, which is distinguished from the magnitudes related to each other in that when it changes the ratio itself changes, whereas the ratio behaves as indifferent towards the change of its two sides and remains the same as long as the exponent does not change. We can therefore also put 3:6 in place of 2:4 without the ratio changing, for the exponent 2 remains the same in both cases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-106\">\u00a7 106<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>sides<\/em> of the ratio are still immediate quanta, and the qualitative and the quantitative determination are still external to each other. But according to their truth, that the quantitative is itself relation to itself in its externality, or that being-for-itself and the indifference of determinacy are united, it is <em>measure<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>By means of the dialectical movement through its moments considered so far, quantity has proved to be a return to quality. As the concept of quantity we first had sublated quality, that is, determinacy not identical with being but indifferent to it, merely external. It is this concept, too, that (as was noted earlier) underlies the definition of magnitude usual in mathematics, as what can be increased and diminished. Now if according to this definition it may at first seem as though magnitude were only the alterable in general (for both increasing and diminishing mean precisely only determining the magnitude otherwise), but magnitude would thereby not be distinguished from <em>existence<\/em> (the second stage of quality), which according to its concept is likewise alterable, then the content of that definition had to be completed to the effect that in quantity we have something alterable which, despite its alteration, nevertheless remains the same. The concept of quantity thereby proves to contain a contradiction within itself, and it is this contradiction that constitutes the dialectic of quantity. But the result of this dialectic is not the mere return to quality, as though quality were the true and quantity the untrue, but the unity and truth of the two, qualitative quantity &#8211; or <em>measure<\/em>. &#8211; It can further be noted here that when, in considering the objective world, we occupy ourselves with quantitative determinations, it is in fact always already measure that we have in view as the goal of such occupation, as is also indicated in our language by our designating the ascertaining of quantitative determinations and relationships as <em>measuring<\/em>. Thus one measures, for example, the length of various strings that are set in vibration, from the point of view of the qualitative difference, corresponding to this difference in length, of the tones produced by the vibration. Likewise in chemistry the quantity of substances brought into combination with one another is ascertained in order to know the measures conditioning such combinations, that is, those quantities that underlie determinate qualities. In statistics too the numbers one deals with are of interest only because of the qualitative results conditioned by them. Mere ascertainments of numbers as such, without the guiding point of view stated here, on the other hand, rightly count as an empty curiosity that can satisfy neither a theoretical nor a practical interest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">31) Diels-Kranz, Zeno B 1<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">32)<em class=\"qua\">Albrecht von Haller, &#8220;Unvollkommenes Gedicht \u00fcber die Ewigkeit&#8221; [Unfinished Poem on Eternity], from: Versuch Schweizerischer Gedichte, Bern 1732<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Doctrine of Being \u2192 C. Measure<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-107\">\u00a7 107<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Measure is qualitative quantum, at first as <em>immediate<\/em>, a quantum to which an existence or a quality is bound.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>Measure, as the unity of quality and quantity, is thereby at the same time completed being. When we speak of being, it at first appears as what is wholly abstract and without determination; but being is essentially this: to determine itself, and it reaches its completed determinacy in measure. Measure can also be regarded as a definition of the absolute, and accordingly it has been said that God is the measure of all things. It is this intuition, too, that forms the keynote of many ancient Hebrew songs, in which the glorification of God essentially comes down to this: that it is <em>he<\/em> who has set its limit to everything, to the sea and the dry land, to the rivers and the mountains, and likewise to the various kinds of plants and animals. &#8211; In the religious consciousness of the Greeks we find the divinity of measure represented, in closer relation to the ethical, as <em>Nemesis<\/em>. This representation implies in general that everything human &#8211; wealth, honour, power, and likewise joy, pain and so on &#8211; has its determinate measure, the overstepping of which leads to ruin and downfall. &#8211; As regards further the occurrence of measure in the objective world, we first find in nature such existences whose essential content is formed by measure. This is the case especially with the solar system, which we have to regard in general as the realm of free measures. If we then advance further in considering inorganic nature, measure here steps, as it were, into the background, insofar as the qualitative and quantitative determinations present here often prove to be indifferent to each other. Thus, for example, the quality of a rock or a river is not bound to a determinate magnitude. On closer consideration, however, we find that even objects such as those named are not utterly without measure, for the water in a river and the individual components of a rock prove, on chemical investigation, again to be qualities conditioned by quantitative ratios of the substances contained in them. But measure emerges again, falling more decisively into immediate intuition, in organic nature. The various species of plants and animals have a certain measure both as a whole and in their individual parts, in which connection the circumstance must further be noted that the more imperfect organic formations, standing nearer to inorganic nature, are distinguished from the higher ones partly by the greater indeterminacy of their measure. Thus we find, for example, among the fossils so-called ammonites that can be recognized only through the microscope, and others up to the size of a cartwheel. The same indeterminacy of measure also shows itself in many plants that stand at a low stage of organic development, as is the case, for example, with ferns.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-108\">\u00a7 108<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Insofar as in measure quality and quantity are only in <em>immediate<\/em> unity, their distinction emerges in them in an equally immediate way. The specific quantum is to that extent partly mere quantum, and existence is capable of an increase and decrease without measure, which to that extent is a <em>rule<\/em>, being sublated thereby; partly, however, the alteration of the quantum is also an alteration of the quality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>The identity of quality and quantity present in measure is at first only <em>in itself<\/em>, but not yet <em>posited<\/em>. This implies that these two determinations, whose unity measure is, also each assert themselves for themselves, in such a way that on the one hand the quantitative determinations of existence can be altered without its quality being affected thereby, but that on the other hand this indifferent increasing and diminishing also has its limit, by the overstepping of which the quality is altered. Thus, for example, the degree of temperature of water is at first indifferent with respect to its being a liquid; but in increasing or diminishing the temperature of liquid water a point occurs where this state of cohesion changes qualitatively and the water is transformed on the one side into steam and on the other into ice. When a quantitative alteration takes place, this at first appears as something quite innocent; but something else is hidden behind it, and this seemingly innocent alteration of the quantitative is, as it were, a cunning by which the qualitative is seized. The antinomy of measure lying in this was already illustrated by the Greeks in various guises. So, for example, in the question whether <em>one<\/em> grain of wheat makes a heap of wheat, or in that other one, whether pulling <em>one<\/em> hair from a horse&#8217;s tail makes a bald tail. If, with regard to the nature of quantity as indifferent and external determinacy of being, one will at first be inclined to answer those questions in the negative, one will nevertheless soon have to admit that this indifferent increasing and diminishing also has its limit, and that a point is finally reached where, through the continued addition of always only <em>one<\/em> grain of wheat, a heap of wheat arises, and through the continued pulling out of always only <em>one<\/em> hair, a bald tail. It is the same as with these examples with that story of a peasant who increased the load of his briskly trotting donkey by <em>one<\/em> ounce after another until it finally collapsed under the load that had become unbearable. One would do very wrong to want to declare such things mere idle school chatter, since they in fact concern thoughts with which it is of great importance to be familiar also in practical and more precisely in ethical respects. Thus, for example, with regard to the expenses we make, there is at first a certain latitude within which a more or less does not matter; but if the measure determined by the individual circumstances in each case is overstepped in the one or the other direction, the qualitative nature of measure asserts itself (in the same way as in the example mentioned before of the different temperature of water), and what was a moment ago still to be regarded as good housekeeping becomes avarice or extravagance. &#8211; The same then also applies to politics, and indeed in such a way that the constitution of a state must be regarded as both independent of and dependent on the size of its territory, the number of its inhabitants and other such quantitative determinations. If we consider, for example, a state with a territory of a thousand square miles and a population of four million inhabitants, one will at first have to admit without hesitation that a couple of square miles of territory or a couple of thousand inhabitants more or less cannot have any essential influence on the constitution of such a state. On the other hand, however, it is just as little to be denied that in the continued enlargement or reduction of a state a point finally occurs where, apart from all other circumstances, merely because of this quantitative alteration the qualitative side of the constitution too can no longer remain unaltered. The constitution of a small Swiss canton does not fit a great empire, and just as unsuitable was the constitution of the Roman republic when transferred to small German imperial cities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-109\">\u00a7 109<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>measureless<\/em> is at first this going of a measure, through its quantitative nature, beyond its qualitative determinacy. But since the other quantitative ratio, the measureless of the first, is just as much qualitative, the measureless is likewise a measure; and these two transitions, from quality into quantum and from quantum into quality, can again be represented as an <em>infinite progress<\/em> &#8211; as the sublating and restoring of measure in the measureless.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>Quantity, as we have seen, is not only <em>capable<\/em> of alteration, that is, of increase and decrease, but is in general, as such, the striding out beyond itself. Quantity then proves this nature of its own in measure too. But when the quantity present in measure oversteps a certain limit, the quality corresponding to it is thereby also sublated. Thereby, however, not quality in general but only this determinate quality is negated, whose place is at once taken again by another quality. One can bring this process of measure, which proves alternately to be mere alteration of quantity and then also a turning over of quantity into quality, to intuition under the image of a nodal line. Such nodal lines we first find in nature in various forms. The qualitatively different states of aggregation of water, conditioned by increase and decrease, were already mentioned earlier. It is similar with the various stages of oxidation of metals. The difference of tones too can be regarded as an example of the turning over, taking place in the process of measure, of what is at first merely quantitative into qualitative alteration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-110\">\u00a7 110<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What in fact happens here is that the <em>immediacy<\/em> which still belongs to measure as such is sublated; quality and quantity themselves are in it at first as <em>immediate<\/em>, and it is only their <em>relative identity<\/em>. But measure shows itself to sublate itself into the measureless, and yet, in this, which is its negation but itself a unity of quantity and quality, just as much to come together only <em>with itself<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-111\">\u00a7 111<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The infinite, affirmation as negation of negation, now had, instead of the more abstract sides, being and nothing, something and an other and so on, quality and quantity as its sides. These have \u03b1) first <em>passed over<\/em>, quality into quantity (\u00a7 98) and quantity into quality (\u00a7 105), and both have thereby been shown to be <em>negations<\/em>. \u03b2) But in their <em>unity<\/em> (measure) they are at first distinguished, and the one is only <em>by means of<\/em> the other; and \u03b3) after the immediacy of this unity has proved to sublate itself, this unity is now <em>posited<\/em> as what it is <em>in itself<\/em>, as simple relation-to-itself, which contains within itself being in general and its forms as sublated. &#8211; Being or immediacy, which through the negation of itself is mediation <em>with itself<\/em> and relation to itself, and thus likewise mediation that sublates itself into relation to itself, into immediacy, is <em>essence<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>The process of measure is not merely the bad infinity of the infinite progress in the shape of a perennial turning over of quality into quantity and of quantity into quality, but at the same time the true infinity of coming together with itself in its other. Quality and quantity at first stand over against each other in measure as something and other. But quality is <em>in itself<\/em> quantity, and likewise conversely quantity is <em>in itself<\/em> quality. Since these two thus pass over into each other in the process of measure, each of these two determinations only becomes what it already is in itself, and we now obtain being negated in its determinations, being sublated in general, which is <em>essence<\/em>. In measure essence was already in itself, and its process consists only in positing itself as what it is in itself. &#8211; Ordinary consciousness grasps things as things that are and considers them according to quality, quantity and measure. But these immediate determinations then prove to be not fixed but passing over, and essence is the result of their dialectic. In essence there is no longer any passing over, but only relation. The form of relation is in being still only our reflection; in essence, on the other hand, relation is its own determination. When (in the sphere of being) the something becomes other, the something has thereby vanished. Not so in essence; here we have no truly other, but only difference, relation of the one to <em>its<\/em> other. The passing over of essence is therefore at the same time no passing over; for in the passing over of the different into the different, the different does not vanish, but the different terms remain in their relation. If we say, for example, <em>being<\/em> and <em>nothing<\/em>, being is for itself, and likewise nothing is for itself. It is quite different with the <em>positive<\/em> and the <em>negative<\/em>. These do have the determination of being and of nothing. But the positive has no sense for itself; it is utterly related to the negative. It is likewise with the negative. In the sphere of being relatedness is only <em>in itself<\/em>; in essence, on the other hand, it is posited. This, then, is in general the distinction of the forms of being and of essence. In being everything is immediate; in essence, on the other hand, everything is relative.<\/p>\n\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Quality, quantity and measure. From the Groundlines, the footnotes to \u00a7 33 (\u00a7\u00a7 84\u201386) and to \u00a7 7 (\u00a7 95) refer here. The text follows the third edition of 1830 as given in the Werkausgabe, with the Additions from the lectures. The versions of 1827 and 1817 will be added later. Contents The Doctrine of [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-906514","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906514","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=906514"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906514\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=906514"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}