{"id":906520,"date":"2026-11-19T08:43:59","date_gmt":"2026-11-19T07:43:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/preliminary-conception-of-logic-enc-19-83\/"},"modified":"2026-11-19T08:43:59","modified_gmt":"2026-11-19T07:43:59","slug":"preliminary-conception-of-logic-enc-19-83","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/preliminary-conception-of-logic-enc-19-83\/","title":{"rendered":"Preliminary Conception of Logic (Enc. \u00a7\u00a7 19\u201383)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This page gives the Preliminary Conception of Logic: Hegel&#8217;s determination of what logic is, his review of the three positions of thought towards objectivity &#8211; metaphysics, empiricism and critical philosophy, immediate knowing &#8211; and the division of logic. From the <em>Groundlines<\/em>, the footnotes to \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 31 (\u00a7\u00a7 79\u201383) and to \u00a7 280 (\u00a7 51) refer here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The text follows the third edition of 1830 in the version of the Werkausgabe, with the Additions from the lectures. The versions of 1827 and 1817 will be added later.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Contents<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li>Preliminary Conception: <a href=\"#l-19\">\u00a7 19<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-20\">\u00a7 20<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-21\">\u00a7 21<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-22\">\u00a7 22<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-23\">\u00a7 23<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-24\">\u00a7 24<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-25\">\u00a7 25<\/a><\/li><li>Preliminary Conception \u2192 A. First Position of Thought towards Objectivity. Metaphysics: <a href=\"#l-26\">\u00a7 26<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-27\">\u00a7 27<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-28\">\u00a7 28<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-29\">\u00a7 29<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-30\">\u00a7 30<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-31\">\u00a7 31<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-32\">\u00a7 32<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-33\">\u00a7 33<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-34\">\u00a7 34<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-35\">\u00a7 35<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-36\">\u00a7 36<\/a><\/li><li>Preliminary Conception \u2192 B. Second Position of Thought towards Objectivity \u2192 I. Empiricism: <a href=\"#l-37\">\u00a7 37<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-38\">\u00a7 38<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-39\">\u00a7 39<\/a><\/li><li>Preliminary Conception \u2192 B. Second Position of Thought towards Objectivity \u2192 II. Critical Philosophy: <a href=\"#l-40\">\u00a7 40<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-41\">\u00a7 41<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-42\">\u00a7 42<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-43\">\u00a7 43<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-44\">\u00a7 44<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-45\">\u00a7 45<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-46\">\u00a7 46<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-47\">\u00a7 47<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-48\">\u00a7 48<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-49\">\u00a7 49<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-50\">\u00a7 50<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-51\">\u00a7 51<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-52\">\u00a7 52<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-53\">\u00a7 53<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-54\">\u00a7 54<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-55\">\u00a7 55<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-56\">\u00a7 56<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-57\">\u00a7 57<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-58\">\u00a7 58<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-59\">\u00a7 59<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-60\">\u00a7 60<\/a><\/li><li>Preliminary Conception \u2192 C. Third Position of Thought towards Objectivity. Immediate Knowing: <a href=\"#l-61\">\u00a7 61<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-62\">\u00a7 62<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-63\">\u00a7 63<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-64\">\u00a7 64<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-65\">\u00a7 65<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-66\">\u00a7 66<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-67\">\u00a7 67<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-68\">\u00a7 68<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-69\">\u00a7 69<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-70\">\u00a7 70<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-71\">\u00a7 71<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-72\">\u00a7 72<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-73\">\u00a7 73<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-74\">\u00a7 74<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-75\">\u00a7 75<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-76\">\u00a7 76<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-77\">\u00a7 77<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-78\">\u00a7 78<\/a><\/li><li>Preliminary Conception \u2192 More Precise Concept and Division of Logic: <a href=\"#l-79\">\u00a7 79<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-80\">\u00a7 80<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-81\">\u00a7 81<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-82\">\u00a7 82<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#l-83\">\u00a7 83<\/a><\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Preliminary Conception<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-19\">\u00a7 19<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Logic is the science <em>of the pure Idea<\/em>, that is, of the Idea in the abstract element of <em>thinking<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What holds of this determination, as of others contained in this Preliminary Conception, is the same as what holds of the concepts put forward in advance about philosophy in general: that they are determinations drawn <em>from<\/em> and <em>after<\/em> the survey of the whole. One may well say that logic is the science of <em>thinking<\/em>, of its <em>determinations and laws<\/em>, but thinking as such makes up only <em>the universal determinacy<\/em> or the <em>element<\/em> in which the Idea is as logical. The Idea is thinking not as formal, but as the self-developing totality of its peculiar determinations and laws, which it gives to itself, which it does not already <em>have<\/em> and find within itself. Logic is to that extent the <em>hardest<\/em> science, since it deals not with intuitions, not even, like geometry, with abstract sensible representations, but with pure abstractions, and requires a strength and practice in withdrawing into pure thought, holding it fast and moving in it. On the other hand it could be regarded as the <em>easiest<\/em>, because its content is nothing but one&#8217;s own thinking and its familiar determinations, and these are at the same time the <em>simplest<\/em> and the <em>elementary<\/em>. They are also the <em>best known<\/em>: being, nothing etc., determinacy, magnitude etc., being-in-itself, being-for-itself, one, many etc. This familiarity, however, rather makes the study of logic harder; on the one hand it is easily held not worth the trouble to occupy oneself further with something so familiar, on the other hand what matters is to become acquainted with it in a quite different, indeed even opposite way from that in which one already is. The <em>use<\/em> of logic concerns its relationship to the subject, insofar as the subject gives itself a certain education for other purposes. The subject&#8217;s education through logic consists in its being practised in thinking, because this science is thinking of thinking, and in its getting thoughts into its head, and getting them as thoughts. &#8211; But insofar as the logical is the absolute form of truth and, still more than this, also pure truth itself, it is something quite other than merely something <em>useful<\/em>. But just as what is most excellent, freest and most self-standing is also the most useful, so the logical too can be grasped in this way. Its use is then to be reckoned otherwise than as merely being the formal exercise of thinking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 1.<\/em> The first question is: what is the object of our science? The simplest and most intelligible answer to this question is that <em>truth<\/em> is this object. Truth is a lofty word and the still loftier thing. If a person&#8217;s spirit and heart are still healthy, his breast must at once beat higher at it. But then the <em>but<\/em> also promptly arises: whether we are able to cognize truth at all. There seems to be a disproportion between us limited human beings and truth being in and for itself, and the question arises of the bridge between the finite and the infinite. God is truth; how are we to cognize him? The virtues of humility and modesty seem to stand in contradiction with such an undertaking. &#8211; But one also asks whether truth can be cognized in order to find a justification for living on in the commonness of one&#8217;s finite purposes. Such humility does not amount to much. Such language &#8211; how should I, poor earthworm, be able to cognize the true? &#8211; is a thing of the past; its place has been taken by conceit and self-importance, and people have imagined that they are immediately in the true. &#8211; Youth has been talked into believing that it already possesses the true (in religion and in ethics) just as it stands. In particular it has also been said in this respect that all adults are sunk, petrified and ossified in untruth. The dawn has appeared to youth, but the older world is stuck in the swamp and mire of the day. The particular sciences have meanwhile been described as something that must indeed be acquired, but as a mere means for external purposes of life. Here, then, it is not modesty that holds people back from the cognition and study of truth, but the conviction that one already possesses truth in and for itself. The older generation does indeed set its hope on youth, for youth is to carry on the world and science. But this hope is set on youth only insofar as it does not remain as it is but takes on the hard labour of spirit. There is yet another shape of modesty towards truth. This is the superior airs towards truth that we see in Pilate over against Christ. Pilate asked &#8220;what is truth?&#8221; in the sense of one who has finished with everything, for whom nothing has meaning any more &#8211; in the sense in which Solomon says: &#8220;all is vanity&#8221;. &#8211; Here only subjective vanity remains. Further, timidity stands in the way of the cognition of truth. The lazy mind readily takes it into its head to say: it was not meant that philosophizing should become serious. One may well attend lectures on logic too, but logic should leave us as we are. People think that if thinking goes beyond the ordinary circle of representations, it is going into houses of ill repute; one entrusts oneself to a sea on which one is tossed hither and thither by the waves of thought, and in the end lands again on the sandbank of this temporality, which one has left for nothing at all. What comes of such a view can be seen in the world. One can acquire all sorts of skills and knowledge, become a practised official and otherwise train oneself for one&#8217;s particular purposes. But it is something else to educate one&#8217;s spirit for the higher too and to strive for it. One may hope that in our time a longing for something better has arisen in youth, and that it will not be content merely with the straw of external knowledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 2. <\/em>That <em>thinking<\/em> is the object of logic is generally agreed. But one can have a very low and also a very high opinion of thinking. Thus on the one hand people say: this is <em>only<\/em> a thought &#8211; and mean by this that the thought is only subjective, arbitrary and contingent, but not the matter itself, the true and actual. On the other hand, however, one can also have a high opinion of thought and grasp it in such a way that it alone reaches the highest, the nature of God, and that nothing of God can be cognized with the senses. It is said that God is spirit and wills to be worshipped in spirit and in truth. What is felt and sensible, we admit, is not the spiritual; rather its innermost is thought, and only spirit can cognize spirit. Spirit can indeed (e.g. in religion) also behave feelingly, but feeling as such, the mode of feeling, is one thing, and its <em>content<\/em> another. Feeling as such is in general the form of the sensible, which we have in common with the animals. This form can then indeed take possession of the concrete content, but this content does not belong to this form; the form of feeling is the lowest form for spiritual content. This content, God himself, is in its truth only in thinking and as thinking. In this sense, then, thought is not merely <em>only<\/em> thought, but is rather the highest and, considered precisely, the only way in which the eternal and what is in and for itself can be grasped. As of thought, so of the science of thought one can have a high and a low opinion. Anyone, people think, can think without logic, as one can digest without studying physiology. Even if one has studied logic, one thinks just as before, perhaps more methodically, but with little change. If logic had no other business than to acquaint us with the activity of merely formal thinking, it would indeed produce nothing that one would not otherwise have done just as well. The earlier logic did in fact have only this position. Moreover, even the knowledge of thinking as merely subjective activity already does a person honour and is of interest to him; by knowing what he is and what he does, man distinguishes himself from the animal. &#8211; On the other hand, however, logic as the science of thinking also has a high standpoint, insofar as thought alone is able to experience the highest, the true. If, then, the science of logic considers thinking in its activity and its production (and thinking is not contentless activity, for it produces thoughts and thought), the content is in general the supersensible world, and occupation with it is dwelling in this world. Mathematics deals with the abstractions of number and space, but these are still something sensible, though the abstractly sensible and existenceless. Thought takes leave of this last sensible too and is free with itself, renounces outer and inner sensibility, removes all particular interests and inclinations. Insofar as logic has this ground, we must think more worthily of it than is usually done.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 3. <\/em>The need to grasp logic in a deeper sense than that of the science of merely formal thinking is occasioned by the interest of religion, of the state, of right and of ethical life. Formerly people saw no harm in thinking and thought freshly straight out of their heads. They thought about God, nature and the state and were convinced that only through thoughts would one come to cognize what truth is, not through the senses or through contingent representing and opining. But as they went on thinking in this way, it turned out that the highest relationships in life were compromised by it. Thinking had taken its power away from the positive. Constitutions fell victim to thought; religion has been attacked by thought, fixed religious representations that counted absolutely as revelations have been undermined, and the old faith was overthrown in many minds. Thus, for example, the Greek philosophers set themselves against the old religion and destroyed its representations. Philosophers were therefore banished and killed for subverting religion and the state, which were essentially connected. Thus thinking asserted itself in actuality and exercised the most tremendous efficacy. Through this people became attentive to this power of thinking, began to examine its claims more closely, and claimed to have found that it presumed too much and was unable to accomplish what it had undertaken. Instead of cognizing the essence of God, of nature and of spirit, instead of cognizing truth in general, it had overthrown the state and religion. A justification of thinking regarding its results was therefore demanded, and it is the inquiry into the nature of thinking and its legitimacy that has in large part made up the interest of philosophy in modern times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-20\">\u00a7 20<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If we take up thinking in its most obvious representation, it appears \u03b1) first in its ordinary subjective meaning, as one of the spiritual activities or faculties <em>alongside<\/em> others, sensibility, intuiting, imagination etc., desiring, willing etc. Its <em>product<\/em>, the determinacy or form of thought, is the <em>universal<\/em>, the abstract in general. <em>Thinking<\/em> as <em>activity<\/em> is thus the <em>active<\/em> universal, and indeed the universal activating <em>itself<\/em>, since the deed, what is brought forth, is precisely the universal. Thinking represented as <em>subject<\/em> is a <em>thinking being<\/em>, and the simple expression of the existing subject as thinking is <em>I<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The determinations given here and in the next following \u00a7\u00a7 are not to be taken as assertions and as my <em>opinions<\/em> about thinking; but since in this preliminary way no derivation or proof can take place, they may count as <em>facts<\/em>, in the sense that in the consciousness of everyone, if he has thoughts and considers them, it is found empirically that the character of universality, and likewise the following determinations, are present in them. An already existing training of attention and abstraction is, admittedly, required for observing the facts of one&#8217;s consciousness and one&#8217;s representations. Already in this preliminary exposition the difference between the sensible, representation and thought comes up; it is decisive for grasping the nature and kinds of cognition; it will therefore serve as elucidation to draw attention to this difference here already. &#8211; For the <em>sensible<\/em>, its external origin, the senses or sense organs, is first taken as explanation. But naming the organ gives no determination of what is apprehended with it. The difference of the <em>sensible<\/em> from thought is to be placed in this, that the determination of the former is <em>singularity<\/em>, and since the singular (quite abstractly, the atom) also stands in connection, the sensible is an <em>asunderness<\/em>, whose more precise abstract forms are <em>juxtaposition<\/em> and <em>succession<\/em>. &#8211; <em>Representing<\/em> has such sensible material as its content, but posited in the determination of <em>mineness<\/em> &#8211; that such content is in <em>me<\/em> &#8211; and of <em>universality<\/em>, of relation-to-self, of <em>simplicity<\/em>. &#8211; Besides the sensible, however, representation also has as its content material that has sprung from self-conscious thinking, such as the representations of the legal, the ethical, the religious, also of thinking itself, and it is not so readily evident where the difference of such <em>representations<\/em> from the <em>thoughts<\/em> of such content is to be placed. Here the content is thought, and the form of universality is present as well, which already belongs to a content&#8217;s being in <em>me<\/em>, in general to its being representation. The peculiarity of representation, however, is in general to be placed in this respect too in the fact that in it such content likewise stands singularized. Right, legal and similar determinations do not, indeed, stand in the sensible asunderness of <em>space<\/em>. In time they may well appear one after another, but their content itself is not represented as affected by time, passing and changeable in it. But such determinations, spiritual in themselves, likewise stand <em>singularized<\/em> on the wide ground of the inner, abstract universality of representing in general. In this singularization they are <em>simple<\/em>: right, duty, God. Representation now either stops at this, that right is right, God is God &#8211; or, more educated, it gives determinations, e.g. that God is creator of the world, all-wise, almighty etc.; here likewise several singularized simple determinations are strung together, which, notwithstanding the connection assigned to them in their subject, remain outside one another. Representation here coincides with the <em>understanding<\/em>, which differs from it only in that it posits relationships of universal and particular or of cause and effect etc., and thereby relations of necessity among the isolated determinations of representation, whereas representation leaves them <em>side by side<\/em> in its undetermined space, connected by the mere <em>also<\/em>. &#8211; The difference between representation and thought has a more specific importance because it can be said in general that philosophy does nothing other than transform representations into thoughts &#8211; but, admittedly, further, mere thought into the concept. Moreover, if the determinations <em>of singularity and asunderness<\/em> have been given for the sensible, it may be added that these too are themselves again thoughts and universals; in logic it will be shown that thought and the universal are precisely this, that thought is itself and its other, overreaches this, and that nothing escapes it. Since <em>language<\/em> is the work of thought, nothing can be said in it either that is not universal. What I only <em>mean<\/em> is <em>mine<\/em>, belongs to me as this particular individual; but if language expresses only the universal, I cannot say what I only <em>mean<\/em>. And the <em>unsayable<\/em>, feeling, sensation, is not the most excellent, the truest, but the most insignificant, the most untrue. When I say &#8220;the <em>singular<\/em>&#8220;, &#8220;<em>this<\/em> singular&#8221;, &#8220;here, &#8220;now&#8221;, these are all universalities; <em>everything<\/em> and <em>each<\/em> is a singular, a this, even when it is sensible, here, now. Likewise when I say &#8220;I&#8221;, I <em>mean<\/em> myself <em>as this one<\/em> excluding all others; but what I say, I, is precisely everyone; an I that excludes all others from itself. &#8211; <em>Kant<\/em> used the awkward expression that the I <em>accompanies<\/em> all my representations, also sensations, desires, actions etc. The I is the universal in and for itself, and commonality is also a form of universality, but an external one. All other human beings have it in common with me to be I, as it is common to all <em>my<\/em> sensations, representations etc. to be <em>mine<\/em>. But <em>I<\/em>, abstractly as such, is pure relation to itself, in which abstraction is made from representing, sensing, from every state as from every particularity of nature, talent, experience etc. The I is to that extent the concrete existence of wholly <em>abstract<\/em> universality, the abstractly <em>free<\/em>. Therefore the I is <em>thinking<\/em> as <em>subject<\/em>, and since I am at the same time in all my sensations, representations, states etc., thought is everywhere present and runs through all these determinations as category.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>When we speak of thinking, it appears at first as a subjective activity, as one faculty among the many we have, such as memory, representation, the faculty of will and the like. If thinking were merely a subjective activity and as such the object of logic, logic would have its determinate object like other sciences. It could then seem arbitrary that one makes thinking the object of a particular science and not also the will, the imagination etc. That thinking receives this honour may well have its ground in the fact that a certain authority is granted to it and it is regarded as what is true in man, as that in which his difference from the animal consists. &#8211; To get to know thinking even merely as subjective activity is not without interest. Its more precise determinations would then be rules and laws, the knowledge of which one acquires through experience. Thinking considered in this relationship according to its laws is what otherwise usually made up the content of logic. <em>Aristotle<\/em> is the founder of this science. He had the strength to assign to thinking what belongs to it as such. Our thinking is very concrete, but in the manifold content one must distinguish what belongs to thinking or to the abstract form of the activity. A gentle spiritual bond, the activity of thinking, links all this content, and this bond, this form as such, Aristotle brought out and determined. This logic of Aristotle is to this day the logical, which has only been spun out further, chiefly by the scholastics of the Middle Ages. These did not yet increase the material, but only developed it further. What modern times have done in relation to logic consists chiefly, on the one hand, only in leaving out many logical determinations developed by Aristotle and the scholastics and, on the other hand, in grafting on a great deal of psychological material. The interest in this science is to get to know finite thinking in its procedure, and the science is correct if it corresponds to its presupposed object. Occupation with this formal logic undoubtedly has its use; through it, as one usually says, the head is cleared out; one learns to collect oneself, learns to abstract, whereas in ordinary consciousness one deals with sensible representations that cross and confuse one another. In abstraction, however, there is a collecting of the mind on <em>one<\/em> point, and through this the habit of occupying oneself with inwardness is acquired. Acquaintance with the forms of finite thinking can be used as a means of education for the empirical sciences, which proceed according to these forms, and in this sense logic has been designated instrumental logic. One can, admittedly, act more liberally and say that logic is to be studied not for the sake of its use but for its own sake, for the excellent is not to be sought for the sake of mere use. This is, on the one hand, quite correct; on the other hand, however, the excellent is also the most useful, for it is the substantial, which stands fast for itself and is therefore the bearer of the particular purposes, which it furthers and brings to their goal. One must not regard the particular purposes as the first, but the excellent does further them. Thus, for example, religion has its absolute value in itself; at the same time the other purposes are borne and held by it. Christ says: &#8220;Seek first the kingdom of God, and the rest will also fall to you.&#8221; &#8211; The particular purposes can be attained only by attaining what is in and for itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-21\">\u00a7 21<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b2) When thinking is taken as active in relation to objects, as <em>reflecting on<\/em> something, the universal, as the product of its activity, contains the value of the <em>matter<\/em>, the <em>essential<\/em>, the <em>inner<\/em>, the <em>true<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In \u00a7 5 the old belief was cited that what is true in objects, properties, events, the inner, the essential, the matter that counts, does not present itself <em>immediately<\/em> in consciousness, is not already what the first appearance and notion offers, but that one must first <em>reflect<\/em> on it in order to arrive at the true constitution of the object, and that this is attained through reflection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>Reflection is demanded even of the <em>child<\/em>. It is given the task, for example, of combining adjectives with nouns. Here it has to pay attention and distinguish; it has to remember a rule and arrange the particular case accordingly. The rule is nothing other than a universal, and the child is to make the particular conform to this universal. &#8211; Further, in life we have <em>purposes<\/em>. In this connection we reflect on how we can attain them. The purpose is here the universal, the governing, and we have means and instruments whose activity we determine according to the purpose. &#8211; In a similar way reflection is active in <em>moral relationships<\/em>. To reflect here means to remember what is right, one&#8217;s duty, the universal according to which, as the fixed rule, we have to arrange our particular conduct in the cases at hand. The universal determination is to be recognizable in and contained in our particular procedure. &#8211; We find the same in our conduct towards <em>natural phenomena<\/em>. We notice, for example, lightning and thunder. This phenomenon is familiar to us, and we often perceive it. But man is not content with mere familiarity, with the merely sensible appearance, but wants to get behind it, wants to know what it is, wants to comprehend it. One therefore reflects, wants to know the cause, as something distinct from the appearance as such, the inner in its difference from the merely outer. One thus doubles the appearance, breaks it in two into inner and outer, force and expression, cause and effect. The inner, force, is here again the universal, the enduring &#8211; not this or that flash of lightning, this or that plant, but what remains the same in all. The sensible is something singular and vanishing; the enduring in it we come to know through reflection. Nature shows us an infinite multitude of singular shapes and appearances. We have the need to bring unity into this manifoldness; we therefore compare and seek to cognize the universal of each. Individuals are born and pass away; the genus is what remains in them, what recurs in all, and it is present only for reflection. Here belong also laws, for example the laws of the motion of the heavenly bodies. We see the stars here today and there tomorrow; this disorder is something inadequate to spirit, which it does not trust, for it has faith in an order, in a simple, constant and universal determination. In this faith it has turned its reflection to the phenomena and has cognized their laws, has fixed the motion of the heavenly bodies in a universal way, so that every change of place can be determined and cognized from this law. &#8211; It is the same with the powers that govern human doing in its infinite manifoldness. Here too man has faith in a ruling universal. &#8211; From all these examples it can be gathered how reflection always seeks what is fixed, abiding, determined within itself and governing the particular. This universal cannot be grasped with the senses, and it counts as the essential and true. Thus, for example, duties and rights are what is essential in actions, and their truth consists in conforming to those <em>universal<\/em> determinations. When we determine the universal in this way, we find that it forms the opposite of an other, and this other is the merely immediate, external and singular as against the mediated, inner and universal. This universal does not exist externally as universal: the genus as such cannot be perceived; the laws of the motion of the heavenly bodies are not written on the sky. The universal, then, one does not hear and does not see; it is only for spirit. Religion leads us to a universal that comprehends everything else within itself, to an absolute by which everything else is brought forth, and this absolute is not for the senses but only for spirit and thought.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-22\">\u00a7 22<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b3) Through reflection something is <em>altered<\/em> in the way in which the content is at first in sensation, intuition, representation; it is thus only <em>by means<\/em> of an alteration that the <em>true<\/em> nature of the <em>object<\/em> comes to consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>What comes out in reflection is a product of our thinking. Thus, for example, <em>Solon<\/em> brought forth from his head the laws he gave the Athenians. The other side, however, is that we also regard the universal, the laws, as the opposite of something merely subjective and cognize in it what is essential, true and objective in things. To learn what is true in things, mere attention is not enough; it requires our subjective activity, which reshapes what is immediately present. This seems at first sight quite wrong and contrary to the purpose at issue in cognition. Nevertheless one can say that it has been the conviction of all ages that only through the reworking of the immediate effected by means of reflection is the substantial attained. Against this, chiefly only in modern times, doubt has been raised and the difference held fast between what the products of our thinking are and what things are in themselves. It has been said that the in-itself of things is something quite other than what we make of it. The standpoint of this separation has been asserted especially by the critical philosophy, against the conviction of the whole earlier world, for which the agreement of the matter and thought counted as something settled. The interest of modern philosophy turns on this opposition. But the natural faith of man is that this opposition is not a true one. In ordinary life we reflect without the particular reflection that the true comes out of it; we think without further ado, in the firm faith in the agreement of thought with the matter, and this faith is of the highest importance. It is the sickness of our time that has come to the despair that our cognition is only subjective and that this subjective is the last word. But truth is the objective, and it is to be the rule for everyone&#8217;s conviction, in such a way that the individual&#8217;s conviction is bad insofar as it does not correspond to this rule. According to the modern view, by contrast, conviction as such, the mere form of being convinced, is already good &#8211; the content may be what it will, for there is no standard for its truth. &#8211; If we said earlier that it is the old faith of men that it is the vocation of spirit to know the truth, this further implies that the objects, outer and inner nature, the object in general, is as it is in itself in the way it is as thought, that thinking is thus the truth of what is objective. The business of philosophy consists only in bringing expressly to consciousness what has counted for men since time immemorial regarding thinking. Philosophy thus puts forward nothing new; what we have brought out here through our reflection is already everyone&#8217;s immediate prejudice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-23\">\u00a7 23<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b4) Since in reflection the true nature comes to light just as much as this thinking is <em>my<\/em> activity, that nature is just as much the <em>product of my<\/em> spirit, and indeed as thinking subject, of me according to my simple universality, as the I that is absolutely <em>with itself<\/em> &#8211; or of my <em>freedom<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">One can often hear the expression <em>thinking for oneself<\/em>, as though something significant were said by it. In fact no one can think for another, any more than eat and drink; that expression is therefore a pleonasm. &#8211; <em>Freedom<\/em> lies immediately in thinking, because it is the activity of the universal, a thereby abstract relating of oneself to oneself, a being-with-oneself that is without determination as regards subjectivity and that as regards <em>content<\/em> is at the same time only in the <em>matter<\/em> and its determinations. If, therefore, there is talk of humility or modesty and of arrogance in relation to philosophizing, and humility or modesty consists in ascribing nothing <em>particular<\/em> by way of property and doing to one&#8217;s subjectivity, then philosophizing will at least have to be acquitted of arrogance, since thinking is true as regards content only insofar as it is immersed in the <em>matter<\/em>, and as regards form is not a <em>particular<\/em> being or doing of the subject, but precisely this, that consciousness behaves as abstract I, as <em>freed<\/em> from <em>all particularity<\/em> of other properties, states etc., and does only the universal, in which it is identical with all individuals. &#8211; When Aristotle calls on us to hold ourselves <em>worthy<\/em> of such conduct, the worthiness that consciousness gives itself consists precisely in letting go of <em>particular<\/em> opining and supposing and letting the <em>matter<\/em> hold sway within oneself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-24\">\u00a7 24<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">According to these determinations thoughts can be called <em>objective<\/em> thoughts, among which are also to be reckoned the forms that are first considered in ordinary logic and are usually taken only for forms <em>of conscious<\/em> thinking. <em>Logic<\/em> therefore coincides with <em>metaphysics<\/em>, the science of <em>things<\/em> grasped in <em>thoughts<\/em>, which were held to express the <em>essentialities of things<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The relationship of such forms as concept, judgement and syllogism to others, such as causality etc., can only emerge within logic itself. But this much can be seen provisionally too: that when thought seeks to form a <em>concept<\/em> of things, this concept (and with it also its most immediate forms, judgement and syllogism) cannot consist of determinations and relationships that are alien and external to things. Reflection, it was said above, leads to the <em>universal<\/em> of things; but this is itself one of the moments of the concept. That there is understanding, reason, in the world says the same as what the expression &#8220;objective thought&#8221; contains. But this expression is inconvenient precisely because <em>thought<\/em> is all too commonly used only as belonging to spirit, to consciousness, and the objective likewise at first only of the unspiritual.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 1. <\/em>When it is said that thought as objective thought is the inner of the world, it may seem as though consciousness were thereby to be ascribed to natural things. We feel a reluctance to grasp the inner activity of things as thinking, since we say that man distinguishes himself from the natural through thinking. We would accordingly have to speak of nature as the system of unconscious thought, as an intelligence that, as Schelling says, is a petrified one. Instead of using the expression <em>thoughts<\/em>, it is therefore better, to avoid misunderstanding, to say <em>determinations of thought<\/em>. &#8211; The logical is, according to what has been said, to be sought as a system of determinations of thought in general, in which the opposition of subjective and objective (in its ordinary meaning) falls away. This meaning of thinking and its determinations is expressed more precisely when the ancients say that \u03bd\u03bf\u03c5<!--\u0342-->\u03c2 [mind] rules the world &#8211; or when we say that there is reason in the world, by which we understand that reason is the soul of the world, dwells in it, is immanent in it, its very own, innermost nature, its universal. A closer example is that when we speak of a determinate animal, we say it is an <em>animal<\/em>. The <em>animal as such<\/em> cannot be shown, only ever a determinate one. <em>The<\/em> animal does not exist; it is the universal nature of the single animals, and every existing animal is something much more concretely determined, something particularized. But to be an animal, the genus as the universal, belongs to the determinate animal and makes up its determinate essentiality. If we take being-an-animal away from the dog, it would be impossible to say what it is. Things in general have an abiding inner nature and an external existence. They live and die, arise and pass away; their essentiality, their universality, is the genus, and this is not to be grasped merely as something common. Thinking, as it makes up the substance of external things, is also the universal substance of the spiritual. In all human intuiting there is thinking; likewise thinking is the universal in all representations, recollections and in general in every spiritual activity, in all willing, wishing etc. All these are only further specifications of thinking. When we grasp thinking in this way, it appears in a different relationship than when we merely say: we have a faculty of thinking among and alongside other faculties, such as intuiting, representing, willing and the like. If we regard thinking as the truly universal of everything natural and also of everything spiritual, it overreaches all this and is the foundation of everything. To this conception of thinking in its objective meaning (as \u03bd\u03bf\u03c5<!--\u0342-->\u03c2) we can first attach what thinking is in the subjective sense. We say first: man is thinking &#8211; but at the same time we also say that he is intuiting, willing etc. Man is thinking and is universal, but he is thinking only insofar as the universal is <em>for<\/em> him. The animal too is <em>in itself<\/em> universal, but the universal as such is not <em>for<\/em> it, but only ever the singular. The animal sees a singular thing, e.g. its food, a human being etc. But all this is for it only a singular. Likewise sensation always deals only with the singular (<em>this<\/em> pain, <em>this<\/em> pleasant taste etc.). Nature does not bring the \u03bd\u03bf\u03c5<!--\u0342-->\u03c2 to consciousness of itself; only man doubles himself in such a way as to be the universal <em>for<\/em> the universal. This is first the case when man knows himself as <em>I<\/em>. When I say <em>I<\/em>, I mean myself as this single, thoroughly determinate person. In fact, however, I thereby say nothing particular about myself. Everyone else too is <em>I<\/em>, and when I designate myself as <em>I<\/em>, I do mean myself, this single one, but at the same time I utter something completely universal. The I is pure being-for-itself, in which everything particular is negated and sublated, this last, simple and pure element of consciousness. We can say: I and thinking are the same &#8211; or more determinately: the I is thinking as a thinking being. What I have in my consciousness is for me. The I is this emptiness, the receptacle for anything and everything, for which everything is and which preserves everything within itself. Every human being is a whole world of representations that are buried in the night of the I. Thus the I is the universal in which abstraction is made from everything particular, but in which at the same time everything lies veiled. It is therefore not merely abstract universality but the universality that contains everything within itself. We use the I at first quite trivially, and it is only philosophical reflection by which it is made an object of consideration. In the I we have wholly pure, present thought. The animal cannot say &#8220;I&#8221;; only man can, because he is thinking. Now in the I there is manifold inner and outer content, and depending on how this content is constituted, we behave sensibly intuiting, representing, recollecting etc. But in all of this there is the I, or in everything there is thinking. Man is thus always thinking, even when he merely intuits; if he considers anything, he always considers it as a universal, fixes something singular, singles it out, thereby withdraws his attention from other things, takes it as something abstract and universal, even if only formally universal. With our representations the twofold case occurs that either the <em>content<\/em> is thought but the <em>form<\/em> is not, or conversely the form belongs to thought but the content does not. If I say, for example, anger, rose, hope, all this is familiar to me through sensation, but I utter this content in a universal way, in the form of thought; I have left out much that is particular and given only the content as universal, but the content remains sensible. If, conversely, I represent God to myself, the content is indeed something purely thought, but the form is still sensible, as I find it immediately within myself. With representations, then, the content is not merely sensible as with intuitions, but the content is either sensible while the form belongs to thinking, or conversely. In the first case the material is given and the form belongs to thinking; in the other case thinking is the source of the content, but through the form the content becomes something given, which thus comes to spirit externally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 2. <\/em>In logic we deal with pure thought or the pure determinations of thought. With thought in the ordinary sense we always represent to ourselves something that is not merely pure thought, for one means by it something thought whose content is something empirical. In logic thoughts are grasped in such a way that they have no content other than one belonging to thinking itself and brought forth by it. Thus the thoughts are <em>pure<\/em> thoughts. Thus spirit is purely with itself and thereby free, for freedom is precisely this: to be with oneself in one&#8217;s other, to depend on oneself, to be what determines oneself. In all drives I begin from an other, from something that is external to me. Here we then speak of dependence. Freedom is only where there is no other for me that I am not myself. The natural man, who is determined only by his drives, is not with himself: however self-willed he may be, the <em>content<\/em> of his willing and opining is still not his own, and his freedom is only a <em>formal<\/em> one. When I think, I give up my subjective particularity, immerse myself in the matter, let thinking have its way for itself, and I think badly when I add something of my own. If, according to what has been said, we regard logic as the system of <em>pure<\/em> determinations of thought, the other philosophical sciences, the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit, appear by contrast as, as it were, an applied logic, for logic is their animating soul. The interest of the remaining sciences is then only to cognize the logical forms in the shapes of nature and spirit, shapes that are only a particular mode of expression of the forms of pure thinking. If we take, for example, the <em>syllogism<\/em> (not in the meaning of the old formal logic but in its truth), its determination is that the particular is the middle that joins together the extremes of the universal and the singular. This form of syllogizing is a universal form of all things. All things are particulars that join themselves together as a universal with the singular. But the impotence of nature brings with it that it does not present the logical forms purely. Such an impotent presentation of the syllogism is, for example, the magnet, which in the middle, in its point of indifference, joins together its poles, which are thereby immediately one in their distinctness. In physics too one gets to know the universal, the essence, and the difference is only that the philosophy of nature brings to our consciousness the true forms of the concept in natural things. &#8211; Logic is thus the all-animating spirit of all sciences; the determinations of thought of logic are the pure spirits; they are the innermost, but at the same time they are what we always have on our lips and which therefore seem to be something thoroughly familiar. But what is thus familiar is usually what is least known. Thus, for example, <em>being<\/em> is a pure determination of thought; yet it never occurs to us to make the <em>is<\/em> an object of our consideration. People usually think that the absolute must lie far beyond; but it is precisely what is wholly present, which we as thinking beings always carry with us and use, even without explicit consciousness of it. Such determinations of thought are laid down chiefly in language, and so the instruction in grammar given to children has the use of drawing their attention unconsciously to distinctions of thinking. It is usually said that logic deals only with <em>forms<\/em> and has to take its <em>content<\/em> from elsewhere. Logical thoughts, however, are not an <em>only<\/em> as against all other content; rather all other content is only an <em>only<\/em> as against them. They are the ground of everything, being in and for itself. &#8211; A higher standpoint of education is already required to direct one&#8217;s interest to such pure determinations. Considering them in and for themselves has the further sense that we derive these determinations from thinking itself and see from them themselves whether they are <em>true<\/em>. We do not take them up externally and then define them or show their value and validity by comparing them with how they occur in consciousness. Then we would start from observation and experience and say, for example: we usually use <em>force<\/em> for this and that. Such a definition we then call correct if it agrees with what is found of its object in our ordinary consciousness. In this way, however, a concept is determined not in and for itself but according to a presupposition, which presupposition is then the criterion, the standard of correctness. We need not use such a standard, however, but let the determinations, living within themselves, have their way for themselves. The question of the truth of the determinations of thought must seem strange to ordinary consciousness, for they seem to receive truth only in their application to given objects, and accordingly it would make no sense to ask about their truth apart from this application. But this question is precisely what matters. Here, of course, one must know what is to be understood by truth. Usually we call truth the agreement of an object with our representation. We then have as presupposition an object to which our representation of it is to conform. &#8211; In the philosophical sense, by contrast, truth means, expressed quite abstractly, the agreement of a content with itself. This is thus a quite different meaning of truth from the one mentioned before. Moreover, the deeper (philosophical) meaning of truth is in part already found in ordinary usage. Thus, for example, one speaks of a <em>true<\/em> friend and understands by this one whose conduct conforms to the concept of friendship; likewise one speaks of a <em>true<\/em> work of art. Untrue then means as much as bad, inadequate within itself. In this sense a bad state is an untrue state, and the bad and untrue in general consists in the contradiction that takes place between the determination or the concept and the concrete existence of an object. Of such a bad object we can form a correct representation, but the content of this representation is something untrue within itself. We can have many such correctnesses in our heads that are at the same time untruths. &#8211; God alone is the true agreement of concept and reality; but all finite things have an untruth in them; they have a concept and a concrete existence which, however, is inadequate to their concept. Therefore they must perish, whereby the inadequacy of their concept and their concrete existence is made manifest. The animal as a singular has its concept in its genus, and the genus frees itself from singularity through death. The consideration of truth in the sense explained here, of agreement with itself, makes up the proper interest of the logical. In ordinary consciousness the question of the truth of the determinations of thought does not arise at all. The business of logic can also be expressed by saying that in it the determinations of thought are considered as to how far they are capable of grasping the true. The question thus is which are the forms of the infinite and which the forms of the finite. In ordinary consciousness one sees no harm in the finite determinations of thought and lets them count without further ado. But all deception comes from thinking and acting according to finite determinations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 3. <\/em>The true can be cognized in various ways, and the ways of cognizing are to be regarded only as forms. Thus one can indeed cognize the true through experience, but this experience is only a form. In experience what matters is the sense with which one approaches actuality. A great sense makes great experiences and discerns in the motley play of appearance what matters. The Idea is present and actual, not something over there and behind. A great sense, such as that of a Goethe, looking into nature or into history, makes great experiences, discerns the rational and utters it. A further point is that one can also cognize the true in reflection and determine it through relationships of thought. The true in and for itself, however, is not yet present in its proper form in these two ways. The most perfect way of cognizing is that in the pure form of thinking. Here man behaves in a thoroughly free way. That the form of thinking is the absolute one and that truth appears in it as it is in and for itself &#8211; this is the assertion of philosophy in general. The proof of this has first the sense of showing that those other forms of cognizing are finite forms. The lofty ancient scepticism accomplished this by showing of all those forms that they contain a contradiction within themselves. When this scepticism also turns to the forms of reason, it first foists something finite on them in order to get hold of them by it. All the forms of finite thinking will occur in the course of the logical development, and indeed as they emerge according to necessity; here (in the introduction) they would have to be taken up at first in an unscientific way as something given. In the logical treatise itself not only the negative side of these forms is shown but also their positive side. When one compares the various forms of cognizing with one another, the first, that of immediate knowing, can easily appear as the most adequate, most beautiful and highest. Into this form falls everything that in moral respects is called innocence, then religious feeling, unprejudiced trust, love, fidelity and natural faith. The two other forms, first that of reflective cognition and then also philosophical cognition, step out of that immediate natural unity. Since they have this in common, the way of wanting to grasp the true through thinking can easily appear as a pride of man, who wants to cognize the true by his own strength. As the standpoint of universal separation this standpoint can indeed be regarded as the origin of all ill and all evil, as the original transgression, and it seems accordingly that thinking and cognizing must be given up in order to attain return and reconciliation. As regards the leaving of natural unity, this wondrous inner division of the spiritual has been an object of the consciousness of peoples since ancient times. In nature such inner division does not occur, and natural things do nothing evil. An old representation of the origin and consequences of that division is given us in the Mosaic myth of the Fall. The content of this myth forms the basis of an essential doctrine of faith, the doctrine of the natural sinfulness of man and the necessity of help against it. It seems fitting to consider the myth of the Fall at the head of logic, since logic has to do with cognition, and this myth too is concerned with cognition, with its origin and meaning. Philosophy must not shy away from religion and must not take up the position as though it had to be content if religion merely tolerated it. But likewise, on the other hand, the view must be rejected that such myths and religious presentations are something done with, for they have a venerability of thousands of years among the peoples. If we now consider the myth of the Fall more closely, we find in it, as was remarked before, the universal relationship of cognition to spiritual life expressed. Spiritual life in its immediacy appears at first as innocence and unprejudiced trust; but it lies in the essence of spirit that this immediate state is sublated, for spiritual life distinguishes itself from natural, and more precisely from animal, life in that it does not remain in its being-in-itself but is <em>for itself<\/em>. This standpoint of division is next likewise to be sublated, and spirit is to return through itself to unity. This unity is then a spiritual one, and the principle of that leading back lies in thinking itself. It is thinking that strikes the wound and also heals it. &#8211; Now it is said in our myth that Adam and Eve, the first human beings, man in general, found themselves in a garden in which there was a tree of life and a tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Of God it is said that he forbade men to eat of the fruits of the latter tree; of the tree of life there is at first no further mention. This expresses that man is not to come to cognition but is to remain in the state of innocence. Among other peoples of deeper consciousness too we find the representation that the first state of man was a state of innocence and unity. What is correct in this is that it indeed cannot rest with the division in which we find everything human; but it is incorrect that immediate, natural unity is the right thing. Spirit is not merely something immediate, but essentially contains within itself the moment of mediation. Childlike innocence has indeed something attractive and touching, but only insofar as it reminds us of what is to be brought forth by spirit. That unity which we intuit in children as a natural one is to be the result of the labour and education of spirit. &#8211; Christ says: &#8220;Unless you <em>become<\/em> like children&#8221; etc.; but this does not say that we are to remain children. &#8211; In our Mosaic myth we further find that the occasion for stepping out of unity reached man through an external solicitation (through the serpent). In fact, however, the entering into opposition, the awakening of consciousness, lies in man himself, and this is the story repeated in every human being. The serpent places divinity in knowing what is good and evil, and this cognition is indeed what has fallen to man&#8217;s share by his having broken with the unity of his immediate being, by his having eaten of the forbidden fruits. The first reflection of awakening consciousness was that the human beings noticed that they were naked. This is a very naive and profound touch. For in shame lies the separation of man from his natural and sensible being. The animals, which do not advance to this separation, are therefore shameless. In the human feeling of shame the spiritual and ethical origin of clothing is also to be sought; merely physical need, by contrast, is only something secondary. &#8211; Next follows the so-called curse that God laid upon man. What is emphasized in it relates chiefly to man&#8217;s opposition to nature. The man is to work in the sweat of his face, and the woman is to give birth in pain. As regards work more precisely, it is just as much the result of division as the overcoming of it. The animal finds immediately at hand what it needs to satisfy its needs; man, by contrast, relates to the means of satisfying his needs as [to] something brought forth and formed by him. Even in this externality man thus relates to himself. &#8211; With the expulsion from paradise the myth is not yet concluded. It goes on to say: &#8220;God said: Behold, Adam has become like one of us, for he knows what is good and evil.&#8221; &#8211; Cognition is here designated as the divine and not, as before, as what ought not to be. Herein also lies the refutation of the talk that philosophy belongs only to the finitude of spirit; philosophy is cognition, and only through cognition has man&#8217;s original calling, to be an image of God, been realized. &#8211; When it is then further said that God drove man out of the garden of Eden lest he also eat of the tree of life, this expresses that man is indeed finite and mortal according to his natural side, but infinite in cognition. It is a well-known doctrine of the Church that man is evil by nature, and this being evil by nature is designated as original sin. Here, however, the external representation must be given up that original sin has its ground only in a contingent deed of the first human beings. In fact it lies in the concept of spirit that man is evil by nature, and one must not imagine that this could also be otherwise. Insofar as man is a natural being and behaves as such, this is a relationship that ought not to be. Spirit is to be free and to be what it is through itself. Nature is for man only the starting point, which he is to transform. The profound ecclesiastical doctrine of original sin is opposed by the doctrine of the modern Enlightenment that man is good by nature and must therefore remain true to nature. Man&#8217;s stepping out of his natural being is his distinguishing himself, as self-conscious, from an external world. But this standpoint of separation, which belongs to the concept of spirit, is then also not the one on which man is to remain. Into this standpoint of division falls the whole finitude of thinking and willing. Here man makes purposes for himself out of himself and takes the material of his action from himself. When he drives these purposes to the highest pitch, knows and wills only himself in his particularity to the exclusion of the universal, he is evil, and this evil is his subjectivity. Here we have at first appearance a double evil; but both are in fact the same. Man, insofar as he is spirit, is not a natural being; insofar as he behaves as such and follows the purposes of desire, he <em>wills<\/em> this. The natural evil of man is thus not like the natural being of animals. Naturalness then has more precisely this determination, that the natural man is a singular as such, for nature in general lies in the bonds of singularization. Insofar, then, as man wills his naturalness, he wills singularity. Against this acting from drives and inclinations, which belongs to natural singularity, the law or universal determination then indeed also comes forward. This law may be an external force or have the form of divine authority. Man is in bondage to the law as long as he remains in his natural conduct. In his inclinations and feelings man does indeed also have benevolent, social inclinations reaching beyond selfish singularity, compassion, love etc. But insofar as these inclinations are immediate, their content, universal in itself, still has the form of subjectivity; selfishness and contingency always have free play here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-25\">\u00a7 25<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The expression <em>objective thoughts<\/em> designates <em>truth<\/em>, which is to be the absolute <em>object<\/em>, not merely the <em>goal<\/em>, of philosophy. But it at once shows an opposition in general, and indeed the one around whose determination and validity the interest of the philosophical standpoint of the present time and the question of <em>truth<\/em> and of its cognition turn. If the determinations of thought are afflicted with a fixed opposition, i.e. if they are only of <em>finite<\/em> nature, they are inadequate to truth, which is absolutely in and for itself, and truth cannot enter into thinking. Thinking that brings forth only <em>finite<\/em> determinations and moves in such is called <em>understanding<\/em> (in the more precise sense of the word). More precisely, the <em>finitude<\/em> of the determinations of thought is to be grasped in a double way: the one, that they are <em>only subjective<\/em> and have their abiding opposition in the objective; the other, that, as being of <em>limited content<\/em> in general, they persist in opposition both towards one another and still more towards the absolute. The <em>positions given to thought towards objectivity<\/em> are now to be considered as a more detailed introduction, in order to elucidate and bring about the meaning and the standpoint that is given to logic here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In my <em>Phenomenology of Spirit<\/em>, which for this reason was designated on its publication as the first part of the system of science, the path is taken of beginning from the first, simplest appearance of spirit, <em>immediate consciousness<\/em>, and developing its dialectic up to the standpoint of philosophical science, whose necessity is shown through this advance. For this purpose, however, it was not possible to stop at the formal aspect of mere consciousness; for the standpoint of philosophical knowing is at the same time the richest in content and most concrete within itself; thus, emerging as result, it also presupposed the concrete shapes of consciousness, such as morality, ethical life, art, religion. The development of the <em>import<\/em>, of the objects of proper parts of philosophical science, therefore falls at the same time into that development of consciousness which at first seems restricted only to the formal, behind whose back that development must, so to speak, proceed, insofar as the content relates to consciousness as the <em>in-itself<\/em>. The presentation thereby becomes more intricate, and what belongs to the concrete parts partly falls into that introduction already. &#8211; The consideration to be undertaken here has the still greater inconvenience of being able to proceed only historically and by argumentation; but it is above all to help towards the insight that the questions which one has before one in representation about the nature <em>of cognition<\/em>, about <em>faith<\/em> and so forth, and which one takes for quite <em>concrete<\/em>, in fact lead back to <em>simple<\/em> determinations of thought, which, however, receive their true settlement only in logic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">15)cf. Kant, <em class=\"qua\">Critique of Pure Reason, B 131<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">16)cf. Matt. 6:33<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">17)Gen. 3:22<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Preliminary Conception \u2192 A. First Position of Thought towards Objectivity. Metaphysics<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-26\">\u00a7 26<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first position is the <em>unprejudiced<\/em> procedure, which, still without consciousness of the opposition of thinking within and against itself, contains the <em>belief<\/em> that through <em>reflection<\/em> <em>truth is cognized<\/em>, that what objects truly are is brought before consciousness. In this belief thinking goes straight at the objects, reproduces the content of sensations and intuitions out of itself as a content of thought, and is satisfied with this as truth. All initial philosophy, all sciences, indeed even the daily doings and dealings of consciousness live in this belief.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-27\">\u00a7 27<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This thinking <em>can<\/em>, because it is unconscious of its opposition, just as well be genuine <em>speculative<\/em> philosophizing as regards its import as dwell in <em>finite<\/em> determinations of thought, i.e. in the <em>still unresolved<\/em> opposition. Here in the introduction the interest can only be to consider this position of thinking with regard to its limit, and therefore to take up the latter kind of <em>philosophizing<\/em> first. &#8211; This, in its most determinate development and the one closest to us, was the <em>former metaphysics<\/em>, as it was constituted among us before the Kantian philosophy. This metaphysics, however, is something <em>former<\/em> only in relation to the history of philosophy; for itself it is always present in general: the <em>mere view of the understanding<\/em> of the objects of reason. A closer consideration of its manner and its main content therefore has at the same time this more immediate present interest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-28\">\u00a7 28<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This science regarded the determinations of thought as the <em>fundamental determinations of things<\/em>; through this presupposition, that what is is cognized <em>in itself<\/em> by being <em>thought<\/em>, it stood higher than the later critical philosophizing. But 1. those determinations were taken in their abstraction as valid for themselves and as capable of being <em>predicates of the true<\/em>. That metaphysics presupposed in general that cognition of the absolute could take place in such a way that <em>predicates are attributed to it<\/em>, and examined neither the determinations of the understanding as to their peculiar content and value, nor the form of determining the absolute by attributing predicates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Such predicates are, for example, <em>existence<\/em>, as in the proposition &#8220;<em>God has existence<\/em>&#8220;; <em>finitude<\/em> or <em>infinity<\/em>, in the question whether the world is finite or infinite; <em>simple<\/em>, <em>composite<\/em>, in the proposition &#8220;the soul is <em>simple<\/em>&#8220;; further &#8220;the thing is <em>one<\/em>, a <em>whole<\/em>&#8221; etc. &#8211; It was not examined whether such predicates are something true in and for themselves, nor whether the form of judgement can be the form of truth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>The presupposition of the old metaphysics was that of unprejudiced belief in general, that thinking grasps the <em>in-itself<\/em> of things, that things are what they truly are only as thought. The human mind and nature are the ever-changing Proteus, and it is a very obvious reflection that things, as they immediately present themselves, are not in themselves. &#8211; The standpoint of the old metaphysics mentioned here is the opposite of what the critical philosophy had as its result. One may well say that, according to this result, man would be left to live on mere chaff and husks. As regards the procedure of that old metaphysics more precisely, it must be remarked that it did not go beyond merely <em>understanding<\/em> thinking. It took up the abstract determinations of thought immediately and let them count as predicates of the true. When thinking is spoken of, one must distinguish <em>finite<\/em>, merely <em>understanding<\/em> thinking from <em>infinite<\/em>, <em>rational<\/em> thinking. The determinations of thought, as they are found immediately and singly, are <em>finite<\/em> determinations. But the true is what is infinite within itself, which cannot be expressed and brought to consciousness through something finite. The expression <em>infinite thinking<\/em> may seem striking if one holds fast to the modern notion that thinking is always limited. But in fact thinking is, according to its essence, infinite within itself. Finite means, formally expressed, that which has an end, which <em>is<\/em> but ceases where it connects with its other and is thus limited by it. The finite thus subsists in relation to its other, which is its negation and presents itself as its limit. Thinking, however, is with itself, relates to itself and has itself as its object. When I have a thought as my object, I am with myself. The I, thinking, is therefore infinite, because in thinking it relates to an object that is itself. An object in general is an other, something negative over against me. If thinking thinks itself, it has an object that is at the same time none, i.e. a sublated, ideal one. Thinking as such, in its purity, thus has no limit within itself. Thinking is finite only insofar as it stops at limited determinations that count for it as something ultimate. Infinite or speculative thinking, by contrast, likewise determines, but in determining, in limiting, it sublates this defect again. Infinity is not to be grasped, as in ordinary representation, as an abstract going beyond and ever further beyond, but in the simple way indicated before. The thinking of the old metaphysics was <em>finite<\/em> thinking, for it moved in determinations of thought whose limit counted for it as something fixed that was not negated again. Thus, for example, it was asked: does God have <em>existence<\/em>? and <em>existence<\/em> was here regarded as something purely positive, something ultimate and excellent. But we shall see later that <em>existence<\/em> is by no means something merely positive, but a determination too low for the Idea and not worthy of God. &#8211; It was further asked about the finitude or infinity of the world. Here infinity is set fixedly over against finitude, and yet it is easy to see that if both are set over against each other, infinity, which is supposed to be the whole, appears only as <em>one<\/em> side and is limited by the finite. &#8211; But a limited infinity is itself only something finite. In the same sense it was asked whether the soul is simple or composite. So simplicity too counted as an ultimate determination capable of grasping the true. But simple is as poor, abstract and one-sided a determination as existence, a determination of which we shall see later that, being itself untrue, it is incapable of grasping the true. If the soul is regarded only as simple, it is determined by such abstraction as one-sided and finite. The old metaphysics thus had the interest of cognizing whether predicates of the kind mentioned are to be attributed to its objects. But these predicates are limited determinations of the understanding which express only a limit, but not the true. &#8211; Here it must be particularly noted further how the procedure consisted in <em>attributing<\/em> predicates to the object to be cognized, e.g. God. But this is external reflection on the object, for the determinations (the predicates) are ready-made in my representation and are attributed to the object only externally. True cognition of an object, by contrast, must be of <em>such<\/em> a kind that the object determines itself out of itself and does not receive its predicates externally. If one proceeds in the manner of predicating, spirit has the feeling of the inexhaustibility of such predicates. The Orientals, accordingly, quite rightly call God, from this standpoint, the many-named, the infinitely-named. The mind is satisfied in none of those finite determinations, and Oriental cognition accordingly consists in a restless search for such predicates. With finite things it is indeed the case that they must be determined by finite predicates, and here the understanding with its activity is in its right place. Itself finite, it also cognizes only the nature of the finite. If I call an action, for example, a <em>theft<\/em>, it is thereby determined as to its essential content, and to cognize this is enough for the judge. Likewise finite things relate as <em>cause<\/em> and <em>effect<\/em>, as <em>force<\/em> and <em>expression<\/em>, and when they are grasped according to these determinations, they are cognized as to their finitude. But objects of reason cannot be determined by such finite predicates, and the endeavour to do so was the defect of the old metaphysics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-29\">\u00a7 29<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Such predicates are for themselves a <em>limited<\/em> content and already show themselves as not adequate to the <em>fullness of the representation<\/em> (of God, nature, spirit etc.) and by no means exhausting it. Further, they are connected with one another through being predicates of <em>one<\/em> subject, but distinct through their content, so that they are taken up <em>towards one another<\/em> from <em>outside<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Orientals, for example, sought to remedy the first defect in determining God by the many <em>names<\/em> they attributed to him; but at the same time the names were to be <em>infinitely<\/em> many.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-30\">\u00a7 30<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">2. Its <em>objects<\/em> were indeed totalities which in and for themselves belong to <em>reason<\/em>, to the thinking of the universal <em>concrete<\/em> within itself &#8211; <em>soul<\/em>, <em>world<\/em>, <em>God<\/em>; but metaphysics took them up from <em>representation<\/em>, laid them down as <em>ready-made given subjects<\/em> as basis when applying the determinations of the understanding to them, and had in that representation the only <em>standard<\/em> of whether the predicates were fitting and sufficient or not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-31\">\u00a7 31<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The representations of soul, world, God seem at first to afford thinking a <em>firm<\/em> hold. But besides the fact that the character of particular subjectivity is mixed into them and they can accordingly have very different meanings, they rather need first to receive their firm determination through thinking. Every proposition expresses this, since in it only through the <em>predicate<\/em> (i.e. in philosophy through the determination of thought) is it to be stated what the subject, i.e. the initial representation, is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the proposition &#8220;God is eternal etc.&#8221; one begins with the representation &#8220;God&#8221;; but what he <em>is<\/em> is not yet <em>known<\/em>; only the predicate states what he <em>is<\/em>. It is therefore, in the logical, where the content is determined solely in the form of thought, not only superfluous to make these determinations into predicates of propositions whose <em>subject<\/em> would be God or the vaguer absolute, but it would also have the disadvantage of calling to mind a standard other than the nature of thought itself. &#8211; In any case the form of the proposition, or more determinately of the judgement, is unsuited to expressing the concrete &#8211; and the true is concrete &#8211; and the speculative; judgement is one-sided through its form and to that extent false.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>This metaphysics was not free and objective thinking, since it did not let the object determine itself freely out of itself but presupposed it as ready-made. &#8211; As regards free thinking, Greek philosophy thought freely, but scholasticism did not, since it likewise took up its content as a given one, and indeed as given by the Church. &#8211; We moderns are initiated through our whole education into representations which are extremely difficult to go beyond, since these representations have the deepest content. Among the ancient philosophers we must imagine people who stand wholly in sensible intuition and have no further presupposition than the heavens above and the earth around, for the mythological representations had been thrown aside. Thought in this factual environment is free and withdrawn into itself, free of all material, purely with itself. This pure being-with-oneself belongs to free thinking, to setting out to sea in the open, where there is nothing beneath us and above us and we stand alone with ourselves in solitude.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-32\">\u00a7 32<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">3. This metaphysics became <em>dogmatism<\/em> because, according to the nature of finite determinations, it had to assume that of <em>two opposed assertions<\/em>, such as those propositions were, the one must be <em>true<\/em> and the other <em>false<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em><em>Dogmatism<\/em> has its opposite first in <em>scepticism<\/em>. The ancient sceptics called every philosophy in general dogmatic insofar as it sets up determinate doctrines. In this wider sense properly speculative philosophy too counts as dogmatic for scepticism. Dogmatism in the narrower sense, however, consists in holding fast to one-sided determinations of the understanding to the exclusion of their opposites. This is in general the <em>strict either<\/em>&#8211;<em>or<\/em>, and accordingly it is said, for example: the world is <em>either<\/em> finite <em>or<\/em> infinite, but <em>only one<\/em> of the two. The true, the speculative, by contrast, is precisely what has no such one-sided determination in it and is not exhausted by it, but as totality contains united within itself those determinations which for dogmatism count in their separation as something fixed and true. &#8211; It is often the case in philosophy that one-sidedness places itself alongside totality with the claim to be something particular and fixed over against it. In fact, however, the one-sided is not something fixed and subsisting for itself, but is contained in the whole as sublated. The dogmatism of the metaphysics of the understanding consists in holding fast to one-sided determinations of thought in their isolation, whereas the idealism of speculative philosophy has the principle of totality and proves to overreach the one-sidedness of the abstract determinations of the understanding. Thus idealism will say: the soul is neither <em>only<\/em> finite nor <em>only<\/em> infinite, but it is essentially <em>both<\/em> the one <em>and<\/em> the other and thereby <em>neither<\/em> the one <em>nor<\/em> the other, i.e. such determinations in their isolation are invalid, and they count only as sublated. &#8211; Idealism already occurs in our ordinary consciousness too. Accordingly we say of sensible things that they are changeable, i.e. that being belongs to them as well as non-being. &#8211; We are more stubborn with regard to the determinations of the understanding. These, as determinations of thought, count as something more fixed, indeed as something absolutely fixed. We regard them as separated from one another by an infinite abyss, so that the determinations standing over against one another can never reach each other. The struggle of reason consists in overcoming what the understanding has fixed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-33\">\u00a7 33<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>first part<\/em> of this metaphysics in its ordered shape was <em>ontology<\/em> &#8211; the doctrine of the <em>abstract determinations of essence<\/em>. For these, in their manifoldness and finite validity, a principle is lacking; they must therefore be enumerated <em>empirically<\/em> and <em>contingently<\/em>, and their more precise <em>content<\/em> can only be based on <em>representation<\/em>, on the <em>assurance<\/em> that by a word one thinks precisely this, perhaps also on etymology. The concern can only be the <em>correctness<\/em> of the analysis in agreement with linguistic usage and empirical <em>completeness<\/em>, not the <em>truth<\/em> and <em>necessity<\/em> of such determinations in and for themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The question whether being, existence, or finitude, simplicity, composition etc. are <em>concepts true in and for themselves<\/em> must seem strange if one thinks that one can speak only of the truth <em>of a proposition<\/em> and can only ask whether a <em>concept to a subject<\/em> is <em>to be attributed<\/em> with truth (as it was called) or not; untruth, on this view, depends on the contradiction found between the subject of the representation and the concept to be predicated of it. But the concept as something concrete, and even every determinacy in general, is essentially within itself a unity of distinct determinations. If truth, then, were nothing more than the absence of contradiction, it would have to be considered first, with every concept, whether it does not for itself contain such an inner contradiction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-34\">\u00a7 34<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>second<\/em> part was <em>rational psychology<\/em> or <em>pneumatology<\/em>, which concerns the metaphysical nature of the <em>soul<\/em>, namely of spirit as a <em>thing<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Immortality was sought in the sphere where <em>composition<\/em>, <em>time<\/em>, <em>qualitative alteration<\/em>, <em>quantitative increase<\/em> or <em>decrease<\/em> have their place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>Psychology was called rational in contrast to the empirical way of considering the expressions of the soul. Rational psychology considered the soul according to its metaphysical nature, as it is determined by abstract thinking. It wanted to cognize the inner nature of the soul as it is in itself, as it is for thought. &#8211; Nowadays little is said of the soul in philosophy; rather, chiefly of spirit. Spirit is distinguished from the soul, which is, as it were, the middle between corporeality and spirit, or the bond between the two. Spirit as soul is sunk in corporeality, and the soul is what animates the body. The old metaphysics regarded the soul as a thing. But &#8220;thing&#8221; is a very ambiguous expression. By thing we understand first something immediately existing, something we represent to ourselves sensibly, and in this sense the soul was spoken of. Accordingly it was asked where the soul has its seat. But as having a seat the soul is in space and is represented sensibly. Likewise it belongs to the conception of the soul as a thing when it is asked whether it is simple or composite. This question was of interest especially in relation to the immortality of the soul, insofar as this was regarded as conditioned by the simplicity of the soul. But in fact abstract simplicity is a determination that corresponds to the essence of the soul as little as that of compositeness. As regards the relationship of rational to empirical psychology, the former stands higher than the latter in that it makes it its task to cognize spirit through thinking and also to prove what is thought, whereas empirical psychology starts from perception and only enumerates and describes what perception provides. But if one wants to think spirit, one must not be so standoffish towards its particularities. Spirit is activity in the sense in which the scholastics already said of God that he is absolute actuosity. But since spirit is active, this implies that it expresses itself. One must therefore not regard spirit as a processless <em>ens<\/em>, as happened in the old metaphysics, which separated the processless inwardness of spirit from its externality. Spirit is essentially to be considered in its concrete actuality, in its energy, and indeed in such a way that its expressions are cognized as determined by its inwardness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-35\">\u00a7 35<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>third<\/em> part, <em>cosmology<\/em>, dealt with the <em>world<\/em>, its contingency, necessity, eternity, limitedness in space and time, the formal laws in its changes, further with the freedom of man and the origin of evil.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here the following count chiefly as absolute oppositions: contingency and necessity; external and internal necessity; efficient and final causes, or causality in general and purpose; essence or substance and appearance; form and matter; freedom and necessity; happiness and pain; good and evil.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>Cosmology had as its object nature as well as spirit in its external entanglements, in its appearance, thus in general existence, the sum total of the finite. But it considered this object not as a concrete whole but only according to abstract determinations. Thus, for example, the questions were discussed here whether chance or necessity rules in the world, whether the world is eternal or created. A chief interest of this discipline was next the setting up of so-called universal cosmological laws, such as this, that there is no leap in nature. Leap here means as much as qualitative difference and qualitative alteration, which appear as unmediated, whereas the (quantitative) gradual presents itself as something mediated. In relation to spirit as it appears in the world, it was then chiefly the questions of the freedom of man and of the origin of evil that were discussed in cosmology. These are indeed questions of the highest interest. But to answer them in a satisfactory way requires above all that one not hold fast to the abstract determinations of the understanding as something ultimate, in <em>the<\/em> sense that each of the two determinations of an opposition had a subsistence for itself and were to be regarded in its isolation as something substantial and true. This, however, was the standpoint of the old metaphysics, as also in general in the cosmological discussions, which for this reason were unable to fulfil their purpose of comprehending the appearances of the world. Thus, for example, the difference of freedom and necessity was taken into consideration, and these determinations were applied to nature and to spirit in <em>such<\/em> a way that the former was regarded in its effects as subject to necessity, the latter as free. This difference is indeed essential and grounded in the innermost of spirit itself; but freedom and necessity, as abstractly opposed to each other, belong only to finitude and hold only on its ground. A freedom that had no necessity within it, and a mere necessity without freedom &#8211; these are abstract and therefore untrue determinations. Freedom is essentially concrete, determined within itself in an eternal way and thus at the same time necessary. When necessity is spoken of, one usually understands by it at first only determination from outside, as, for example, in finite mechanics a body moves only when it is pushed by another body, and indeed in the direction imparted to it by this push. This, however, is a merely external necessity, not the truly inner one, for this is freedom. &#8211; It is the same with the opposition of <em>good<\/em> and <em>evil<\/em>, this opposition of the modern world deepened within itself. If we regard evil as something fixed for itself that is not the good, this is quite correct, and the opposition is to be recognized, insofar as its semblance and relativity must not be taken as though evil and good were one in the absolute, as indeed has been said recently, that something becomes evil only through our view. What is false, however, is regarding evil as something fixed and positive, whereas it is the negative, which has no subsistence for itself but only wants to be for itself and is in fact only the absolute semblance of negativity within itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-36\">\u00a7 36<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>fourth<\/em> part, <em>natural<\/em> or <em>rational theology<\/em>, considered the concept of God or its possibility, the proofs of his existence, and his attributes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">a) In this consideration of God by the understanding what matters chiefly is which predicates fit or do not fit what <em>we represent<\/em> to <em>ourselves<\/em> by God. The opposition of reality and negation occurs here as absolute; therefore what remains in the end for the <em>concept<\/em>, as the understanding takes it, is only the empty abstraction of indeterminate <em>essence<\/em>, of pure reality or positivity, the dead product of the modern Enlightenment. b) The <em>proving<\/em> of finite cognition shows in general the inverted position that an objective ground of God&#8217;s being is to be given, which thus presents itself as something <em>mediated<\/em> by another. This proving, which has the identity of the understanding as its rule, is caught in the difficulty of making the transition from the <em>finite<\/em> to the <em>infinite<\/em>. So it could either not free God from the finitude of the existing world, which remained positive, so that he had to be determined as its immediate substance (pantheism) &#8211; or he remained as an object over against the subject, and thus in this way something <em>finite<\/em> (dualism). c) The <em>attributes<\/em>, since they are supposed to be determinate and diverse, have properly perished in the abstract concept of pure reality, of indeterminate essence. But insofar as the finite world still remains in representation as a <em>true<\/em> being and God over against it, the representation of various relationships of God to it also arises, which, determined as attributes, must on the one hand, as relationships to finite states, themselves be of a finite kind (e.g. just, kind, mighty, wise etc.), but on the other hand are at the same time supposed to be infinite. On this standpoint this contradiction admits only the nebulous solution through quantitative intensification, driving them into the indeterminate, into the <em>sensum eminentiorem<\/em>. But through this the attribute is in fact annihilated and merely a name is left to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>In this part of the old metaphysics the concern was to establish how far reason for itself could get in the cognition of God. To cognize God through reason is indeed the highest task of science. Religion contains first representations of God; these representations, as they are compiled in the creed, are communicated to us from youth on as doctrines of religion, and insofar as the individual believes in these doctrines and they are the truth for him, he has what he needs as a Christian. Theology, however, is the science of this faith. If theology gives merely an external enumeration and compilation of religious doctrines, it is not yet science. Nor does the merely historical treatment of its object so popular nowadays (as, for example, by recounting what this or that Church Father said) yet give theology the character of being scientific. This happens only by advancing to comprehending thinking, which is the business of philosophy. True theology is thus essentially at the same time philosophy of religion, and this it was also in the Middle Ages. As regards the <em>rational<\/em> theology of the old metaphysics more precisely, it was not a science of <em>reason<\/em> but a science of God of the <em>understanding<\/em>, and its thinking moved in abstract determinations of thought. &#8211; In treating the <em>concept<\/em> of God here, it was the <em>representation<\/em> of God that formed the standard for cognition. But thinking must move freely within itself, though it must at once be remarked that the result of free thinking agrees with the content of the Christian religion, since this is the revelation of reason. Such agreement, however, did not come about in that rational theology. When it set about determining the representation of God through thinking, what resulted as the concept of God was only the abstraction of positivity or reality in general, to the exclusion of negation, and God was accordingly defined as the <em>most real being<\/em>. But it is easy to see that this most real being, by having negation excluded from it, is precisely the opposite of what it is supposed to be and of what the understanding thinks it has in it. Instead of being the richest and absolutely fulfilled, it is, because of its abstract conception, rather the poorest of all and absolutely empty. The mind rightly demands a concrete content; but such content is present only by containing determinacy, i.e. negation, within itself. If the concept of God is grasped merely as that of the abstract or most real being, God thereby becomes for us a mere beyond, and there can then be no further talk of cognizing him; for where there is no determinacy, no cognition is possible either. Pure light is pure darkness. The second interest of this rational theology concerned the proofs of God&#8217;s existence. The main point here is that proving, as it is taken by the understanding, is the dependence of one determination on another. In this proving one has something presupposed, something fixed, from which something else follows. Here, then, the dependence of a determination on a presupposition is shown. If God&#8217;s existence is to be proved in this way, this takes on the sense that God&#8217;s being is to depend on other determinations, that these thus make up the ground of God&#8217;s being. Here one sees at once that something skewed must come out, for God is supposed to be precisely the ground of everything pure and simple and thus not dependent on anything else. In this connection it has been said in modern times that God&#8217;s existence cannot be proved but must be cognized immediately. Reason, however, understands by proving something quite different from the understanding, and so does sound common sense. The proving of reason does indeed also have as its starting point something other than God, but in its advance it does not leave this other as something immediate and existing; rather, by showing it to be something mediated and posited, it results at the same time that God is to be regarded as what contains mediation within itself as sublated, the truly immediate, original and self-resting. &#8211; If one says: &#8220;consider nature, it will lead you to God, you will find an absolute final purpose&#8221;, this does not mean that God is something mediated, but that only <em>we<\/em> make the passage from an other to God, in <em>such<\/em> a way that God, as the consequence, is at the same time the absolute ground of that first, so that the position is reversed, and what appears as consequence also shows itself as ground, and what first presented itself as ground is reduced to consequence. This then is also the course of rational proving. If, after the discussion so far, we cast one more glance at the procedure of this metaphysics in general, we find that it consisted in grasping the objects of reason in abstract, finite determinations of the understanding and making abstract identity the principle. But this infinity of the understanding, this pure essence, is itself only something finite, for particularity is excluded from it, limits and negates it. This metaphysics, instead of coming to concrete identity, persisted in abstract identity; but its good side was the consciousness that thought alone is the essentiality of what is. The material for this metaphysics was provided by the earlier philosophers and notably by the scholastics. In speculative philosophy the understanding is indeed a moment, but a moment at which one does not stop. Plato is no such metaphysician, and Aristotle still less, although the opposite is usually believed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Preliminary Conception \u2192 B. Second Position of Thought towards Objectivity \u2192 I. Empiricism<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-37\">\u00a7 37<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The need, partly for a <em>concrete<\/em> content as against the abstract theories of the understanding, which cannot by itself advance from its universalities to particularization and determination, partly for a <em>firm hold<\/em> as against the possibility of <em>being able to prove everything<\/em> in the field and by the method of finite determinations, led first to <em>empiricism<\/em>, which, instead of seeking the true in thought itself, goes to fetch it from <em>experience<\/em>, from outer and inner presence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>Empiricism owes its origin to the need stated in the preceding \u00a7 for a <em>concrete content<\/em> and a <em>firm hold<\/em>, a need which the abstract metaphysics of the understanding is unable to satisfy. As regards the concreteness of the content, what matters in general is that the objects of consciousness are known as determined within themselves and as a unity of distinct determinations. But this, as we have seen, is by no means the case with the metaphysics of the understanding, according to the principle of the understanding. Merely understanding thinking is restricted to the form of the abstract universal and is unable to advance to the particularization of this universal. Thus, for example, the old metaphysics set about determining through thinking what the essence or fundamental determination of the soul is, and it was then said that the soul is <em>simple<\/em>. This simplicity ascribed to the soul has here the meaning of abstract simplicity to the exclusion of difference, which, as compositeness, was regarded as the fundamental determination of the body and then further of matter in general. But abstract simplicity is a very meagre determination, by which the richness of the soul, and then further of spirit, can by no means be grasped. Since abstract metaphysical thinking thus proved insufficient, people saw themselves compelled to take refuge in empirical psychology. It is the same with rational physics. When it was said here, for example, that space is infinite, that nature makes no leap etc., this is thoroughly unsatisfying as against the fullness and life of nature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-38\">\u00a7 38<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Empiricism<\/em> has this source in common, on the one hand, with metaphysics itself, which likewise has representations, i.e. the content originating first from experience, as the warrant for the authentication of its definitions &#8211; the presuppositions as well as the more determinate content. On the other hand, singular perception is distinct from experience, and empiricism raises the content belonging to perception, feeling and intuition into the <em>form of universal<\/em> representations, <em>propositions<\/em> and <em>laws<\/em> etc. This happens, however, only in the sense that these universal determinations (e.g. force) are to have no further meaning and validity for themselves than that taken from perception, and no connection is to have legitimacy other than one that can be demonstrated in appearance. Empirical cognition has its firm hold on the <em>subjective<\/em> side in the fact that consciousness has its <em>own immediate presence<\/em> and <em>certainty<\/em> in perception.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There lies in empiricism this great principle, that what is true must be in actuality and be there for perception. This principle is opposed to the <em>ought<\/em> with which reflection puffs itself up and acts contemptuously towards actuality and the present with a <em>beyond<\/em> that is supposed to have its seat and existence only in the subjective understanding. Like empiricism, philosophy too (\u00a7 7) cognizes only what <em>is<\/em>; it does not know what only <em>ought<\/em> to be and is thus <em>not there<\/em>. &#8211; On the subjective side, likewise, the important principle of <em>freedom<\/em> that lies in empiricism is to be recognized, namely that man should <em>see for himself<\/em> what he is to accept in his knowing, should know <em>himself<\/em> to be <em>present<\/em> in it. &#8211; The <em>consistent<\/em> carrying through of empiricism, however, insofar as it restricts itself to the finite as regards content, denies the supersensible in general, or at least the cognition and determinacy of it, and leaves to thinking only abstraction and formal universality and identity. &#8211; The fundamental illusion in scientific empiricism is always this, that it uses the metaphysical categories of matter, force, not to mention of one, many, universality, also infinite etc., further goes on <em>inferring<\/em> along the thread of such categories, thereby presupposing and applying the forms of syllogizing, and in all this does not know that it thus itself contains and practises metaphysics and uses those categories and their connections in a completely uncritical and unconscious way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>From empiricism the call went out: stop drifting about in empty abstractions, look at your hands, grasp the <em>here<\/em> of man and of nature, enjoy the present &#8211; and it cannot be denied that an essentially justified moment is contained in this. The <em>here<\/em>, the present, this world was to be exchanged for the empty beyond, for the cobwebs and misty shapes of the abstract understanding. With this the firm hold missed in the old metaphysics, i.e. the infinite determination, is also gained. The understanding picks out only finite determinations; these are in themselves without hold and wavering, and the building erected on them collapses. To find an infinite determination was in general the drive of reason; but the time had not yet come to find it in thinking. So this drive seized on the present, the here, the this, which has the infinite form in it, even if not in the true concrete existence of this form. The external is <em>in itself<\/em> the true, for the true is actual and must exist. The infinite determinacy that reason seeks is thus in the world, though in sensibly singular shape, not in its truth. &#8211; More precisely, <em>perception<\/em> is the form in which comprehension was supposed to take place, and this is the defect of empiricism. Perception as such is always something singular and transient; but cognition does not stop at this; rather it seeks out in the perceived singular the universal and abiding, and this is the advance from mere perception to experience. &#8211; To make experiences, empiricism makes use chiefly of the form of <em>analysis<\/em>. In perception one has a manifold concrete whose determinations are to be laid apart like an onion whose skins one peels off. This dissection thus has the sense that one dissolves and takes apart the determinations that have grown together and adds nothing but the subjective activity of taking apart. Analysis, however, is the advance from the immediacy of perception to thought, insofar as the determinations which the analysed object contains united within itself receive the form of universality by being separated. Empiricism, in analysing objects, is in error when it thinks it leaves them as they are, since in fact it transforms the concrete into something abstract. Through this it happens at the same time that the living is killed, for only the concrete, the one, is living. Nevertheless that separation must take place in order to comprehend, and spirit itself is separation within itself. This, however, is only <em>one<\/em> side, and the main thing consists in the uniting of what has been separated. Insofar as analysis stops at the standpoint of separation, the poet&#8217;s word holds of it:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Encheiresin naturae chemistry calls it, mocks itself and knows not how. It has the parts in its hand, lacking, alas, only the spiritual bond.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Analysis starts from the concrete and in this material has much advantage over the abstract thinking of the old metaphysics. It fixes differences, and this is of great importance; but these differences are then themselves only abstract determinations again, i.e. <em>thoughts<\/em>. Since these thoughts count as what the objects are in themselves, this is again the presupposition of the old metaphysics, namely that what is true in things lies in thinking. If we now further compare the standpoint of empiricism with that of the old metaphysics with regard to content, the latter, as we saw earlier, had as its content those universal objects of reason, God, the soul and the world in general; this content was taken up from representation, and the business of philosophy consisted in leading it back to the form of thoughts. It was similar with scholastic philosophy; for it the dogmas of the Christian Church formed the presupposed content, whose more precise determination and systematization through thinking was the concern. &#8211; Of a quite different kind is the presupposed content of empiricism. This is the sensible content of nature and the content of finite spirit. Here, then, one has finite material before one, and in the old metaphysics the infinite. This infinite content was then made finite by the finite form of the understanding. In empiricism we have the same finitude of form, and moreover the content too is finite. The method, incidentally, is the same in both ways of philosophizing insofar as in both one starts from presuppositions as something fixed. For empiricism the external is in general the true, and even if something supersensible is then admitted, no cognition of it is supposed to be possible, but one is to keep solely to what belongs to perception. This principle, however, carried through, has given what was later designated as <em>materialism<\/em>. For this materialism matter as such counts as the truly objective. But matter is itself already an abstraction, which as such cannot be perceived. One can therefore say there is no matter; for as it exists it is always something determinate, concrete. Nevertheless the abstraction of matter is supposed to be the foundation of everything sensible &#8211; the sensible in general, absolute singularization within itself and therefore what exists outside one another. Since this sensible is and remains something given for empiricism, this is a doctrine of unfreedom, for freedom consists precisely in my having no absolute other over against me but depending on a content that I myself am. Further, on this standpoint reason and unreason are only subjective, i.e. we have to accept the given as it is, and we have no right to ask whether and to what extent it is rational within itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-39\">\u00a7 39<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">About this principle, first, the correct reflection has been made that in what is called <em>experience<\/em>, and is to be distinguished from mere singular perception of singular facts, <em>two elements<\/em> are found &#8211; the one the infinitely <em>manifold material<\/em>, singularized for itself, the other the <em>form<\/em>, the determinations of <em>universality<\/em> and <em>necessity<\/em>. Empirical observation does indeed show many, perhaps countless, similar perceptions; but <em>universality<\/em> is still something quite other than a great multitude. Likewise empirical observation does afford perceptions of <em>successive<\/em> changes or of objects <em>lying side by side<\/em>, but not a connection <em>of necessity<\/em>. Since perception is to remain the foundation of what counts as truth, universality and necessity appear as something <em>unjustified<\/em>, as a subjective contingency, a mere habit, whose content can be constituted this way or otherwise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">An important consequence of this is that in this empirical manner legal and ethical determinations and laws, as well as the content of religion, appear as something contingent, and their objectivity and inner truth are given up. <em>Humean<\/em> scepticism, from which the above reflection chiefly proceeds, is, moreover, very much to be distinguished from <em>Greek scepticism<\/em>. Humean scepticism lays down the <em>truth<\/em> of the empirical, of feeling, of intuition as its basis and from there disputes universal determinations and laws, on the ground that they have no legitimation through sense perception. Ancient scepticism was so far from making feeling, intuition the principle of truth that it rather turned first and foremost against the sensible. (On modern scepticism in its comparison with the ancient, see Schelling&#8217;s and Hegel&#8217;s <em>Critical Journal of Philosophy<\/em>, 1802, vol. I, no. 2.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">18)<em class=\"qua\">Faust, Part 1, Study, ll. 1940\u20131941 and 1938\u20131939<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">19)Hegel, &#8220;Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy, Presentation of its Various Modifications and Comparison of the Newest with the Ancient&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Preliminary Conception \u2192 B. Second Position of Thought towards Objectivity \u2192 II. Critical Philosophy<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-40\">\u00a7 40<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The critical philosophy has in common with empiricism that it takes experience as the <em>only ground<\/em> of cognitions, which, however, it allows to count not as truths but only as cognitions of appearances. It starts first from the difference of the elements found in the analysis of experience, the <em>sensible material<\/em> and its <em>universal relations<\/em>. Since this is combined with the reflection cited in the preceding \u00a7, that in perception for itself only the <em>singular<\/em> and only <em>what happens<\/em> is contained, at the same time the <em>fact is insisted on<\/em> that <em>universality<\/em> and <em>necessity<\/em>, as equally essential determinations, are found in what is called experience. Because this element does not stem from the empirical as such, it belongs to the spontaneity of <em>thinking<\/em> or is a priori. &#8211; The determinations of thought or <em>concepts of the understanding<\/em> make up the <em>objectivity<\/em> of cognitions of experience. They contain <em>relations<\/em> in general, and therefore <em>synthetic<\/em> judgements a priori (i.e. original relations of opposites) are formed through them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That the determinations of universality and necessity are found in cognition is a fact that Humean scepticism does not deny. In the Kantian philosophy too it is nothing other than a presupposed fact; one can say, in the ordinary language of the sciences, that this philosophy has merely put forward a different <em>explanation<\/em> of that fact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-41\">\u00a7 41<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>critical<\/em> philosophy now first subjects to examination the value of the <em>concepts of the understanding<\/em> used in metaphysics &#8211; and, incidentally, also in the other sciences and in ordinary representing. This critique, however, does not go into the <em>content<\/em> and the determinate relationship of these determinations of thought to one another itself, but considers them according to the opposition of <em>subjectivity<\/em> and <em>objectivity<\/em> in general. This opposition, as it is taken here, relates (see preceding \u00a7) to the difference of the elements <em>within<\/em> experience. <em>Objectivity<\/em> here means the element of <em>universality<\/em> and <em>necessity<\/em>, i.e. of the determinations of thought themselves &#8211; the so-called <em>a priori<\/em>. But the critical philosophy extends the opposition in such a way that the <em>whole<\/em> of experience, i.e. those two elements together, falls into <em>subjectivity<\/em>, and nothing remains over against it but the <em>thing-in-itself<\/em>. The more precise <em>forms<\/em> of the <em>a priori<\/em>, i.e. of thinking, and indeed of thinking as an activity that, notwithstanding its objectivity, is only subjective, result in the following way &#8211; a systematization which, moreover, rests only on psychological-historical foundations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 1. <\/em>Through the determinations of the old metaphysics having been subjected to examination, a very important step has undoubtedly been taken. Unprejudiced thinking moved unsuspectingly in those determinations, which arose straightforwardly and of their own accord. No thought was given to the extent to which these determinations had value and validity for themselves. It has already been remarked that free thinking is one that has no presuppositions. The thinking of the old metaphysics was therefore not free, because it let its determinations count without further ado as something existing in advance, as an a priori which reflection had not itself examined. The critical philosophy, by contrast, made it its task to examine to what extent the forms of thinking are capable at all of helping towards the cognition of truth. More precisely, the faculty of cognition was now to be examined before cognizing. What is correct in this is indeed that the forms of thinking themselves must be made the object of cognition; but the misunderstanding soon creeps in of wanting to cognize before cognizing, or of not wanting to go into the water before one has learned to swim. The forms of thinking should indeed not be used unexamined, but this examining is itself already a cognizing. The activity of the forms of thought and their critique must therefore be united in cognition. The forms of thought must be considered in and for themselves; they are the object and the activity of the object itself; they examine themselves, must determine their limit in themselves and show their defect. This is then that activity of thinking which will shortly be taken into particular consideration as <em>dialectic<\/em>, and of which it need only be remarked provisionally here that it is to be regarded not as brought to the determinations of thought from outside but rather as indwelling in them themselves. The next point in the Kantian philosophy, then, is that thinking itself is to examine to what extent it is capable of cognizing. Nowadays people have got beyond the Kantian philosophy, and everyone wants to be further. Being further, however, is twofold: a further forwards and a further backwards. Many of our philosophical endeavours are, seen in the light, nothing other than the procedure of the old metaphysics, an uncritical thinking along just as it happens to come to each.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 2. <\/em>Kant&#8217;s examination of the determinations of thought suffers essentially from the defect that they are considered not in and for themselves but only from the point of view of whether they are <em>subjective<\/em> or <em>objective<\/em>. In the usage of common life the <em>objective<\/em> is understood as what is present outside us and reaches us from outside through perception. Kant denied of the determinations of thought (such as cause and effect) that objectivity in the sense mentioned here belongs to them, i.e. that they are given in perception, and regarded them instead as belonging to our thinking itself or to the spontaneity of thinking, and in <em>this<\/em> sense as subjective. But Kant nevertheless calls what is thought, and more precisely the universal and necessary, the objective, and what is merely sensed the subjective. The usage mentioned before thus appears to be turned on its head, and Kant has therefore been reproached with confusing language; but very unjustly. The matter stands more precisely as follows. To common consciousness what stands over against it, the sensibly perceptible (e.g. this animal, this star etc.), appears as what subsists for itself, the self-standing, and thoughts by contrast count for it as non-self-standing and dependent on an other. But in fact the sensibly perceptible is what is properly non-self-standing and secondary, and thoughts by contrast are the truly self-standing and primitive. In this sense Kant called what accords with thought (the universal and necessary) the <em>objective<\/em>, and indeed with full right. On the other hand the sensibly perceptible is indeed the <em>subjective<\/em> insofar as it does not have its hold within itself and is just as fleeting and transient as the character of duration and inner subsistence belongs to thought. The determination of the difference between the objective and the subjective mentioned here and asserted by Kant we also find nowadays in the usage of more highly educated consciousness; thus, for example, it is demanded of the judgement of a work of art that it be objective and not subjective, and by this is understood that it is not to proceed from contingent, particular sensation and the mood of the moment but is to keep in view the universal points of view grounded in the essence of art. In the same sense, in a scientific occupation, one will be able to distinguish between an objective and a subjective interest. Further, however, Kantian objectivity of thinking is itself only subjective again insofar as, according to Kant, thoughts, although universal and necessary determinations, are still <em>only our<\/em> thoughts and are separated from what the thing is <em>in itself<\/em> by an insurmountable gulf. True objectivity of thinking, by contrast, is this: that thoughts are not merely our thoughts but at the same time the <em>in-itself<\/em> of things and of what is objective in general. &#8211; <em>Objective<\/em> and <em>subjective<\/em> are convenient expressions which are used fluently and in whose use confusion nevertheless very easily arises. According to the discussion so far, objectivity has a threefold meaning. <em>First<\/em>, the meaning of what is externally present, as distinct from the <em>merely<\/em> subjective, supposed, dreamt etc.; <em>second<\/em>, the meaning established by Kant of the universal and necessary, as distinct from the contingent, particular and subjective belonging to our sensation; and <em>third<\/em>, the meaning last mentioned above of the in-itself as thought, of what is there, as distinct from what is merely thought by us and thus still distinct from the matter itself or <em>in itself<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-42\">\u00a7 42<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">a) <em>The theoretical faculty<\/em>, cognition as such.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As the determinate ground of the concepts of the understanding this philosophy gives the <em>original identity<\/em> of the <em>I<\/em> in thinking (transcendental unity of self-consciousness). The representations given through feeling and intuition are a <em>manifold<\/em> as regards their <em>content<\/em>, and just as much through their form, through the <em>asunderness<\/em> of sensibility in its two forms, space and time, which, as forms (the universal) of intuiting, are themselves a priori. This manifold of sensing and intuiting, since the I relates it to itself and unites it within itself as in <em>one<\/em> consciousness (pure apperception), is thereby brought into identity, into an original connection. The determinate modes of this relating are the pure concepts of the understanding, the <em>categories<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As is well known, the Kantian philosophy made things very easy for itself in <em>finding<\/em> the categories. The <em>I<\/em>, the unity of self-consciousness, is quite abstract and completely undetermined; how, then, is one to arrive at the <em>determinations<\/em> of the I, the categories? Fortunately, the <em>various kinds of judgement<\/em> are already found empirically given in ordinary logic. But judging is <em>thinking<\/em> a determinate object. The various modes of judgement, already enumerated ready-made, thus supply the various <em>determinations of thinking<\/em>. &#8211; To the <em>Fichtean<\/em> philosophy remains the profound merit of having reminded us that the <em>determinations of thought<\/em> are to be shown in their <em>necessity<\/em>, that they are essentially to be <em>derived<\/em>. &#8211; This philosophy ought at least to have had the effect on the method of treating logic that the determinations of thought in general, or the usual logical material, the <em>kinds<\/em> of concepts, judgements, syllogisms, would no longer be taken merely from observation and so grasped merely empirically, but derived from thinking itself. If thinking is to be capable of proving anything at all, if logic must demand that <em>proofs<\/em> be given, and if it wants to teach proving, it must surely above all be capable of proving its own most peculiar content, of seeing its necessity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 1. <\/em>Kant&#8217;s assertion, then, is that the determinations of thought have their source in the I, and that accordingly the I gives the determinations of universality and necessity. &#8211; If we consider what we have before us at first, it is in general a manifold; the categories are then simple unities to which this manifold relates. The sensible, by contrast, is the asunder, what is outside itself; this is its proper fundamental determination. Thus, for example, &#8220;now&#8221; has being only in relation to a before and an after. Likewise red is present only insofar as yellow and blue stand over against it. But this other is outside the sensible, and the sensible is only insofar as it is not the other and only insofar as the other is. &#8211; It is precisely the reverse with thinking or the I as with the sensible, which is asunder and outside itself. The I is what is originally identical, at one with itself and absolutely with itself. If I say &#8220;I&#8221;, this is abstract relation to myself, and what is posited in this unity is infected by it and transformed into it. The I is thus, as it were, the melting pot and the fire by which indifferent manifoldness is consumed and reduced to unity. This is then what Kant calls <em>pure apperception<\/em>, as distinct from ordinary apperception, which takes the manifold as such into itself, whereas pure apperception is to be regarded as the activity of making mine. &#8211; With this the nature of all consciousness is indeed correctly expressed. The striving of human beings goes in general towards cognizing the world, appropriating it and subjugating it, and to this end the reality of the world must, as it were, be crushed, i.e. idealized. At the same time, however, it must be remarked that it is not the subjective activity of self-consciousness that brings absolute unity into manifoldness. This identity is rather the absolute, the true itself. It is then, as it were, the goodness of the absolute to release singular things to their self-enjoyment, and this itself drives them back into absolute unity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 2. <\/em>Such expressions as <em>transcendental unity of self-consciousness<\/em> look very difficult, as though something monstrous were being held back behind the mountain, but the matter is simpler. What Kant understands by the <em>transcendental<\/em> results from its difference from the <em>transcendent<\/em>. The <em>transcendent<\/em>, namely, is in general that which steps beyond the determinacy of the understanding, and in this sense it occurs first in mathematics. Thus, for example, it is said in geometry that one must represent the circumference of the circle as consisting of infinitely many infinitely small straight lines. Here determinations which count for the understanding as absolutely different (the straight and the curved) are expressly posited as identical. Such a transcendent is also self-consciousness, identical with itself and infinite within itself, as distinct from common consciousness determined by finite material. Kant, however, designated that unity of self-consciousness only as <em>transcendental<\/em> and understood by this that it is only subjective and does not also belong to objects themselves as they are in themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 3. <\/em>That the <em>categories<\/em> are to be regarded only as belonging to <em>us<\/em> (as subjective) must seem very bizarre to natural consciousness, and there is indeed something skewed in it. This much is correct, however: that the categories are not contained in immediate sensation. Let us consider, for example, a piece of sugar; it is hard, white, sweet etc. We now say that all these properties are united in <em>one<\/em> object, and this <em>unity<\/em> is not in sensation. It is the same when we regard two events as standing in the relationship of cause and effect to each other; what is perceived here is the two singularized events, which follow one another in time. But that the one is the cause and the other the effect (the causal nexus between the two) is not perceived but is present merely for our thinking. Now even though the categories (such as unity, cause and effect etc.) belong to thinking as such, it by no means follows that they are therefore merely something of ours and not also determinations of objects themselves. But according to Kant&#8217;s conception this is supposed to be the case, and his philosophy is <em>subjective idealism<\/em>, insofar as the <em>I<\/em> (the cognizing subject) supplies both the <em>form<\/em> and the <em>material<\/em> of cognition &#8211; the former as <em>thinking<\/em>, the latter as <em>sensing<\/em>. &#8211; As regards the content of this subjective idealism, it in fact makes no difference whatever. One might at first think that objects are deprived of reality by their unity being placed in the subject. But merely by <em>being<\/em> belonging to them, neither the objects nor we would gain anything. What matters is the <em>content<\/em>, whether it is a <em>true<\/em> one. Things are not yet helped by merely <em>being<\/em>. Time comes over what <em>is<\/em>, and it soon becomes <em>non-existent<\/em> too. &#8211; One might also say that, according to subjective idealism, man could think a great deal of <em>himself<\/em>. But if his world is the mass of sensible intuitions, he has no cause to be proud of such a world. Nothing at all depends, then, on that difference of subjectivity and objectivity; what matters is the content, and this is just as much subjective as objective. Objective in the sense of mere concrete existence is a crime too, but an existence null within itself, which then also comes to existence as such in punishment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-43\">\u00a7 43<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On the one hand it is through the categories that mere perception is raised to objectivity, to <em>experience<\/em>; on the other hand, however, these concepts, as unities merely of subjective consciousness, are conditioned by the given material, are empty for themselves and have their application and use solely in experience, whose other component, the determinations of feeling and intuition, is likewise only something subjective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>To assert of the categories that they are empty for themselves is unfounded insofar as they in any case have their content in being <em>determinate<\/em>. The content of the categories is indeed not sensibly perceptible, not spatio-temporal; but this is to be regarded not as a defect but rather as an advantage of theirs. This also finds recognition already in ordinary consciousness, and indeed in <em>such<\/em> a way that one says of a book or a speech, for example, that it is <em>full of content<\/em> to the extent that more thoughts, universal results etc. are to be found in it &#8211; just as conversely one does not yet allow a book, more precisely a novel, say, to count as full of content because a great multitude of singular events, situations and the like are piled up in it. With this, then, ordinary consciousness too expressly recognizes that <em>more<\/em> belongs to content than sensible material; but this <em>more<\/em> is thoughts, and here first the <em>categories<\/em>. &#8211; It must further be remarked that the assertion that the categories are empty for themselves does indeed have a correct sense insofar as one is not to stop at them and their totality (the logical Idea) but to advance to the real domains of nature and spirit; this advance, however, must not be grasped as though a content alien to the logical Idea came to it from outside, but in such a way that it is the logical Idea&#8217;s own activity to determine itself further and unfold into nature and spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-44\">\u00a7 44<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The categories are therefore incapable of being determinations of the absolute, which is not given in a perception, and the understanding, or cognition through categories, is therefore incapable of cognizing <em>things in themselves<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>thing-in-itself<\/em> (and by <em>thing<\/em> spirit and God are also meant) expresses the object insofar as <em>abstraction<\/em> is made from everything it is for consciousness, from all determinations of feeling as from all determinate thoughts of it. It is easy to see what remains &#8211; the <em>complete abstraction<\/em>, the wholly <em>empty<\/em>, determined only as a <em>beyond<\/em>; the <em>negative<\/em> of representation, feeling, determinate thinking etc. But just as simple is the reflection that this <em>caput mortuum<\/em> is itself only <em>the product<\/em> of thinking, of thinking that has advanced precisely to pure abstraction, of the empty I that makes this empty <em>identity<\/em> of itself its <em>object<\/em>. The <em>negative<\/em> determination that this abstract identity receives as <em>object<\/em> is likewise listed among the Kantian categories and is just as familiar as that empty identity. &#8211; Accordingly one can only wonder at having read so often repeated that one does not know what the <em>thing-in-itself<\/em> is; nothing is easier than to know this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-45\">\u00a7 45<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is now <em>reason<\/em>, the faculty of the <em>unconditioned<\/em>, that sees the conditioned character of these cognitions of experience. What is here called the object of reason, the <em>unconditioned<\/em> or <em>infinite<\/em>, is nothing other than what is equal to itself, or it is the <em>original identity<\/em> of the <em>I<\/em> in <em>thinking<\/em> mentioned in \u00a7 42. <em>Reason<\/em> is the name for this <em>abstract I<\/em> or thinking that makes this pure <em>identity<\/em> its object or purpose. Cf. Remark to preceding \u00a7. The cognitions of experience are inadequate to this absolutely <em>indeterminate<\/em> identity, because they are in general of <em>determinate<\/em> content. Since such an unconditioned is taken for the absolute and true of reason (for the <em>Idea<\/em>), the cognitions of experience are thereby declared to be the untrue, to be <em>appearances<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>Only through Kant was the difference between understanding and reason emphasized determinately and fixed in such a way that the former has the finite and conditioned as its object, the latter the infinite and unconditioned. Now although it is to be recognized as a very important result of the Kantian philosophy that it asserted the finitude of cognition of the understanding resting merely on experience and designated its content as <em>appearance<\/em>, one must not stop at this negative result and reduce the unconditionedness of reason merely to abstract identity with itself excluding difference. When reason is regarded in this way merely as going beyond the finite and conditioned of the understanding, it is thereby in fact itself reduced to something finite and conditioned, for the truly infinite is not a mere beyond of the finite but contains it within itself as sublated. The same then also holds of the <em>Idea<\/em>, which Kant did bring back into honour insofar as he vindicated it for reason, as distinct from abstract determinations of the understanding or even merely sensible representations (such as are often called ideas in common life too), but with regard to which he likewise stopped at the negative and the mere <em>ought<\/em>. &#8211; As regards, further, the conception of the objects of our immediate consciousness, which form the content of cognition of experience, as mere <em>appearances<\/em>, this is in any case to be regarded as a very important result of the Kantian philosophy. For common (i.e. sensible-understanding) consciousness the objects it knows count in their singularization as self-standing and resting on themselves, and when they prove to be related to one another and conditioned by one another, this mutual dependence of theirs is regarded as something external to the objects and not belonging to their essence. Against this it must indeed be asserted that the objects we know immediately are mere appearances, i.e. that they have the ground of their being not in themselves but in an other. But here what further matters is how this other is determined. According to the Kantian philosophy the things we know are only appearances for <em>us<\/em>, and their <em>in-itself<\/em> remains for us an inaccessible beyond. Unprejudiced consciousness has rightly taken offence at this subjective idealism, according to which what forms the content of our consciousness is something <em>only<\/em> ours, posited only by <em>us<\/em>. The true relationship is in fact this: that the things we know immediately are mere appearances not only <em>for us<\/em> but <em>in themselves<\/em>, and that it is the very determination of things, thereby finite, to have the ground of their being not in themselves but in the universal divine Idea. This conception of things is then likewise to be designated as idealism, but, as distinct from that subjective idealism of the critical philosophy, as <em>absolute idealism<\/em>; and this absolute idealism, although it goes beyond common realistic consciousness, is in substance so little to be regarded merely as a property of philosophy that it rather forms the foundation of all religious consciousness, insofar namely as this too regards the sum total of everything that is, the existing world in general, as created and governed by God.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-46\">\u00a7 46<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But the need arises to cognize this identity or the empty <em>thing-in-itself<\/em>. To <em>cognize<\/em> means nothing other than to know an object according to its <em>determinate<\/em> content. But determinate content contains manifold <em>connection<\/em> within itself and grounds connection with many other objects. For this determination of that infinite or <em>thing-in-itself<\/em>, this reason would have nothing but the <em>categories<\/em>; when it wants to use them for this, it becomes <em>soaring beyond<\/em> (transcendent).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here the second side of the <em>critique of reason<\/em> comes in, and this second is for itself more important than the first. The first is the view that came up above, that the <em>categories<\/em> have their source in the unity of self-consciousness; that cognition through them therefore in fact contains nothing objective, and the objectivity ascribed to them (\u00a7\u00a7 40, 41) is itself only something <em>subjective<\/em>. If one looks at this, the Kantian critique is merely a <em>subjective<\/em> (flat) <em>idealism<\/em>, which does not engage with the <em>content<\/em>, has before it only the abstract forms of subjectivity, and indeed one-sidedly stops at the former, subjectivity, as the ultimate, absolutely affirmative determination. In considering, however, the so-called <em>application<\/em> that reason makes of the categories for the cognition of its objects, the content of the categories comes up at least as regards some determinations, or at least there would lie in it an occasion through which it could come up. It is of particular interest to see how <em>Kant<\/em> judges this <em>application of the categories to the unconditioned<\/em>, i.e. metaphysics; this procedure will be briefly cited and criticized here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-47\">\u00a7 47<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">1. The <em>first unconditioned<\/em> that is considered is (see above \u00a7 34) the <em>soul<\/em>. &#8211; In my consciousness I always find myself \u03b1) as the <em>determining subject<\/em>, \u03b2) as something <em>singular<\/em> or abstractly simple, \u03b3) as <em>one and the same<\/em> in all the manifold of what I am conscious of &#8211; as something <em>identical<\/em>, \u03b4) as something that <em>distinguishes me<\/em>, as thinking, <em>from all things outside me<\/em>. The procedure of the former metaphysics is now correctly stated: that it puts in place of these <em>empirical<\/em> determinations <em>determinations of thought<\/em>, the corresponding <em>categories<\/em>, whereby these four propositions arise: \u03b1) the <em>soul is substance<\/em>, \u03b2) it is <em>simple<\/em> substance, \u03b3) it is <em>numerically identical<\/em> through the various times of its existence, \u03b4) it stands in <em>relationship<\/em> to the <em>spatial<\/em>. In this transition the defect is pointed out that two kinds of determinations are confused with each other (<em>paralogism<\/em>), namely empirical determinations with categories, that it is something unjustified <em>to infer<\/em> from the former to the latter, in general to put the latter in place of the former. One sees that this critique expresses nothing other than the <em>Humean<\/em> remark cited above in \u00a7 39, that the determinations of thought in general &#8211; universality and necessity &#8211; are not met with in perception, that the empirical is different in its content as in its form from the determination of thought.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If the empirical were to make up the authentication of thought, then thought would indeed be required to be capable of being demonstrated precisely in perceptions. &#8211; That substantiality, simplicity, identity with itself and the self-standingness preserving itself in community with the material world cannot be asserted of the soul is based, in the Kantian critique of metaphysical psychology, solely on the fact that the determinations which consciousness lets us <em>experience<\/em> about the soul are not exactly the same determinations that <em>thinking<\/em> produces here. But according to the above presentation Kant too lets <em>cognition<\/em> in general, indeed even <em>experiencing<\/em>, consist in <em>perceptions<\/em> being thought, i.e. in the determinations that first belong to perceiving being <em>transformed<\/em> into determinations of thought. &#8211; It is always to be counted a good outcome of the Kantian critique that philosophizing about <em>spirit<\/em> has been freed from the soul-<em>thing<\/em>, from the categories and thereby from the questions about the <em>simplicity<\/em> or <em>compositeness<\/em>, <em>materiality<\/em> etc. of the soul. &#8211; But the true point of view regarding the <em>inadmissibility<\/em> of such forms will, even for ordinary common sense, surely not be that they are <em>thoughts<\/em>, but rather that such thoughts do not contain the truth in and for themselves. &#8211; If thought and appearance do not completely correspond to each other, one has at first the choice of regarding the one or the other as the deficient. In Kantian idealism, insofar as it concerns the rational, the defect is pushed onto thoughts, so that these are insufficient because they are not adequate to what is perceived and to a consciousness restricting itself to the range of perceiving, because the thoughts are not met with in such. The content of thought for itself does not come up here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. Paralogisms<\/em> are in general faulty syllogisms whose fault consists more precisely in using one and the same word in different senses in the two premisses. According to Kant the procedure of the old metaphysics in rational psychology rests on such paralogisms, insofar namely as merely empirical determinations of the soul are here regarded as belonging to it in and for itself. &#8211; It is, moreover, quite correct that such predicates as <em>simplicity<\/em>, <em>unchangeability<\/em> etc. are not to be attributed to the soul, but not for the reason given by Kant, that reason would thereby overstep the limit assigned to it, but because such abstract determinations of the understanding are too poor for the soul, and the soul is something quite other than the merely simple, unchangeable etc. Thus, for example, the soul is indeed simple identity with itself, but at the same time, as active, it distinguishes itself within itself, whereas what is <em>only<\/em>, i.e. abstractly, simple is precisely as such at the same time the dead. &#8211; That Kant, through his polemic against the old metaphysics, removed those predicates from the soul and from spirit is to be regarded as a great result, but the &#8220;why&#8221; is quite mistaken in him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-48\">\u00a7 48<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">2. In reason&#8217;s attempt to cognize the unconditioned of the <em>second<\/em> object (\u00a7 35), <em>the world<\/em>, it falls into <em>antinomies<\/em>, i.e. into the assertion of two <em>opposed<\/em> propositions about the <em>same<\/em> object, and indeed in such a way that each of these propositions must be asserted with equal necessity. From this it follows that the worldly content whose determinations fall into such contradiction cannot be <em>in itself<\/em> but only appearance. The <em>solution<\/em> is that the contradiction does not fall into the object in and for itself but belongs solely to cognizing reason.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here it comes up that it is the content itself, namely the categories for themselves, that bring about the contradiction. This thought, that the contradiction posited in the rational by the determinations of the understanding is <em>essential<\/em> and <em>necessary<\/em>, is to be counted one of the most important and profound advances of the philosophy of modern times. As profound as this point of view is, so trivial is the solution; it consists only in a tenderness for worldly things. It is not supposed to be the worldly essence that has the stain of contradiction in it; rather the stain is supposed to belong <em>only<\/em> to thinking reason, to the <em>essence of spirit<\/em>. No one will object that the <em>appearing<\/em> world shows contradictions to the observing spirit &#8211; it is the appearing world as it is for subjective spirit, for <em>sensibility<\/em> and <em>understanding<\/em>. But if the worldly <em>essence<\/em> is compared with the spiritual <em>essence<\/em>, one may wonder with what naivety the humble assertion has been put forward and repeated that not the worldly essence but the thinking essence, reason, is what is self-contradictory. It is of no help to use the turn of phrase that reason falls into contradiction <em>only<\/em> through <em>the application of the categories<\/em>. For it is asserted at the same time that this applying is <em>necessary<\/em> and that reason has no determinations for cognizing other than the categories. Cognizing is in fact <em>determining<\/em> and <em>determinate<\/em> thinking; if reason is only empty, indeterminate thinking, it thinks <em>nothing<\/em>. But if in the end reason is reduced to that <em>empty identity<\/em> (see following \u00a7), then in the end it too is happily freed from contradiction by the easy sacrifice of all content and import. It may further be remarked that the lack of a deeper consideration of the antinomy also occasioned Kant&#8217;s listing only <em>four<\/em> antinomies. He arrived at these by presupposing the table of categories, as with the so-called paralogisms, applying the manner that later became so popular of merely placing an object under an otherwise ready-made <em>schema<\/em> instead of deriving its determinations from the concept. What is further wanting in the working out of the antinomies I have shown on occasion in my <em>Science of Logic<\/em>. The main thing to be noted is that the antinomy is found not only in the four particular objects taken from cosmology, but rather in <em>all<\/em> objects of all kinds, in <em>all<\/em> representations, concepts and ideas. To know this and to cognize objects in this property belongs to what is essential in philosophical consideration; this property makes up what will further be determined as the <em>dialectical<\/em> moment of the logical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>On the standpoint of the old metaphysics it was assumed that if cognition falls into contradictions, this is only a contingent aberration and rests on a subjective error in syllogizing and reasoning. According to Kant, by contrast, it lies in the nature of thinking itself to fall into contradictions (antinomies) when it wants to cognize the infinite. Now although, as mentioned in the Remark to the above \u00a7, the pointing out of the antinomies is to be regarded as a very important furtherance of philosophical cognition insofar as the rigid dogmatism of the metaphysics of the understanding has thereby been removed and attention drawn to the dialectical movement of thinking, it must at the same time be remarked that here too Kant stopped at the merely negative result of the uncognizability of the in-itself of things and did not penetrate to the cognition of the true and positive meaning of the antinomies. The true and positive meaning of the antinomies consists in general in the fact that everything actual contains opposed determinations within itself, and that cognizing, and more precisely comprehending, an object accordingly means precisely becoming conscious of it as a concrete unity of opposed determinations. Whereas, as was shown earlier, the old metaphysics, in considering the objects whose metaphysical cognition was at issue, went to work by applying abstract determinations of the understanding to the exclusion of their opposites, Kant, by contrast, sought to show how the assertions resulting in this way can always be opposed, with equal justification and equal necessity, by other assertions of opposite content. In pointing out these antinomies Kant restricted himself to the cosmology of the old metaphysics and, in his polemic against it, on the basis of the schema of the categories, brought out four antinomies. The <em>first<\/em> concerns the question whether the world is to be thought of as limited in space and time or not. The <em>second<\/em> antinomy concerns the dilemma whether matter is to be regarded as infinitely divisible or as consisting of atoms. The <em>third<\/em> antinomy relates to the opposition of freedom and necessity, insofar namely as the question is raised whether everything in the world must be regarded as conditioned by the causal nexus or whether free beings, i.e. absolute starting points of action in the world, are also to be assumed. To this comes finally, as <em>fourth<\/em> antinomy, the dilemma whether the world has a cause at all or not. &#8211; The procedure Kant observes in his discussion of these antinomies is first this, that he sets the opposed determinations contained in them over against each other as thesis and antithesis and seeks to prove both, i.e. to present them as necessary results of reflection about them, whereby he expressly protests against having sought illusions, say in order to conduct an advocate&#8217;s proof. But in fact the proofs Kant brings for his theses and antitheses are to be regarded as mere sham proofs, since what is to be proved is always already contained in the presuppositions from which one starts, and only through the long-winded apagogic procedure is the semblance of a mediation produced. Nevertheless the setting up of these antinomies always remains a very important and commendable result of the critical philosophy insofar as it expresses (even if at first only subjectively and immediately) the actual unity of those determinations which the understanding holds fast in their separation. Thus, for example, the first of the cosmological antinomies mentioned contains this, that space and time are to be regarded not only as continuous but also as discrete, whereas the old metaphysics stopped at mere continuity and accordingly regarded the world as unlimited in space and time. It is quite correct that one can go beyond every <em>determinate<\/em> space and likewise beyond every <em>determinate<\/em> time; but it is no less correct that space and time are actual only through their determinacy (i.e. as <em>here<\/em> and <em>now<\/em>) and that this determinacy lies in their concept. The same then also holds of the other antinomies cited, for example of the antinomy of <em>freedom<\/em> and <em>necessity<\/em>, with which, considered more closely, the matter stands thus: what the understanding understands by freedom and necessity are in fact only ideal moments of true freedom and true necessity, and no truth belongs to either of the two in their separation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-49\">\u00a7 49<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b3) The <em>third<\/em> object of reason is <em>God<\/em> (\u00a7 36), who is to be cognized, i.e. <em>determined by thinking<\/em>. For the understanding, as against simple <em>identity<\/em>, all determination is only a <em>limit<\/em>, a negation as such; thus all reality is to be taken only as limitless, i.e. <em>indeterminate<\/em>, and God, as the sum total of all realities or as the most real being, becomes a <em>simple abstraction<\/em>, and for determination only the equally absolutely abstract determinacy, <em>being<\/em>, remains. Abstract <em>identity<\/em>, which is here also called the concept, and <em>being<\/em> are the two moments whose union is what reason seeks; it is the <em>ideal<\/em> of reason.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-50\">\u00a7 50<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This union admits of <em>two<\/em> ways or forms; one can namely begin from <em>being<\/em> and pass over from there to the <em>abstraction of thinking<\/em>, or conversely the transition can be effected from the <em>abstraction<\/em> to <em>being<\/em>. As regards the beginning with being, being, as the immediate, presents itself as a being determined in infinitely many ways, a filled world. This can be determined more precisely as a collection of infinitely many contingencies in general (in the <em>cosmological<\/em> proof) or as a collection of infinitely many purposes and <em>purposive<\/em> relationships (in the <em>physico-theological<\/em> proof). &#8211; To <em>think<\/em> this filled being means to strip it of the form of singularities and contingencies and to grasp it as a universal being, necessary in and for itself, determining itself and active according to universal purposes, which is different from that first being &#8211; as God. &#8211; The main sense of the critique of this procedure is that it is a syllogizing, a transition. Since, namely, <em>perceptions<\/em> and their aggregate, the world, do not show in themselves as such the universality to which thinking purifies that content, this universality is not justified by that empirical representation of the world. The ascent of thought from the empirical representation of the world to God is thus opposed by the <em>Humean<\/em> standpoint (as with the paralogisms, see \u00a7 47) &#8211; the standpoint that declares it inadmissible to <em>think<\/em> perceptions, i.e. to lift the universal and necessary out of them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Because man is thinking, neither sound common sense nor philosophy will ever let itself be deprived of raising itself to God <em>from<\/em> and <em>out of<\/em> the empirical view of the world. This raising has nothing else as its foundation than the <em>thinking<\/em>, not merely sensible, animal consideration of the world. For thinking and <em>only<\/em> for thinking is there the <em>essence<\/em>, the <em>substance<\/em>, the <em>universal power<\/em> and <em>purposive determination<\/em> of the world. The so-called proofs of God&#8217;s existence are to be regarded only as the <em>descriptions<\/em> and analyses of the <em>course of spirit<\/em> within itself, which is a <em>thinking<\/em> spirit and thinks the sensible. The <em>raising<\/em> of thinking above the sensible, its <em>going beyond<\/em> the finite to the infinite, the <em>leap<\/em> that is supposedly made into the supersensible by breaking off the series of the sensible &#8211; all this is thinking itself; this passing over is <em>only thinking<\/em>. If such a transition is not to be made, this means that there is to be no thinking. In fact animals do not make such a transition; <em>they<\/em> stop at sensation and intuition; therefore they have no religion. Two things are to be remarked both in general and in particular about the critique of this raising of thinking. <em>First<\/em>, when it is brought into the form of <em>syllogisms<\/em> (so-called <em>proofs<\/em> of God&#8217;s existence), the <em>starting point<\/em> is indeed the view of the world, determined in some way as an aggregate of contingencies or of purposes and purposive relations. This starting point can seem, in thinking insofar as it makes <em>syllogisms<\/em>, <em>to remain<\/em> as a <em>firm foundation<\/em> and to be <em>left<\/em> just as empirical as this material at first is. The relation of the starting point to the end point to which one advances is thus represented as only <em>affirmative<\/em>, as an inference from <em>one<\/em> thing which <em>is<\/em> and <em>remains<\/em> to <em>another<\/em> which likewise <em>also is<\/em>. But it is the great error to want to cognize the nature of thinking only in this form of the understanding. To think the empirical world means rather essentially to alter its empirical form and transform it into a universal; thinking at the same time exercises a <em>negative<\/em> activity on that foundation; the perceived material, when it is determined by universality, <em>does not remain<\/em> in its first empirical shape. The inner <em>import<\/em> of what is perceived is lifted out with the removal and <em>negation<\/em> of the husk (cf. \u00a7\u00a7 13 and 23). The metaphysical proofs of God&#8217;s existence are deficient interpretations and descriptions of the elevation of spirit from the world to God because they do not express, or rather do not bring out, the moment <em>of negation<\/em> contained in this elevation; for in the world&#8217;s being <em>contingent<\/em> it itself lies that it is only something <em>falling<\/em>, appearing, and <em>null<\/em> for itself. The sense of the elevation of spirit is that being does indeed belong to the world, but a being that is only semblance, not true being, not absolute truth; that this is rather, beyond that appearance, only in God; that God alone is true being. Since this elevation is <em>transition<\/em> and <em>mediation<\/em>, it is just as much <em>sublation<\/em> of the <em>transition<\/em> and of mediation, for that through which God could seem to be mediated, the world, is rather declared to be the null; only the <em>nullity<\/em> of the <em>being<\/em> of the world is the bond of the elevation, so that what is as the mediating vanishes, and thereby in this mediation itself mediation is sublated. &#8211; It is chiefly that relationship grasped only as <em>affirmative<\/em>, as a relationship between two existing things, that <em>Jacobi<\/em> holds on to in combating the proving of the understanding; he makes against it the just reproach that <em>conditions<\/em> (the world) are thereby sought for the <em>unconditioned<\/em>, that the <em>infinite<\/em> (God) is in this way represented as <em>grounded<\/em> and <em>dependent<\/em>. But that elevation, as it is in spirit, itself corrects this semblance; rather, its whole import is the correction of this semblance. But this true nature of essential thinking, to sublate mediation itself in mediation, Jacobi did not recognize, and he therefore wrongly took the correct reproach he makes against merely reflecting understanding for a reproach affecting thinking in general, and thus also rational thinking. To illustrate the overlooking of the <em>negative<\/em> moment, one may cite as an example the reproach made against <em>Spinozism<\/em>, that it is pantheism and atheism. Spinoza&#8217;s <em>absolute substance<\/em> is admittedly not yet absolute <em>spirit<\/em>, and it is rightly demanded that God must be determined as absolute spirit. But when Spinoza&#8217;s determination is represented as though he mixed God with nature, with the finite world, and made the world into God, it is presupposed that the finite world possesses true actuality, <em>affirmative reality<\/em>. With this presupposition, of course, a unity of God and the world makes God absolutely finite and reduces him to the merely finite, external manifoldness of concrete existence. Apart from the fact that Spinoza does not define God [as] the unity of God and the world but as the unity of <em>thinking<\/em> and extension (of the material world), it already lies in this unity, even if it is taken in that first, wholly clumsy way, that in the Spinozist system the world is rather determined only as a phenomenon to which no actual reality belongs, so that this system is rather to be regarded as <em>acosmism<\/em>. A philosophy which asserts that God and <em>only<\/em> God <em>is<\/em> ought at least not to be passed off as atheism. After all, religion is still ascribed to peoples who worship the ape, the cow, statues of stone and bronze etc. as God. But in the sense of representation it goes even much more against the grain to give up its own presupposition that this aggregate of finitude of its, which is called the <em>world<\/em>, has actual reality. That there is <em>no world<\/em>, as it might perhaps put it &#8211; to assume something like this is readily held to be quite impossible, or at least much less possible than that it could come into someone&#8217;s head that there is <em>no God<\/em>. People believe, and this not exactly to their own credit, much more easily that a system denies God than that it denies the world; they find it much more comprehensible that God should be denied than that the world should be denied. The <em>second<\/em> remark concerns the critique of the <em>import<\/em> which that thinking elevation first gains. This import, if it consists only in the determinations of the <em>substance<\/em> of the world, of its <em>necessary essence<\/em>, of a <em>cause arranging purposively<\/em> and <em>directing<\/em> etc., is admittedly not adequate to what is understood or is to be understood by <em>God<\/em>. But apart from the manner of presupposing a representation of God and judging a result according to such a presupposition, those determinations already have great value and are necessary moments in the Idea of God. To bring before thinking in this way the import in its true determination, the true Idea of God, the starting point must admittedly not be taken from subordinate content. The <em>merely contingent<\/em> things of the world are a very abstract determination. Organic formations and their purposive determinations belong to the higher circle, to <em>life<\/em>. But besides the fact that the consideration of living nature and of the other relation of existing things to <em>purposes<\/em> can be contaminated by the triviality of purposes, indeed by even childish citations of purposes and their relations, merely living nature itself is in fact not yet that from which the true <em>determination<\/em> of the Idea of God can be grasped; God is more than living, he is spirit. <em>Spiritual<\/em> nature alone is the worthiest and truest <em>starting point<\/em> for the thinking of the absolute, insofar as thinking takes a starting point and wants to take the nearest one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-51\">\u00a7 51<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/280\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 280<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>other way of union<\/em>, through which the <em>ideal<\/em> is supposed to come about, proceeds from the <em>abstraction of thinking<\/em> to determination, for which only <em>being<\/em> remains; &#8211; the <em>ontological proof<\/em> of <em>God&#8217;s existence<\/em>. The opposition that occurs here is that of <em>thinking<\/em> and <em>being<\/em>, whereas in the first way <em>being<\/em> is common to both sides and the opposition concerns only the difference between the singularized and the universal. What the understanding opposes to this other way is in itself the same as what has just been cited, namely that, just as the universal is not found in the empirical, so conversely the determinate is not contained in the universal, and the determinate here is being. Or: being cannot be derived from the concept and analysed out of it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Kantian critique of the ontological proof has no doubt also found such unconditionally favourable reception and acceptance because, to illustrate what a difference there is between thinking and being, Kant used the example of the <em>hundred thalers<\/em>, which according to the <em>concept<\/em> are equally a hundred whether they are only possible or actual; but for <em>my<\/em> financial situation this makes an essential difference. &#8211; Nothing can be so evident as that what I think or represent to myself is not yet <em>actual<\/em> on that account &#8211; the thought that representing, or even the concept, does not suffice for being. &#8211; Apart from the fact that it could not unjustly be called a barbarism to call something like a hundred thalers a concept, those who repeat again and again against the philosophical Idea that <em>thinking and being are different<\/em> ought surely at last to presuppose that this is likewise not unknown to philosophers; what more trivial piece of knowledge could there in fact be? But then it should be considered that when <em>God<\/em> is spoken of, this is an object of a different kind from a hundred thalers and from <em>any<\/em> particular concept, representation or whatever name it may have. In fact everything <em>finite<\/em> is this and <em>only<\/em> this, that <em>its existence is different from its concept<\/em>. But God is expressly to be that which can only be &#8220;<em>thought as existing<\/em>&#8220;, where the concept includes being within itself. It is this unity of concept and being that makes up the concept of God. &#8211; This is admittedly still a formal determination of God, which therefore in fact contains only the nature of the <em>concept<\/em> itself. But that the concept, even in its wholly abstract sense, includes <em>being<\/em> within itself is easy to see. For the concept, however else it may be determined, is at least the <em>immediate relation<\/em> to itself that emerges through the sublation of mediation and is thus itself immediate; but being is nothing other than this. &#8211; It would be strange indeed, one may well say, if this innermost of spirit, the concept, or even the I, or altogether the concrete totality which God is, were not even rich enough to contain within itself so poor a determination as <em>being<\/em> is, indeed the very poorest, the most abstract. For thought there can be nothing lesser in import than <em>being<\/em>. Only this may be still lesser: what one perhaps first represents to oneself by being, namely an <em>external<\/em>, <em>sensible<\/em> concrete existence like that of the paper I have here before me; but one will hardly want to speak of a sensible concrete existence of a limited, transient thing anyway. &#8211; Moreover, the trivial remark of the critique that thought and being are different can at most disturb, but not take away, man&#8217;s course of spirit from the <em>thought<\/em> of God to the certainty that he <em>is<\/em>. This transition, the absolute inseparability of the thought of God from his being, is also what has been restored to its right in the view <em>of immediate knowing<\/em> or <em>faith<\/em>, of which later.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-52\">\u00a7 52<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this way, for <em>thinking<\/em> at its highest peak, <em>determinacy<\/em> remains something <em>external<\/em>; it remains only absolutely <em>abstract thinking<\/em>, which is here always called <em>reason<\/em>. This reason, so runs the result, supplies nothing but <em>formal unity<\/em> for the simplification and systematization of experiences, is a <em>canon<\/em>, not an <em>organon<\/em> of <em>truth<\/em>, is unable to supply a <em>doctrine<\/em> of the infinite but only a <em>critique<\/em> of cognition. This critique consists, in its final analysis, in the <em>assurance<\/em> that thinking within itself is only <em>indeterminate unity<\/em> and the <em>activity<\/em> of this <em>indeterminate unity<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>Kant did indeed grasp reason as the faculty of the unconditioned; but if it is reduced merely to abstract identity, this at the same time implies renouncing its unconditionedness, and reason is then in fact nothing other than empty understanding. Reason is unconditioned only by not being determined from outside by a content alien to it, but rather determining itself and thereby being with itself in its content. But according to Kant the activity of reason consists expressly only in systematizing the material supplied by perception through the application of the categories, i.e. in bringing it into an external order, and its principle here is merely that of non-contradiction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-53\">\u00a7 53<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">b) <em>Practical reason<\/em> is grasped as the will that determines itself, and indeed in a <em>universal<\/em> way, i.e. the <em>thinking<\/em> will. It is to give imperative, objective laws of freedom, i.e. such as say what <em>ought to happen<\/em>. The justification for assuming thinking here as an <em>objectively determining<\/em> activity (i.e. in fact <em>a reason<\/em>) is placed in the claim that practical freedom can be <em>proved through experience<\/em>, i.e. demonstrated in the appearance of self-consciousness. Against this experience in consciousness everything that determinism likewise brings forward from experience against it recurs, in particular the sceptical (also Humean) induction from the <em>infinite diversity<\/em> of what counts as right and duty among human beings, i.e. of the laws of freedom that are supposed to be objective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-54\">\u00a7 54<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For what practical thinking makes its law, for the criterion <em>of determining<\/em> itself within itself, there is again nothing available but the same <em>abstract identity<\/em> of the understanding, that no contradiction take place in the determining; &#8211; <em>practical<\/em> reason thus does not get beyond the formalism that is supposed to be the last word of <em>theoretical<\/em> reason. But this practical reason posits the universal determination, <em>the good<\/em>, not only <em>within itself<\/em>, but is properly <em>practical<\/em> only in the demand that the good have worldly existence, external objectivity, i.e. that thought be not merely <em>subjective<\/em> but objective in general. Of this postulate of practical reason later.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>What Kant denied to theoretical reason &#8211; free self-determination &#8211; he expressly vindicated for practical reason. It is chiefly this side of the Kantian philosophy that has won it great favour, and indeed with full right. To appreciate the merit due to Kant in this respect, one must first call to mind the shape of practical philosophy, and more precisely of moral philosophy, that he found prevailing. This was in general the system of <em>eudaemonism<\/em>, which answered the question of the vocation of man by saying that he must set himself his <em>happiness<\/em> as his goal. Since by happiness was understood the satisfaction of man in his particular inclinations, wishes, needs etc., the contingent and particular was thereby made the principle of the will and its activity. Against this eudaemonism, which lacked any firm hold within itself and opened the door wide to all arbitrariness and caprice, Kant then set practical reason and thereby expressed the demand for a determination of the will that is universal and equally binding for all. Whereas, as remarked in the preceding \u00a7\u00a7, theoretical reason according to Kant is supposed to be merely the negative faculty of the infinite and, without positive content of its own, restricted to seeing the finitude of cognition of experience, he by contrast expressly recognized the positive infinity of practical reason, and indeed in such a way that he ascribes to the <em>will<\/em> the faculty of determining itself in a universal way, i.e. <em>thinkingly<\/em>. The will does indeed possess this faculty, and it is of great importance to know that man is free only insofar as he possesses it and makes use of it in his action; but with this acknowledgement the question of the <em>content<\/em> of the will or of practical reason is not yet answered. If it is then said that man is to make the <em>good<\/em> the content of his will, the question of the content, i.e. of the determinacy of this content, at once recurs, and with the mere principle of the agreement of the will with itself, as well as with the demand to do one&#8217;s duty for duty&#8217;s sake, one gets nowhere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-55\">\u00a7 55<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">c) To <em>reflective judgement<\/em> is ascribed the principle of an <em>intuitive understanding<\/em>, i.e. one in which the <em>particular<\/em>, which is supposed to be <em>contingent<\/em> for the <em>universal<\/em> (abstract identity) and cannot be derived from it, would be determined by this universal itself &#8211; which is supposed to be experienced in the products of art and of <em>organic<\/em> nature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>Critique of Judgement<\/em> has the distinction that in it Kant expressed the representation, indeed the thought, <em>of the Idea<\/em>. The representation of an <em>intuitive understanding<\/em>, of <em>inner<\/em> purposiveness etc. is the <em>universal<\/em> thought at the same time as <em>concrete<\/em> in itself. In these representations alone, therefore, the Kantian philosophy shows itself <em>speculative<\/em>. Many, notably Schiller, have found in the Idea of the <em>beautiful in art<\/em>, the <em>concrete<\/em> unity of thought and sensible representation, the way out of the <em>abstractions<\/em> of the separating understanding &#8211; others in the intuition and consciousness of <em>vitality<\/em> in general, whether natural or intellectual vitality. &#8211; The product of art, like living individuality, is indeed limited in its content; but the Idea that is comprehensive in content too Kant sets up in the postulated harmony of nature or necessity with the purpose of freedom, in the final purpose of the world thought of as realized. But the laziness of <em>thought<\/em>, as it may be called, has in the <em>ought<\/em> too easy a way out with this highest Idea, enabling it to hold fast, against the actual realization of the final purpose, to the separatedness of concept and reality. The <em>presence<\/em> of living organizations and of the beautiful in art, by contrast, shows the <em>actuality<\/em> of the <em>ideal<\/em> even for <em>sense<\/em> and <em>intuition<\/em>. Kant&#8217;s reflections on these objects would therefore be particularly suited to introducing consciousness to the grasping and thinking of the <em>concrete<\/em> Idea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-56\">\u00a7 56<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here the thought is put forward of a relationship of the <em>universal<\/em> of the understanding to the <em>particular<\/em> of intuition other than the one underlying the doctrine of theoretical and practical reason. But this is not connected with the insight that the former <em>is<\/em> the <em>true<\/em>, indeed <em>truth<\/em> itself. Rather this unity is taken up only as it comes to concrete existence in finite appearances, and is shown in <em>experience<\/em>. Such experience is afforded first in the <em>subject<\/em> partly by <em>genius<\/em>, the faculty of producing aesthetic ideas, i.e. representations of free <em>imagination<\/em> that serve an idea and give food for <em>thought<\/em> without such content being expressed in a <em>concept<\/em> or capable of being expressed in one &#8211; partly by the <em>judgement of taste<\/em>, the feeling of the <em>accord<\/em> of <em>intuitions<\/em> or representations in their freedom with the <em>understanding<\/em> in its lawfulness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-57\">\u00a7 57<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The principle of reflective judgement for <em>living products of nature<\/em>, further, is determined as <em>purpose<\/em>, the active <em>concept<\/em>, the universal determined and determining within itself. At the same time the representation of <em>external<\/em> or <em>finite purposiveness<\/em> is removed, in which purpose is only external form for the means and the material in which it realizes itself. In the <em>living<\/em>, by contrast, purpose is immanent determination and activity in matter, and all members are just as much means as purpose to one another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-58\">\u00a7 58<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now although in such an Idea the relationship of the understanding between purpose and means, between subjectivity and objectivity, is sublated, purpose is nevertheless again, in contradiction with this, declared to be a cause that exists and is active <em>only as representation<\/em>, i.e. as something <em>subjective<\/em> &#8211; and with this the determination of purpose too is declared to be only a principle of judging belonging to <em>our<\/em> understanding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Once it is the result of the critical philosophy that reason can cognize only <em>appearances<\/em>, one would at least have had, for living nature, a choice between two <em>equally subjective<\/em> ways of thinking, and, according to the Kantian presentation itself, an obligation to cognize the products of nature not merely according to the categories of quality, cause and effect, composition, components etc. The principle <em>of inner purposiveness<\/em>, held fast and developed in scientific application, would have brought about a quite different, higher way of considering them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-59\">\u00a7 59<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Idea according to this principle in its whole unlimitedness would be that the universality determined by reason, the absolute final purpose, <em>the good<\/em>, would be actualized in the world, and indeed through a third, the power that itself posits this final purpose and realizes it &#8211; <em>God<\/em>, in whom, as absolute truth, those oppositions of universality and singularity, of subjectivity and objectivity, are thereby resolved and declared to be non-self-standing and untrue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-60\">\u00a7 60<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But the <em>good<\/em>, in which the final purpose of the world is placed, is determined from the outset only as <em>our<\/em> good, as the moral law of <em>our<\/em> practical reason; so that the unity goes no further than the agreement of the state of the world and the events of the world with our morality. Besides the fact that even with this limitation the <em>final purpose<\/em>, the <em>good<\/em>, is an indeterminate abstraction, as is also what is supposed to be <em>duty<\/em>. More precisely, against this harmony the opposition that is posited in its content as <em>untrue<\/em> is again awakened and asserted, so that the harmony is determined as something only <em>subjective<\/em> &#8211; as something that only <em>ought<\/em> to be, i.e. that at the same time has <em>no reality<\/em> &#8211; as something <em>believed<\/em>, to which only subjective certainty belongs, not truth, i.e. <em>not<\/em> that objectivity corresponding to the Idea. &#8211; If this contradiction seems to be covered up by placing the realization of the Idea in time, in a future where the Idea also is, such a sensible condition as time is rather the opposite of a resolution of the contradiction, and the corresponding representation of the understanding, <em>the infinite progress<\/em>, is immediately nothing but the contradiction itself posited perennially.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A general remark can still be made about the result that has emerged from the critical philosophy for the nature of <em>cognition<\/em> and has been raised into one of the prejudices, i.e. universal presuppositions, of the age. In every dualistic system, but especially in the Kantian, its fundamental defect makes itself known through the inconsistency of <em>uniting<\/em> what a moment before was declared to be self-standing and thus <em>incapable of union<\/em>. Just as what is united has just been declared to be the true, so immediately it is rather declared to be the true that the <em>two moments<\/em>, to which subsistence for themselves was denied in the union as their truth, have truth and actuality only as separated. What is lacking in such philosophizing is the simple consciousness that through this going back and forth each of these single determinations is itself declared unsatisfactory, and the defect consists in the simple inability to bring two thoughts together &#8211; and as regards form only <em>two<\/em> are present. It is therefore the greatest inconsistency, on the one hand, to admit that the understanding cognizes only appearances and, on the other hand, to assert this cognition as <em>something absolute<\/em> by saying that cognition <em>cannot<\/em> go further, that this is the <em>natural,<\/em> absolute <em>limit<\/em> of human knowing. Natural things are limited, and they are merely natural things insofar as they <em>know nothing<\/em> of their universal <em>limit<\/em>, insofar as their determinacy is a limit only <em>for us<\/em>, not <em>for them<\/em>. Something is known, indeed felt, as a <em>limit<\/em>, as a lack, only insofar as one is at the same time <em>beyond<\/em> it. Living things have the privilege of pain over lifeless ones; even for them a <em>single<\/em> determinacy becomes the sensation of something <em>negative,<\/em> because as living they have within them the <em>universality<\/em> of vitality, which is <em>beyond<\/em> the singular, preserve themselves still in the negative of themselves and feel this <em>contradiction<\/em> as existing in them. This contradiction is in them only insofar as both are in the <em>one<\/em> subject: the universality of its feeling of life and the singularity negative towards it. A limit or lack of cognition is likewise determined <em>as<\/em> limit or lack only through <em>comparison<\/em> with the <em>present<\/em> Idea of the universal, of a whole and complete. It is therefore only unconsciousness not to see that precisely the designation of something as finite or limited contains the proof of the <em>actual presence<\/em> of the infinite, the unlimited; that knowledge of a limit can only be insofar as the unlimited is <em>on this side<\/em>, in consciousness. To that result about cognition <em>the further remark<\/em> can be attached that the Kantian philosophy has been unable to have any influence on the treatment of the sciences. <em>It leaves the categories and the method of ordinary cognition entirely unchallenged<\/em>. When scientific writings of that time occasionally took their run-up with propositions of the Kantian philosophy, it is shown in the course of the treatise itself that those propositions were only a superfluous ornament and that the same empirical content would have appeared if those first few pages had been left out. As regards the closer comparison of the Kantian philosophy with <em>metaphysicizing empiricism<\/em>, <em>unprejudiced<\/em> empiricism does indeed keep to sense perception, but likewise admits a spiritual actuality, a supersensible world, however its <em>content<\/em> may be constituted, whether it stems from thought, from imagination etc. As regards <em>form<\/em>, this content has its authentication in spiritual authority, just as the other content of empirical knowing has it in the authority of external perception. But <em>reflective<\/em> <em>empiricism<\/em>, which makes <em>consistency<\/em> its principle, combats such dualism of the ultimate, highest content and negates the self-standingness of the thinking principle and of a spiritual world developing within it. <em>Materialism<\/em>, <em>naturalism<\/em>, is the <em>consistent<\/em> system of empiricism. &#8211; The Kantian philosophy sets the principle of thinking and freedom absolutely over against this empiricism and attaches itself to the first empiricism, without in the least stepping out of its universal principle. The one side of its dualism remains the world of perception and of the understanding reflecting on it. This world is indeed passed off as a world of <em>appearances<\/em>. But this is a mere title, a merely formal determination, for source, import and way of considering remain entirely the same. The other side, by contrast, is the self-standingness of thinking grasping itself, the principle of freedom, which it has in common with the former ordinary metaphysics, but emptied of all content, and it is unable to procure it any again. This thinking, here called <em>reason<\/em>, is, as deprived of all determination, relieved of all <em>authority<\/em>. The main effect the Kantian philosophy has had has been to awaken the consciousness of this absolute inwardness, which, although because of its abstraction it can develop into nothing out of itself and can bring forth no determinations, neither cognitions nor moral laws, nevertheless absolutely refuses to let anything that has the character of <em>externality<\/em> have its way and count within it. The principle of the <em>independence of reason<\/em>, of its absolute self-standingness within itself, is from now on to be regarded as the universal principle of philosophy as well as one of the prejudices of the age.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 1. <\/em>To the critical philosophy belongs the great negative merit of having asserted the conviction that the determinations of the understanding belong to finitude and that cognition moving within them does not attain to truth. But the one-sidedness of this philosophy then consists in placing the finitude of those determinations of the understanding in their belonging merely to our subjective thinking, for which the thing-in-itself is supposed to remain an absolute beyond. In fact, however, the finitude of the determinations of the understanding does not lie in their subjectivity; rather they are finite in themselves, and their finitude is to be shown in them themselves. According to Kant, by contrast, what we think is false because <em>we<\/em> think it. &#8211; A further defect of this philosophy is to be seen in its giving only a historical description of thinking and a mere enumeration of the moments of consciousness. This enumeration is indeed correct in the main, but there is no talk here of the necessity of what is thus empirically apprehended. As the result of the reflections undertaken on the various stages of consciousness it is then stated that the content of what we know is only appearance. This result is to be agreed with insofar as finite thinking indeed deals only with appearances. But this stage of appearance is not yet the end of the matter; there is still a higher land, which, however, remains an inaccessible beyond for the Kantian philosophy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 2. <\/em>Whereas in the Kantian philosophy the principle that thinking determines itself out of itself is at first put forward only formally, while the <em>how<\/em> and <em>to what extent<\/em> of this self-determination of thinking has not yet been shown by Kant, it is by contrast <em>Fichte<\/em> who recognized this defect and, in expressing the demand for a deduction of the categories, at the same time made the attempt actually to supply one. The Fichtean philosophy makes the I the starting point of philosophical development, and the categories are supposed to result as the product of its activity. But the I does not appear here truly as free, spontaneous activity, since it is regarded as first aroused by an impulse from outside; the I is then supposed to react against this impulse, and only through this reaction is it supposed to attain consciousness of itself. &#8211; The nature of the impulse here remains an uncognized outside, and the I is always something conditioned that has an other over against it. Accordingly Fichte too stops at the result of the Kantian philosophy, that only the finite can be cognized, while the infinite goes beyond thinking. What is called &#8220;the thing-in-itself&#8221; in Kant is in Fichte the impulse from outside, this abstraction of an other than the I, which has no other determination than that of the negative or of the not-I in general. The I is here regarded as standing in relation to the not-I, by which its activity of self-determining is first aroused, and indeed in such a way that the I is only the continuous activity of freeing itself from the impulse, without, however, ever attaining actual liberation, since with the ceasing of the impulse the I itself, whose being is only its activity, would cease to be. Further, the content that the activity of the I brings forth is none other than the ordinary content of experience, only with the addition that this content is merely appearance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">20)*In the very words of Kant&#8217;s <em class=\"qua\">Critique of Judgement [1st ed.], p. 427 [\u00a7 88]<\/em>: &#8220;Final purpose is merely a concept of our practical reason and can neither be inferred <em>from any data of experience<\/em> for a theoretical judging of nature nor be related to a cognition of it. No use of this concept is possible except solely for practical reason according to moral laws; and the <em>final purpose of creation<\/em> is that constitution of the world which agrees with that which alone we can specify determinately according to laws, namely the final purpose <em>of our pure practical reason<\/em>, and indeed insofar as it is to be practical.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">21)*Even Hermann&#8217;s <em>Handbook of Metrics<\/em> [<em class=\"qua\">Gottfried Hermann, Handbuch der Metrik, Leipzig 1799<\/em>] begins with paragraphs of Kantian philosophy; indeed in \u00a7 8 it is inferred that the law of rhythm must be 1. an <em>objective<\/em>, 2. a <em>formal<\/em>, 3. an a priori <em>determined<\/em> law. Compare now with these demands, and with the principles of causality and reciprocity that follow further, the treatment of the metres themselves, on which those formal principles exercise not the slightest influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Preliminary Conception \u2192 C. Third Position of Thought towards Objectivity. Immediate Knowing<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-61\">\u00a7 61<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the critical philosophy thinking is grasped in such a way that it is <em>subjective<\/em> and that its <em>ultimate<\/em>, insuperable determination is <em>abstract universality<\/em>, formal identity; thinking is thus opposed to truth as universality concrete within itself. In this highest determination of thinking, which is supposed to be reason, the categories do not come into consideration. &#8211; The opposite standpoint is to grasp thinking as activity only <em>of the particular<\/em> and in this way likewise to declare it incapable of grasping truth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-62\">\u00a7 62<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thinking as activity of the particular has only the <em>categories<\/em> as its product and content. These, as the understanding holds them fast, are <em>limited<\/em> determinations, forms of the <em>conditioned<\/em>, the <em>dependent<\/em>, the <em>mediated<\/em>. For thinking restricted to them the infinite, the true, is not; it can make no transition to it (against the proofs of God&#8217;s existence). These determinations of thought are also called <em>concepts<\/em>; and to <em>comprehend<\/em> an object means, to this extent, nothing but to grasp it in the form of something <em>conditioned<\/em> and <em>mediated<\/em>, and thus, insofar as it is the true, the infinite, the unconditioned, to transform it into something conditioned and mediated and in this way, instead of grasping the true thinkingly, rather to pervert it into the untrue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is the single simple polemic which the standpoint brings forward that asserts merely immediate knowing of God and of the true. Earlier, the so-called anthropopathic representations of all kinds were removed from God as finite and therefore unworthy of the infinite, and he had thereby already become a considerably empty being. But the determinations of thought were not yet in general included under the anthropopathic; rather thinking counted as stripping finitude from the representations of the absolute &#8211; according to the prejudice of all ages remarked above [\u00a7 5], that one attains truth only through reflection. Now at last the determinations of thought in general too have been declared to be anthropopathism, and thinking to be the activity of <em>merely making finite<\/em>. &#8211; In the seventh supplement to the Letters on Spinoza <em>Jacobi<\/em> put forward this polemic most determinately, which, moreover, he drew from Spinoza&#8217;s philosophy itself and applied to combating cognition in general. By this polemic cognition is grasped only as cognition of the finite, as the thinking advance through <em>series<\/em> from <em>conditioned<\/em> to <em>conditioned<\/em>, in which each thing that is a condition is itself again only something conditioned; &#8211; through <em>conditioned conditions<\/em>. To explain and comprehend means, accordingly, to show something as <em>mediated<\/em> by an <em>other<\/em>; thus all content is only <em>particular<\/em>, <em>dependent<\/em> and <em>finite<\/em>; the infinite, the true, God, lies outside the mechanism of such connection, to which cognition is supposedly restricted. &#8211; It is important that, whereas the Kantian philosophy placed the finitude of the categories chiefly only in the formal determination of their <em>subjectivity<\/em>, in this polemic the categories come up according to their determinacy and the category as such is recognized as finite. &#8211; Jacobi had in view in particular the brilliant successes of the sciences relating to nature (the <em>sciences exactes<\/em>) in cognizing natural forces and laws. Immanently on this ground of the finite the infinite can certainly not be found; as indeed <em>Lalande<\/em> said that he had searched the whole heaven but not found God (cf. Remark to \u00a7 60). As the final result on this ground there emerged the <em>universal<\/em> as the <em>indeterminate<\/em> aggregate of the external finite, <em>matter<\/em>; and Jacobi rightly saw no other way out on the path of mere advance in <em>mediations<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-63\">\u00a7 63<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At the same time it is asserted that <em>truth is for spirit<\/em>, so much so that it is <em>reason<\/em> alone by which man subsists, and that it is <em>knowing of God<\/em>. But because mediated knowing is supposed to be restricted only to finite content, reason is <em>immediate knowing<\/em>, <em>faith<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Knowing<\/em>, <em>believing<\/em>, <em>thinking<\/em>, <em>intuiting<\/em> are the categories occurring on this standpoint, which, being <em>presupposed as familiar<\/em>, are all too often used arbitrarily according to mere psychological representations and distinctions; what their nature and concept is, the only thing that would matter, is not examined. Thus one finds <em>knowing<\/em> very commonly opposed to <em>believing<\/em>, while at the same time believing is determined as immediate knowing and is thereby at once also recognized as a knowing. It will surely also be found as an empirical fact that what one believes is in consciousness, that one thus at least <em>knows of it<\/em>; and also that what one believes is in consciousness as something <em>certain<\/em>, that one therefore knows it. &#8211; Thus further, above all <em>thinking<\/em> is opposed to immediate knowing and believing, and in particular to intuiting. If intuiting is determined as <em>intellectual<\/em>, this can mean nothing but <em>thinking<\/em> intuiting, unless by the intellectual here, where God is the object, one wants to understand imaginative representations and images too. It happens in the language of this philosophizing that believing is also said in relation to the common things of <em>sensible<\/em> presence. We <em>believe<\/em>, says Jacobi, that we have a <em>body<\/em>; we believe in the <em>existence<\/em> of <em>sensible things<\/em>. But when there is talk of believing in the true and eternal, of God being revealed and given in immediate knowing, in intuiting, these are not sensible things but a content <em>universal within itself<\/em>, objects only for <em>thinking<\/em> spirit. Also when <em>singularity<\/em> as I, <em>personality<\/em>, is meant, insofar as not an <em>empirical<\/em> I, a <em>particular<\/em> personality is understood, above all when the personality of God is before consciousness, then <em>pure<\/em>, i.e. personality <em>universal within itself<\/em>, is at issue; such personality is thought and belongs only to thinking. &#8211; Pure <em>intuiting<\/em>, further, is entirely the same as pure thinking. Intuiting and believing express first the determinate representations we connect with these words in ordinary consciousness; so they are certainly different from thinking, and this difference is roughly intelligible to everyone. But now believing and intuiting are also to be taken in a higher sense, as believing in God, as intellectual intuiting of God, i.e. abstraction is to be made precisely from what makes up the difference between intuiting, believing and thinking. It cannot be said how believing and intuiting, transposed into this higher region, are still different from thinking. People think that with such distinctions, which have become empty, they have said and asserted something very important, and that they are disputing determinations which are the same as those they assert. &#8211; The expression <em>faith<\/em>, however, brings with it the particular advantage that it reminds one of <em>Christian-religious<\/em> faith, seems to include it or even easily to be the same, so that this believing philosophizing looks essentially pious and Christian-pious and, on the strength of this piety, allows itself the freedom to make its arbitrary assurances all the more with pretension and authority. But one must not let oneself be deceived by the semblance of what can creep in through the mere sameness of words, and must hold the difference fast. Christian faith includes within itself an authority of the Church; but the faith of that philosophizing standpoint is rather only the authority of one&#8217;s own subjective revelation. Further, that Christian faith is an objective content rich within itself, a system of doctrine and cognition; but the content of this faith is so indeterminate within itself that it may well admit that content too, but equally comprehends within itself the belief that the Dalai Lama, the bull, the ape etc. is God, and that for itself it restricts itself to <em>God in general<\/em>, the <em>highest being<\/em>. Faith itself in that sense meant to be philosophical is nothing but the dry <em>abstraction<\/em> of immediate knowing, a wholly formal determination which is neither to be confused with the spiritual fullness of Christian faith, either on the side of the believing heart and the Holy Spirit indwelling in it or on the side of the doctrine full of content, nor to be taken for this fullness. What is here called faith and immediate knowing is, moreover, entirely the same as what has otherwise been called inspiration, revelation of the heart, a content implanted in man by nature, and further in particular also sound human understanding, <em>common sense<\/em>, communal sense. All these forms in the same way make immediacy, the way in which a content is found in consciousness, is a fact in it, into the principle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-64\">\u00a7 64<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What this immediate knowing knows is that the infinite, the eternal, God, which is in our <em>representation<\/em>, also <em>is<\/em> &#8211; that in consciousness the certainty of its <em>being<\/em> is immediately and inseparably bound up with this <em>representation<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It could least of all occur to philosophy to want to contradict these propositions of immediate knowing; it could rather congratulate itself that these old propositions <em>of its own<\/em>, which even express its whole universal content, have in a certain way, in such an admittedly unphilosophical manner, likewise become universal prejudices of the age. Rather one can only wonder that anyone could think these propositions were opposed to philosophy &#8211; the propositions that what is held to be true is immanent in spirit (\u00a7 63) and that truth is for spirit (ibid.). In formal respects the proposition is particularly interesting that with the <em>thought<\/em> of God his <em>being<\/em>, with the <em>subjectivity<\/em> that thought first has, <em>objectivity<\/em> is immediately and inseparably linked. Indeed, the philosophy of immediate knowing goes so far in its abstraction that not only with the thought of God alone, but also in intuition with the <em>representation<\/em> of my <em>body<\/em> and of <em>external<\/em> things, the determination of their <em>existence<\/em> is supposed to be just as inseparably bound up. &#8211; If philosophy endeavours to prove such unity, i.e. to show that it lies in the nature of thought or subjectivity itself to be inseparable from being or objectivity, then, whatever may be the case with such proofs, philosophy must in any event be entirely content that its propositions are asserted and shown to be <em>facts of consciousness<\/em> as well, and thus to <em>agree with experience<\/em>. &#8211; The difference between the assertion of immediate knowing and philosophy comes down solely to the fact that immediate knowing gives itself an <em>exclusive<\/em> position, or solely to its setting itself against philosophizing. &#8211; But in the manner of immediacy too that proposition around which, one may say, the whole interest of modern philosophy turns was expressed at once by its originator: <em>Cogito<\/em>, <em>ergo sum<\/em>. One must know little more about the nature of the syllogism than that &#8220;ergo&#8221; occurs in a syllogism to take that proposition for a syllogism; where would the <em>medius terminus<\/em> be? and such a term surely belongs more essentially to the syllogism than the word &#8220;ergo&#8221;. But if, in order to justify the name, one wants to call that connection in Descartes an <em>immediate<\/em> syllogism, this superfluous form means nothing other than a <em>connection of distinct determinations mediated by nothing<\/em>. But then the connection of being with our representations which the proposition of immediate knowing expresses is no more and no less a syllogism. &#8211; From Mr <em>Hotho<\/em>&#8216;s dissertation on the <em>Cartesian<\/em> philosophy, which appeared in 1826, I take the quotations in which <em>Descartes<\/em> himself also expressly declares that the proposition <em>cogito<\/em>, <em>ergo sum<\/em> is not a syllogism; the passages are <em>Respons.ad sec.object<\/em>.<em> [Meditationes]<\/em>; <em>De Methodo<\/em> IV; <em>Epistolae<\/em> I, 118. From the first passage I cite the more precise expressions. Descartes says first that our being thinking beings is &#8220;prima quaedam notio quae ex nullo syllogismo concluditur&#8221; [&#8220;a certain first notion which is concluded from no syllogism&#8221;], and continues: &#8220;neque cum quis dicit: ego cogito, ergo sum sive existo<em>, existentium ex cogitatione per syllogismum deducit<\/em>&#8221; [&#8220;nor, when someone says: &#8216;I think, therefore I am or exist&#8217;, does he deduce existence from thinking by a syllogism&#8221;]. Since Descartes knows what belongs to a syllogism, he adds that if a derivation through a syllogism were to take place with that proposition, it would require the major premiss: &#8220;illud omne, quod cogitat, est sive existit&#8221; [&#8220;everything that thinks is or exists&#8221;]. But this latter proposition, he says, is one that is rather first derived from that first proposition. Descartes&#8217; expressions about the proposition of the inseparability of myself as thinking from being &#8211; that this connection is contained and stated in the <em>simple intuition<\/em> of consciousness, that this connection is absolutely first, a principle, the most certain and evident, so that no scepticism can be imagined so enormous as not to admit it &#8211; are so telling and determinate that the modern propositions of Jacobi and others about this immediate connection can count only as superfluous repetitions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-65\">\u00a7 65<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This standpoint is not content with having shown of <em>mediated<\/em> knowing that, taken <em>in isolation<\/em>, it is insufficient for truth; rather its peculiarity consists in the claim that <em>immediate<\/em> knowing, taken only <em>in isolation<\/em>, to the <em>exclusion<\/em> of mediation, has truth as its content. &#8211; In such exclusions themselves the standpoint named at once reveals itself as a relapse into the metaphysical understanding, into its <em>either-or<\/em>, and thus in fact itself into the relationship of external mediation, which rests on holding fast to the finite, i.e. to one-sided determinations, beyond which that view wrongly thinks it has placed itself. But let us leave this point undeveloped; exclusively immediate knowing is asserted only as <em>a fact<\/em>, and here in the introduction it is to be taken up only according to this external reflection. In itself what matters is the logical aspect of the opposition of immediacy and mediation. But that standpoint refuses to consider the nature of the matter, i.e. the concept, for such a consideration leads to mediation and even to cognition. The true consideration, that of the logical, has to find its place within science itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The whole second part of <em>logic<\/em>, the doctrine of <em>essence<\/em>, is the treatment of the essential self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-66\">\u00a7 66<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We thus stop at this, that immediate knowing is to be taken as a <em>fact<\/em>. With this, however, the consideration is led onto the field of <em>experience<\/em>, to a <em>psychological<\/em> phenomenon. &#8211; In this respect it is to be pointed out that it belongs to the commonest experiences that truths which one knows very well to be the result of the most intricate, highly mediated considerations present themselves <em>immediately<\/em> in the consciousness of someone to whom such cognition has become familiar. The mathematician, like everyone instructed in a science, has solutions immediately present to which a very intricate analysis has led; every educated person has a multitude of universal points of view and principles immediately present in his knowing which have emerged only from manifold reflection and long experience of life. The facility we have attained in any kind of knowing, also in art and technical skill, consists precisely in having such knowledge, such kinds of activity, <em>immediately<\/em> in one&#8217;s consciousness when the case arises, indeed even in an outward-going activity and in one&#8217;s limbs. &#8211; In all these cases the immediacy of knowing not only does not exclude its mediation, but they are so linked that immediate knowing is even the product and result of mediated knowing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">An equally trivial insight is the linking of immediate <em>concrete existence<\/em> with its mediation; seeds and parents are an immediate, initiating concrete existence with respect to the children etc., who are generated. But the seeds and parents, however much they are <em>immediate<\/em> as existing in general, are likewise generated, and the children etc., notwithstanding the mediation of their concrete existence, are now immediate, for they <em>are<\/em>. That I <em>am<\/em> in Berlin, this <em>immediate<\/em> presence of mine, is <em>mediated<\/em> by the journey made here etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-67\">\u00a7 67<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But as regards <em>immediate knowing<\/em> of <em>God<\/em>, of the <em>legal<\/em>, of the <em>ethical<\/em> &#8211; and here belong also the other determinations of instinct, implanted, innate ideas, common sense, natural reason etc. &#8211; whatever form one gives this originality, it is universal experience that, in order for what is contained in it to be brought to consciousness, <em>education<\/em>, development (even for <em>Platonic recollection<\/em>) is essentially required (Christian baptism, although a sacrament, itself contains the further obligation of a Christian education); i.e. that religion and ethical life, however much they are a <em>believing<\/em>, an <em>immediate<\/em> knowing, are absolutely conditioned by the <em>mediation<\/em> that is called development, education, cultivation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the assertion of <em>innate<\/em> ideas and in the contradiction of it a similar opposition of exclusive determinations prevailed as the one considered here, namely the opposition between what may be expressed as the essential <em>immediate<\/em> connection of certain universal determinations with the soul and another connection that would take place in an external way and be mediated by <em>given<\/em> objects and representations. Against the assertion of <em>innate ideas<\/em> the empirical objection was made that all human beings would then have to have these ideas, e.g. have the principle of contradiction in their consciousness, know it, since this principle, together with others of its kind, was reckoned among the innate ideas. One can ascribe a misunderstanding to this objection, insofar as the determinations meant, as innate, are not on that account supposed to be already in the <em>form<\/em> of ideas, of representations of something known. But against immediate knowing this objection is quite apt, for it expressly asserts its determinations insofar as they are in consciousness. &#8211; If the standpoint of immediate knowing perhaps admits that, in particular for religious faith, a development and a Christian or religious education is <em>necessary<\/em>, then it is arbitrary to want to ignore this again when speaking of faith, or it is thoughtlessness not to know that with the admitted necessity of an education precisely the essentiality of mediation is expressed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>When it is said in the Platonic philosophy that we <em>recollect<\/em> the ideas, this has the sense that the ideas are in themselves in man and do not (as the sophists asserted) reach him from outside as something alien to him. Through this conception of cognition as <em>recollection<\/em>, however, the development of what [is] <em>in itself<\/em> in man is not excluded, and this development is nothing other than mediation. It is the same with the <em>innate ideas<\/em> occurring in Descartes and the Scottish philosophers, which are likewise to be regarded at first only as present in man in themselves and in the manner of a disposition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-68\">\u00a7 68<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the experiences cited appeal is made to what shows itself as <em>bound up<\/em> with immediate knowing. If this bond is perhaps first taken as only an <em>external<\/em>, empirical connection, it proves for empirical consideration itself to be essential and inseparable, because it is constant. But further, if, according to experience, this immediate knowing is taken for itself, insofar as it is knowing of God and of the divine, such consciousness is universally described as a <em>raising above<\/em> the sensible, the finite, as above the immediate desires and inclinations of the natural heart &#8211; a raising that passes over into faith in God and the divine and ends in it, so that this faith is an immediate knowing and holding-to-be-true, but nonetheless has that course of mediation as its presupposition and condition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It has already been remarked that the so-called proofs of God&#8217;s existence which start from finite being express this elevation and are not inventions of an artificial reflection but the proper, necessary mediations of spirit, even if they do not have their complete and correct expression in the ordinary form of those proofs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-69\">\u00a7 69<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The transition from the subjective Idea to being designated in \u00a7 64 is what makes up the main interest for the standpoint of immediate knowing and is essentially asserted as an original connection without mediation. Taken quite without regard to connections that seem empirical, precisely this central point shows mediation <em>in itself<\/em>, and indeed in its determination as it truly is, not as a mediation with and through something external, but as concluding itself within itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-70\">\u00a7 70<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The assertion of this standpoint is namely that neither the <em>Idea<\/em> as a merely <em>subjective<\/em> thought nor merely a being for itself is the true; &#8211; being only for itself, a being not of the Idea, is the sensible, finite being of the world. With this, then, it is immediately asserted that the Idea is <em>the true<\/em> only <em>by means<\/em> of being and conversely being only <em>by means<\/em> of the Idea. The proposition of immediate knowing rightly wants not indeterminate, empty immediacy, abstract being or pure unity for itself, but the unity <em>of the Idea<\/em> with being. But it is thoughtlessness not to see that the unity of <em>distinct<\/em> determinations is not merely purely immediate, i.e. wholly indeterminate and empty unity, but that precisely in it it is posited that the one of the determinations has truth only as mediated through the other &#8211; or, if one likes, each is mediated with truth only through the other. &#8211; That the determination of mediation is contained in that immediacy itself is thereby shown as a <em>fact<\/em>, against which the <em>understanding<\/em>, in accordance with the very principle of immediate knowing, may have nothing to object. It is ordinary abstract understanding that takes the determinations of immediacy and of mediation, each for itself, as absolute and thinks it has in them something <em>fixed<\/em> by way of distinction; thus it generates for itself the insuperable difficulty of uniting them &#8211; a difficulty which, as has been shown, is just as little present in the fact as it disappears in the speculative concept.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-71\">\u00a7 71<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The one-sidedness of this standpoint brings with it determinations and consequences whose main features are still to be pointed out after the discussion of its foundation. <em>First<\/em>, because not the <em>nature of the content<\/em> but the <em>fact of consciousness<\/em> is set up as the criterion of truth, <em>subjective<\/em> knowing and the <em>assurance<\/em> that I find a certain content in <em>my<\/em> consciousness is the foundation of what is passed off as true. What I find in <em>my<\/em> consciousness is thereby exaggerated into being found in the consciousness of <em>all<\/em>, and passed off as the <em>nature<\/em> of consciousness itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Formerly the <em>consensus gentium<\/em>, to which Cicero already appeals, was listed among the so-called proofs of God&#8217;s existence. The <em>consensus gentium<\/em> is a significant authority, and the transition from a content&#8217;s being found in the consciousness of <em>all<\/em> to its lying in the nature of consciousness itself and being necessary to it lies close at hand. There lay in this category of <em>universal<\/em> agreement the essential consciousness, not escaping even the least educated human sense, that the consciousness of the singular is at the same time something <em>particular<\/em>, <em>contingent<\/em>. If the nature of this consciousness is not itself examined, i.e. if what is particular and contingent in it is not separated off &#8211; by which laborious operation of reflection alone what is universal in and for itself in it can be found &#8211; then only the agreement of <em>all<\/em> about a content can ground a respectable prejudice that it belongs to the nature of consciousness itself. For the need of thinking to know what shows itself as <em>universally<\/em> present as <em>necessary<\/em>, the <em>consensus gentium<\/em> is indeed not sufficient; but even within the assumption that that universality of the fact would be a satisfactory proof, it has been given up as a proof of this faith because of the experience that there are individuals and peoples among whom faith in God is not found. But there is nothing shorter and more convenient than to have merely to make the <em>assurance<\/em> that I find a content in my consciousness with the certainty of its truth and that therefore this certainty belongs not to me as a particular subject but to the nature of spirit itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-72\">\u00a7 72<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">From the claim that <em>immediate knowing<\/em> is to be the criterion of truth it follows, <em>secondly<\/em>, that all superstition and idolatry is declared to be truth and that the most unrighteous and unethical content of the will is justified. For the Indian, the cow, the ape, or the Brahmin, the Lama counts as God not from so-called mediated knowing, from argumentation and syllogisms; rather he <em>believes<\/em> in it. But natural desires and inclinations lay their interests in consciousness of their own accord; immoral purposes are found quite immediately in it; good or evil character would express the <em>determinate being<\/em> of the will, which would be known in the interests and purposes, and indeed known most immediately.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-73\">\u00a7 73<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Finally, immediate knowing of God is supposed to extend only to <em>that<\/em> God is, not <em>what<\/em> God is; for the latter would be a cognition and would lead to mediated knowing. With this God as the object of religion is expressly restricted to God <em>in general<\/em>, to the indeterminate supersensible, and religion is reduced in its content to its minimum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If it were really necessary to bring about only so much that the belief <em>that there is a God<\/em> is still preserved, or even that such belief comes about, one could only wonder at the poverty of the age, which lets the meagrest of religious knowing count as a gain and has come so far as to return in its church to the altar that long ago stood in <em>Athens<\/em> and was dedicated <em>to the unknown God<\/em>!<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-74\">\u00a7 74<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The universal nature of the <em>form of immediacy<\/em> is still to be stated briefly. It is namely this form itself which, because it is <em>one-sided<\/em>, makes its content itself one-sided and thereby <em>finite<\/em>. To the <em>universal<\/em> it gives the one-sidedness of an <em>abstraction<\/em>, so that God becomes the indeterminate essence; but God can be called spirit only insofar as he is known as <em>mediating himself with himself<\/em> within himself. Only so is he <em>concrete<\/em>, living and spirit; <em>knowing<\/em> of God as spirit precisely thereby contains mediation within itself. &#8211; To the <em>particular<\/em> the form of immediacy gives the determination of <em>being<\/em>, of <em>relating to itself<\/em>. But the particular is precisely this, to relate to an <em>other<\/em> outside it; through that form the <em>finite<\/em> is posited as absolute. Since, as wholly abstract, it is <em>indifferent to every content<\/em> and precisely thereby receptive of every content, it can sanction idolatrous and immoral content just as well as the opposite. Only the insight into that content that it is not self-standing but <em>mediated by an other<\/em> reduces it to its finitude and untruth. Such insight, because the content carries mediation with it, is a knowing that contains mediation. A content can be cognized as the true only insofar as it is not mediated with an other, is not finite, thus mediates itself with itself and so is in one mediation and immediate relation to itself. &#8211; That understanding which thinks it has freed itself from finite knowing, from the <em>identity of the understanding<\/em> of metaphysics and of the Enlightenment, itself immediately makes this <em>immediacy<\/em> again, i.e. <em>abstract relation-to-self<\/em>, abstract identity, into the principle and criterion of truth. <em>Abstract thinking<\/em> (the form of reflecting metaphysics) and <em>abstract intuiting<\/em> (the form of immediate knowing) are one and the same.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>When the form of immediacy is held fast as opposed to the form of mediation, it is thereby one-sided, and this one-sidedness communicates itself to every content that is led back only to this form. Immediacy is in general abstract relation-to-self and thus at the same time abstract identity, abstract universality. If the universal in and for itself is then taken only in the form of immediacy, it is only the abstract universal, and from this standpoint God receives the meaning of the absolutely indeterminate essence. If one then still speaks of God as spirit, this is only an empty word, for spirit, as consciousness and self-consciousness, is in any case a distinguishing of itself from itself and from an other, and thereby at once mediation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-75\">\u00a7 75<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>assessment<\/em> of this third position given to thinking towards truth could be undertaken only in a way that this standpoint immediately indicates and concedes within itself. It has thereby been shown to be <em>factually<\/em> false that there <em>is<\/em> an immediate knowing, a knowing that would be without mediation, whether with another or within itself with itself. Likewise it has been declared a factual untruth that thinking advances <em>only<\/em> through determinations <em>mediated by another<\/em> &#8211; finite and conditioned ones &#8211; and that this mediation does not just as much sublate itself in mediation. But of the <em>fact<\/em> of such cognition, which advances neither in one-sided immediacy nor in one-sided mediation, <em>logic<\/em> itself and the <em>whole of philosophy<\/em> is the <em>example<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-76\">\u00a7 76<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If the principle of immediate knowing is considered in relation to the starting point, the metaphysics called <em>unprejudiced<\/em> above, the comparison shows that it has <em>returned<\/em> to that beginning which this metaphysics took in modern times as the <em>Cartesian<\/em> philosophy. In both it is asserted: 1. the simple inseparability of the <em>thinking<\/em> and the <em>being<\/em> of the thinker &#8211; <em>cogito ergo sum<\/em> is entirely the same [as saying] that the being, reality, existence of the I is immediately revealed to me in consciousness (Descartes at the same time expressly declares, <em>Principia philosophiae<\/em> I, 9, that by thinking he understands <em>consciousness<\/em> in general as such), and that that inseparability is the absolutely <em>first <\/em>(not mediated, proved) and <em>most certain<\/em> cognition; 2. likewise the inseparability of the representation of <em>God<\/em> and his <em>existence<\/em>, so that the latter is contained in the representation of God itself, that representation absolutely not without the determination of existence, which is thus a necessary and eternal one. 3. As regards the likewise immediate consciousness of the existence of <em>external<\/em> things, this means nothing other than <em>sensible<\/em> consciousness; that we have such consciousness is the least of cognitions; the only thing of interest is to know that this immediate knowing of the <em>being<\/em> of external things is deception and error and that there is no truth in the sensible as such, that the <em>being<\/em> of these external things is rather a contingent, transient one, a <em>semblance<\/em> &#8211; that they are essentially this: to have only a concrete existence that is separable from their concept, their essence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-77\">\u00a7 77<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But the two standpoints are distinguished: 1. The Cartesian philosophy advances from these unproved presuppositions, assumed to be unprovable, <em>to further<\/em> developed cognition and has in this way given rise to the sciences of modern times. The modern standpoint, by contrast, has come to the result, important for itself (\u00a7 62), that cognition advancing through <em>finite<\/em> mediations cognizes only the finite and contains no truth, and demands of the consciousness of God that it stop at that faith, and indeed a wholly abstract faith. 2. The modern standpoint, on the one hand, changes nothing in the method of ordinary scientific cognition introduced by Descartes and carries on the sciences of the empirical and finite that sprang from it in entirely the same way &#8211; but on the other hand this standpoint rejects this method and thereby, since it knows no other, <em>all<\/em> methods for knowing what is infinite in its import; it therefore abandons itself to the wild arbitrariness of fancies and assurances, to a moral self-conceit and arrogance of feeling, or to a measureless opining and argumentation that declares itself most strongly against philosophy and philosophemes. For philosophy does not permit mere assuring, nor fancying, nor the arbitrary thinking back and forth of argumentation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-78\">\u00a7 78<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>opposition<\/em> between a self-standing immediacy of content or knowing and a mediation equally self-standing over against it, which would be incompatible with that immediacy, is to be set aside first because it is a mere <em>presupposition<\/em> and arbitrary <em>assurance<\/em>. Likewise all other presuppositions or prejudices are to be given up on entering science, whether they are taken from representation or from thinking; for it is in science that all such determinations are first to be examined and what there is in them and their oppositions is to be cognized.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Scepticism<\/em>, as a negative science carried through all forms of cognition, would offer itself as an introduction in which the nullity of such presuppositions would be demonstrated. But it would be not only a dismal but also a superfluous path, because the dialectical itself is an essential moment of affirmative science, as will be remarked shortly. Moreover, it would have to find the finite forms too only empirically and unscientifically and take them up as given. The demand for such a completed scepticism is the same as the demand that science be preceded by <em>doubting everything<\/em>, i.e. by complete <em>presuppositionlessness<\/em> in everything. It is properly fulfilled in the resolve <em>to want to think purely<\/em>, through the freedom which abstracts from everything and grasps its pure abstraction, the simplicity of thinking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">22)<em class=\"qua\">Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, \u00dcber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn (1785), new enlarged edition, 1789<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">23)Joseph J\u00e9r\u00f4me Lalande, 1732\u20131807, French astronomer<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">24)<em class=\"qua\">Heinrich Gustav Hotho, De philosophia Cartesiana, Berlin 1826<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">25)<em class=\"qua\">Lettres de Mr. Descartes, ed. Clerselier, 3 vols., Paris 1657 ff. Cf. letter no. CDXL, \u0152uvres IV.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">26)*Whether one finds atheism and faith in God more or less widespread in experience depends on whether one is content with the determination of a God <em>in general<\/em> or whether a more determinate cognition of him is demanded. Of the Chinese and Indian etc. idols at least, as little of the African fetishes, and even of the Greek gods themselves, will it be admitted in the Christian world that such idols are God; whoever believes in such therefore does not believe in God. If, on the other hand, the consideration is made that in such faith in idols there nevertheless lies <em>in itself<\/em> faith in God <em>in general<\/em>, as the genus lies in the particular individual, then idolatry too counts as a faith not only in an idol but in God. Conversely, the Athenians treated as atheists the poets and philosophers who held Zeus etc. to be only clouds etc. and perhaps asserted only a <em>God in general<\/em>. &#8211; What matters is not what is contained <em>in itself<\/em> in an object, but what of it has come <em>out<\/em> for consciousness. Every human sensible intuition, even the commonest, would be religion if one allowed the confusion of this determination, because <em>in itself<\/em> there is indeed contained in every such intuition, in everything spiritual, the principle which, developed and purified, rises to religion. But it is one thing to be <em>capable<\/em> of religion (and that <em>in-itself<\/em> expresses capability and possibility), another to <em>have<\/em> religion. &#8211; Thus in recent times travellers again (e.g. Captains <em>Ross<\/em> [<em class=\"qua\">Sir John Ross (1777\u20131856), A voyage of discovery &#8230; for the purpose of exploring Baffin&#8217;s Bay &#8230; , London 1819<\/em>] and <em>Parry<\/em> [Sir William Edward Parry, 1790\u20131855, numerous travel accounts]) have found tribes (Eskimos) to whom they denied all religion, even such a thing of religion as one might still find in African <em>sorcerers<\/em> (the <em>goetes <\/em>of Herodotus). From a quite different side, an Englishman who spent the first months of the last jubilee year in Rome says in his travel account of the present-day <em>Romans<\/em> that the common people are bigoted, but that those who can read and write are all atheists. &#8211; The reproach of atheism has, moreover, become rarer in recent times probably chiefly because the import of and demand regarding religion has been reduced to a minimum (see \u00a7 73).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">27)*<em class=\"qua\">Descartes, Principia philosophiae I, 15<\/em>: &#8220;Magis hoc (ens summe perfectum existere) <em>credet<\/em>, si attendat, nullius alterius rei ideam apud se inveniri, in qua eodem modo necessariam existentiam contineri animadvertat; intelliget, illam ideam exhibere veram et immutabilem naturam, quaeque <em>non potest non existere<\/em>, cum necessaria existentia <em>in ea contineatur<\/em>.&#8221; [He will be all the more convinced of this (that a supremely perfect being exists) if he notices that no idea of any other thing is found in him in which he observes necessary existence to be contained in the same way; he will understand that this idea presents a true and immutable nature which cannot not exist, since necessary existence is contained in it. &#8211; The English rendering is the translator&#8217;s own; the German edition here quotes A. Buchenau&#8217;s translation.] A turn of phrase following this, which sounds like a mediation and proof, does no harm to this first foundation. &#8211; In Spinoza it is entirely the same: God&#8217;s <em>essence<\/em>, i.e. the abstract representation, includes existence within itself. Spinoza&#8217;s first definition is that of <em>causa sui<\/em>, that it is such a thing &#8220;<em>cujus essentia<\/em> involvit existentiam; sive id, cujus <em>natura non potest concipi<\/em>, nisi existens&#8221; [whose essence involves existence; or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing, <em>Ethics<\/em> I, Def. 1 &#8211; translator&#8217;s own rendering]; &#8211; the inseparability of the concept from being is the fundamental determination and presupposition. But what concept is it to which this inseparability from being belongs? Not that of <em>finite things<\/em>, for these are precisely such as have a <em>contingent<\/em> and created existence. &#8211; That in Spinoza the 11th proposition, that God necessarily exists, follows with a proof, and likewise the 20th, that God&#8217;s existence and his essence are one and the same, is a superfluous formalism of proving. God is the (and indeed the only) substance; but substance is <em>causa sui, therefore<\/em> God necessarily exists &#8211; means nothing other than that God is that whose concept and being are inseparable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">28)<em>*Anselm<\/em>, by contrast, says: &#8220;<em>Negligentiae<\/em> mihi videtur, si postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non <em>studemus<\/em>, quod <em>credimus<\/em>, <em>intelligere<\/em>&#8221; (<em>Tractat<\/em>. <em>Cur Deus homo<\/em> [I, 1 &#8211; &#8220;it seems to me negligence if, after we have been confirmed in faith, we do not strive to understand what we believe&#8221;; translator&#8217;s own rendering]). &#8211; Anselm has thereby, in the concrete content of Christian doctrine, a quite different and difficult task for cognition from what that modern faith contains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Preliminary Conception \u2192 More Precise Concept and Division of Logic<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-79\">\u00a7 79<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/2\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 2<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/31\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 31<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>logical<\/em> has, as regards form, three sides: \u03b1) <em>the abstract<\/em> or <em>understanding<\/em> side, \u03b2) <em>the dialectical<\/em> or <em>negatively rational<\/em> side, \u03b3) <em>the speculative<\/em> or <em>positively rational<\/em> side.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These three sides do not make up three <em>parts<\/em> of logic but are <em>moments of everything logically real<\/em>, that is, of every concept or of everything true in general. They can all be placed under the first moment, the <em>understanding<\/em>, and thereby kept apart separately, but so they are not considered in their truth. &#8211; The statement made here of the determinations of the logical, as well as the division, is here likewise only anticipated and historical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-80\">\u00a7 80<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/2\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 2<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/31\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 31<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b1) Thinking as <em>understanding<\/em> stops at fixed determinacy and its distinctness from others; such a limited abstraction counts for it as subsisting and being for itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>When thinking in general, or more precisely comprehending, is spoken of, one often has in view merely the activity of the understanding. Thinking is indeed at first understanding thinking, but it does not stop there, and the concept is not a mere determination of the understanding. &#8211; The activity of the understanding consists in general in giving its content the form of universality, and indeed the universal posited by the understanding is an abstract universal, which as such is held fast over against the particular, but is thereby at the same time itself determined again as particular. Since the understanding behaves towards its objects separatingly and abstractingly, it is thereby the opposite of immediate intuition and sensation, which as such deal throughout with the concrete and stop there. To this opposition of understanding and sensation relate those so often repeated reproaches usually made against thinking in general, which amount to saying that thinking is hard and one-sided and that, followed consistently, it leads to ruinous and destructive results. To such reproaches, insofar as they are justified in content, it is first to be replied that they strike not thinking in general, and more precisely rational thinking, but only understanding thinking. The further point, however, is that above all merely understanding thinking too must be granted its right and its merit, which consists in general in this, that both in the theoretical and in the practical domain there is no firmness and determinacy without the understanding. As regards cognition first, it begins by apprehending the objects at hand in their determinate differences, and so, for example, in considering nature, substances, forces, genera etc. are distinguished and fixed for themselves in this isolation. Thinking proceeds here as understanding, and its principle is identity, simple relation to itself. It is then also this identity by which the advance from one determination to another is first conditioned in cognition. Thus notably in mathematics magnitude is <em>the<\/em> determination along which one advances, leaving out all others. Accordingly in geometry one compares figures with one another by bringing out what is identical in them. In other domains of cognition too, for example in jurisprudence, one advances first along identity. When one infers here from one determination to another, this inferring is nothing other than an advance according to the principle of identity. &#8211; As in the theoretical, so in the practical the understanding cannot be dispensed with. Character belongs essentially to action, and a man of character is a man of understanding who as such has determinate purposes in view and pursues them with firmness. Whoever wills something great must, as Goethe says, know how to limit himself. Whoever, by contrast, wills everything in fact wills nothing and achieves nothing. There are a host of interesting things in the world; Spanish poetry, chemistry, politics, music &#8211; all this is very interesting, and one cannot hold it against anyone who is interested in it; but in order to achieve something as an individual in a determinate situation, one must keep to something determinate and not fritter away one&#8217;s strength in many directions. Likewise in every profession what matters is that it be pursued with understanding. Thus, for example, the judge has to keep to the law, pass his judgement in accordance with it and not let himself be deterred by this or that, allow no excuse, without looking right or left. &#8211; Further, the understanding is in general an essential moment of education. An educated person is not content with what is nebulous and indeterminate but grasps objects in their fixed determinacy, whereas the uneducated person wavers uncertainly back and forth, and it often takes much trouble to come to an understanding with such a person about what is under discussion and to bring him to keep the determinate point at issue steadily in view. Now further, since according to the earlier discussion the logical in general is to be grasped not merely in the sense of a subjective activity but rather as the absolutely universal and thereby at the same time objective, this also applies to the understanding, this first form of the logical. The understanding is accordingly to be regarded as corresponding to what is called the <em>goodness<\/em> of God, insofar as this is understood to mean that finite things <em>are<\/em>, that they have a subsistence. Thus, for example, one recognizes the goodness of God in nature in the fact that the various classes and genera, both of animals and of plants, are provided with everything they need to preserve themselves and thrive. It is the same then with man, with individuals and with whole peoples, who likewise partly find at hand as something immediately present what is required for their subsistence and development (such as climate, the constitution and products of the land etc.), and partly possess it as disposition, talent etc. Grasped in this way, the understanding shows itself in general in all domains of the objective world, and it belongs essentially to the perfection of an object that the principle of the understanding comes to its right in it. Thus, for example, the state is imperfect if it has not yet come to a determinate distinction of estates and professions and if the political and governmental functions, different according to the concept, have not yet been developed into particular organs in the same way as is the case, for example, in the developed animal organism with the various functions of sensation, motion, digestion etc. &#8211; From the discussion so far it can further be gathered that even in those domains and spheres of activity which according to the ordinary representation seem to lie furthest from the understanding, it must nevertheless not be lacking, and that to the extent that this is the case, it must be regarded as a defect. This holds notably of art, of religion and of philosophy. Thus, for example, in art the understanding shows itself in the forms of the beautiful, different according to the concept, being held fast in this their difference too and brought to presentation. The same then holds of single works of art. It belongs accordingly to the beauty and perfection of a dramatic poem that the characters of the various persons are carried through in their purity and determinacy, and likewise that the various purposes and interests at issue are set forth clearly and decisively. &#8211; As regards the religious domain next, the superiority of Greek over Nordic mythology, for example (apart from the other difference of content and conception), consists essentially also in the fact that in the former the single figures of the gods are developed into plastic determinacy, whereas in the latter they flow into one another in the fog of murky indeterminacy. &#8211; That finally philosophy too cannot dispense with the understanding hardly needs special mention after the discussion so far. Philosophizing requires above all that every thought be grasped in its full precision and that one not let it rest with the vague and indeterminate. Further, however, it is also often said that the understanding must not go too far, and what is correct in this is that what belongs to the understanding is indeed not something ultimate but rather finite, and more precisely of such a kind that, driven to the extreme, it turns over into its opposite. It is the way of youth to toss about in abstractions, whereas the person experienced in life does not engage in the abstract <em>either-or<\/em> but keeps to the concrete.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-81\">\u00a7 81<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/2\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 2<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/31\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 31<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b2) The <em>dialectical<\/em> moment is the proper self-sublating of such finite determinations and their passing over into their opposites.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">1. The dialectical, taken by the understanding separately for itself, makes up, especially when shown in scientific concepts, <em>scepticism<\/em>; it contains mere negation as the result of the dialectical. 2. Dialectic is usually regarded as an external art which arbitrarily produces a confusion in determinate concepts and a mere <em>semblance<\/em> of <em>contradictions<\/em> in them, so that not these determinations but this semblance is something null, while what belongs to the understanding is rather the true. Often dialectic is also nothing more than a subjective seesaw system of argumentation going back and forth, where import is lacking and the nakedness is covered by such acuteness as produces such argumentation. &#8211; In its peculiar determinacy dialectic is rather the proper, true nature of the determinations of the understanding, of things and of the finite in general. Reflection is first the going beyond the isolated determinacy and a relating of it, whereby it is placed in a relationship but otherwise preserved in its isolated validity. Dialectic, by contrast, is this <em>immanent<\/em> going beyond, in which the one-sidedness and limitedness of the determinations of the understanding presents itself as what it is, namely as their negation. Everything finite is this: to sublate itself. The dialectical therefore makes up the moving soul of scientific advance and is the principle through which alone <em>immanent connection and necessity<\/em> enter the content of science, just as in it in general lies the true, not external, elevation above the finite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 1. <\/em>To grasp and cognize the dialectical properly is of the highest importance. It is in general the principle of all movement, all life and all activity in actuality. Likewise the dialectical is also the soul of all truly scientific cognition. In our ordinary consciousness not stopping at the abstract determinations of the understanding appears as mere fairness, according to the proverb &#8220;live and let live&#8221;, so that the one holds and <em>also<\/em> the other. But the more precise point is that the finite is not merely limited from outside but sublates itself through its own nature and passes over through itself into its opposite. Thus, for example, it is said: man is mortal, and dying is then regarded as something that has its ground only in external circumstances, according to which way of considering it there are two particular properties of man, being alive and <em>also<\/em> being mortal. But the true conception is this, that life as such bears the germ of death within itself and that the finite in general contradicts itself within itself and thereby sublates itself. &#8211; Further, dialectic is not to be confused with mere <em>sophistry<\/em>, whose essence consists precisely in asserting one-sided and abstract determinations in their isolation for themselves, according as the interest of the individual and his particular situation at the time requires. Thus, for example, in relation to action it is an essential moment that I exist and that I have the means for existence. But if I then single out this side, this principle of my welfare, for itself and derive from it the consequence that I may steal or betray my fatherland, this is sophistry. &#8211; Likewise in my action my subjective freedom, in the sense that in what I do I am present with my insight and conviction, is an essential principle. But if I argue from this principle <em>alone<\/em>, this is likewise sophistry, and all principles of ethical life are thereby overthrown. &#8211; Dialectic is essentially different from such doing, for it aims precisely at considering things in and for themselves, whereby the finitude of the one-sided determinations of the understanding then [shows itself]. &#8211; Dialectic, moreover, is nothing new in philosophy. Among the ancients Plato is named as the inventor of dialectic, and rightly so insofar as in the Platonic philosophy dialectic first occurs in free scientific and thereby at the same time objective form. In Socrates the dialectical still has, in agreement with the general character of his philosophizing, a predominantly subjective shape, namely that of <em>irony<\/em>. Socrates directed his dialectic, on the one hand, against ordinary consciousness in general and, on the other hand, in particular against the sophists. In his conversations he then used to assume the semblance of wanting to be instructed more closely about the matter under discussion; in this respect he asked all sorts of questions and so led those he conversed with to the opposite of what had at first seemed right to them. When, for example, the sophists called themselves teachers, Socrates, through a series of questions, brought the sophist Protagoras to have to admit that all learning is merely recollection. &#8211; Plato then shows in his strictly scientific dialogues, through dialectical treatment in general, the finitude of all fixed determinations of the understanding. Thus, for example, in the <em>Parmenides<\/em> he derives the many from the one and shows nevertheless how the many is only this, to determine itself as the one. In such a great manner did Plato treat dialectic. &#8211; In modern times it was above all Kant who brought dialectic back to mind and reinstated it in its dignity, and indeed through the working out, already discussed (\u00a7 48), of the so-called antinomies of reason, which are by no means concerned with a mere going back and forth among reasons and a merely subjective doing, but rather with showing how every abstract determination of the understanding, taken only as it gives itself, immediately turns over into its opposite. &#8211; However much the understanding is wont to resist dialectic, it is nevertheless by no means to be regarded as present merely for philosophical consciousness; rather what is at issue here is found already in all other consciousness and in universal experience. Everything around us can be regarded as an example of the dialectical. We know that everything finite, instead of being something fixed and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient, and this is nothing other than the dialectic of the finite, by which it, as in itself the other of itself, is also driven beyond what it immediately is and turns over into its opposite. If it was said earlier (\u00a7 80) that the understanding is to be regarded as what is contained in the representation of the <em>goodness<\/em> of God, it is now to be remarked of dialectic in the same (objective) sense that its principle corresponds to the representation of the <em>power<\/em> of God. We say that all things (i.e. everything finite as such) go to judgement, and have in this the intuition of dialectic as the universal irresistible power before which nothing, however secure and firm it may think itself, can stand. With this determination the depth of the divine essence, the concept of God, is indeed not yet exhausted; but it does form an essential moment in all religious consciousness. &#8211; Further, dialectic also asserts itself in all particular domains and shapes of the natural and spiritual world. Thus, for example, in the motion of the heavenly bodies. A planet stands now in this place, but is in itself also to be in another place, and brings this its otherness to concrete existence by moving. Likewise the physical elements prove to be dialectical, and the meteorological process is the appearance of their dialectic. It is the same principle that forms the foundation of all other natural processes and by which nature is at the same time driven beyond itself. As regards the occurrence of dialectic in the spiritual world, and more precisely in the domain of the legal and ethical, one need only recall here how, according to universal experience, the extreme of a state or of a doing is wont to turn over into its opposite, a dialectic which also finds manifold recognition in proverbs. Thus it is said, for example: <em>summum ius summa iniuria<\/em>, which expresses that abstract right, driven to its extreme, turns over into wrong. Likewise it is well known how in politics the extremes of anarchy and despotism are wont to bring each other about. Consciousness of dialectic in the domain of the ethical in its individual shape we find in those well-known proverbs: pride comes before a fall, too sharp grows blunt, etc. &#8211; Sensation too, bodily as well as spiritual, has its dialectic. It is well known how the extremes of pain and joy pass over into each other; the heart filled with joy relieves itself in tears, and the deepest melancholy is wont, in certain circumstances, to announce itself by a smile.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 2. <\/em>Scepticism must not be regarded merely as a doctrine of doubt; rather it is absolutely certain of its matter, i.e. of the nullity of everything finite. Whoever merely doubts still stands in the hope that his doubt can be resolved and that one or the other of the determinate things between which he wavers back and forth will turn out to be something fixed and true. Scepticism proper, by contrast, is complete despair of everything fixed of the understanding, and the disposition resulting from it is that of imperturbability and resting within oneself. This is the lofty ancient scepticism, as we find it presented notably in Sextus Empiricus and as it received its development in later Roman times as a complement to the dogmatic systems of the Stoics and Epicureans. With this lofty ancient scepticism is not to be confused that modern scepticism already mentioned earlier (\u00a7 39), which partly preceded the critical philosophy and partly emerged from it, and which consists merely in denying the truth and certainty of the supersensible and designating instead the sensible and what is present in immediate sensation as what we must keep to. If, moreover, scepticism is still often regarded nowadays as an irresistible enemy of all positive knowing in general and thus also of philosophy, insofar as philosophy is concerned with positive cognition, it must be remarked against this that it is in fact merely finite, abstractly understanding thinking that has to fear scepticism and is unable to resist it, whereas philosophy contains the sceptical within itself as a moment, namely as the dialectical. Philosophy, however, does not then stop at the merely negative result of dialectic, as is the case with scepticism. Scepticism misconstrues its result by holding it fast as mere, i.e. as abstract, negation. Since dialectic has the negative as its result, this, precisely as result, is at the same time the positive, for it contains within itself as sublated that from which it results and is not without it. But this is the fundamental determination of the third form of the logical, namely of the <em>speculative<\/em> or positively rational.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-82\">\u00a7 82<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/2\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 2<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/31\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 31<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u03b3) The <em>speculative<\/em> or <em>positively rational<\/em> grasps the unity of the determinations in their opposition, the <em>affirmative<\/em> that is contained in their dissolution and their passing over.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">1. Dialectic has a <em>positive<\/em> result because it has a <em>determinate content<\/em>, or because its result is truly not <em>empty<\/em>, <em>abstract nothing<\/em>, but the negation of <em>certain determinations<\/em>, which are contained in the result precisely because this is not an <em>immediate nothing<\/em> but a result. 2. This rational is therefore, although something thought, also something abstract, at the same time something <em>concrete<\/em>, because it is not <em>simple<\/em>, <em>formal<\/em> unity but <em>unity of distinct determinations <\/em>. Philosophy therefore has nothing whatever to do with mere abstractions or formal thoughts, but solely with concrete thoughts. 3. The mere <em>logic of the understanding<\/em> is contained in speculative logic and can at once be made from it; nothing is needed for this but to leave out the dialectical and rational; so it becomes what <em>ordinary logic<\/em> is, a <em>history<\/em> of various determinations of thought put together, which in their finitude count as something infinite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>As regards its <em>content<\/em>, the rational is so little merely the property of philosophy that it must rather be said to be present for all human beings, whatever stage of education and spiritual development they may be at, in which sense man has rightly been designated since ancient times as a rational being. The empirically universal way of knowing of the rational is at first that of prejudice and presupposition, and the character of the rational is, according to the earlier discussion (\u00a7 45), in general that of being something unconditioned and thus containing its determinacy within itself. In this sense man knows of the rational above all insofar as he knows of God and knows him as what is absolutely determined through himself. Likewise, further, a citizen&#8217;s knowing of his fatherland and its laws is a knowing of something rational insofar as these count for him as something unconditioned and at the same time as a universal to which he must subject himself with his individual will, and in the same sense even the knowing and willing of the child is rational, since it knows the will of its parents and wills it. Further, the <em>speculative<\/em> is in general nothing other than the rational (and indeed the positively rational) insofar as it is <em>thought<\/em>. In common life the expression <em>speculation<\/em> is usually used in a very vague and at the same time subordinate sense, as, for example, when marriage or commercial speculations are spoken of, by which is understood only this much: on the one hand that one is to go beyond what is immediately present, and on the other hand that what forms the content of such speculations is at first only something subjective, but is not to remain so, rather to be realized or translated into objectivity. What was remarked earlier about the Idea holds of this common usage regarding speculations, and to this is attached the further remark that many who already count themselves among the more educated also speak of speculation expressly in the meaning of something <em>merely<\/em> subjective, namely in such a way that it is said that a certain conception of natural or spiritual states and relationships may indeed, taken merely speculatively, be very fine and correct, but experience does not agree with it, and in actuality such a thing cannot be admitted. Against this it is to be said that the speculative, in its true meaning, is neither provisionally nor definitively something merely subjective, but rather expressly that which contains within itself as sublated those oppositions at which the understanding stops (thus also that of subjective and objective), and precisely thereby proves itself to be concrete and a totality. A speculative content therefore cannot be expressed in a one-sided proposition either. If we say, for example, that the absolute is the unity of the subjective and the objective, this is indeed correct, but one-sided insofar as only the <em>unity<\/em> is expressed here and the accent is laid on it, whereas in fact the subjective and the objective are not only identical but also distinct. Regarding the meaning of the speculative it is still to be mentioned here that by it is to be understood the same as what was formerly, especially in relation to religious consciousness and its content, usually designated as the <em>mystical<\/em>. When the mystical is spoken of nowadays, it as a rule counts as synonymous with the mysterious and incomprehensible, and this mysterious and incomprehensible is then, according to the difference of other education and cast of mind, regarded by some as what is proper and true, but by others as what belongs to superstition and deception. About this it must first be remarked that the mystical is indeed something mysterious, but only for the understanding, and indeed simply because abstract identity is the principle of the understanding, whereas the mystical (as synonymous with the speculative) is the concrete unity of those determinations which count as true for the understanding only in their separation and opposition. If, then, those who recognize the mystical as the true likewise let it rest with its being something absolutely mysterious, they thereby on their part only express that thinking likewise has for them only the meaning of abstract positing-as-identical, and that for this reason, in order to attain truth, one must renounce thinking, or, as it is also usually said, one must take reason captive. But, as we have seen, abstractly understanding thinking is so little something fixed and ultimate that it rather proves to be the constant sublating of itself and the turning over into its opposite, whereas the rational as such consists precisely in containing the opposites within itself as ideal moments. Everything rational is thus at the same time to be designated as mystical, by which, however, only so much is said, that it goes beyond the understanding, and by no means that it is to be regarded as inaccessible and incomprehensible to thinking at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"l-83\">\u00a7 83<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/2\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 2<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/31\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 31<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Logic falls into three parts: I. The Doctrine of Being. II. The Doctrine of Essence. III. The Doctrine of the Concept and the Idea. Namely into the doctrine of thought: I. In its immediacy &#8211; the concept in itself. II. In its reflection and mediation &#8211; the being-for-itself and semblance of the concept. III. In its <em>having returned into itself<\/em> and its developed being-with-itself &#8211; the concept <em>in<\/em> and <em>for itself<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>The division of logic given here, like the whole discussion of thinking so far, is to be regarded as a mere anticipation, and its justification or proof can result only from the completed treatment of thinking itself; for to prove means in philosophy as much as to show how the object makes itself through and out of itself into what it is. &#8211; The relationship in which the three main stages of thought or of the logical Idea named here stand to one another is in general to be grasped in such a way that only the <em>concept<\/em> is the true, and more precisely the truth of <em>being<\/em> and of <em>essence<\/em>, both of which, held fast in their isolation for themselves, are thereby at the same time to be regarded as untrue &#8211; <em>being<\/em> because it is as yet only the <em>immediate<\/em>, and <em>essence<\/em> because it is as yet only the <em>mediated<\/em>. The question might first be raised here why, if this is so, one begins with the untrue and not at once with the true. The answer is that truth, precisely as such, has to <em>prove itself true<\/em> [sich bew\u00e4hren], and this proving here, within the logical, consists in the concept&#8217;s proving itself to be what is mediated through and with itself and thereby at the same time the truly immediate. In concrete and real shape the relationship of the three stages of the logical Idea mentioned here shows itself in such a way that God, who is the truth, is cognized by us in this his truth, i.e. as absolute spirit, only insofar as we at the same time recognize the world created by him, nature and finite spirit, as untrue in their difference from God.<\/p>\n\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This page gives the Preliminary Conception of Logic: Hegel&#8217;s determination of what logic is, his review of the three positions of thought towards objectivity &#8211; metaphysics, empiricism and critical philosophy, immediate knowing &#8211; and the division of logic. From the Groundlines, the footnotes to \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 31 (\u00a7\u00a7 79\u201383) and to \u00a7 280 (\u00a7 [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-906520","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906520","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=906520"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906520\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=906520"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}