{"id":906521,"date":"2026-11-19T08:50:49","date_gmt":"2026-11-19T07:50:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/the-phenomenology-of-spirit-enc-1817-1827-1830\/"},"modified":"2026-11-19T13:23:18","modified_gmt":"2026-11-19T12:23:18","slug":"the-phenomenology-of-spirit-enc-1817-1827-1830","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/the-phenomenology-of-spirit-enc-1817-1827-1830\/","title":{"rendered":"The Phenomenology of Spirit (Enc. 1817\/1827\/1830)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>Groundlines<\/em> presuppose not only the Psychology but also the section that precedes it: the Phenomenology of Spirit within the <em>Encyclopaedia<\/em>. Hegel refers to it explicitly twice &#8211; in <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/35\/\">\u00a7 35<\/a> for the transition from the natural will to the person (3rd ed. \u00a7 424) and in <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">\u00a7 57<\/a> for the struggle for recognition and the relationship of lordship and bondage (3rd ed. \u00a7 430 ff.). In addition there is <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/8\/\">\u00a7 8<\/a>, where the relationship of consciousness is designated as merely the side of appearance of the will.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">All three versions are reproduced: the third edition of 1830 with the Additions, the second of 1827 and the first of 1817. The second and third editions have the same numbering here (\u00a7\u00a7 413\u2013439); the first edition has \u00a7\u00a7 329\u2013362. Hegel&#8217;s reference &#8220;\u00a7 325 ff.&#8221; in \u00a7 57 of the Groundlines does not exactly fit the first edition &#8211; there the Phenomenology begins only with \u00a7 329, and lordship and bondage are in \u00a7\u00a7 352\u2013357.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Contents<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li><a href=\"#p1830\">Encyclopaedia 1830, \u00a7\u00a7 413\u2013439<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#p1827\">Encyclopaedia 1827, \u00a7\u00a7 413\u2013439<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#p1817\">Encyclopaedia 1817, \u00a7\u00a7 329\u2013362<\/a><\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table><thead><tr><th>Subject matter<\/th><th>1830<\/th><th>1827<\/th><th>1817<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>Consciousness as such (sensuous consciousness, perceiving, understanding)<\/td><td>\u00a7 413\u2013423<\/td><td>\u00a7 413\u2013423<\/td><td>\u00a7 329\u2013343<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Self-consciousness (desire, recognitive and universal self-consciousness)<\/td><td>\u00a7 424\u2013437<\/td><td>\u00a7 424\u2013437<\/td><td>\u00a7 344\u2013360<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Reason<\/td><td>\u00a7 438\u2013439<\/td><td>\u00a7 438\u2013439<\/td><td>\u00a7 361\u2013362<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830\">Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), \u00a7\u00a7 413\u2013439<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li>Consciousness as such: <a href=\"#p1830-413\">\u00a7 413<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-414\">\u00a7 414<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-415\">\u00a7 415<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-416\">\u00a7 416<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-417\">\u00a7 417<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-418\">\u00a7 418<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-419\">\u00a7 419<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-420\">\u00a7 420<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-421\">\u00a7 421<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-422\">\u00a7 422<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-423\">\u00a7 423<\/a><\/li><li>Self-consciousness: <a href=\"#p1830-424\">\u00a7 424<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-425\">\u00a7 425<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-426\">\u00a7 426<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-427\">\u00a7 427<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-428\">\u00a7 428<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-429\">\u00a7 429<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-430\">\u00a7 430<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-431\">\u00a7 431<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-432\">\u00a7 432<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-433\">\u00a7 433<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-434\">\u00a7 434<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-435\">\u00a7 435<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-436\">\u00a7 436<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-437\">\u00a7 437<\/a><\/li><li>Reason: <a href=\"#p1830-438\">\u00a7 438<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1830-439\">\u00a7 439<\/a><\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-413\">\u00a7 413<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Consciousness<\/em> makes up the stage of reflection or of the <em>relationship<\/em> of spirit, of spirit as <em>appearance<\/em>. The I is the infinite relation of spirit to itself, but as <em>subjective<\/em>, as <em>certainty of itself<\/em>; the immediate identity of the natural soul is raised to this pure ideal identity with itself; the content of the former is <em>object<\/em> for this reflection being for itself. Pure abstract freedom for itself releases from itself its determinacy, the natural life of the soul, as equally free, as a <em>self-standing object<\/em>, and it is of this as <em>external to it<\/em> that the I first knows, and is thus consciousness. The I as this absolute negativity is <em>in itself<\/em> identity in otherness; the I is itself and overreaches the object as something sublated in itself, is <em>one<\/em> side of the relationship and the <em>whole<\/em> relationship; &#8211; <em>the light<\/em> that manifests itself and something else as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> As was remarked in the Addition to the preceding paragraph, the I must be grasped as the individually determined universal that, in its determinacy, in its difference, relates only to itself. This already implies that the I is immediately <em>negative<\/em> relation to itself, consequently the unmediated opposite of its <em>universality<\/em> abstracted from all determinacy, thus the equally <em>abstract<\/em>, <em>simple singularity<\/em>. Not only do <em>we<\/em>, the observers, thus distinguish the I into its opposed moments; rather, by virtue of its singularity, universal within itself and thus distinguished from itself, the I is <em>itself<\/em> this <em>distinguishing-itself-from-itself<\/em>, for as relating itself to itself its excluding singularity excludes itself from itself, thus from singularity, and thereby posits itself as the opposite of itself, immediately joined together with it, as universality. But the determination essential to the I, that of abstractly universal singularity, makes up its <em>being<\/em>. I and my being are therefore inseparably bound up with each other; the difference of my being from me is a difference that is none. On the one hand, being as the <em>absolutely immediate<\/em>, <em>indeterminate<\/em>, <em>undifferentiated<\/em> must indeed be distinguished from <em>thinking that distinguishes itself from itself<\/em> and, through sublation of the difference, <em>mediates itself with itself<\/em>, from the <em>I<\/em>; on the other hand, however, being is identical with thinking, because thinking returns from all mediation to immediacy, from all its self-distinguishing to untroubled unity with itself. The I is therefore being, or has it as a moment within itself. In positing this being as something <em>other<\/em> than me and at the same time as <em>identical<\/em> with me, I am <em>knowing<\/em> and have the absolute <em>certainty<\/em> of my being. This certainty must not, as happens on the part of mere <em>representation<\/em>, be regarded as a kind of <em>property<\/em> of the I, as a determination <em>in<\/em> its nature, but is to be grasped as the <em>very nature<\/em> of the I; for the I cannot exist without distinguishing itself from itself and being with itself in what is distinguished from it, that is, precisely without knowing of itself, without having and being the certainty of itself. <em>Certainty<\/em> therefore relates to the <em>I<\/em> as <em>freedom<\/em> to the <em>will<\/em>. As the former makes up the nature of the I, so the latter the nature of the will. At first, however, certainty is to be compared only with <em>subjective<\/em> freedom, with <em>arbitrariness<\/em>; only <em>objective<\/em> certainty, <em>truth<\/em>, corresponds to the <em>genuine<\/em> freedom of the will. The I certain of itself is accordingly at the beginning still the <em>wholly simple subjective<\/em>, the <em>wholly abstractly free<\/em>, the <em>completely indeterminate ideality<\/em> or negativity of all limitedness. Repelling itself from itself, the I therefore first arrives only at something <em>formally<\/em>, not <em>actually<\/em>, distinguished from it. But, as is shown in logic, the difference that is <em>in itself<\/em> must also be posited, developed into an <em>actual<\/em> difference. With regard to the I this development takes place in such a way that the I &#8211; not falling back into the <em>anthropological<\/em>, into the unconscious unity of the spiritual and the natural, but remaining certain of itself and preserving itself in its freedom &#8211; lets its other unfold into a <em>totality<\/em> equal to the totality of the I and precisely thereby become, from something corporeal <em>belonging to the soul<\/em>, something that <em>stands over against it self-standingly<\/em>, an <em>object<\/em> in the proper sense of this word. Because the I is as yet only the wholly abstract subjective, the merely formal, contentless distinguishing-itself-from-itself, the <em>actual<\/em> difference, the <em>determinate content<\/em>, is found outside the I and belongs solely to the <em>objects<\/em>. But since <em>in itself<\/em> the I already has difference within itself, or, in other words, since it is in itself the unity of itself and its other, it is necessarily <em>related<\/em> to the difference existing in the object and <em>immediately reflected into itself<\/em> out of this its other. The I thus overreaches what is actually distinguished from it, is with itself in this its other and remains, in all intuition, certain of itself. Only in coming to grasp myself as I does the other become objective to me, step over against me and at the same time become posited in me as ideal, and thus led back to unity with me. That is why in the above paragraph the I has been compared with <em>light<\/em>. As light is the manifestation of itself and of its other, the <em>dark<\/em>, and can reveal itself only by revealing that other, so the I too is revealed to itself only insofar as its other is revealed to it in the shape of something independent of it. From this general exposition of the nature of the I it is already sufficiently evident that the I, because it enters into struggle with external objects, is something higher than the impotent natural soul caught in, so to speak, childlike unity with the world, into which, precisely because of its impotence, fall the spiritual states of illness considered by us earlier.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-414\">\u00a7 414<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The identity of spirit with itself, as it is first posited as I, is only its abstract, formal ideality. As <em>soul<\/em> in the form of <em>substantial<\/em> universality, it is now subjective reflection-into-itself, related to this substantiality as to its negative, as to something beyond it and dark. Consciousness is therefore, like relationship in general, the <em>contradiction<\/em> of the self-standingness of both sides and of their identity, in which they are sublated. Spirit as I is <em>essence<\/em>; but since reality in the sphere of essence is posited as immediately existing and at the same time as ideal, spirit as consciousness is only the <em>appearing<\/em> of spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> The negativity which the wholly <em>abstract<\/em> I or <em>mere consciousness<\/em> exercises on its other is a still thoroughly indeterminate, superficial, not absolute one. Therefore on this standpoint the <em>contradiction<\/em> arises that the object is on the one hand <em>in me<\/em> and on the other hand has a subsistence <em>outside me<\/em> just as self-standing as the <em>dark<\/em> outside the <em>light<\/em>. To consciousness the object appears not as one <em>posited<\/em> by the I but as an <em>immediate<\/em>, <em>existing<\/em>, <em>given<\/em> one; for consciousness does not yet know that the object is <em>in itself<\/em> identical with spirit and released into seemingly complete independence only through a self-division of spirit. That this is so only <em>we<\/em> know, who have penetrated to the <em>Idea<\/em> of spirit and have thus raised ourselves above the abstract, formal identity of the I.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-415\">\u00a7 415<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since the I is <em>for itself<\/em> only as formal identity, the <em>dialectical<\/em> movement of the concept, the further determination of consciousness, is not for it its own activity; rather it is <em>in itself<\/em> and, for consciousness, an alteration of the object. Consciousness therefore appears determined differently according to the difference of the given object, and its further development as an alteration of the determinations of its object. The I, the subject of consciousness, is thinking; the logical further determination of the object is <em>what is identical in subject and object<\/em>, their absolute connection, that according to which the object is the subject&#8217;s own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Kantian philosophy can most determinately be regarded as having grasped spirit as consciousness and as containing entirely only determinations of the phenomenology, not of the philosophy, of spirit. It regards the <em>I<\/em> as relation to something lying beyond, which in its abstract determination is called the thing-in-itself; and it grasps both intelligence and will only according to this finitude. Although in the concept of <em>reflective<\/em> judgement it does arrive at the <em>Idea<\/em> of spirit, subject-objectivity, an <em>intuitive understanding<\/em> etc., as well as at the Idea of nature, this Idea itself is again reduced to an appearance, namely a subjective maxim (see \u00a7 58, Introd.). It is therefore to be regarded as a correct sense of this philosophy that it was grasped by <em>Reinhold<\/em> as a theory of <em>consciousness<\/em>, under the name of the <em>faculty of representation<\/em>. The <em>Fichtean<\/em> philosophy has the same standpoint, and the not-I is determined only as <em>object<\/em> of the I, only in <em>consciousness<\/em>; it remains as an infinite impulse, i.e. as a <em>thing-in-itself<\/em>. Both philosophies therefore show that they have not arrived at the <em>concept<\/em> and at <em>spirit<\/em> as it <em>is in and for itself<\/em>, but only as it is in relation to an other. With regard to <em>Spinozism<\/em>, by contrast, it is to be remarked that spirit, in the judgement by which it constitutes itself as <em>I<\/em>, as free subjectivity against determinacy, steps out of substance, and philosophy, since this judgement is for it the absolute determination of spirit, steps out of Spinozism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 1. <\/em>Although the further determination of consciousness proceeds from its <em>own<\/em> inner and also has a <em>negative<\/em> direction against the object, which is thus <em>altered<\/em> by consciousness, this alteration nevertheless appears to consciousness as one that comes about without its subjective activity, and the determinations it posits in the object count for it as belonging only to the object, as existing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition 2. <\/em>In <em>Fichte<\/em> there always prevails the predicament of how the <em>I<\/em> is to cope with the <em>not-I<\/em>. No <em>true<\/em> unity of these two sides comes about here; this unity always remains only one that <em>ought to be<\/em>, because from the outset the false presupposition is made that I and not-I, in their <em>separatedness<\/em>, in their <em>finitude<\/em>, are something <em>absolute<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-416\">\u00a7 416<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The goal of spirit as consciousness is to make this its appearance identical with its essence, to raise <em>the certainty of itself to truth<\/em>. The <em>concrete existence<\/em> that spirit has in consciousness has its finitude in being formal relation to itself, only certainty. Because the object is determined only abstractly as <em>its own<\/em>, or spirit is reflected in the object only into itself as abstract I, this concrete existence still has a content that is not as its own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition. <\/em>Mere <em>representation<\/em> does not distinguish between <em>certainty<\/em> and <em>truth<\/em>. What is <em>certain<\/em> for it, what it holds to be something subjective agreeing with the object, it calls <em>true<\/em>, however trivial and bad the content of this subjective may be. Philosophy, by contrast, must essentially distinguish the concept of <em>truth<\/em> from <em>mere certainty<\/em>, for the certainty which spirit has of itself on the standpoint of mere consciousness is still something <em>untrue<\/em>, <em>self-contradictory<\/em>, since spirit here, besides the abstract certainty of being <em>with itself<\/em>, has the directly opposite certainty of relating to something essentially <em>other<\/em> than itself. This contradiction must be sublated; the drive to resolve itself lies within it. Subjective certainty must not retain any limit in the object; it must receive true objectivity; and conversely the object for its part must become <em>mine<\/em> not merely in an <em>abstract<\/em> way but according to all sides of its <em>concrete<\/em> nature. This goal is already divined by reason <em>believing<\/em> in itself, but is reached only by the <em>knowing<\/em> of <em>reason<\/em>, by <em>comprehending cognition<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-417\">\u00a7 417<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The stages of this raising of certainty to truth are that spirit is a. <em>consciousness<\/em> in general, which has an object as such, b. <em>self-consciousness<\/em>, for which the <em>I<\/em> is the object, c. unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, such that spirit intuits the content of the object as itself and itself as determined in and for itself; &#8211; <em>reason<\/em>, <em>the concept of spirit<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> The three stages of the raising of <em>consciousness<\/em> to <em>reason<\/em> given in the above paragraph are determined by the power of the <em>concept<\/em> active both in the <em>subject<\/em> and in the <em>object<\/em>, and can therefore be regarded as so many <em>judgements<\/em>. But of this, as already remarked earlier, the <em>abstract I<\/em>, <em>mere consciousness<\/em>, as yet knows nothing. Since, therefore, the <em>not-I<\/em>, which at first counts for consciousness as self-standing, is sublated by the power of the concept activating itself in it, and the object is given, instead of the form of <em>immediacy<\/em>, <em>externality<\/em> and <em>singularity<\/em>, the form of something <em>universal<\/em>, something <em>inner<\/em>, and consciousness takes this <em>inwardized<\/em> into itself, the I&#8217;s <em>own<\/em> becoming-inward, which precisely thereby comes about, appears to it as an inwardizing of the <em>object<\/em>. Only when the object is inwardized into the <em>I<\/em> and <em>consciousness<\/em> has in this way developed into <em>self-consciousness<\/em> does spirit know the power of its own inwardness as one present and effective in the object. What, then, in the sphere of mere consciousness is only for <em>us<\/em>, the observers, comes to be for spirit itself in the sphere of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness has consciousness as its <em>object<\/em>, thus sets itself <em>over against<\/em> it. At the same time, however, consciousness is also preserved as a <em>moment<\/em> in self-consciousness itself. Self-consciousness therefore necessarily proceeds, by repelling itself from itself, to set <em>another<\/em> self-consciousness over against itself and to give itself in it an object that is identical with it and yet at the same time self-standing. This object is at first an <em>immediate<\/em>, <em>singular I<\/em>. But if it is freed from the form of <em>one-sided<\/em> subjectivity still attaching to it in this way and grasped as a <em>reality<\/em> penetrated by the <em>subjectivity<\/em> of the concept, consequently as Idea, then <em>self-consciousness<\/em> advances from its <em>opposition<\/em> to <em>consciousness<\/em> to <em>mediated unity<\/em> with it and thereby becomes the <em>concrete being-for-itself<\/em> of the I, <em>absolutely free reason cognizing itself<\/em> in the <em>objective world<\/em>. It hardly needs remarking here that <em>reason<\/em>, which appears in our consideration as the <em>third<\/em> and <em>last<\/em>, is not something <em>merely last<\/em>, a result emerging from something alien to it, but rather what <em>underlies<\/em> consciousness and self-consciousness, thus the <em>first<\/em>, and that through the sublation of these two one-sided forms it proves to be their <em>original unity<\/em> and <em>truth<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">337)<em class=\"qua\">Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsverm\u00f6gens, Prague and Jena 1789<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-418\">\u00a7 418<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Consciousness is at first <em>immediate<\/em>, its relation to the object therefore the simple, unmediated certainty of it; the object itself is therefore likewise determined as immediate, as <em>existing<\/em> and reflected into itself, further as immediately <em>singular<\/em>; &#8211; <em>sensuous<\/em> consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Consciousness as relationship contains only the categories belonging to the abstract I or formal thinking, which are for it determinations of the object (\u00a7 415). Sensuous consciousness therefore knows of the object only as something <em>existing<\/em>, a <em>something<\/em>, an <em>existing thing<\/em>, a <em>singular<\/em> and so forth. It appears as the richest in content but is the poorest in thoughts. That rich filling is made up of the determinations of feeling; they are the <em>material<\/em> of consciousness (\u00a7 414), the substantial and qualitative which in the anthropological sphere the soul <em>is<\/em> and finds <em>within itself<\/em>. This material the reflection of the soul into itself, the I, separates from itself and gives it first the determination of <em>being<\/em>. &#8211; Spatial and temporal singularity, <em>here<\/em> and <em>now<\/em>, as I determined the object of sensuous consciousness in the <em>Phenomenology of Spirit<\/em>, p. 25 ff., properly belongs to intuiting. The object is here at first to be taken only according to the relationship it has to <em>consciousness<\/em>, namely as something <em>external<\/em> to it, not yet determined as external in itself or as being-outside-itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> The first of the three stages of development of <em>phenomenological<\/em> spirit named in the preceding paragraph, namely <em>consciousness<\/em>, has within itself the three stages \u03b1) of <em>sensuous<\/em>, \u03b2) of <em>perceiving<\/em> and \u03b3) of <em>understanding<\/em> consciousness. In this sequence a logical advance reveals itself. \u03b1) First the object is a wholly <em>immediate<\/em>, <em>existing<\/em> one; so it appears to <em>sensuous<\/em> consciousness. But this <em>immediacy<\/em> has no truth; from it one must advance to the <em>essential<\/em> being of the object. \u03b2) When the <em>essence<\/em> of things becomes the object of consciousness, consciousness is no longer <em>sensuous<\/em> but <em>perceiving<\/em> consciousness. On this standpoint the <em>singular<\/em> things are related to a <em>universal<\/em>, but also only <em>related<\/em>; therefore no <em>true unity<\/em> of the singular and the universal comes about here yet, but only a <em>mixture<\/em> of these two sides. In this lies a contradiction that drives on to the third stage of consciousness, \u03b3) to <em>understanding<\/em> consciousness, and finds its resolution there insofar as there the object is reduced or raised to the <em>appearance<\/em> of an <em>inner existing<\/em> for itself. Such appearance is the <em>living<\/em>. In considering it <em>self-consciousness<\/em> kindles, for in the living the <em>object<\/em> turns over into the <em>subjective<\/em> &#8211; there consciousness discovers itself as what is <em>essential<\/em> in the object, reflects itself out of the object into itself, becomes objective to itself. After this general survey of the three stages of development of consciousness we now turn first more closely to <em>sensuous<\/em> consciousness. This is distinguished from the other modes of consciousness not by the object&#8217;s reaching me through the <em>senses<\/em> in its case alone, but rather by the object, whether external or internal, having on its standpoint no further <em>determination of thought<\/em> at all than, first, simply to <em>be<\/em> and, second, to be a <em>self-standing other against me<\/em>, something <em>reflected into itself<\/em>, a <em>singular<\/em> against me as a <em>singular<\/em>, <em>immediate<\/em> one. The <em>particular content<\/em> of the sensuous, for example smell, taste, colour etc., falls, as we saw in \u00a7 401, to <em>sensation<\/em>. But the <em>form<\/em> peculiar to the sensuous, <em>being-external-to-itself<\/em>, stepping asunder in <em>space<\/em> and <em>time<\/em>, is the determination of the object apprehended by <em>intuition<\/em> (as we shall see in \u00a7 448) &#8211; in such a way that for <em>sensuous<\/em> consciousness as such only the above-mentioned determination of thought remains, by virtue of which the manifold particular content of sensations gathers itself into a one existing outside me, which on this standpoint is known by me in an immediate, singularized way, comes contingently into my consciousness now and then disappears from it again, and is in general, as regards both its existence and its constitution, something given for me, thus something of which I do not know where it comes from, why it has this determinate nature and whether it is something true. From this brief statement of the nature of <em>immediate<\/em> or <em>sensuous<\/em> consciousness it is evident that it is a form thoroughly inadequate to the content of <em>right<\/em>, of the <em>ethical<\/em> and of <em>religion<\/em>, which is <em>universal<\/em> in and for itself, a form that corrupts such content, since in that consciousness the absolutely necessary, eternal, infinite, inner is given the shape of something finite, singularized, external to itself. If, therefore, in recent times people have wanted to admit only an <em>immediate<\/em> knowing of God, they have confined themselves to a knowing that can say of God only that he <em>is<\/em>, that he exists <em>outside<\/em> us and that to sensation he seems to possess such and such properties. Such consciousness gets no further than a self-assertive bluster, taking itself to be religious, with its contingent assurances regarding the nature of the divine that is beyond it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-419\">\u00a7 419<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>sensuous<\/em> as something becomes an <em>other<\/em>; the reflection of the <em>something<\/em> into itself, the <em>thing<\/em>, has <em>many<\/em> properties and, as singular in its immediacy, <em>manifold predicates<\/em>. The <em>many singulars<\/em> of sensuousness therefore become something <em>broad<\/em> &#8211; a manifoldness of <em>relations<\/em>, <em>determinations of reflection<\/em> and <em>universalities<\/em>. &#8211; These are logical determinations, posited by the thinking, i.e. here by the I. But <em>for it<\/em>, as appearing, the object has changed in this way. Sensuous consciousness in this determination of the object is <em>perceiving<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> The content of sensuous consciousness is <em>dialectical<\/em> in itself. It is supposed to be <em>the<\/em> singular; but precisely thereby it is not a singular but every singular; and precisely in <em>excluding<\/em> others from itself the singular content relates itself to others, proves to be <em>going beyond itself<\/em>, dependent on others, mediated by them, having others within itself. The <em>next<\/em> truth of the <em>immediately singular<\/em> is thus its <em>being related<\/em> to others. The determinations of this relation are what are called <em>determinations of reflection<\/em>, and the consciousness apprehending these determinations is <em>perceiving<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-420\">\u00a7 420<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Consciousness that has gone beyond sensuousness wants to take the object <em>in its truth<\/em> [wahr-nehmen, i.e. to perceive], not as merely immediate but as mediated, reflected into itself and universal. The object is thus a combination of sensuous determinations and of expanded determinations of thought of concrete relationships and connections. With this the identity of consciousness with the object is no longer the abstract identity of <em>certainty<\/em> but a <em>determinate<\/em> one, a <em>knowing<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The next stage of consciousness, on which the <em>Kantian philosophy<\/em> grasps spirit, is <em>perceiving<\/em>, which is in general the standpoint of our <em>ordinary consciousness<\/em> and more or less of the <em>sciences<\/em>. One starts from sensuous certainties of single apperceptions or observations, which are supposed to be raised to truth by being considered in their relation, by being reflected on, in general by becoming at the same time, according to determinate categories, something necessary and universal, <em>experiences<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> Although <em>perceiving<\/em> starts from the <em>observation<\/em> of sensuous material, it does not stop there, does not restrict itself to smelling, tasting, seeing, hearing and touching, but necessarily advances to relating the sensuous to a <em>universal<\/em> not immediately observable, to cognizing each singularized thing as something connected within itself &#8211; for example to gathering together in <em>force<\/em> all its expressions &#8211; and to seeking out the relations and mediations that take place between single things. Whereas, therefore, <em>merely sensuous<\/em> consciousness only <em>points<\/em> to things, i.e. merely shows them in their immediacy, <em>perceiving<\/em> by contrast grasps the connection of things, demonstrates that when these circumstances are present this follows from them, and so begins to <em>show<\/em> things to be <em>true<\/em>. This <em>showing<\/em>, however, is still deficient, not final. For that through which something is to be shown here is itself something <em>presupposed<\/em>, consequently in need of being shown, so that in this field one goes from <em>presuppositions<\/em> to <em>presuppositions<\/em> and gets into the progress <em>to infinity<\/em>. &#8211; On this standpoint stands <em>experience<\/em>. Everything must be <em>experienced<\/em>. But if there is to be talk of <em>philosophy<\/em>, one must raise oneself from that showing of empiricism, which remains bound to presuppositions, to the proving of the <em>absolute necessity<\/em> of things. Already at \u00a7 415, moreover, it was said that the further development of consciousness appears as an alteration of the determinations of its object. With reference to this point it may be mentioned here that, since perceiving consciousness sublates the <em>singularity<\/em> of things, posits it as <em>ideal<\/em> and thus negates the <em>externality<\/em> of the object&#8217;s relation to the I, the I goes into itself, itself gains in <em>inwardness<\/em>, but that consciousness regards this <em>going-into-itself<\/em> as falling into the object.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-421\">\u00a7 421<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This linking of the singular and the universal is a mixture, because the singular remains being that lies at the <em>ground<\/em> and fixed against the universal, to which it is at the same time related. It is therefore the many-sided contradiction &#8211; in general of the <em>singular<\/em> things of sensuous apperception, which are supposed to make up <em>the ground<\/em> of universal experience, and of <em>universality<\/em>, which is rather supposed to be the essence and the ground &#8211; of <em>singularity<\/em>, which makes up <em>self-standingness<\/em> taken in its concrete content, and of the manifold <em>properties<\/em>, which, free of this negative bond and of one another, are rather self-standing <em>universal matters<\/em> (see \u00a7 123 ff.) etc. Here properly falls the contradiction of the finite through all forms of the logical spheres, most concretely insofar as the something is determined as <em>object<\/em> (\u00a7 194 ff.).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-422\">\u00a7 422<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The next <em>truth<\/em> of perceiving is that the object is rather <em>appearance<\/em> and its reflection-into-itself an <em>inner<\/em> and universal being for itself over against it. The consciousness of this object is the <em>understanding<\/em>. &#8211; That <em>inner<\/em> is on the one hand the <em>sublated manifoldness<\/em> of the sensuous and in this way abstract identity; on the other hand, however, it therefore also contains manifoldness, but as <em>inner simple difference<\/em>, which remains identical with itself in the change of appearances. This simple difference is the realm <em>of the laws<\/em> of appearance, its calm universal image.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> The contradiction designated in the preceding paragraph receives its first resolution through the manifold determinations of the sensuous, self-standing against one another and against the inner unity of each single thing, being reduced to the <em>appearance<\/em> of an <em>inner<\/em> being for itself, and the object thus being developed further from the contradiction of its <em>reflection-into-itself<\/em> and its <em>reflection-into-another<\/em> to the essential relationship of itself to itself. But since consciousness raises itself from the <em>observation<\/em> of <em>immediate singularity<\/em> and from the <em>mixture<\/em> of the <em>singular<\/em> and the <em>universal<\/em> to the apprehension of the <em>inner<\/em> of the object, thus determines the object in a way equal to the <em>I<\/em>, it becomes <em>understanding<\/em> consciousness. Only in that non-sensuous inner does the understanding believe it has the true. At first, however, this inner is something <em>abstractly identical<\/em>, <em>undifferentiated within itself<\/em>; such an inner we have before us in the category of <em>force<\/em> and of <em>cause<\/em>. The <em>true<\/em> inner, by contrast, must be designated as <em>concrete<\/em>, as <em>differentiated within itself<\/em>. So grasped, it is what we call law. For the essence of law, whether it relates to external nature or to the ethical world order, consists in an <em>inseparable unity<\/em>, in a <em>necessary inner connection of distinct<\/em> determinations. Thus through the law <em>punishment<\/em> is necessarily bound up with <em>crime<\/em>; to the criminal it may indeed appear as something alien to him, but in the concept of crime its opposite, punishment, essentially lies. Likewise, as regards external nature, for example the law of the motion of the planets (according to which, as is well known, the squares of the periods of revolution are as the cubes of the distances) must be grasped as an inner necessary unity of distinct determinations. This unity is indeed comprehended only by the speculative thinking of <em>reason<\/em>, but is already discovered by <em>understanding<\/em> consciousness in the manifoldness of appearances. Laws are the determinations of the understanding indwelling in the world itself; in them, therefore, understanding consciousness finds its own nature again and thus becomes objective to itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-423\">\u00a7 423<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Law, at first the relationship of universal, abiding determinations, has its necessity in itself insofar as its difference is the inner one; the one of the determinations, as not externally distinguished from the other, lies immediately itself in the other. But in this way the inner difference is what it is in truth, difference in itself or <em>the difference<\/em> <em>that is none<\/em>. &#8211; In this form-determination in general consciousness, which as such contains the <em>self-standingness<\/em> of subject and object against each other, has disappeared <em>in itself<\/em>; the I as judging has an object that is not distinguished from it &#8211; <em>itself<\/em>; &#8211; <em>self-consciousness<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> What was said in the above paragraph of the <em>inner difference<\/em> making up the essence of <em>law<\/em>, namely that this difference is a <em>difference<\/em> that is <em>none<\/em>, holds just as much of the difference existing in the <em>I<\/em> that is objective to itself. Just as law is something distinguished not merely against something <em>other<\/em> but <em>within itself<\/em>, something identical with itself in its difference, so too is the I that has itself as its object, that knows of itself. Since, therefore, consciousness as <em>understanding<\/em> knows of <em>laws<\/em>, it relates to an object in which the I finds again the counter-image of its own self and thus is on the point of developing into <em>self-consciousness as such<\/em>. But since, as already remarked in the Addition to \u00a7 422, <em>merely understanding<\/em> consciousness does not yet attain to <em>comprehending<\/em> the unity of the distinct determinations present in law, i.e. to developing dialectically from one of these determinations its opposite, this unity still remains something dead for that consciousness, consequently something <em>not in agreement<\/em> with the <em>activity<\/em> of the I. In the <em>living<\/em>, by contrast, consciousness intuits the very <em>process<\/em> of the positing and sublating of the distinct determinations, perceives that the difference is <em>no<\/em> difference, i.e. no absolutely fixed difference. For life is that inner which does not remain an <em>abstractly<\/em> inner but enters wholly into its <em>expression<\/em>; it is something <em>mediated<\/em> through the negation of the immediate, the external, which itself sublates this its mediation into <em>immediacy<\/em> &#8211; a <em>sensuous<\/em>, <em>external<\/em> and at the same time absolutely <em>inner<\/em> concrete existence, something <em>material<\/em> in which the <em>asunderness<\/em> of the parts appears <em>sublated<\/em>, the singular reduced to something <em>ideal<\/em>, to a <em>moment<\/em>, to a <em>member<\/em> of the whole; in short, life must be grasped as <em>end in itself<\/em>, as a purpose that has its means in itself, as a totality in which each distinct term is at the same time purpose and means. In the consciousness of this <em>dialectical<\/em>, this <em>living<\/em> unity of the distinct, <em>self-consciousness<\/em> therefore kindles &#8211; consciousness of the simple <em>ideal<\/em> that is objective to itself and thus distinguished within itself, the knowing of the <em>truth of the natural<\/em>, of the <em>I<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-424\">\u00a7 424<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/35\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 35<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The truth of consciousness is <em>self-consciousness<\/em>, and this is the ground of the former, so that in concrete existence all consciousness of another object is self-consciousness; I know of the object as mine (it is my representation), I therefore know of myself in it. &#8211; The expression of self-consciousness is I = I; &#8211; <em>abstract freedom<\/em>, pure ideality. &#8211; So it is without reality, for it itself, which is <em>object<\/em> of itself, is not such an object, since no difference between it and itself is present.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> In the expression I = I the principle of absolute <em>reason<\/em> and <em>freedom<\/em> is expressed. Freedom and reason consist in my raising myself to the form of I = I, in my cognizing everything as <em>mine<\/em>, as <em>I<\/em>, in my grasping every object as a member in the system of what I myself am &#8211; in short, in my having <em>I<\/em> and the <em>world<\/em> in <em>one and the same<\/em> consciousness, finding myself again in the world and conversely having in my consciousness what <em>is<\/em>, what has <em>objectivity<\/em>. This unity of the I and the object, which makes up the principle of spirit, is, however, present only in an <em>abstract<\/em> way in <em>immediate<\/em> self-consciousness and is cognized only by <em>us<\/em>, the observers, not yet by self-consciousness itself. Immediate self-consciousness does not yet have I = I as its object, but only the I, and is therefore free only <em>for us<\/em>, not <em>for itself<\/em> &#8211; does not yet know of its freedom and has within itself only its <em>foundation<\/em>, but not yet truly <em>actual<\/em> freedom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-425\">\u00a7 425<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Abstract self-consciousness is the <em>first<\/em> negation of consciousness, and therefore also burdened with an external object, formally with the negation of itself; it is thus at the same time the preceding stage, consciousness, and is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and of itself as consciousness. Since the latter, and negation in general, is already sublated in itself in I = I, self-consciousness, as this certainty of itself against the object, is the <em>drive<\/em> to posit what it is in itself &#8211; i.e. to give content and objectivity to the abstract knowing of itself and conversely to free itself from its sensuousness, to sublate the given objectivity and posit it as identical with itself; both are one and the same; &#8211; the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> The defect of <em>abstract self-consciousness<\/em> lies in its and consciousness still being <em>two things<\/em> against each other, in the two not yet having balanced each other out. In consciousness we see the tremendous <em>difference<\/em> of the <em>I<\/em>, this wholly <em>simple<\/em>, on the one side and the infinite <em>manifoldness of the world<\/em> on the other. This opposition of I and world, not yet coming here to true mediation, makes up the <em>finitude<\/em> of consciousness. <em>Self-consciousness<\/em>, by contrast, has its finitude in its still wholly <em>abstract identity with itself<\/em>. In the I = I of immediate self-consciousness only a difference that <em>ought to be<\/em> is present, not yet a <em>posited<\/em>, not yet an <em>actual<\/em> difference. This split between self-consciousness and consciousness forms an <em>inner<\/em> contradiction of <em>self-consciousness<\/em> with itself, because the latter is at the same time the stage immediately preceding it, <em>consciousness<\/em>, consequently the opposite of itself. For since abstract self-consciousness is only the <em>first<\/em>, thus still <em>conditioned<\/em>, negation of the immediacy of consciousness and not yet <em>absolute<\/em> negativity, i.e. the negation of that negation, <em>infinite affirmation<\/em>, it itself still has the form of something <em>existing<\/em>, something <em>immediate<\/em>, something still filled with <em>externality<\/em> despite, or rather precisely because of, its <em>undifferentiated inwardness<\/em>; it therefore contains negation not merely <em>within itself<\/em> but also <em>outside itself<\/em>, as an <em>external<\/em> object, as a <em>not-I<\/em>, and is precisely thereby <em>consciousness<\/em>. The contradiction depicted here must be resolved, and this happens in such a way that self-consciousness, which has itself as consciousness, as I, for its object, develops the <em>simple ideality<\/em> of the I further into <em>real difference<\/em>, and thus, sublating its <em>one-sided subjectivity<\/em>, gives itself <em>objectivity<\/em> &#8211; a process identical with the reverse one, through which at the same time the <em>object<\/em> is posited <em>subjectively<\/em> by the I, sunk into the inwardness of the self, and so the dependence of the I on an external reality present in consciousness is annihilated. Thus self-consciousness comes to have consciousness not <em>beside<\/em> itself, not to be externally bound up with it, but truly to penetrate it and contain it within itself as dissolved. To reach this goal, self-consciousness has to run through three stages of development. \u03b1) The first of these stages presents to us the immediate <em>singular self-consciousness<\/em>, simply identical with itself and at the same time, in contradiction with this, related to an external object. So determined, self-consciousness is the certainty of itself as what exists, against which the object has the determination of something only seemingly self-standing but in fact null; &#8211; <em>desiring self-consciousness<\/em>. \u03b2) At the second stage the objective I receives the determination of <em>another I<\/em>, and thus arises the relationship of <em>one self-consciousness<\/em> to <em>another self-consciousness<\/em>, and between these two the <em>process of recognition<\/em>. Here self-consciousness is no longer merely <em>singular<\/em> self-consciousness; rather in it a union of <em>singularity<\/em> and <em>universality<\/em> already begins. \u03b3) When then, further, the <em>otherness<\/em> of the selves standing over against each other sublates itself and these become identical with each other while remaining self-standing, the third of those stages comes forth &#8211; <em>universal self-consciousness<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-426\">\u00a7 426<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Self-consciousness in its immediacy is a <em>singular<\/em> and <em>desire<\/em> &#8211; the contradiction of its abstraction, which is supposed to be objective, or of its immediacy, which has the shape of an external object and is supposed to be subjective. For the certainty of itself that has emerged from the sublation of consciousness the object is determined as something null, and for the relation of self-consciousness to the object its abstract ideality is likewise determined as something null.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> As already remarked in the Addition to the preceding paragraph, <em>desire<\/em> is the form in which self-consciousness appears at the first stage of its development. <em>Desire<\/em> has here, in the second main part of the doctrine of subjective spirit, as yet no further determination than that of <em>drive<\/em>, insofar as, without being determined by <em>thinking<\/em>, it is directed to an <em>external<\/em> object in which it seeks to satisfy itself. But that the drive so determined exists in self-consciousness has its necessity in the fact that self-consciousness (as we have likewise already pointed out in the Addition to the preceding paragraph) is at the same time the stage immediately preceding it, namely consciousness, and knows of this inner contradiction. Where something identical with itself bears a contradiction within itself and is filled with the feeling of its identity with itself that is in itself as well as with the opposite feeling of its inner contradiction, there the <em>drive<\/em> necessarily comes forth to sublate this contradiction. The non-living has no drive, because it cannot bear contradiction but perishes when the other of itself penetrates into it. The ensouled, by contrast, and spirit necessarily have drive, since neither soul nor spirit can be without having contradiction within itself and either feeling it or knowing of it. But in <em>immediate<\/em>, therefore <em>natural<\/em>, <em>singular<\/em>, <em>excluding<\/em> self-consciousness, as already indicated above, the contradiction has the shape that self-consciousness, whose concept consists in relating <em>to itself<\/em>, in being I = I, on the contrary at the same time still relates to an <em>immediate<\/em> other not posited as ideal, to an <em>external<\/em> object, to a <em>not-I<\/em>, and is <em>external to itself<\/em>, since, although <em>in itself<\/em> totality, unity of the subjective and the objective, it nevertheless exists at first as something one-sided, as something merely subjective, which only through the satisfaction of desire comes to be totality <em>in and for itself<\/em>. &#8211; Despite that inner contradiction, however, self-consciousness remains absolutely certain of itself, because it knows that the immediate, external object has no true reality, is rather something null against the subject, something merely seemingly self-standing, but in fact such as neither deserves nor is able to subsist for itself, but must perish through the real power of the subject.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-427\">\u00a7 427<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Self-consciousness therefore knows itself <em>in itself<\/em> in the object, which in this relation is in accordance with the drive. In the negation of the two one-sided moments, as the I&#8217;s own activity, this identity comes to be <em>for<\/em> the I. The object can offer no resistance to this activity, being in itself and for self-consciousness the selfless; the dialectic that is its nature, to sublate itself, exists here as that activity of the I. The given object is herein just as much posited subjectively as subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness and becomes objective to itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> The self-conscious subject knows itself to be <em>in itself<\/em> <em>identical<\/em> with the external object &#8211; knows that the latter contains the <em>possibility<\/em> of the satisfaction of desire, that the object is thus <em>in accordance<\/em> with desire and that for this very reason desire is aroused by it. The relation to the object is therefore necessary to the subject. The latter intuits in the former its <em>own lack<\/em>, its own one-sidedness, sees in the object something belonging to its own essence and yet lacking to it. Self-consciousness is able to sublate this contradiction, since it is not a being but absolute activity, and it sublates it by taking possession of the object, which only pretends, as it were, to be self-standing, satisfying itself by consuming it and, since it is an end in itself, preserving itself in this process. The object must perish in this; for both, subject and object, are here immediate, and these cannot be in one otherwise than by the immediacy, and indeed <em>first<\/em> that of the selfless object, being negated. Through the satisfaction of desire the identity of subject and object that is in itself is posited, the one-sidedness of subjectivity and the seeming self-standingness of the object are sublated. But since the object is annihilated by desiring self-consciousness, it can seem to succumb to a thoroughly alien force. This, however, is only a semblance. For the immediate object must sublate itself according to its <em>own<\/em> nature, its <em>concept<\/em>, since in its <em>singularity<\/em> it does not correspond to the <em>universality<\/em> of its concept. Self-consciousness is the <em>appearing<\/em> concept of the object itself. In the annihilation of the object by self-consciousness, the object therefore perishes through the power of its own concept, which is <em>only inner<\/em> to it and for that very reason seems to come to it <em>only from outside<\/em>. Thus the object is posited subjectively. But through this sublation of the object the subject, as already remarked, also sublates its own lack, its falling apart into an undifferentiated I = I and an I related to an external object, and gives objectivity to its subjectivity just as much as it makes its object subjective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-428\">\u00a7 428<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The product of this process is that the I joins itself together with itself and is thereby satisfied <em>for itself<\/em>, something actual. On the external side it remains at first determined in this return as a <em>singular<\/em> and has preserved itself as such, because it relates only negatively to the selfless object, which to that extent is only consumed. Desire is thus in its satisfaction in general <em>destructive<\/em>, as it is <em>selfish<\/em> in its content, and since satisfaction has taken place only in the singular, which is transient, desire generates itself again in satisfaction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> The relationship of desire to the object is still thoroughly that of selfish <em>destroying<\/em>, not that of <em>forming<\/em>. Insofar as self-consciousness relates to the object as <em>forming<\/em> activity, the object receives only the <em>form<\/em> of the subjective, which gains a <em>subsistence<\/em> in it, but is preserved as regards its material. Through the satisfaction of self-consciousness caught in desire, by contrast, the self-standingness of the object is destroyed, since this self-consciousness does not yet possess the strength to bear the other as something independent, so that the form of the subjective attains no subsistence in it. But like the object of desire and desire itself, the <em>satisfaction<\/em> of desire too is necessarily something <em>singular<\/em>, <em>transient<\/em>, giving way to desire that awakens ever anew, an objectification that remains constantly in contradiction with the <em>universality<\/em> of the subject and is nevertheless again and again stimulated by the felt lack of immediate subjectivity, which <em>never<\/em> absolutely reaches its goal but only brings about the <em>progress to infinity<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-429\">\u00a7 429<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But the self-feeling that comes to it [the I] in satisfaction does not, on the inner side or <em>in itself<\/em>, remain in abstract <em>being-for-itself<\/em> or in its <em>singularity<\/em>; rather, as the negation of <em>immediacy<\/em> and of singularity, the result contains the determination of <em>universality<\/em> and of the <em>identity<\/em> of self-consciousness with its object. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is the consciousness of a <em>free<\/em> object, in which the I has the knowing of itself as I, but which is also still outside it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> On the <em>external<\/em> side, as was remarked in the Addition to the preceding paragraph, immediate self-consciousness remains caught in the tedious alternation, continuing to infinity, of desire and its satisfaction, in subjectivity that falls back again and again into itself out of its objectification. On the <em>inner<\/em> side, by contrast, or according to the <em>concept<\/em>, self-consciousness, by sublating its subjectivity and the external object, has negated its own immediacy, the standpoint of desire, posited itself with the determination of otherness against itself, filled the <em>other<\/em> with the <em>I<\/em>, made it from something <em>selfless<\/em> into a <em>free<\/em>, a <em>selfish<\/em> object, into <em>another<\/em> I &#8211; thus set itself over against itself as a <em>distinct I<\/em>, but thereby raised itself above the selfishness of merely destructive desire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-430\">\u00a7 430<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness, at first <em>immediately<\/em>, as an other for an <em>other<\/em>. In it as I, I intuit myself, but also in it an immediately existing object, other and, as I, absolutely self-standing against me. The sublation of the <em>singularity<\/em> of self-consciousness was the <em>first<\/em> sublation; self-consciousness is thereby determined only as <em>particular<\/em>. &#8211; This contradiction gives the drive to <em>show<\/em> oneself as a free self and to <em>be there<\/em> as such for the other &#8211; the process of <em>recognition<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> The second stage of development of self-consciousness designated in the heading of the above paragraph has at first still in common with self-consciousness caught in <em>desire<\/em>, which forms its first stage of development, the determination of <em>immediacy<\/em>. In this determination lies the tremendous contradiction that &#8211; since the I is the wholly <em>universal<\/em>, the absolutely <em>pervasive<\/em>, <em>interrupted by no limit<\/em>, the <em>essence common<\/em> to <em>all<\/em> human beings &#8211; the two selves relating to each other here make up <em>one<\/em> identity, <em>one<\/em> light, so to speak, and yet at the same time are <em>two<\/em>, which in complete <em>rigidity<\/em> and <em>brittleness<\/em> towards each other subsist each as something <em>reflected into itself<\/em>, absolutely <em>distinct<\/em> from and <em>impenetrable<\/em> to the other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-431\">\u00a7 431<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is a <em>struggle<\/em>; for I cannot know myself in the other as myself insofar as the other is an immediate other existence for me; I am therefore directed to the sublation of this its immediacy. Equally I cannot be recognized as something immediate, but only insofar as I sublate immediacy in myself and thereby give existence to my freedom. But this immediacy is at the same time the corporeality of self-consciousness, in which, as in its sign and instrument, it has its own <em>self-feeling<\/em> as well as its being <em>for others<\/em> and its relation mediating it with them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> The more precise shape of the contradiction indicated in the Addition to the preceding paragraph is that the two self-conscious subjects relating to each other, because they have immediate existence, are <em>natural<\/em>, <em>bodily<\/em>, thus exist in the manner of a <em>thing<\/em> subject to <em>alien force<\/em> and come up against each other as such, but at the same time are absolutely <em>free<\/em> and may not treat each other as something only <em>immediately existing<\/em>, as something merely <em>natural<\/em>. To overcome this contradiction it is necessary that the two selves standing over against each other posit themselves in their <em>existence<\/em>, in their <em>being-for-another<\/em>, as what they are <em>in themselves<\/em> or according to their concept, and recognize themselves as such &#8211; namely as not merely <em>natural<\/em> but <em>free<\/em> beings. Only so does <em>true<\/em> freedom come about; for since this consists in the identity of myself with the other, I am truly free only when the other too is free and is recognized by me as free. This freedom of the <em>one<\/em> in the <em>other<\/em> unites human beings in an inner way, whereas <em>need<\/em> and <em>want<\/em> bring them together only externally. Human beings must therefore want to find themselves again in one another. But this cannot happen as long as they are caught in their immediacy, in their naturalness; for this is precisely what excludes them from one another and prevents them from being for one another as free. Freedom therefore demands that the self-conscious subject neither let its own naturalness subsist nor tolerate the naturalness of others, but rather, indifferent towards existence, in single immediate encounters stake its own and the other&#8217;s life for the winning of freedom. Only through <em>struggle<\/em>, then, can freedom be won; the assurance of being free does not suffice for this; only by man bringing himself, as well as others, into the <em>danger of death<\/em> does he prove on this standpoint his capacity for freedom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-432\">\u00a7 432<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The struggle for recognition is thus a struggle of life and death; each of the two self-consciousnesses brings the life of the other into <em>danger<\/em> and exposes itself to it, but only as <em>to danger<\/em>, for each is equally directed to the preservation of its life as the existence of its freedom. The death of the one, which resolves the contradiction on one side through the abstract, therefore crude, negation of immediacy, is thus, on the essential side, the existence of recognition, which is at the same time sublated in it, a new contradiction, and the higher one compared with the first.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> The <em>absolute<\/em> proof of freedom in the struggle for recognition is <em>death<\/em>. Already by exposing themselves to the danger of death the combatants posit their natural being on both sides as something negative, prove that they regard it as something null. But through death naturalness is actually negated, and thereby at the same time its contradiction with the spiritual, with the I, is resolved. This resolution, however, is only wholly <em>abstract<\/em>, only of a <em>negative<\/em>, not of a <em>positive<\/em> kind. For if even only one of the two fighting each other for their mutual recognition perishes, no recognition comes about; the survivor exists as recognized just as little as the dead one. Consequently, through death the new and greater contradiction arises that those who have proved their inner freedom through the struggle have nevertheless attained no recognized existence of their freedom. To prevent possible misunderstandings regarding the standpoint just depicted, we must still remark here that the struggle for recognition in the form indicated, driven to the extreme, can take place only in the <em>state of nature<\/em>, where human beings exist only as <em>singulars<\/em>, but remains remote from civil society and the state, because there what makes up the result of that struggle, namely being recognized, is already present. For although the state can also <em>arise through force<\/em>, it does not rest on it; in bringing it forth, force has only brought into existence something justified in and for itself, the laws, the constitution. In the state the spirit of the people, custom, law are what rule. There man is recognized and treated as a <em>rational<\/em> being, as <em>free<\/em>, as a person, and the singular for his part makes himself worthy of this recognition by obeying, overcoming the naturalness of his self-consciousness, a <em>universal<\/em>, the <em>will being in and for itself<\/em>, the <em>law<\/em>, and thus by conducting himself towards others in a <em>universally valid<\/em> way, recognizing them as what he himself wants to count as &#8211; as free, as a person. In the state the citizen receives his honour through the office he holds, through the trade he pursues and through his other working activity. His honour thereby has a substantial, universal, objective content no longer dependent on empty subjectivity, such as is still lacking in the state of nature, where individuals, however they may be and whatever they may do, want to compel recognition. But from what has just been said it is evident that the <em>duel<\/em> must by no means be confused with that struggle for recognition, which makes up a necessary moment in the development of the human spirit. The latter does not, like the former, fall into the natural state of human beings, but into an already more or less developed form of civil society and the state. The duel has its proper world-historical place in the feudal system, which was supposed to be a condition of right but was so only to a very small degree. There the knight, whatever he might have committed, wanted to count as having in no way compromised himself, as being completely spotless. This the duel was supposed to prove. Although the law of the fist had been brought into certain forms, it nevertheless had selfishness as its absolute foundation; through its exercise, therefore, what was given was not a proof of rational freedom and truly civic honour, but rather a proof of crudeness and often of the shamelessness of a mind that, despite its badness, laid claim to external honour. Among the ancient peoples the duel does not occur, for to them the formalism of empty subjectivity, the subject&#8217;s wanting to count in its immediate singularity, was entirely alien; they had their honour only in their solid unity with the ethical relationship that the state is. In our modern states, however, the duel can hardly be declared anything other than an <em>artificial<\/em> putting oneself back into the crudeness of the Middle Ages. At most, in the former military, the duel could have a tolerably rational sense, namely that the individual wanted to prove that he still had a higher purpose than to let himself be killed for the sake of a penny.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-433\">\u00a7 433<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since life is as essential as freedom, the struggle ends at first, as <em>one-sided<\/em> negation, with the inequality that one of the combatants prefers life, preserves itself as singular self-consciousness but gives up its being recognized, while the other holds [fast] to its relation to itself and is recognized by the first as the subjugated one: &#8211; the <em>relationship<\/em> of <em>lordship and bondage<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The struggle for recognition and subjugation under a lord is the <em>appearance<\/em> from which the living together of human beings, as a beginning of <em>states<\/em>, has emerged. <em>Force<\/em>, which is the ground in this appearance, is not on that account the ground of <em>right<\/em>, although it is the <em>necessary<\/em> and <em>justified<\/em> moment in the transition from the <em>condition<\/em> of self-consciousness sunk in desire and singularity to the condition of universal self-consciousness. It is the external or <em>appearing beginning<\/em> of states, not their <em>substantial principle<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> The relationship of lordship and bondage contains only a <em>relative<\/em> sublation of the contradiction between the <em>particularity reflected into itself<\/em> and the <em>mutual identity<\/em> of the distinct self-conscious subjects. For in this relationship the immediacy of particular self-consciousness is at first sublated only on the side of the bondsman, but preserved on the side of the lord. While the naturalness of life remains on both sides, the self-will of the bondsman gives itself up to the will of the lord and receives as its content the purpose of the master, who for his part takes into his self-consciousness not the will of the bondsman but merely the care for the preservation of his natural vitality, in such a way that in this relationship the <em>posited<\/em> identity of the self-consciousness of the subjects related to each other comes about only in a <em>one-sided<\/em> way. As regards the historical aspect of the relationship under discussion, it may be remarked here that the ancient peoples, the Greeks and Romans, had not yet raised themselves to the concept of <em>absolute<\/em> freedom, since they did not recognize that <em>man as such<\/em>, as this <em>universal<\/em> I, as <em>rational<\/em> self-consciousness, is entitled to freedom. Among them, rather, a human being was held to be free only if he was <em>born<\/em> free. Freedom thus still had among them the determination of <em>naturalness<\/em>. Therefore there was slavery in their free states, and among the Romans bloody wars arose in which the slaves sought to make themselves free, to attain recognition of their eternal human rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-434\">\u00a7 434<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This relationship is on the one hand, since the means of lordship, the bondsman, must likewise be preserved in his life, <em>community<\/em> of need and of care for its satisfaction. In place of the crude destruction of the immediate object there steps the acquisition, preservation and forming of it as the mediating term in which the two extremes of self-standingness and non-self-standingness join together; &#8211; the form of universality in the satisfaction of need is a <em>lasting<\/em> means and a provision that takes the future into account and secures it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-435\">\u00a7 435<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Secondly, according to the difference, the lord has in the bondsman and his service the intuition of the validity of his <em>singular<\/em> being-for-itself; and indeed by means of the sublation of immediate being-for-itself, which, however, falls into another. &#8211; But this other, the bondsman, works off his singular will and self-will in the service of the lord, sublates the inner immediacy of desire, and in this divestment and the fear of the lord makes the beginning of wisdom &#8211; the transition to <em>universal self-consciousness<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> Since the bondsman works for the lord, and consequently not in the exclusive interest of his own singularity, his desire receives the <em>breadth<\/em> of being not only the desire of <em>this one<\/em> but of containing within itself at the same time that of <em>another<\/em>. Accordingly the bondsman raises himself above the selfish singularity of his natural will and to that extent stands higher in worth than the lord, who is caught in his selfishness, intuits in the bondsman only his immediate will and is recognized in a formal way by an unfree consciousness. That subjugation of the bondsman&#8217;s selfishness forms the <em>beginning<\/em> of the true freedom of man. The trembling of the singularity of the will, the feeling of the nullity of selfishness, the habit of obedience, is a necessary moment in the education of every human being. Without having experienced this discipline that breaks self-will, no one becomes free, rational and capable of commanding. To become free, to attain the capacity for self-government, all peoples have therefore first had to pass through the strict discipline of subjection to a lord. Thus, for example, it was necessary that, after <em>Solon<\/em> had given the Athenians democratic, free laws, <em>Peisistratus<\/em> procured for himself a power by which he compelled the Athenians to obey those laws. Only when this obedience had taken root did the rule of the Peisistratids become superfluous. So too <em>Rome<\/em> had to live through the strict government of the kings before, through the breaking of natural selfishness, that admirable Roman virtue of love of the fatherland ready for every sacrifice could arise. &#8211; Bondage and tyranny are thus a necessary stage in the history of peoples and therefore something <em>relatively<\/em> justified. Those who remain bondsmen suffer no absolute wrong; for whoever does not possess the courage to risk his life for the winning of freedom deserves to be a slave; and if, on the other hand, a people does not merely imagine that it wants to be free but actually has the energetic will to freedom, no human power will be able to hold it back in the bondage of merely passive being-governed. That servile obedience forms, as was said, only the <em>beginning<\/em> of freedom, because what the natural singularity of self-consciousness subjects itself to in it is not the truly <em>universal<\/em>, rational will <em>being in and for itself<\/em>, but the <em>singular<\/em>, <em>contingent<\/em> will of <em>another<\/em> subject. Thus here only the <em>one<\/em> moment of freedom comes forth, the <em>negativity<\/em> of selfish singularity; whereas the <em>positive<\/em> side of freedom receives actuality only when, on the one hand, servile self-consciousness, freeing itself both from the singularity of the lord and from its own singularity, grasps the <em>rational in and for itself<\/em> in its <em>universality<\/em>, independent of the particularity of subjects &#8211; and when, on the other hand, the self-consciousness of the lord, through the <em>community<\/em> of need and of care for its satisfaction taking place between him and the bondsman, as well as through the intuition of the sublation of the immediate singular will objective to him in the bondsman, is brought to cognize this sublation in relation to himself too as the true, and accordingly to subject his own selfish will to the law of the will being in and for itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-436\">\u00a7 436<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Universal self-consciousness<\/em> is the affirmative knowing of itself in the other self, each of which, as free singularity, has <em>absolute self-standingness<\/em>, but, by virtue of the negation of its immediacy or desire, does not distinguish itself from the other, is universal [self-consciousness] and objective, and has real universality as reciprocity in such a way that it knows itself recognized in the free other and knows this insofar as it recognizes the other and knows it to be free.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This universal reappearance of self-consciousness, the concept that knows itself in its objectivity as subjectivity identical with itself and therefore as universal, is the form of consciousness of the <em>substance<\/em> of every essential spirituality, of the family, the fatherland, the state, as well as of all virtues, love, friendship, bravery, honour, fame. But this <em>appearing<\/em> of the substantial can also be separated from the substantial and held fast for itself in honour empty of import, vain fame etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> The result of the struggle for recognition brought about by the concept of spirit is <em>universal self-consciousness<\/em>, forming the third stage in this sphere, i.e. that free self-consciousness for which the other self-consciousness objective to it is no longer, as at the second stage, an <em>unfree<\/em> one but one that is <em>likewise self-standing<\/em>. On this standpoint, then, the self-conscious subjects related to each other have, through sublation of their <em>unequal particular singularity<\/em>, raised themselves to consciousness of their <em>real universality<\/em>, of the <em>freedom<\/em> belonging to <em>all<\/em>, and thereby to the intuition of their <em>determinate identity with one another<\/em>. The lord standing over against the bondsman was not yet truly free, for he did not yet intuit himself thoroughly in the other. Consequently only through the bondsman&#8217;s becoming free does the lord too become completely free. In the condition of this universal freedom, in being reflected into <em>myself<\/em> I am immediately reflected into the <em>other<\/em>, and conversely, in relating to the <em>other<\/em>, I relate immediately to <em>myself<\/em>. We therefore have here the mighty diremption of spirit into different selves which, in and for themselves and for one another, are completely free, self-standing, absolutely brittle, resistant &#8211; and yet at the same time identical with one another, thus not self-standing, not impenetrable, but, as it were, flowed together. This relationship is thoroughly <em>speculative<\/em> in kind; and if one thinks the speculative is something remote and ungraspable, one need only consider the content of that relationship to convince oneself of the groundlessness of that opinion. The speculative, or the rational and true, consists in the unity of the concept or the subjective and of objectivity. This unity is evidently present on the standpoint in question. It forms the substance of ethical life, notably of the family, of sexual love (there that unity has the form of particularity), of love of the fatherland, this willing of the universal purposes and interests of the state, of love of God, also of bravery when this is a staking of life for a universal cause, and finally also of honour, if this has as its content not the indifferent singularity of the individual but something substantial, truly universal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-437\">\u00a7 437<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness contains at first the singular selves as shining into one another. But their difference is in this identity the wholly indeterminate diversity, or rather a difference that is none. Their truth is therefore the universality and objectivity of self-consciousness being in and for itself &#8211; <em>reason<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Reason as the <em>Idea<\/em> (\u00a7 213) appears here in the determination that the opposition of concept and reality in general, whose unity it is, has had here the more precise form of the concept existing for itself, of consciousness, and of the object externally present over against it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Addition.<\/em> What we called <em>universal self-consciousness<\/em> in the preceding paragraph is in its truth the concept of <em>reason<\/em> &#8211; the <em>concept<\/em> insofar as it exists not as merely logical Idea but as the Idea developed into self-consciousness. For, as we know from logic, the Idea consists in the unity of the subjective or the concept and of objectivity. But universal self-consciousness has shown itself to us as such a unity, since we have seen that, in its absolute difference from its other, it is nevertheless at the same time absolutely identical with it. This identity of subjectivity and objectivity makes up the <em>universality<\/em> now reached by self-consciousness, which overreaches those two sides or <em>particularities<\/em> and into which they dissolve. But in attaining this universality self-consciousness ceases to be self-consciousness in the proper or narrower sense of the word, because holding fast to the particularity of the self belongs precisely to self-consciousness as such. Through giving up this particularity self-consciousness becomes reason. The name &#8220;reason&#8221; has at this point only the sense of the still <em>abstract<\/em> or <em>formal<\/em> unity of self-consciousness with its object. This unity grounds what one must call, in determinate distinction from the <em>true<\/em>, the merely <em>correct<\/em>. My representation is <em>correct<\/em> through its mere agreement with the object, even if the object corresponds extremely little to its concept and thus has almost no truth at all. Only when the <em>true<\/em> content becomes objective to me does my intelligence receive, in a <em>concrete<\/em> sense, the meaning of <em>reason<\/em>. In this meaning reason will have to be considered at the close of the development of theoretical spirit (\u00a7 467), where, coming from an opposition of subjective and objective developed further than so far, we shall cognize reason as the unity of this opposition <em>full of content<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-438\">\u00a7 438<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The truth being in and for itself which reason is, is the simple <em>identity<\/em> of the <em>subjectivity<\/em> of the concept and its <em>objectivity<\/em> and universality. The universality of reason therefore has just as much the meaning of the <em>object<\/em>, which in consciousness as such was only given but is now itself <em>universal<\/em>, penetrating and comprehending the I, as of the pure <em>I<\/em>, the pure form overreaching the object and comprehending it within itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1830-439\">\u00a7 439<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Self-consciousness, thus the certainty that its determinations are just as much objective, determinations of the essence of things, as they are its own thoughts, is reason, which as this identity is not only absolute <em>substance<\/em> but <em>truth<\/em> as knowing. For here it has as its peculiar <em>determinacy<\/em>, as its immanent form, the pure concept existing for itself, the I, the certainty of itself as infinite universality. &#8211; This knowing truth is spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827\">Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), \u00a7\u00a7 413\u2013439<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li>Consciousness as such: <a href=\"#p1827-413\">\u00a7 413<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-414\">\u00a7 414<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-415\">\u00a7 415<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-416\">\u00a7 416<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-417\">\u00a7 417<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-418\">\u00a7 418<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-419\">\u00a7 419<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-420\">\u00a7 420<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-421\">\u00a7 421<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-422\">\u00a7 422<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-423\">\u00a7 423<\/a><\/li><li>Self-consciousness: <a href=\"#p1827-424\">\u00a7 424<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-425\">\u00a7 425<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-426\">\u00a7 426<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-427\">\u00a7 427<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-428\">\u00a7 428<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-429\">\u00a7 429<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-430\">\u00a7 430<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-431\">\u00a7 431<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-432\">\u00a7 432<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-433\">\u00a7 433<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-434\">\u00a7 434<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-435\">\u00a7 435<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-436\">\u00a7 436<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-437\">\u00a7 437<\/a><\/li><li>Reason: <a href=\"#p1827-438\">\u00a7 438<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1827-439\">\u00a7 439<\/a><\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-413\">\u00a7 413<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Consciousness makes up the stage of reflection or of the relationship of spirit, of spirit as appearance. The I is the infinite relation of spirit to itself, but as subjective, as certainty of itself. Pure abstract freedom for itself releases determinacy from itself as equally free, as a self-standing <em>object<\/em>. But the I as this absolute negativity is identity in otherness; the I is itself and overreaches the object as something sublated in itself, is one side of the relationship and the whole relationship; &#8211; the light that manifests itself and something else as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-414\">\u00a7 414<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The identity of spirit with itself, as it is first posited as I, is only its abstract, formal ideality. As soul in the form of substantial universality, spirit is, as subjective reflection-into-itself, related to this as to its negative, as to something beyond it and dark. Consciousness is therefore, like relationship in general, the <em>contradiction<\/em> of the self-standingness of the sides and of their identity, in which they are sublated. Spirit as I is <em>essence<\/em>, but since reality in the sphere of essence is relationship, spirit as consciousness is only the appearing of spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-415\">\u00a7 415<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since the I is for itself only as formal identity, the dialectical movement of consciousness is not for it its own activity; rather it is in itself, i.e. for consciousness, an alteration of the object. Consciousness therefore appears different according to the difference of the given object, and its further development as an alteration of the determinations of its object. The Kantian philosophy can most determinately be regarded as having grasped spirit as consciousness and as containing entirely only determinations of the phenomenology, not of the philosophy, of spirit. It regards the I as relation to something lying beyond, in its abstract determination the thing-in-itself, and so both intelligence and will; and although in the concept of reflective judgement it does come to speak of the Idea of spirit, subject-objectivity, an intuitive understanding etc., as well as of the Idea of nature, this Idea itself is again reduced to an appearance, namely a subjective maxim (see \u00a7 58, Introd.). It is therefore to be regarded as a correct sense of this philosophy that it was grasped by Reinhold as a theory of <em>consciousness<\/em>, under the name of the <em>faculty of representation<\/em>. The Fichtean philosophy has the same standpoint, and the not-I is determined only as object of the I, only in consciousness; it remains as an infinite impulse, i.e. as thing-in-itself. Both philosophies therefore show that they have not arrived at the <em>concept<\/em> or at spirit as it is in and for itself, but only as it is in relation to an other. With regard to <em>Spinozism<\/em>, by contrast, it is to be remarked that spirit, in the judgement by which it constitutes itself as I, as free subjectivity against determinacy, steps out of substance, and philosophy, since this judgement is for it the absolute determination of spirit, steps out of Spinozism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-416\">\u00a7 416<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The goal of spirit as consciousness is to make this its appearance identical with its essence, to raise the certainty of itself to <em>truth<\/em>. The concrete existence that spirit has in consciousness has its finitude in being the formal one; because the object is determined only abstractly as its own, or spirit is reflected in it only into itself as abstract I, this concrete existence still has a content that is not as its own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-417\">\u00a7 417<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The stages of this raising of certainty to truth are that spirit is a) consciousness in general, which has an object as such, b) self-consciousness, for which the I is the object, c) unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, such that spirit intuits the content of the object as itself and itself as determined in and for itself; &#8211; reason, the <em>concept<\/em> of spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center wp-block-paragraph\">a. Consciousness as such.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-418\">\u00a7 418<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Consciousness is 1) at first <em>immediate<\/em>, its relation to the object therefore the simple unmediated certainty of it; the object itself is therefore likewise determined as immediate, as existing and reflected into itself, further as immediately singular; &#8211; sensuous consciousness. Consciousness as relationship contains only the categories belonging to the abstract I or formal thinking, which are for it determinations of the object. It therefore knows of the object only as something existing, a something, an existing <em>thing<\/em>, a singular. Sensuous consciousness, appearing as the richest in content, is the poorest in thoughts. That rich filling is made up of the determinations of sensation. Spatial and temporal singularity, here and now, as I determined the object of sensuous consciousness in the <em>Phenomenology<\/em> of Spirit, p. 25 ff., properly belongs to intuiting. The object is here at first to be taken only according to the relationship it has to consciousness, namely as something external to it, not yet as something external for itself or as itself a being-outside-itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-419\">\u00a7 419<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The sensuous as something becomes an other; the reflection of the something into itself, the <em>thing<\/em>, has many properties, and the singular in its immediacy <em>manifold<\/em> predicates. The many singulars of sensuousness therefore become something broad &#8211; a manifoldness of relations, <em>determinations of reflection<\/em> and universalities. &#8211; These are logical determinations, posited by the thinking, i.e. here by the I. But for it, as appearing, the object has changed in this way. Sensuous consciousness has in this determination become perceiving.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-420\">\u00a7 420<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">2) Consciousness that has gone beyond sensuousness wants to take the object in its <em>truth<\/em>, not as merely immediate but as mediated within itself and reflected into itself. The object is thus a combination of sensuous determinations and determinations of thought, and consciousness in its sensuous conduct is here at the same time active reflection-into-itself. With this its identity with the object is no longer the abstract identity of certainty but a <em>determinate<\/em> one, a knowing. The next stage of consciousness, on which the Kantian <em>philosophy<\/em> grasps spirit, is <em>perceiving<\/em>, which is in general the standpoint of our ordinary consciousness and more or less of the <em>sciences<\/em>. One starts from sensuous certainties of single apperceptions or observations, which are supposed to be raised to truth by being considered in their relation, by being reflected on, in general by becoming at the same time, according to determinations of the understanding, something universal, experiences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-421\">\u00a7 421<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This linking of the singular and the universal is a mixture, because the singular remains being that lies at the ground and fixed against the universal, to which it is at the same time related. It is therefore the many-sided contradiction &#8211; in general of the singular things of sensuous apperception, which are supposed to make up the ground of universal experience, and of <em>universality<\/em>, which is rather supposed to be the essence and the ground &#8211; and then of the singularity of the <em>things<\/em> themselves, which makes up their self-standingness, and of the manifold properties, which, free of this negative bond and of one another, are rather self-standing <em>universal matters<\/em>, etc. (see \u00a7 123 ff., appearance).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-422\">\u00a7 422<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The next <em>truth<\/em> of perceiving is that the object is rather appearance and its reflection-into-itself an inner being for itself over against it. The consciousness of this object is 3) the understanding. &#8211; That inner is on the one hand the sublated <em>manifoldness<\/em> of the sensuous and in this way abstract identity, but on the other hand it therefore also contains manifoldness, but as inner simple difference, which remains identical with itself in the change of appearance. This simple difference is the realm of the laws of appearance, its calm universal image.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-423\">\u00a7 423<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Law, at first the relationship of universal, abiding determinations, has its necessity in itself insofar as its difference is the inner one; the one of the determinations, as not externally distinguished from the other, lies immediately itself in the other. But in this way the inner difference is what it is in truth, difference in itself, or the <em>difference<\/em> that is none. &#8211; In this determination consciousness in its first form, which contains the self-standingness of subject and object against each other, has disappeared in itself; the I as judging has an object that is not distinguished from it &#8211; itself; &#8211; self-consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center wp-block-paragraph\">b. Self-consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-424\">\u00a7 424<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/35\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 35<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The truth of consciousness is self-consciousness, and this is the ground of the former, so that in concrete existence all consciousness of another ob<em>ject<\/em> is at the same time self-consciousness. The expression of this is <em>I =<\/em> I; &#8211; abstract freedom, pure ideality. &#8211; So it is without reality, for it itself, which is object of itself, is not such an object, since no difference between it and itself is present.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-425\">\u00a7 425<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness, it is also burdened with an external object; it is therefore at the same time the preceding stage, consciousness, and is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and of itself as consciousness. But since the latter, and negation in general, is already sublated in itself, self-consciousness, as this certainty of itself against this negation, is the drive to posit what it is in itself &#8211; more precisely, to give content and objectivity to the abstract knowing of itself and conversely to free itself from its sensuousness, to sublate objectivity as given and posit it as identical with itself, or to make its consciousness equal to its self-consciousness. &#8211; Both are one and the same.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-426\">\u00a7 426<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">1) Self-consciousness in its immediacy is a singular and <em>desire<\/em> &#8211; the contradiction of its abstraction, which is supposed to be objective, or of its immediacy, which is supposed to be subjective and which at the same time has the shape of an external object, according to which self-consciousness is consciousness. For its simple identity with itself the negation which is in it as abstraction is determined as something <em>null<\/em>, as is the object for the certainty of itself that has emerged from the sublation of consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-427\">\u00a7 427<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Self-consciousness is therefore to itself in itself in the object, which in this way is in accordance with the drive; in negativity, as the I&#8217;s own activity, this identity comes to be for the I. The object can offer no resistance to this activity, being in itself and for it the selfless; the dialectic that is its nature, to sublate itself, exists here as that activity of the I. The given object is herein just as much posited subjectively as subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness and thus becomes objective to itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-428\">\u00a7 428<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The product of this process is that the I joins itself together with itself and is thereby something actual for itself. On the external side it remains at first in this return determined only as a singular, and has only preserved itself, because it relates only negatively to the selfless object, which to that extent is only consumed. Desire is thus in its satisfaction in general destructive, and selfish.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-429\">\u00a7 429<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But self-consciousness already has in itself the certainty of itself in its abstraction (one-sided subjectivity) and in the immediate object. The self-feeling that comes to it in satisfaction is therefore, on the inner side, not only the abstract self-feeling of its being-for-itself or only of its singularity; rather, as the negation of the <em>immediacy<\/em> of its being-for-itself, the product is <em>universal<\/em> (at first, more precisely, particular) self-consciousness. The judgement or diremption of it is the consciousness of a free object, in which the I has the knowing of itself as I.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-430\">\u00a7 430<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">2) There is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness, at first <em>immediately<\/em>, as an other for an other. In it as I, I immediately intuit myself, but also in it an immediately existing object, other and, as I, absolutely self-standing against me. This contradiction gives the drive to show oneself as a free self and to be there as such for the other &#8211; the process of recognition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-431\">\u00a7 431<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is a <em>struggle<\/em>; for I cannot know myself in the other as myself insofar as the other is an immediate other existence for me; I am therefore directed to the sublation of this its immediacy. Equally I cannot be recognized as something immediate, but only insofar as I sublate immediacy in myself and thereby give existence to my freedom. &#8211; But this immediacy is at the same time the corporeality of self-consciousness, in which, as in its sign <em>and instrument<\/em>, it has its own self-feeling and its being for others, and its relation mediating it with them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-432\">\u00a7 432<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The struggle for recognition is thus a struggle of life and death; each of the two self-consciousnesses brings the life of the other into danger and exposes itself to it &#8211; but only as to danger, for each is equally directed to the preservation of its life, as the existence of its freedom. The death of the one, which resolves the contradiction on one side through the abstract, therefore crude, negation of immediacy, is, on the essential side, the existence of recognition &#8211; thus the greater &#8211; contradiction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-433\">\u00a7 433<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since life is as essential as freedom, the struggle ends at first as one-sided negation, with the inequality that one of the combatants prefers life, preserves itself as singular self-consciousness but gives up its being recognized, while the other holds to its relation to itself and is recognized by the first as the subjugated one: &#8211; the relationship of <em>lordship<\/em> and bondage. The struggle for recognition and subjugation under a lord is the appearance in which the living together of human beings, as a beginning of states, has emerged. <em>Force<\/em>, which is the ground in this appearance, is not on that account the ground of <em>right<\/em>, although it is the <em>necessary<\/em> and justified moment in the transition from the condition of self-consciousness sunk in desire and singularity to the condition of universal self-consciousness. &#8211; It is the external or appearing beginning of states, not their substantial principle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-434\">\u00a7 434<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This relationship is, first, according to its identity, a <em>community<\/em> of the need of desire and of the care for its satisfaction; in place of the crude destruction of the immediate object there steps the acquisition, preservation and forming of it as the mediating term in which the two extremes of self-standingness and non-self-standingness join together.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-435\">\u00a7 435<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Secondly, according to the difference, the lord has in the bondsman and his service the intuition of the objectivity of his singular being-for-itself; this is his validity for him by means of the sublation of immediate being-for-itself, which, however, falls into another. &#8211; But this other, the bondsman, works off his singular will or self-will in the service of the lord, sublates his inner immediacy, and through this divestment and the fear of the lord makes the beginning of wisdom &#8211; the transition to <em>universal self-consciousness<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-436\">\u00a7 436<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">3) <em>Universal<\/em> self-consciousness is the positive knowing of itself in the other self, each of which, as free singularity, has absolute self-standingness, but, by virtue of the negation of its immediacy or desire, does not distinguish itself from the other, is universal and objective, and has real universality in such a way that it knows itself recognized in the free other and knows this insofar as it recognizes the other and knows it to be free. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness, the concept that knows itself in its objectivity as subjectivity identical with itself and therefore as universal, is the form of consciousness of the substance of every essential spirituality, of the family, the fatherland, the state; as well as of all virtues &#8211; love, friendship, bravery, honour, fame.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-437\">\u00a7 437<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness has at first the singular selves subsisting as being for themselves and shining into one another. But their difference is in this identity the wholly indeterminate diversity, or rather a difference that is none. Their truth is therefore the unmediated universality and objectivity of self-consciousness being in and for itself &#8211; reason. Reason as the Idea appears here in the determination that the opposition of concept and reality in general, whose unity it is, has had here the more precise form of consciousness and of the object externally present over against it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center wp-block-paragraph\">c. Reason.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-438\">\u00a7 438<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The truth being in and for itself which reason is, is the simple identity of the subjectivity of the concept and its <em>objectivity<\/em> and universality. The universality of reason therefore has just as much the meaning of the object, which in consciousness as such was only given but is itself a <em>universal object<\/em>, as of the pure I in self-consciousness. This is thus posited as determined in and for itself, and therefore as the certainty that its determinations are just as much objective, determinations of the essence of things, as they are its own thoughts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1827-439\">\u00a7 439<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Reason as this identity is not only absolute substance but also truth as knowing. For here it has as its peculiar <em>determinacy<\/em> the pure concept existing for itself, the I &#8211; the certainty of itself as infinite universality. &#8211; This knowing truth is spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817\">Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), \u00a7\u00a7 329\u2013362<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li>Consciousness as such: <a href=\"#p1817-329\">\u00a7 329<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-330\">\u00a7 330<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-331\">\u00a7 331<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-332\">\u00a7 332<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-333\">\u00a7 333<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-334\">\u00a7 334<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-335\">\u00a7 335<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-336\">\u00a7 336<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-337\">\u00a7 337<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-338\">\u00a7 338<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-339\">\u00a7 339<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-340\">\u00a7 340<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-341\">\u00a7 341<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-342\">\u00a7 342<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-343\">\u00a7 343<\/a><\/li><li>Self-consciousness: <a href=\"#p1817-344\">\u00a7 344<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-345\">\u00a7 345<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-346\">\u00a7 346<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-347\">\u00a7 347<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-348\">\u00a7 348<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-349\">\u00a7 349<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-350\">\u00a7 350<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-351\">\u00a7 351<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-352\">\u00a7 352<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-353\">\u00a7 353<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-354\">\u00a7 354<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-355\">\u00a7 355<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-356\">\u00a7 356<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-357\">\u00a7 357<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-358\">\u00a7 358<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-359\">\u00a7 359<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-360\">\u00a7 360<\/a><\/li><li>Reason: <a href=\"#p1817-361\">\u00a7 361<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"#p1817-362\">\u00a7 362<\/a><\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-329\">\u00a7 329<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Consciousness<\/em> makes up the stage of reflection or of the relationship of spirit, of spirit as appearance. The I is the infinite relation of spirit to itself, but as subjective, as certainty of itself. As this absolute negativity it is identity in its otherness; the I is itself and overreaches the object, is one side of the relationship and the whole relationship; &#8211; the <em>light<\/em> that manifests itself and something else as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-330\">\u00a7 330<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But the identity is only the formal one. Spirit, which as soul is in the form of substantial universality, of gravity being within itself, is, as subjective reflection into itself, related to something dark, and consciousness is, like relationship in general, the contradiction of the self-standingness of the sides and of their identity, in which they are sublated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-331\">\u00a7 331<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The object, as released in its judgement from the infinite reflection of spirit into itself, has this infinite relation to itself as its essence, and is determined as something existing and given against the being-for-itself of the I.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-332\">\u00a7 332<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since the I is not as the concept but as formal identity, the dialectical movement of consciousness is not for it its own activity; rather it is in itself, i.e. for consciousness, an alteration of the object. Consciousness therefore appears different according to the difference of the given object, and its further development as a further development of the object; but the consideration of the object&#8217;s necessary alteration, the concept, falls into us, because the concept is still inner as such. The Kantian philosophy can most determinately be regarded as having grasped spirit as consciousness and as containing entirely only determinations of the phenomenology, not of the philosophy, of spirit. It regards the I as relation to <em>a thing-in-itself lying beyond<\/em>, and so both intelligence and will; and although in the concept of <em>reflective<\/em> judgement it does come to speak of the Idea of spirit, subject-objectivity, an intuitive understanding etc., as well as of the Idea of nature, this Idea itself is again reduced to an appearance, namely a subjective maxim. It is therefore to be regarded as a correct sense of this philosophy that it was grasped by Reinhold as a theory of <em>consciousness<\/em>, under the name of the <em>faculty of representation<\/em>. The Fichtean philosophy has the same standpoint, and the not-I is determined only as object of the I, only in <em>consciousness<\/em>; it remains as an infinite impulse, i.e. as a <em>thing-in-itself<\/em>. Both philosophies therefore show that they have not arrived at the <em>concept<\/em> or at <em>spirit<\/em> as it is in and for itself, but only as it is in relation to an other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-333\">\u00a7 333<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The goal of spirit as consciousness is to make this its appearance identical with its essence, to raise the certainty of itself to <em>truth<\/em>. The <em>concrete existence<\/em> that spirit has in consciousness is the formal or universal one as such; because the object is determined only abstractly as its own, or spirit is reflected in it only into itself as abstract I, this concrete existence still has a content that is not as its own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-334\">\u00a7 334<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The stages of this raising of certainty to truth are that spirit is a) <em>consciousness<\/em> in general, which has an object as such, b) <em>self-consciousness<\/em>, for which the I is the object, c) unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, such that spirit intuits the content of the object as itself and itself as determined in and for itself; &#8211; <em>reason<\/em>, the <em>concept<\/em> of <em>spirit<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center wp-block-paragraph\">a. Consciousness as such.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-335\">\u00a7 335<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Consciousness is 1) at first <em>immediate<\/em>, its relation to the object therefore the simple unmediated certainty of it; the object itself is determined as existing, but as reflected into itself, further as immediately <em>singular<\/em>; &#8211; sensuous consciousness. To sensuousness there belong, indeed, as content the determinations of feeling, external or internal, and as <em>form<\/em> the spatial and temporal. But both of these belong to spirit in its <em>concrete<\/em> form, to its feeling and intuition. Consciousness as relationship contains only the determination of the object that enters into relationship with the <em>abstract<\/em> I as such, the first or immediate therefore only as existing, and immediacy as determined in and for itself, <em>something<\/em>, an existing thing, a singular. What the object otherwise is in its concretion concerns spirit; the I as concrete is spirit. The determinations of feeling too are sensuous only through the form of immediacy; their content can be of a quite different nature. The I is in consciousness still abstract thinking and therefore has in its object at first those abstract determinations of thought. Spatial and temporal singularity is <em>here<\/em> and now, as I determined the object of sensuous consciousness in my <em>Phenomenology<\/em> of Spirit (Bamberg 1807), p. ff. It is taken more essentially only according to the identity of the relationship through which it has its determination; through this it is external only to <em>consciousness<\/em>, not external for itself or itself a being-outside-itself. This freedom the other can receive only through the freedom of spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-336\">\u00a7 336<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The sensuous as something becomes an other; the reflection of the <em>something<\/em> into itself, the thing, has many properties, and the singular in its immediacy <em>manifold<\/em> predicates. The many singulars of sensuousness therefore become something <em>broad<\/em> &#8211; a manifoldness of <em>relations, determinations of reflection<\/em> and <em>universalities<\/em>. Since the object has changed in this way, sensuous consciousness has become <em>perceiving<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-337\">\u00a7 337<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">2) Consciousness that has gone beyond sensuousness wants to take the object <em>in its truth<\/em>, not as merely immediate but as mediated within itself and reflected into itself. The object is thus a combination of sensuous determinations and determinations of thought; just as consciousness in its sensuous conduct is here at the same time <em>reflection-into-itself<\/em>. With this its identity with the object is no longer the abstract identity of <em>certainty<\/em> but a <em>determinate<\/em> one, a <em>knowing<\/em>. The next stage of consciousness, on which the <em>Kantian philosophy<\/em> grasps spirit, is <em>perceiving<\/em>, which is in general the standpoint of our <em>ordinary<\/em> consciousness and more or less of the <em>sciences<\/em>. One starts from sensuous certainties of single apperceptions or observations, which are supposed to be raised to truth by being considered in their relation, by being reflected on, in general by becoming at the same time, according to determinations of the understanding, something universal, experiences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-338\">\u00a7 338<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This linking of the singular and the universal is a mixture, because the singular is being that lies at the ground, while the universal by contrast is reflected into itself. It is therefore the many-sided contradiction &#8211; in general of the singular things of sensuous apperception, which are supposed to make up the ground of universal experience, and of <em>universality<\/em>, which is rather supposed to be the essence and the ground &#8211; and of the singularity of the things themselves, which makes up their self-standingness, and of the manifold properties, which, free of this negative bond and of one another, are rather self-standing <em>universal matters<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-339\">\u00a7 339<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <em>truth<\/em> of perceiving, which instead of the identity of the singular object and the universality of consciousness, or of the singularity of the object itself and its universality, is rather contradiction, is therefore that the object is rather appearance and its reflection-into-itself an inner being for itself over against it. The consciousness that receives this object, into which the object of perception has passed over, is the understanding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-340\">\u00a7 340<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">3) For the understanding the things of perception count as appearances; their inner, which it has as its object, is on the one hand their sublated <em>manifoldness<\/em> and in this way abstract identity, but on the other hand it therefore also contains manifoldness, but as inner simple <em>difference<\/em>, which remains identical with itself in the change of appearance. This simple difference is at first the realm of the laws of appearance, its calm universal image.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-341\">\u00a7 341<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Law, at first the relationship of universal, abiding determinations, has its necessity in itself insofar as its difference is the inner one; the one of the determinations, as not externally distinguished from the other, lies immediately itself in the other. But in this way the inner difference is what it is in truth, difference in itself, or the <em>difference<\/em> that is none.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-342\">\u00a7 342<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Consciousness, which as understanding has at first only the abstract inner and then the universal difference <em>as<\/em> law for its object, now has the <em>concept<\/em> as its object. But insofar as it is still consciousness and the object is something given to it, it intuits it as something living &#8211; an inwardness that is universality determined in and for itself, truth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-343\">\u00a7 343<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But in the consciousness of life self-consciousness kindles; for as consciousness it has an object as something distinct from it; but precisely this in life, that the difference is no difference. The <em>immediacy<\/em> in which the living object of consciousness is, is precisely this moment reduced to appearance or to negation, which now, as inner difference or concept, is the negation of itself against consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center wp-block-paragraph\">b. Self-consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-344\">\u00a7 344<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/35\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 35<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The truth of consciousness is self-consciousness, and this is the ground of the former, so that all consciousness of another object is at the same time self-consciousness. The expression of this is I = I.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-345\">\u00a7 345<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But so it is still without reality, for it itself, which is object of itself, is not such an object, for it has no difference; but the I, the concept itself, is the absolute diremption of judgement; with this self-consciousness is for itself the drive to sublate its subjectivity and to realize itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-346\">\u00a7 346<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since abstract self-consciousness is the <em>immediate<\/em> and the first negation of consciousness, it <em>is<\/em> in itself existing and sensuously <em>concrete<\/em>. <em>Self-determination<\/em> is therefore on the one hand negation as its moment posited by it within itself, on the other hand as an external object. Or the whole that is its object is the preceding stage, consciousness, and it itself is still this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-347\">\u00a7 347<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The drive of self-consciousness is therefore in general to sublate its subjectivity; more precisely, to give content and objectivity to the abstract knowing of itself and conversely to free itself from its sensuousness, to sublate objectivity as given and posit it as identical with itself, or to make its consciousness equal to its self-consciousness. &#8211; Both are one and the same.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-348\">\u00a7 348<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">1) Self-consciousness in its immediacy is a singular and <em>desire<\/em>, the contradiction of its abstraction, which is supposed to be objective, or of its immediacy, which is supposed to be subjective, against <em>I =<\/em> I, the concept, which is in itself the Idea, unity of itself and of reality. &#8211; Its immediacy, which is determined as what is to be sublated, has at the same time the shape of an external object, according to which self-consciousness is consciousness. But the object is determined as <em>null<\/em> in itself for the certainty of itself that has emerged from the sublation of consciousness; self-consciousness is therefore to itself in itself in the object, which in this way [is] in accordance with the drive, and in negativity, as the I&#8217;s own activity, this identity comes to be for the I.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-349\">\u00a7 349<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The object can offer no resistance to this activity, because it is in itself and for it the <em>selfless<\/em>; the dialectic that is its nature, to sublate itself, is here as that activity which the I thereby at the same time intuits as external. The given object herein becomes just as much subjective as subjectivity divests itself and becomes objective to itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-350\">\u00a7 350<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The product of this process is that the I joins itself together with itself in this reality; but in this return it gives itself at first only <em>singular<\/em> existence, because it relates only negatively to the selfless object,2 and that this is only consumed; desire is therefore in its satisfaction in general destructive, and selfish.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-351\">\u00a7 351<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But self-consciousness already has in itself the certainty of itself in the immediate object; the self-feeling that comes to it in satisfaction is therefore not the abstract self-feeling of its being-for-itself or only of its singularity, but something <em>objective<\/em>; satisfaction is the negation of its own immediacy, and its diremption therefore into the consciousness of a free object, in which the I has the knowing of itself as I.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-352\">\u00a7 352<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">2) There is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness, at first <em>immediately<\/em>, as an other for an other. In the I, I immediately intuit myself, but also in it an immediately existing object, other and, as I, absolutely self-standing. This contradiction, that I am I only as negativity of immediate existence, gives the process of recognition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-353\">\u00a7 353<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is a <em>struggle<\/em>; for I cannot know myself in the other as myself insofar as the other is an immediate other existence for me. I am therefore directed to the sublation of this immediacy. But it is at the same time the existence of self-consciousness, in which, as in its sign and instrument, it has its own self-feeling and its being for <em>others<\/em>, and its universality mediating it with them. Equally I cannot be recognized as something immediate, but only insofar as I sublate immediacy in myself and thereby give existence to my freedom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-354\">\u00a7 354<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The struggle for recognition is thus a struggle of life and death; each of the two self-consciousnesses brings the life of the other into danger and exposes itself to it &#8211; but only as to <em>danger<\/em>, for each is equally directed to the preservation of its life, as an essential moment. The death of the one, which resolves the contradiction on one side through the abstract, therefore crude, negation of immediacy, is, on the essential side, the existence of recognition, thus the greater contradiction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-355\">\u00a7 355<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since life is as essential as freedom, the struggle, since in this sphere the immediate singularity of the two self-consciousnesses is presupposed, ends at first with the inequality that one of the combatants prefers life and preserves itself as abstract or singular self-consciousness but gives up its being recognized, while the other holds to this universality and is recognized by the first as the subjugated one: &#8211; the relationship of <em>lordship<\/em> and bondage. The struggle for recognition and subjugation under a lord is the appearance in which the living together of human beings, as a beginning of states, has emerged. <em>Force<\/em>, which is the ground in this appearance, is not on that account the ground of <em>right<\/em>, although it is the <em>necessary<\/em> and justified moment in the transition from the condition of self-consciousness sunk in desire and singularity to the condition of universal self-consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-356\">\u00a7 356<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This relationship is, first, according to its identity, a <em>community<\/em> of the need of desire and of the care for its satisfaction, and in place of the crude destruction of the immediate object there steps the acquisition, preservation and forming of it as the mediating term in which the two extremes of self-standingness and non-self-standingness join together.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-357\">\u00a7 357<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u2192 <a href=\"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/57\/\">Groundlines \u00a7 57<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Secondly, according to its difference, the lord has in the bondsman and his service the intuition of the objectivity of his singular being-for-itself, in the sublation of it, but insofar as it belongs to another. &#8211; But the bondsman works off his singular will or self-will in the service of the lord, sublates his inner immediacy, and through this divestment and the fear of the lord makes the beginning of wisdom &#8211; the transition to <em>universal self-consciousness<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-358\">\u00a7 358<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">3) <em>Universal<\/em> self-consciousness is the positive knowing of itself in the other self, each of which, as free singularity, has absolute self-standingness, but through the negation of its immediacy does not distinguish <em>itself<\/em> from the other, is universal and objective, and has real universality in such a way that it knows itself recognized in the free other and knows this insofar as it recognizes the other and knows it to be free. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness, the concept that knows itself in its objectivity as subjectivity identical with itself and therefore as universal, is the substance of every essential spirituality, of the family, the fatherland, the state; as well as of all virtues &#8211; love, friendship, bravery, honour, fame.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-359\">\u00a7 359<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness has at first the singular selves subsisting against one another as being for themselves. But their difference is in this identity the wholly indeterminate diversity, or rather a difference that is none. Their truth is therefore the unmediated universality and objectivity of self-consciousness being in and for itself &#8211; <em>reason<\/em>. C.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center wp-block-paragraph\">c. Reason.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-360\">\u00a7 360<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The truth being in and for itself which reason is, is the simple identity of the subjectivity of the concept and its objectivity and universality. The universality of reason therefore has just as much the <em>meaning of the<\/em> <em>object<\/em> given in consciousness as of the I in self-consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-361\">\u00a7 361<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Reason is therefore determined in and for itself as pure singularity of subjectivity, and is therefore the <em>certainty<\/em> that the determinations of self-consciousness are just as much objective, determinations of the essence of things, as they are its own thoughts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"p1817-362\">\u00a7 362<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Reason as this identity is absolute substance, which is <em>truth<\/em>. The peculiar <em>determinacy<\/em> it has here, after the object presupposed against the I, as well as the I that is selfish against the object, has sublated its one-sidedness, is substantial truth, whose determinacy is the pure concept being for itself, the I &#8211; the certainty of itself as infinite universality. This knowing truth is <em>spirit<\/em>. C. <em>SPIRIT<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The Groundlines presuppose not only the Psychology but also the section that precedes it: the Phenomenology of Spirit within the Encyclopaedia. Hegel refers to it explicitly twice &#8211; in \u00a7 35 for the transition from the natural will to the person (3rd ed. \u00a7 424) and in \u00a7 57 for the struggle for recognition and [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-906521","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906521","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=906521"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906521\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":906526,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/906521\/revisions\/906526"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=906521"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}