{"id":900130,"date":"2024-05-31T12:00:00","date_gmt":"2024-05-31T10:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/?p=900130"},"modified":"2026-08-24T10:30:03","modified_gmt":"2026-08-24T08:30:03","slug":"132","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/132\/","title":{"rendered":"132"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The right of the subjective will<\/em> is that what it is to recognize as valid should be seen by it as good<\/em>, and that an action, as the purpose entering into external objectivity, should be imputed to it as right or wrong, good or evil, lawful or unlawful, according to its knowledge<\/em> of the value that the action has in this objectivity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The good<\/em> is, in general, the essence of the will in its substantiality<\/em> and universality<\/em> — the will in its truth — and it is therefore purely and simply only in thought<\/em> and through thought<\/em>. The assertion, therefore, that man cannot know the true but has to do only with appearances, that thinking is harmful to the good will — such notions, and others like them, take away from spirit all intellectual, and equally all ethical, worth and dignity. — The right to recognize nothing that I do not see to be rational is the highest right of the subject, but through its subjective determination it is at the same time formal<\/em>, while the right of the rational<\/em>, as the objective, over against the subject remains firmly fixed nonetheless. — Because of its formal determination, insight is just as capable of being true<\/em> as of being mere opinion<\/em> and error<\/em>. That the individual attain to that right of his insight belongs, on the standpoint of the still moral sphere, to his particular subjective formation. I can make the demand upon myself, and regard it as a subjective right in me, that I should see an obligation on good<\/em> grounds and hold the conviction<\/em> of it, and, still more, that I should recognize it out of its concept and nature. But what I demand for the satisfaction of my conviction regarding the good, the permitted, or the impermissible character of an action, and thus regarding its accountability in this respect, does no injury to the right of objectivity<\/em>. — This right of insight into the good<\/em> is distinguished from the right of insight (\u00a7 117<\/a>) with respect to the action as such; the right of objectivity has, according to the latter, the shape that, since the action is a change that is to exist in an actual world, and thus wants to be recognized therein, it must in general be in accordance with what holds good there. Whoever wishes to act in this actuality has, by that very fact, submitted himself to its laws and recognized the right of objectivity. — Equally, in the state<\/em>, as the objectivity<\/em> of the concept of reason, judicial imputation<\/em> must not stop short at what someone holds to be in accordance with his own reason or not — at his subjective insight into rightfulness or wrongfulness, into good or evil — and at the demands that he makes for the satisfaction of his conviction. In this objective field, the right of insight holds good as insight into what is lawful<\/em> or unlawful<\/em>, into valid<\/em> right, and it is limited to its nearest meaning, namely knowledge<\/em> as acquaintance<\/em> with what is legal and, in this respect, obligatory. Through the publicity of the laws and through general custom, the state takes from the right of insight the formal side and the contingency for the subject that this right still has on the present standpoint. The right of the subject to know an action in the determination of good<\/em> or evil<\/em>, lawful or unlawful, has, in the case of children, imbeciles, and madmen, the consequence of diminishing or annulling accountability from this side as well. A determinate boundary cannot, however, be fixed for these conditions and their accountability. But to make momentary blindness, the irritation of passion, drunkenness — in general, what is called the strength of sensuous incentives (insofar as what grounds a right of necessity, \u00a7 120<\/a>, is excluded) — into grounds for the imputation and determination of crime<\/em> itself and its punishability<\/em>, and to regard such circumstances as if the criminal’s guilt<\/em> were thereby removed, is likewise (compare \u00a7 100<\/a>, \u00a7 119<\/a> Remark) not to treat him according to the right and honour of a human being, whose nature is precisely to be essentially something universal, not an abstractly momentary and isolated instance of knowledge. — Just as the arsonist has not set fire to this inch-large surface of wood that he touched with the flame, taken in isolation, but rather, in it, the universal — the house — so too, as a subject, he is not the single instance of this<\/em> moment or this isolated sensation of the heat of vengeance; were he so, he would be an animal, which, because of its harmfulness and the insecurity of being subject to fits of rage, would have to be knocked on the head. — That the criminal must, at the moment of his action, have had a distinct representation<\/em> of the wrong and the punishability of the deed before it can be imputed to him as a crime — this demand, which seems to preserve for him the right of his moral subjectivity, in fact denies him the intelligent nature dwelling within him, which, in its active presence, is not tied to the Wolffian-psychological form of distinct representations<\/em>, and is only, in the case of actual madness, so deranged as to be severed from the knowing and doing of particular things. — The sphere in which those circumstances come into consideration as grounds for the mitigation of punishment is a different one from that of right — the sphere of clemency<\/em>.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The right of the subjective will is that what it is to recognize as valid should be seen by it as good, and that an action, as the purpose entering into external objectivity, should be imputed to it as right or wrong, good or evil, lawful or unlawful, according to its knowledge of the value […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[21,13],"tags":[35],"class_list":["post-900130","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-paragraph-en","category-uncategorized","tag-concept"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/900130","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=900130"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/900130\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":900190,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/900130\/revisions\/900190"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=900130"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=900130"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=900130"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}