{"id":900438,"date":"2024-05-30T12:40:00","date_gmt":"2024-05-30T10:40:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/?p=900269"},"modified":"2026-09-10T16:49:33","modified_gmt":"2026-09-10T14:49:33","slug":"272","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/272\/","title":{"rendered":"272"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

I. The Internal Constitution as such<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The constitution is rational in so far as the state differentiates<\/em> and determines its activity within itself according to the nature of the concept<\/em>, and indeed in such a way that each<\/em> of these powers<\/em> is itself, within itself, the totality<\/em>, in that it has the other moments effectively present and contained within it, and in that, because they express the difference of the concept, they remain simply within its ideality, and constitute only one individual<\/em> whole.<\/p>\n\n\n

\n

In recent times there has been an infinite amount of chatter about the constitution, as about reason itself, and in Germany the shallowest of it has been brought into the world by those who persuaded themselves that they understood best \u2014 indeed to the exclusion of all others, and better than governments themselves \u2014 what a constitution is, and who supposed themselves to have the unassailable warrant for this in the belief that religion and piety ought to be the foundation of all these shallow notions of theirs. It is no wonder that this chatter has had the consequence that, to reasonable men, the words reason, enlightenment, right, and so forth, like constitution and freedom, have become distasteful, and that one might be ashamed even to join in speaking about political constitution any longer. But at least one may hope for the effect of this weariness, that the conviction should become more general that a philosophical cognition<\/em> of such subjects cannot proceed from ratiocination, from purposes, grounds, and utilities \u2014 still less from feeling, love, and enthusiasm \u2014 but solely from the concept, and that those who hold the divine to be incomprehensible and the cognition of the true to be a futile undertaking must refrain from joining in the discussion. Whatever they produce out of their feeling and enthusiasm, whether undigested chatter or mere edification, neither of the two can, at any rate, lay claim to philosophical attention.<\/p>\n

Among the circulating representations, one to be mentioned in connection with \u00a7269<\/a> is that of the necessary division of powers<\/em> of the state \u2014 a highly important determination which, if it had indeed been taken in its true sense, could rightly be regarded as the guarantee of public freedom \u2014 a representation, however, of which precisely those who suppose themselves to be speaking out of enthusiasm and love know nothing and wish to know nothing; for it is precisely in it that the moment of rational determinacy<\/em> lies. The principle of the division of powers contains, namely, the essential moment of difference<\/em>, of real<\/em> rationality; but as the abstract understanding grasps it, there lies in it, on the one hand, the false determination of the absolute independence<\/em> of the powers in relation to one another, and, on the other, the one-sidedness of conceiving their relation to one another as something negative, as mutual limitation<\/em>. On this view it becomes a hostility, an anxiety of each toward the other, since each produces against the other, as against an evil, the determination to oppose it, and, through these counterweights, to bring about a general equilibrium rather than a living unity. It is only the self-determination<\/em> of the concept within itself, and not any other purposes or utilities, that contains the absolute origin of the differentiated powers, and it is only for this reason that the organization of the state is something rational in itself and the image of eternal reason. \u2014 How the concept<\/em>, and then, in a concrete way, the Idea, determine themselves within themselves, and thereby posit their moments abstractly as universality, particularity, and individuality, is to be recognized from logic \u2014 though certainly not from the logic otherwise current.1<\/a><\/sup> In general, to take the negative as one’s starting point, to make the willing of evil and mistrust of it the first thing, and then, on this presupposition, cleverly to contrive dams which, as the condition of their efficacy, require only mutual damming \u2014 this characterizes, in point of thought, the negative understanding<\/em>, and, in point of disposition, the outlook of the rabble (see above \u00a7244<\/a>). \u2014 With the independence<\/em> of the powers \u2014 for example, of what have been called the executive<\/em> and the legislative<\/em> power \u2014 the shattering of the state is immediately posited, as has also been seen on the grand scale; or, in so far as the state essentially maintains itself, there arises instead the struggle whereby the one power subordinates the other to itself, thereby bringing about, in the first instance, unity of whatever kind, and so alone rescuing what is essential \u2014 the subsistence of the state.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n

  1. Hegel gives no reference. What is meant are the three moments of the concept – universality, particularity, singularity – which do not lie side by side but issue from one another; “not the logic otherwise current” means: not the school logic of concept, judgement and syllogism as mere forms of thought (Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed. \u00a7 163–165<\/em>). – See Die Grammatik der logischen Begriffe: Der Gang der Logik – Der Begriff<\/a> (in German). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li><\/ol>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    I. The Internal Constitution as such The constitution is rational in so far as the state differentiates and determines its activity within itself according to the nature of the concept, and indeed in such a way that each of these powers is itself, within itself, the totality, in that it has the other moments effectively […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"[{\"content\":\"Hegel gives no reference. What is meant are the three moments of the concept – universality, particularity, singularity – which do not lie side by side but issue from one another; “not the logic otherwise current” means: not the school logic of concept, judgement and syllogism as mere forms of thought (Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed. \u00a7 163–165<\/em>). – See Die Grammatik der logischen Begriffe: Der Gang der Logik – Der Begriff<\/a> (in German).\",\"id\":\"a2591548-da4f-4afa-84b9-7b76e7046fe1\"}]"},"categories":[21,13],"tags":[35],"class_list":["post-900438","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-paragraph-en","category-uncategorized","tag-concept"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/900438","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/11"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=900438"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/900438\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":902942,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/900438\/revisions\/902942"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=900438"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=900438"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grundlinien.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=900438"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}