

Jena Philosophy of Spirit

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[*Realphilosophie: Philosophy of Spirit, 1805/06*]

The second part of Hegel's manuscript for his lectures on "Realphilosophie" (philosophy of nature and of spirit), written in 1805/06 for the winter semester 1805/06 and revised in 1806; Hegel certainly delivered the lectures in the summer semester of 1806. Not published in his lifetime; first edited by Johannes Hoffmeister in 1931 as "Jenenser Realphilosophie II", hence the customary title. Translated from the text of the Gesammelte Werke (vol. 8, "Jenaer Systementwürfe III", ed. Rolf-Peter Horstmann with Johann Heinrich Trede, 1976, pp. 185–287). Additions by the editors stand in square brackets, as do headings that are not Hegel's; the critical apparatus and the leaf numbers of the manuscript are not reproduced. Hegel's emphases (letter-spaced or in small capitals in the edition) appear in italics.

The figures between vertical bars, e.g. [293], mark the beginning of a page of the printed edition, so that a passage can be found again in one's own copy.

The notes reproduce Hegel's marginal notes; the italic indication before them (e.g. "In the margin:") is the editors' of the Gesammelte Werke. Asterisks within a note refer to Hegel's own additions to it. The enumerators α , β , γ , δ stand thus in Hegel's manuscript.

Cross-reference: Hegel's last working-out of the philosophy of spirit before the *Phenomenology*, and the first in which recognition, contract, crime, law, the estates and government are developed out of the will – the path of the *Groundlines*, which begin with the will (§ 4 ff.). Many pieces return there: property and recognition (§ 41 ff., § 71), contract (§ 72 ff.), crime and punishment (§ 90 ff.), wealth and poverty (§ 241 ff.), the estates (§ 201 ff.), war (§ 324 ff.), state and religion (§ 270 Remark). Written earlier is the System of Ethical Life. At each section the corresponding place is noted as a cross-reference. The German text is on the German side of this edition.

[I. Spirit according to its concept]

Cross-reference: Intelligence and will: in the *Groundlines* the distinction of thinking and will, § 4 Remark; the concept of the will § 5–§ 7.

[a. Intelligence]

The subsistence of the object, its *space*, is in spirit *being*; it is the abstract pure concept of subsistence. I and the thing are *in space*;¹⁾ it is posited as essentially *different* from its content, it is not the essence of its filling itself, it is only something formally universal that is separated from its particular; but the subsistence of spirit is truly *universal*; it contains the particular itself; the *thing is*, it is not *in being* – but it *is* itself.

1) *In the margin:* attention in general, singling out a *single* point, distinguishing for spirit.

This is immediately the *essence of intuition*; knowing of something that *is*. But spirit is this which mediates itself with itself, it is only as sublating what it *immediately* is, stepping back from it; or the movement in it is to be considered, how *that which is* becomes the universal for it,²⁾ or how it makes it so, posits it as what it is – being is the form of immediacy, but it is to be posited in its truth.

2) *In the margin:* how it posits the *thing*.

α) As intuiting in general, so that for it a *being* is, it is immediate –

[186] but it [turns] out of this immediacy, back into itself, [is] for itself; it *sets itself free from this immediacy*, first removing itself from it, it is, like the animal, *time* that is for itself, and likewise freedom of time; this pure subject which is free of its content; but also *lord* over it, as space and time are not, which are the selfless; it goes [out] from this being, and posits the same within itself as something *not-being*, as something sublated in general, thus it is representing *imagination* in general – It is the self, over against itself. – *It itself is first intuiting*; this self it sets over against itself – not the *object*, but its intuiting is object to it, i.e. the content of perception as *its own*. – In intuiting, what is intuited *is* in me, – for it is indeed *I* who intuit – it is *my* intuition –³⁾ Out of this intuiting spirit steps forth and intuits *its* intuiting, i.e. the object as *its own*; the object sublated as *something that is*, the *image*. In intuiting spirit *is* the image – for it as consciousness it is a *being*, separated from the I; – but for us unity of both. This comes to be for spirit itself – it is *in and for itself*; in intuiting it is at first only *in itself*, it completes this through the for-itself, – through negativity, separation of the in-itself, and goes back into itself – and its first self is object to it; the *image*, *being* as *mine*, as sublated. This⁴⁾ image belongs to *it*,⁵⁾ it is in possession of it, it is lord over it; it is preserved in its *treasury*, in its *night* – it is *unconscious*

3) *In the margin*: α) like the animal, it is in itself arbitrary movement, freedom, the self of time and space, arbitrarily posits the content here or there in *space* and *time*; – time and space is the external *relation*, this external *relation* as *form* it sublates; β) *being*, this belongs properly to the I as such, not space and time;

4) *In the margin*: α) *night of preservation*

5) *In the margin*: to its simple self – but the simple has no distinction, so here too, *it is in it* as *undistinguished*

[187] i.e. without being set forth as object before representation. Man is this night, this empty nothing, which contains everything in its simplicity – a wealth of infinitely many representations, images, none of which occurs to him just now –, or which are not as present. This the night, the interior of nature, which here exists – *pure self*, – in phantasmagorical representations it is night all around, here then a bloody head shoots forth, – there another white shape suddenly, and vanish likewise – This night one glimpses when one looks a human being in the eye – into a night which becomes *terrible*, – the night of the world here hangs out towards one.

In⁶⁾ this night that which is has gone back – But⁷⁾ the movement of this power is likewise posited. α) the image is a manifold – form is in it as determinacy, and thereby other determinates, multiplicity in general. The I is the form not only as simple self, but as movement; the *relation* of the parts of the image, – positing the form, *relation*, as its own; – insofar as it makes up a *part* of the *content* – it alters the same⁸⁾ – *For itself* here is free *arbitrary will* – to tear images apart and to link them in the most unbound way. – If in its drawing forth of the images it lets itself be led by the *received* relation, then it stands under the dominion of the so-called association of *ideas* – an English word, for these still to this day call the mere image of a dog, e.g., an *idea*. The laws of this association of ideas mean nothing more than the passive order of representation – seen *at the same time*, also reproduces itself together etc.

6) *In the margin*: β self-positing; inner consciousness, doing, sundering.

7) *In the margin*: power to draw the images forth out of this night, or to let them fall down –

8) *In the margin*: an entirely different movement from that of space and time, a free one, subsisting before this movement *that is*

[188] This arbitrary will is empty freedom, for its content is one after another, it lies merely in the form, and concerns only this.

β The object has thereby in general received the form, the determination of being mine; and when it is *intuited* again, its *being* no longer has this pure meaning of being, but of the *mine*, it is already *known* to me; or I *recollect* it. Or I have immediately the consciousness of *myself* in it – in immediate intuiting only the consciousness of *it*; but when it is known, it comes to be so for me with this express determination; we are also made to recollect something by another, merely the image of the object brought into us – recollection adds the moment of being-for-itself – I have *seen* it once before,⁹⁾ or *heard* it; I *recollect*; I do not merely see, hear the object, but go *thereby within myself* – *inwardize* – *myself*, take *myself* out of the mere image, and posit myself *in myself*; I posit myself particularly in relation to the object.

9) *In the margin*: being-for-me superficially attached to the intuition

γ) This *being-for-me*, which I *add* to the object, is that night, that self into which I sank it, which, now drawn forth, is object to myself – and what is before me is the *synthesis* of both,¹⁰⁾ *content* and *I*. But the external *object itself* has precisely therein been sublated – [become] something other than *it is*, it has come under the dominion of the self, it has lost the meaning of being immediate, self-standing. Not only has a synthesis taken place, but the *being* of the object has been sublated; it is thus this, that the object *is* not *what* it is. The content is not free of its *being*; being is *self*, – the content is its simple essence in general – this is something other than its *being*; it counts as a *whole* other, has another *essence*, self another meaning; or counts as a *sign*. In the sign being-for-itself is, as the *essence* of the object, object, and it as sublated in its totality,

10) *In the margin*: its *being* is determined as this *being-for-me*, inner

[189] according to its content; its content no longer has any free value of its own; its being is the I itself – idealism, which becomes object to itself; the thing *is* not what it *is*; that being is self; – my *being-for-me* is object as the *essence* of the thing, in recollection only synthetically, externally attached. The I is here object as the *interior* of the thing itself, this inwardness of the thing is still separated from its being, it is not yet universality, or the thing posited as *thing*. This, ¹¹⁾ that I intuit the thing only as sign, but its essence as I, as meaning, as reflection into itself, is likewise itself *object*; it is thus only at first *immediate* inwardness, it must also enter into existence, become object, conversely this inwardness be external; return to *being*. This is *language*, as the *name-giving power*,¹²⁾ – imagination only the empty-form-giving, designating [power], which posits the form as inward, but language [posits the inward] as *something that is*. This then is the true *being* of spirit as spirit in general – it is *there* as the unity of two free selves; and an existence which is in accordance with its concept, – it likewise immediately sublates itself – dies away, but is *apprehended*. At first language speaks only with this self, the *meaning* of the thing, gives it a name, and expresses this as the *being* of the object; what *is* this? we answer, it *is* a lion, ass etc. it *is*, i.e. it is not at all something yellow, having feet and so forth, something of its own, self-standing, but a *name*, a *sound* of my voice; something quite other than it is in intuition, and this its true *being*. This is only its *name*, the thing itself is something else; i.e. we then fall back into *sensuous representation*; – or *only* a name in a higher sense, for the name is itself only at first the very superficial *spiritual being*. – Through the name, then, the

11) *In the margin*: inwardness which itself *is there*.

12) *In the margin*: memory, creative power

[190] object is born out of the I as *something that is*. – This is the first *creative power* which spirit exercises; Adam gave all things a name, this is the sovereign right and first taking possession of the whole of nature, or the creating of it out of spirit; λογος reason *essence* of the thing and speech, *matter* and *saying*, category. Man speaks to the thing as *his own*,¹³⁾ and this is the *being* of the object. Spirit relates itself to itself; – it says to the ass, you are an inner and this inner is I – and your being is a sound which I have arbitrarily invented – *ass* is a sound which is something quite other than sensuous being itself; insofar as we see it, also feel or hear it, we are it ourselves, immediately one with it, filled; but stepping back as name, it is something spiritual – something quite other.

13) *In the margin*: and lives in a spiritual nature, in his world.

The world, nature, is no longer a realm of *images*, inwardly sublated, which have no being, but a realm of names. – That realm of images is *dreaming* spirit, which has to do with a content which [has] no reality, no existence – its awakening is the *realm of names*; here is at the same time the separation, it is as consciousness; now for the first time its images have truth; – the dreamer, indeed, also supposes this, but it is not true – the dreamer cannot distinguish himself from the one awake; but the waking distinguishes itself from the dreaming, in that what is for it is true – it is true – no longer is merely its *being-for-itself* present – the object images; but the enclosed being-for-itself has at the same time the form of *being*; *it is*.

In¹⁴⁾ the name *intuiting*, the animal, and time and space are properly overcome for the first time; what is intuited is something volatilized; its wholeness

14) *In the margin*: the limit entirely taken back into itself, cut off

[191] as it were the *simple atmosphere, the smell*,¹⁵⁾ simple individuality, raised up out of feeling into the higher spiritual sense; individuality,¹⁶⁾ actuality in general, but it is still *first*; without filling of its own, or immediate;¹⁷⁾ the *name* still has another *meaning* than it is. – The object, in the sign, has another meaning than it *is* – the *inner*; the name's meaning, conversely, is that which sensuously *is*. Its content must become equal to it itself, to its simple spirituality that is.

15) *In the margin*: As in sense feeling and warmth; *being* and *sign* sublated being

16) *In the margin*: thus smell *first actuality* and therefore singularity

17) *In the margin*: The other meaning rests in this, that it is the *singularity* still undeveloped in itself; it is, this; – *being* of the image, it is through *determinacy** – determinacy *imperfect* unity of being and being-for-itself* *Alongside*: (unity with *its opposite*, gone back into singularity)

α) spirit goes into itself out of this *being* of the name, or its naming is object to it, as a realm, as a multiplicity of names; they are *simple*, closed off within themselves, the manifoldness of the image is extinguished, enveloped in this self – imagination takes the object out with its multiplicity, its nearest surroundings¹⁸⁾ – but the name is solitary, without *relation* and connection – a series not bearing itself, because there is no determinacy, i.e. relation to other, in *it* itself. The *I*¹⁹⁾ is quite alone

18) *In the margin*: (cuts out a piece of space, interrupts, negates the continuity of space – but association of ideas)

19) *In the margin*: α) The I steps over against the *many* names; their *singular* content is alien; but their determinacy is the I – and their singularity *simple*. β) having stepped over against them, the I is their simplicity, their essence; they are related to one another through the I, through their essence; the I alone is *necessity*, what in itself the

[192] the bearer, space, substance of these names – it is their *order* – or the relation as of those completely *indifferent* to one another, they have in themselves no rank, relation. The I must now intuit itself as this ordering, or them as ordered, and as holding fast this order; – that it is an abiding order.

It is at first in *possession* of the names, it must *retain* them in its night, as serviceable ones that obey it; – and not only the names in general thus. but intuit them in its space as a *fixed* order, for it is their relation, and necessity, is relation of different ones *that is in itself* – It is heading towards creating the *content* out of itself. Its content is the *indifferent* names; but in their indifference as many the *self* is not present, as negative, as it is in truth; the negative in the many is the relation of each through itself to the *other*. This relation it posits in its names as such, holds them fast in necessity in general,²⁰⁾ which is necessity not yet posited in *them*, but only fixed *order*. – Or it is *memory* (memory proper), the *understanding* which still has itself in its object, as object. Memory preserves the name in general, the free arbitrary connection of this image (of the meaning) and of the *name*, which is with the opposite of itself – they now have the *I* for their *being*, – because they are *simple*. –

20) *In the margin*: In the *name* the I is *immediate singularity*, – positing itself as this makes itself into *necessity* – but empty, just as when we say: *fate*, do not know what its law, its content, what it wants.

γ) how now does this their necessity or their fixing *come to be* – so that the I becomes their *being*; or that the I which is their *essence* should become their being, for being is the *fixed* objective, the I is the form of pure unrest, movement, or night of vanishing – Or: the I is, in the name, *something that is (universal)* immediately; now through mediation – it must *become* it through itself; its unrest must become *the* self-fixing, movement subsuming itself as unrest, as pure movement. This the *labour*; its *unrest* becomes *object*, as *fixed* multiplicity, as order; – unrest becomes *order* precisely by becoming object.

[193] image to it the name, and with the name the image is there; but higher is the liberation of the relation from this heterogeneity, so that name relates only to name – (*lightning*, thunder, *resemblance* to the sensuous appearance) but free names [are] not [related] among themselves – The I is the power of this free²¹⁾ order, not yet posited as necessary, but order. – It is the free bearer, the free non-objective order – it is the first I grasping itself as *power*; it itself is necessity, free of representation – the fixing and fixed order – The exercise of memory is therefore the first *labour* of awakened spirit,²²⁾ as spirit – The giving, inventing of names is an inventing arbitrary will; in memory this arbitrary will first vanishes, the I having come to *being*; name is fixed sign; abiding relation, a universal one – The I has given up its *arbitrary will* in its *being*; posited itself as universal. – Hence order, necessary relation here in general; – but still inward, or itself contingent order, arbitrary necessity, – for its sides are not yet posited, not yet *in themselves*; – it is only necessity in general, i.e. contingent. –

21) *In the margin: extirpation of arbitrary will*, empty singularity – it has been *singularity* (in the name) *hitherto within itself*; now bound, no stuff it can *go beyond*; whereby it remains *within itself*; *opposed* to the stuff, indeed to sensuous consciousness, into this *emptiness* – *empty itself as self*

22) *In the margin: immediate sublation* of itself, which is directed upon itself

The holding fast now of such a relation of the name and of the names is *the stuffless occupation* and movement of spirit with itself, it no longer ties together sensuous representations that are, according to arbitrary will – or such that it merely reproduced them,²³⁾ as they are – but it is the *free* power, and holds itself fast as this free power. – The labour is at the same time this, that the I makes itself into

23) *In the margin: passive combining*, – or wholly arbitrary

[194] what it is given in the *name*, namely *thing*, *something that is*; the name is *it*, and is a thing; – it makes itself into a *thing* by fixing within itself the order of the names; it fixes them in *itself*, i.e. it makes itself into this thoughtless order, which has only the semblance of an order – in the *semblance of order* lies the I – necessity, self of the sides; but the sides are still purely indifferent – It can make itself into a thing only as memory, because the thing into which it makes itself is *in itself* I;²⁴⁾ it is now the *doing*, the movement making itself into the object which it is given immediately in the name. (The for-itself of recollection is here its doing upon itself) Producing of itself, negating of itself – if the name is regarded as the object upon which it is active, then it sublates itself –

24) *In the margin*: This labour is *repeating* of the same; therein consists what is irksome, the I renounces its free arbitrary will, going beyond the determinate; – repeating is the *positing* of *equality*, of being. Holding fast to itself [as] the same. It is repeating of something *known*, where there is no longer any *interest* in the *matter*; no enjoyment in finding oneself in the other, not the naming; – hence purely *non-sensuous* occupation – holding fast of *abstraction*, *itself* as the empty space, fixing stars therein, pure fixing, – α) pure *liberated activity*; repeating β) without objectivity, – those to be fixed are still indifferent.

This labour is therefore the first inner working upon itself – an entirely *non-sensuous* occupation – and the beginning of the free elevation of spirit, for here it has itself as object – A far higher labour than the childish occupation with external sensuous, or painted images, – plants, animals – having a big snout, yellow mane, long tail etc., this seeing, *attention* is the first necessary activity, seeing precisely, activity of spirit, *fixing*, abstracting, taking out, exertion, over-coming of the

[195] indeterminate of feeling; – but the doing does not go upon itself –²⁵⁾

25) *In the margin*: α) giving names, the universal of this sphere β) activity, being-*for-itself*, memory; inward efficacy γ) being *in and for* itself. The I reflects upon its doing, i.e. reflects itself out of it, and makes it its object; – the next product is that we have *knowledge by heart* of something; but not yet *inward knowledge* – the I is *being* – wholly incomplete external product; the whole is α) the fixed relation which is posited by the I, and it is fixed because it is so through the same; it is necessity, *memory* is becoming of *thought*, becoming of the non-sensuous object; i.e. α) which is no longer image β) in which the *singularity* of the name is extirpated. The labour, own doing, is singularity, order likewise the self; the I is objective to itself as multiplicity, – for its doing is movement, distinguishing, – it is itself the order; – and the order of distinctions which are its own, remain enclosed in it – *thing moments* (thus *in itself* or for us) it is *thinking* intuiting, or intuiting thinking. They are not indifferent names, but moments, division in it itself; brought forth through labour, it has this product as object and at first as *immediate*; it is comprehending understanding, necessity of *the understanding*, explaining, searching for the cause of the effect; the sensuous is determined as an effect and the like, or it is for the I what it was for us in the name; the thing has as *essence* for the I something other than *it is*; it is merely a sign; but its meaning is not contingent, but is its *essence*; for it is universal, – the I *looks upon* the category, it comprehends, what it *understands* is the matter itself – but not *because* it understands, or [is] form of I-hood – but it understands the *matter* (the content of the thing doubled.) *Understanding* α) relation of opposed concepts β) unity of the same, *ground*; those have their substance in *being*; ground is sublated *being*. A) distribution; object is *thing*, the I is self, substance unity of the opposed determinations, which it distributes among several substrates B) In the thought of substance the thing itself becomes this self; substance and accidental property – in cause and effect both united, inspirited things; but their *essence* is the inspiriting; *activity** goes to ground in the product * *Above*: mere form of self-standingness the cause

This occupation with itself is precisely this, to produce itself; – the *reverse* of making the *thing* into the I; holding fast the order is the

[196] *thought* of the I's own content – not in the names does it have a content, as that of the I – but in the *form*, order – but [in it] as a *fixed*, arbitrary, contingent one there is externality, thinghood. I know something by heart, I have made myself into an *indifferent* order – I am order, relating – doing – but it is arbitrary – the I thereby made into a thing.

This direction upon the name thus has the opposite meaning, namely that the direction upon the I, sublating of it as that which is for itself, i.e. arbitrary, active, is posited – there is posited *universality*, with equal value, equal being-sublated of the active I and of the object – the I become *object* – in the name [it has] only [become] *being*, to which being-for-itself stands opposed; or the name is still arbitrary, singular. – *Thing, understanding, necessity. Thing as simple universality, necessity as moving itself.* The thing has necessity in it, for it has the *self* of the I in it. Distinction *in* the thing is distinction in the self – i.e. in itself *negative* relation – understanding, insight is the distinction, not in the thing, but of the thing against the understanding – which does not really belong here – but experience of consciousness.²⁶⁾

26) On the lower margin: *understanding, judgement, syllogism* –

The I²⁷⁾ is thus active upon the *thing* or the universal as such, or there is posited the

27) *In the margin:* The understanding is α) related to the *thing* in such a way that the form of *being* in it is for it. One, many, cause, etc. relation of the same, as of ones different towards one another, *inspired, abstraction* or the concept has its *substance* in *being*; concepts enter only into *relation*; the thing is not yet in itself what is set at rest, the unity of the opposed determinations – But those inspired determinations go to *ground* in simple neutrality, to universality as *ground*, it becomes the ground. Now β) for the I the ground is the *universal* as such, it knows *itself* as the understanding; it speaks of *determinate concepts* as its own – and β) *judges*, is the movement of the determinate concept. *Singularity* and *universality* are *different*, and opposed. α) *syllogism* – they are thus, on the first view, equal only in a third; the copula is the I, bears them, it is at first the empty. But how is this third constituted β) it is not the pure copula $A = A$, empty identity – people often suppose it to be the absolute – otherwise it would not be the equality of *them*. γ) but contains them *both*, their equality as well as their *opposition* is the I δ) the same they both are, (*beings*) – each is equal to the other in that wherein it is opposed to it; or it is opposed to it in that wherein it is equal to it – distinction and equality are the same. – There remains to them the empty form of *being*, which they have long since lost.

[197] movement of the universal; its distinction: *it* as distinguished from itself; *it* the universal, to which it itself, as the negativity which it contains, is opposed; this itself in the form of universality is *singularity*. They are both completely indifferent towards one another; for each is the universal or *relating itself to itself*. But these extremes are likewise absolutely related to one another, they are *equal* to each other, in indifference, or universality; related *in themselves*; but for one another, for each is itself what it is only in opposition to the other; *ground become* through this movement – the *universal* only as enveloping *negativity* in its simplicity and

[198] concealing it; but the singular as the negative is that which negatively excludes an other, the non-negative, the universal. *Both* relate themselves to themselves, or are universal, but likewise only *one* is the universal; both are negatives of the other, but likewise only one is the negative. The one (the singular) is *inwardly* universal in relation to itself, to itself, for it excludes precisely the *other*, its being outwardly; – and is negative towards this other; – but the other, the *universal*, is *inwardly* negative, it contains negativity *in itself*, but is *universal* outwardly.²⁸⁾ Each thus has what it is *inwardly* outside it at the same time as the other. Or the *in-itself* of each, that which it is not for the other, is the other, is that which is for it. They are the opposite of themselves; they themselves this movement, this otherness; of *relating* themselves, precisely relation is the opposite of their indifference, which they have in the judgement.

28) *In the margin*: memory, positing of necessity in general α) concept, understanding of what is necessarily only opposed – ground is the I, thus it posits itself in the judgement β) judgement, positing of the indifference of the two, *not being-related, like determinate concepts* γ) syllogism, unity of both such that each is itself this unity of opposition and indifference.

Its being inwardly [is] distinguished from their being *outwardly*; [they are] thus *sundered* within themselves, sublating themselves; – that being *inwardly* is in and for itself, but precisely this (e.g. negativity, universal) is its other. Or the universal is equal to *itself*, thus it is negativity, for this is its interior; thus singularity, thus it is *universality*, opposite, inequality, its true being be *being* outwardly, i.e. only in relationship, not in and for

[199] itself. Their universality thereby has at the same time the meaning of *being*; they are equal to themselves in such a way that precisely this which they are *in themselves* falls apart into *two* indifferent ones. Universality as such is only one, but being is precisely reality, or subsisting as many. – They are thus *both universal*, and only one is the universal, they are *beings*, and likewise this *being* is unequal, the one being is the interior, the in-itself of the other, and they are negative. – Their unity is α) itself something other than the two extremes; for they are opposed; but β) their opposition is so *constituted* that *precisely in that wherein they* are opposed to one another, they are equal to one another; – (and again, that *their opposition is something other than* they, than their *self-equality*.) But precisely in their unity and in their opposition they are related to one another, and since both are something other than they, it is their middle, which relates them. Their *syllogism* is posited; insofar as they are opposed, they are one in a third, and insofar as they are equal, their opposition, that which diremps them, is likewise a third.

This third, however, is so constituted that it is everything that they are, it is universality, negativity, and, since there are several universals, their being. Universality is such a one as is immediately equal to itself, and opposed to itself; dirempted into itself and its opposite, likewise negativity; and simple being is immediately many. It is the *unity* of opposites, the universal moving itself within itself, which sunders itself into *beings* which it is, which thereby is pure negativity. – The understanding is *reason*, and its object is *the I itself*. –²⁹⁾ The main thing is that thinghood, insofar as it is *universality*, likewise immediately presents itself *to be*, and negativity or unity is posited. Thinghood represented as *being* passes over from the *judgement* into the syllogism;³⁰⁾

29) *In the margin*: (or that *singularity*, the *content* of language, becomes as purely negative *singularity*; – it becomes *object as such*)

30) *In the margin*: α *They are other than the I; what is their being?* They are *in themselves*, because *others* β) singular and universal; but this distinction is precisely such a one that wherein they are distinguished, they are equal to each other, i.e. they *are* not; i.e. not *other* than I

[200] the relation through the opposition is an other, a third; but each is *mediated* with the other through the third; the singular, according to its *relating itself to itself*, is *in itself not* there, the understanding is its *in-itself*;³¹⁾ likewise the universal is not there as negativity, this is its *in-itself*; and likewise the understanding; – for [it] is the *in-itself*. It is [α] the *interior* of each. – But β likewise the [understanding is the] *exterior* of each; for as negativity it is the exterior, the *existence* of the singular; and as universality it is the exterior, the existence of the universal. It is γ) likewise the *being* (of many), for it is that which contains them as indifferent. It is thus this pure movement of universality which is the in-itself and the existence of what is distinguished from it; it is *reason*, which is *the object* to itself. It is the *syllogism* in its infinity, which sunders itself into extremes which immediately, in that they *are*, have precisely the other as their *in-itself*.³²⁾ –

31) *In the margin*: The movement of the pure categories is becoming of [being] in the form of the thing into ground; or the ground has that which is, as movement, as its *interior*; conversely, the *ground* goes in the movement of the syllogism to *being*, insofar as this movement goes back to the *simple* non-negative equality of all moments; – but totality, actuality as this transparent play of all *sides*. *Opposition* (object) extremes – *real* ones, which are so constituted that precisely this makes up their filled *being*, to be opposed in that wherein they are equal – repelling of the like-named – and conversely; – thus *being* itself is this pure movement. *Syllogism*, unity of opposition as such, mediation is itself immediate unity.

32) *In the margin*: singularity, *immediate negative* unity of indifference and opposition, actuality – the I all actuality

Intelligence in this way no longer has an other object as

[201] its content, but it has grasped *itself*, and is to itself the object, – the *thing*, the universal is for it as it is *in itself*, sublated being, and this positively, or as I. – It is *actual*, possibility of acting; – the object is *in itself* what it is, and therefore it can be sublated. But [it] has not yet been active *for itself*; *for itself*, i.e. so that it would have intuited the change as *itself*; or the *doing* as self; – the alteration, the objective minus of the same, as itself.

This intelligence is *free*, but its freedom is, conversely, without the *content* at whose expense, through whose loss, it has precisely freed itself. Its movement is the opposite one, to fill itself, not through intussusception,³³⁾ but through generation [of a content], and indeed of such a one wherein it has the consciousness of its *doing*; i.e. of itself as the positing of the content, or as making itself into *content*. – In the theoretical [it knows] itself indeed also in the image, [in] recollection, but not as content, but as form; or the I itself is not the *ground*, the *universal*, upon which the determining, the distinctions, are laid.³⁴⁾

33) *In the margin: form and content; empty objectivity, universality*

34) *In the margin: survey of intelligence – thinghood of the understanding is light, reason is apprehending, hearing; intelligence, object, the form of abstract being.* Movement to the I, through positing of the I, because being is in itself universal, in spirit, thus for us in the concept – this for the I, or it is its positing of itself; at first itself only formal positing.* Alongside: what it is in itself for us; in understanding, concluding in itself – inwardness not yet separated from it*

b. Will³⁵⁾

35) *In the margin*: a) the drive has its own *content*, purpose; the opposed is it itself, and indeed for it

Cross-reference: Drive and satisfaction § 11 ff.; on the tool and labour § 196; on love and the family § 158 ff.

That which wills *wills*, i.e. it wills to posit *itself*, to make *itself* as itself into its object. It is *free*, but this freedom is the *empty*, formal, bad one. It is enclosed within itself, or it is the *sylllogism* within itself; α) it is the *universal, purpose*; β) [it] is the singular, self, activity, actuality³⁶⁾ γ) it is the middle of these two, *the drive*;³⁷⁾ it is the *two-sided*, which has the *content*, universal, which is purpose, and the active self of the same; the former the *ground*, the latter the *form*. α) what the *determinate content* of the drive is cannot yet be stated here, for it is not yet determined; it has none as yet; for here only the concept of will is posited. Which drives the I has, *this* emerges only from the *content* of its world; these are its drives.

36) *In the margin*: *sylllogism, magnet in each extreme*. The I judges, thus reflected into itself – out of the extreme

37) *In the margin*: first diremption of the syllogism, *indifference* of the extremes: in everything self is immediately – activity is its own

β) the determinate way in which that *sylllogism is posited in the I* is such that all *moments of it in the self as the universal* or the sphere are comprised; *now the whole* is, and their opposition only empty form for self-consciousness. This is precisely what makes the strength of its syllogism, of its will, that insofar as [it] presents a side outwardly, it is taken back into itself in this side, thereby does not expose a determinacy by which it can be grasped; they are *pattes de velour*, which are claws against the other, but as he turns against them, he grasps

[203] into the fluid velvet, which he cannot get hold of. – It is thus wholeness therein, and precisely for that reason unassailable.

γ)³⁸⁾ (this syllogism, rounded within itself, is at the same time turned outwards, or it is *consciousness* proper, which however is considered here as enclosed in the I.) – Namely, the will is *being-for-itself*, which has extirpated within itself all alien content that is; thereby, however, it is the *otherless*, the contentless,³⁹⁾ and feels this *lack*; but it is a lack which is likewise positive; (it is the *purpose*; the *form*, that it is only purpose, is the lacking *being*. *Being* as such has precisely become form.) The negative, excluding, is in the will itself in such a way that in it it is directed only upon itself; it is that which is *excluded* from itself; – the *purpose* stands over against the self; singularity, actuality over against the universal; the *feeling* of lack is the α) unity of both posited above in the drive, as feeling; as lack of the opposition. The syllogism is only the first, the universal is concluded together with singularity through the drive; the extremes have the form of indifferent *being* for one another. Positing of the *first* reality, which is imperfect.

38) *In the margin*: α) positing of the syllogism into its extremes, so that they are mediated through another relationship. singularity opposed to the purpose

39) *In the margin*: lack because the syllogism is the *immediately first*, hence indifference of the extremes.

b)⁴⁰⁾ The satisfaction of the drive is the second syllogism. α) the satisfaction is [that] of the drive, not of *desire*; the latter is animal, i.e. the object has the abstract form of *being* proper, of *externality*; and only thus is it for the self; the union is therefore the equally pure vanishing. But here being is only form, or what the I is, as a whole, is the drive; this

40) *In the margin*: positing in the element of *universality*, indifference, *being*; – for this the truth – not to be enclosed in the I – the I *inwardly* tensed –

[204] it separates off, and makes into its object, which is thus not the *empty satiety*, the *simple* feeling of self which is lost in *desire* and restored again in its satisfaction;⁴¹⁾ but what vanishes is the pure form of the indifference of the extremes of the drive, or the purpose, content, which is opposed to singularity, and this vanishing of this indifference is, as vanishing of the opposition, *being*, but *filled being*. α) it becomes *intuiting*, through the immediacy which comes to be through the sublation of the opposition (in general the I always passes over in this way into intuiting, and feeling everywhere.) β) the main thing is the content of the object; it separates itself from its drive, thereby it receives another form; it is the drive set at rest, become itself, filled with itself; the lack was the intuiting of the *empty I*;⁴²⁾ for this was object to itself; it held together the distinctions of the syllogism, was their indifference, their subsisting, – not being as such, it was the first immediate I, but as such. The drive separated from the I, it is released out of the self, or the mere filling held together by *being – work* of the I, it knows its *doing* therein, i.e. itself as the I which was previously *being* in the interior; – as doing (not as in recollection) but such that the *content* as such is through it; because the *distinction* as such was its own; the *distinction* makes up the content, and *what alone matters here* is that the I [has] posited the *distinction* out of itself, or knows it as its own, (name and thing are, the former, not the distinction as such of the I, the latter is *simple*.)

41) *In the margin*: external self-consciousness, *being*, and desire – abstract being-for-itself, *animal*, or not singular satisfaction – but universal – *desire* is moment, being-for-itself precisely the syllogism enclosed in the self.

42) *In the margin*: *itself* as distinguished within itself – (not an external object)

[205] c) Determination of the object; it is thus content, distinction, and indeed of the syllogism; singularity and universality, and a middle of the same. But α) *being*, immediate, its middle is dead universality, thinghood, *otherness*; and β) its extremes are *particularity*, *determinacy*, and individuality – Insofar as it is the other, its activity is that of the I; it has none of its own; this extreme falls outside it; as thinghood it is passivity, communication of this activity, has it as fluid, but as alien in it. – Its other extreme is the opposition – (particularity) of this its being and of activity; it is *passive*, it [is] for other, touches the same,⁴³⁾ is (acid) in general something to be worn away, communication *of the other*, this is *its* being, but at the same time active shape against it. Reversed relationship, on one side the activity is only something communicated, and in the communication, the purely receptive, on the other it is active against other.

43) *In the margin*: play* of this activity, transformation of its passivity into activity – *thinghood* is its centre, *simple* universality, force its other, only communicated outside it, for it is pure object, has it as something alien in it. – Tool; * *Alongside*: pride of peoples in their tool Man makes tools for this reason, because he is rational, and this is the first expression of his *will*, this will still the abstract will –

(The satisfied drive is the *sublated labour* of the I, this is this object, which labours in its stead. Labour is the this-worldly making-oneself into a *thing*, the sundering of the I that is drive is precisely this making-oneself into an object – (desire must always begin from the beginning, it does not get as far as separating labour from itself) but the drive is unity of the I as made into a thing.)

Mere activity is *pure mediation*, movement; – the mere satisfaction of desire is pure annihilation of the object.

*Labour*⁴⁴⁾ itself as such is not only activity (acid); but

44) *In the margin*: not cause, the same is the effect

[206] reflected into itself, producing; one-sided *form* of the *content*, singular moment; but here the drive produces itself, it produces *labour* itself – it satisfies itself – those fall into *external* consciousness. – It is the *content* also insofar as it is what is willed, and means of desire, the *determinate possibility* of the same; in the tool or in the cultivated field made fruitful I possess the *possibility*, the *content* as a *universal one*; therefore the tool, the means, more excellent than the purpose of desire, which is singular; – it embraces all those singularities.

But the tool does not yet have activity in itself; it is an *inert* thing; does not [return] into itself – I must still labour with it; I have placed *cunning* between myself and external thinghood, – to spare myself and to cover my determinacy with it and to let it wear itself out;⁴⁵⁾ but I thereby save only as to quantity – but still get calluses; making myself into a thing is still a necessary moment; the drive's own activity not yet in the thing. Activity of its own is also to be laid into the tool; to make it into something self-acting. This happens in such a way that α) it is so intertwined, in the line, thread, its two-sidedness is used in order, in this *opposition*, to make it go back into itself – in general passivity transforms itself into activity, into holding fast of the coming-together. β) in general that nature's own activity, elasticity of the watch-spring, water, wind, is applied in order to do, in their sensuous existence, something quite other than they wanted to do – *their* blind doing is made into a purposive one;⁴⁶⁾ – into the opposite

45) *In the margin*: the I remains the soul of this syllogism, in relation to it the activity

46) *In the margin*: the reality, *indifference* of the extremes of the syllogism, which are in tension against one another; that this indifference *in itself*

[207] of themselves⁴⁷⁾ – rational conduct of nature's *laws* in their external *existence*. To *nature itself* nothing happens – *singular purposes of natural being* [become] a universal. Bird flies off –

47) *In the margin*: singular hen, its rational existence is that it is fed and eaten – wind, mighty stream, mighty ocean, subdued, ploughed. No compliments to be made to it – wretched sentimentality, which holds to singulars.

Here the drive steps back entirely out of labour; it lets nature wear itself away, looks on calmly, and governs the whole with only slight effort – *cunning*.⁴⁸⁾ Honour of cunning against power, to take hold of blind power at one side so that it turns against itself – to comprehend it, to grasp it as *determinacy*, to be active against this – or to make it, as movement, go back precisely into itself, to sublate itself – man is thus the *fate* of the singular. Through *cunning* the will has become *feminine*.⁴⁹⁾ The drive that *goes outward* is, as *cunning*, theoretical *looking on*; the *unknowing* driving into *knowing*; two *powers, characters*.

48) *In the margin*: the *broad* side of the side of force is attacked by the point of cunning.

49) *In the margin*: cunning something other than slyness; – the most open action is the greatest *cunning*, – (we must take it in its truth) – namely, through his openness he brings the other to light, so that it *shows itself in and for itself*, precisely therein annihilates itself. – The great bearing, to compel the others to be as they are in and for themselves; into the light of consciousness; even if they are in the right, they do not know how to defend it through speech – muteness the bad, base cunning; master from the ground up, so that the other in its doing perverts itself

This looking on, how that which is sublates itself in itself, is different from the drive, the I that has stepped back out of it into itself, and the I knowing the nullity of this being, whereas [the drive] is that which is tensed in them.

[208] The will has become a doubled, sundered one, it is determined; it is *character*. The one character is this tension, the power of the opposition of that which is,⁵⁰⁾ which however [is] blind, has no consciousness about the nature of this being; it is the openly lying, straight outgoing, outward-driving and driven; the other, the *evil*, that which is within itself, the subterranean, that which *knows* about what lies in the light of day, and which looks on as this [gives] itself its downfall through itself, or is active against it in such a way that it rather substitutes the negative for its being, its self-preservation. – The former is directed as *something that is* against *something that is*; the latter rationally as being with which it is not in earnest, – as a cloak is offered to the bull, against which he charges and, hitting nothing, is hit. The will has sundered itself into the two extremes, in one of which, the universal, it is wholly, as in the other, the singular.⁵¹⁾

50) *In the margin*: the man has desire, drive; the female drive is rather this, to be only object of the drive; to *excite*, to awaken drive, and to let it satisfy itself in her.

51) *In the margin*: Its solitary existence is completed.

These⁵²⁾ extremes have to posit themselves into one, the knowing of the latter to pass over into *cognition*

52) *In the margin*: first unity of intelligence and will, i.e. there are two self-standing I's for one another, the first syllogism of the will has altered in such a way that the *being* of each extreme has received the meaning of I. – (*Being* is precisely the opposite of lack, but it is *lack* itself, or lack is felt, because the extremes *are*.) But these I's which make up the extremes of the syllogism are not yet whole totalities; are opposed to each other in such a way that the one is inwardly what the other is outwardly. Only the indifference is sublated, and the I, being-for-itself, has stepped into its place. – First knowing of a self-standing I by a self-standing I; – because they are I, knowing, this equality of both in opposition is *for them*. α) the one *within itself* equal to itself, turned against the other; the other locks its unrest, its activity, within itself, and behaves calmly, as if it had not happened.

[209] . This movement of the syllogism is posited through this, that each is in itself what the other is. The one, the universal, is singularity, the knowing self; likewise the singular is the universal, for it is relating to itself. But it has to come to be *for them*. Or this sameness a knowing of it.

α) The drive comes to the intuiting of itself – it has returned into itself in that satisfaction, it has likewise become *knowing* of what it is – The *simple* return into itself, knowing, is just as much in the sundering (syllogism) the middle. – Drive *outside itself* – in the other, simple *self*, and knows it as *self-standing* extreme; likewise knowing knows its essence in the other – tension in the drive, *self-standingness* of both. β) Sublating of both in themselves; precisely therein is each equal to the other, wherein it is opposed to it, or the *other*, that whereby the other is for it, is itself. Precisely in that each knows itself in the other, it has renounced itself. *Love*.

(Knowing⁵³) is precisely this double sense; each is equal to the other in that wherein it [has] opposed itself to it. Its distinguishing itself from the other is therefore its equating itself with it;) and it is *cognition* precisely in this, that it is itself this knowing, that for it, for itself, *its opposition turns round into equality*, or this, that it knows how it intuites itself in the other as itself; to cognise means precisely to know the objective in its objectivity as self, comprehended content, concept which is object.

53) *In the margin*: They are for one another in the form of knowing; each *is* self-standing; not yet cognition of what this being *other* amounts to; they are *in themselves* the same; – this in-itself passing over into being-for-itself is their movement.

This cognition is only *cognition* of the characters; or both had not yet determined themselves

[210] towards one another as self, only the one is knowing, within itself, and the other knowing as activity outwardly; – and the one is outwardly the universal, the *rounded* substance, – the other inwardly. They are therefore only opposed characters, not knowing themselves, but knowing themselves on one side in the other, and on one side only themselves within themselves; the movement of knowing is therefore in the interior itself, not in the objective; in their *first relationship* the sides of the tension already fall apart; they do indeed approach one another with uncertainty and shyness, but yet with trust, for each knows itself immediately in the other, and the movement is only the inversion whereby each experiences that the other likewise knows itself in its other. This reversal lies in this, that precisely each gives up its self-standingness; the stimulus is itself an *excitation*, i.e. it is not being satisfied within itself, but having its essence in the other – through knowing itself *in the other*, it *sublates* itself as being for itself, as different. This sublating of its own is its *being for other*, into which its *immediate* being turns round. Its own sublating comes to be for each in the other as being *for other*. The other is thus for me, i.e. it knows itself in me. It is only being for other, i.e. it is outside itself.

This cognition is *love*. It is the movement of the syllogism, such that each extreme, filled by the I, is thus immediately in the other, and only this being in the other separates itself from the I and becomes object to it. – It is the element of ethical life, not yet it itself, it is only the presentiment of it. Each only as *determinate will*, character or *natural* individual, its uncultivated natural self is recognised. – High⁵⁴⁾ chivalrous love falls within mystical

54) *In the margin*: doubled presentiment of the ideal in actuality, raised from immediate existence to it – ideal *universal self*; – descending from the world of heaven into the present – rung of the ladder of heaven – that the divine is in the present – God is love joy, because the natural is recognised.

[211] consciousness, which lives in a spiritual world as the true one, which now approaches its actuality, and in this has a presentiment of it as present; friendship is only in common work, and falls into the period of the becoming of the ethical essence – softening of Herculean virtue, Theseus and Pirithous, Orestes and Pylades.

Love⁵⁵⁾ likewise immediately becomes objective to itself; movement enters into it; it is satisfied, the unity of the extremes which was previously the drive; this⁵⁶⁾ satisfied love; distinguished from the characters is the *third*, the engendered. – The unity sunders itself into such as are *indifferent* towards the middle;⁵⁷⁾ they are different beings.

55) *In the margin*: God is love, in that he is the spiritual *essence*, great cognition, cognition of cognition.

56) *In the margin*: the North American savages kill their parents, we do the same.

57) *In the margin*: sundering of love into the extremes *that are*, whose middle steps over against them as an abstract *being*, in which each makes its love representable for the other – itself into *otherness*, into *thing*; – labour for the other, likewise abiding satisfaction of desire. The thing receives the meaning of love.

Satisfied love first becomes *objective* to itself in such a way that this third is something *other* than the extremes, or love is *otherness*, immediate *thinghood*, in which love does not immediately cognise itself, but it is for the sake of an other (as the tool does not have activity in itself;) – or both cognise their mutual love through mutual service, mediated by a third which is *the thing*; it is means, and means of love; and indeed, as the tool is abiding labour, so this third is also a universal; it is the lasting, abiding possibility of their existence. – They, as *indifferent* extremes, *are*; this being, since it is being of the extreme, is a vanishing one – as middle, as unity, it is universal. It is a family possession, as

[212] movement, *acquisition*.⁵⁸⁾ Here for the first time the *interest* of acquiring, and of *abiding possession*, and of the universal possibility of existence is present. Here for the first time desire itself as such properly enters, namely as rational, sanctified if one will; it is satisfied through common labour. The labour is done not for desire as singular, but as universal; he who works on this does not consume precisely this, but it goes into the common store, and from this all are maintained. – It is, like the tool, the universal *possibility* of enjoyment, and also the *universal* actuality of the same; it is an immediately spiritual possession.

58) *In the margin*: possession has the meaning that a thing is mine, or the I is universal, it is many I's, this present here.

– The family estate has the moment of activity in it, higher than the tool, in such a way that the two extremes are self-conscious activities – But this object does not yet have love in it,⁵⁹⁾ rather love is in the extremes; the cognition of the two characters is not yet itself a cognising cognition, love itself is not yet the object; but the I of love withdraws from it, repels itself from itself, and becomes object to itself. The unity of the two characters is only *love*, but it does not know itself as love; as this it knows itself in the child. In it they intuit love, their *self-conscious* unity, as self-conscious.

59) *In the margin*: love is α) as *equality abstract being* this posited, possession appears as something alien, but in its concept β) *actuality, self-being-for-itself*

It is the *immediate* object, or a singular; and the unity of love is now at the same time movement to sublimate this singularity. This movement has, on one side, the significance of subsuming the immediate existence – death of the parents; they are the vanishing *becoming*, the self-subsuming origin. –

[213] Towards the begotten individual this movement, as conscious, is the becoming of its *being-for-itself, education*;⁶⁰⁾ but according to its essence it is in general the sublation of love.

60) *In the margin*: it is immediate *spiritual substance*; it intuitively it as its essence, but as something alien, in which it does not yet have its self; – it *serves*, it is not individuality, that which is for itself; but its serving is doing; through doing it makes the substance its own; the movement adds the moment of the self – (A wheel that has been driven retains the movement in it for a while, although it is no longer driven) but I the concept, itself the movement; it moves through *another*, turns this into self-movement, and this conversely into otherness, the I's becoming-objective, and *being-for-itself*, and indeed not as the abstract one of desire, but as a whole that has issued from the whole, *from love*. Two wholes now stand opposed to one another – It is *character*, which it has become through *mediation*, through serving, against the substance, against the whole; – is therefore no longer *natural* character, but has left its natural existence; the determinateness of the will is sublated. *Actuality* of love;

The family is concluded in these moments α) of love, as natural, begetting of children β) self-conscious love, conscious feeling and disposition and the language of these γ) common labour, and acquisition, mutual service and care δ) education – No single one can be made the whole purpose.

Love has become object to itself, and this object a being-for-itself; no longer character, but it has the whole simple essence in itself; each is [the] spiritual recognising itself, *which* knows itself. The family as a *whole* has stepped over against another whole closed within itself, or there are complete, free individualities for one another; or there is here for the first time a being proper for spirit, in that it is a self-conscious being-for-itself.

[214] They⁶¹⁾ are at the same time related to one another, and in tension against one another. Their immediate existence is exclusive; the one has, in his goods, taken possession of a piece of the earth, – not of a singular thing, as in the tool, but of enduring universal existence. He has marked it through labour, or given the sign its content as something existing; a negative, exclusive significance. The other is therefore excluded from what *he is*; being is no longer a universal.

61) *In the margin:* α) State of nature – right in the state of nature, as absolute, right. – Right contains the *pure person, pure being-recognised*; – thus they are not in the state of nature, but sunk in existence – by the fact that he is man, in his *concept*, but in the state of nature he is not in his *concept*, but as a natural being, in his *existence*. – Question contradicts itself immediately – I consider man in his *concept*, i.e. not in the state of nature

This relation is what is usually called the *state of nature*; the free, indifferent being of individuals towards one another, and natural right is supposed to answer what rights and duties the individuals have towards one another according to this relation; what the necessity of their conduct is, – of them as self-consciousnesses that are, according to their concept, self-standing. But the only relation between them is precisely to sublate this relation, *exeundum e statu naturae*. In this relation they have no rights and no duties towards one another, but receive them only by leaving it. It is the *concept* of self-consciousnesses free towards one another that is posited; – but precisely only the concept; because it is concept, it has rather to realise itself, i.e. precisely to sublate itself, which is in the form of the concept as against its reality. – In fact this happens unconsciously in the very solution of the problem, and in it itself; – unconsciously, i.e. in that the concept does not fall into the object. The problem runs thus: *what is right and duty for the individual in the state of nature?* – the concept of this individual

[215] is laid down as the ground; from this concept it is to be developed. To this I bring in the determination of *right*; I show from it that he is capable of rights, a person; – but this showing falls within me; it is the movement of my thought; but the content is the free self; – but this movement does not leave this as it is – or it is the movement of this concept – Right is the *relation* of the person in its conduct towards the other – the universal element of its free being – or the determination, limitation of its empty freedom. This relation or limitation I do not have to hatch out for myself and bring in; rather the object is itself this producing of right in general, i.e. of the *recognising* relation – In recognising, the self ceases to be this singular; it is rightful in recognising, i.e. no longer in its immediate existence. What is recognised is recognised as *immediately* valid, through *its being*; – but precisely *this being is produced from the concept*; it is recognised being; man is necessarily recognised and is necessarily recognising. This necessity is his own, not that of our thinking in opposition to the content. As recognising he is himself the movement, and this movement sublates precisely his state of nature; he is recognising; the natural only *is*, – it is not *spiritual*.

The individuals, as they are towards one another, do not yet recognise one another; rather, their being is disturbed; the one has disturbed it through his *possession*; this possession is not yet property.⁶²⁾ – The right of *possession* is immediately directed against

62) *In the margin*: If I therefore consider him in this state of nature, as *immediately possessing*, and ask what is right here, this requires an absolute determination; that, however, is contingent being; just as contingent is their relation to one another, and no determination is to be gained – It seems the thing, because it is *mine*, I am to be recognised, is valid *immediately* and in the form of immediacy; this *recognising* is *right*.

[216] things, not against a third – Man has the *right* to take into possession what he can as a singular; he has the right – this lies in his concept – to be self; thereby he is the power over all things. But his taking possession also acquires the significance of excluding a third – what, in respect of this significance, is that which binds the other? What may I take into possession without wrong to the third? Precisely such questions cannot be answered. – The seizure of possession⁶³⁾ is the *sensuous taking of control*,⁶⁴⁾ and through recognition it has to become a rightful one. It is not rightful because it is. *In itself* the immediate man takes possession. – It is this contradiction, that the immediate makes up the content, the subject whose predicate right is supposed to be. – Because it is recognised by the others, it is my property; but what do the others recognise? That which I have, of which I am in possession. The content therefore proceeds from my possession. Can I now have what and as much as I will? I cannot take it from a third, for the sake of recognition, for what he has is indeed recognised. – But in taking it into possession immediately, i.e. as something that belongs to no one, I exclude him *in itself*, and so in the taking of possession the question of recognition comes forth again; I take what could become his possession. – But it *could* only become his possession, whereas it *actually* is mine; his possibility ranks behind my actuality; he has to recognise me, who *actually* am. But what then do I possess? – a) my body, b) the thing that I already have in my mouth, or in my hand –⁶⁵⁾

63) *In the margin*: outwards, or determination of *universal being*

64) *In the margin*: Contradiction of *having* and of *being-for-itself* – In having I am *immediately existing* – the former as *immediate being*, the latter as *being for itself*, immediate contradiction – *my* thing insofar as it is *mine*, not insofar as it is thing, distinction

65) *In the margin*: Objectivity; free separation of the *mine* (into possession, the free object of love;) *essence* thing, *form* mine.

[217] but not only this, rather what I already marked with desire, with a glance, already willed, already reached for, – children assert a right because they saw it, willed it *first*; and grown-ups, though they can do nothing more about it, are annoyed at being forestalled by another – But apart from what has been immediately seized, the existing thing is made known as my possession by a *sign*, e.g. the working of it itself – what is marked as *mine*, the other is not to violate – But the marking is just as contingent – an enclosed piece of ground – where only the enclosure, a furrow has been drawn around it⁶⁶⁾ – is marked as mine, and again is not – The sign has an unlimited extension⁶⁷⁾ – a stake driven into an island signifies⁶⁸⁾ that I will to have taken possession of it – likewise in working, I cannot separate form from a metal cup; but where, in a worked field, a tree, does the form [begin] and where does it cease – the inside of every clod of earth is left untouched⁶⁹⁾ – or at least moved, so the lower – and much not – and so on.

66) *In the margin*: Extension of the objective I, – through its *significance** * Below: weapon, mass

67) *In the margin*: *Form*; *hollowing out* of something formed – the *thing* as *thing* belongs to me, my will encloses it in its self

68) *In the margin*: First possession chance, *so it is* the side of contingency, precisely this is to be sublated –

69) *In the margin*: Mass of stone worked on some sides, where not, I can hollow it out – tree not planted by him – animal

The *sensuous* immediate, to which the universal is applied, does not correspond to it; – not encompassed by it – spuriously infinite division.

It is not universal *in itself*, always a contradiction in respect of this content – adequacy to the need of a family, of a singular, contradicts the pure *self*, equality, which is precisely what lies at the basis of right. – Nothing to be determined *in itself* about this; rather, belonging to singularity, it is the side that is left *to chance*; – there is no reason in it; rather, reason is first to be brought into it in such a way that nothing belongs to anyone by immediate taking

[218] but by *contract*, i.e. that precisely this immediate taking of possession does not take place, that there is no excluding *in itself*, but recognition. Excluding *in itself* is rather what is not rightful, what is not to take place, for the excluded is not present in it as actual consciousness, nor do I conduct myself in it towards such a consciousness.

Recognition is therefore the first thing that must come to be. Or the individuals are *love*, this *being-recognised* without opposition of the will, in which each would be the whole syllogism, in which they enter only as characters, not as free wills. Such a thing has to come to be. What they are in themselves has to come to be for them. – Their being for one another is the beginning of this. –

They⁷⁰⁾ are thus α) such an individual as has excluded from its possession, and the other, which has become for itself, the excluded one. They are thus themselves immediate for one another. The *syllogism* is that each knows its *essence* not in the other, like character, but its essence in itself, or he is *for himself*, but the one as excluded from being, the other as excluding. They are so opposed and for one another that the one rather finds itself as essence, as *being*, negated by the other; but if he is not for the first, he is on the other hand for himself.

70) *In the margin*: His substance, his subsistence is thing, which this whole possesses *for itself*, – in the significance of *this singular whole*; he only *has* as yet, not yet property

The movement therefore does not begin here with the positive, with knowing oneself in the other and thereby intuiting the self-negating of the other; but on the contrary with not knowing oneself in it, and rather seeing *its* being-for-itself of the other in the other. The syllogism therefore begins with the self-standingness of the being-for-itself of the extremes, or with its being for the other that they are self-standing. And indeed first from the one side, that of the excluded, for he is *for*

[219] *himself*, because he is not for the other, because he is excluded from being by the other; but the other – the family – is calmly, unconcernedly for itself. The excluded one violates the possession of the other; he puts into it his excluded being for himself, his *mine*; he spoils something in it, – annihilating, like that of desire, in order to give himself his feeling of self, but not his empty feeling of self, rather positing his self in another self, in the knowing of another; – the activity is directed not at the negative, the thing, but at the self-knowing of the other. A difference is thereby posited in the *knowing* of the other, who posited one only in the existence of the *other*. He is thereby likewise roused; he is divided *within himself*, and his excluding from being has turned over into an excluding of knowing; he comes to the consciousness that he did something quite other than he *meant*; his *meaning* was the pure relating of his being to itself, his unconcerned being for himself. – Thus roused, both stand against one another, – and indeed the second as offender, the first as the offended; for the latter did not *mean the former* in his taking possession – the former, however, offended; he meant him; what he annihilated was not the thing's own form, but the form of labour or the doing of the other. That the excluded one restored himself therefore brings about not the equality of both, but rather a new inequality; – equality, in that *both* have now posited themselves in the thing; but the higher inequality of the positing of the one in the being-for-itself of the other; – the first posited himself in the ownerless thing, the other in the possessed one. –

This inequality is to be sublated; but it must already be sublated in itself, and the doing of both is only that this comes to be for both. The sublating of the excluding has already happened; both are *outside themselves*. Both are a knowing, are object to themselves; each is conscious of himself in the other, as something sublated, it is true, but the positivity likewise stands on the side of each one; each *wills* to count for the other; it is each one's *purpose* to intuit *himself* in the other;⁷¹⁾ each is the syllogism

⁷¹⁾ In the margin: *each is outside himself*

[220] one extreme of which is outside him (sublated in the other), and each is within himself – but both I's, the one in me and the one sublated in the other, are the same. I am *content* to myself as purpose, i.e. I am positive to myself – *my* I is to be likewise positive; – or my positivity is as yet only enclosed in me, as yet only *my purpose*. The inequality therefore has α) the form that the one sublated only the being of the other, while the other sublated the being-for-itself of the first β) in each, that *each knows himself outside himself*; the one has lost his existence, namely *the offended one*; the other *has given himself his existence again*, but *this restoration happened at the expense of the other*, is conditioned by it; it is not an immediate, free acquisition. Their roles are therefore exchanged; the offender is satisfied for himself (not *in himself*, for his being-in-itself is conditioned); the second is now the provoked one, the tense one; an alien being for itself has posited itself in his own; he aims no longer at restoring his existence, but his knowing of himself, i.e. at being *recognised*. The⁷²⁾ *actual being-for-itself is to be posited as such*, not as form of the thing, for this had nothing abiding, nor through language; for *knowing* is actual; – it is will, *being-for-itself* as such; its actuality has the significance of being recognised by the other, of counting as absolute for him. – But for it to count as absolute, it must present itself [as] absolute, as will, i.e. as something for which its existence, which it had as possession, no longer counts, but rather *this its known being for itself*; whose being has the pure significance of knowing of itself, and so comes to existence. Such presenting, however, is the sublating, accomplished through itself, of the existence⁷³⁾ that belongs to it, through itself, direction of the

72) *In the margin*: Each *knows* himself for himself – for the one has sublated the alien *being for itself*; but the other intuits his being for himself sublated; – he intuits it as sublated – he is *knowing* –

73) *In the margin*: α) possession; β) vanishing of this being for itself of the form, of possession γ) vanishing of his own immediate existence

[221] will upon itself, upon the extreme of its singularity; (character is directed only upon itself as universal) – To it as consciousness this appears as aiming at the *death* of another, but it aims at its own, suicide, – in exposing itself to *danger*.

It⁷⁴⁾ therefore intuitively its sublated external existence; this existence is its very own; it transforms the being-sublated of that alien one into that of its very own being-for-itself; because it is reason. – The restoring is the taking up of its existence into the abstraction of knowing. – *Cunning* is knowing, *being-within-itself*, knowing of itself, – as will is only drive; in drive the extremes have the form of indifference, *of being*; it is not yet a *knowing*; the knowing will is to be fulfilled α) as of love, with the knowing of the immediate unity of the two extremes, of them as selfless; β) with recognition, with them as free self; the former is the fulfilment of the universal extreme, – the latter of the singular; i.e. the making of it into the whole syllogism; this syllogism has the extremes in the form of being-for-itself within it. That cognising becomes recognising. – They are knowing themselves as *being-for-itself*, – thus they are separated – The movement is the struggle of life and death. From this each emerges [in such a way] that it has seen the other as pure self – and it is a *knowing of the will*; and that the will of each is knowing, i.e. reflected within itself perfectly into its pure unity. Driveless will; determinateness enveloped within itself – not to know being as something alien.

74) *In the margin*: Force, lordship and serving

This knowing will is now *universal*. It is *being-recognised*;

[222] opposed to itself in the form of universality,⁷⁵⁾ it is being, actuality in general, – and the singular, the subject, is the *person*. The will of the singular is the universal will, and the universal is [the] singular – ethical life in general, but immediately right.⁷⁶⁾

75) *In the margin*: How* the stages of intelligence and of will correspond. a) language, name b understanding judgement and reason α) love has existence β) judgement, whole – movement of the syllogism *movement in the element of language* * *Above*: imagination recollection sign, free will in general tool cunning.

76) *In the margin*: Limitation of freedom, i.e. of the arbitrary will of freedom in the singular, contingent.

II. Actual spirit⁷⁷⁾

77) *In the margin*: a) *intelligence*, particular representation, image in general – *existing* alien empty mine – *being-recognised* is *existence filled with the will*;* b. *will* love the *immediate* being-recognised; right, this universal abstract being-recognised. * *Alongside*: a complete mine is filled with the whole will.

Cross-reference: Being-recognised: in the *Groundlines* § 71 and § 192; on lordship and bondage § 57 Remark; on property § 41 ff., on taking possession § 54 ff.

Spirit is actual neither as intelligence nor as will – but *as will that is intelligence*, i.e. in intelligence they are the unity of two universalities; *and in the universal will these are complete selves*; – they are a knowing of their *being*, and their being is this spiritual, the

[223] universal will. In this element the preceding has now to present itself; in it, just as in the will abstract intelligence has sublated [itself] – or its objects fulfilled themselves through themselves – so here abstract will has to sublate itself, or to produce itself as sublated in the element of universal being-recognised, this spiritual actuality. Possession is thereby transformed into right, just as labour previously into universal labour; what was family goods, in which the spouses knew themselves,⁷⁸⁾ becomes universal work and enjoyment of all; – and the difference of individuals becomes a knowing of good and evil;⁷⁹⁾ – *personal* right and wrong.

78) *In the margin:* (*Permitted* and not permitted) comes only in the other.

79) *In the margin:* (Good and evil)

[a. Being-recognised]

a. [Immediate being-recognised]

*Being-recognised*⁸⁰⁾ is *immediate* actuality, and in its element the person, at first as *being-for-itself* in general; it is enjoying and labouring. – Only here *does desire have the right to appear*; for it is *actual*, i.e. it *itself has universal, spiritual being*. Labour of all and for all, and enjoyment – enjoyment of all; each serves the other, and renders help – or the individual here first has existence as a *singular*. Before, it is only abstract, or untrue. – Spirit can indeed set itself in an abstraction, analyse itself, and give existence to one – which the animal cannot – where the self that lays itself into a system

80) *In the margin:* abstract *being* and *movement*

[224] becomes disease; but it has only momentary, vanishing existence. Here desire *is*. To the I as *abstract being-for-itself* its *inorganic nature stands opposed, likewise as existing*; it relates negatively to it, and [as] unity of both sublates it; but in such a way that it first forms it, intuits it as its self, its own form, and thus likewise consumes itself.⁸¹⁾ *Existence*, the range of natural needs, is in the element of being in general a *multitude* of needs; the things that serve their satisfaction *are worked up*; *their universal inner possibility* posited as outer, as *form*. But this working up is itself something manifold; it is the *making itself into a thing* on the part of *consciousness*. But in the element of universality it is such that it becomes an abstract labouring. – The needs are many. To take this multiplicity up into the I, to work it, is the *abstraction* of the *universal* images; but a self-moving forming. The I that *is for itself is abstract*; but it is labouring; its labouring is just as abstract. – Need in general is *analysed* into its many sides; the *abstract* in its movement is being-for-itself, doing, labouring. – Because *labour is done only for need as abstract being-for-itself, labour too is done only abstractly*; this is the concept, the truth of desire, which exists here.⁸²⁾ Each singular,

81) *In the margin*: α) immediate I of labour α) immediate movement of doing, which is not taken up into *knowing*; its labour has the character of abstraction. Does not labour as a *singular*, more concrete – totality of needs

82) *In the margin*: As his concept is, so is his labouring; satisfaction of all the needs of the singular is not how he becomes object to himself in his existence, which is produced by him. *Universal* labour *division* of labour, – saving – 10 can make as many pins as 100;

[225] because he is here a singular, thus labours for one need; the content of his labour goes beyond *his* need; he labours for the needs of many, – and so does each. Each therefore satisfies the needs of many, and the satisfaction of his many particular needs is the labour of many others. – Since *his labour* is this abstract labour, he relates as abstract I, or after the manner of thinghood; – not as comprehensive, rich in content, circumspect *spirit which commands a large range*, and is master over it – it has no *concrete* labour; rather its force consists in analysing, in abstraction, – in the dissection of the concrete into many abstract sides. – His labouring itself becomes wholly *mechanical*, or belongs to a manifold determinateness; but the more abstract it becomes, the more he is only abstract activity, and he is thereby in a position to withdraw himself from labour and to substitute for his activity that of external nature – he needs mere movement, and this he finds in external nature; or pure movement is precisely the relation of the abstract forms of space and time; – abstract external activity. – *Machine*.

Between these many kinds of abstract worked products there must now *take place a movement* whereby they become *concrete* need again, i.e. the need of a singular, this again [in the] subject that contains many such within itself. The judgement that analysed them⁸³⁾ set them over against itself as *determinate* abstractions;⁸⁴⁾ – their universality, to which it ascends, is their *equality*, or *value*. In this they are the same; this value itself as thing is *money*. – The return to concretion, to possession, is *exchange*. –

83) *In the margin: Determinateness in itself, going back to singularity*

84) *In the margin: He has himself made it into a being for the need of others, whereas in family possession he, on the contrary, kept it to himself. Ground is that his simple existence is universal; his possession has the significance of being for others.*

[226] In exchange the *abstract* thing presents⁸⁵⁾ what it is, namely to be this change, to go back in thinghood into the I, and indeed in such a way that *its thinghood consisted in being the possession of another*. Each himself gives his possession, sublates his existence, and in such a way that he is recognised in this, that the other receives it with the *consent of the first*; they are recognised; each receives from the other the possession of the other, so that he obtains only insofar as the other himself [is] this negative of himself – or as property through *mediation*. – Each is that which negates his being, his belongings, and this is *mediated* through the negating of the other; only because the other parts with his thing do I do so – and this *equality in the thing*, as its inner, is its *value*, which has entirely my concurrence and the meaning⁸⁶⁾ of the other, – the *positive mine*, and likewise the *his*; *the unity of my will and his*; and my [will] counts as actual, existing; *being-recognised* is existence; thereby my will counts, I possess; possession is transformed into *property*. In possession, being has the unspiritual significance of *my* having as this singular; here, however, *being-recognised* – the *being* of possession, that the *thing* is and I am, and the former as comprised *in the self* – Here

85) *In the margin*: b) in his abstract *labour* he intuits the universality of himself, of his form, or that it is *for another*; – he therefore wills to posit this – to communicate it to others. Or these others are themselves to be *intuited in it*. Second movement, which contains the moments of the first developed – I doing towards *another I*, and indeed as recognised by it; – as one that relates to my possession but wills to have it only *with my will*, just as I relate to his only with his will – the *equality* of both as *recognised* – *value*, significance of the thing

86) *In the margin*: The thing has the significance of *relation to others*, being for another; existence is *being-recognised*, i.e. the *particular will* of each singular is in it, and the equality of this will – unity of what is absolutely different – and in such a way that for each the will of the other is

[227] being [is] universal self, and having is mediating through the other, or is universal – The universal is *value*; the movement as sensuous is exchange – the same universality is mediation as knowing movement – *property*, thus an immediate *having which is mediated through being-recognised* – or its existence is,⁸⁷⁾ is the spiritual essence. – Here the contingency of *seizing possession is sublated*; I have everything through labour and through exchange, in being-recognised. (I am likewise a *universal*, not this *singular* person, but at the same time *family*; – or property is α) the movement of the thing in exchange. *Inheritance*, later, is the change of individuals; the family is what abides; this does not yet occur here)⁸⁸⁾ *Source*, origin of property is here that of labour, of my *doing* itself, immediate self, – and being-recognised; *ground*; I am the *cause*; likewise because I have *willed*, *purpose* in exchange – cause, ground the universal – I have *willed* in exchange, – posited my thing as value, i.e. *inward* movement, inward doing – like labour, that which is sunk into being – the same externalization. α) I make myself *immediately* into a thing, form that is *being*, in labour (β) of this my existence I likewise externalize myself, make it into *something alien to me*, and *preserve* myself in it; precisely in this I intuit my *being-recognised*; *being* as knowing, – there my *immediate I*; here my *being-for-me*, my person.

87) In the margin: α) forming (β) recollection, value

88) In the margin: I am the contingency of the possession of my skill, inclination, talent – better contingency, brought closer. I myself absolutely necessary

Here, then, I intuit my *being-recognised* as existence, and my will is this counting.

b. Contract

Cross-reference: § 72–§ 81.

This *being-recognised* in exchange, which has become object, or *my* will is *existence*, as is that of the other. The *immediacy* of being-recognised has come apart. My *will* is represented as *valid* not only for me but for the other, and it is as much as existence itself. – Value is *my opinion* of the thing; this my opinion and will has been valid for the other (mediated through his opinion and will); I have *performed* something, I have *externalized* myself of it; the *negative* is *positive*; this externalization is an *acquiring*.⁸⁹⁾ My opinion – of the value *was valid* for the other, and my willing of his *thing*. They intuit one another as such whose opinion and will has actuality. It is a consciousness, a distinguishing of the concept of being-recognised: *will of the singular is common will*, proposition or judgement – and his will is his actuality⁹⁰⁾ as externalization of himself, which is my will. This *knowing* is expressed in the *contract*. – It is the same as exchange – but ideal exchange⁹¹⁾ – α) I give up nothing, I externalize nothing, perform nothing – but my *word, speech*, that I will externalize myself, – β) the other likewise – this my externalizing is likewise *his* will; he is content that I leave this to him, γ) it is also his externalizing; it is common

89) *In the margin*: about what can I *contract in general* – about my person, about my singular *undetermined serving* – (custom enters here – singularity in itself undeterminable) – not about the whole of my person – lifelong, unalterable – and not [about] family and children, of which later –

90) *In the margin*: *Sense of property* is that my will and opinions have *existence*

91) *In the margin*: Offer, *bid*,

[229] will; my externalization is mediated through his; I will to externalize myself only because *he* too for his part wills to externalize himself; and because his negation becomes my position. It is an *exchange* of declaring, no longer of things – but it counts for as much as the thing itself. For both, the will of the other counts as such. – Will has gone back into *its concept*.

Here, however, this separation [enters], which can just as much turn over into the opposite; the going into itself. The will as such has validity, – it is *freed* from actuality; precisely in this, is the opposite – singular and common will separate; – the former as negative of the *universal*, *crime* only insofar as I am recognised, my will counts as universal, as will in itself; – not offence, violation before recognition. Or the common will has in contract only positive significance for mine, as mine for it; they agree. – But they *can* also not agree; I can break the contract unilaterally; for my singular will *counts* as such; not only insofar as it is common, but the common will itself indeed is only insofar as my singular will counts; – both are equally essential, my singular will as much [as] the equality; my singular will is cause – and the singular and the universal appear here as stepping apart in such a way that my will *counts* insofar as it is only will, insofar as I have not yet performed. But performance is existence, or is the existing universal will. – It therefore steps apart in representation into [the will] as universally valid will, and the will in existence; the former counts for the latter; and yet it is not the same.

Positing the distinctness actually, I thus *break the contract*; the other recognised *my non-existing will*; – he was content with it; the not-existing, not-having-performed *was to be* sublated, it is true, an *ought*, but he recognised the ought as ought; – precisely in the will counting as such lies the indifference towards existence and time. –⁹²⁾

92) *In the margin*: Contradiction of the *ought*, of *represented existence*

[230] This is one sense; but the reverse is the essentiality of existence as such, and indeed against the essentiality of the will as such, against the singular will; *existence*, which has the significance of the common will, against the *singularity* of the will; and it is rather this that is to be upheld against the latter.⁹³⁾ This upholding is the sublating of that existence, *coercion*; the other must perform; his will, although it is will, is not respected, because it is opposed to itself as common will. – My singular will is essential, but at the same time only a moment; – and in my having posited it as common, I have posited [myself] as common [will]; my *word must count*; not for moral reasons, that I *ought* to remain inwardly equal to myself, not change my disposition, conviction and so on; rather I can change this; but my will *is* there only as recognised; I contradict not only myself but the fact that my will is recognised; one cannot rely on my word, i.e. my will is merely *mine*, mere opinion. The person, pure being-for-itself, is therefore respected not as singular will separating itself from the common will, but only as common will; – I am coerced to be a person.

93) *In the margin*: because he himself posited himself as *such* a one to whom *his actual existence is indifferent*; holds him to it –

The⁹⁴⁾ contract contains α) the *determinate, particular* will as a universal one β) its content, the thing which is the middle of the relation, is therefore a particular thing, a particular existence, from which I can abstract; – my contingent will concerns something contingent; as in exchange, the *existing*, which belongs to the middle, is a particular, and I step forward as particular will against the other

94) *In the margin*: But this holding-to is one-sided – contradiction of property; I am *person*, *existence* is indifferent to me – and I lay my *personality into my existence*

[231] particular will, not as *person* against person; I neither will at this, nor is this the universal will as such, that which steps forward; rather it is hidden under the determinate thing; the universal will as common, and it as my pure will or person, is represented in the particular. – And my pure will as such is in speech, my declaration; – in it, it has taken itself back from the immediate existence of exchange, but it is only significance of the particular performance; and the common will only dissolution not of the person as such but of the person as particular existence; coercion is directed not at the person but only at its determinateness, its existence.

But⁹⁵⁾ according to the concept, existence is dissolved in the person and in the universal will; or it *is* only as pure person and as purely universal will, as pure negativity; this is the force of contract; just as in performing I laid my will into an existence, i.e. particularity, but could do this only as person, i.e. because the will counts as being in general, so I was also coerced as person, for in this negation of my existence my *being in general* was also negated, for the two are inseparable; – I am reflected into myself. – Precisely in *coercion* this comes to presence; – not this particularity is coerced, but *I*. The concept is therefore *posited*, *set up*, that the universal will absorbs the *singular* I into itself, – as *existing* against it, – the whole singular, and that I am for myself, recognised, *as person*; not only *my belongings* and property is posited here, but my *person*, or this insofar as my *whole* lies in my existence, honour and life.

95) *In the margin*: I hold not to what the other *thinks* I should perform, but to what *is*; this counts

c. Crime and punishment⁹⁶⁾

96) *In the margin*: Contract concerns *property, existence*, not person; for it is this *mediation* which intuitively itself in the *thing*, in *existence* (as in the family *goods*, not child *tool* in the will, not yet)

Cross-reference: Coercion and crime § 90 ff., on punishment § 99 ff., on revenge § 102.

(*About my honour* and life no contract takes place) – the contract is sublated according to its concept, not [as] a singular one.⁹⁷⁾ – The contract posited my will in a separable particularity; – I have given this away, as in exchange, and what has come to be is the existence of myself as pure person, and so I now step forward as something recognised according to my pure will – existence has in contract stepped back into a mere consequence; but in contract as such the matter is settled. – Here the necessary movement seems to be sublated;⁹⁸⁾ the violation of my honour and life [appears] as something contingent. – But this violation is necessary – *I* have been coerced; – not only according to my existence, but precisely according to my *I*, as reflected into myself in my existence. – The recognition of my person in contract lets precisely *me* count as existing; my word already for the performance; i.e. *I*, my mere will, is not separated from my existence, both equal – it is precisely this that coercion and force contradict, for in my existence it violates *me*.

97) *In the margin*: In *contract* my *word* has the *significance* of the thing; but [as] contract about the person it would be my *word*, my *immediate* pure *being* itself that I staked; there is nothing binding here – i.e. the determinate existence is personal service

98) *In the margin*: I have kept the contract, *man of my word*, i.e. who counts as ideal pure person, as *in-itself*, as *being* – inviolability of the pure person – of life, or of my will as free will, pure concurrence, which has not yet bound itself to an existence.

[233] I am offended, as in the movement of recognition; the other has violated my possession, – not, as in that movement, immediately only my form, but my recognised will as such, which he recognised as being in existence, inseparably bound up with it. – I hold myself to be violated, and indeed as person, according to the concept – going to and fro between existence as something external and as something into which my I is laid, or which is inner. – The contradiction emerges in me as inequality of my first and second word, but it is the same as I as universal and as particular; – or in concluding a *determinate* business with me, the other took my pure will as that which is *unequal* to itself, as the universal that has a *determinate* existence.

– Against coercion I therefore restore my being-for-me; not, as in the movement of recognition, my I violated as such, but my violated recognised I; – I will show him that he is after all not to be able to coerce me, i.e. that my I bound to the determinate performance, and the coercion that I suffered in it, was a violation of my pure I; – I find *my honour* injured; only my will was sublated on the side of this determinate existence, but thereby my thought, pure will. I step forward as person against the person of another; I sublate his *being* as universal, the security of his person; – I show him that in this *existence*, determinateness, he violates me as *universal*, and thus conducted himself unequally, since it was only a matter of the determinate thing; I therefore stand back against him; in *his* performance towards me his will was not violated, but he had his will and only externalized himself of a determinate existence. – His coercion, however, is an externalization of my will. I sublate this inequality, him as will, as he me – I take revenge on him, not as in the state of nature merely as on *self-conscious activity*, for itself, but as on a will, i.e. here one that at the same time

[234] [is] intelligence, thinks itself, knows itself as universal –⁹⁹⁾ a universal knowing that is also my knowing, or as on one that is recognised. In coercion he restored the common will to existing, and sublated my singular will, which I only recognise; *my* will as such is *for me* equal to the universal; and since it is violated, its existence taken from it, I restore it – so that I [sublate] the being of the other, who posited his will, which is opposed to me who did not perform, as the universal will. I thereby commit crime. Violence, robbery, theft, insult and so on. – Verbal insult sublates him as¹⁰⁰⁾ a universal; I do not say he has done me this or that bad thing, but *he is* this; the term of abuse posits him in general as something sublated – judgement posits the tree as *green*; it *is green*, i.e. it [is] not subject but universal; so the term of abuse makes his whole into something null in itself. – Or real injury sublates him as will; – be it that I steal from him, rob him; – there I attack his unconscious existence, and do not respect what is his, his will in general, but act against it; – here I act openly against his existing, self-expressing will; the former baser, the latter more injurious – open murder finally,¹⁰¹⁾ (not through treachery) [is] on the whole least base, but the greatest violation. – For baseness is conduct towards another as non-existent, or that which keeps [the] form of inwardness, so that my deed does not come to light,

99) *In the margin*: something is violated that was posited *as common will by myself*.

100) *In the margin*: culpa, dolus

101) *In the margin*: Theft [violates] not the *knowing* will, – secretly, but the violation greater, for it is in the knowing will in its completeness – in robbery I attack his intelligence only as *existence*; – not his pure *being* – life; – absolute power over a *life*, master, this infinite

[235] cannot be grasped according to what it *is* in truth, but remains cunningly reflected into itself. – The inner source of crime is the coercion of right; – need and so on – are external causes belonging to animal need; but crime as such is directed against the person as such and *its knowing* of it; for the criminal is intelligence; his inner justification is this: coercion, the restoring of his singular will to *power*, to counting, to being-recognised; he wills to *be something* (like Herostratus), not exactly famous, but that he has carried out *his* will in defiance of the universal will. – The accomplished crime is the will that knows itself as singular, being for itself, come to *existence*; [in defiance of] the power of the other will that knows itself as *universal*. But this crime is the enlivening, the activating – the rousing to activity – of the universal will. The universal will is active; the recognised activity is *universal*, not singular, i.e. it is a sublation of the singular. *Punishment* is this turning over; it is retribution as of the universal will; its *essence* rests not on a contract, nor on the deterring of others, nor on the improvement of the criminal, – but its *essence* concept is this transition, inversion; of the violated universal being-recognised; it is *revenge*, but as justice, i.e. to restore the being-recognised that is *in itself* and (externally) violated. To the criminal happens the same as he has done, insofar as he had constituted himself as power against one; another, the universal as *its* power – and indeed the universal as such – not the singular, as in revenge; revenge can be just, but here it is justice. – α) the violated one is recognised *in himself*; everything takes place in the element of being-recognised, of right; – *dolus*: crime has this significance, that the violator previously recognised the violated (the thief most of all), that the criminal knew what he did – not *determinately* the range and so on [, but] determinateness in general, that it is forbidden – or precisely in this, that he violated a person, one that is

[236] recognised in itself, that he lives in the element of being-recognised, that what exists had this significance.¹⁰²⁾ β) thereby it comes about that the violated one did not suffer in his *honour*; the honour of the one robbed, murdered, is not injured – for he is recognised *in himself*; or his being-recognised *is* – not as in the state of nature, where honour was attacked through the violation of possession, i.e. a being-recognised that is still only in thought – verbal insult violates honour, but not absolutely; the one insulted is not without rights – in itself the man *without honour* is also *without rights*.¹⁰³⁾

102) *In the margin*: He who believes himself violated attacks the other in his *life*, as the *being* that is immediately one with his being-for-itself – *quantitative* relation

103) *In the margin*: In death the absolute power, the *lord* of the *singular* – or the common will has become pure *being*.

Through this movement being-recognised has presented itself as realised α) as containing within itself determinate existence and the particular will; as preserving *itself* in giving itself up, in its expression, as retaining its will β) this will as such, as the singular, as the existing one [in] contract; going back into singularity, crime, as though this will as such were it; crime, loss of the singularity of *being* through the universal will; the reconciled universal will, which *counts* absolutely as such; *deterrence* from crime. Intuiting of the law as the absolute power – not that of the singular.

b. The law possessed of power¹⁰⁴⁾

104) *In the margin*: The law is so different from *being-recognised* that it is the self

Cross-reference: The law and its application: § 211 ff.; on marriage § 161 ff.; on wealth, factory labour and poverty § 198 and § 241–§ 245; on the administration of justice § 219 ff.

It is the *substance* of the *person*, and has these moments in it, that it is α) the *mediation* of the person according to its *immediate existence* with

[237] itself; the substance of its existence – which rests entirely on community with the others,¹⁰⁵⁾ hence the absolute necessity of this community; the whole is at the same time only this universal subsistence;¹⁰⁶⁾ the singular subsistence is sublated in it, or provision is made only for all, not for the singular as such; he is rather sacrificed to the universal, β) the singular counts as possessing property; the universal is the *substance* of contract, or precisely this existence, this counting of the common will. He is *person*, security of the person, – justice, the power that contains him as pure being,¹⁰⁷⁾ the power of his life as over his life, as over the preservation of his subsisting existence. γ) His existence in it is now the *becoming*, in himself, into the universal, culture. Or this force of the singular includes within itself α) according to his existence β and according to his knowing – intelligent being-recognised – α) substance β) that he knows this universal as such and knows himself in it. – These moments occur in every singular act, α) that each subsists in the universal substance, that he knows it – that his particular being is immediately universal – It *is*, and is object, as essence, and not as something alien, but as that in which each knows himself.

105) *In the margin*: in its *otherness itself*; common will – and indeed *itself*, as *pure* abstraction (death) or pure *knowing*.

106) *In the margin*: Difference, where the common will must first come about through consent and determinate declaration, – (marriage, and contract) and where it is immediately *counting* (inheritance) *being*. Law α) mere preserving, existence of the common will that has come about; β) where there is no *will*, taking up of the concept [as] *in-itself* – degrees of kinship, *content* of the law; γ) the law is the existing *in-itself*; takes the place of the living, guardianship; upholds the right of the singular as such.

107) *In the margin*: Law of the will as such, and of existence

Movement of this intelligent commonwealth is its fulfilment, as power possessed of force –

[238] the law possessed of it has the two sides, the singular subsisting in it, and the *becoming* of the singular; but that subsisting is in general the movement in itself.

The¹⁰⁸⁾ force of the law is *in itself*, or the substance; it is *this for the* singular, object which is his essence, his in-itself, and he himself is its life; he becomes α) *in himself* the universal, the *dead*, dull consciousness β) cultivated consciousness, which preserves itself in its pure abstraction.

108) *In the margin: Content* and movement of the law. The law is thus immediate, its content likewise immediate; it is not yet custom, not living; but abstract; as law it is the existing of the *common will* of different persons about a singular matter; they [enter] on behalf of the law where they have come to a common will about a *determinate* relation, and declare it; freedom to keep the contract or not is thereby sublated – insofar as the singular is pure person, life, will as such, he is immediately object of the law. – What is undetermined by law is permitted, i.e. what is undeterminable by it as abstraction; – only *forbidding* can be done by the law as such, not *commanding*, because the *singular will* is here the beginner; a common will must first come about through itself – the singular is the actual as against its abstraction

a) The law [as] the subsisting of his *immediate existence*. α) He is immediately in it as a *natural* whole, he is as family; he counts as this natural whole, not as person; this he has yet to become – He is α) immediate being-recognised, he is something bound by love; this bond is a totality of many relations; natural procreation, common living together, care, acquisition, education – the bond is this whole; the singular is absorbed in this whole – As this whole it is for the law, for the universal – thus it is *marriage*; not this or that purpose, but as the universal; this total movement within itself, being-recognised love, intuiting in care, doing, labour, and return in the child, in procreation, but precisely therein dissolution, intervention in the

[239] whole. This whole, closed within itself, is not a bond through a contract; about their property they do indeed both contract; but not about their body – Kant’s barbaric notion of wanting to cede to one another the sexual organs for use, and so the whole body too, as it were as an extra; – thus they could be forced together by soldiers. – a) that relatives who are too close do not marry is the positive law about marriage; – opposed to the concept of love. Independent, naturally free persons, not posited in immediate being-recognised, are to find one another; relatives are the same blood, the same being-recognised. – Even in this degree of kinship indeterminacy already begins, but still more with regard to the other aspects, b) consent of both persons. For the law marriage is, in so far as both are persons, *will*; the consent of both parties, – whether they want to marry, whether they *will* this whole that is called *marriage*, thus in general, – not in detail, as in the contract; – and since each at the same time counts not as a singular but as a member of the family, whether the family of both *consents*. – Marriage [is] precisely this *mixing of personality, and impersonality of the natural* – this the divine – as a natural that is spiritual in this naturalness, does not merely determine the will; hence [it is] a *religious act*; but for the sake of the will, a civil one, which belongs before the law; – both come together, as also in the consent the persons and the families. – The law is as the pure will, freedom from *singularity*; both of the persons, of their natural character,¹⁰⁹⁾ – and of the particular moments into which marriage analyses itself. – This free vitality and the pure law are in interplay with one another; the pure willing is the result of the living movement, and this has that abstraction, pure thinking, for its being – and solely on the side of the pure willing – of the

¹⁰⁹⁾ In the margin: Law is no compulsion to marriage

[240] declaring that one wills, does the law enter; it is that which has not at all encompassed the several sides of individuality, is not yet living spirit at all – hence this empirical counterplay. According to *the empty law*, marriage is indissoluble because they have declared their *will*,¹¹⁰⁾ – but this [is] completely one-sided – the *law*, fulfilled, must take account of the *vitality that is free* of it; return from the common unity – of the persons into themselves (adultery, malicious desertion, incompatibilité d’humeur) – determinations which concern the content. – Whether the purpose of marriage is positively fulfilled is no concern of the law; a marriage has been founded, – *possibility* of marriage, not too great a difference in age, – (possibility of supporting oneself) – laws remain indeterminate with regard to this content. *Separation* of marriage, for this the positive will of one who wants to be divorced is required.

110) *In the margin*: abstract law comes into conflict with *vitality*, [it is] the empty pure will – it must recognise its abstraction; and give way to the fulfilled will; – the law is still this *unliving* universality.

Before the law, or *in itself*, marriage is concluded neither by a promise of marriage, nor by intercourse, but by the *declared* will, the pronouncing; this *counts*; – likewise *in itself* not broken by adultery, by malicious desertion, incompatibility, bad housekeeping, but whether both *regard* this as such and *will* it – But the question is whether, as they regard it, [it] is also so *in itself*; – and conversely, whether what is in itself the parties also want to *regard* so; their first will of marriage has changed, but just as well their second will can also change. The rigid law could persist in that first will, and declare the marriage indissoluble, or else consider the *natural*, the *in-itself*, and dissolve it. – The natural, impossibility of marriage on account of too unequal age, – dissolution on account of adultery, positive violation, which is

[241] in itself with will (not an empty in-itself, infertility)ⁱⁱⁱ⁾ is the most determinate, i.e. the form of universality but no determination; legislation must see how it manages; – fix this or that determination, – determination, being on account of other living purposes; – military estate, depopulation, – characters of the estates etc. –

iii) *In the margin*: Taking marriage as the universal under protection against contingency, and other relationships

β) the singular is considered in marriage according to his willing; – but as *living only one with the family, he has renounced his natural solitude*; – in *this the family has property*, it is property not of the singular, but of the family, it is *family patrimony*, – if a member dies, only this accident falls away, and the family remains, – hence *inheritance*, – it is not for the first comer to take possession of it, the state of nature does not set in – ground of *inheriting*. – But the singular [is] equally pure person, it is his property – and as such he is universal; he does not die; it is *his declared* will that counts concerning his property; not whether he is alive or dead; – just as a contract does not cease through the death of one contracting party, if the will can be fulfilled without his life; – the dead cannot marry, any more than a living person with a heavenly bridegroom; – but for one to receive the property of another, the life of the receiving one is not needed. – But this disposition of the singular over his fortune contradicts inheritance. – This cannot be mediated in any absolute way, but the one is to be limited by the other in a determinate way – bizarre notions in testaments (Thellusson's) – contingency, one must simply see how to manage in an equitable way; – here and there there must now and then be give and take; the harshness

[24.2] of the law is to be upheld as far as possible, if it does not become too bad; – the will is to be respected most of all.

γ) the law of the children as such is equally indeterminate, mixing of their own and still alien will; hence contracts of those not of age are not valid before the law; the determinate is α) their majority, which with regard to time is equally rather indeterminate β) guardianship, the family steps in first;¹¹²⁾ but the supervision of the law supplements its incompleteness, as pure will of the immediate parents.¹¹³⁾

112) *In the margin*: Law steps in positively here; – likewise with regard to education –

113) *In the margin*: Education, institutions of the state, contingency; the will of the family is to be respected; law.

b. This law of the immediate existence of the singular is, as law, their will, or it preserves this as such – in the vanishing of contingent being – death of the parents, it becomes positive, it emerges as the existence, since they were it before; – *state*. It is the actual *being valid* of property, element of actual existence, through the willing of all. The law protects the family, leaves it in its being, but it is, like the family, the substance and necessity of the singular; it is the unconscious guardianship over the singular whose family has died, that is, in so far as he emerges as a singular. – It is the substance and necessity – harsh side, in which it emerges.

α) it is universal right, property in general, protects each in his immediate possession, inheritance and exchange. But this is only formal right, which with regard to [the content] remains entirely free. – (Contingency of inheriting) – The individual emerges as acquiring through labour; here his law is merely that what he works on, and what he exchanges, belongs to him. But the universal is at the same time his necessity, which sacrifices him while leaving him his freedom of right.

[243] The universal is α) pure necessity in the singular labourer; – he has his unconscious existence in the universal, society is his nature, on whose elemental blind movement he depends, which sustains or sublates him spiritually and physically. He is there through immediate possession, [or] *inheritance*, complete chance. – He labours an abstract labour, he wins so much from nature; but this only turns round into another form of chance α) he can work up more; but this lessens the value of his labour, he does not thereby step out of the universal relation. β) needs are thereby multiplied – each single one is divided into several; taste is refined; it makes more distinctions; a preparation is demanded that brings the thing to be used ever nearer to easy use, and that all sides of its incongruity be provided for (cork, corkscrew, snuffers) he is *cultivated* as one who enjoys naturally γ) but equally, through the abstraction of labour, more *mechanical*, duller, more spiritless. – The spiritual, this fulfilled self-conscious life, becomes an empty doing, the power of the self consists in rich comprehending, this is lost. – He can leave some labour free as machine, all the more formal his own doing becomes. – His dull labouring confines him to one point; – and the labour is all the more perfect the more one-sided it is – But this multiplicity produces *fashion*, changeableness, freedom in the use of forms; – these things, cut of clothing, kind of furnishing, are nothing permanent – their change is essential and rational – much more rational than staying with one fashion, wanting to maintain something fixed in such singular forms – the beautiful is subject to no fashion – but here there is no free beauty, but a charming one, i.e. one that is the ornament of an other

[244] and relates itself to something else – wants to excite drive, desire, and thus has contingency in it – Equally unceasing is the struggle for simplification of labour, invention of other machines etc. – The skill of the singular is the possibility of preserving his existence. – This is subject to the complete entanglement of the chance of the whole – Thus a multitude are condemned to the wholly dulling, unhealthy and insecure factory, manufactory labours that restrict skill – mines etc., – and branches of industry which sustained a large class of people dry up all at once because of fashion – or cheapening through inventions in other countries, etc. and this whole multitude is abandoned to poverty, which cannot help itself. – The opposition of great wealth and great poverty [arises] – poverty, for which it becomes impossible to get anything ahead; – wealth, like every mass, makes itself into a force, – accumulation of wealth partly by chance, – partly through universality, through distribution – a point of attraction of a kind which casts [its] glance further over the universal, gathers round itself – as a large mass draws the smaller ones to itself; – unto him that hath shall be given. – Acquisition *becomes a many-sided* system that brings returns from all sides *which a smaller business cannot use*; – or the highest abstraction of *labour reaches through* all the more singular *kinds*, and obtains an all the *wider scope*. – This inequality of wealth and poverty, – this need and necessity becomes the utmost disruption of the will, – inner indignation and hatred – This necessity, which is the complete contingency of singular existence, is, however, equally its *sustaining substance*; – the power of the state steps in, and must see to it that every sphere is sustained, intervene; seek out outlets, new channels of sale in other countries – etc. – make the one more difficult, in so far as it encroaches too much to the disadvantage of the others – *freedom of trade*, the intervention must be as inconspicuous as possible; for it is the field of arbitrary will – the semblance of force must be avoided;

[245] – and not want to save what is not to be saved, but occupy the suffering classes otherwise – it is the universal overview; – the singular is only buried in the singular – The trade is of course abandoned of its own accord, – but with the sacrifice of this generation, and increase of poverty. – *Poor Rates* and institutions.

But the substance is not only this ordering law as the might that sustains the singulars – but it is itself acquiring – a universal good, a good of the whole; – levies; – α) direct levies on fixed possession (β) indirect – the former alone according to the physiocratic system; but the raw materials are indeed the abstract ground – yet themselves a determinate singular – which appears too heavily burdened; – it is abandoned; – this branch is missing in the whole, and then the revenues are lessened. – The system of levies must nestle in everywhere – appear inconspicuously, little of everything but everywhere – if it is disproportionate on one branch, this is abandoned, less wine is drunk if there are heavy imposts, for everything some kind of surrogate is to be found, or going without – But this necessity turns likewise against itself – the costs of collection become all the more considerable – the *gène*, the ill humour ever greater, since in everything enjoyment is disturbed and bound up with complications. – The wealth of the state must be founded as little as possible on domains, but on imposts; the former are private possession, and contingent, exposed to squandering, because no one seems to have anything to lose, but gains or has hope of gaining, imposts everyone feels, and wants to know them well used.

b) This elemental necessity, contingency of the singular, passes over into the judicial power; the *singular is contingent according to his actual possession and his skill, understanding*,¹¹⁴⁾ but as *universal essential*, α) as possessing property in general, i.e. *abstract right*

114) *In the margin*: that the *contract* be kept

[246] – The state¹¹⁵⁾ is the existence, the *might* of right; the keeping of *the contract* (and of remaining *in his peaceful* property;) the *existing unity* of the word, of ideal *existence* and of *actuality*, as well as the *immediate* unity of *possession* and of *right*, property as universal substance, – the remaining; being-recognised as *valid*. Being valid is the mediation of the immediate, which has likewise become immediate.

115) *In the margin*: the singular has his supposed right only in the universal

– Here the substance, just as it is the immediate subsisting, is likewise the universal law, and the holding fast of this abstraction against the singular, his known and willed necessity against him, and the attempted equalisation of this empty necessity and his existence.

αα) it is the subsisting, the protection of immediate property, the universal will and its force, the force of all singulars, ββ) *it is the protection of the contract, of the declared common will; the bond of word and performance* – and if *performance does not take place, the movement and restoration of performing*. Judicial power. – It insists that the contract be fulfilled, what is for it is the *common* will; this counts as the essence – The ambiguity of the *ought*,¹¹⁶⁾ which lies in the contract according to its concept, has vanished; in it the will separated from the immediacy of performing is posited as valid; *it is there*, the other is satisfied with it – But this existence is only the existence of the particular – an immediate, not a mediated one – in the moment of agreement¹¹⁷⁾ it is *thus present*,

116) *In the margin*: Command is law – pure I, pure abstraction in the law – through punishing power

117) *In the margin*: the singular has externalized his *supposed* right – *command*, is law, that has power.

[247] but precisely this unmediated being-present no longer counts – but a being-present that is as common will, – or that is likewise a mediated one – the *meaning counts*, the other did indeed recognise me as not yet performing, but in the meaning of the *common will* – This meaning counts in the law – the meaning is the inner – *the pure person*, the law *is* this meaning – In the death penalty all duality of *meaning* and existence has sublated itself; I am there as I am *in myself*, according to the meaning, not *that* which I particularly put into it, but according to the meaning *of the common will*. –¹¹⁸⁾ The law therefore *compels*, i.e. here, it carries out, against my particular meaning, the common one, against my *existence* my in-itself, or against my particular self, my *universal* one. (– Through this coercion my honour is no longer injured (culture) for *compulsion* does not contain my subjection; the vanishing of my self before another self, but *of me against myself, of me as particular, against myself as universal, and* indeed this not as *might*, but as *might of the law*, which I recognise; i.e. *the negative* meaning of me has equally a *positive* one; I am equally preserved therein – It likewise comes to¹¹⁹⁾ my good – I¹²⁰⁾ am preserved not only in *my thought*, – honour – but also in my being.)

118) *In the margin*: over the singular no absolute *universal* – but common will

119) *In the margin*: Culture, intuiting oneself in the universal. Human beings must first be compelled like animals.

120) *In the margin*: Because I have *positive meaning*, I do not retain my *opinion* against this law; – nothing for me

However, the contingency comes in here in another way – in the concept it was contingency of performing. Here $\alpha\alpha$) the determination of the abstract law according to its

[248] content, – in general manifold – in the manifold determinations of the singular – the simpler the laws, the more indeterminate, the more determinate, the more manifold, the further the distinctions are pushed; and the concrete singular case is thereby all the more dissected, and relates itself to [all] the more laws; – since the universal is here immediately applied to the particular, such that the latter is to subsist; thus arises the bad infinity; – and a perfect legislation as regards its completeness is the same undertaking as, e.g., wanting to specify all colours. – Continual legislating. bb. The greater this manifoldness becomes, the more contingent becomes the knowledge of them; the citizens are to know the laws, even if they do not comprehend them, i.e. do not know their self in them – but let alone the citizens knowing them, it becomes all the harder for the judges to know them, and, even if this, to have them present in every case; – no collections of laws, a multitude of contradictory ones, since one does not know what is already commanded or forbidden. cc) still greater becomes the contingency with regard to the acumen of the judge – to apply the laws skilfully to the case at hand, *presence* of mind.

The *administration of justice* and the *course of proceedings* is then the *carrying out of right* – it is the *proper protection* of the carrying out of the right of both parties,¹²¹⁾ to preserve for them their means of defence – The *course of proceedings* is almost still more essential than the laws themselves. Here the same opposition comes in – *costs of proceedings* greater, more impossible for him who most needs the safeguarding of right to raise the costs – The more excellent, the longer, in short on all sides a great evil – compensation for damages not completely contingent – time. *The law must relent from its strictness*; α) promote *settlements* instead of strict¹²²⁾ right, settlement commissions, with which the jurists are very

121) *In the margin*: Carrying out of the right of both parties before the court.

122) *In the margin*: Time – bills of exchange, ruin of whole singulars – telescope for a certain time; surgical instrument medicine

[249] dissatisfied; *punishment for litigious parties* and *pettifogging legal counsel* – the increase of court costs itself, and especially in higher instances etc., make right more difficult,¹²³⁾ and compel people to see how they come by their right; – but likewise see to it that whoever has a mind to can give himself over to the whole length and breadth of the carrying out. – It is the deception of wanting to find an absolute determination in such temporal, determinate, concrete, sensuous things and relations as such.

123) *In the margin:* Remedying the evil is itself in turn an evil

c.¹²⁴⁾ *criminal* administration of justice is the power of the law over the life of the singular; the law is his absolute might even over his life; for it is his essence, as purely universal will, i.e. as the vanishing of himself as a particular being, life; – the law is likewise the liberation from crime and *pardon*; it is master over evil just as much as pure life; the deed is for it as if it had not happened, what exists has as such no truth for it.

124) *In the margin:* The singular is a legal person – and the judicial power a movement of the *externalization* of his right, of his *essence as thought* in relation to his existence, he counts as having his *will* in his existence, – and his *peaceful* particular will is respected. – But in that he has given up his *opining of right* to the universal, he thus *counts as pure person*, and in so far as he, as pure person, as pure will, separates himself from the universal, as evil; – in civil dispute not as pure will but as *supposed* right against the universal; so that this is to count; – or right against particularity of the other, fraud, dolus circumvents his will, but addresses itself to his knowing –

This¹²⁵⁾ might over all *existence*, property and life, and likewise over thought, *right*, and good and evil is the commonwealth, the living

125) *In the margin:* By the singular's having given up his *supposed* right, he presents himself as *pure* being-recognised; he counts as such – as before his will in the common will about determinate things – so now his pure will as such counts – This pure being-recognised has immediately in itself the two sides, to be pure being-recognised, and pure being – a) α) as pure being-recognised, as will, he is opposed to force – to the alien will that is *not* common – he is protected against force over his property and doing, and his life in general – his life is *immediately* his pure will. – β) he is, as pure will, the abstraction of pure being – or he is no longer an *opining* about his right – i.e. he is there *only* through his opining – this he is no longer – he is something lifeless – I.e. the law has complete might over his life – he, *his* life, stands opposed to the universal, in which he is pure abstraction – and this is his essence, recognised by him. – He has renounced his life against the universal – it is judge, as over his *supposed* right, so over his pure being. – This is the absolute might over life – the singular knows himself *positively* in it b) but the singular, stepping over against it, as absolute might for himself – is for himself absolute infinite will; – and absolute might – i.e. that which sublates an other *absolute* – this other he can sublate – because it is *being*; quantitative – determinable by something else – unknowing – he seizes it by this, and has thereby brought the other under himself – *murder*; – crime – he is *evil** – * *Alongside:* – only against the *will* force, or *cunning*, c) The law is the *actual punishment*, this substance which is the reversal of the concept, – that he has killed himself – the other is *equal* to him, thus himself – not something alien – punishment as punishment – not as revenge – It is turned against *evil* as evil – dolus, not *guilt in general* – satisfaction of the concept, and the law appeased. Law carries out *right*. But this pure right is likewise exposed to contingency, – or as pure right it is the *abstraction* that cannot hold to itself absolutely – α) it has to protect the will as such, and to make the violation, force of the other, rebound upon himself; *but in the singular case* where *force* and *non-force* begins is hard to say; it can begin already in the contract proper. – Willing *is* determinate willing – it has, *purpose*, is to it *object*, thus relation of *knowing*; thereby it intervenes in otherness, in the quantitative, in the contingent – the object of its knowing can be altered for it, concealed, connection of the purpose and of its doing, means is [a matter of] judgement – he can be made to believe his purpose attained in a way through which he destroys it – no *force* proper has been done to him – he has enormously injured himself in the contract with knowledge and will, and – the law, for which only the de-

clared common will counts, has here to take the actual purpose under protection; the inner meaning against an enormous laesion; – the particular will against *common* will, which is essentially declared – Here it is indeterminate to ascertain where fraud actually begins as force which is to be punished β) theft, robbery, – are just such mixtures; they concern particular existence, *violate* there the will without knowledge – here the will and knowledge – but they violate here not the *absolute* will but over α) a *determinate* one, i.e. β) it in a particular existence – not as pure *being*, not as life; and the reaction can therefore also not be the absolute one, not death – [it goes only] to his *freedom*, beating, particular being – But public security is too much compromised, i.e. the pure will is also violated therein – *thief, robber* violates in the will *the pure will* – admittedly in a particular existence – but the will is only as pure will; – the death penalty can also be awarded; – (But contingent *circumstances*) – *degrees* of crime, approximate manifold determination – γ) Murder proper – only essentially evil, the *imputation* – not *accidental killing* – but there too – the intention – hard to ascertain – flees back from the simple *existence* of the deed into *the night of the inner* – *confession* of the criminal is required – on account of the mistrust of the inference from the circumstances to the *inner*, this inner must pronounce itself – is free of all circumstances – *obstinacy* against this pronouncing – not to be overcome, the law is to know δ) *Evil* is what is in itself null – the *pure knowing* of itself – this darkness of *man* within himself – precisely thereby the absolute will – nothing alien to the law; to recognise it as itself, to forgive it – or as deed – to make it undone, for precisely this single deed is a drop that does not touch the universal, is absorbed – *spirit*, and treats man as spirit, a homicide, what does it matter to the whole? and again therein the undone.

|250| people. – The law is living, perfect, living self-conscious life; as the universal will which is *substance* of all actuality, knowing of itself

[251] as universal might of everything living and of every determination of the concept – of all essence. – It is α) the *universal wealth* and the universal

[252] necessity, which is known as such, which, knowingly recognised as such, is sacrificed to this evil; and thereby also lets all in general partake of their existence; in order to be able to use them; – condemns a multitude to crudeness, to dulling in labour, – and poverty, in order to let others amass wealth, and to be able to take it from them; the inequality of wealth brings it about that it is not begrudged, if great levies are given, lessens envy, and averts the fear of need and of robbery. – Aristocrats who pay no levies stand in the greatest danger of losing it by force, because it has no reconciliation in sacrifice – state power of existence and letting subsist, necessity and letting the singular have his way, who buys it through his reconciliation. – The government squanders its wealth, *does not save*.

β) In right it is intuited as the *essence as thought*, earns respect – It likewise leaves the singulars to fraud, to come by their right, and gives them [over] to this confusion of their opinion of knowing themselves as persons, – citizens,

[253] as abstract universal ones, – who are worthy of *respect*; – The abstract universal receives *respect*; – it has at the same time the goodness to correct its right through settlement and equity – Is master over the one just as over the other – abstract universality, or in existence. γ) Finally it is the might over life and death, the fearsome of the singular – but is master over pure evil, it is the divine spirit – which knows the *absolutely other*, evil, that which in thought as such is utterly other, as itself.

These are its *powers*, or abstract moments, it has as yet no existence in which these are reflected into themselves.

Criminal¹²⁶⁾ jurisdiction is grounded in this, that α) the universal is the *substance* of the singular β) the known and willed substance, whoever has given up his right has externalized himself precisely as abstract universal, – i.e. α) positively he counts as living and pure will against force, and is protected β) he has given himself as living and will into the power of the state; through the externalization of supposed right I am pure person,¹²⁷⁾ but am only as such as law, – my existence is the law, – i.e. I depend on it entirely. –

¹²⁶⁾ In the margin: in itself revenge is just

¹²⁷⁾ In the margin: the existing evil intention, (culpa dolus –)

III. Constitution

Cross-reference: The state § 257 ff.; on who makes the constitution, the Remark to § 273; on the prince § 275 ff.

The state as wealth is the being-sublated both of singularised existence, – and of the in-itself in existence, and of the pure being-*in-itself* of the person – man has his existence, being and thinking solely in the law. – The law

^[254] knows itself as the absolute power, which is just as much wealth as [it] sacrifices the universal one, just as much protects right as equity and settlement, just as much protects life and punishes in life, as it forgives evil and grants forfeited life – Thus this spirit is the absolute *might* everywhere, which lives in itself, and now [must] give itself the intuition of itself as this, or makes *itself* its *purpose*. As power it is only the singular that is the purpose – or the abstract of the singular; but its self-preservation is the *organisation* of its life, the spirit of a people which intends itself. – Its concept, universality in the complete freedom and independence of the singulars –

Spirit is the *nature* of the individuals, their immediate substance, and its movement and necessity; it is just as much their *personal consciousness* in existence as their pure consciousness, their life, their actuality. *They know* the universal *will* α) *as* their particular one, and in such a way that it is their externalized particular one, and likewise know it as their objective essence, their pure might, which is *in itself* their essence; as in *their knowing*. In the movement of the powers three things are to be distinguished α) these themselves, as having come to be through externalization β) as knowing of the singulars, and γ [as] universal knowing. α) The coming-to-be of the powers is externalization; but not of necessity, rather the power of the universal is *known* as essence;¹²⁸⁾ for the sake of this knowing each externalizes himself;¹²⁹⁾ not as towards a lord, but towards it

¹²⁸⁾ *In the margin*: On the part of the singular, movement of these powers – *On account of necessity*

¹²⁹⁾ *In the margin*: This, culture in general, externalization of his immediate

[255] in the form of his pure knowing, i.e. of himself as one externalized, or of himself as universal. The universal *form* is this becoming of the singular into the universal, and becoming of the universal; – but it is not a blind necessity, but one mediated through knowing; or each is his own purpose in it, i.e. the purpose is already what moves; – each singular is immediately his own cause, his interest *drives* him, but equally the universal is to him what is valid, the middle which joins him together with his particular and his actuality.

That I have my *positive* self in the common will is being-recognised as intelligence, as known by me, that it is posited through me; – that I have it *negatively* therein, as my might, as the universal which is the negative of me, through intuiting its *necessity*, or through *externalization*. – The universal for its part presents itself so as to be, *in the latter, my necessity*, in the former, *to sacrifice itself*, and to let me come to what is mine; herein I obtain consciousness as *of my self* – α) labouring in general, *levies*, β) *opining abstraction* of its concretions from itself as the universal – crudeness, taking offence γ) to know oneself as pure self as sublated.

α) Externalization of his *particular self* – he sets the self on *the side of the universal*, the universal is the *book*, dead letter – its life, will is the self of the individuals – They are its *power*, they all help it, it can count on the external support of all.

β) Likewise their *pure knowing* belongs to it; they know it as their *essence* – (as their nature *their custom*,) – *might*, pure essence;

γ) their particular self, they are preserved, and *goodness* –

The universal

^[256] *itself*. – *Right* was the *immediate* concept of spirit – the power, *the necessity* of its movement, *externalizing*, becoming other. (The universal, in that it protects my life and is might over my life, is this *immediate* unity – of the pure will and of existence,¹³⁰⁾ – of pure consciousness and of myself. Relating myself to it as this immediate unity, I have *trust* in it –¹³¹⁾ towards it only as my negative essence, *fear*, towards it, which is immediately *my will*, – not only agrees with it, but in that it is my actual self, I *am regent*. – It is *lord*,¹³²⁾ *public power*, and *regent*, according to these three sides towards me –)

¹³⁰⁾ *In the margin*: Return into itself – in *pardon*; everything actual *deed* – *evil inner actual* – *is the actual, as itself* – existing, *absolute certainty of itself*

¹³¹⁾ *In the margin*: pure night of *being-for-itself* absolute *knowing*, which is entirely *free of all existence*

¹³²⁾ *In the margin*: *real spirit* immediate *otherness* universal might

– It is people, multitude of individuals in general, existing whole, the universal power; it is of insuperable strength against the singular, *and his necessity and oppressing* might, and the strength which *each has according to his being-recognised* is that of the people.¹³³⁾ But this strength is¹³⁴⁾ effective only in so far as it is *bound into a One*,¹³⁵⁾ *only as will*; – the universal will is the will *as of all and each*, but as will it is simply only this self, – the doing of the universal is *a One*; the

¹³³⁾ *In the margin*: Concept of the *constitution* – its *universal essence*

¹³⁴⁾ *In the margin*: α) his knowing of himself as *object* as *alien might* – singular

¹³⁵⁾ *In the margin*: *Freedom of spirit from singularity in general* – and the higher freedom from *determinate existence*

[257] universal will has to gather itself together into this One. – It has *first to constitute itself out of the will of the singulars* as universal, so that the latter seems the principle and element, but conversely it is *the first* and the *essence*, and the singulars have to make themselves into the universal through *negation* of themselves, externalization and culture,¹³⁶⁾ it is earlier than they, *it is absolutely there* for them, *they are* not at all *immediately* the same. – One imagines the constituting of the universal will thus, that *all citizens come together*,¹³⁷⁾ deliberate, give their votes, and so *the majority makes the universal will* – In this way precisely that is posited which was said, that the singular must make [himself] into it through negation, through *giving himself up*. – The commonwealth, the union of the state, is supposed to rest on an original contract to which each is presumed to have *tacitly* given his *consent*, – but properly expressly – and *this determinately for every subsequent act* of the commonwealth – And this is supposed to be the principle of the *true, of the free state*. – The multitude is imagined thus, more *actually*, as constituting the commonwealth, – be it from the beginning, that this is not yet there, or perhaps that a revolution has dissolved the previous constitution. Here they *emerge as actual singulars*, each of whom wants to know his positive will in the universal; but their positive singularity, because it is not yet an externalized one, or does not have negativity in itself, is a contingency for the universal, and this an actual other than they; there is no necessity that all will the same, no obligation that the minority submit to the majority, but each has the right, – for he is posited, recognised, as singular positive will, – to run away; and to come to an agreement with others about something else. – But it is at the same time presupposed that they are in themselves universal will; this

¹³⁶⁾ *In the margin*: Aristotle – the whole is [by] nature prior to the parts

¹³⁷⁾ *In the margin*: What is to come to be is *presupposed*, – for the sake of *universality* they unite – *purpose* – They willed it because it is in itself. *Syllogism* as in the concept of the *will*

[258] *in-itself* is an other than their actual one, and they have not yet externalized theirs, do not recognise the universal one, but only their singularity counts in it¹³⁸) – But it is *in itself*, it is there, it is *their* in-itself; i.e. it is their external *power*, which compels them. – Thus all states have been founded, through the sublime power of great men – not physical strength, for many are physically stronger than one; but the great man has something in his features which the others may well call their lord; they obey him against their will, against their will his will is their will – their *immediately* pure will is his will – but their conscious will is something else; the great man has the former on his side, and they *must*, even though they do not want to – This is the advantage of the great man, to know the absolute will, to pronounce it, all gather round his banner, he is their god. – Thus Theseus founded the state of Athens, thus in the French Revolution a fearful power sustained the state, the whole in general.¹³⁹) This power is not despotism, *but tyranny*, pure appalling domination, but it is *necessary* and *just*, *in so far as it* constitutes the state as this *actual individual*, *and sustains* it – This state is the simple absolute spirit, which is certain of itself, and for which nothing determinate counts but itself, – no concepts of good and bad, shameful and base, malice and fraud; it is sublime above all this, – for evil is in it reconciled with itself – In this great sense Machiavelli's Prince is written, that in the constituting of the state in general, what is called assassination, treachery, cruelty etc. has no meaning of evil, but of what is reconciled with itself. – His writing has even been taken for irony – but what deep feeling of the misery of his fatherland, what enthusiasm of patriotism underlies his cold, considered doctrines, – he expresses in the preface and in the

¹³⁸) *In the margin*: first *uncultivated* – moment of immediacy in general –

¹³⁹) *In the margin*: After Solon Pisistratus made the laws of the former the citizens' own.

[259] conclusion – his fatherland trodden to the ground by foreigners, devastated, without independence, every nobleman, leader, [every] city¹⁴⁰⁾ asserted itself as sovereign; the only means to found the state, to exterminate these sovereignties, and indeed, since they want to count as sovereign precisely as immediate singulars, against the crudeness only the death of the leaders is the means, and the terror of death for the rest – The Germans have abhorred such doctrines the most, and *Machiavellism* expresses what is most evil, precisely because they lie prostrate with the same sickness, and have died of it. – Indifference of the subjects towards their princes, however, and of these, on the other hand, towards being princes, i.e. behaving as princes, – makes that tyranny superfluous – for the self-will of the princes has thereby become powerless.

140) *In the margin:* Elaboration of the Nordic self-will of the Germans, because they could not bear a tyrant they have vanished as a *people*; – were only *nation* – brought the principle of absolute singularity into the world – the *existence* of thought in the south of the Christian religion –

Thus the universal, against the singulars as such who want to know their immediate *positive will absolutely* asserted, is lord, tyrant, pure power, – for it is something alien to them, and the power of the state, which knows what it is, must have the courage, in every emergency where the existence of the whole is compromised, to proceed wholly tyrannically – Through tyranny the immediate externalization of the actual singular will has come about;¹⁴¹⁾ this [is] cultivation to *obedience*. – Through this cultivation to obedience – to know the universal rather than the actual wills – tyranny has become superfluous, and the rule of law has set in – The power which the tyrant exercises is the power of the law, *in itself*; through *obedience* it is itself

141) *In the margin:* Sublated immediate thises

[260] no longer *alien* power, but the known universal will¹⁴²⁾ – tyranny is overthrown by the peoples because it is said to be abominable, base and so forth, – but in fact only because it is superfluous, – *the memory of the tyrant is abhorred*; – he is precisely therein also this spirit certain of itself, which as the god acts only in itself and for itself, and is prepared only for the ingratitude of his people – But were he wise, – he would himself lay aside his tyranny as soon as it is superfluous, – but as it is, his divinity is only the divinity of the animal, the blind necessity, which deserves to be abhorred precisely [as] evil – Robespierre went about it thus –, his strength has left him, because *necessity has left him*, – and so he was overthrown by force – What is necessary happens – but each part of necessity is usually allotted only to singulars¹⁴³⁾ – the one is the accuser and defender, the other judge, the third executioner, but all are necessary.

142) *In the margin*: they make it their own – flattery acquires that which they flatter – self-abasement is taking possession of that before which one abases oneself

143) *In the margin*: Fear has vanished in obedience

– The¹⁴⁴⁾ *rule of law* is now not this law-giving, as if there were none there, but *they are there* –, and the relation is the movement of those cultivated to obedience towards the commonwealth; this existing essence lies at the ground. – The second is the *trust* that sets in, i.e. that the singular *knows himself likewise therein, as his essence*; – *finds himself preserved therein*,¹⁴⁵⁾ though he does not comprehend and see how he is preserved therein, through what connection and arrangement. The universal thus has immediately

144) *In the margin*: as *being in themselves*, the eternal laws of the gods – whether Solon gave them – they are *in themselves*; essence of thinking and being – no *self-given* laws – no longer have the *shape* of the singular will but of one's own

145) *In the margin*: Form of immediate unity

[261] negative and positive meaning at once – the former through tyranny, the latter in the preservation of the singular, or [through] the externalization of the universal.

This¹⁴⁶⁾ unity of *individuality and of the universal* is now there in the twofold way – extremes of *the universal, which is itself individuality, government* – is not an abstractum – of the state –, *individuality* which has the *universal* as such for its purpose – and the other extreme of the same, which has the singular for its purpose – Both individualities as the same, – the same man provides for himself and his family, labours, concludes contracts, etc. and likewise he also labours for the universal, has this *for his purpose* – on that side he is called *bourgeois*, on *this citizen*.¹⁴⁷⁾ – *The universal* will is obeyed as the majority of all, and *constituted through the determinate pronouncing and voting of the singulars*; even those who are not of the opinion of the majority obey; – even if the measure or the law is against their conviction. – It is open to them to *protest*, i.e. to reserve their conviction,¹⁴⁸⁾ to declare determinately that they are in it with their obedience but not with their conviction; which is especially the affair of the Germans, this tenacity of clinging to conviction, this self-will of abstract willing, of empty right, without the thing, without the possession. – In this *democracy* the will of the singular is still contingent α) as opinion in general – he must renounce it against the majority, – β) as actual will – as self, or doing, the will is itself singular, and to it each must submit; the execution presupposes will-less actual obeying, each renounces his opinion about the execution γ) the resolutions, laws, here concern only particular circumstances – the insight into their connection with the universal is the insight of all, but on account of their particularity itself contingent.

¹⁴⁶⁾ *In the margin*: Living unity – ancient ethical life

¹⁴⁷⁾ *In the margin*: Philistine citizens and citizens of the Empire, the one as much a formal philistine as the other

¹⁴⁸⁾ *In the margin*: absurd

[262] The *election* of *officials, generals*, belongs to the community, it is *a confidence* in them which, however, is justified only by success; – circumstances are always different – This is the beautiful, happy freedom of the Greeks, which has been and is so much envied¹⁴⁹⁾ – The people is at the same time dissolved into citizens, and it is at the same time the one individual, the government – it stands only in interaction with itself; – the externalization of the singularity of the will is the immediate preservation of it. – But a higher abstraction is necessary, a greater opposition and culture, a *deeper* spirit. It is the realm of ethical life – each is *custom*, immediately one with the universal; – no protesting takes place here; each knows himself *immediately* as universal; i.e. he renounces his particularity without knowing it as such, as *this* self, as the essence. – The higher diremption is thus that each completely *goes back into himself*, knows his *self as such*,¹⁵⁰⁾ as the essence, comes to this self-will of being absolute although separated from the existing universal – *of possessing his absolute immediately in his knowing*; – as singular he lets the universal go free, he has complete independence in himself, – he gives up his *actuality*, counts for himself only in his *knowing*.¹⁵¹⁾ b) *The free universal* is the point of individuality, this, thus free from the knowing of all, is one not constituted by them, – as extreme of the government thus an immediate one, a *natural* one, it

149) *In the margin*: the same *will* is the *singular*, and the same the *universal*

150) *In the margin*: his self not in the law, custom; or essence the *law*, – *evil*; – that which has gone into itself, and precisely thereby is completely externalized – which has abandoned its existence – knows an other world – as its own – In actuality only this externalization itself in general comes to light. – To this absolute universality the immediacy of being stands likewise opposed.

151) *In the margin*: *public opinion* – one is as rational as his state is

[263] is the *hereditary monarch*, he is the firm *immediate* knot of the whole. – The spiritual bond is *public* opinion; – this the true legislative body, national assembly – (*universal culture*) – *useless artifices* boards to improve laws – declaration of the universal will – it lives in the execution of all commands – the government officials belong to this spirit – Now there is different governing – and living in states whose constitution is still the same – and this changes gradually with time – the government must not step onto the side of what is past and obstinately protect it – But be, as it were, the last to be convinced; and change – actual *doing* actual will – through election of the officials – each sphere town guild [represented] in the administration of its particular affairs – A people is bad when it is the government – and as bad as it is irrational. But the whole is the middle, the free spirit, which bears itself free from these completely fixed extremes, the whole [however is] independent of the knowing of the singulars, as well as of the character of the regent – *empty knot*.

This is the *higher principle* of the *modern age*, which *the ancients*, *Plato* did not *know*, – in ancient times, the *beautiful* public life was the custom of all, – beauty, immediate unity of the universal and singular, a work of art in which no part separates itself from the whole, but this genial unity of the self that knows itself and of its presentation [is;] but the absolute knowing-itself of singularity, this absolute being-within-itself, was not present – The Platonic republic – is, like the Lacedaemonian state – this vanishing of self-knowing individuality.¹⁵²⁾ – Through this principle the external actual

¹⁵²⁾ *In the margin*: Plato did not set up an ideal, but grasped the state of his time in its inner being – but this state has passed away – not the Platonic republic is not practicable – because it lacked the principle of absolute singularity – The actual, to be sure, does not [look] so externally, as the ideal – because the observer holds to the immediate – to the necessary – excess, ruin, dissoluteness, viciousness of the singular ones must be able to be borne – the state is the *cunning*

[264] freedom of the individuals in their immediate existence is lost; but their inner one – the freedom of thought preserved – spirit is purified of immediate existence, it has stepped into its pure element of *knowing*, and is indifferent to existing singularity; it begins here to *be* as knowing; or it is its formal existence as [that of] knowing itself; – it is this Nordic essence which is within itself but has its existence in the self of all.

According to this principle there is α) the multiplicity of individuals, the mass of the people, over against their one individual, the monarch – those are the multiplicity, movement, fluidity; – this one is the immediate, the *natural* – this alone is the *natural*, i.e. hither *nature has fled*; – it is the last *remnant of it, as positive* – the family of the prince is the only positive one – the others are to be left¹⁵³⁾ – the other *individual counts only as externalized*, cultivated, as that *which it has made itself into*, – the whole, the commonwealth, is as little bound to the one as to the other – it is the self-supporting indestructible body, – the prince may be constituted as he will, the citizens as they will, – the commonwealth is closed within itself and self-preserving.¹⁵⁴⁾ β) just as

153) *In the margin*: this alone *born* to it, immediate will – or great *individuality* – *energy of willing*, *absolute resolve*, in itself, of one will – *We command*.

154) *In the margin*: Not the *artificiality of the legislative* etc. power – *self* is the highest – *free abandonment* of the powers, cunning of *necessity*, letting the singular ones act, *each provides for himself*, flows into the universal – higher being-reflected-into-itself of spirit. *Guarantee* against arbitrary will; universal constitution of the *estates* – not estates of the realm; universal reason the *reason* of the people – as clever as the institutions are – * * *Alongside*: fluidity of everything singular

[265] free as each singular one in his knowing, in his disposition, and however different it is – just as free are the powers, the singular sides of the whole, abstract moments – labour, manufacture, – the condition of right and administration and the military, each develops itself completely according to its one-sided principle,¹⁵⁵⁾ – the organic whole has complete entrails, which develop themselves in their abstraction, – it is not each singular one, manufacturer, peasant, craftsman, soldier, judge, etc. – rather this divides itself – each belongs to one abstraction – and he is a whole to himself in his thinking.

¹⁵⁵⁾ *In the margin: Organisation of spirit; α) duty – b) morality; each to raise himself above his estate. α) nature – or estate of singularity β) universal estate, purpose the universal, man of business, – scholar, soldier and government γ) religion, philosophy, spirit that is*

(Three things are now to be developed, firstly the members of the whole, the external fixed organisation and its entrails, the powers as they are in them¹⁵⁶⁾ – β) the *disposition* of each estate, its self-consciousness – its *being* as purely knowing within itself – immediate tearing loose from existence – knowing of spirit of its member, as such – and *elevation* above it – the former ethical life – the latter morality – thirdly religion; – the first is spiritual nature freely released – the other is the *knowing* of it of itself, – as of knowing, the third is spirit knowing itself as absolute spirit, – religion.)

¹⁵⁶⁾ *In the margin: The estate and the spirit of an estate; it is properly this determinate spirit that develops itself further, from crude trust and labour on, up to the knowing of absolute spirit of itself. – It is at first the life of a people in general, from this it has to free itself – α) its consciousness is in the particular, three first estates – β) its object becomes the universal in the estate of business,*

The estates; or the nature of spirit articulating itself within itself

Cross-reference: The estates of the *Groundlines*: § 201–§ 207.

Spirit¹⁵⁷⁾ knowing itself as all actuality and essentiality intuitively itself, is *object* to itself, or it is to itself an existing organism.¹⁵⁸⁾ It forms its consciousness – it is only as yet true spirit; in itself; in each estate it has a determinate labour, knowing of its existence and doing in it, – and a particular concept, knowing of essentiality. The two have partly to separate, partly to unite; – trust is the first, its diremption into the abstraction of right is the second; – absolute mistrust is the third; (or the absolute counting of the thing – of money – of the representative, of the universal) – With this the object [enters], which is in itself the universal one, the state is purpose – knowing of duty; morality – but this universal in its particular branches, estate of business. – Then the universal as universal, the scholar, – finally the military estate – the negated actual singular, danger of death – to the scholar the vanity of his self is the most important thing. – Absolute *individuality of the people*.

157) *In the margin:* I. the lower estates, or those which have their object and their consciousness in the particular.

158) *In the margin:* Consciousness is its stuff, out of which it makes its existence for itself

I) The lower estates and dispositions

Cross-reference: Peasant estate § 203, estate of trade and industry § 204.

a) the estate of immediate trust and of crude concrete labour, the *peasant estate*.
 – Absolute trust is the ground and the element of the state; – but in the cultivated state it withdraws into an *estate* – into the elementary point of departure – and universal element which remains in all – but which takes on its more conscious form. – The peasant estate is thus this individuality-less trust, *which has its individuality* in the *unconscious individual*, in the earth.¹⁵⁹⁾ As labouring it is not the labourer of the abstract form, but provides, roughly speaking, for the most, the whole of its needs; likewise its work is connected with its doing only inwardly – the connection of its purpose and of the actualization is the unconscious, nature – he ploughs, sows, but it is God who gives the increase – the seasons, and the trust that what he has laid in the soil will come about of itself – the activity is the subterranean one – taxes and levies he pays because it just *is* so – these fields, houses have been so charged from all time – it *is* so, nothing further – old rights – and if something new is imposed on him, he does not understand why, but regards it as an individual lordship, that the noble lords need a great deal, – that in general the state surely needs it – but immediately he does not see this, but [only that] money is just being drawn from him, the men of business must live too, and the noble lord, the prince, is just the noble lord, the prince – So he also lets right be laid on him more like a command, and demands only, not that he understand the matter, but only that he be spoken with, that he be told what he [should] do, and [for what he] is commanded, – a rough stimulus, so that he notices there is a power present here, must be added in

¹⁵⁹⁾ *In the margin:* it is only the possibility that labours

[268] this form; – he for his part then also brings his peasant understanding to light, shows that he is not so stupid, says something at random, some maxim or other, and against the power, that one should need to snap at him, he will do it all right; and in thus reserving the right of his understanding and of his will, he obeys – It is the formal side of speaking and of insight – This formalism of knowing passes over into abstract knowing, just as concrete labouring passes over into abstract labouring.

Concrete labour is the elementary, [the] substantial preserving, the crude ground of the whole, like trust; – in war the estate makes up the crude mass; – a crude blind animal which in its dullness is content with itself, which, when its right is not done it, reflects itself only into its singularity, and becomes spiteful, – and when it breaks loose, rages as a blind mad element, like a flood of water, which only destroys,¹⁶⁰⁾ at most deposits universal fertilising mud, but runs off without having brought a work about.

160) *In the margin:* feudal system, freedom from the soil, – this animal freedom that goes beyond the life of plants.

b) this substantiality passes over into the abstraction of labour and of knowing of the universal, – estate of *trade* and of *right* – The labour of the *burgher estate* is the abstract labour, that of the single craft; – its *disposition* is *rectitude* – It has taken labour from nature and lifted forming out of unconsciousness; – the self has stepped forth out of the earth; the form, the self of the work, is the self of man – the natural has died – it comes into consideration only as mere capacity for a use and labour.

Trust is a closer, more determinate one in consciousness; the burgher estate looks to the state of livelihood of its town; to the number of the fellows of its labour; – its activity and skill is the contingency which has returned into it out of the contingency of nature, and which belongs to it. – It knows itself determinately as

[269] owner, and maintains it not only because it possesses, but because it is its right; it knows itself as recognised in its particularity, and everywhere stamps it with its seal; – he does not enjoy, as the peasant does in his crudeness, his glass of beer or wine in order to raise himself to his universal dullness, partly to give in it a movement to his chatter and understanding, but in order to show himself with it, as with his coat and the finery of his wife and children, that he is as good as another, and has got so far – in it he enjoys himself, his worth and rectitude, this he has worked for and brought about himself – It is not the enjoyment of pleasure that he enjoys, but that he has this enjoyment, the imagined notion of himself.

c) this imagined notion of his worth, of his universal self in particularity, becomes immediate unity, in that counting and having come to mean the same, – the imagined notion of filling out his estate, of having raised his particularity into this universality, vanishes; – it is [not] the estate as such that counts for more, but the reality of the having, as such – the abstraction of right and of estate is fulfilled, and counts only so far as it is fulfilled. – *Merchant estate*. The labour of the merchant is pure exchange, neither natural nor artificial producing and forming – exchange is the movement, the spiritual, the middle, that which is freed from use and need as well as from labouring, from immediacy; this movement – the pure one, is here object, and doing – the object itself is directed into the particular, the article of trade, and the abstract, *money*¹⁶¹⁾ – a great invention – the thing of need has become a merely *represented*, unenjoyable one; – the object is thus here something that counts purely only according to its *meaning*, no longer in itself, i.e. for need – it is an utterly *inward* thing. The disposition of the merchant estate is thus this understanding of the unity of *essence* and *thing* – one is as real as one has money; – the imagined notion has vanished – meaning has immediate

161) *In the margin*: all needs are gathered together into this one

[270] existence – the *essence* of the matter is the matter itself – *Value* is ringing coin. – The formal principle of reason is present. (But this money, which has the *meaning* of all needs, is itself only an *immediate thing*,) – it is the abstraction from all particularity, character etc., skill of the singular one; the disposition is this hardness of spirit in which the particular one, wholly externalized, no longer counts, – strict *right*, the bill of exchange must be honoured, let whatever will go to ruin – family – prosperity, life etc. – utter mercilessness – factories, manufactures found their subsistence precisely on the misery of a class – Spirit has thus become object to itself in its abstraction – as the *selfless* inner. But this inner is the I itself – and this I is its existence itself – the shape of the inner is not the dead thing – *money*, but likewise *I* – Or¹⁶²) to spirit the state in general is object of its doing and endeavour, and purpose.

162) *In the margin*: α) trust and concretion of the peasants; – spirit as *this one* sublates itself into abstract universality, the opposition of right, or the counting of the universal – β merchant restores the imagined notion – formal concept of the unity of the self and of reality, of naive immediate unity – *I* = *thing* – their meaning the concrete

II. The estate of universality

Cross-reference: The universal estate § 205, the civil servants § 294; the military estate and war § 324 ff.

α) The public estate is immediately this intervention of the *universal* in everything singular, or the blood vessels and nerves which wind themselves

[271] through everything, animate it, preserve it, and bring it back into the universal – It is *necessity*, and the life of the pouring out of the particular into the universal; the administration and coming-to-be of public wealth, as well as the exercise of right, and then the *police*. – The strength of the government consists in this,¹⁶³⁾ that each system, as if it were alone, develops itself freely and independently according to its concept, – and *the wisdom of the government* in modifying each at the same time according to the estate, i.e. in relaxing the strictness of the abstract concept for the sake of its living entrails – as the veins and nerves give way to the different entrails, and adjust and form themselves according to them – The stiff abstract ordering of the powers for all estates in the same way makes up the harshness of a government. – But if this abstract is modified without giving itself up, there arises thereby the contentment of the estates with their government – levies on the peasant cruder, taxes and tithes something that is without great formality; – he must not be exposed to the lengthy formalities that occur with customs duties on merchant goods. Indirect imposts must bear with their whole weight principally on the burgher and merchant estate – The peasant becomes through formalities – himself, it is true, more attentive and more cultivated – but his dullness must be given way to – Likewise in respect of the judicial – for the peasant estate the easier, cruder justice must be present – for the burgher the rightful, detailed one, so that his right is surely done him on all sides – for the merchant the hard, strict one of the law of exchange – marriage laws altered according to the character of the estates – peasant folk – burghers too are more easily reconciled again, – thrash each other and become good friends again – But the deeper sense, the more malicious nature of the higher estates goes into itself, can neither forget nor be reconciled – In respect of *criminal* [right] too there can be difference, modifications in

¹⁶³⁾ *In the margin*: substance in which all moments go on proliferating

[272] respect of punishment – formal stiff equality is just that [which] does not spare character, – the same thing wounds more deeply in the one *estate*, or *restoration* irretrievable, which in the other is not dishonouring. – Punishment is the reconciliation of the law with itself – if it is not the death penalty,¹⁶⁴⁾ it must not kill the man civilly; one who has served his punishment can no longer be reproached with his crime – he is reintegrated into his estate – there is nothing absolutely dishonouring – wounding of feeling, so that he can no longer return – is expelled from his estate, character; his estate must still be preserved for him in his punishment (higher estates to the fortress instead of into the house of correction among the other criminals of other estates)

¹⁶⁴⁾ *In the margin: duel** permitted in the military estate; because it is not a civil one – does not have the purpose of acquisition – estate of honour; of living in the pure. *being-recognised of opinion* – not of *property* and right * *Above: self-revenge, state of nature; honour of its arms just as for the state, for itself – not even the army chaplain may utter a peep against it*

As particular administration of justice, so particular science, – religion – our states have not yet got that far –

(The¹⁶⁵⁾ *police* is added here, – from *politia*, public life and governing, the acting of the whole itself – now reduced to the acting of the whole on public security of every kind – supervision of trades – against fraud – universal trust realised – trust in the exchange of wares – Each provides only for himself, not for the universal; the quiet exercise of his right of property and free disposal of his property is the possible harm for others – restriction of this, prevention of harm – also of proceeding merely on trust – police [watches] over servants, that a contract

¹⁶⁵⁾ *In the margin: free disposal of his property,*

[273] [must] be made – guilds determine rights of masters over apprentices and journeymen – so too over wages for labour and the like)

The public estate labours for the state; spirit has raised itself to the universal object – *man of business*; but his labour is itself very divided, abstract, – machine labour;¹⁶⁶⁾ it is indeed immediately for the universal – but according to a limited and at the same time fixed side, on which he cannot make changes. – *His disposition* is that he *fulfils his duty*; he raises the determinate universal to the knowing of the universal; in his determinate doing he sees the *absolute, moral* disposition – spirit has raised itself above character – it does a universal.

166) *In the margin*: having *being-recognised in itself*; – each [agrees] according to this morality, on top of this, that he does what belongs to his estate –

b) the man of business proper is in part also at the same time *scholar*; – he knows how to fulfil his duty – this knowing is empty, universal, – or in the particular duty only the universal counts – This¹⁶⁷⁾ pure knowing is to be filled, has to give itself a content in itself – a free content which is at the same time a disinterested object – or in which I – have my thinking just as duty is – but so that this my thinking is at the same time free of me – this¹⁶⁸⁾ is *the*

167) *In the margin*: empty thinking of itself – as duty

168) *In the margin*: cultivated *public opinion*, treasury of maxims, of consciousness – concepts of right – and wrong – insight – against this public opinion one cannot – From it all changes proceed, and it *itself* is only the *conscious* lack of *advancing* spirit; what spirit has made its own – that is superfluous as *force*. When conviction has slackened – inner necessity, no force can hold it back – but wisdom of the government to know what spirit properly no longer wills – Its language formally *universality* – Thus French Revolution – abolition of the *privileged estates* – this accomplished – abolition of the inequality of estate, *empty talk* –

[274] *science* in general – Spirit here has some object or other which it treats without relation to desire and need – it is intelligence¹⁶⁹⁾ that knows itself – the object is the *concept* of some determinate thing or other – ascending from its sensuous constitution to its essence. – But it is an object appearing alien; a doing which treats the *thought* as such – externalizes *itself* as intelligence, not as absolute *actual self*;¹⁷⁰⁾ – the concept does not become object to itself. He raises his *thinking* into universality, effaces its *arbitrariness*, what is in itself and necessary.

169) *In the margin*: filled thinking –

170) *In the margin*: war, the government *inwardly*, single people – art, religion, *philosophy*

This missing moment is supplied in the *military estate*, – or the whole is individuality. – Its busyness for the existing whole,¹⁷¹⁾ its thinking of it, goes back into the self – the whole is individual, people, turned against others; the restoration of the indifferent standing of individuals towards one another, *state of nature*; only here is it *real*. – The relation is partly quiet subsistence of the individuals independently of one another, sovereignty; – partly connection through *treaties*; but the treaties do not have the *actuality* of the actual contract; not an *existing* power over them, but the individual people is precisely the universal as existing power – They must therefore

171) *In the margin*: *estate of honour*, being-recognised of opinion

[275] not be regarded after the manner of civil *contracts*; – they have no binding force as soon as one party sublates them – It is this eternal deceit¹⁷²⁾ of concluding treaties, binding oneself, and letting this obligation vanish again. – A universal league of peoples for perpetual peace¹⁷³⁾ would be the lordship of one people, or there would be only one people – their individuality obliterated – universal monarchy. – *Morality* has nothing to do in this relation; for it is the unfilled, individuality-less knowing of duty as such – insecurity, uncertainty – but security in the absolute certainty of oneself.

172) *In the margin*: labour for art and love one another; *model people* Jews – *waters become swamps** *
Alongside: empty dreaming perpetual peace, golden age

173) *In the margin*: war α) power against the actuality of the systems β) wisdom of the government – violation of the *principles*

The military estate and war are α) the actual sacrifice of the self, – the danger of death for the singular one; the intuiting of his abstract immediate negativity, just as he is likewise his immediately positive self; *crime* is a necessary moment in the concept of right and of law that holds force; – that each, as this singular one, makes himself into absolute power – beholds himself as absolutely free, – for himself and really against an other as the universal negativity; – in war it is granted to him – it is crime *for the universal*; the purpose the preservation of the whole – against the enemy who goes about destroying it – This externalization must have precisely this abstract form, be individuality-less, death be received and given coldly, not through the stationary battle where the singular one fixes his opponent in the eye and kills him in immediate hatred – but death is given and received empty.¹⁷⁴⁾

174) *In the margin*: *impersonally* out of the powder smoke –

[276] In¹⁷⁵⁾ this individuality, as absolute self and negativity of the singular ones, the government, the apex of the whole, is completed; – α) as war it is shaking itself as *subsisting*, the organisation of its estates, – and the systems of *right*, of personal security and property, which reach through everything, – in this it comes to intuition that they vanish in the power of the universal¹⁷⁶⁾ – what in the concept is their transition into one another is here present; – their disruption, the subjugation and constraint under pure power – Here labouring and getting on in the world, right of property and security of the person, are not this absolute subsisting, but rather their damage; the rooting of the singular one in his existence, this falling apart of the whole into atoms, effaces itself here; – the singular one has his absolute freedom, and precisely this is the strength of the government.¹⁷⁷⁾ – This immediate pure will is likewise self-conscious will; the *government* is this willing is the abstract universal of right etc.; it is the resolve, the singular willing. – *Wisdom* of the government – firstly – to adapt these abstract moments¹⁷⁸⁾ to the estates in general – and in single cases to make exceptions from the law. – Execution in general is not this dead doing,¹⁷⁹⁾ – but the singularising of the universal is

175) *In the margin*: government the *spirit* of nature certain of itself

176) *In the margin*: police

177) *In the margin*: cunning of the *government*, letting the *self-interest** of the others act; right; the understanding of the merchant knows what matters [in reality –] to turn to their *use*, to place them so that it goes back into it * *Alongside*: α) *crudeness* β) *morality* γ) the sciences and truth, *spinning out truths* salutary to the human race –

178) *In the margin*: waters which, unmoved by the wind, become swamps –

179) *In the margin*: cunning – having-returned-into-itself – the government this busy doing

[277] precisely to sublimate it, and [in the] singular to act in opposition to it.¹⁸⁰⁾ It is the *spirit certain of itself*, which, free of spirit, does what is right, acts immediately –¹⁸¹⁾

180) *In the margin*: spirit of the government* as universal disposition * *Alongside*: certain of itself in its simplicity to give and to take

181) *In the margin*: spirit certain of itself come to the rest of universality within itself

Spirit¹⁸²⁾ is thus fulfilled freedom. – *Estate, determinate character* as reality, and an abstract system, reaching through it, of the subsisting of the singular ones – branches of the powers – but likewise freedom from what subsists, as such, and spirit immediately conscious of itself.

182) *In the margin*: γ) *ethical life*, spirit certain of itself – self-certainty – which has made the *heart* into the grave of its heart – all joys and sorrows of its heart – all sins and crimes forgiven itself – and acted as if nothing had happened – its duty without further ado only its conceit – about *estate*, about what it has *endured*, what it has done – *complete culture, dangers of death*, labours etc. *forgotten*, rest in the immediate *present* – not narrow-minded moral concepts

C. Art, religion and science

Cross-reference: On the relation of state and church, the Remark to § 270; on world history § 341 ff.

Absolutely free spirit,¹⁸³⁾ which has taken its determinations back into itself, now brings forth another world; a world which has the *shape* of itself; where its work is completed within itself, and it attains to the intuition of *itself as itself* – As intelligence what is has the shape of an other – as will,

183) *In the margin*: spirit as nature, its own nature, quiet equanimity, – to intuition

[278] of itself – *being-recognised* is the spiritual element; but still indeterminate in itself, and therefore filled with manifold content – the law that holds force is the movement of this content – or the universal intuiting itself as mediation – the constitution is its generation of the *content* out of itself, it constitutes *itself*, but in the form of the object, – it makes *itself* into the content, and as government it is spirit certain of itself, which knows that this is *its* content, it the power over it; *spiritual* content. It has thus now to generate this content as such, as self-knowing –

Thus it is *immediately art*. The infinite knowing which is immediately living, its own fulfilment, which has all the neediness of nature and of external necessity, of the diremption of knowing from itself and from its truth – taken back into itself – It is immediately the *form* to which the content is indifferent, and which could toss itself about in any – can bring each to intuition as infinite; lets its *inner* life, – or its spirit come forth – makes it as spirit into the object – It wavers between the shape and the pure I of it – and so between plastic and musical art – the latter is pure hearing, in which shaping [brings] only vanishing sounding to existence, and the melody of movement moves under harmony, the triad returned into itself – it is shapeless movement – the dance of this movement itself is the intuition-less – belonging to time – presentation – The other extreme, sculpture, is the resting presentation of the divine – Between the two falls painting, – the plastic, which takes *colour* into itself, the self-like in the form of feeling – *poetry*, the plastic as representation of the shape into the musical, whose sounding, expanded into language – has a content in itself.

Absolute art is that whose content is equal to the form, – everything can be raised into art – but this raising is an alien imagining; it must, as *existing* content – according to prosaic intuition, itself be equal to the form – this is spirit itself – *nature* poetry therefore the worst – land

[279] scape etc. because its animation contradicts the shape in which it immediately is – modern formalism of art – poetry of all things; longing of all, – not an external force – things are so *in themselves*, in the divine intuition – but this *in-itself* is the abstract, which is unequal to their existence – This purely intellectual beauty – this music of things – has the Homeric plastic as its opposite – the former unsensuous, the latter sensuous intuition – here not the form of the symbol, of meaning, it is only touched upon softly, from afar; – here the *meaning* itself is to come forth – but the shape is lost. Art is in this contradiction with itself – when it is self-standing, of having to be extended into allegory, and then it has vanished as individuality, and the meaning reduced into individuality, so the former is not expressed.

Art generates the world as spiritual and for *intuition* – it is the Indian Bacchus, who is not the clear spirit knowing itself, but *inspired spirit* – spirit enveloping itself in feeling and image, under which the terrible is hidden. – Its element is intuition – but this is *immediacy*, which is not mediated – this element is therefore inadequate to spirit. Art can therefore give its shapes only a limited spirit; – beauty is form, it is the deception of absolute liveliness, which suffices to itself, and would be closed and completed within itself. – This medium of finitude; intuition cannot grasp the infinite; it is only *supposed* infinity. This god as statue, this world of song which encloses heaven and earth, the universal essences in mythical individual form, and the singular essences, self-consciousness; – it is *supposed*, not *true* representation, – it is not necessity, – not the shape of *thinking* in it; – beauty is rather the veil which covers the truth than the presentation of it. – Or as *form* of liveliness, – the content does not correspond [to it], it is limited; the artist therefore often demands that the relation

[280] to art be only relation to form, and that one abstract from the content; – but this content men do not let be taken from them – They demand essence – not mere form – The connoisseur is this observer of pure poetry, and of the understanding of the artist, [whether] the motifs, the detail, which is determined through the whole and brings it out – are chosen with understanding, the parts kept well apart, etc.

Art in its truth is rather *religion*. Elevation of the world of art into the unity of absolute spirit; – in the former each *singular* gains through beauty free life of its own – but the truth of the singular spirits is to be a moment in the movement of the whole – knowing of *absolute* spirit of itself as absolute *spirit*; it itself is the *content* of *art*, which is only the self-production of it, as self-conscious life reflected into itself in general –

In art α) this singular self *one* is only a particular one, the artist; – the enjoyment of the others is the selfless, universal intuition of beauty β) the determinateness is singular content – hence its immediacy as existence – as of the self separated from *beauty* – from the unity of individuality and universality, or of the self and its universal existence. – In religion, however, spirit becomes object to itself as absolutely universal, or as essence of all nature [, of] being and doing, and in *the shape* of the immediate self – the self is universal knowing, and the return thereby into itself – Absolute religion is this knowing – that *God is the depth of spirit certain of itself*, – thereby he is the self of all – The *essence* is pure thinking, – *but externalized of this abstraction, he is actual self*; he is a *man*, *who has common spatial and temporal existence* – *and this singular one is all singular ones* – *the divine nature is not an other than the human* – all other religions are *imperfect*; – either only essence – the terrible of the power of nature, in which the self is only null – or the beautiful religion, – the mythical – a play,

[281] which, not worthy of the essence, is without *thoroughness* and *depth*, where the deep is the unknown fate. But absolute religion is the deep that has stepped forth into the light of day – this deep is the I – it is the concept, the absolute pure power.

(In it, then, spirit is reconciled with its world – spirit as existing is its organisation and coming-to-be through the estates, determinate character, and determinate duty; each self has a restricted purpose, and likewise limited doing, – the knowing of itself as essence – in right and duty – is, as pure essence and pure knowing, empty, – as filled, a limited manifoldness – and immediate actuality a likewise singular thing. – Morality is the elevation above the estate, in its doing, to bring itself and the doing of its estate further; – to do something for the universal –)

But the *government* stands above all – spirit which knows itself as universal essence and universal actuality; – the absolute self – in religion each raises himself to this intuition of himself as [a] universal self – His nature, *his estate*, sinks away like a dream image, like *a distant island appearing at the edge of the horizon as a little cloud of haze* – he is equal to the prince – it is the knowing of himself as spirit – he counts for as much before God as any other. It is the externalization of his whole sphere, of his whole existing world, – not that externalization which is only form, *culture*, and whose content is again sensuous existence – but the *universal* one of the whole of actuality; this externalization gives it back to itself as something perfect –

But both realms, of actuality and of heaven, thus still come to lie apart – Beyond this world spirit is reconciled only with itself, not in its *present* – If it is satisfied in this, then it is not spirit raising itself above its existence; it is to be shaken in this, and it is shaken in it through war and need and *flee*s out of *existence into*

[282] *thought*, but it is a *longing for heaven, and a longing likewise for the earth; the former is the *pis aller*. – It has satisfied through religion, the trust that the events of the world and nature are reconciled with spirit, and that no discord, no unreconciled, selfless necessity reigns in them –*

Religion, however, is represented spirit, the self which does not bring together its pure consciousness and its actual one, to which the content of the former stands opposed in the latter as an other. –

The¹⁸⁴⁾ thought – inner Idea – of absolute religion is this speculative Idea, that the self, the actual, is thinking; – essence and being the same, – this so posited that *God, the otherworldly absolute essence, has become man* – this *actual* one, – but likewise this actuality has sublated itself, become a past one, and this God, who [is] actuality and sublated, i.e. universal actuality, is the spirit of the congregation – *That*¹⁸⁵⁾ *God is spirit – this is the content of this religion and the object of this consciousness – α) of pure consciousness α) eternal essence, Son, and Spirit, here all the same essence; not the difference, the indifference of immediate being posited this*¹⁸⁶⁾ *β) God, the essence of pure consciousness, becomes to himself an other, which*

184) *In the margin:* Religion* *representing* the unity of *knowing* and of *truth* – or as spirit [, which] is *absolute essence*, not dead essence but this life within itself – as living God – * *Alongside:* the same as spirit of the people only immediacy

185) *In the margin:* α *true religion* – in so far as the absolute essence is spirit β *revealed religion* without mystery – for God is the self – God is man.

186) *In the margin:* β) philosophy nature, *which goes into itself*; becomes evil* – but conversely this being within itself is the loss of the positive, *in itself*; God takes on the shape of the *self*; this which is *in itself*, the presupposed, presents itself in its existence** – precisely that the divine *sacrifices* itself – that *abstract essence*; it is not man that dies – but *the divine*; precisely thereby it becomes man – * *Above:* concept the pure *negativity* ** *Above:* externalization, culture – of abstract essence

[283] is world – but this *existence* is concept – *being within itself*, evil, and nature, the immediate, must be represented as evil, each come to the insight into his evil nature – i.e. that nature turns over into the concept, the *evil, being for itself*, against the essence that is *in itself*, but conversely [is] likewise the essence *that is in itself*; i.e. *God appears in nature – as actual*; everything beyond has fled – That, now, this opposition itself is null – evil, the actuality that is for itself, is not in itself, but is universal – this is presented precisely in the sacrifice of the divine man – α) the sacrifice of divinity, i.e. of the abstract otherworldly essence, has already taken place in its becoming actual β) the sublating of actuality the becoming of its universality¹⁸⁷⁾ – universal spirit – but this a representation for consciousness; – likewise γ) the universality of the self in itself – i.e. the congregation must renounce its being-for-itself and immediate nature – or regard it precisely as evil, and this view of evil sublates itself through the grasping of that representation. – Presentation in the *cult*,¹⁸⁸⁾ in which that self gives itself the consciousness of unity with the essence. – *Devotion* knows itself in it; cult.

187) *In the margin: immediate self – reconciled nature* – imagining of the divine into everything natural – peopling with saints, history of saints – apparitions – everywhere *immediate presence* (new earth, natural sun extinguished) – *pain of religion – pure feeling of externalization* –

188) *In the margin: enjoys the body and blood which daily sacrifices itself in its congregation, and becomes this singular self.*

This¹⁸⁹⁾ universal spirit, or the spirit of the congregation, is the *state of the church*,

189) *In the margin: synthetic connection of state and church*

[284] – the *existing* actual spirit, become object to itself as spirit – but as representation and faith – It *is* the spirit of the congregation – but in its representation it flees beyond its self, far away from it – that immediate knowing and this otherness are not united – Everything¹⁹⁰⁾ has the form of representation, of the beyond – without concept – without necessity, – happening – chance – True, the word eternal counsel and will of God¹⁹¹⁾ – but only said, not understood – not concept, not self.

190) *In the margin*: the *in-itself* is distant – the *reconciliation* in its *being* took place long ago

191) *In the margin*: *pain*, not thinking – not universal

The church has its opposite in the state, i.e. in *existing* spirit; it is *the latter* raised into thought; man lives in two worlds¹⁹²⁾ – in the one he has *his actuality*, *which vanishes*, his naturalness, his sacrifice, his transience – in the other his absolute preservation – knows himself as absolute *essence* – He dies away from actuality with knowledge and will, in order to acquire the eternal – *the non-actual, life in thought – universal self* – But *this eternal has its existence in the spirit of the people* – it is *spirit, which is just only spirit* – *through this movement* – still opposed in form, [is] the same in essence – *The government* knows this, *the spirit of the people* knows that it is the actual spirit which contains itself and the thought of itself. – The *fanaticism* of the church is – *wanting to introduce the eternal, the kingdom of heaven as such on earth*, i.e. *in opposition to the actuality of the state* – to *preserve fire in water* – precisely *the actuality of the kingdom of heaven is the state* – reconciliation in thinking of the essences of the two with one another through the church – If they are unreconciled – then state and church are imperfect. – The state is the spirit of actuality; what shows itself in it must be in conformity with it; it does not have to respect conscience, – this is the inner; whether it is valid as action or as principle of action

192) *In the margin*: he is *assured of his reconciliation* – in devotion enjoyment not present

[285] must show itself from the action itself – The church is spirit knowing itself as universal – the inner, *absolute security* of the state; the singular one counts as singular – everything external is in itself insecure and unstable;¹⁹³⁾ in it its complete guarantee; what man does out of religion he does out of his own thinking,¹⁹⁴⁾ in so far as it is not an insight – the universal thought, not forsaking one in all the different manifoldness of the singular, this is duty – or to this I must surrender myself; it *is*, is justified in the absolute essence – morality in the absolute essence, in so far as it is *my knowing* – there absolute essence in general.

193) *In the margin*: They work only on the singular; they do not count absolutely –

194) *In the margin*: *God is everywhere* – is pure thinking, when man is secretly with himself – his solitude, his thinking, is precisely with him

Religion as such is in need of existence, of immediate actuality – it [is] the *universal*,¹⁹⁵⁾ hence under the lordship of the state, – and is used by it, serves it – used – for it is the actuality-less, which has its *self* in actual spirit, and thus is as sublated. – Conversely it is again thinking that raises itself above its actuality; this inner obstinacy which gives up its existence and is ready to die for its thought, – [is] the unconquerable, which dies for the thought, – to which pure *thought* is everything, [has] its inner thinking as such or the *meaning* of the doing which otherwise appears as a contingent one – So high has thinking as such been raised – gone joyfully to death for the sake of faith – But the state which subjects itself to the church is either given over to fanaticism, and lost, or else [there] would be introduced the rule of priests, which demands not the externalization of doing and existence and determinate thought, but of will as such, and indeed in existence as such, and indeed not against the universal, being-recognised – but against a singular will as such.

195) *In the margin*: particular estate, determinate character.

From religion heaven flees in actual consciousness – man falls down to earth – and finds the religious only in imagination, in it –

[286] Or this selflessness of religion is so in itself that it is spirit that only represents itself – i.e. that its moments have for it the form of *immediacy* and of *happening*; – that they are not comprehended, not understood. – The content of religion is indeed *true*; but this *being-true* is an assurance – without insight –

This *insight* is philosophy, absolute *science* – the same content as that of religion – but form of the *concept* – α) speculative philosophy absolute *being* which to itself an other, (*becomes relation*) life and cognition – and knowing knowing, spirit, knowing of spirit of itself – β) philosophy of nature – expression of the Idea in the shapes of immediate being – It is the going into itself, *evil*, becoming spirit; the concept *existing as concept*; but this pure intelligence is likewise the opposite, the universal, and indeed that which sacrifices itself and thereby becomes actual – and universal actuality, is the people, restored nature, the reconciled essence, in which each takes his being-for-itself through his own externalization and sacrifice. –

In philosophy it is *I* as such which is knowing of absolute spirit, in the concept within itself, as *this* one which is universal. – Here [it is] not an *other* nature, not the *non-present* unity, not a reconciliation whose enjoyment and existence is beyond and future, but *here* – *here I cognises* the absolute; it cognises – it *comprehends* – it is no other – *Immediately*, it is *this* self. – I is this inseparable linking of the singular and the universal – and of singularity as universal of all nature – and of the universal, of all *essentiality*, of all *thinking*. The *immediacy* of spirit is the spirit of the people – or it as *existing* absolute spirit – Religion thinking spirit, which, however, does *not think itself*; not itself – hence not equality with itself – not immediacy. This knowing of philosophy is restored immediacy; – it itself is the form of mediation, *of the concept*; as immediacy it is spirit knowing itself in general – and it is *consciousness*, *immediate* sensuous consciousness – which is an other to itself under the form of what is – the dir-empted into *nature* – *and knowing*

[287] *of itself* – It is its *resting* work of art – the *existing universe*, and *world history*. – Philosophy externalizes itself – arrives at its beginning, immediate consciousness – which is precisely the dirempted – It is thus man in general – and as the point of man is – so is the world – and as it is, so is he – One stroke creates them both – What was before this time – the other of *time* – not another *time*, but eternity, the thought of time – in this the question is sublated; for it means *another time*; – but thus eternity itself is in time; it is a before of time – thus itself past – it *has been*; absolutely been, it *is* not – *Time* is the pure concept – the intuited empty *self* in its movement, as space in its rest – Before filled time is, time is not at all – Its filling is the actual returned into itself out of empty time – its intuiting of itself is time – the non-objective – But if we say *before* the world – time without filling – the thought of time, precisely the thinking, that reflected into itself. – It is necessary to go out beyond this time, every period – but into the thought of time; – the former [is the] bad infinity, which never reaches that – whither it goes.

This diremption is the *eternal* creating, i.e. the creating of the *concept* of spirit – this substance of the concept which bears itself and its opposite. – The universe, thus immediately free of spirit – but must return to it – or rather the *doing* is its, this movement – it has to establish the unity for itself – likewise in the form of immediacy, it is *world history*.¹⁹⁶⁾ In it this is sublated, that nature and spirit are one *essence* only *in themselves* – spirit comes to knowing of it.

¹⁹⁶⁾ *In the margin*: man does not become master over nature until he has become so over himself – It is becoming *spirit in itself*; – that this in-itself may *exist*, spirit must comprehend itself –