

System of Ethical Life

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[*Fair-copy draft, 1802/03*]

Hegel's manuscript from the autumn and winter of 1802/03, an unfinished fair copy of 22 sheets, not published in his lifetime. The title was given by Karl Rosenkranz; Georg Mollat published a first, incomplete edition in 1893, Georg Lasson the complete text in 1913. Translated from the text of the Gesammelte Werke (vol. 5, "Schriften und Entwürfe (1799–1808)", ed. Manfred Baum and Kurt Rainer Meist, 1998, pp. 279–361). Additions by the editors stand in square brackets, as does the heading [Introduction]; the critical apparatus and the page numbers of the manuscript are not reproduced. Towards the end the fair copy turns into brief notes in keyword form.

The figures between vertical bars, e.g. |293|, mark the beginning of a page of the printed edition, so that a passage can be found again in one's own copy.

The notes reproduce Hegel's marginal notes; the italic indication before them (e.g. "Alongside and further down in the margin:") is the editors' of the Gesammelte Werke. The enumerators α , β , γ , δ and the Hebrew letters aleph (א), bet (ב) and gimel (ג) stand thus in Hegel's manuscript.

Cross-reference: Hegel's first draft of a whole practical philosophy, still in Schelling's conceptual language (intuition and concept, "potencies"). Many doctrines of the *Groundlines* appear here for the first time: need, labour and the tool (§ 189 ff.), possession, exchange and contract (§ 45 ff., § 72 ff.), crime and punishment (§ 90 ff.), the estates (§ 201 ff.) and the government (§ 272 ff.). The essay on natural right, in which Hegel uses the expression "system of ethical life", was written at the same time. At each section the corresponding place is noted as a cross-reference. The German text is on the German side of this edition.

[Introduction]

Cross-reference: The Idea of absolute ethical life as the unity of intuition and concept. In the *Ground-lines* ethical life is “the Idea of freedom”, § 142 ff.

In order to cognise the Idea of absolute ethical life, intuition must be posited as perfectly adequate to the concept, for the Idea is itself nothing other than the identity of the two; but in order that this identity may be cognised, it must be thought as a being-adequate; but because they are held apart in being-equal, they are posited with a difference, the one in the form of universality, the other in the form of particularity, over against the other; so that this equating may thereby become complete, then conversely that which [was] here posited in the form of particularity [must] now be posited in the form of universality, and that which was posited in the form of universality now be posited in the form of particularity. But that which is truly the universal is intuition, while the truly particular is the absolute concept; each must therefore be posited over against the other once under the form of particularity, the other time under the form of universality; the one time intuition subsumed under the concept, the other time the concept under intuition; although the latter relation is the absolute one, for the reason given, the former is just as absolutely necessary, in order that complete equality might be there for cognition; for the latter is itself only one, and only One, relation; and so the absolute equality of intuition and cognition is not posited in it. Now the Idea of absolute ethical life is the taking-back of absolute reality into itself, as into a unity; in such a way that this taking-back and this unity is absolute totality; its intuition is an absolute people; its concept is the absolute being-one of individualities.

First, intuition must be subsumed under the concept; through this, absolute ethical life appears as nature; for nature itself is nothing other

[280] than the subsumption of intuition under the concept, whereby, therefore, intuition, the unity, remains the inner, while the multiplicity of the concept and its absolute movement come forth to the surface. In this subsumption, then, the intuition of ethical life, which is a people, becomes a manifold reality, or a singularity, a single human being, and thereby the absolute taking-back of nature into itself becomes something hovering above this singular one, or something formal, for the formal is precisely the unity which is not in itself absolute concept, or absolute movement. At the same time, precisely because this unity hovers above the singular one, he does not get out of it, he does not abstract from it, but it is in him, though hidden in him; and, in this contradiction, that this inner light does not absolutely flash together and become one with the universal light hovering above him, it appears as something driving him towards it, as drive, striving. Or, the identity of the particular (on whose side intuition has now stepped) and of the universal is thereby determined as an incomplete unification, or as a *relation*.

I. Absolute ethical life according to relation

Cross-reference: Natural ethical life: need, labour and enjoyment; in the *Groundlines* the system of needs, § 189 ff., on labour and the tool § 196–§ 198; on love, parents and children § 158 ff. and § 173 ff.

Just as in the foregoing, this must be divided; this absolute ethical life according to relation, – or natural ethical life, must be considered in such a way that the concept is subsumed under intuition, and in such a way that intuition is subsumed under the concept; in the former the unity, the universal, is the inner; in the latter it steps over against it and is again in relation with the concept or the particular. In both, ethical life is a drive, that is, the drive α) does not become absolutely one with the absolute unity, β) it goes towards the singular, γ) is satisfied in this singular; this singular satisfaction is itself totality; but δ . at the same time it goes beyond it, though this going-beyond is here something negative, indeterminate, in general.

[281] Satisfaction itself is nothing other than that the concept and intuition are one; it is therefore totality, living, but formal, precisely because this stage on which it stands is itself a determinate one; so that absolute life both hovers above it and remains something inner; but it remains inner because it is not absolute concept, and thus, as inner life, is not at the same time present under the form of the opposed, the external; and for that very reason it is not absolute intuition, because it is not present for the subject in the relation as such, and so its identity, too, cannot be the absolute one.

A.

The first potency is natural ethical life as *intuition*; its complete differencelessness, or the being-subsumed of the concept under intuition; thus nature proper.

But the ethical is, in and for itself, according to its essence, a taking-back of difference into itself, reconstruction; identity arises out of difference, is negative in its essence; that it may be this is preceded by there being that which it annihilates. Hence this ethical naturalness, too, is an unveiling, an emergence of the universal against the particular, but in such a way that this emergence is itself wholly a particular one, while the identical, absolute quantity, remains wholly hidden; this intuition is, as such, wholly sunk in the singular *feeling*; and we shall call this the *practical* potency.

Its essence is that feeling (not what is called ethical feeling) is something wholly singular and particular, but, as such, divided, a difference which is not to be sublated otherwise than through its negation, that of the division into subjective and objective, which being-sublated is itself a perfect singularity and differenceless identity.

The feeling of division is *need*; feeling as the being-sublated of division is *enjoyment*.

The distinguishing character as potency is that feeling is in the particular,

[282] and goes towards the singular, and that it is absolutely feeling. But this feeling, which goes towards sublating the division of subjectivity and objectivity, must itself present itself as totality, and must therefore be the totality of the potencies.

This feeling a) subsuming the concept b) subsumed under the concept.

a)

When feeling is presented as subsuming the concept, its formal concept is presented: this is properly its concept, which was set out above; that [there are] α) the being-sublated of the wholly absolutely identical, unconscious, the division, and this division as feeling or need β) the difference against this division¹⁾ which difference, however, is negative, namely an annihilation of the division; thus an annihilating of the subjective and objective, of the empirical objective intuition according to which the object of need is outside, or effort and labour; γ) the being-annihilated of the object; or the identity of the first two moments; conscious feeling, i.e. one [that] comes out of difference, *enjoyment*.

1) *Alongside and further down in the margin*: Desire ideal determination of the object

The subsumption of feeling under the concept, or the real concept of practical feeling, spread out in its dimensions, necessarily presents feeling a) in its dimensions according to the nature of the form or of the concept, b) but in such a way that in all of them a whole, feeling, remains, and that form is something wholly external to it.

α . practical feeling, or enjoyment, an intuitionless and differenceless,

[283] and thus reasonless, identity, which therefore goes towards the absolute annihilation of the object, and is likewise a complete indifference of the subject, which, for the ethical, is without the bringing-out of a middle uniting the opposites within itself, and is thus not the taking-back of intuiting into itself, and thus no cognising of itself in it.

$\alpha\alpha$) need is here an absolute singularity, a feeling restricting itself to the subject, which belongs wholly to nature, and whose multiplicity and system it is not the place here to comprehend. Eating, drinking.

$\beta\beta$. through this difference an inner and an outer are immediately posited, and this outer is determined absolutely according to the determinacy of the feeling (something edible, something drinkable). This outer thereby ceases to be something universal, identical, quantitative, and becomes a singular particular; the subject, notwithstanding its being-singular in this feeling and in the relation posited in the division, remains in itself something indifferent; it is the universal, the potency, the subsuming; the determinacy which the object of enjoyment receives in this potency is wholly ideal, or subjective; immediately its own opposite; the determinacy does not enter into the objectivity of intuition, so that something would arise for the subject which it would cognise as identity of the subjective and objective; – or this identity is posited solely in the individual; hence the object, since it is determined purely ideally, is absolutely annihilated.

$\gamma\gamma$) this enjoyment, in which the object is determined purely ideally and is wholly annihilated, is the purely sensuous one; satiation, which is the restoration of the indifference and emptiness of the individual, or of its mere possibility of being ethical or rational; it is merely negative, because it goes towards the absolute singularity of the individual and thereby towards the annihilating of the objective and universal. But enjoyment remains practical according to its essence, and distinguishes itself from absolute self-feeling by the fact that it comes out of difference, and that to this extent a consciousness of the negativity of the object is in it.

b

this feeling in the form of difference, or of the being-subsumed of intuition under the concept, must itself likewise be comprehended as totality;

$\alpha\alpha$) as negative practical intuiting (labour) $\beta\beta$. difference (product and possession) $\gamma\gamma$. tool.

Practical feeling subsumed under the concept presents the moments of totality, thrown apart from one another, as reality; these moments are:

α)²⁾ the annihilation of the object, or of intuition, but as moment, in such a way that this annihilation is replaced by another intuition or object; or the pure identity, the activity of annihilating, is fixed; in it, therefore, abstraction is made from enjoyment, i.e. it does not come to that; for here every abstraction is a reality, a being; the object is not annihilated as object in general, but in such a way that another is put in its place; for in this annihilating, as the abstraction, there is not the object, or there is not enjoyment. But this annihilating is *labour*; through which that which is determined by desire, insofar as it is for itself something not determined by desire, real for itself, is sublated, and the being-determined by desire is posited objectively as intuition; in labouring the difference of desire and enjoyment is posited; enjoyment is checked and deferred, it becomes ideal, or a relation, and in this relation through labour there is now immediately posited as coming forth: $\aleph$) the relating of the subject to the object, or the ideal determination of the object by desire; this is *taking possession*; $\beth$) then the

2) *Alongside and further down in the margin, continued below the text:* α intuition is subsumed under the concept; labouring itself is the subsuming of the object, the subject is the indifference, the subsuming, where the subject is the subsuming, the concept is dominant

[285] real annihilation of its form, for the objective or the difference remains, or the activity of labour itself, finally 1) the *possession* of the product, or the possibility of annihilating it, as something [real for itself], both through that first relating, according to its matter, and through the second, of the annihilation of its form and of the giving of form by the subject, – and of passing over to enjoyment, which, however, remains wholly ideal.

Possession is not present at all in the first potency of practical feeling, and likewise taking possession purely as moment; or rather they are not real, not held apart, fixed. (Of a ground of right, or a side of possession pertaining to right, there can be no question here at all.)

Taking possession is the ideal element of this subsuming, or its rest; labour, the reality, or the movement, the entering of the subsuming subject into the reality of the object; the third, the synthesis, is possession and the storing and saving of the object; in it there is that ideal determination according to the first moment, but as real in the object according to the second.

β . In α the product has already been formally determined; as identity of the ideal determination, but of this as objective, real, checked; but the essential thing was the identity, the activity as such, and hence as something inner, which does not come forth; it must come forth in the object, and this second potency $\beta\beta$ considers the relation of checked feeling to the object checked in annihilation, or the difference which is also in labour, namely the difference which lies between the reality and proper nature of the object, and its being ideally determined and being-determined by labour; in $\alpha\alpha$ the object was the subsumed, here it is the subject; or in $\alpha\alpha$ the ideal relation in labour was considered, here the real one; here labour is properly *subsumed under intuition*; for the object is in itself the universal; hence, where it is subsuming, the singularity of the subject has its proper rational place; it is concept in itself, difference, and subsumes.

Labour in $\alpha\alpha$ is wholly mechanical, for singularity, abstraction, pure causality, is in the form of indifference and is the dominant, and hence something external for the object; for causality is thereby in truth posited, since this subject [is] a singular, absolutely for-itself-being, and thus absolute division and difference. Where, on the other hand, the object and the universal is subsuming, there is

[286] no causality, for it is in itself the indifference of the particular; and one with the particular, for which particularity is thereby mere external form, not the inner essence, being-subject.

In that the object subsumes labour under itself, it is real in the relation (as previously annihilated, posited as mere abstraction of an object), for as subsuming it is identity of the universal and particular, the latter in abstraction against the subject; hence labour, too, is a real or living labour, and its livingness is to be cognised as totality, but each moment itself as a living labour of its own, as a particular object.

For the subsuming living object and living labour, intuition is subsumed under the concept, then the concept under intuition; and then the identity of both.

$\alpha\alpha$) the living object subsumed under the concept is the plant, bound to the element, or to the pure quantity of the earth, and producing itself against the element of air in an infinitely manifold (through the concept) production of its own whole individuality and totality; each part of the plant is itself an individual, a complete plant; it maintains itself against its inorganic nature only [by] producing itself wholly at each point of contact, or (dies off at the stem); it is given over to producing (to the absolute concept, that of being the opposite of itself). Because it thus stands under the power of the element, labour, too, is directed chiefly against the element, and is mechanical, but it leaves it to the element to compel the plant to produce; labour cannot have, or can have but little, of the plant's specific livingness; it is the more living through the fact that it wholly alters only the external form of the element, does not destroy it chemically, and that this is an inorganic nature which itself is only in relation to the living; and lets this have its way.

$\beta\beta$ the concept of the living subsumed under intuition is the animal; for since this subsumption is itself one-sided, not in turn subsuming intuition under the concept in the same way, livingness is an empirically real one, infinitely dispersed, and presenting itself in the most manifold forms;

[287] for the form, or the absolute concept, is not itself in turn unity, universality; it is thus an individuality without intelligence; not, as with the plant, each unity of the individual itself a multitude of such, but indifference in more extended difference and distinction.

Labour against the animal is thus directed less at its inorganic nature than at the organic nature itself, because the objective is not an external element but the indifference of individuality. The subsuming is determined as a subduing of the particularity of the animal for the kind of use that is appropriate to its nature; at times more negative, a subjugating, at times more positive, as a trust of the animal; at times also, as against the plant, elemental, for those animals which are destined to be annihilated in eating, so that merely their natural producing is determined.

If the use of plants is very simple, and if labour for them is to be exhibited as a need of the subject, or as it is present in subjective form, then this is inorganic, or little organised and individualised, nourishment, thus no nourishment of a higher difference of the individual, the human or the animal; a weak irritability, a feeble going-out, an annihilating which, because of the weak individuality of the plant, is itself a weak one – and then, for pleasure, there are sensuous enjoyments which are finer than annihilating because the plant is not annihilated (smelling, seeing); or this is the potency of the enjoyment of plants, like the potency towards the animal, its taming; it concerns the senses, for the senses are the animal potency in man, an individuality of feeling which, as sense, is an individual, not like an arm etc., but a complete organisation. The eating of the plant is, as enjoyment, subsumption of the concept under intuition as feeling; labour for the plant, on the other hand, is subsumption of intuition under the concept. Thus the cultivation of plants, their taming, is subsumption of the concept under intuition on the side of labour; as³⁾ enjoyment, the reverse, for the enjoyment of the singular senses is a singularising of it.

3) *Alongside and further down in the margin:* NB. Enjoyment and labour are the reverse of one another with regard to subsumption.

[288] The taming of animals, considered subjectively, is a more manifold need, but insofar as they are means, they cannot yet be considered here, for that would not be a subsumption of the concept under intuition, not the respect of living labour; – this is an associating of them for movement and strength, and the joyfulness of this augmentation is first of all the respect which belongs here.

γγ) the absolute identity of both potencies is that the concept of the first be one with the identity of the second, or be absolute concept; intelligence. Labour subsumed under this intuition is one-sided subsuming insofar as through it this subsuming itself is sublated; it is totality, precisely because the separated subsuming of the first and second potency is here posited at once; the human being is potency, universality, for the other, but the other likewise, and so his reality, his own peculiar being, makes the acting upon him into a reception into indifference, and he is now the universal against the first; and *culture* is this absolute alternation in the absolute concept, wherein each, being subject and universal absolutely at once, immediately makes his particularity into universality, and, in the wavering, in the momentary positing as potency, precisely posits himself as universal, and thereby has this being-potency, and universality unmediated in the same, against himself, and thus himself becomes a particular. The ideal determination of the other is objective, but in such a way that this objectivity immediately also posits itself subjectively, and becomes cause; for in order that something be potency for the other, it must not merely be universality and indifference in relation to it, but be so as that which is for itself, posited, or a truly absolutely universal; and this is intelligence in the highest degree; in precisely the same respect a universal as it is a particular, both unmediated and absolutely one; whereas plant and animal are so in different respects.

That he is the identity of the first two potencies is the concept of this relation, but as totality it is itself under the form of the three potencies.

⌘) as feeling or as pure identity; according to it the object is determined as one that is desired; but here the living is not to be determined through working upon it; it is to be something absolutely living, and its reality, its [being] for itself, is to be absolutely so determined as that which is desired, i.e. through

[289] nature the relation of desire is perfectly objective, the one in the form of indifference, the other of being-particular; this highest organic polarity in the most perfect individuality of each pole is the highest unity which nature can bring forth; for it cannot go beyond this, that the difference is not real but absolutely ideal; the sexes are absolutely in relation, one the universal, the other the particular; not absolutely equal; hence their being-one, too, is not after the manner of the absolute concept, but, because it is perfect, the differenceless feeling. The annihilation of one's own form is mutual, but not absolutely equal; each intuitively itself in the other as at the same time something alien, and this is *love*; the incomprehensibility of this being-oneself in something alien therefore belongs to nature, not to ethical life, for the latter is, in relation to the different, absolute equality of both; in relation to being-one, absolute being-one through ideality; but that natural ideality remains in inequality and therefore in desire, in which the one is determined as a subjective, the other as an objective.

3. this same living relation, in such a way that in it intuition is subsumed under the concept, is ideal as determinacy of the opposed; but in such a way that, on account of the dominion of the concept, the difference remains, but without desire; or the determinacy of the opposed is a superficial one, not natural, real, and the practical does indeed go towards the sublation of this opposed determinacy, yet not in a feeling, but in such a way that it becomes intuition of itself in something alien, and thus ends with a perfect individuality standing over against it, whereby the being-one of nature is the more sublated. This is the relation of *parents* and *children*. The absolute being-one of the two separates immediately into the relation; the child is the subjective human being, but in such a way that this particularity is ideal, something external, only the form; the parents are the universal, and the labour of nature goes towards the sublation of this relation, as does that of the parents, who sublate ever more the external negativity of the child, and precisely thereby posit a greater inner negativity and thus a higher individuality.

[290] but the totality of labour is the perfect individuality and thus equality of the opposed, wherein the relation is posited and sublated, enters, appearing in time, at every moment and turns over into the opposite, according to the above; the universal interaction and *culture* of human beings; their absolute equality is here, too, in the inner, and according to the whole potency in which we are, the relation is constant only in the singular. A recognising that is mutual, or the highest individuality and external difference. Here, in these potencies, from the first to the third, things go apart, or the unification of feeling sublates itself; but precisely thereby so do desire and the need corresponding to it, and each is an equal, self-standing being. That the relation is also one of such love and feeling is external form, which does not concern its essence, which is the universality in which they stand.

c

The first two potencies are relative identities; the absolute identity is something subjective, outside them; but since this potency is itself totality, the rational, which lies hidden in the representation of the formal potencies, must come forth as such and be real. This rational is that which steps into the middle, and is of the nature of the subjective and objective, or the mediating of both.

This middle likewise exists under the form of the three potencies

α) the concept subsumed under intuition; belongs therefore wholly to nature, because the difference according to which the intelligent is, is not present in it as subsumption of intuition under the concept, and it is thus absolute indifference, not according to the naturalness occurring in the formal potencies, which cannot free itself from difference. At the same time this middle is not the formal identity which hitherto appeared as feeling, but a real absolute identity, a real absolute feeling, which is absolute middle, for itself, in this whole side of reality, exists as individual. Such a middle is the *child*; it is the highest individual natural feeling, a feeling of such a totality of the living

[291] sexes that they are wholly in it, so that it [is] absolutely real and itself for itself individual and real. The feeling is realised in that it is the absolute indifference of the natural beings, so that in it there is no one-sidedness, no lack of any circumstance; their unity is therefore immediately real, and because by nature itself they are real and separated, and cannot sublate their individuality, the reality of their unity is likewise a being of its own, real, and an individual; in this perfectly individualised and realised feeling the parents intuit their unity as reality; they are it themselves, and it is their visible identity and middle, born forth out of them; the real rationality of nature, wherein the difference of the sexes is completely effaced, and both are in absolute unity; living substance.

β) intuition subsumed under the concept is the middle in difference, or it is solely the form in which the real middle lies, while the substance is dead matter; the middle as such is wholly external according to the difference of the concept; the inner is pure empty quantity. This middle is the *tool*. Because in it the form or the concept is the dominant, it is torn away from nature, to which the middle of sexual love belongs, and is in ideality, as belonging to the concept; or the absolute reality which is present according to the essence of the concept. In the concept the identity is unfilled, empty; it shows only the extremes annihilating themselves; here the annihilation is checked, the emptiness is real, and the extremes are likewise fixed. On one side it is subjective, in the power of the labouring subject, and wholly determined by it, prepared and worked upon; on the other, objective, directed against the object of labour. Through this middle the subject sublates the immediacy of annihilating, for labour, as an annihilating of intuition, is just as much an annihilation of the subject, a negation, something positing mere quantitateness in it; hand and spirit become dulled by it; i.e. they themselves take on the nature of the negative and formless, just as, on the other side (for the negative, the difference, is twofold), labour is an absolutely singular subjective thing. In the tool the subject makes a middle between itself and the object, and this middle is the real rationality of labour; for that labour

[292] as such, and the object worked upon, are themselves means is a formal middle, since that for which they are lies outside them, and so the relating of the subjective to the objective is a completely separated one, remaining merely inside, within the subjective, in the thought of intelligence. In the tool the subject separates its becoming dulled, and objectivity, from itself; it gives up another thing to annihilation, and shifts onto it the subjective part of that annihilation; at the same time its labour ceases to be something singular; the subjectivity of labour is raised in the tool to something universal; anyone can imitate it and labour in the same way; it is to that extent the constant rule of labour.

On account of this rationality of the tool, it stands, as the middle, higher both than labouring and than the object worked upon (for enjoyment, of which we are speaking here), and than enjoyment, or the purpose; and for this reason, too, all peoples standing in the natural potency have so honoured the tool, and in Homer we find respect for it, and the consciousness of it, most beautifully expressed.

γ. The tool stands under the dominion of the concept, and therefore belongs to different or mechanical labour; the child is the middle as absolutely pure, simple intuition. But the totality of both must have precisely this simplicity, yet at the same time the ideality of the concept; or, in the child, the ideality of the extremes of the tool must enter into its substantial essence; in the tool, precisely thereby, an ideality must enter [into] the dead inner, and the reality of the extremes disappear; it must be a middle which is perfectly ideal; as absolute ideality there is only the absolute concept, or intelligence; the middle must be intelligent; but not individual, nor subjective; of the former only an infinitely vanishing and self-presenting appearance; a light ethereal body, which passes away as it is formed; not a subjective intelligence, nor an accident of it, but rationality itself, as real, but in such a way that this reality is itself ideal and infinite, and in its being is immediately also its opposite, namely not to be; thus an ethereal body which presents the extremes, and so is real according to the concept, but also has its ideality, in that the essence of this body is to pass away immediately, and its appearance is this immediate

[293] being-tied-together of appearing and passing away. Such a middle is thereby intelligent; it is subjective, or in the individuals of intelligence, but objectively universal in its corporeality, and that being-subjective is, [on account] of the immediacy of the nature of this essence, immediately as objectivity. This ideal rational middle is *speech*, the tool of reason, the child of intelligent beings. The substance of speech is, like the child, the most indeterminate, purest, most negative, most sexless, and, on account of its absolute softness and transparency, capable of all forms; its reality is completely taken up into ideality; and at the same time it is individual, it has form or a reality, it is a subject, something being for itself; it must thereby be distinguished from the formal concept of speech, for which objectivity as such is a speech; but this objectivity is only an abstraction; for the reality of the object is subjective in another way than it is subjective; objectivity is not itself absolute subjectivity.

The totality of speech in the form of the potencies

8. of nature, or of inner identity, the unconscious assuming of a body which passes away as quickly as it is, but which is a singular, has only the form of objectivity, does not carry itself in itself and upon itself, but appears in an alien reality and substance. Gesture, mien, and the totality of these, the affection of the eye, is not fixed objectivity or the abstraction of it, but it is volatilised, and an accident; a mobile, ideal play; but this ideality is only play in another, which is the subject, its substance; it expresses itself as feeling, and is addressed to feeling, or it is in the form of pure identity, of articulated, changing feeling, to be sure, but which is precisely whole in every moment, without the ideality of its objective, and without its own corporeality, to which nature cannot come forth.

2. the intuition of speech subsumed under the concept; thus it has a body of its own, for its ideal nature is posited in the concept, and the concept is the fixed, its bearer; this body is an external matter, which, however, as such, in its substantial inwardness and being-for-itself, is wholly annihilated, without meaning, and ideal; but because the concept is the dominant, this body is something dead, which

[294] does not infinitely annihilate itself within itself, but is here, in difference, annihilated only externally for it. Thus its being-twofold is likewise an externality; it expresses nothing but the relation to the subject and to the object, whose ideal middle it is; but this connection it receives through something subjective outside it which thinks it; through itself it expresses it negatively, through its being-annihilated as subject, or as having a meaning of its own for itself, through its inner meaninglessness, so that it is the middle insofar as it is a thing, a determinacy for itself, and yet nothing at all for itself, no *thing*; it is immediately this opposite of itself, to be for itself and absolutely not for itself but another, so that the absolute concept is here really objective. *Corporeal sign*; it is the ideality of the tool, as the mien is the ideality of the child, and as it is more rational to make a tool than a child, so a corporeal sign is more rational than gesture. The sign, since it corresponds to the absolute concept, expresses no shape, as which the absolute concept taken up into indifference is; but since it expresses only the concept, it is bound to the formally universal; as mien and gesture are a subjective language, so the corporeal sign is an objective one; as the former does not tear itself loose from the subject nor become free, so the latter remains something objective, and does not carry its subjective element, cognition, immediately in itself; it is therefore also attached to the object, and expresses, on it but free of it, so that it is not a determinacy of the object but has merely been added to it and remains contingent to it, precisely through the contingency of the connection, a relation to something subjective, which, however, is presented wholly indeterminately and must first be added in thought; it therefore also expresses the relation of the possession of an object to the subject.

2. *sounding speech* unites the objectivity of the corporeal sign and the subjectivity of gesture; the articulation of the latter with the being-for-itself of the former; it is the middle of intelligences, Logos, their rational bond. The abstract objectivity, which is a mute recognising, gains in it a body of its own, independent, being for itself, but after the manner of the concept, namely one that immediately annihilates itself; with sounding speech

[295] the inner immediately comes forth in its determinacy, and the individual, intelligence, the absolute concept, presents itself in it immediately as purely singular and fixed; or it is the corporeality of absolute singularity, through which all indeterminacy is articulated and fixed, and, precisely through this corporeality, immediately absolute recognising. The ringing of metal, the rushing of water, and the roaring of the wind is nothing that transforms itself into its opposite out of the inner, out of absolute subjectivity; rather, they arise through movement from outside. The voice of the animal comes from its punctuality, or its being-concept; but, like the whole of it, it belongs to feeling; most animals cry out in mortal danger; it is absolutely only a going-out of subjectivity, something formal, whose highest articulation, in the song of birds, does not come from intelligence, not from the preceding transformation of nature into something subjective; the absolute solitude in which nature is within intelligence is lacking to the animal; it has not taken nature back into itself, and does not give birth to its voice out of the totality which is in this solitude; rather, the voice is something empty, totalityless, formal. The corporeality of speech, however, presents totality resumed into individuality; the absolute breaking-in into the absolute point of the individual, whose ideality is driven apart internally into a system. – It is the highest blossom of the first potency, but in this potency not considered according to its content, but formally, as the abstraction of the highest rationality and shape of singularity; but as this pure speech it does not go beyond singularity.

The negative of this potency is want, natural death, the force and devastation of nature, also of human beings against one another, or relation to organic nature; but a natural relation.

B. Second potency of infinity, ideality, in the formal, or in relation

Cross-reference: Possession, exchange, price and contract: § 45 ff., on value § 63, on contract § 72 ff.; on marriage, which is no contract, § 75 Remark and § 161 ff.; on lordship and bondage § 57 Remark.

It is the subsumption of intuition under the concept, or the coming-forth of the ideal, and the being-determined of the particular or singular by it; it has causality, but as purely ideal; for this potency is itself a formal one; the ideal is only the abstraction of the ideal; there is not yet any question of its constituting itself as such for itself and becoming a totality; as in the previous potency the singular, so here the universal is dominant; in the first, the latter remains hidden, something inner, and speech itself is there considered only as a singular, in its abstraction.

In this subsumption singularity immediately ceases; it becomes a universal, which has absolutely relation to others. But through this formal concept the living natural connection likewise becomes a fixed relation, which it previously was not; over it, too, universality must hover and subjugate it; love, the child, culture, the tool, speech, are objective and universal, connections, relations, but natural, unsubjugated, contingent, ungoverned, not themselves taken up into universality; universality is on and [in] them themselves, not come forth nor opposed to them.

If this subsuming universality is regarded from the side of particularity, then there is nothing in this potency which would not have relation to other intelligences, so that an equality among them [is] posited; or it is the universality which thus appears in them.

a.

This relation of the opposed universal to the particular, as it appears in the particular, or subsumption of the universal under intuition; the universal, itself dominant in the singular or particular, relates only to this

[297] singular; or the singular is the first, not the ideal hovering above it, nor a multiplicity of particulars subsumed under it. This is found in the purely practical, real, mechanical relation of labour and of possession.

¶ The particular into which the universal is transposed becomes thereby ideal, and this ideality is a dividing of it; the whole object is not annihilated in general according to its determinacy, but this labour, which goes towards the object as a whole, divides itself within itself and becomes a singular labouring; and this singular labouring becomes precisely thereby more mechanical, because multiplicity is excluded from it, and so it itself becomes something more universal, more alien to wholeness. This kind of labouring, which thus divides itself, at the same time presupposes that the rest of the needs are obtained in another way, since these too must be worked up, through the labour of other human beings. But in this dulling of mechanical labour there lies immediately the possibility of separating oneself from it entirely; because labour is wholly quantitative, without multiplicity, and so its subsuming in intelligence sublates itself, something absolutely external, a thing, can be used by virtue of its self-sameness, and likewise in its labour as pure movement; it [depends] only on finding for it a likewise dead principle of movement; a self-differentiating force of nature, such as the movement of water, of the wind, of steam etc., and the tool passes over into the *machine*, in that the restlessness of the subjective, of the concept, is itself posited outside the subject.

⌌. as the subject and its labour are here determined, so too is the product of labour determined; it is a singularised thing, and therefore pure quantity for the subject; since its quantity is not in relation to the totality of needs, but exceeds it, quantity in general and in abstraction, this possession has lost its meaning with respect to the practical feeling of the subject, is no longer need for it but surplus; its relation to use is therefore a universal one; and this universality thought in its reality, –

[298] to the use of others. Because, for itself, in relation to the subject, it is an abstraction of need in general, it is a universal possibility of use, not of the determinate use which it expresses, for this is separated from the subject.

c. The subject is [not] merely determined as one who possesses, but taken up into the form of universality; as a singular in relation to others, and universally negative; as a recognised possessor; for recognising is being-singular, negation, in such a way that it remains fixed as such, but ideally, in others; merely the abstraction of ideality, not ideality, is in them. In this respect possession is *property*; but the abstraction of universality in it is *right*; (it is ridiculous to want to consider everything under the form of this abstraction, as right; it is something wholly formal α) infinite in its multiplicity, and totalityless; β) without any content, in itself.) The individual is owner, possessor by right, not absolutely, in and for himself; his personality, or the abstraction of his unity and singularity, is merely an abstraction and a thing of thought; nor is it individuality in which right and property lie, for individuality is absolute identity, or itself an abstraction; rather, it lies solely in the relative identity of possession, insofar as this relative identity has the form of universality; right to property is right to right; right of property is the side, the abstraction, in property according to which it is a right, for whose other, the particular, possession remains.

The *negative* of this potency against the universal is the relation of freedom; or the negative insofar as it constitutes itself positively and posits itself in difference against the universal, thus in relation to it; not lack and the enveloping of difference; in this latter, undeveloped, respect the preceding potencies would be its negative.

The mechanically negative, which conflicts with and does not fit a particularity determined by the subject, does not belong here; it is not at all for this determinacy insofar as it is practical; rather, this respect belongs wholly to nature. – The negative comes into consideration here solely insofar as it is in conflict with the universal as such

[299] and, as a singularity, disavows it and abstracts from it; not insofar as singularity truly annihilates its form, for therein it posits it as truly ideal, and itself as one with it; but rather when it cannot annihilate it, cannot unite itself with it, but is in difference with it. – The negative thus consists in the non-recognising of property, in its sublation; but property is here itself posited as not necessary, not related to the use and enjoyment of the subject; matter, insofar as it is posited as a universal, is thereby itself posited as a negative; the relation of the subject to it is itself determined as a merely possible one. Negation can therefore concern merely this form, or not matter itself, but matter as universal; a surplus is sublated, which already for itself has no relation to need, which has the determination of stepping out of the relation of possession. Whether this sublation, the negation, accords with the determination or not must emerge from the following potency.

b. The subsumption of intuition under the concept

A relation of the subject to its surplus labour is posited, which, ideal in this relation to the subject, has no real relation to enjoyment; but at the same time this relation has come forth as a universal, or as a pure abstraction, or infinite: possession in right as property. By its nature, however, that which is possessed has only a real relation to the subject: to annihilation; and the formerly ideal relation of possession to the subject is now to become real. The infinite, as the positive of this potency in general, is the fixed, and is to remain, namely right; likewise the ideal relation of possession; and yet possession is to be realised. The whole potency in general is that of difference; this present dimension is likewise difference; thus difference of difference; previously the resting, here the moved; [in] the concept lies the difference, the relation of a subject to something determined as merely possible.

[300] Through the new difference the relation of the subject to its labour is sublated, but because infinity, right as such, must remain, there steps into the place of that ideal relation of surplus, according to the concept, the opposite one, the real one, the relation to use and need; the separation is stronger, but precisely therefore so is the drive towards unification; as the magnet holds its poles apart without their having a drive, but, when cut in pieces, this identity sublated, electricity is stronger separation, real opposition, drive towards unification. What is sublated here is the being-one with the object through one's own labour, one's own individual determination of it (magnetism); what takes its place is real difference, being-sublated of the identity of subject and object; and thereby real annihilation of the opposed, or a difference which has relation to need. – In this whole potency (a. and b.) thoroughgoing ideality first begins, and the true potencies of practical intelligence; with surplus labour it ceases, in need and labour, to belong to need and labour. The relation to an object which it acquires for need and use, which is posited here, namely one which it has not itself worked up for its own use, in which it does not annihilate its own labour, is the beginning of rightful, formally ethical enjoyment and possession.

The absolute, the ineradicable, of both potencies is the absolute concept, the infinite itself, right; in the first resting, or subsisting in its opposition, and therefore inwardly concealed and hidden; in the second in movement, the accident sublating itself through the accident, passing through nothing, and so right coming forth, standing over against, as causality.

This pure infinity of right, its inseparability, reflected in the thing, in the particular itself, is its *equality* with others, and the abstraction of this equality of a thing with others, the concrete unity and right, is *value*, or rather value itself is equality as abstraction, the ideal measure; but the actually found, empirical measure is *price*.

In the sublation of the individual relation there remain α) right β) right appearing in determinate things in the form of equality, or value;

[301] γ) but the individually related object loses this relation, and δ) there steps into its place an object related to desire, really determined.

The inner essence of this real interchange is, as has been shown, the concept that remains equal to itself; but this concept real in intelligences, and indeed in needy ones, which relate themselves at the same time to a surplus and to a lacking need; each undertakes the transformation of the individual, ideally-objectively related, into something subjectively related, related to need. Such is *exchange*; the realisation of the ideal relation. Property appears in reality through the plurality of the persons engaged in exchange, as mutually recognising one another; value in the reality of things; and in each of them as surplus; the concept as moving itself, annihilating itself in its opposite, taking up the other, opposed, into the place of what was previously possessed; and indeed determined in such a way that the previous is something ideal, that which now enters something real; for the first potency is that of intuition; the present one that of the concept; that ideal one which here is by nature the first, the ideal in the practical before enjoyment.

The interchange is, in its externality, a twofold one, or rather a repetition of itself; for the universal object, the surplus, and then the particular object of need, is according to its matter one object, but its two forms are necessarily repetitions of it. But the concept, the essence, is the transformation itself, and since its absolute is the identity of the opposed, the question is how this pure identity, infinity as such, is to be presented in reality.

The transition in exchange is a manifold, divided, drawn-out series of the singular moments of the whole; it can be in one moment, in One present, through simultaneous transfer of the possession of each party to the other; but if the object is a manifold one, then so is the transition, and the opposite demanded is a manifold one, and the opposite at the same time is not, until it is whole, not at the beginning, not in the course, or it is only as a leap. Thereby exchange itself becomes something uncertain, on account of these empirical conditions, which appear as gradualness of *performance*, postponement of the whole

[302] performance to a later time etc.; the moment, the present, is lacking in appearance. That performance is something inner, presupposes truthfulness, is something wholly formal; for what is at issue is precisely that the exchange has not happened, the interchange, the transition, is not realised; and the uncertainty rests on multiplicity and on coming apart, and on the *possibility* of abstraction from it, or on freedom.

(the third of this second potency b.)

γ. This unreason, or the opposition of this empty possibility and freedom to actuality and appearance, is to be sublated; or the inner of the intelligences that exchange must likewise come forth; this freedom must become equal to necessity, so that the transition is withdrawn from its empirical contingencies, and its middle, the identity, is posited as something necessary and fixed. The nature and form of exchange remain, but it is taken up into quantity and universality.

This transformation of exchange is *contract*. In it the moment of absolute presence, which is in pure exchange, forms itself into a rational middle, which not only admits the empirical appearances of exchanging, but, in order to be a totality, requires them as a necessary difference, which is indifferenced in contract.

Through the necessity which the transition receives in contract, the empirical element, the coming apart of the performance of each party in appearance, the unity of the present, becomes indifferent and something contingent, which does no harm to the security of the whole; it is as good as if the performance itself had already taken place; the right of that singular one to his thing is already transferred to the other, the transition itself is to be regarded as having taken place; the external appearance, that performance has not yet been made, that the transition has not presented [itself] in empirical reality, is wholly empirical and contingent, or rather annihilated; property is thus wholly withdrawn from the external relation through which it not only designates itself as possession, but is still possession for the one who has already transferred it.

In that contract thus transforms the transition from a real into an ideal one, but in such a way that this ideal transition is the true, necessary one, it must, in order to be this, itself have absolute reality; the ideality or

[303] universality which the moment of the present receives must therefore exist; but reality itself lies above the sphere of this formal potency; this much emerges formally, that ideality as such and at the same time as reality in general can be nothing other than a spirit, which presents itself as existing, in which the contracting parties are annihilated as singular ones, the universal subsuming them, which is the absolutely objective essence and the binding middle of the contract; through the absolute being-one in it, freedom and possibility are sublated with respect to the members of the transition; the being-one is not something inner, good faith, in which inner the individual subsumes the identity under itself, but the individual is, against the absolutely universal, the subsumed; thus its arbitrary will and peculiarity are excluded, since in contract it invokes this absolute universality; but even if its whole force does enter into the contract, this nevertheless happens only formally; the determinacies which are linked through it and subsumed under it are and remain determinacies; they [are] posited as infinite only empirically, as this or that or whichever it may be, but they are subsisting; they are regarded as singularity of the individuals or of the things about which the contract is made; and therefore true reality cannot fall within this potency; for the side [of] reality is here a finitude subsisting for itself, which is not to be annihilated in ideality; whereby it is impossible that the reality should be a true and absolute one.

c.

The third potency is the indifference of the preceding ones; the relation of exchange, and of the recognising of a possession, and thereby property, – which hitherto related to singular things, becomes here totality, but always within singularity itself; or the second relation is taken up into universality, the concept of the first.

α) relative identity, or relation.

[304] Surplus posited in indifference, as universal and as possibility of all needs, is *money*; just as is labour which goes towards surplus and, mechanically uniform, at the same time towards the possibility of universal exchange and of the acquisition of all necessities. As money is the universal, their abstraction, and mediates them all, so *trade* is this mediation posited as activity, which exchanges surplus for surplus.

β. but the intuition of this totality, though of it as singularity, is the individual as the indifference of all determinacies, and how it presents itself as such, as totality.

§. formally, in simplicity, or intuition, the individual is indifference of all determinacies, and as such something formally *living*; and is recognised as such; as previously only as possessing singular things, so here as being for itself in the whole; but because the individual as such is absolutely one with life, not merely in relation with it, it cannot be said of life, as of the other things with which it is only in relation, that the individual possesses it; this has sense only insofar as the individual is not such a one, but an absolutely whole system, and thus its singularity and life are posited, like a thing, as something particular. The recognising of this formal being-alive is, like recognising and empirical intuition in general, a formal ideality; life is the highest indifference of the singular, but it is at the same time absolutely something formal, insofar as it is the empty unity of the singular determinacies, and no totality and wholeness reconstructing itself out of difference is thereby posited. As the absolutely formal, it is for that very reason also absolute subjectivity, or the absolute concept, and the individual considered under this absolute abstraction is the *person*. The life of the individual is the abstraction of his intuition heightened to the utmost; but the person is his pure concept, and indeed this concept is the absolute concept itself. In this recognising of life, or in thinking the other as absolute concept, he is as a free being, as possibility of being the opposite of himself with respect to a determinacy; and in the singular as such there is nothing which could not be regarded as

[305] determinacy; in this freedom, therefore, the possibility of non-recognition, and of unfreedom, is just as well posited. All things likewise are, through their concept, the possibility of being the opposite of themselves, but they are in absolute determinacy, or lower potencies of necessity; not the indifference of all, but in absolute difference against others; but intelligence, or the life of man, is the indifference of all determinacies.

3. This formal, relationless recognising, in relation and in difference, or according to the concept. In this, living individual stands against living individual, but with unequal power of life; the one is therefore the power or potency for the other; it is the indifference, while the other is in difference; the former therefore relates to the latter as cause; it is as its indifference, its life, its soul or spirit. Greater strength or weakness is nothing other than that the one is caught up in a difference, is fixed and determined in some way, according to which the other is not, but is free; the indifference of the unfree is its inner, formal, not brought out, and difference-annihilating element; but it must absolutely be for it; it is its hidden inner, and therefore it intuitively it as the opposite, namely as something external, and the identity is a relative one, not an absolute one, nor middle. This relation, in which the indifferent and free is the powerful against the different, is the relation of *lordship* and *bondage*. This relation is posited immediately and absolutely with the inequality of the power of life; there is no thought here of any right or any necessary equality. Equality is nothing other than the abstraction and the formal thought of life, of the first potency, which is merely ideal and without reality; in reality, on the other hand, the inequality of life is posited, and with it the relation [of lordship] and bondage; for in reality there is shape and individuality and appearance, thus diversity of potencies or of power; or the relative identity according to which the one individual is posited as indifferent, but the other as different.

Plurality here is the plurality of individuals, for in the first potency, in the formality of life, absolute singularity was posited as the form of the inner, since life is the form of outer indifference. *And where* there is plurality of individuals, there is a relation of them; and this relation is

[306] lordship and bondage, which is immediately the very concept of this relation, without transition and inference, as if some other ground had still to be shown. Lordship and bondage belong to nature because individuals stand against one another in this relation; and insofar as, with respect to the most ethical, individuals as such enter into relation, and it is a matter of the shaping of the ethical, as that which takes place through the highest individuality of genius and talent, the relation of lordship and obedience is posited; formally it is the same; the difference lies in this, that in ethical lordship and obedience the potency or power is at the same time an absolutely universal, whereas here it is only a particular; there individuality is only the external and the form, here it is the essence of the relation; and for that reason it is here a relation of bondage; for bondage is obedience towards the singular and particular; the lord is the indifference of determinacies, but merely as person, or as something formally living; he is at the same time subject, or cause; indifference is subsumed under being-subject, or the concept; and the bondsman relates to him as to formal indifference, or to the person. Because that which commands is here as person, it is not the absolute, the Idea, that is the identical of both, that which is posited in the lord in the form of indifference but in the bondsman in the form of difference; rather, it is particularity in general, in the practical, want, that constitutes the bond of both; the lord is in possession of a surplus of what is physically necessary in general, and the other in lack of it; and indeed in such a way that that surplus, like this lack, is not singular sides but the indifference of the necessary needs.

1. This relation of bondage, or of person to person, of formal life to formal life, of which the one is under the form of indifference, the other under the form of difference, must be indifferenced, or be subsumed under the first potency, so that the same relation of personality, of the dependence of the one on the other, remains; but so that the identity is an absolute one, though inner, not born forth; and the relation of difference only the external form. But that the identity remains an inner one is necessary because in this whole potency it is either only a formal one (right), hovering above the

[307] particular, opposed, or an inner one; namely one which is subsumed under the intuition of particularity, individuality as such, and thus appears as nature; not as an identity subjugating an opposition, or as ethical nature, in which that opposition will likewise be sublated, but in such a way that particularity and individuality become the subsumed.

This indifference of the relation of lordship and bondage, in which, therefore, personality and the abstraction of life are absolutely one and the same, and this relation only the external, appearing, is the *family*: in it the totality of nature and everything hitherto is united; the whole particularity hitherto is in it transposed into the universal; it is the identity α) of external needs, β) of the sexual relation, the natural difference posited in the individuals themselves, and γ) of the relation of parents to children, or of natural reason come forth, but being as nature.

α) on account of the absolute natural being-one of the man, the woman and the child, in which the opposition of personality and of the subject ceases, surplus is not the property of one; for the indifference is not formal according to right; hence all contract concerning property, service and the like also falls away; for all this is grounded on the presupposition of one's own personality; rather, surplus, labour, property is absolutely common, in and for itself, and at the death of one there is no transition from one to a stranger, but only the share of the deceased in the common property ceases.

The difference is the superficial one of lordship; the man is the lord and administrator; not owner in opposition to the other members of the family; as administrator he has only the semblance of free disposal. Labour is likewise divided according to the nature of each member; but its product is common; each, precisely through this division, works out a surplus, but not as his property; the transition is no exchange, but it is immediately, in and for itself, common.

β . The relation of sex, of the woman to the man, is likewise made indifferent after its own fashion; that they are one according to the determinacy of personality, i.e. according to

[308] possession, has been said in α . But the sexual relation gives the indifference a form of its own; for it is in itself a particular one. The particular as such, made into a universal, into the concept, can only become an empirically universal (in religion it becomes something else); the particularity becomes a constant, lasting, fixed one; the sexual relation restricts itself solely to these two individuals in relation to each other, and it endures for ever; thus it is *marriage*. Since this relation is founded on a particular being of individuals whose peculiarity is fixed even by nature, not by the arbitrary will of an abstraction, this relation seems to be a contract; but it would be a negative contract, which sublates precisely that presupposition on which the possibility of contract in general rests; namely personality, or being a subject, which in marriage annihilates itself, since the whole person gives itself as a whole. But what according to the relation of contract was supposed to become the property of the other could absolutely not come into his possession; it remains, since the relation is personal, the property of the person; just as in general no contract about personal services is possible in itself, since the product alone, not what is personal, can pass into the possession of the other. The bondsman can, as a whole of personality, become property, and so too the wife; but this relation is not marriage, nor is it a contract with the bondsman, but rather a contract about the bondsman or the wife with someone else; as among many peoples the wife is bought from her parents. With her herself, however, no contract is possible; for precisely in so far as she is to give herself freely in marriage, she gives up, together with herself, the possibility of contract, and so does the man; their contract would have as its content to make no contract, and would thus immediately sublate itself. Through a positive contract, however, each would make itself into a thing that is in possession, would posit its whole personality as a determinacy of itself to which it is at the same time absolutely bound; but as a free being it must regard itself as absolutely bound to no determinacy, but rather as the indifference of it; this determinacy would have to be regarded, as Kant does, as the sexual organs; but to posit oneself as an

[309] absolute thing, as absolute bond with a determinacy, is the highest contrariety to reason and infamy.

γ. In the child the family itself is wrested from its contingent, empirical existence, or from the singularity of its members; and it is secured against the concept through which the singularities, or subjects, annihilate themselves; the child is, as against the appearance, the absolute, the rational element of the relation; and what is eternal and lasting; the totality which produces itself again as such. But because in the family, as the highest totality of which nature is capable, the absolute identity itself remains something inner and is not posited in the absolute form itself, the reproduction of the totality is also an appearance, that of the children; in the true totality the form is absolutely one with the essence, so that its being is not the form drawn apart into the isolation of the moments; here, however, what persists is something other than what is; or reality hands over its persistence to an other, which in its turn likewise lasts only by becoming, and transfers its being, which cannot remain in it, to an other; the form or infinity is thus the empirical, negative form of being-other, which sublates a determinacy only by positing another, and is positive only ever in an other; the power and the understanding, the difference of the parents, stand in inverse relation to the youthfulness and strength of the child, and these two sides of life flee each other, and follow upon each other, and are outside each other.

II. The negative, or freedom, or crime

Cross-reference: In the *Groundlines* coercion and crime, § 90 ff.; on revenge § 102, on punishment § 99 ff.

What has gone before has singularity as its principle; the absolute is subsumed under the concept, and all the potencies express determinacies, and the indifferences are formal, universality opposed to particularity; or the

[310] particularity is made indifferent only in relation to lower particularities; and these indifferences are themselves in turn particularities. None of them, therefore, is at all absolute; each can be sublated; the indifference, the absolute totality of each potency, is not in itself; it lies under the form, which is what subsumes. The sublation of the determinacies must be the absolute one, the taking up of all determinacies into absolute universality. This taking up is the absolute and positive, but it is also merely negative; just as the absolute form expressed itself in what preceded as the subsistence of the opposition, so it expresses itself in its opposite, or in the being-annihilated of the opposition. But this being-annihilated is either purely negative, and then it is dialectical, the cognition of ideality, and the real sublating of determinacy; the negative is not fixed, is not in opposition, and so it is in the absolute; absolute ethical life raises itself above determinacy by sublating it, but in such a way that it unites it with its opposite in something higher, and thus does not in truth let it subsist and posit it only with negative significance; rather, through the perfect identity with its opposite, it sublates its form, or ideality, takes precisely the negative away from it, and makes it absolutely positive or real. Quite different is negative sublation; it is itself sublation against sublation, opposition against opposition, but in such a way that ideality, the form, likewise subsists in it, though in the reverse sense, namely that it holds fast to the ideal being-determined of singularity and so determines it as a negative; thus it lets its singularity and its being-opposed subsist, does not sublating the opposition, but transforms the real form into the ideal one. In what has gone before, each potency and each reality of a potency is an identity of opposites, absolute in itself; it is subsumed under the form, but this is something external; the real subsists; the form is what is superficial; its determinacy is enlivened, made indifferent; it is indeed something determinate, but not for itself; it is not determined, its essence is not posited as something determinate. Now the form as negative is the essence; the real is posited as something ideal; it is determined by pure freedom. It is the same transformation as when

[311] feeling is posited as thought; the same determinacy remains; the red that is felt remains red that is thought; but what is thought is determined at the same time as something annihilated, a sublated negative; the freedom of intelligence has raised the determinacy of the feeling of red into the universal, has not withdrawn it from its opposition to other determinacies, but has only made the false attempt to do so; it has reflected on the feeling, taken it up into the infinite, but in such a way that the finitude absolutely remains in existence; it has transformed the objective ideality of time and space into the subjective one; the objective ideality is being-other, the fact that others are beside it, that ideality, infinity, is posited empirically, absolutely in all relations, as something everywhere other; the subjective ideality purifies infinity of this manifoldness, gives it the form of unity; it connects with the determinacy itself the infinity which in the objective lies outside it and is presented as being-other, and in this way makes it into unity, as the absolute determinacy of the subjective, or ideal, in opposition to the real; and whereas the determinacy as something real, as feeling, had the form, infinity, as it were superficially outside itself, it is now connected with it. So in the practical, which is negative in and for itself, a determinacy posited by it is, according to the preceding potency of necessity, itself something objective, ideal, universal; the negation of this practical positing is the restoration of the first original particularity of the opposition; in that this objectivity is sublated, the thing falls into the power of the inorganic, objective potencies; a murder sublates the living being as a singularity, as a subject, but ethical life does this too; but ethical life sublates its subjectivity, its ideal determinacy; murder, however, sublates its objectivity, posits it as a negative, particular thing which returns under the power of the objective from which it had wrested itself by being itself something objective. Absolute ethical life sublates subjectivity immediately by annihilating it only as ideal determinacy, as opposition, but letting its essence absolutely subsist, and precisely in this lets it subsist and makes it real, that it lets its essence be what it is; intelligence remains such in ethical life.

This negative, or pure freedom, is therefore directed at the sublation of the

[312] objective in such a way that it makes the ideal determinacy, which in necessity is only external and superficial, makes the negative, into the essence; it thus negates reality in its determinacy, but fixes this negation.

This negation, however, must be counteracted; since the sublation of the determinacy is only formal, the determinacy remains in existence; it is posited as ideal, but it remains in its real determinacy; and life has merely been injured in it, not raised higher; and for that reason this life must be restored. But the injury of life cannot be restored in its actuality (restoration through religion does not bear on actuality); this restoration, however, does bear on actuality, and this reconstruction can only be a formal one, because it bears on an actuality as such, on a being-fixed of the negation. It is therefore external equality; what negates makes itself the cause and posits itself as negative indifference, but for that very reason the proposition must be reversed upon it, and it must likewise be posited under the same determinacy of indifference as it posited; what it negated is likewise to be really negated in it, and it is to be subsumed just as it subsumed; and this reversal of the relation is absolute, for in what is determinate it is possible for reason to assert itself as indifference, and thus in a formal manner, only through the equal positing of the two opposites. With *crime avenging justice* stands absolutely in connection; it is absolute necessity which binds them, for the one is the opposite of the other; the one is the opposite subsumption of the other. Crime, as negative vitality, as the concept constituting itself into intuition, subsumes the universal, objective, ideal; conversely, avenging justice, as something universal and objective, in turn subsumes that negation which constitutes itself into intuition.

It is to be remarked here that what is being spoken of is the real counteraction or reversal, and that the ideal, immediate one is indeed contained according to the abstract necessity of the concept in general, but in this form of ideality is only an abstraction and something incomplete. This ideal reversal is

[313] *conscience*, and only something inner, not inner and outer at once; something subjective, not objective at once; immediately, in what the criminal apparently injures externally and as something alien to him, he has likewise ideally injured and sublated himself; in so far the external deed is at the same time an inner one; the crime committed against what is alien is likewise committed against himself. But the consciousness of this his own annihilation is something subjective, inner; or the bad conscience; it is in so far incomplete and must also present itself externally as avenging justice; because it is something inner and incomplete, it drives towards its totality; it betrays, reveals, and works through itself until it sees the ideal counteraction or reversal externally threatening its reality, and facing it as its enemy; then it [begins] to be satisfied, because it beholds in it the beginning of its reality; it produces an attack upon itself so that it may defend itself, and through resistance against the attack it calms itself in the fact that it defends the most universal demand, indifference and totality, namely life, of which conscience itself is a determinacy, against the threatened negation. Through victory in this posited struggle that drive of conscience repeats itself, and its reconciliation lies solely in the danger of death, and ceases with it; but through every victory, when it occurs, the fear, the ideal being-annihilated, grows greater; it presses into the living strength, and so brings on weakness, and thus the reality of avenging justice; and if the enemy does not at once appear externally, and the reversal of the subsumption is not present as reality, it generates this itself.

a.

The first potency of the negation so determined is the formal one, according to the subsumption of the concept under intuition; annihilation for itself, without being related to anything else or presupposing a determinate lack; rather it presupposes a completely indeterminate, universal one, directed at nothing singular, but turned against the abstraction of what has been formed. This is *natural annihilation*

[314] , or purposeless destruction, devastation. Thus nature is turned against the formation which intelligence imparts to it, as well as against its own producing of organised things; and just as the element, the objective, is subsumed under intuition and life, so the element in turn subsumes what is organised and individualised under itself and annihilates it; and this annihilation is devastation. Thus in the human race forming alternates with destroying; when forming has done harm long enough to inorganic nature and has determined its formlessness on all sides, the oppressed indeterminacy breaks loose, and the barbarism of destruction falls upon what has been formed, clears it away, and makes everything free and level and equal. Devastation appears in its greatest splendour in the Orient, and a Genghis Khan, a Tamerlane, as the brooms of God, sweep whole parts of the world completely clean. The northern barbarians who constantly attack the south are in the determinacy of the understanding; their poor enjoyment, which they have formed into a slight manifoldness, has a determinacy thereby, and their devastating is not indifferent, purely for the sake of devastating. The fanaticism of devastation, because it is an absolute element and assumes the form of nature, is invincible from without; for difference and the determinate succumb to indifference and indeterminacy; but it has, like negation in general, its negation within itself; the formless drives itself into indeterminacy until, because it is after all not absolutely formless, it expands like a water bubble until it bursts into infinitely small drops; it passes over from its pure unity into its opposite, the absolute formlessness of absolute multiplicity; and thereby becomes completely formal form, or absolute particularity, and with that the weakest. This progression of devastation to absolute devastation, and to the absolute transition into its opposite, is *fury*, which, because devastation is wholly in the concept, must infinitely intensify the pure, the opposite, until it is its opposite, and has thus annihilated itself; standing at the extreme, at absolute abstraction, it is the absolute drive without means; the absolute concept in its complete indeterminacy, the unrest of infinity, of the *absolute concept*, which is nothing but this, and in its annihilating of the opposites through each other annihilates itself, the being-real of absolute subjectivity; the absolute concept, the

[315] immediate opposite of itself, is real, because the product is absolutely no identity of the subjective and objective, but pure objectivity, formlessness.

b.

This devastation, subsumed under the concept, as a relation with difference and determinacy, is directly turned against the positive relation of difference. The devastation of nature, in so far as it is in determinacy, can only wrest away possession; it is presupposed that it is in the very same determinacy as is present, and thus lets it subsist; the indifference of possession, or right, does not concern it; it is only in particularity. But the ethical, by its nature of being intelligence, is at the same time objectively universal, and thus in an indifferent relation with an other; the annihilation of a particularity of it – and no annihilation other than that of an ethical being occurs here – is at the same time annihilation of the indifference, and positing of it as a negative; the positive element of this positing lies in the fact that the determinacy remains as such, and is only posited with negative determinacy. Such a letting-subsist of the determinacy, but annihilation of the indifference of recognition; it is an injury of right, whose appearance as a real annihilation of recognition is also a severing of the relation of the determinacy to the subject; for recognition recognises precisely this relation, which in itself is merely ideal, as a real one; through recognition it is a matter of indifference whether the subject has actually united the determinacy with itself inseparably, absolutely, or is only in relative relation with it, whether this union is posited only in the form of possibility; through recognition the relative relation itself becomes indifferent, its subjectivity at the same time objective. The real sublation of recognition also sublates that relation, and is *robbery*, or, in so far as it bears purely on the related object, *theft*. In this relation of the object to the subject which lies in property, the annihilation of the indifference, or of right, does indeed leave the determinacy as it is; this remains indifferent in the process; the robbed object remains what it is; but not the subject, which here in the particular is itself the indifference

[316] of the relation. In so far, then, as it is not the abstraction of its relation to the object that is sublated, but rather it itself is injured in that relation and something in it is sublated, and what is sublated in it is not the diminution of its possession, for this does not concern it as a subject, but the annihilation of it as indifference through and in this singular act; since, then, the indifference of the determinacies is the *person*, and this is injured here, the diminution of property is a personal injury; and here, in this whole potency of particularity, it is necessarily such. For immediately it is not personal if only the abstraction of the relation of the subject to the object is injured; but this abstraction as such has not been made in this potency; it does not yet have its reality and support in something that is itself universal, but has it solely in the particularity of the person; and for that reason every robbery is personal; the relation is personal, which it otherwise is only when it is real or empirical, when the possessor is just looking at the object of his possession, or holding it, or has it otherwise locked up within his domain, which he counts as part of the space he occupies with his possession; this empirical relation, as a particular one, is here the relation of this potency in general, for no way has yet been indicated in it by which the empirical relation itself would be made indifferent and property would be protected without it; i.e. by which the ideal relation, without being empirical, would be real, so that through injury of the ideal relation, of possession as property, the personal relation would not be injured.

Theft is therefore here just as much personal and robbery; and the subsumption of a possession that is property under the desire of another, or the negation of the indifference, and the assertion of the quantitatively greater particularity against the quantitatively lesser one, the subsumption of the more different under the lesser, that is, force, not in general but against property, or robbery, must also have its counteraction, or the reversed subsumption. As subjugation has taken place here, i.e. the lesser force has been subsumed under the greater force, so conversely the force that is now greater must be posited as the lesser; and according to absolute reason this reversal is as necessary in and for itself as that subsumption is actually robbery. But robbery exists only

[317] where the relation of lordship and bondage does not. Where this does exist, however, where one individual is more indifferent, and thus the higher potency, than the other, there is by nature no robbery, except in so far as it is absolutely devastating and destructive, not in so far as it would be robbery proper; and by its passing over into the personal, person measures himself against person, and the one subjugated becomes the bondsman of the other; and this becoming a bondsman is properly the appearance of that relation which, in this relation of subsumption, belongs to each of the individuals; without relation they cannot be side by side. Robbery is the singular subsumption, not bearing on the totality of personality, and in so far that which makes this personal injury the affair of its whole personality must retain the upper hand and make the reversal real, because it posits itself as totality, whereas the other posits itself only as particularity; and the reality of this relation is subjection, while the appearance of its becoming is *subjugation*.

In the preceding relation the reversal is absolutely annihilating, because the annihilation itself is absolute; hence the reaction, as against a beast of prey, is absolute subjugation or death. In this one, however, the reaction cannot be merely the taking back of what was robbed, for the sake of the personal character of the injury, but is either only a momentary positing of lordship and bondage, so that being subsumed becomes real in the robber only for a moment, and only for this determinacy, according to the determinacy of the personal insult occurring in it; but precisely because the assailant has not staked his whole personality on it, the relation too cannot end with the totality of personality in the relation of subjection, but can only be for a moment; only in the case of war, of personalities that recognise each other mutually, or of need in respect of the whole of life which, as also in war, comes from human beings, – but otherwise from nature, does bondage occur; otherwise the reaction is formally the wholeness of this relation, and admission into the family, but as regards its matter it is likewise singular and particular; for he who has robbed is too base even to be a bondsman, for he has not shown trust in the whole personality of himself, since he remained in the particular.

c.

The indifference or totality of these two negations bears on the indifference of the determinacies, or life, and whole personality; and the reversal, which is posited as doubtful and is not one-sided, so that the relation would be wholly determinate and certain on one side, is likewise the loss of personality, through bondage or death. Because the negation can only be a determinacy, this determinacy must, so that the whole may be at stake, be intensified into a whole. But by being personal it is immediately the whole; for the determinacy belongs to the person, who is the indifference of the whole, and a particularity of the person that is negated is only an abstraction, for in the person it is absolutely taken up into indifference; what is living is injured. But because the abstraction of the injured particularity stands over against this indifference, the latter too is posited as ideal through the former, and what is injured is *honour*. Through honour the singular becomes a whole and something personal, and the apparent negation of something singular alone is the injury of the whole, and so there arises the struggle of the whole person against the whole person. There can be no question of the justice of the occasion of such a struggle; as soon as the struggle as such arises, justice is on both [sides], for the equality of danger is posited, and indeed of the freest danger, because the whole is at stake. The occasion, i.e. the determinacy which is posited as taken up into indifference and as personal, is absolutely nothing in and for itself, precisely because it is something only as personal; and as such anything posited in absolutely many ways can be taken; no exclusion and limit can be set in this regard. Force, or rather force posited as individualised, strength, decides the subsumption, and here, where the whole real personality is the subject, the relation of lordship and bondage must immediately arise; or, if absolute equality is presupposed, the impossibility of such a different relation, and thus the impossibility that one should be the indifferent and the other the different, then in the struggle, as absolute difference and mutual negation, indifference is to be preserved and the

[319] dispute settled solely through death; in which subjugation is absolute, and precisely through the absoluteness of the negation its opposite, freedom, is absolutely asserted.

Something else, however, is inequality in the negation, and the one-sidedness of the struggle, which then is no struggle at all; this inequality, where the subsumption is posited absolutely on one side only, not wavering, and the middle is posited as *possibility* and for that very reason as the indifference of both, is oppression, and when it proceeds to absolute negation, murder. Oppression and murder are not to be confused with the relation of lordship, and with struggle; true unjust oppression is personal attack and injury in a manner through which all struggle is absolutely sublated, through which it is impossible for the other to be on his guard and thereby to posit the struggle. In itself, however, this impossibility cannot be proved and demonstrated (the Italians give as the ground of the lawfulness of assassination the immediacy of the declaration of war through the insult); only then is the impossibility to be regarded as actually present when there is no insult, and the murder takes place for absolutely nothing personal; thus for the sake of robbery. But even if an insult has preceded, so that personality and wholeness are at stake, the insult is wholly unequal to the total negation in relation to reality; honour is indeed injured, but honour is distinguishable from life, and in that the latter is staked in order [to restore] to the former its reality, which as injured honour is only ideal, the linking of the ideality of honour with its reality takes place solely through the injured determinacy being raised to the whole reality; and honour consists in this, that once a single determinacy has been negated, the totality of the determinacies, or life⁴⁾, is also to be spent on it; hence one's own life must be staked, as that through which alone that negation of singularity is made into a whole, which is what it is meant to be.

4) *Alongside and further down in the margin*: 3 potencies a) murder b) revenge c) duel; the middle is the struggle, the wavering. Duel, personal insult in the singular.

This totality of negation must be presented under its three forms;

[320] $\alpha\alpha$) the raw totality, the absolute indifference of negation, without relation and ideality, is the transformation of determinacy into personality, and the immediate positing of the reality of the negation, or simple *murder*; it excludes the recognition of this relation, the other's knowing of it; it does not let equality of danger precede, just as the insult is, as regards its matter, completely unequal.

$\beta\beta$. the second potency must be formal indifference, according to which the subsuming and the reversal are according to the law of equality, but in such a way that this equality, as form, as consciousness, hovers above the opposition of the individuals and is not a consciousness and recognition of it; thus the form of equality is lacking, and the equality of danger; for danger is nothing other than negation in the process of becoming, but the knowing of it, indifference, is here not in it, but is only material; the relation is subsumed under the concept. In this equality lies the true real reversal of the subsumption, and it is *revenge*; that which has been killed must itself effect the reversal; but as something killed [it] is only something ideal; from its life, which is its blood, only its spirit can rise up avenging, and either this spirit hunts the murderer about until, in whatever way it may be, he sets up a reality over against himself and himself procures a body for the spirit of the slain, which, because it is no longer the same external appearance of the slain, appears as something more universal in general, and the spirit as fate procures its revenge for itself. – Or else its own real vitality, belonging to the spirit, has remained; it has kept its body, and the murder has destroyed only a single member and organ; then this still living body, the family, assumes the revenge. – Revenge is the absolute relation against murder, and against the singular murderer; it is nothing other than the reversal of what the murderer has posited; this can be sublated and made rational in no other way; it cannot be abstracted from; for an actuality has been posited which as such must have its right, namely that according to reason the opposite of what has been set up is set up; the determinacy of the relation

[321] remains, but within it the relation is now transformed into its opposite; what subsumes is subsumed; it is this form alone which changes.

γγ. The totality of this relation is the rational, and makes the middle come forth; the indifference of justice, which is in revenge but as something material and external, enters into the individuals as equal consciousness of the negation in the process of becoming, and thereby the reality of this becoming itself becomes equal. An injustice seems to prevail here, in that he who made the attack, the first unequal, one-sided subsumption – and in appearance the two opposite subsumptions must also present themselves as following upon each other – is supposed to be in the wrong, yet through consciousness would come only into equality of danger. When revenge is in question, then absolutely only he who was the murderer must in his turn be subsumed in a sure manner; and the avengers must therefore avoid equality of strength, and exercise revenge either through superior power against force, or through cunning, i.e. through circumventing strength altogether. But here, in the totality of the relation, it is otherwise; for it immediately excludes singularity in such a way that for revenge the avenger is not something alien, nor something singular, any more than the assailant is; rather he is a member of a family, not an abstraction; but in that this is so, the murder is not an absolute negation; the spirit has lost only a member of the body, and revenge can just as little be absolute negation. In the totality of revenge the form must be posited as absolute consciousness, and so the injured party himself, and no stranger, must be the avenger; this, however, is only the family; likewise the offender is not something singular; he has not offended as a singular individual, but as a member of a whole; he is not posited in the totality as an abstraction. Hereby the middle is immediately posited at the same time; namely, negatively, the sublation of the superior power and unconsciousness of the one, and the equality of danger for both, the struggle; the difference for the relation lies, with complete external equality, in what is inner (hence the struggle is a judgement of God); the one side is only defending, the other at the same time attacking; on the offended

[322] side is the right, or it is the indifferent, the subsuming side; it is therefore absolute, because absolute equality must present itself through the reversal, so that what was the subsumed is now the subsuming. But with the size of the body that is still living, the loss of the lost member diminishes, and with it also the right; and the right, or the indifference, becomes honour by the particularity of the action of the offended party being made into the indifference of the whole, into the affair of the whole, and is thereby equal on both sides; through honour the bad conscience, the drive to annihilate oneself, is sublated, for honour is the drive of subsuming; and the offended side, which wholly removes from itself the singularity of the deed, which as this singularity is not its own, is through honour completely in equal right, just as in the singular personal insult the one insulted is in equal right through protecting his life. This equality, before which the side of right and of necessary subsuming vanishes, is *war*; in it the difference of the relation of subsuming has vanished, and equality is what prevails; both are indifferences; the difference is the external, formal aspect of the struggle, not the inner, but something that is in absolute unrest, constantly passing over from one side to the other (Mars a deserter), and that leaves being subsumed wholly doubtful and only lets it be decided. It is decided either through complete subsumption of the one party, which in itself, as totality, is immortal, not through its extermination but through its subjection, and bondage; in which what decides is the higher, not the triviality of the first insult, but the greater or lesser strength of the totality, which through the struggle enters into equality, and into the testing of it, which beforehand, in the relationlessness of being side by side, was merely ideal, something thought, and submits itself to the decision as to which is truly the more indifferent, or the stronger; a decision which can thus end with the relation of lordship. – Or else it comes to no absolute decision which would concern the wholeness of the total individuals; rather they find themselves more or less equal, at least for the empirical moment incapable, even with the manifest superiority of the one, of carrying the reality of the constitution of the relation through to the end; the abstract preponderance of the one would indeed be present, but not the

[323] real preponderance for this moment of the struggle, since its forces are necessary for other natural necessities which concern not the struggle immediately but the inner subsistence of the totality, and cannot be employed for the struggle; anger (*ῥυμός*) subsides, for it is the feeling of the non-real relation of the indifference of what subsumes; it returns to the feeling of equality, since the reality of the struggle contradicts this imagining of anger; and so a *peace* is made, in which, whether one party obtains the position of the subsuming and the other that of the vanquished and gives up singular determinacies, or whether both sublate the struggle with the feeling of complete equality, they set themselves in the former unrelated, relationless difference, and thus with the cessation of the relation all interest also ceases. The rationality of this totality is thus, in the opposites, the equality of indifference; the middle is their being-one in their complete intermingledness and in their uncertainty.

Part III. Ethical life

Cross-reference: Ethical life as a people; in the *Groundlines* § 144 ff. and the state § 257 ff.

In the preceding potencies there is the totality of particularity according to its two sides, particularity as such, and universality as abstract unity; the former is the family, but it is such a totality that, while all the natural potencies are indeed united in it, intuition is at the same time in relation; the really objective intuiting of the individual in the other is burdened with a difference; the intuiting in the wife, in the child and in the bondsman is no absolute, perfect equality; it remains something inner, not brought forth, unexpressed; there is in it an invincibility of the comprehending of nature; – in universality, however, freedom from relation, the annihilation of the one

[32.4] side of it by the other, is the highest, and it is rational only as absolute concept, in so far as it bears on this negativity.

But absolute nature is present in none of these in the shape of spirit, and therefore not as ethical life either; neither the family, nor still less the subordinate potencies, least of all the negative, is ethical. Ethical life must, with complete annihilation of particularity and of the relative identity of which the natural relation alone is capable, be absolute identity of intelligence; or the absolute identity of nature must be taken up into the unity of the absolute concept and be present in the form of this unity; a clear and at the same time absolutely rich essence; a perfect being-objective-to-oneself and intuiting of the individual in what is alien; thus the sublation of natural determinacy and configuration, complete indifference of self-enjoyment; in this way alone is the infinite concept absolutely one with the essence of the individual, and this essence present in its form as true intelligence; it is truly infinite, for all its determinacy is annihilated; and its objectivity is not for an artificial consciousness, for itself with sublation of empirical intuition; and for intellectual intuition; thus intellectual intuition is a real one through ethical life, and in it alone; the eyes of the spirit and the bodily eyes coincide perfectly; according to nature the man sees flesh of his flesh in the woman; according to ethical life alone he sees spirit of his spirit in the ethical being, and through it.

Ethical life is accordingly determined in such a way that the living individual, as life, is equal to the absolute concept, that his empirical consciousness is one with the absolute consciousness, and the absolute consciousness is itself empirical consciousness; an intuition distinguishable from itself; but in such a way that this distinction is something altogether superficial and ideal, and being a subject is nothing in reality and in the distinction. This complete being-equal is possible solely through intelligence, or the absolute concept, according to which the living essence [is] as the opposite of itself, as object; this object is itself absolute vitality and absolute identity of the one and the many, not posited like every other empirical

[325] intuition under a relation, serving necessity, and posited as something limited, having infinity outside itself.

In ethical life, therefore, the individual exists in an eternal manner; his empirical being and doing is something absolutely universal; for it is not the individual that acts, but the universal absolute spirit in him. The view which philosophy takes of the world and of necessity, according to which all things are in God and there is no singularity, is perfectly realised for empirical consciousness, in that every singularity of acting or thinking or being has its essence and significance solely in the whole, and in so far as its ground is thought, this alone is thought, and the individual knows and imagines no other; since non-ethical empirical consciousness consists in inserting, between the being-one of the universal and the particular, of which the former is the ground, some other singularity as ground; here, on the contrary, the absolute identity which before belonged to nature and was something inner has come forth into consciousness.

The intuition of this Idea of ethical life, however, the form in which it appears on the side of its particularity, is the *people*. The identity of this intuition and of the Idea is to be cognised. For in the people the relation of a multitude of individuals is in general formally posited, not a relationless multitude, nor a mere plurality; not the former, since a multitude in general does not posit the relation which is in ethical life, the subsumption of all under a universal which would have reality for their consciousness, would be one with them, and would have might and force over them in so far as they wished to be singular, and would be identical with them in a friendly or hostile way; rather the multitude is absolute singularity, and the concept of the multitude, in so far as they are one, is their abstraction, alien to them, outside them; – nor a mere plurality, for the universality in which they are one is absolute indifference; in a plurality, however, this is not posited; rather the plurality is not absolute multiplicity, as the presentation of all differences, through which allness alone indifference can present itself really and be a universal one.

Since the people is the living indifference, and all natural difference is annihilated, the individual intuits himself in each as himself; he attains to the

[326] highest subject-objectivity; and this identity of all is for that very reason not an abstract one, not an equality of citizenship, but an absolute one, and one intuited in empirical consciousness, presenting itself in the consciousness of particularity; the universal, spirit, is in each and for each, even in so far as each is something singular. At the same time this intuiting and being-one is immediate; the intuiting is not something other than the thought; it is not symbolic; there does not step between the Idea and reality a particularity which would first have to be annihilated through thought and would not already in and for itself be equal to the universal; rather the particular, the individual, is as particular consciousness absolutely equal to the universal; and this universality, which has absolutely united particularity with itself, is the divinity of the people, and this universal, intuited in the ideal form of particularity, is the god of the people; he is an ideal manner of intuiting it.

Consciousness is the infinite, the absolute concept, in the form of unity; in empirical consciousness, however, the concept is posited only as relation; the opposites of the concept are, and are thus opposites; their unity is as such a hidden one; it appears in both as quantity, i.e. under the form of possibility of being divided (in one consciousness), and the actuality of being divided is precisely the opposition; in ethical life, however, this separation is for empirical consciousness itself an ideal determinacy; it recognises in the opposite, the object, absolutely the same as what the subject is; it intuites the sameness.

This intuition is absolute because it is absolutely objective, all being-singular and feeling being extinguished in it, and it [is] intuition because it is in consciousness; its content is absolute because it is the eternal and freed from everything subjective; the oppositions, the empirical and the appearance, fall so much within the absolute intuition itself that they present themselves only as play. All relation to need and annihilation is sublated, and the practical, which

[327] began with the annihilation of the object, has passed over into its opposite, into annihilation of the subjective, so that the objective is the absolute identity of both.

This totality must be considered according to the moments of its Idea, and indeed in such a way that first its rest, or the constitution of the state, is considered, and then its movement, or government; there the Idea as intuition; here according to relation; but in such a way that now the essence of the totality itself is absolute identity of intuition and concept, and the form of this identity under which it appears is something altogether superficial; the extremes of the relation are absolutely the totality itself, not abstractions which would exist only through the relation.

A. The constitution of the state

The people as organic totality is the absolute indifference of all determinacies of the practical and the ethical; its moments as such are the form of the identity of indifference, then that of difference, and finally that of absolute living indifference; and none of these moments is an abstraction, but a reality.

I. Ethical life as system, at rest

Cross-reference: The estates: in the *Groundlines* § 201–§ 207; on the estate of bravery § 325 ff.; on rectitude § 150 Remark.

The concept of ethical life has been placed in its objectivity, the sublation of singularity. This being-annihilated of the subjective in the objective, the absolute being-taken-up of the particular into the universal, is

a) intuition; the universal not a formal one, opposed to consciousness and subjectivity, or to individual vitality, but in intuition absolutely one with it. In every shape and expression of ethical life the opposition of a position and a negation sublates itself through their integration; the separation of the particular and the universal, however, would appear first as a bondage of the particular, as something subjected to the moral law; then as the possibility of something else; in the ethical there would be no

[328] necessity; pain would not be endured, for it would not be intuited in its objectivity, and not separated off; and the ethical action would become a contingency of insight, for with the separation the possibility of another consciousness is posited.

b. this ethical life, as this living, self-standing spirit, which appears as a Briareus with myriads of eyes, arms and the other members, each of which is an absolute individual, is something absolutely universal, and in relation to the individual each part of this universality, everything that belongs to it, appears as an object, as a purpose; it is something ideal for the individual as such; or as it enters into his consciousness; but its entering into his consciousness means nothing other than that it is posited as individual. But it is something else in so far as the individual subsumes absolute ethical life under himself, and it appears in him as his individuality. Here, as in general, it is just as little meant that will, arbitrary will, determinacies posited by the individual, subsume ethical life in such a way that they would dominate it and posit it negatively as enemy and fate; rather the subsuming is solely the external form of subjectivity under which ethical life appears without its essence being affected thereby; this appearance of it is the *ethical life of the singular individual*, or the *virtues*; because the individual is the singular, possibility, the negative, determinacy, the virtues too are, in their determinacy, something negative, possibilities of the universal. Here, then, the difference of morals from natural right is posited, not as though they were separated, the former excluded from the latter; rather its content is wholly within natural right; the virtues appear in what is absolutely ethical, but only in their transience.

Ethical life is now

a) as absolute ethical life; not the sum but the indifference of all virtues; it appears not as love of fatherland and people and laws, but as absolute life in the fatherland and for the people; it is absolute truth, for untruth lies only in the fixing of a determinacy; in the eternal of the people, however, all singularity is sublated; it is absolute culture, for in the eternal is the real empirical annihilation of all determinacies and

[329] the change of all; it is absolute disinterestedness, for in the eternal there is nothing of one's own; it, and each of its movements, is the highest beauty and freedom, for the being-real and the configuration of the eternal is its beauty; it is without suffering and blessed, for in it all difference and all pain are sublated; it is the divine, absolute, real, existing, being, under no veil, nor such that it would first have to be raised into the ideality of divinity and first be drawn out of appearance and empirical intuition; rather it is immediately absolute intuition.

The movement of this absolute ethical life, however, as it is in the absolute concept, runs through all the virtues, but fixes itself in none. In the movement the ethical goes into difference and sublates it; the appearance of the transition from the subjective to the objective and the sublating of this opposition. This activity of producing is not directed at a product, but immediately shatters it, and makes the emptiness of the determinacies come forth. That difference in its appearance is determinacy, and this posited as something to be negated. But this thing to be negated must itself be a living totality; the ethical must intuit its own vitality in its difference, and here in such a way that the essence of this living thing standing over against it is posited as something alien and to be negated; – not as in education, where the negation, subjectivity, is only the surface of the child; – such a difference is the enemy, and the difference posited in relation is at the same time, as the opposite of the being of the opposites, the nothing of the enemy, and this nothing, equal on both sides, is the danger of the struggle. This enemy can, for the ethical, only be an enemy of the people, and can itself only be a people. Because singularity appears here, it is for the people that the singular individual places himself in the danger of death. Besides this negative side, however, there appears also the positive side of difference, and likewise as ethical life, or rather as ethical life in the singular individual, or the virtues. Bravery is the indifference of the virtues as negativity, or virtue in determinacy, but in the absoluteness of being determined; it is therefore virtue in itself, but formal virtue, since every other is only one virtue. Now because in difference determinacy is as manifoldness,

[330] the whole garland of the virtues also appears in it. In war, as the presentation of the negative and of the manifold, and of its annihilation, there enters therefore the manifoldness of determinate relations, and in them the virtues; the former appear as what they are, posited through empirical necessity, and just as quickly they vanish again, and with them the existence of the virtues, which, because they have this headlong haste, are equally without any relation to a determinate totality (the whole condition of a citizen), and are thus equally vices. The necessity of war posits the highest abstinence, and likewise the highest wretchedness and appearance of avarice, and then of enjoyment, which is equally debauchery, because it can take no thought for the morrow or for the whole of life and livelihood; thrift and liberality become avarice, and the highest hard-heartedness towards oneself and others, when the highest need demands this restriction; – and extravagance, for property is thrown away, since it can have no permanence, and the expenditure is wholly inappropriate to one's own or others' use and need. Likewise there is present in the highest degree reality that is completely not taken up into indifference, the not-becoming-virtue of determinacy, but rather being in its negativity, or annihilating; as with the ethical element of the virtues, so with labour. The necessity of war demands the highest exertions of the body, and complete formal unity of concept of the spirit in mechanical labour, just as much as the highest bondage of a wholly external obedience. As the virtues are without outer and inner hypocrisy, according to the former their appearance and externality would be posited by the arbitrary will of the subject, which inwardly, however, would have something else in its intention – which, however, cannot happen here, because the ethical is the essence, the inner; any more than the inner hypocrisy, which, conscious of its ethical life, holds fast to its subjectivity through this consciousness, and is morality; there the outer semblance, here the inner semblance, the consciousness of having done one's duty, so that it shines before the individual himself. – Likewise labour is without purpose, without need, and without relation to practical

[331] feeling, without subjectivity; just as little does it have relation to possession and acquisition; rather with labour itself its purpose ceases, and its product. This war is not war of families against families, but of peoples against peoples, and thereby hatred itself is made indifferent, free of all personality; death goes into the universal just as it comes out of the universal, and is without anger, which at times creates itself just as it also sublates itself; the firearm is the invention of universal, indifferent, impersonal death; and what drives is national honour, not the injury of a singular individual; rather the injury which is the occasion of the war comes, wholly in the indifference of honour, to every individual.

b. relative ethical life, which relates itself to relations, and does not freely organise itself and move in them, but lets the determinacy which is in them subsist, while bringing it to equality with the opposite one, namely to a superficial, partial equality, which is only in the concept. This form of ethical life thus creates right, and is *rectitude*. Where it acts or becomes real, it holds [fast] to right, that each should receive his own, and indeed not according to written laws; rather it takes the whole of the case and pronounces according to equity when right has not decided; otherwise it must keep to right; in equity, however, it mitigates the objective element of right according to pressing needs, for empirical circumstances of necessity, for an ignorance called pardonable, for a subjective trust; its totality is the empirical existence of the singular individual, whose preservation in itself and others it takes to heart. Rectitude provides for the family according to the estate it has; likewise for fellow citizens; it relieves singular need; it grows angry at bad action. The universal, the absolute of ethical life, and how this would have to exist in its reality and reality be subjected to it, is for rectitude a thought; its highest flight is to have all manner of thoughts about this; but its reason at the same time is that it sees how the empirical condition would be altered, and this lies too close to its heart for it to let anything happen to it; its reason is therefore to see that absolute ethical life must remain a thought.

[332] In relation to the negative, and to sacrifice, it sacrifices from its earnings both for the universal according to a concept, to the people in levies according to the equality of justice, and in particular for the poor and suffering. But it may give up neither its whole possession nor life, for singularity is fixed in it, and so the person and life are not only something infinite but something absolute; it therefore cannot be brave; any more than it is able to run through the whole series of the virtues, or to organise itself as virtue only for the moment; for virtue is itself, for the moment, without purpose and relation to any totality other than the one it has within itself; the empirical totality of existence sets its determinate limit to disinterestedness and sacrifice, and must stand under the dominion of the understanding.

c. *trust* is in the identity of the first and the difference of the second; so that that identity of absolute ethical life is an enveloped intuition, not at the same time taken up into the concept and developed, and therefore this intuition in the form of its intellectuality lies outside it. For the robust solidity of intuition, which lacks cognition and form, and thus equally lacks the means to the acting of the understanding, this same intuition, developed, is a power against which it is different, but at the same time mistrustful, because the singularity in which this power comes to it can seem to cheat it of the whole, and the identity of the absolute intuition and of the form, as a singular means, cannot be evident to it; it is not through the understanding, for through this it fears, as is only fair, to be deceived, that it is to be set in motion, but through the wholeness of trust and of necessity, through an external impulsion likewise directed at the whole. As elemental as its ethical intuition is, so too is its labour; it does not come from the understanding, nor is it in the isolation of rectitude; rather it is whole and robust, and is not directed at the annihilation and death of the object, but lets nature do and bring forth what is useful. Likewise

[333] its property is preserved for it in ignorance of right, and disputes are settled according to passion and persuasion. – This trust, because it relies on something eternal, is then also capable of bravery.

In the real absolute totality of ethical life these three forms of it must likewise be real; each must organise itself for itself, be an individual, and take on shape; for their intermixture is the formlessness of the naturally ethical and of what is without wisdom; it goes without saying that, in that each organises itself, it is by that very fact totality, and carries within itself the other potencies of the form, but in conformity with itself and organised in; as they have already been shown in each according to their concepts. Individualisation, living life, is not possible without isolation; each principle and potency must absolutely go towards its concept, for it [is] real, and must strive after its self-enjoyment and to be for itself. In its concept, or in its own indifference, it has taken the relative identity with the other completely into itself and has thus given itself shape, and everything that is a potency must press towards this shape of its own; for infinity is absolutely one with reality; but in infinity lies the difference of the potencies. That physical nature, after its own fashion, expresses the potencies in pure shape and posits each as living for itself seems easier to accept only because, according to the principle of the multiplicity of nature, each singular thing may be incomplete; in ethical nature, however, each must be something absolutely complete, and each absolutely lays claim for itself to the absolute real totality, because the singularity of each is the absolute one, or the pure concept, and thus the negation of all determinacies. But precisely this absolute concept and negation is the highest abstraction, and immediately the negative; the positive is the unity of this form with the essence; and this is the spreading out of ethical life into a system of potencies (and of nature); and the ethical potency which organises itself can organise itself only in individuals as its material, and it is not the individual as such that is the true, but only the formally absolute; the true is the system of ethical life. For that reason this system cannot be thought, either, as being present in its purity in the individual as such, namely as developed, distributing itself completely into its potencies; for its essence is ethereality, the elemental, pure, which has subjected the unities to itself

[334] and dissolved them out of their brittleness into absolute softness; the singularity of the individual is not what comes first; rather the vitality of ethical nature, divinity, is; and for its essence the singular individual is too poor to grasp its nature in its whole reality; for the moment it is able, as formal indifference, to present all the moments; but as formal indifference it is the negative, time, and annihilates them again; the ethical, however, must grasp itself as nature, as the subsistence of all potencies, and each in its living shape; it must be one with necessity and subsist as relative identity; but this necessity has no reality except in so far as each potency has reality, i.e. is totality.

The potencies of ethical life, presenting themselves in this reality within the perfect totality, are the *estates*; and the principle of each is the determinate form of ethical life among those shown above; there is thus an estate of absolute free ethical life, an estate of rectitude, and an estate of unfree or natural ethical life. According to the true concept of an estate, it is not a universality lying outside it and something thought; rather universality is real in it; it recognises itself in its equality and constitutes itself as a universal over against a universal, and the relation of the distinct estates is [not] a relation of singular to singular; rather each singular individual is, through [his] belonging to an estate, something universal, and thereby a true individual, and a person; thus, for example, the estate of slaves is no estate; for it is only something formally universal; the slave relates himself as a singular individual to the lord.

a. The absolute estate has absolute pure ethical life as its principle, and in the above presentation of the latter it is itself presented; for its being-real and its Idea are absolutely one, because the Idea is the absolute Idea. In the being-real of absolute ethical life, all that is to be considered is the manner in which this estate conducts itself with regard to the subsistence of difference, and how being-practical can be indifferenced in it. In the Idea itself this is, as presented above, absolutely only negative, and in its reality the relations and the

[335] virtues relating to them, driving each other out and abandoned to empirical contingency. But need and the use of things is for the reality of ethical life, or the estate, an absolute necessity which clings to its heels, but which may not cling to it in its form presented above, in its being-held-apart; for its labour may only be a universal labour, whereas labour for need would be a singular one. The satisfaction of need itself is, it is true, itself also absolutely a particularity; but nothing but the satisfaction of it, or pure practical particularity, is to occur here; for as such it is pure annihilation of the object, absolute negation, but no mixing of the ideal with it, and [not] the extension of the consequences of this mixing; no partial positing of intelligence into the object, nothing practical, no forming of something unliving whose result would nevertheless be annihilation; rather, the labour can be none other than that of war, or a forming for this labour; for the immediate activity in the people is not labour, but organic within itself and absolute. Now if they have no relation to need, and this nevertheless cannot be satisfied without labour, then it is necessary that the labour should be done by the other estates, and that what is prepared and manufactured for need should be delivered to it, and that only immediate annihilation in enjoyment should remain for it. But this relation of this estate to the two others is a relation of subsisting reality itself, to be taken up into indifference according to the possible form; this form is here equality; and since according to its content it is a usefulness of the other estates for the first, such that they deliver to it something which is necessary to it, and it makes another's goods and acquisition its own, it must, according to equality, be useful to the others in return. But this it is in the highest manner, and then in theirs; the relation of usefulness according to its content is partly that of the difference of the two, according to which it is the absolute power for them, partly that of equality, according to which it is for them in the negative, thus in their immanent manner. That first usefulness is that it is the absolute real ethical shape, and thus for them the image of the moving and being absolute; the highest real intuition which ethical nature demands; these estates, according to their nature, stop short at this intuiting; they

[336] are not in the infinite concept, through which this, which is posited only for their consciousness as something external, would be absolutely their own absolute spirit moving them, which would overcome all their differences and determinacies; that their ethical nature attains to this intuition, this benefit the first estate affords them; insofar as this, presenting itself in the shape of something objective, is their absolute inner essence, it remains for them something hidden, and does not unite with their individuality and their consciousness. – The other benefit, in their manner, is in the negative, and on the side of the first estate labour is likewise posited, but the absolutely indifferent labour, that of government and of bravery; in relation to the other estates, or in them, this labour is the security of their property and possession, and the absolute security is that they themselves, at least the second estate, are exempted from bravery.

b. The estate of rectitude is in the labour of need, in possession and acquisition and property. Since the unity which is in these relations is something absolutely ideal, something thought, for the sake of the fixedness of difference, it receives a reality only in the people; it is abstract, contentless power in general, without wisdom; its content is posited through the contingency of real things and of the arbitrary will which is in them, in acquisition, in contracts and so on; the universal, rightful element of these relations becomes real, physical force against the particularity which wants to be negative towards it. This being-sunk in possession and particularity here ceases to be bondage towards absolute indifference; it is indifferenced as well as it can be, or the formal indifference, being-a-person, is respected in the people, and the possessor, through his difference, does not fall with the whole essence, thus does not fall into personal dependence; rather, his negative indifference is posited as something real, and he is thus a citizen, bourgeois; and is recognised as a universal. In the first estate all particularity of individuality is annihilated, and so it also conducts itself towards the second as a universal, which is thereby itself so determined, but, for the sake of the fixedness of its possession, only as something formally universal; [it is] an absolutely singular one.

Since labour likewise becomes a universal labour, then, since it is directed towards the totality of need not according to its matter but only according to the concept, a universal dependence on account of the satisfaction of physical need is

[337] posited. The value and the price of labour and of the product are determined according to the universal system of all needs, and the arbitrary will in value, which was grounded on the particular want of others, as well as the uncertainty whether the surplus is necessary for others, is completely sublated. – The universality of labour, or the indifference of all as their middle, against which they compare themselves and into which each singular thing could immediately transform itself, posited as something real, is *money*; just as the active universal exchanging, the doing which mediates particular need and particular surplus, is the *merchant estate*, the highest point of universality in the exchange of acquisition; what it produces is that it takes up the surplus present in the particular and thereby makes it a universal, just as what it exchanges for is likewise money, or the universal.

Where exchange, or the transfer of property to another in general, becomes ideal, partly through the universally known possession of the one, which universal being-known hinders the transfer, since property and its certainty rest in part upon it, – partly through the empirical falling-apart of the simultaneity of exchange, – that ideality is posited as real through the whole power of the state attaching itself to it, as if what is supposed to happen had actually happened, and the empirical appearance of the exchange becomes indifferent. Just as the empirical appearance of possession or non-possession also becomes indifferent, and what matters is the nearer or more remote inner absolute relation of the individual to the thing, whether it is his property or not. Both together constitute *justice* concerning property in things.

Personal injury, which in the natural potency became infinite, a matter of honour and of the whole person, becomes in the real system this determinate abstraction of injury; for since the indifference of the individual is here the absolute indifference, the people, but this cannot be injured, nothing remains but precisely the determinacy and particularity of the injury. In a citizen in general, therefore, the universal is so little injured, and this is so little to be avenged or in danger, that only the particularity remains to be set free, through its being sublated, namely through the one who injures being placed under the very same.

[338] In this way revenge is transformed into punishment; for revenge is indeterminate, and belongs to honour and to wholeness; here it is taken over by the people, for in place of the particular offended person there enters abstract but real universality, not his living universality, that of the individual.

But the living totality for rectitude is the family; or the natural one, and a condition of property and of livelihood which is secured, as far as possible, likewise for the empirical totality of the whole of life and of the education of the children.

It is capable neither of a virtue nor of bravery; for the former is a free individuality; rectitude is, in the universality of its estate, without individuality, and in the particularity of its relations, without freedom.

The highest to which this estate rises through activity in its production is partly the contribution to the needs of the first estate; partly help to the needy; both are a partial negation of its principle; the former for the universal according to the concept; the latter in the particular according to an empirical want; that universal sacrificing is without livingness; just as this more living sacrificing is without universality.

The inner relation of the family is likewise determined according to the concept; whoever joins himself to the head through want joins himself, for all the personal character of the connection, as a servant only as an absolute person, by contract, and for a determinate time; for because each is an absolute person, each is to be able to attain to his living totality, to becoming a father of a household; – this very relation holds when the connection is less personal, only for determinate services and labours.

c. The estate of crude ethical life is the *peasant estate*. The shape of the potencies for it is that, while with respect to physical need it is likewise in the system of universal dependence, its labour and acquisition is, more patriarchally, a greater and more comprehensive totality.

The character of the labour itself is likewise neither wholly of the understanding nor immediately concerned with the preparation of the thing for need, but more mediate, and concerns the earth or the animal, something living, of whose potency labour takes hold, and thus determines the living, which however produces itself for itself.

[339] Its ethical life is trust in the absolute estate, according to the totality of the first estate, which must have that relation and influence; for its crude ethical life can be open to the singularisation of doing only in trust, or under compulsion. For the sake of its totality it is also capable of bravery, and is able to join the first estate in this labour and in the danger of death.

II. Government

Cross-reference: The internal constitution of the *Groundlines*: § 272 ff.

In the preceding potency the system of ethical life was presented in its rest; the organic for itself, as also taking the inorganic up into itself, and forming a system in its reality; but this potency considers how the organic is different against the inorganic; it recognises the difference of the universal and particular, and how above it there is the absolutely universal, which eternally sublates and produces it; or the absolute subsumed under the absolute concept, the *absolute movement*, or the process of ethical life; this movement, which extends itself into the unfolding of all the potencies and which properly first posits and brings forth this unfolding, must be presented in them; and since the essence of this potency is the difference of the universal and particular, but at the same time the sublation of that difference, and this organic movement must have reality, while the reality of the universal consists in its subsisting as a multitude of individuals, this opposition is to be recognised thus: how the universal is real, or in the hands of individuals, that these are in truth in the universal and indifferenced, and in separation take such a movement that through it particularisation is subsumed under the universal and becomes absolutely equal to it. In terms of power the universal in its reality is superior to the particular, for in whatever potency it may be, that which governs is formally the absolutely universal, the power of the whole is attached to it; but the government must at the same time be the positive absolutely universal, thereby it is absolute potency; and the question everywhere in difference is that the government truly be potency against the

[340] particular, that the individuals necessarily be in the universal and ethical. This formal determination of the concept of a *constitution*, the reality of the universal insofar as it is in opposition to a particular and thus appears as potency and cause, must at the same time be recognised as totality, in the falling-apart of the potencies, and this system, determined according to the necessity in which they separate, and according to how in the separation the potency of government is at the same time formed for each of these determinacies, is the true constitution. A truly ethical totality must have gone into this separation, and the concept of government must present itself as wisdom of the constitution; so that the form and consciousness is just as real as the absolute is in the form of identity and nature; the totality is only as the unity of essence and form, neither of which can be lacking. Crudeness in relation to constitution, in which nothing is separated but the whole as such moves immediately against every singularity of determination, is formlessness, and sublation of freedom; for freedom lies in form, and in the singular part, a subordinate system of the whole organism, being self-active for itself in its determinacy.

This government therefore divides itself immediately into the absolute government and that of the singular potencies.

A.

The *absolute government* seems immediately to be the first estate, because this is the absolute potency for the remaining ones; the reality of absolute ethical life, and the real, intuited spirit of the others; the others, however, are in the particular. But it is itself estate against estate, and there must be something higher than itself and its difference against the other. As absolute universal reality it is indeed the absolute government; but organic nature goes towards the annihilation of the inorganic and the taking of it into itself, and the latter preserves itself through itself, through the inner spirit which posits organic nature, and its reflection as an inorganic one; this subsists in the concept, as something absolutely universal, and the annihilation and potentiating of it by the organic necessarily concerns

[341] what is particular in it; it is in itself the particular, but taken up into the concept and infinity, and this is what its subsistence means. Likewise the absolute estate is the ethical organic nature against the inorganic, and consumes it in particularity, so that the latter must procure for the former the needs of life, labour, so that the former individualises itself in intuition against this opposition, and, through being an estate, has the difference of the second and the crudeness of the third in its consciousness, posits itself as separated from them, and obtains the feeling of its high individuality, or pride, which, as consciousness of the noble within, keeps off the consciousness of the ignoble, and the doing of the ignoble, which is the very same thing. This spiritual, as well as that physical, individualisation posits a relation of organic to inorganic nature, and the unconscious limitation of this movement and of the annihilation of the latter must in the ethical be posited consciously, must come forth as a middle that is born forth and appears, not remain left to itself, or not retain the form of nature, but rather the boundary of the particularity to be annihilated must be precisely recognised. Such a cognition, however, is *law*.

The movement of the first estate against the others taken up into the concept, through both having reality, both [being] limited, and the empirical freedom of the one as well as of the other [being] annihilated; – this absolute preservation of all the estates must be the highest government, and according to its concept it can properly belong to no estate, since it is the indifference of all. It must therefore consist of those who have, as it were, given up real being in an estate and live absolutely in the ideal, the old and the priests, who are both properly one. From old age the self-constituting of individuality disappears; of life it has lost the side of shape and of reality, and on the threshold of death, which will take the individual absolutely up into the universal, it has already half died; but through the loss of the real element of individuality, of the particular, it alone is capable, outside its estate, which is the shape and particularity of its individuality, of being above all in indifference

[342] and of preserving the whole in and through all its parts. Only to the highest indifferent, to God and nature, to the priests and to the old, can the preservation of the whole be tied; for every other form of reality is in difference; but the indifference which nature produces in the old, and God in his priests consecrated to him alone, seems to be that which lies outside ethical life, and ethical life seems to have to flee outside its domain to nature, to the unconscious. But this must be so because here the discussion concerns reality, and reality belongs to nature and to necessity; it belongs to the ethical to recognise nature, and to connect with the ethical potency that potency of nature which for itself formally expresses the determinacy of an ethical potency. Nature conducts itself here as tool; it is what mediates the determinate Idea of the ethical and its external appearance; as tool it must formally accord with the former, without ethical content for itself, it is true, but agreeing with the Idea according to formal potency and determinacy; or its content is itself nothing other than precisely the possibility, the negative of the ethical determinacy. The latter, posited ideally, requires a tool, or its subjective reality, its immediate body, taken up into its unity and indifferenced in it, appears, considered for itself, as its tool; and posited ideally for the Idea, opposed to reality, this body of it appears as something contingent for it, as something that is found, that fits and agrees; in nature the soul immediately forms its body for itself, and neither is to be posited or comprehended without the other; it is originally, unconsciously, one without separation. But in the ethical the separation of the soul from the body is the first thing, and the identity is a totality or a reconstructed identity; the body is therefore to be sought for the ideal as something present, formal, negative in itself, and to be connected with it, and herein consists the essence of the construction of government: that for the determinacy of the soul, or the ethical determinacy whose reality is to be recognised, that be found which is outside difference in the respect in which it is the ethical determinacy, but at the same time that this tool be not something universal, adequate for much else, but only for precisely this determinacy; for partly the tool would

[343] thereby be limited against its nature; partly it would, for that against which it is limiting, be potency in general, superior might, not one with it in essence and spirit; it must have the whole shape in common with it, be one with it in relation to particularity, or, as this is expressed, have the same interest as it, only that the opposition of the governing against the governed is the external form of the indifferent against the different, of the universal against the particular.

Thus old age is the body of absolute indifference against all the estates; it lacks the individuality which is the shape of each singular one; and although priesthood is the indifference which is not left to nature but wrested from it and which annihilates the individual with self-activity, it is to be noted partly that the old of the first estate, as belonging to it, have led a divine life; partly that the old man of the first estate must himself be a priest, and in the transition from manhood into the higher age must live as a priest, and so bring forth for himself an absolute, true old age; partly that the true priest also requires external old age as his body, that his completion cannot be placed, contrary to nature, in an earlier age, but must await the highest.

In this highest government the preservation of [the] absolute relation of the whole is absolutely deposited; it is absolute rest in the infinite movement of the whole, and in relation to that movement; the wisdom of this government is directed towards the livingness of all the parts, and this livingness is that of the whole, and only through this. But the livingness of the whole is not an abstraction of life-force, but absolute identity in difference; the absolute Idea; but this, in its absolute highest falling-apart, is nothing other than the relation of the estates constructed in the first potency; it is the absolute as universal, without any of the determinacy which occurs in the particular potencies; this indifferent Idea of the highest government does not concern any form of particularity and determinacy which presents itself in the ramification of the whole into its subordinate systems; it does not have to repeat this Idea in them; for otherwise it would be a formal potency for them; rather, once this

[344] distinction of the estates is established, it is directed towards preserving it; it is thus to that extent negative in its doing, for the preserving of something living is negative; it is government, therefore, opposed to the particular; the absolute positive soul of the living is in the whole of the people itself; insofar as it is government, it is in opposition, and appearance; it can therefore as such only be negative. But this absolute negation of everything which could conflict with the absolute relation of the absolute Idea and would mix the distinction of the estates must have the supreme oversight over the manner in which any potency determines itself; absolutely no ordinance of any of them is withdrawn from it, neither insofar as a potency establishes itself, nor insofar as it wants to assert itself where it is limited by the movement of a higher potency, either in general, so that it would still remain subsisting, or so that it would be entirely sublated for a time. Whatever could have an influence on a disturbance of the relation, or on the hindering of the freer movement of a higher potency, is organic in the absolute sense, and within the competence of the highest government. Its negative business, however, is not to be understood in appearance as if it conducted itself merely by supervising and negatively by prohibiting, through a veto; rather, its negativity is its essence, but it is an activity of a government, and its relation to the particular, or its appearance, is a positive one, precisely insofar as it steps forth against the particular; it is therefore legislative, ordaining, where a relation develops which wanted to organise itself for itself, or where a formerly insignificant side gradually develops in its previous unlimitedness and begins to become powerful. Above all it has to decide in all cases [in which] different rights of systems come into collision and the present makes them impossible in their positive subsistence.

A formal thought of absolute government is to be met with in all systems of theory, as also of actuality, namely an organic central power, and indeed one which preserves the constitution; but α) such a thought, like the Fichtean ephorate, is in its negative stance wholly formal, and empty, β and then all possible oversight over governing in everything singular is ascribed to it, thus a crude mixing of the universal and the singular in it; it is to be a power over everything, thus to act commandingly, with superior might; and at the same time as power

[345] yet be a nothing; γ) absolute government is non-formal solely through presupposing the distinction of the estates, and thus being truly the supreme; if it does not presuppose it, then the whole power of reality falls into one lump, however much this might otherwise ramify within itself, and the crudeness of this lump would have its equally crude and wisdomless power undivided at its summit; there [could] be no true objective distinction in it, and that which was to hover above its distinctions [would be] a pure nothing; for absolute government, in being the absolute Idea, absolutely posits infinite movement, or the absolute concept; in this the distinctions must be, and they must therefore, because in the concept they are universal, infinite, be systems; and only thus is an absolute government possible, and absolute living identity, but born forth into appearance and reality.

This is the external form of its absolute power, that it belongs to no estate, notwithstanding that it has emerged from the first; from this it must emerge; for in reality the crude living identity, without wisdom and without difference, is the third, the third estate; but the second is that in which difference is fixed, which however has unity, as formal universality, united with itself but hovering above it; the first, however, is the clear, mirror-pure identity, the spirit of the others; but through being fixed in opposition it is the infinite side, the others however the finite; but the infinite is nearer to the absolute than the finite, and, if one may speak thus, ascending from below, it soars immediately forth and upwards out of infinity, which is its formal, negative side. This government is absolute potency for all the estates in being above them; its power, that through which it is potency, is nothing external through which it would itself be, as a particular, against a particular, would have an army or whatever else it might be as executors of its ordinances; rather it is entirely withdrawn from opposition, nothing against which something could set itself up as a particular and thereby make it into a particular itself; rather it is absolutely only universality against the particular; and as this absolute ideal universal, against which everything else is a particular, it is the appearance of God, its words are his pronouncements, and it can appear and be under no other form; it is the immediate priesthood of the Most High, in whose sanctuary it takes

[346] counsel with him and receives his revelations; all human and all other sanction ceases here.

It is neither the declaration that such a power is to be inviolable, nor its election by the whole people as its representative, that can give it its holiness; rather, such sanctioning takes it away from it; the election and the declaration are a deed, come from freedom and will, and can therefore just as well be overturned again; the force would belong to empirical conscious will and to insight, and every such singularity and deed of electing is in time, empirical, contingent, and may, and must be allowed to, be capable of being taken back. A people is not bound to its word, to its deed, to all its will; for all this is from its consciousness and from singularity; rather, absolute government is divine, sanctioned in itself, and not made, but absolutely the universal; every making of it, however, would come from freedom and will.

B. Universal government

Cross-reference: The system of needs, § 189 ff.; on wealth and poverty § 241 ff., on the police § 231 ff.

Absolute government is the resting substance of the universal movement, but universal government is its cause, or the universal insofar as it is opposed to the particular in the form of a particular, but according to its essence is at the same time the universal and, for the sake of its form, determining for the particular.

Now because universal government relates to movement, but this is in individuality, shape, relation, its object and content is a universal condition; for the absolutely abiding is the essence of absolute government; to universal government only something formally universal can belong, a universal accident; a determinacy of the people for this time; for this determinacy must not itself be an abstraction, something which in its reality belongs entirely to particularity and is no affection and particularity of the universal, as e.g. that everyone lives, is clothed etc.; such determinacies are only abstractions as universals, and needs of the singular; but what in them is a universal, a potency, and subsumes the whole under itself and makes it into a

[347] potency, is the object of universal government; it provides for the need which is a universal one, and for it in general.

The movement of the whole is a constant separation of the universal and particular and a subsumption of the latter under the former; this particular, however, is the subsisting separation, and therefore in it the moments of the absolute, or the form, are imprinted as outside and alongside one another, and the movement is just as manifoldly determined.

The particular against which the universal moves, in the potency of difference turned outwards and of hidden identity, determines the movement as directed towards annihilation; for that which is posited absolutely as particular and cannot bring forth identity, thus is not absolute concept, intelligence, can become one with the universal only through annihilation.

But the particular itself as absolute concept, and as organic totality, as a people, is a particular, and herewith both are against one another; insofar as they posit themselves as ideally negated, the side of the negation of the absolute concept, and not ideally as subsisting, they do not recognise one another. The people which finds itself not recognised must produce this being-recognised, through war, or colonies.

But the self-constituting individuality is in the second potency not itself potency which takes its inorganic, the absolute concept which stands over against it, into itself, and makes it really, absolutely one with itself; through war there is only a recognising; an ideal equating; a true, living one.

Since government is a subsuming of the particular under the universal, in this concept the moments of the universality opposed to the particular, and then the subsumption, can be distinguished, and this subsumption is in turn a two-fold one, namely the ideal and the real; the former in which it is the formal universality under which the particular is placed, the latter the

[34.8] true one, with which it is posited as one. These are the moments which have been conceived as the different powers of the state; the positing of the universal as legislative power; ideal subsuming as judicial power in general, justice; real subsuming as executive power. (Kant conceived the real subsumption, or the conclusion of the syllogism, as judicial power; but the ideal subsumption, or the minor premiss, as real subsuming, as executive power.)

Every real or living movement is an identity of these three moments, and in every act of government all three are united; they are abstractions to which no reality of their own can be given, or which cannot be constituted and organised as powers; legislating, judging and executing are something wholly formal, empty, without content. A content makes them real, but through this connection of form and content each would immediately be an identity of the universal and particular, or, as movement, a subsuming of the particular under the universal, and would thus unite all three moments in itself. These abstractions can, however, indeed obtain reality; each for itself can be linked with individuals who limit themselves to it, but then their true reality is in that which unites the three, or, since the conclusion, the executive power, is this union, this is properly always the government, and whether the others are not mere abstractions, empty activities, depends on the executive power, and this is absolutely the government; and after those distinctions have been made and powerless powers constituted, the first task returns again: to recognise not the executive power as such, but it as government.

The movement of the people is government for this reason: because movement as such is something formal, since in it it is not determined in and for itself which of those standing in relation in the movement is the potency and which the particular, and that they have the relation of movement seems contingent; whereas in the movement of the people the universal and particular are absolutely bound to one another, and the absolutely universal as such is absolutely determined, and with it also the particular.

Organic movement must be recognised insofar as intuition subsumes the

[349] concept, and insofar as the concept subsumes intuition. But because what moves is essentially organic, this distinction [is] thoroughly formal; the intuition which subsumes the concept is itself absolute concept; the concept which [subsumes] intuition is itself absolute intuition. The appearance of this form of this opposition is outside the organic itself; it is in reflection on the movement. For the organic itself it is posited thus: insofar as the concept appears as what subsumes, the organic is posited as individual, as a singular being for itself, against other individual peoples as singular beings; insofar as intuition is what subsumes, thus subsuming takes place really, truly, the universal in itself is what determines the particular and annihilates it within itself, to that extent the people, the totality, is directed against its own, inner particular; this particular is its own because here the universal is posited as the in-itself.

This separation is, as said, a formal one; the movement itself is nothing but an alternation of these two subsumptions; from the subsumption under the concept, in which the opposed are singular, indifference raises itself, and ideally intuits the singular, herewith posited outside the organic, as its own, but still itself in the form of particularity; until it also intuits it really as itself, or absolute identity reconstructs itself.

Being subsumed under the concept would be the abstraction of the relation to foreign peoples, as individuals against one another; but the organic process is immediately an ideal subsuming of this difference; or the determinacy immediately becomes the people's own, a difference within itself, and the living movement absolutely sublates it; internal government and government directed outwards can therefore [be] no absolute principle of division; neither is an organic system comprehended in the universal, subordinate, but at the same time being for itself; rather, the moments of absolute intuition, in order to be recognised as organic, must themselves be systems in which those forms of outer and inner are subordinated; those moments, in order to be systems, must have difference wholly from outside, in reflection, but in themselves absolute identity within themselves, not such that this hovered above them as such, but only as form.

[350] The *first* system of movement in the totality is thus this: that absolute identity be wholly hidden in it as feeling.

The *second* is the falling-apart of the universal and particular, and thus in movement a twofold one, *either* that the particular remains what it is, and the universal is thus only formal, – *or* that the universal is absolute and takes the particular completely up into itself; the former, first, is justice and war, the second education, culture, conquest and colonisation.

A.

The system of need has been conceived above formally as the system of universal reciprocal physical dependence on one another; no one is for himself for the totality of his need; his labour, or whatever manner of capacity for the satisfaction of his need, does not secure this satisfaction for him; it is an alien power over which he has no control, on which it depends whether the surplus which he possesses is for him a totality of satisfaction; its value, i.e. that which expresses the relation of the surplus to need, is independent of him, and changeable. This value itself depends on the whole of needs and on the whole of surplus; and this whole is a power that is little cognisable, invisible, incalculable, because in relation to quantity it is a sum of infinitely many singularities, and in relation to quality it is composed of infinitely many qualities. This reciprocal action of the singular upon the whole, which consists of the singular, and of the whole in turn, as ideal, upon the singular, as determining value, is a constantly rising and falling surge; in which singularity, determined by the whole as having a high value, accumulates its mass, and thereby becomes in the whole a surplus, taken up into the whole of need; through this determinacy the indifference of the whole, regarded as a multitude of the remaining qualities, appears as a relation of them,

[351] and this has changed; these remaining ones are necessarily in relation to that superfluous one, and this, which previously stood at a higher value, sinks. Through each singular kind of surplus being indifferentiated in the whole, and through having its place and value assigned to it by this taking-up into the whole, measured against the whole of universal need, it is as little the singular individual who determines the value both of his surplus and of his need, and can keep it independent outside the relation to everything else, as there is anything constant and secure in it.

In this system, therefore, that which governs appears as the unconscious, blind whole of needs and of the kinds of their satisfactions. But the universal must be able to take hold of this unconscious, blind fate and become a government. This whole does not lie beyond the possibility of cognition in the great relations considered in mass; the possibility of cognition, because value, the universal, must be reckoned up wholly atomistically, is capable only of degree in relation to the singular kinds which compose themselves in this way. But from the value of the kind itself it can be recognised how the surplus stands in relation to need, and this relation, or value, has its significance both on the side of whether the producing of such a surplus is the possibility of the totality of needs, whether a man can support himself from it; and also on the side of universality, whether this value of one kind of need is not disproportionate to the totality itself for which it is need. Both must be determined from intuition, from the whole of what a man necessarily needs, and this is to be recognised partly [from] crude nature, according to the different climates, partly [from] cultivated nature, what is on average deemed necessary for existence in a people. It happens of itself through nature that the right equilibrium partly maintains itself amid insignificant fluctuation, partly, when it is more strongly disturbed by external circumstances, restores itself through greater fluctuation. But precisely in the latter case the government must work against nature, which brings forth such a movement of preponderance through empirical contingencies acting more quickly – like barren years, or more slowly – like the rise of the same labour

[352] in other regions, and cheapness, which in others sublates the even relation of the surplus to the whole, – and, since nature has sublated the tranquil middle, must assert this middle and the equilibrium. For the sinking of the value of a kind of surplus, and its incapacity to represent the totality of need, destroys this existence, since a part of the people, in trust in the universal, has tied its existence to this capacity, and betrays its trust. The government is the real whole holding power, which, indifferent towards the parts, is not an abstraction, and is thus indeed indifferent towards the singular kind of surplus to which a part binds its reality, but not towards the existence of this part itself. The abstraction of equilibrium is indeed certain that a kind of surplus which no longer has adequacy to the totality of needs will regain it, thus that it will follow, on the one hand, that only as many will occupy themselves with it as can live from it, that its value will rise, on the other hand, that if there are too few of them for those to whom this surplus is a need, its value will fall; but for reality, and for the government, [partly] the too low value, because it concerns a part whose physical existence has made itself dependent on the whole and is now completely ruined through this whole, partly the too high value, through which all are disturbed in their totality of enjoyment and of the habitual, has an interest which is disregarded by the abstraction of equilibrium, which, in the fluctuation of the latter, remains outside it as the idle indifference of contemplation; but the government has it as the real power-holding and difference-determining one.

But these empirical fluctuations and formal, non-necessary differences, towards which the government, holding power, is indifferent, are contingent, not the necessary drive of difference which goes into the destruction of equilibrium. The organic principle of this potency is singularity, feeling, need, and this is empirically infinite; insofar as it is for itself and is to remain what it is, it posits itself as limitless, and, since its nature is singularity, as empirically infinite. Enjoyment does seem to be something firmly determined and limited, but its infinity is its ideality, and in this it is infinite. As

[353] enjoyment itself it idealises itself into the purest, most refined enjoying; cultivated enjoying, in volatilising the crudeness of need, must seek out or prepare the noblest, and the more different its stimuli become, the greater becomes the labour which they make necessary; for both the difference of the stimuli and their indifference, their concentration, which the reality of nature separates, are to unite together; the indifferent element, which the natural product has as a totality for itself, is to [be] sublated, and merely its difference for enjoyment is to remain.

This ideality of enjoyment then also presents itself as otherness, as foreignness in the external relation of the product, and attaches itself to rarity, and both this foreign kind of satisfaction and the most convenient kind, already appropriated beforehand through the manner of preparation, put the whole earth to expense.

Empirically infinite, the ideality of enjoyment presents itself finally in objectified, inhibited enjoyment, in possession, and in this respect all limit likewise ceases.

Over against this infinity stands the particularity of enjoyment and of possession, and since possible possession, which is the objective side of the potency of enjoyment, and labour have their limit, are a determinate quantum, then with the accumulation of possession in one place, possession must decrease in another place.

This inequality of wealth is necessary in and for itself; every natural inequality is able to express itself as such when the natural turns in this direction, and the drive towards the increase of wealth is nothing other than the necessity of taking the determinate singular, which possession is, up into the infinite. But the trade which is the more universal, more ideal, is the one which as such yields greater gain for itself.

This necessary inequality, which within the estate of acquisition separates itself again into many particular estates of acquisition, and these into estates of differing wealth and enjoyment, brings forth, however, through its quantitative constitution, which relates to degrees and is capable of no determination other than that of degree, a relation of lordship; the singular, immensely rich individual becomes a

[354] power, he sublates the form of thoroughgoing physical dependence, that of being dependent on a universal, not on a particular. Then high wealth, which is likewise bound up with the deepest poverty, – for in the separation labour becomes universal, objective on both sides; – [brings forth], on the one side in ideal universality, on the other in real universality, mechanically, and this purely quantitative, inorganic element of labour, singularised down to the concept, is immediately the highest crudeness. The first character of the estate of acquisition, that it is capable of an organic absolute intuition, and of respect for something divine, albeit posited outside it, falls away; and the bestiality of contempt for all that is high sets in; the wisdomless, purely universal, the mass of wealth, is the in-itself; and the absolute bond of the people, the ethical, has vanished, and the people is dissolved.

The government has to work to the utmost against this inequality, and against its own and the universal destruction; immediately it is able to do this externally by making high gain more difficult, and if it sacrifices a part of this estate to mechanical and factory labour and abandons it to crudeness, it must absolutely preserve the whole in the livingness possible to it. This, however, happens most necessarily, or rather immediately, through the constitution of the estate within itself. The relation of physical dependence is absolute particularisation, and dependence on something thought, abstract; the constitution posits a living dependence, and a relation of individuality to individuality, another, an inner active connection, which is not that of physical dependence. This estate is constituted within itself means: within its limitation it is a living universal; what its universal, its law and right, is, is at the same time as being in the individuals, real in them, through their will and self-activity. This organic existence of this estate makes each singular individual, insofar as there is livingness in him, one with the others; but the estate cannot be in absolute unity; thus it also makes them in part dependent, but ethically, in trust, respect and the like, and this ethical life sublates the elemental, the pure mass, quantity, posits a living relation; and

[355] the rich man is immediately compelled [to diminish] the relation of lordship, and even the suspicion of it, by letting others share⁵⁾ more universally in it, and external inequality diminishes both externally and in that the infinite does not throw itself upon determinacy but exists as living activity, and thus the drive towards infinite wealth is itself rooted out.

5) *Alongside and further down in the margin:* Athenian law, of the defraying of the festivities by the richest man of the quarter.

This constitution belongs more to the nature of the estate itself and its organic essence, not to the government; to the latter belong the external limitations. But this is the particular: the care for the subsistence of the singular estates within this sphere, through resisting the infinite fluctuation in the value of things. But the government, as the universal, itself has universal needs; first, in general, for the first estate, withdrawn from property and acquisition, which is in constant and absolute universal neediness; then for the formally universal estate, namely for that which in the other estates is the organ of government and works merely in the universal; finally for the need of the universal, of the whole people as such, e.g. its dwellings etc., i.e. its temples, streets etc.

The government must acquire these needs for itself; its labour, however, can be none other than that it either immediately takes possession of the ripe fruits without labour, or itself labours and acquires. The latter, since it is contrary to the nature of the universal to be in the particular, as the government here is something formally universal, can only be a possessing and a letting out of this possession; so that immediate acquiring and labouring do not fall to it, but it comes to it in the form of benefit, of result, of the universal. [As concerns] the former, however, the taking possession of the ripe fruits, these ripe fruits are the finished labour, and, as universal, money, or the most universal needs; they are themselves a possession of singular individuals, and the sublation of this possession must have the form of formal universality, or of justice.

[356] The system of imposts, however, immediately falls into the contradiction that it is to [be] absolutely just, that each is to contribute in proportion to the size of his possession; but this possession is nothing immovable, fixed, but in the industry of acquisition something living, infinite, incalculable; if capital is assessed and calculated according to revenues, this is, formally considered, possible, but revenues are something wholly particular, not, like immovable goods, something objective, knowable and cognisable; in this way, therefore, singular possession is not to be burdened according to justice, because as singular possession it does not itself have the form of the objective.

But the objective, immovable goods, is to be assessed, although here too particularity always plays a part, according to the value which they have according to their possibility of producing; but because at the same time possession is present in the form of particularity, as skill, not everything is comprised under the former, and if the products of immovable goods are burdened enormously, the value of the product does not settle into equilibrium, for the quantity, on which the value depends, always remains the same, and in the degree that production decreased, the revenues of the state would also decrease; all the more would it have to be burdened in rising progression, and in this progression the revenue would behave inversely. Skill is therefore at the same time to be taxed, but not according to what it takes in, this is something particular, peculiar to it; but according to what it spends; for what it buys makes the *passage* through the form of universality out of its particularity, or becomes commodity; and on account of the same circumstance, namely that either the quantity remains the same, then this article does not change the value, and this labouring class becomes impoverished; or, what then follows, less is produced, then the revenues become less, and whatever branch the impost throws itself upon, the case is the same; therefore [it] must extend itself to the most manifold possible particularity of it; although through this the same likewise follows, that less is used, this is precisely the external means by which acquiring limits itself, and in the imposts the government has a means of having influence [upon] this limiting, or extending, of singular parts.

B. The second system of government. System of justice

Cross-reference: The administration of justice: § 209 ff.

In the first, the opposition of the universal and particular is formal; value, the universal, and needs, possessions, the particular, do not determine the essence of the thing, but are outside it; the essence remains its relation to a need. But in this system of falling-apart, the ideal determinacy is the essence; the thing related to need, as property, is determined such that, essentially, as this particular possessed thing, it is a universal, that the relation to need, and need is something wholly singular, is a recognised one; the thing is mine, its not-being-annihilated, but rather the relative identity in which I stand with it, or the ideality of being-annihilated, (possession) this objectivity is posited as a subjective one, as being in the intelligences; thereby, as this identity, it is intuition, and not a singular intuition, of this singular individual, but absolute intuition; that relation has objective reality; the I is a universal, made fast, it has being; that relation is determined as a universal one.

The middle, the reality of this relation, is the government; that a relation of possession is not something ideal but at the same time real consists in all I's positing this relation; in the empirical I of relating existing as the whole multitude of I's. This multitude, according to the abstraction of its quantity, is public power, and this public power, as thinking, conscious, is the government, here as *administration of justice*. As administration of justice it is the totality of all rights, but with complete indifference towards the interest of the relation of the thing to the need of this determinate individual; this individual is for it a completely indifferent universal person; in pure justice only the universal, the abstract element of the kind of possession and acquisition, comes into consideration. But justice must itself be something living, and have regard to the person.

Right in the form of consciousness is law, which here relates to

[358] singularity; but this form is indifferent; although it is necessary that right be present in the form of consciousness as law.

Right is directed at singularity and is the abstraction of universality, for singularity is to subsist in it; this singularity is either the living singularity of the individual, or a relative identity of it; or the livingness of the individual itself, as singularity, posited as relative identity.

So also the negation of singularity, which is one through singularity – not through the absolutely universal – is a negation of possession, purely as such; or the negation of a living singularity in the individual; or that of the wholeness of the living individual; the second an act of violence; the third murder.

Absolute government could leave the second and third estate, which in the first is in civil right, to itself in this regard, and let it have its way in its vain striving to take the absolutely posited finite of possession up into the infinite; this endeavour presents itself as completeness of the civil laws; as absolute consciousness about judicial procedure, so that the rule would be perfect in the form of the rule, and the judge would become a pure organ, the absolute abstraction of the present singularity alone, without livingness and intuition of the whole.

This false infinity must be removed through the organic element of the constitution, as that which, as organic, takes the universal absolutely up into the particular.

The organic principle is freedom, that the governing itself be the governed; but since here the government, as universal, remains opposed to the collision of singularity, this identity must first be posited thus: that the same estate, equality of birth, the constitution into a whole in a narrower circle, residence among the same citizenry, constitutes the living being-one. Then, as regards actuality in the singular pronouncing of right, not the abstraction of the law must be the absolute, but a settlement made to the satisfaction and with the conviction and assent of the parties according to equity, i.e. one which has regard to the whole of them as individuals.

[359] This principle of freedom in its mechanical constitution comprehends itself as organisation of the courts of justice, and is an analysis of the dispute, and of its decision.

In the civil administration of justice only determinacy as such is absolutely negated in the dispute, and the living performance, labour, the personal, can become determinacy.

In criminal justice, however, not determinacy but individuality, the indifference of the whole, livingness, personality. That negation in civil right is a merely ideal one; that in criminal right a real one; for the negation which is directed at a totality is for that reason real; I am in possession of the property of another, without robbery or theft, but because I assert it as mine, and in a rightful manner, I recognise the capacity of the other for possession; but force, theft are against this recognising; they are coercive, are directed at the whole; they sublate freedom, and the reality of being-universal, of being-recognised; if crime did not deny recognising, it could just as well leave what it accomplishes to others, to the universal.

Civil justice is therefore directed merely at determinacy; criminal justice must, besides determinacy, also sublate the negation of universality, and the universality posited in its place, opposition against opposition; this sublating is *punishment*, and it is determined precisely according to the determinacy in which universality has been sublated.

I. civil II. criminal III. war; here universality and singularity are one, and the essence is this totality; in I. the essence is universality, in II. singularity, III. identity; the people becomes the criminal who is in II and sacrifices the possession of I.; takes the side of the negative of I. and II.; to the first estate belongs III. –

C. Third system of government

Cross-reference: On education § 174 and § 239, on the police § 231 ff., on colonization § 248.

In this the universal is the absolute, and, purely as such, the determining; – in the first it is the crude, merely quantitative, wisdomless universal; in the second the universality of the concept, the formal, the recognising. For the absolutely universal, therefore, the difference which it sublates in its movement is also a superficial, formal one, and the essence of the different is absolute universality; just as in the first the essence of the different is feeling, need and enjoyment; in the second, to be a singular, formally absolute; the universal, the cause, is determined according to its essence as the particular is.

I. Education. II. Culture, and discipline; the former talents, inventions, science formally, really it is the whole, the absolutely universal, the self-moving within itself of the people, the absolutely cultivating, true absolute reality of science; inventions concern only the singular, as do the singular sciences, and where these, as philosophy, are absolute, they are nevertheless wholly ideal; culture in truth, with annihilation of all semblance, is the self-cultivating and self-discussing and conscious *people*; – the other is police, as discipline in the singular; the great discipline is the universal customs, and order, and the cultivation for war, and the testing of the truthfulness of the singular individual in it.

III. Procreation of children; the becoming objective to itself as this people; that the government, the people, brings forth another people. Colonisation.

Possible forms of a free government. I. Democracy. II. Aristocracy. III. Monarchy; each is capable of being unfree; I. Ochlocracy. II. Oligarchy; III. Despotism; the external mechanical element is the same; the difference is made by the relation of the government to the governed; whether the essence is the same, and the form of opposition only superficial.

[361] Monarchy is the presentation of the absolute reality of ethical life in one individual; aristocracy in several; it differs from the absolute constitution through heredity, still more through possessions; and because it has the form of the absolute constitution, and not its essence, it is the worst. – Democracy is the presentation in all, thus mixing of possession with it, and no separation of the absolute estate. For the absolute constitution the form of aristocracy or monarchy is indifferent; it is also democracy in the estates.

In monarchy a religion must stand beside the monarch; he is the identity of the whole, but in empirical shape; and the more empirical he is, the more barbarous the people, the more power religion has and the more independently it constitutes itself; the more the people becomes one with itself, with nature and ethical life, the more it takes the divine into itself, and loses in this religion which resists it; and then passes through, by way of the reconciliation with the world and with itself, by way of the unimaginativeness of irreligion, and of the understanding.

In aristocracy this is likewise so, but for the sake of its fatherliness, of the universal porridge, there is little imagination and religion.

In democracy absolute religion indeed, but unconsolidated, or rather natural religion, the ethical is bound up with the natural, and the connection of objective nature makes it accessible to the understanding; for the positing of nature as something objective, – Epicurean philosophy; – religion must be purely ethical; so the imagination of absolute religion, so the art which produced a Jupiter, Apollo, Venus; not the Homeric, where Jupiter Juno is the air, Neptune the water; – this separation must be complete; the ethical movement of God absolute, not crimes and weaknesses but absolute crime, death.