b) Insofar as the determinations of the will are the will’s own—its particularization reflected into itself in general—they are content“The asunderness of the world of appearance is totality and is entirely contained in its relation-to-self. The relation of appearance to itself is thus completely determined, having form within itself and, because of this identity, as an essential subsistence. Thus, form is content and, according to its developed determinacy, the law of appearance. Into form as not reflected into self falls the negative of appearance, the unself-subsistent and changeable—it is the indifferent, external form.
Note: Regarding the opposition of form and content, it is essential to maintain that content is not formless, but just as much possesses the form within itself as form is an external to it. There is a doubling of form present: once as reflected into itself, it is the content; another time as not reflected into itself, it is the external existence indifferent to the content. In-itself, the absolute relation of content and form is present here, namely their turning into one another, so that content is nothing but the turning of form into content, and form is nothing but the turning of content into form. This turning is one of the most important determinations. However, this is only posited in the absolute relation.” (§ 133 Enz. 1830 Content and Form) . This content, as content of the will, is its purpose according to the form specified in a)—partly an internal or subjective purpose in representational willing, partly a purpose actualized and carried out through the mediation of activity which translates the subjective into objectivity.
