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2 responses to “34”

1. 

   Hegel (Notes)

   14. November 1822

   Abstr. Hold fast to what is at issue: α) Free will, which wills itself, abstract. β) Outside it, P[articularity].
   § 34. Abstract thought, not yet determined within itself – such a thing also exists – so it is being, not yet in motion, related to an other – thus immediate.
   Free will, which wills itself, infinitely related to itself, negativity – one, singularity –
   Its reality, objectivity, has as yet no content of its own that would be determined out of itself – on the contrary, for itself – reality thus itself immediate –
   α) partly subjective impulse, needs
   β) partly excl[usively] external world
   Objectivity – to determine further that which I will – to take up this negative into the will
   § 34. These moments are [treated] in what follows, § 35 etc.
   Still without determination, without opposition, within itself –
   – This abstract [element] is the determinacy of this standpoint.

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2. 

   Eduard Gans (Additions)

   29. May 1833

   When it is said that the will that is free in and for itself, as it is in its abstract concept, is in the determinacy of immediacy, the following must be understood by this. The completed idea of the will would be the state in which the concept had fully realized itself and in which its existence would be nothing but the development of itself. In the beginning, however, the concept is abstract, that is, all determinations are indeed contained in it, but only contained: they are only in themselves and not yet developed within themselves into a totality. When I say I am free, the I is still this oppositionless being-within-itself, whereas in the moral sphere there is already an opposition, for there I am as a single will, and the good is the universal, although it is within myself. Here, then, the will already has the distinctions of singularity and universality within itself, and is thus determinate. But at the beginning no such distinction is present, for in the first abstract unity there is as yet no progression and no mediation: the will is thus in the form of immediacy, of being. The essential insight to be gained here is now that this first indeterminacy is itself a determinacy. For the indeterminacy consists in the fact that there is as yet no distinction between the will and its content; but this indeterminacy itself, opposed to what is determinate, falls into the determination of being something determinate; it is abstract identity that constitutes determinacy here; the will thereby becomes a single will – the person.

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