§ 1: Determination of the subject matter: The philosophical science of right treats the Idea of right (the unity of the concept and its realization).

§ 2: Scientific method: Right is grasped not through definitions imposed from outside but through the immanent development of the concept (deduction).

§ 3: Positive law: The distinction between philosophical right and law, which derives its validity from historical circumstances, national character, and application.

§ 4: The ground of right: Freedom is the substance of the will; the system of right is the realm of realized freedom.

§ 5: First moment of the will (universality): The capacity of the I to abstract from every content (the negative freedom of emptiness).

§ 6: Second moment of the will (particularization): The transition to determinacy; the will posits for itself a concrete content (finitude).

§ 7: Third moment of the will (individuality): The unity of universality and particularity; the will remains with itself even in its determinacy.

§ 8: Formal determinacy: The will as self-consciousness encounters an external world and translates subjective purposes into objectivity.

§ 9: The content of the will: The will determines itself; its content is a purpose for it (either as representation or as deed).

§ 10: The will in itself: In its mere immediacy the will is only the possibility of freedom (not yet in its truth).

§ 11: The natural will: Here the content appears as drives, desires, and inclinations, which the human being finds immediately present.

§ 12: The resolving will: Only by sublating the indeterminacy of the drives and making a decision does the will become an actual will.

§ 13: The individuality of the individual: Through resolving, the will sets itself apart, as the willing of a determinate individual, from others.

§ 14: The finite will: The I stands reflectively above its content and is capable of choosing among the various drives.

§ 15: Arbitrary will (Willkür): Freedom as mere choice between given contents; it is contingency and the contradiction of freedom.

§ 16: The one-sidedness of choice: Even the particular that is chosen remains something finite; through mere choosing the will does not attain true infinity.

§ 17: The dialectic of the drives: The drives interfere with one another; the will must subordinate or sacrifice them without any fixed standard (arbitrarily).

§ 18: Judgment of nature: The drives are positive (good) as an expression of life, but negative (evil) as a limitation on spiritual freedom.

§ 19: The purification of the drives: The demand to free the drives from their natural determinacy and to organize them rationally.

§ 20: Happiness: Reflection compares the drives and gathers them into a whole of satisfaction (a universal end).

§ 21: The will that is free in and for itself: Freedom becomes its own object; thinking recognizes freedom as the essence of the will.

§ 22: The infinity of the will: The will is truly infinite because its existence is its own inwardness (itself).

§ 23: True freedom: The will relates only to itself and is independent of any external dependency.

§ 24: Concrete universality: The will is the immanent Idea of self-consciousness, which reaches over and beyond its own determinations.

§ 25: Subjectivity: The will determined as pure I, as arbitrary will, or as the one-sided form of an unexecuted purpose.

§ 26: Objectivity: The will determined as a rational system, as immersion in its condition, or as external existence.

§ 27: The Idea of the will: The absolute determination of spirit is that its freedom becomes for it an objective, rational object.

§ 28: The realization of the Idea: The activity of the will dialectically sublates the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity.

§ 29: Definition of right: Every existence that is an existence of the free will is right (freedom as Idea).

§ 30: The sanctity of right: Right is sacred because it is the existence of freedom; more concrete stages of spirit carry a higher right.

§ 31: The dialectic: The scientific method by which the concept organically brings forth its determinations out of itself.

§ 32: Concepts and shapes: The logical moments of the development appear in the world as a series of temporal shapes.

§ 33: Division of the work: The system is divided into: A. Abstract Right, B. Morality, C. Ethical Life (family, civil society, state).

Part One: Abstract Right (§§ 34–104)

Preliminary Concept: Personality (§§ 34–40)

§ 34: The will as individual: The free will here appears in its most immediate form, as abstract I.

§ 35: The person: The subject that knows itself as absolutely infinite and universal; the capacity to be a bearer of rights.

§ 36: The imperative of right: ‘Be a person and respect others as persons.’ (A purely formal command.)

§ 37: The separation of person and particularity: For right, it is initially irrelevant what talents or desires (content) the individual has.

§ 38: The thing: Everything that is not a person is something unfree, impersonal, and thus without rights.

§ 39: The necessity of embodiment: In order to be actual as a free person, the will must give itself an external sphere (a space in the world).

§ 40: Division of abstract right: A. Property, B. Contract, C. Wrong.

I. Property (§§ 41–71)

A. The Concept of Property (§§ 41–53)

§ 41: The will places itself into a thing: possession becomes property through the recognition of the will within it.

§ 42: The thing as the external: Spirit is the inward, the thing is the absolutely external.

§ 43: Spiritual goods as things: talents, branches of knowledge, or inventions can, through externalization, become ‘things’ that one can possess.

§ 44: The right of appropriation: the human being has the absolute right to appropriate every thing; nature has no will of its own against spirit.

§ 45: Possession vs. property: possession is mere physical control (taking hold of something); property is the right to possession.

§ 46: Private property: since the person is a single individual, property too must essentially be private (individual).

§ 47: Immediate possession of the body: the human being is at first immediately conscious of his own body.

§ 48: Taking possession of the body: only through training and labor does spirit truly take possession of its own body.

§ 49: The distribution of property: abstract right demands no equality of possessions, only that everyone be able to possess property.

§ 50: The right of priority: whoever comes first has the right, since he is the first to place his will into the thing.

§ 51: Recognizability: taking possession must be visible to others as an expression of the will.

§ 52: Form and matter: the will takes possession of the form of the thing; for right, matter is merely the bearer of this form.

B. The Modes of Taking Possession (§§ 53–58)

§ 53: Overview: taking possession occurs through direct physical seizure, through forming, or through mere marking.

§ 54: The act of the will: property is not merely a state but an ongoing relation of the will.

§ 55: Physical seizure: the most direct form (holding something), but spatially very limited.

§ 56: Forming: working on a thing (e.g. agriculture or craft); the most spiritual mode of appropriation, since it leaves lasting traces.

§ 57: Disposal over living beings: animals are treated as things; slavery is a wrong, because the human being is in himself no thing.

§ 58: Marking: the most ideal form (a sign, a boundary stone); the will represents itself through a sign, without physically touching the thing.

C. The Use of the Thing (§§ 59–64)

§ 59: The right to use: property without use would be empty; use is the realization of property.

§ 60: Use and substance: through use the thing is altered or consumed.

§ 61: Temporally limited use: one can give up the use without losing ownership of the substance (e.g. rent).

§ 62: Identity of use and property: if one has total use permanently, one is in fact the owner.

§ 63: Value: abstracting from concrete usefulness leads to exchange-value (measurable in money).

§ 64: Prescription (lapse): if the will is no longer present in the thing for a long time (non-use), the right of property lapses.

D. The Relinquishing of Property (§§ 65–70)

§ 65: Freedom to relinquish: I can give a thing away, because it is something external.

§ 66: Inalienable goods: my personality, my life, and my freedom of conscience are myself, and can never be rightfully sold.

§ 67: Alienation of powers: one can rent out one’s labor power for a limited time, but not the whole person (the distinction between labor and slavery).

§ 68: Intellectual property: the particularity of books/inventions; the buyer owns the copy but not the right to reproduce it.

§ 69: Plagiarism: the violation of the author’s right to the spiritual form of his expression.

§ 70: Moral significance: relinquishment shows that spirit stands above matter.

Transition (§ 71):

§ 71: Property leads to the relation of person to person. The existence of my will no longer lies merely in a thing, but in the will of another person. This is the transition to contract.

II. Contract (§§ 72–81)

At this stage, property is no longer merely a one-sided relation to a thing, but is mediated through the will of another.

§ 72: Property, as the existence of the will, no longer exists merely in a thing, but in relation to the will of another person.

§ 73: Possession is mediated through contract; one possesses something because one has come to an agreement with another about it.

§ 74: The essence of contract is the common will. Two persons mutually recognize each other as owners.

§ 75: The limit of contract: it applies only to external things. Here Hegel criticizes the idea of a ‘social contract’ for the state, since the state is not a mere contractual relation.

§ 76: The two sides of contract: the agreement (stipulation) and the performance (realization).

§ 77: The thing in contract: it is regarded as a value, which can be exchanged against another thing or performance.

§ 78: The transfer of property: through contract, property is ideally transferred, even while physical delivery is still outstanding.

§ 79: Contract as formal expression: mere words or a signature make the will objectively valid for others.

§ 80: The division of contracts: here Hegel distinguishes, roughly, between gift, exchange (purchase), and service (loan contract).

§ 81: The transition to wrong: since contract rests on the particular will (arbitrary will), the possibility arises that this will may diverge from universal right.

III. Wrong (§§ 82–104)

Here the opposition between right in itself (the universal) and the particular will of the individual comes to the fore.

§ 82: Definition: wrong is the semblance of right, in which the particular will contradicts universal right.

§ 83: Three kinds of wrong: 1. unpremeditated wrong, 2. fraud, 3. crime.

A. Unpremeditated Wrong (§§ 84–86)

§ 84: A mere legal dispute: both parties want what is right, but are mistaken about to whom the thing belongs.

§ 85: Recognition of right: the conflict remains within the recognition of right as such; a decision is sought through a court.

§ 86: Civil proceedings: here the wrong is only a lack of insight, not an evil intent against right.

B. Fraud (§§ 87–89)

§ 87: The semblance of right: the fraudster uses the form of right (e.g. a contract) to violate right at its core.

§ 88: Deception: the other is made to believe that right is being done to him, while in truth his will is being violated.

§ 89: Transition to coercion: in fraud, right is now merely a pretext; the mask falls in the next step.

C. Coercion and Crime (§§ 90–104)

§ 90: Coercion: the exercise of physical force against the will of a person.

§ 91: Vulnerability: because the person has an external existence (body, property), it can be attacked through coercion.

§ 92: Crime: the total negation of right. The criminal disregards not merely a single rule, but the principle of right as such.

§ 93: The nullity of coercion: coercion is in itself contrary to right; it may be applied only as counter-coercion, to annul a wrong.

§ 94: The legal principle of coercion: the use of force against someone who has himself exercised force is lawful (self-defense).

§ 95: The violation of right: a crime is an injury directed against the freedom of the person.

§ 96: The gravity of the crime: the magnitude of the injury depends on the value of the thing and its significance for personality.

§ 97: Punishment: it is the negation of the negation. Crime is the first negation (of right); punishment annuls this and restores right.

§ 98: Retribution as compensation: in the case of damage to property, punishment can consist in payment of its value.

§ 99: The purpose of punishment: Hegel rejects deterrence or reform as the primary justification; punishment is an act of justice in itself.

§ 100: The criminal’s right: by being punished, the criminal is honored as a rational being, whose own deed reacts back upon him as law.

§ 101: Retaliation (jus talionis): punishment must correspond to the crime in value and quality (an ‘eye for an eye’ in a figurative sense).

§ 102: Objective punishment: punishment may not be private revenge, but must be carried out by an impartial power (a court).

§ 103: The end of revenge: revenge is itself a new wrong; only punishment by the state ends the cycle of violence.

§ 104: Transition to morality: through punishment, right is no longer merely external (a thing), but present within the will itself. The will becomes subjective knowledge of right.

Part Two: Morality (§§ 105–141)

Preliminary Concept: The Moral Standpoint (§§ 105–114)

§ 105: The will as subject: it is no longer merely immediate (as the person), but reflected into itself.

§ 106: Subjectivity as the side of the concept’s existence; the will is for itself.

§ 107: The subjective will as the ground of actions; only what lies in the will counts as one’s own.

§ 108: The action: the expression of the moral will in the external world.

§ 109: The opposition of subjectivity and objectivity: acting is the attempt to sublate this opposition.

§ 110: The right of the subjective will: it recognizes only what it knows as its own (as rational).

§ 111: The goal of morality: that the will should have its own concept (freedom) as its content.

§ 112: The externality of action: as soon as the will acts, it enters the sphere of contingency and the laws of nature.

§ 113: The deed as a change in the world: the will is responsible for the changes it has brought about.

§ 114: Division of morality: 1. Purpose and Responsibility, 2. Intention and Welfare, 3. The Good and Conscience.

I. Purpose and Responsibility (§§ 115–118)

This concerns what a subject can be held accountable for at all.

§ 115: The finitude of acting: the will finds material at hand upon which it acts.

§ 116: Responsibility (imputation): the subject is responsible for a deed insofar as it was his purpose.

§ 117: The right of knowledge: the subject acknowledges as his action only those moments of the deed that he knew in his purpose.

§ 118: The consequences of the deed: the subject bears responsibility for the necessary consequences, but not for external, contingent interferences.

II. Intention and Welfare (§§ 119–128)

Here the action is judged according to its purpose and its value for the subject.

§ 119: From deed to intention: the action is considered as a universal principle (what do I actually want to achieve by it?).

§ 120: The right of intention: the action should make sense for the subject and fulfill his purpose.

§ 121: The particularity of the action: in the action, the subject seeks its own satisfaction.

§ 122: Means and end: the will uses things and circumstances as means for its intention.

§ 123: Subjective interest: every deed requires a driving force within the subject (interest).

§ 124: The right of subjectivity: it is a right of the human being that he find his honor and his happiness in his own doing.

§ 125: Welfare: the sum of the subject’s particular ends; the striving for happiness.

§ 126: Collision of right and welfare: welfare may not violate abstract right (property), but it has its own validity.

§ 127: The right of necessity: in extreme danger to life, abstract right recedes (stealing a loaf of bread to save one’s life is not an ordinary crime).

§ 128: Transition to the good: when welfare is no longer merely my private welfare but a universal one, it becomes the good.

III. The Good and Conscience (§§ 129–141)

This is the high point of morality, but also the point at which it turns over into its opposite.

§ 129: The good: the unity of abstract right and welfare; realized freedom as the absolute final end of the world.

§ 130: Duty: the will ought to do the good. It is the necessity of acting in accordance with the concept.

§ 131: The subject’s right to insight: I am obligated to do only what I recognize as rational and good.

§ 132: Conscience: the innermost conviction of the subject as to what is right and duty.

§ 133: Formal certainty: conscience tells me ‘do what is right,’ but it does not yet say concretely what is right.

§ 134: The fulfillment of duty: the subject must find a concrete content, so as not to remain stuck in the abstract.

§ 135: Critique of Kant: Hegel criticizes the ‘categorical imperative’ because it remains empty (formal identity without concrete content).

§ 136: True conscience: the agreement of subjective disposition with the objective good.

§ 137: The right of conscience: it is the highest stage of moral freedom, to act according to one’s own knowledge.

§ 138: The danger of subjectivity: conscience can turn against objective right and make itself the standard.

§ 139: Evil: the arbitrary will that raises itself above the universal; the conscious decision against what is rational.

§ 140: The forms of moral aberration: here Hegel analyzes hypocrisy, probabilism, the ‘good intention’ as an excuse, and irony.

§ 141: Transition to ethical life: since conscience alone cannot guarantee the content of the good, it must embody itself in stable, objective institutions (family, state).

Part Three: Ethical Life (§§ 142–360)

Preliminary Concept: Ethical Life (§§ 142–157)

Here Hegel explains how the subjective and the objective work together in a living unity.

§ 142: Ethical life is the Idea of freedom; it is the living good will that has its existence in the world of institutions.

§ 143: It is the unity of the subjective will and the concept of right.

§ 144: Ethical substance is the system of laws and institutions that carry absolute authority for the individual.

§ 145: These laws are not alien, but the individual’s own essence of spirit (they are ‘spirit of its spirit’).

§ 146: The recognition of the ethical powers: the individual recognizes in them its own substance.

§ 147: The individual’s relation to substance is a relation of trust.

§ 148: Duty: in ethical life, duty loses its character of compulsion, since it is the individual’s own essence.

§ 149: Duty frees the human being from dependence on mere drives and subjective arbitrariness.

§ 150: Virtue: ethical life as it shows itself in the character of an individual as firm conduct.

§ 151: Ethical life as second nature: through habit, rational acting becomes the nature of the human being.

§ 152: Objective ethical life takes the place of mere moral conscience.

§ 153: The individual finds his right and his freedom in being a member of an ethical whole.

§ 154: Trust as the subjective disposition within ethical life.

§ 155: The ethical is the universal; it pervades all the actions of the individual.

§ 156: Ethical substance as the true, real spirit of a people.

§ 157: Division of ethical life:

The family (immediate ethical life),

civil society (the stage of separation/particularity),

the state (concrete universality).

I. The Family (§§ 158–181)

The family is ‘natural ethical life.’ Its principle is love.

A. Marriage (§§ 161–169)

§ 158: Love as spirit: within the family, one is no longer a separate person for oneself, but part of a whole.

§ 159: The family as a single person: the members surrender their individual personality within the unity.

§ 160: Moments of the family: marriage, the family’s resources, and the upbringing of children.

§ 161: Marriage: it is ethical love. It begins as a contract, but through love it sublates the contractual character (the merely legal aspect).

§ 162: The transition to marriage: it should not rest on mere drive, but on a free, conscious consent to the bond.

§ 163: The conclusion of marriage: the act of consent makes marriage into an ethical relationship.

§ 164: The solemn ceremony: recognition of the marriage by the community/the state is what first makes it an objective right.

§ 165: Monogamy: since marriage requires the total surrender of the person, it can exist only between two persons.

§ 166: The difference of the sexes: the man has his essence more in the state and in work, the woman in the family and piety.

§ 167: Indissolubility: in the Idea, marriage is indissoluble, since it rests on an absolute ethical bond.

§ 168: Prohibitions on marriage: marriage may not be contracted within the circle of blood relations (the prohibition of incest), since here love is already ‘naturally’ present rather than first grounded ethically.

§ 169: The end of marriage as mere feeling: the goal is the transformation of love into a stable, lasting institution.

B. The Family’s Resources (§§ 170–172)

§ 170: Resources: the family needs a common external existence (possessions).

§ 171: The head of the family: the husband represents the family’s resources externally, but they belong to the family as a whole.

§ 172: Acquisition and care: labor serves to maintain this common ethical ground.

C. The Upbringing of Children and the Dissolution of the Family (§§ 173–181)

§ 173: Children: in them the unity of the parents becomes objective and perceptible. They are ‘flesh of flesh.’

§ 174: The right of upbringing: children have a right to an upbringing; they are not things belonging to the parents, but persons free in themselves.

§ 175: The aim of upbringing: to lead children to independence and to ethical freedom, so that they can found families of their own.

§ 176: The dissolution of marriage: as a matter of fact, marriage can end through divorce, when the ethical bond (love) has been irreparably destroyed.

§ 177: Death and inheritance: with the death of the parents, the family as an immediate unity dissolves.

§ 178: The right of inheritance: the family’s resources remain within the family and pass to the children.

§ 179: The will (testament): Hegel takes a critical view of the right to arbitrary testaments; the children’s right of inheritance is more substantial than the parents’ arbitrary will.

§ 180: Coming of age: children step out of the family as new, independent persons.

§ 181: Transition to civil society: when many families, as independent units, confront one another, the ‘system of needs’ arises.

II. Civil Society (§§ 182–256)

For Hegel, this section is the stage of difference. Whereas the family is an immediate unity, in civil society individuals emerge as independent, self-interested persons. It is the ‘system of needs,’ in which each is for himself, yet remains unconsciously bound to all others through labor and the market.

Preliminary Concept (§§ 182–188)

§ 182: The concrete person: the individual as a whole of needs and arbitrary will, for whom his own particular end is the highest thing (egoism).

§ 183: Particularity and universality: I can achieve my own end only by relating myself to others; in this way a universal, all-round dependence arises.

§ 184: Civil society as the realm of division: here spirit steps outside its unity; luxury and misery exist side by side.

§ 185: The contradiction of civil society: the satisfaction of needs is boundless and tends toward the destruction of ethical life.

§ 186: Formal education (Bildung): in order for needs to be satisfied, the human being must learn to conduct himself in a universal manner (the formation of the understanding).

§ 187: The individual as ‘son of civil society’: he is no longer merely a member of a family, but stands within a worldwide network of labor.

§ 188: Division:

A. The System of Needs * B. The Administration of Justice * C. The Police and the Corporation

A. The System of Needs (§§ 189–208)

a) The Kind of Need and Satisfaction (§§ 190–195)

§ 189: The satisfaction of the particular through the mediation of the universal.

§ 190: Animal versus human needs: the human being multiplies his needs and refines them (culture).

§ 191: The social component: needs arise through comparison with others.

§ 192: Convenience: technology and labor make satisfaction ever easier and more refined.

§ 193: Social ambition: the craving for recognition through consumption.

§ 194: Liberation through consumption: the human being makes himself independent of mere nature by subjugating it.

§ 195: The opposition of wealth and poverty as a necessary result of the logic of the market.

b) The Kind of Labor (§§ 196–198)

§ 196: Labor: the mediation between need and thing; the human being gives matter a human form.

§ 197: The division of labor: through specialization, labor becomes simpler, more abstract, and more productive.

§ 198: The machine: once labor becomes entirely mechanical, the human being can delegate it to machines.

c) Resources and the Estates (§§ 199–208)

§ 199: Universal resources: the labor of all forms a common pool from which everyone draws.

§ 200: Inequality: since talents and industriousness differ, inequality of resources is unavoidable.

§ 201: The estates (classes): the division of society according to the kind of labor performed.

§ 202: The three estates:

The substantial estate (farmers).

The estate of trade and industry (craftsmen, merchants).

The universal estate (civil servants).

§ 203: The substantial estate: its life is shaped by nature, by the land, and by family love.

§ 204: The estate of trade and industry: it rests on reflection, education, and the exchange of goods.

§ 205: The universal estate: its purpose is the welfare of the universal, and for this it is maintained by the state.

§ 206: Choice of estate: the individual’s right to choose his own estate (as opposed to a caste system).

§ 207: The honor of one’s estate: an individual’s sense of self-worth depends on being a recognized member of an estate.

§ 208: Transition to the administration of justice: right must now hold as law, equally for all.

B. The Administration of Justice (§§ 209–229)

In civil society, abstract right becomes concrete law.

§ 209: Recognition of right: in civil society, the human being is recognized as a ‘human being,’ independent of his estate.

§ 210: Right must be known objectively.

§ 211: Law: right must be fixed in writing so that it is recognizable to everyone (codification).

§ 212: Legal validity: in civil society, only the law is binding.

§ 213: Positive law: the application of rational right to the contingent details of actuality.

§ 214: The determinacy of the law: it must lay down clear measures and penalties.

§ 215: Promulgation: a law is just only if it is public and comprehensible.

§ 216: Legal certainty: trust that the law will remain stable.

§ 217: The judge: the personification of the law, who subsumes the particular under the universal.

§ 218: The gravity of an offense: in a stable society, a crime is punished more mildly than in an unstable one.

§ 219: The court: the public institution for the enforcement of right.

§ 220: Justice as a service that society renders to the individual.

§ 221: Civil proceedings: the formal clarification of legal claims.

§ 222: The burden of proof: the rational ascertainment of the truth in a trial.

§ 223: Transparency: the trial must proceed according to fixed rules.

§ 224: Publicity: judicial proceedings must be public, so that citizens have trust in justice.

§ 225: The separation of the facts of the case from the question of law.

§ 226: The jury: the citizen’s right to be judged on the facts by his equals.

§ 227: The judge’s conviction must rest on objective grounds.

§ 228: Equality before the law.

§ 229: Transition to the police: right protects only what already exists; the police must take on responsibility for the provident protection of welfare.

C. The Police and the Corporation (§§ 230–256)

Civil society must protect itself against contingency and poverty.

§ 230: The transition to the police: whereas in the administration of justice, right becomes active only once it has been violated (reactively), there now arises the necessity of protecting the right and welfare of individuals in a provident, preventive way. The right to security and subsistence becomes a general concern of society.

a) The Police (§§ 231–249) Note: for Hegel, ‘police’ means the entire public administration and provision of public welfare.

§ 231: External order: the protection of property and security.

§ 232: Oversight of public security.

§ 233: Market regulation: the police ensure that trade and commerce function smoothly.

§ 234: Provision against fraud: the control of weights, measures, and the quality of goods.

§ 235: Public infrastructure: roads, bridges, lighting.

§ 236: Public health: provision against disease and epidemics.

§ 237: Market instability: the police must intervene when the market shows excessive fluctuations.

§ 238: Education: society takes on the task of educating individuals when the family fails.

§ 239: Protecting the individual from his own arbitrary will.

§ 240: General oversight of the family.

§ 241: Poor relief: society is obligated to provide for the poor.

§ 242: The limits of private charity: assistance must be carried out through public institutions, in order to be legally secure.

§ 243: The production of the rabble: civil society necessarily produces a class of people who have needs but cannot find work.

§ 244: The danger of the rabble: when poverty leads to indignation against society, it becomes dangerous.

§ 245: The insolubility of the problem of poverty: Hegel recognizes that civil society cannot resolve the problem of poverty out of itself.

§ 246: Colonization: society must expand outward in order to find new markets.

§ 247: The sea as a trade route: the sea connects peoples and furthers the world spirit.

§ 248: The founding of colonies as an outlet for the surplus of people and goods.

§ 249: The police as the connecting link between private, civic advantage and the universal interest.

b) The Corporation (§§ 250–256)

§ 250: The corporation (professional association): the estate of trade and industry organizes itself into corporations.

§ 251: Professional identity: the individual finds his social home within the corporation.

§ 252: The corporation as a ‘second family’: it provides protection and solidarity in the case of illness or unemployment.

§ 253: The honor and dignity of one’s estate: through the corporation, the individual’s labor is socially recognized.

§ 254: Oversight of qualifications: the corporation guarantees the quality of the work.

§ 255: A preliminary stage of the state: within the corporation, the citizen learns to act, beyond his own self-interest, for a common goal.

§ 256: Transition to the state: civil society finds its conscious unity in the state.

III. The State (§§ 257–360)

Preliminary Concept: The Essence of the State (§§ 257–259)

§ 257: The state as the actuality of the ethical Idea; the spirit that unfolds itself in the world as will and knowledge.

§ 258: The state as rational in and for itself: it is not a means to an end, but the absolute end in itself. It is the union of the universal end and individual interest.

§ 259: The Idea of the state has:

a) Immediate actuality (internal constitutional law).

b) Its relation to other states (external constitutional law).

c) The stage of the world spirit (world history).

A. Internal Constitutional Law (§§ 260–329)

1. The Internal Constitution as Such (§§ 260–271) Here Hegel describes the organic interplay between citizens and the state.

§ 260: The principle of the modern state: the unity of subjective freedom and the objective order of the state.

§ 261: The unity of duty and right: what is a duty for the state is a right for the citizen (and vice versa).

§ 262: Mediation through family and civil society: the state needs these spheres as its foundation.

§ 263: The transformation of interest: private welfare becomes, within the state, a universal end.

§ 264: The knowledge of the substantial: citizens know themselves, within the state, to be in their own essence.

§ 265: Institutions as pillars of freedom: they guarantee that the state is not arbitrary.

§ 266: Spirit as knowledge: the state is a conscious structure, not a blind fate.

§ 267: Patriotism (political disposition): the citizen’s trust in the state as his own foundation.

§ 268: Political consciousness: the habit of regarding the commonwealth as the basis of one’s life.

§ 269: The organization of the state: spirit organically articulates itself into different powers.

§ 270: State and religion: religion provides inner depth, but the state is the external, legal actuality. The state protects freedom of religion, but must not allow itself to be ruled by religious arbitrariness.

§ 271: The constitution as the organization of the powers of the state.

2. The Division of Powers (§§ 272–297) Hegel rejects a rigid separation of powers (checks and balances) and calls instead for an organic articulation.

§ 272: The differentiation of the powers: they are not separate, but parts of a living whole.

a) The power of the crown.

b) The power of government.

c) The legislative power.

§ 274: The sovereignty of the state: the power of the state to decide on and over itself.

a) The Power of the Crown (§§ 275–286) The prince (monarch) is the ‘point,’ the final ‘I’ that makes the decision.

§ 275: The monarch: he represents the unity of the state.

§ 276: The ideality of the members of the state: in the prince, the multiplicity of the state finds its apex.

§ 277: Office and person: in the modern state, an office is not bound to the private person, except in the case of the monarch.

§ 278: Sovereignty internally: the subordination of all particular rights to the welfare of the state.

§ 279: The subjective ‘I will’: the monarch places the final point beneath the laws and deliberations.

§ 280: Hereditary monarchy: so that the choice of head of state is not subject to arbitrary will or party strife, it must be fixed naturally (through birth).

§ 281: The inviolability of the monarch: he is the neutral point above the day-to-day political business.

§ 282: The right of pardon: the monarch can mitigate the law and let mercy prevail over right.

§ 283: The appointment of ministers: the prince chooses his advisors.

§ 284: The responsibility of the ministers: it is not the monarch who is politically responsible, but the executive government.

§ 285: The government as the executive organ.

§ 286: The securing of the constitution through loyalty to the monarch.

b) The Power of Government (§§ 287–297) This concerns administration and the civil service.

§ 287: The executive: the application of the law to the particular case.

§ 288: The tasks of the police and the corporations within the state.

§ 289: The civil servants: they form the core of the ‘universal estate.’

§ 290: The division of administrative business: specialized ministries and authorities.

§ 291: Access to the civil service: every citizen can become a civil servant (the principle of merit).

§ 292: The filling of posts: examination and qualification rather than arbitrary appointment.

§ 293: Remuneration: civil servants must be economically independent in order to remain impartial.

§ 294: The service relationship as an ethical bond, not a mere contract.

§ 295: Control of administration: protecting citizens from arbitrariness through a hierarchy of appeal.

§ 296: The ethics of the civil service: objectivity, a sense of duty, and education.

§ 297: Government as the connecting link between prince and people.

c) The Legislative Power (§§ 298–320)

The legislative power is the power to determine the laws as such and to regulate the internal affairs of the state that concern everyone.

§ 298: Definition: the legislative power concerns the laws as such, and those internal affairs which, in their content, are wholly universal.

§ 299: The content of legislation: on the one hand it determines what the state demands from citizens (services/contributions), and on the other, the rights of citizens vis-à-vis the state.

§ 300: The cooperation of the powers: legislation is not an isolated power; the monarch has the final decision, and the power of government contributes its expert knowledge.

§ 301: The estates element: the participation of private persons in legislation takes place through deputies of the estates. Hegel emphasizes that the people should not act as an ‘unorganized mass.’

§ 302: The purpose of the estates: they serve as mediators between the government and the people, dissolved into its particular circles.

§ 303: Organic articulation: the estates rest on the articulation of civil society (the circles of the corporations and professions).

§ 304: The bicameral division of the Assembly of Estates: to avoid one-sidedness, the assembly is divided into two chambers.

The Two Chambers of the Estates (§§ 305–313)

§ 305: The substantial estate (nobility/landowners): it forms the first chamber. Its position rests on landed property and, through primogeniture (hereditary succession), is independent of the state treasury and market fluctuations.

§ 306: The political role of the nobility: it is the born mediator between throne and people, since it possesses a natural firmness.

§ 307: Independence: this estate needs no election; it is called to participation in state power through its social position.

§ 308: The estate of trade and industry: it sends deputies to the second chamber. These are elected from the corporations and communities.

§ 309: Deputation rather than direct election: it is not every single individual who votes directly (which would lead to atomization), but the organized communities that send representatives.

§ 310: The qualification of deputies: they must possess expert knowledge and a disposition that keeps the universal welfare in view.

§ 311: The representation of interests: deputies represent the particular interests of their own spheres of life (trade, craft, etc.), which they know best.

§ 312: Deliberation: in the assembly, particular interests are raised to universal insight.

§ 313: The publicity of debates: sessions must be public, so that the people learn how affairs of state are handled.

Public Opinion (§§ 314–320)

§ 314: Political education: through the Assembly of Estates, the public is instructed about the purposes of the state.

§ 315: Public opinion: it is the way in which the people think and pass judgment about universal affairs.

§ 316: The essence of public opinion: it contains both the eternal, substantial truths of reason and an infinite amount of prejudice, unreason, and contingency.

§ 317: The paradox of public opinion: ‘It deserves to be as much respected as despised.’ One respects the kernel of truth within it, but despises its superficial form.

§ 318: The true statesman: he is the one who listens to public opinion, but does what it, at its core, actually wants, without following its fickle moods.

§ 319: Freedom of the press: Hegel supports it, but also emphasizes legal responsibility for defamation and incitement against the state.

§ 320: Subjectivity and the state: subjective freedom finds its expression in public opinion, but must measure itself against the objective rationality of the state.

3. Sovereignty Abroad (§§ 321–329)

The state is an individuality, and as such it confronts other states.

§ 321: The state as real individuality: it is an exclusive one, which delimits itself against others.

§ 322: Sovereignty: it shows itself in the fact that the state is externally independent and asserts its own identity.

§ 323: The relation to other states: it is marked by recognition, but also by potential hostility.

§ 324: War: Hegel regards it as a moment that preserves the ‘ethical health’ of peoples, by preventing ossification in purely private prosperity (functional equivalents are possible at more developed stages).

§ 325: Sacrifice for the whole: in war, the nullity of finite goods (life and property) is demonstrated in the face of the infinity of the state.

§ 326: State power in war: in times of emergency, all power concentrates in the monarch as the point of decision that saves the situation.

§ 327: Valor: the disposition to stake one’s own life for the freedom of the state.

§ 328: Formal versus substantial valor: it is not a matter of mere love of adventure, but of service to a rational cause.

§ 329: Command: the power of the crown decides on war and peace and leads the military.

B. External Constitutional Law (International Law) (§§ 330–340)

This concerns the ‘treaties’ between sovereign powers.

§ 330: International law rests on the relation of independent states to one another.

§ 331: Recognition: a state is such only when it is recognized as sovereign by others.

§ 332: The treaty between states: the means of exchange between states.

§ 333: The problem of international law: since there is no ‘super-state’ (no world praetor), international law rests only on the will of states. Pacta sunt servanda holds, but only so long as it serves the welfare of the state.

§ 334: Dispute and war: when wills collide and no treaty helps, war is the sole means of decision.

§ 335: The ground for war: an injury to honor or right suffices as a ground for war.

§ 336: The highest law: the welfare of the state is the supreme criterion in foreign policy.

§ 337: Diplomacy: states interact through envoys and recognize one another as legal subjects even in conflict.

§ 338: Jus in bello (the law of war): war, as a moment of reason, must be conducted in such a way that a later peace remains possible (sparing civilians and private property).

§ 339: Prisoners and private persons: war is waged between states (the military), not against individuals.

§ 340: The transition to history: since states have no judge over them, their verdict is world history.

C. World History (§§ 341–360)

Hegel regards history as progress in the consciousness and the realization of freedom.

§ 341: World history is the world’s court of judgment: the world spirit decides on the right of peoples.

§ 342: The world spirit stands above the right of individual states; it uses them as its instruments.

§ 343: Spirit as the actual: history is the unfolding of spirit toward self-knowledge.

§ 344: Peoples as organs: each people has an era in which it represents the world spirit.

§ 345: Dominant peoples: at any one time, only a single people can be the world-historically leading one.

§ 346: The stages of development: history proceeds according to a necessary rationality.

§ 347: The world-historical people: it has the right to carry forward the principles of freedom.

§ 348: Spirit works ‘behind the backs’ of the actors (the cunning of reason).

§ 349: The right of the world spirit is the absolutely highest right.

§ 350: Civilization versus barbarism: peoples with a higher ethical organization have a right against unorganized peoples.

§ 351: The task of the state in history: to bring spirit into an objective shape.

§ 352: The four realms of world history:

§ 353: Criterion of the realms: how much freedom has been realized?

§ 354: 1. The Oriental realm: substantial unity. Only one is free (the ruler).

§ 355: 2. The Greek realm: beautiful freedom. Some are free (citizens, but slavery remains).

§ 356: 3. The Roman realm: abstract right. The person is legally recognized, but under an abstract imperial will.

§ 357: 4. The Germanic realm: the Christian-European world. Spirit recognizes that all human beings are free in themselves.

§ 358: Reconciliation: the ‘Germanic principle’ leads to the reconciliation of state and church, inwardness and world.

§ 359: The state as the image of reason: here spirit finds its abiding existence.

§ 360: The goal: in the philosophy of right, spirit returns to itself and comprehends its freedom as absolute truth.