The will, α) insofar as it has itself for its own determination and is thus in conformity with its concept and truthful, is the will that is unqualifiedly objective; β) but the objective will, taken as without the infinite form of self-consciousness, is the will submerged in its object or condition, whatever that condition may be in its content – the childlike will, the ethical will, as well as the slavish, the superstitious, and so forth; γ) objectivity, finally, is the one-sided form opposed to the subjective determination of the will, and hence is the immediacy of determinate being as external existence; in this sense the will becomes objective only through the execution of its ends.
These logical determinations of subjectivity and objectivity have been set out here in particular with the intention of remarking expressly, with regard to them, since they will often be used in what follows, that it fares with them as with other differing and opposed determinations of reflection: on account of their finitude, and hence their dialectical nature, they pass over into their opposite.1 With other such determinations of opposition, however, their meaning remains fixed for representation and the understanding, since their identity is still only something inward. |33| In the will, by contrast, such oppositions – which are supposed to be abstract determinations, and at the same time determinations of the will, which can be known only as the concrete – of themselves lead to this identity of theirs and to a confusion of their meanings, a confusion which the understanding encounters only unconsciously. – Thus the will, as freedom existing in itself, is subjectivity itself; this is accordingly its concept, and hence also its objectivity; but finitude is its subjectivity as opposed to objectivity; yet it is precisely in this opposition that the will is not with itself, but entangled with the object, and its finitude likewise consists just as much in its not being subjective, and so forth. – What, therefore, the subjective or the objective aspect of the will is to mean in what follows must in each case be made clear from the context, which contains their position in relation to the totality.
- Hegel gives no reference. Subjectivity and objectivity are determinations of reflection: they have their sense only in opposition to one another and therefore exchange it as soon as either is held fast on its own (Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed. § 115 ff.). – See The Grammar of Logical Concepts: reflection and transition. ↩︎

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